1. )G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974 ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C.

CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent. Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit. According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3 As noted at the outset, the petition must fail. 1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for
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postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6 2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8 So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12 The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident. 3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in
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these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16 Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner. LEDESMA VS CLIMACO DIGEST

Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge.

On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte.

The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants.

On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as
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on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.

On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar.

Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time.

Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

In People v. Holgado: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

The present Constitution provides not only that the accused shall enjoy the rig ht to be heard by himself and counsel but further provides that Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. This made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused.

Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

2.) [A.C. No. 5161. April 14, 2004]

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra TingDumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics. The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit: a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

b)

c)

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam. 2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina. 3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings. 4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee. In his Comment,[2] the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law. Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith. The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.
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Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages; and a criminal case for Estafa an d Falsification of Public Documents. In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondents wife herself; ( 3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses. On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.[3] On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.[4] In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333[5] of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years. We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus: LAWYER'S OATH I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD. This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. [6] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
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Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. ... CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. ... CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed. The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings.[7] There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines.[8] Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam. It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted [9] regarding the falsification of complainants signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement[10] dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that document. [11] Such act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that the com plainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document. [12] Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented[13] such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife.[14] He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other coheirs.[15]Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.[16] Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.[17] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
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profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[18] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[19] He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. [20] He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct. [21] Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.[22] Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads: ATTY. TORRES: Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?

WITNESS: A Q A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I. Do you have other brothers and sisters? None, sir.[23]

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony [24] in court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case.[25] Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.[26] Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to b e misled by any artifice.[27] This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605. The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.[28] It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title [29] and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost. Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month.[30] Respondents information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter.[31] Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent. Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
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Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor . -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.[33] Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[34] Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. A. 2 ISIDRA TING-DUMALI VS TORRES DIGEST

The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died intestate and they left several properties including two parcels of land Lot 1586 and Lot 1603 both in Malabon. Isidra has 5 other siblings. In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima Ting-Torres and Miriam Ting-Saria, executed two Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement. They were assisted by Felicisimas husband, Atty. Rolando Torres who was also the administrator of the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1586, they made it appear that Felicisima and Miriam were the only heirs of the Tings. Atty. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1603, the signature of Isidra was forged to make it appear that she was a party to the Deed. Torres then presented the Deeds to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite for the purpose of transferring the titles into the name of Miriam and Felicisima. Thereafter, Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation. Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this disbarment case
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against Atty. Torres. Torres, in his defense, averred that he acted in good faith in allowing his wife and Miriam to execute the Deeds; that he thought that the Deeds were agreed to by the other siblings pursuant to a toka or verbal will left by Isidras mother and as implemented by their eldest brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of the other heirs was merely an oversight. Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no such toka. ISSUE: Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of the other heirs from the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement despite his knowledge of their presence. HELD: Yes. He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has committed falsehood. By letting his wife and Miriam declare in a public document that they are the only heirs to the estate when in fact there are other compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds to the Registry of Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to advise that the two were doing acts contrary to law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to the subsequent transactions involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts facilitated a wrong against the other heirs.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC

of

the

Philippines COURT

3.) A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM: This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal
11

of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him. On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74). Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution. In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him. In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of
12

Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994. II We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant. It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. SO ORDERED.

4.) SECOND DIVISION EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Adm. Case No. 6589 Complainant, Present:
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PUNO, J., - versus Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR., Respondent. Promulgated: December 19, 2005

DECISION TINGA, J.:

In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997, Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to attain his ends.
[1]

According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique. [2] The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein. [3] Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court.[4] On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine.[5] Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each. [6] In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment. [7] Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainant s evidence was conducted.[8] While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. [9] In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were not wi thin the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving
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aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus, according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[11] Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his change of address.[12] Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one month.[13] As explained in the Report: A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month.[14]

On 30 July 2004, the IBP Recommendation, to wit: RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376 CBD Case No. 510 Epifania Q. Bantolo vs. Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon

passed a resolution adopting the Report and

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.

The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. [15] Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission
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of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts. A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts[16] and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him.[17] Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents reco rd as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

5.) [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.:
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The Case Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Agu irre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan). On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him. In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading. On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
17

signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta. On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBCs Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OB C believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar. On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC. The Courts Ruling We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
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REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions . (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3] The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5] The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7] True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be perfo rmed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9] On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
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Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law. WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC AGUIRRE DIGEST Aguirre v Rana Facts: Rana passed the 2000 bar examinations. The following year, one day before the oath taking, Aguirre filed a petition for denial of admission to the bar against Rana, charging Rama with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation. Rama was alleged to have appeared as counsel for a certain Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of canvassers in Masbate , and filed a pleading as counsel. His clients were running for Mayor and Vice-Mayor. He was still allowed to take his oath as a member of the bar but ruled that he could not sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the charge. Incidentally he is also a government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon Masbate): By law, he is not allowed to act as counsel in any court/admin body because of his government position Issue: W/n he is allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body? Held: Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Rana had been appearing in proceedings even before he took his oath. This misconduct casts serious doubt on his moral fitness as a member of the bar. Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces preparation of pleadings and papers incident to actions and other proceedings, the management of such actions on behalf of clients before judges and courts. Giving advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law . Basically activity in and out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. Although he passed the bar examinations it is the signing in the roll of attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. In fine, he engaged in the practice of law by filing pleadings and signing as counsel and giving advice to his clients thereby creating a atty-client relationship even before signing the roll of attorneys. He shouldve waited a little longer. (Rule 9 violated; Unauthorized practice of law)
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He is DENIED ADMISSION to the Bar

6.) [A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004]

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[1] to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[2] In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851. Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community. On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint. Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment. Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983. Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her. Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary, [6] to support the allegations in herAffidavit-Complaint. From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married[7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At
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that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother. Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper. Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses. Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour[13] to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.[14] In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to crossexamine complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings [15] onAugust 1, 2002. Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence. [16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003. In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite[18] filed against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit. On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

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The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[24] In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.[27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[28] Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[29] In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.[33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. [34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

7.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989 LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5 February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections to complainant after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the same. In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals. We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their respective evidence. After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the following Findings and Recommendation: Findings: The issue to be resolved is whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting for the funds collected by him for his former client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional conduct respondent should be disciplined. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report promptly the money of
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client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent viz: Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported promptly, and except with the client's know and consent should not be commingled with his private or be used by him. And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust: ... But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen. In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed that the relation of attorney and client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in question took place. The records disclose that on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding months thereafter. When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter on February 4, 1980, demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8, record). On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her a receipt for the said amount representing her rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980, Pineda again went back to respondent and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and April, 1980 in the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again received from Pineda on June 30, 1980 rental payments covering the months of May, June and July, 1980 in the total sum of P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.). And, on September 29, 1980, he received and issued Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental payments for the months of August, September and October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). After four months had elapsed, or on January 23, 1981, he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of October, November, December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.). During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money. He allowed the money to accumulate for a year and kept complainant in the dark as to the progress of the case. He did not even attempt to tell her about the money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that complainant used to call him and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985). It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15, Ibid.). But this was rather late because as early as April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an
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administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation (Exh. "G", p. 14, Ibid.). This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan) for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida Pineda), since as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan, herein respondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate incident would not have happened had respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to be honest and candid towards his client. Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept the money of complainant for a year merely because he wanted to surprise her with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the contrary, it is very much discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant because he was using it for his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the money of complainant for such length of time, respondent deprived her of the use of the same. It is therefore too credulous to believe his explanation, which is flimsy and incredible Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty and integrity. He must know that the "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney and client requires that the attorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the client's benefit, and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304, to wit: A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics). Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11). xxx xxx xxx A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27). The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential in character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special relationship, 'lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received. (Emphasis supplied).
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In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to his client, he became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a severe punishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.) Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer. RECOMMENDATION WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of not less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his duties to his clients. (pp. 78-85, Rollo) We find the foregoing findings well considered and adopt the same but differ with the recommendation. The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly: 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him. * Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her By force of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent had unjustifiedly withheld from her. Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment. WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved
27

to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the personal record of respondent Atty. Manuel L. Melo. SO ORDERED. LEONILA LICUANAN vs V ATTY MANUEL MELO pe t February 9, 1989 A.M. No.2361 FACTS: Melo was hired as counsel by Licuanan in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, Aida Pineda. Melo, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Pineda and was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October 1978 and succeeding months thereafter. When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, Licuanan decided to send her a letter demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client. Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him rental payments and continued paying her obligations religiously to Melo. During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money Licuanan not knowing that Melo had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her Pineda before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation Pineda brought an action against Licuanan for damages before the then CFI of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case filed against her since as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan It wasonly when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by Licaunan, wrote Melo a letter advising him to surrender the money to Licaunan, that he accounted for it. Melo admitted having received the payment of rentals from Licaunan's tenant, but explained that he kept this matter from the Licaunan for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals ISSUE: Is Melo guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and breaching the Lawyers Oath HELD: The court held in the affirmative. The actuations of Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount received by him on behalf of his client, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of theCanons of Professional Ethics particularly Canon 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY. By his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an ACR and the practice of law. By reason thereof Licaunan was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her by force of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent withheld from her. - The court is constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment. Consistent with the crying
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need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is herebyordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys

8.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.: Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z). When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they
29

were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child. Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan. In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J). Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
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Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535). Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102). (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256). (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313). (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450). (5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439). (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before
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the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586). (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91). Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.

DIGEST In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arcigas parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries against Arciga. Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born. ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga
32

was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

9.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989 PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent. Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November 1987, referred the Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation. During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only respondent and his counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of the hearing. The hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent and upon failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General. This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice. The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988 because only complainant appeared, respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice to him. The hearing of 20 September 1988 was again reset to 20 October 1988 because
33

neither complainant nor her counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14 November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14 November 1988 was rescheduled two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989. In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of respondent to appear at the hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter submit the case for resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's counsel on 31 January 1989. On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows: 1. Exh. 'A' Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan Tinio. Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as shown on the document; 2. Exh. 'B' Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict Laguitan. Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the child as shown on the document: 3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital. Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital and for which respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of doctors; 4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' Receipts issued by the Paulino Medical Clinic. Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a baby boy at said clinic and for which respondent paid the bill for hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of doctors; 5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' Baptismal certificates of Sheila L. Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of the children: 6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' The family pictures showing respondent either singly or with the rest of the family during happier times. Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really lived together as husband and wife and begot two children and the respondent admits these through the pictures: 7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' The school records of Sheila L. Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.
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Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the schooling of the children as he himself signed the correspondence and was marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1 Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors submitted to us its findings and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows: Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that the prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with respondent until eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's parents in supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again. After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and his having begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for having cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support. The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar, 2 Concubinage imports moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the Commission and to this Court that respondent is supporting or has made provision for the support of his illegitimate children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on Leave.

Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC

of

the

Philippines COURT

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Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991 ISMAELA vs. ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent. PER CURIAM: This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties. The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the Supreme Court, states: xxx xxx xxx The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for annulment of sale and was docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated annulling the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620. On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the decision of the Lower Court; That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno. Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs; That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971; That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972; That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan; Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the same persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending before said court.
36

DIMAGIBA, complainant,

In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty. Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on may part. The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the CFI, Bulacan. They can not be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court. In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate action. xxx xxx xxx 1 In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the respondent Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice. 2 In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant were done. xxx xxx xxx at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the pleadings filed by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking, diligent, and careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. 3 In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620. 4 As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that the issue raised had been decided by the Court. 5 Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided by Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground of res judicata. xxx xxx xxx

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But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases previously litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by final judgment. 6 In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants. xxx xxx xxx Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause with the other plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties between this case and Civil Case No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills inclusion herein as a p plaintiff can not produce any legal significance. 7 This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases. On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution of disciplinary case against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8 It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No. 1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of Court of the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes. In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action: 1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to probate but was subsequently appealed. 2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831. The decision was affirmed. 3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court, upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the due execution the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of the complainant. 4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, this was a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed. 5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint dated November 3, 1970 was again dismissed. 6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the property left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute. 7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.
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8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for the outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which was a complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes. Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment. This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court.9 Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs. A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT. WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. SO ORDERED.

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10.)

[G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000]

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., petitioner, vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent. DECISION VITUG, J.: On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated ("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian corporation.The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Pursuant to the contract, PAWI shipped to FASGI a total of eight thousand five hundred ninety four (8,594) wheels, with an FOB value of US$216,444.30 at the time of shipment, the first batch arriving in two containers and the second in three containers. Thereabouts, FASGI paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with stated requirements, viz; "A. contrary to the terms of the Distributorship Agreement and in violation of U.S. law, the country of origin (the Philippines) was not stamped on the wheels; "B. the wheels did not have weight load limits stamped on them as required to avoid mounting on excessively heavy vehicles, resulting in risk of damage or bodily injury to consumers arising from possible shattering of the wheels; "C. many of the wheels did not have an indication as to which models of automobile they would fit; "D. many of the wheels did not fit the model automobiles for which they were purportedly designed; "E. some of the wheels did not fit any model automobile in use in the United States; "F. most of the boxes in which the wheels were packed indicated that the wheels were approved by the Specialty Equipment Manufacturer's Association (hereafter, `SEMA'); in fact no SEMA approval has been obtained and this indication was therefore false and could result in fraud upon retail customers purchasing the wheels."[1] On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In January 1980, during the pendency of the case, the parties entered into a settlement, entitled "Transaction" with the corresponding Italian translation "Convenzione Transsativa," where it was stipulated that FPS and PAWI would accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to FASGI the purchase price of US$268,750.00 viafour (4) irrevocable letters of credit ("LC"). The rescission of the contract of distributorship was to be effected within the period starting January up until April 1980.[2] In a telex message, dated 02 March 1980, PAWI president Romeo Rojas expressed the company's inability to comply with the foregoing agreement and proposed a revised schedule of payment. The message, in part, read:

40

"We are most anxious in fulfilling all our obligations under compromise agreement executed by our Mr. Giancarlo Dallera and your Van Curen. We have tried our best to comply with our commitments, however, because of the situation as mentioned in the foregoing and currency regulations and restrictions imposed by our government on the outflow, of foreign currency from our country, we are constrained to request for a revised schedule of shipment and opening of L/Cs. "After consulting with our bank and government monetary agencies and on the assumption that we submit the required pro-forma invoices we can open the letters of credit in your favor under the following schedule: "A) First L/C - it will be issued in April 1980 payable 90 days thereafter "B) Second L/C - it will be issued in June 1980 payable 90 days thereafter "C) Third L/C - it will be issued in August 1980 payable 90 days thereafter "D) Fourth L/C - it will be issued in November 1980 payable 90 days thereafter "We understand your situation regarding the lease of your warehouse. For this reason, we are willing to defray the extra storage charges resulting from this new schedule. If you cannot renew the lease [of] your present warehouse, perhaps you can arrange to transfer to another warehouse and storage charges transfer thereon will be for our account. We hope you understand our position. The delay and the revised schedules were caused by circumstances totally beyond our control."[3] On 21 April 1980, again through a telex message, PAWI informed FASGI that it was impossible to open a letter of credit on or before April 1980 but assured that it would do its best to comply with the suggested schedule of payments. [4] In its telex reply of 29 April 1980, FASGI insisted that PAWI should meet the terms of the proposed schedule of payments, specifically its undertaking to open the first LC within April of 1980, and that "If the letter of credit is not opened by April 30, 1980, then x x x [it would] immediately take all necessary legal action to protect [its] position."[5] Despite its assurances, and FASGI's insistence, PAWI failed to open the first LC in April 1980 allegedly due to Central Bank "inquiries and restrictions," prompting FASGI to pursue its complaint for damages against PAWI before the California district court. Pre-trial conference was held on 24 November 1980. In the interim, the parties, realizing the protracted process of litigation, resolved to enter into another arrangement, this time entitled "Supplemental Settlement Agreement," on 26 November 1980. In substance, the covenant provided that FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for every LC opened and paid by PAWI: "3. Agreement "3.1 Sellers agree to pay FASGI Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars ($268,750.00), plus interest and storage costs as described below. Sellers shall pay such amount by delivering to FASGI the following four (4) irrevocable letters of credit, confirmed by Crocker Bank, Main Branch, Fresno, California, as set forth below: "(i) on or before June 30, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-Five Thousand, Three Hundred Sixty-nine and 00/100 Dollars ($65,369.00), (b) plus interest on that amount at the annual rate of 16.25% from January 1, 1980 until July 31, 1980, (c) plus Two Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and 00/100 ($2,940.00) and (d) with interest on that sum at the annual rate of 16.25% from May 1, 1980 to July 31, 1980, payable on or after August 31, 1980;
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"(ii) on or before September 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) SixtySeven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,940.00), plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, and on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, payable ninety days after the date of the bill of lading under the letter of credit; "(iii) on or before November 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) SixtySeven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,490.00), plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, and on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, payable ninety days after the date of the bill of lading under the latter of credit; "(iv) on or before January 1, 1981, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Five Thousand, Eight Hundred Eighty and 00/100 Dollars ($5,880.00), plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, and on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, payable ninety days after the date of the bill of lading under the latter of credit."[6] Anent the wheels still in the custody of FASGI, the supplemental settlement agreement provided that "3.4 (a) Upon execution of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement, the obligations of FASGI to store or maintain the Containers and Wheels shall be limited to (i) storing the Wheels and Containers in their present warehouse location and (ii) maintaining in effect FASGI's current insurance in favor of FASGI, insuring against usual commercial risks for such storage in the principal amount of the Letters of Credit described in Paragraph 3.1. FASGI shall bear no liability, responsibility or risk for uninsurable risks or casualties to the Containers or Wheels. "x x x x x x x x x "(e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters of Credit are delayed past such date pursuant to the penultimate Paragraph 3.1, in which case from and after such later date, FASGI shall have no obligation to maintain, store or deliver any of the Containers or Wheels." [7] The deal allowed FASGI to enter before the California court the foregoing stipulations in the event of the failure of PAWI to make good the scheduled payments; thus "3.5 Concurrently with execution and delivery hereof, the parties have executed and delivered a Mutual Release (the `Mutual Release'), and a Stipulation for Judgment (the `Stipulation for Judgment') with respect to the Action. In the event of breach of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement by Sellers, FASGI shall have the right to apply immediately to the Court for entry of Judgment pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment in the full amount thereof, less credit for any payments made by Sellers pursuant to this Supplemental Settlement Agreement. FASGI shall have the right thereafter to enforce the Judgment against PAWI and FPS in the United States and in any other country where assets of FPS or PAWI may be located, and FPS and PAWI hereby waive all defenses in any such country to execution or enforcement of the Judgment by FASGI. Specifically, FPS and PAWI each consent to the jurisdiction of the Italian and Philippine courts in any action brought by FASGI to seek a judgment in those countries based upon a judgment against FPS or PAWI in the Action."[8]
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In accordance with the aforementioned paragraph 3.5 of the agreement, the parties made the following stipulation before the California court: "The undersigned parties hereto, having entered into a Supplemental Settlement Agreement in this action, "IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between plaintiff FASGI Enterprises, Inc. (`FASGI') and defendants Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc., (`PAWI'), and each of them, that judgment may be entered in favor of plaintiff FASGI and against PAWI, in the amount of Two Hundred Eighty Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty And 01/100ths Dollars ($283,480.01). "Plaintiff FASGI shall also be entitled to its costs of suit, and to reasonable attorneys' fees as determined by the Court added to the above judgment amount."[9] The foregoing supplemental settlement agreement, as well as the motion for the entry of judgment, was executed by FASGI president Elena Buholzer and PAWI counsel Mr. Thomas Ready. PAWI, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the supplemental settlement agreement. While it opened the first LC on 19 June 1980, it, however, only paid on it nine (9) months after, or on 20 March 1981, when the letters of credit by then were supposed to have all been already posted. This lapse, notwithstanding, FASGI promptly shipped to PAWI the first container of wheels. Again, despite the delay incurred by PAWI on the second LC, FASGI readily delivered the second container. Later, PAWI totally defaulted in opening and paying the third and the fourth LCs, scheduled to be opened on or before, respectively, 01 September 1980 and 01 November 1980, and each to be paid ninety (90) days after the date of the bill of lading under the LC. As so expressed in their affidavits, FASGI counsel Frank Ker and FASGI president Elena Buholzer were more inclined to believe that PAWI's failure to pay was due not to any restriction by the Central Bank or any other cause than its inability to pay. These doubts were based on the telex message of PAWI president Romeo Rojas who attached a copy of a communication from the Central Bank notifying PAWI of the bank's approval of PAWI's request to open LCs to cover payment for the re-importation of the wheels. The communication having been sent to FASGI before the supplemental settlement agreement was executed, FASGI speculated that at the time PAWI subsequently entered into the supplemental settlement agreement, its request to open LCs had already been approved by the Central Bank. Irked by PAWI's persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California the following stipulation for judgment against PAWI. "PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. in the Courtroom of the Honorable Laughlin E. Waters of the above Court, plaintiff FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC. (hereinafter `FASGI') will move the Court for entry of Judgment against defendant PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. (hereinafter `PAWI'), pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment filed concurrently herewith, executed on behalf of FASGI and PAWI by their respective attorneys, acting as their authorized agents. "Judgment will be sought in the total amount of P252,850.60, including principal and interest accrued through May 17, 1982, plus the sum of $17,500.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees for plaintiff in prosecuting this action. "The Motion will be made under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to and based upon the Stipulation for Judgment, the Supplemental Settlement Agreement filed herein on or about November 21, 1980, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavits of Elena Buholzer, Franck G. Ker and Stan Cornwell all filed herewith, and upon all the records, files and pleadings in this action.
43

"The Motion is made on the grounds that defendant PAWI has breached its obligations as set forth in the Supplemental Settlement Agreement, and that the Supplemental Settlement Agreement expressly permits FASGI to enter the Stipulation for Judgment in the event that PAWI has not performed under the Supplemental Settlement Agreement." [10] On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. A certificate of finality of judgment was issued, on 07 September 1982, by the US District Judge of the District Court for the Central District of California. PAWI, by this time, was approximately twenty (20) months in arrears in its obligation under the supplemental settlement agreement. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment" in February 1983, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, of Makati, Philippines. The Makati court, however, in an order of 11 September 1990, dismissed the case, thereby denying the enforcement of the foreign judgment within Philippine jurisdiction, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact.[11] The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels.[12] This situation, the trial court maintained, amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the trial court said, the supplemental settlement agreement and the subsequent motion for entry of judgment upon which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's authorization. FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. In a decision,[13] dated 30 July 1997, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the full enforcement of the California judgment. Hence this appeal. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; [14] however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.[15] In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. [16] A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines provides: Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: xxxx (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
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In Soorajmull Nagarmull vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc.,[17] one of the early Philippine cases on the enforcement of foreign judgments, this Court has ruled that a judgment for a sum of money rendered in a foreign court is presumptive evidence of a right between the parties and their successors-in-interest by subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court has said that a party attacking a foreign judgment is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest.[19] In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was signed by the parties, including Mr. Thomas Ready, on 06 October 1980. The agreement was lodged in the California case on 26 November 1980 or two (2) days after the pre-trial conference held on 24 November 1980. If Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI to enter into the supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead, more than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement agreement, particularly on09 October 1981, PAWI President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to Elena Buholzer of FASGI that failed to mention Mr. Ready's supposed lack of authority. On the contrary, the letter confirmed the terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance for the impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in the agreement. It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it.[20] Nor could PAWI claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared from possibly paying FASGI substantial amounts of damages and incurring heavy litigation expenses normally generated in a full-blown trial. PAWI, under the agreement was afforded time to reimburse FASGI the price it had paid for the defective wheels. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations. PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready's authority to sign on its behalf the Supplemental Settlement Agreement but denounced likewise his authority to enter into a stipulation for judgment before the California court on 06 August 1982 on the ground that it had by then already terminated the former's services. For his part, Mr. Ready admitted that while he did receive a request from Manuel Singson of PAWI to withdraw from the motion of judgment, the request unfortunately came too late. In an explanatory telex, Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson that under American Judicial Procedures when a motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel would not be permitted to withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From the time the stipulation for judgment was entered into on26 April 1982 until the certificate of finality of judgment was issued by the California court on 07 September 1982, no notification was issued by PAWI to FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready's services. If PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready who purportedly acted in collusion with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue before the forum which issued the judgment in line with the principle of international comity that a court of another jurisdiction should refrain, as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of passing judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal.[21] Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered,[22] or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause
45

of action - such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract - is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment. [23] Even while the US judgment was against both FPS and PAWI, FASGI had every right to seek enforcement of the judgment solely against PAWI or, for that matter, only against FPS. FASGI, in its complaint, explained: "17. There exists, and at all times relevant herein there existed, a unity of interest and ownership between defendant PAWI and defendant FPS, in that they are owned and controlled by the same shareholders and managers, such that any individuality and separateness between these defendants has ceased, if it ever existed, and defendant FPS is the alter ego of defendant PAWI. The two entities are used interchangeably by their shareholders and managers, and plaintiff has found it impossible to ascertain with which entity it is dealing at any one time. Adherence to the fiction of separate existence of these defendant corporations would permit an abuse of the corporate privilege and would promote injustice against this plaintiff because assets can easily be shifted between the two companies thereby frustrating plaintiff's attempts to collect on any judgment rendered by this Court."[24] Paragraph 14 of the Supplemental Settlement Agreement fixed the liability of PAWI and FPS to be "joint and several" or solidary. The enforcement of the judgment against PAWI alone would not, of course, preclude it from pursuing and recovering whatever contributory liability FPS might have pursuant to their own agreement. PAWI would argue that it was incumbent upon FASGI to first return the second and the third containers of defective wheels before it could be required to return to FASGI the purchase price therefor,[25] relying on their original agreement (the "Transaction").[26] Unfortunately, PAWI defaulted on its covenants thereunder that thereby occasioned the subsequent execution of the supplemental settlement agreement. This time the parties agreed, under paragraph 3.4(e)[27] thereof, that any further default by PAWI would release FASGI from any obligation to maintain, store or deliver the rejected wheels. The supplemental settlement agreement evidently superseded, at the very least on this point, the previous arrangements made by the parties. PAWI cannot, by this petition for review, seek refuge over a business dealing and decision gone awry. Neither do the courts function to relieve a party from the effects of an unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered into. As has so aptly been explained by the appellate court, the over-all picture might, indeed, appear to be onerous to PAWI but it should bear emphasis that the settlement which has become the basis for the foreign judgment has not been the start of a business venture but the end of a failed one, and each party, naturally, has had to negotiate from either position of strength or weakness depending on its own perception of who might have to bear the blame for the failure and the consequence of loss.[28] Altogether, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in its appealed judgment. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs FASGI Enterprises GR 137378; 12 October 2000 DIGEST Facts: On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (FASGI), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (FPS), an Italian corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB value
46

of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in noncompliance with the contract. On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked b y PAWIs persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI. On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for enforcement of foreign judgment, before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latters authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. Issue: WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment. Held: In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a clients authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his clients interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced. Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.

11.)

G.R. No. L-29543

November 29, 1969

47

GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees. Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant. Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees. TEEHANKEE, J.: We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the lower Court's Order of dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction against respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the defendant in a simple collection case. The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated August 16, 1968 certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law: This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July 21, 1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos. In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows: "2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not make the full payment up to the present time; "3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85, representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is already overdue and payable." Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the complaint. After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court, she then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion. But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed by the said company in the inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of
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action against her so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2) that things asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill. Convinced that the said motion of the company is well founded, the lower court accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under her lone assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as amended by its order dated August 18, 1962. The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1) whether the allegations of the complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against her; and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions. A perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all involved in this appeal. It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.1 It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars sought all concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial." Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready made goods for resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars were just as much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer whether from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount. The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case, it had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account in the said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the operation of her stall, she would not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as heretofore." No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing appellant's petition for certiorariagainst respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars, as
49

pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an analogous case,2 that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases." Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless cause. As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered DIGEST November 29, 1969 G.R. No. L-29543 GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees. Teehankee, J.: FACTS: Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares for recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was eventually assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos. In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows: 2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not make the full payment up to the present time; 3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85, representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is already overdue and payable. Instead of answering the complaint against her, Pajares, moved for a bill of particulars to require Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company.
50

The inferior court denied the motion and her motion for reconsideration has been likewise denied. She then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance, alleging respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion. Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari and was granted. A subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court, Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court. ISSUE: WON counsel for petitioner failed in his duty to encourage amicable settlement or a confession of judgment to accord respect to the other partys claim, saving h is client additional expenses and help prevent the clogging of court dockets. RULING: The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that the appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases. This simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellants brief, and attorneys fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless cause. The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. A litigation involves time, expense and ill feelings, which may well be avoided by the settlement of the action. And in those clearly unmeritorious cases, a compromise or even a confession of judgment will accord respect to the just claim of the other party, save the client additional expenses and help prevent clogging of court dockets.

DEN BANC [A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.] JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v. HON. JUDGE TERESITA DIZONCAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Respondent. Romeo M. Mendoza for complainants.

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE; FORMAL INVESTIGATION NOT REQUIRED WHERE CULPABILITY WELL DOCUMENTED. The charges against her are clearly meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability as it is well
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documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her open defiance of higher judicial authority. In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge committed the following highly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest, to wit: (a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her disputed Order of 7 June 1989; (c) respondent Judge issued another order authorizing the sale of the other properties previously titled in the complainant Jose P. Uy; (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989. These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to the lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative liability. 2. ID.; ID.; CONDUCT EXPECTED OF JUDGE AS VISIBLE REPRESENTATION OF LAW AND JUSTICE. Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise such omission can never be excused. 3. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO KNOW LAW THAT IS SO ELEMENTARY CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 4. ID.; ID.; WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE AND CONTINUED DISREGARD OF JUDGMENT OF HIGHER COURT AND RESOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTE GRAVE AND SERIOUS MISCONDUCT. The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of properties titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar . . . Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991 cannot be condoned. Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. She issued two (2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which were titled in the name of complainants. We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and serious misconduct. Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show proper respect for, and due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court. 5. ID.; ID.; ACT OR OMISSION WHICH WOULD DIMINISH PEOPLES FAITH IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE NOT COUNTENANCED BY SUPREME COURT; RATIONALE
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THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance of her duties that prudence and circumspection which the law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of which she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission which would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice. As Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence of the court is gone and popular respect impaired."cralaw virtua1aw library 6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; PROBATE COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP WHERE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO ESTATE CLAIMED BY ANOTHER PERSON. Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro Manila, is charged 1 with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint filed on 15 November 1991 with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.chanrobles law library : red The records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, or on 23 November 1988, respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. On 27 March 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion stating that sometime in February 1978 two (2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco and his wife covered by TCT Nos. 7537 and 75101 had been sold to complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel requested the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T39565, T-50276, T-52754, T220168, TCT. Nos. T-7537 and 75101. On 29 March 1989, respondent Judge granted the motion. On 18 April 1989, upon order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela reported on the status of the titles to the properties subject of the "freeze order;" informing the Court that on 3 February 1989, a deed of absolute sale executed by the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated 9 December 1978 was filed with the Register of Deeds, describing therein fifteen (15) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, and B53

163276; that, by virtue of the deed of sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276 which could not be located in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 were still registered in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez, and, that the status of TCT Nos. T-39565 and T-220168, which were with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan, could not yet be determined. On 5 May 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was able to register the titles in his name in February 1989 through fraud, and the signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged. On 7 June 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in their name. On 3 July 1989, complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, with prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from implementing the Order of 7 June 1989, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding against him. Meanwhile, acting on the questioned Order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela cancelled the certificates of title of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy and reverted them to Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary On 28 September 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition of complainants and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the intestate proceedings thus ". . . a probate court has no authority to y decide questions of the ownership of property, real or personal. The only purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination there is good reason for believing that the person so examined has property in possession belonging to the estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by ordinary action, to recover the same (Alafriz v. Mina, 28 Phil. 137 [1914]; Modesto v. Modesto, 109 Phil. 1066 [1959]; Chanco v. Madrilejo, 12 Phil. 543 [1909])."cralaw virtua1aw library Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos sought a reconsideration of the ruling of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied on 15 November 1989. On 28 December 1989, Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 91092. On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved a project of partition dated 18 August 1990 submitted by Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together with Paz Ramirez (surviving spouse of Ambrocio C. Pingco) and Alicia Alinsunurin. In the project of partition, TCT Nos. B15345 to B-15352 and B-15354 to B-15359 covering the parcels of land in Bulacan (which were reverted in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco pursuant to the Order of 7 June 1989) were adjudicated to the surviving spouse Paz Ramirez Pingco. On 16 January 1991, on motion of counsel for the Special Administratrix, respondent Judge ordered the Registers of Deeds of Valenzuela and Manila to cancel the titles in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez and to issue new ones in favor of the persons mentioned in the approved project of partition.
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On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B15351, B-15348 and B-15349, and stating therein that as far as the intestate proceedings were concerned, complainant Jose P. Uy was not a participant either as heir or oppositor; that the property covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351 and B-15348 and B-15349 were part of the intestate estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco over which the trial court had jurisdiction and in whose name said titles were registered when the proceedings were instituted, that even as the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulled her Order of 7 June 1989, it did not prevent her from proceeding with her actions on the properties, neither did it direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to revert the titles again from Ambrocio C. Pingco to complainant Jose P. Uy. As a result, instead of complying with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge directed the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her own Order of 16 January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and ordering the issuance of new titles in accordance with the project of partition she obstinately approved. On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals which annulled and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge. Thus "We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply provides that a person who is suspected of having in his possession property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath on the matter. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land under administration and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction. To recover the property, an independent action against the vendee must be instituted in the proper court" (citing Tagle, Et. Al. v. Manalo Et. Al., 105 Phil 1124). On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter disregard of Our Resolution of March 1991, granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 and B-15346 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale of her questioned Order of 4 February 1991. On 29 April 1991, undaunted by her reversal by the Court of Appeals and this Court, and in blatant disobedience to judicial authority, and established precedents and jurisprudence, respondent Judge again granted an ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of another deed of absolute sale covering three (3) more parcels of land originally titled in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos. B-15347, B-15355 and B-15356 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, reiterating for the second time the reasons stated in her Orders of 4 February and 2 April 1991. In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency of the petition for review by way ofcertiorari before this Court, respondent Judge continued issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the properties in the name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the damage and prejudice of complainants.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad Complainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings concerning the ownership of the properties, respondent Judge still, in an attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial authority, issued, orders approving the sale of the properties to the further prejudice of complainants. In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the filing of the complaint against her is merely to
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harass her. While she admits that her Order of 7 June 1989 was annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals, which annulment was affirmed by this Court, she argues that no temporary restraining order was issued and that before the Decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated her Order of 7 June 1989 was already complied with by the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela. She further contends that even as she was prohibited from proceeding against complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not order the reversion of the titles to them. We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The charges against her are clearly meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability 2 as it is well documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her open defiance of higher judicial authority. In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge committed the following highly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest, to wit: (a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her disputed Order of 7 June 1989; 3 (c) respondent Judge issued another order authorizing the sale of the other properties previously titled in the complainant Jose P. Uy; 4 (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989. 5 These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to the lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative liability. Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. 6 To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. 7 If the judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise such omission can never be excused. 8 Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 9 The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules. Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10 The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide
56

by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of properties titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of a temporary restraining order or an order from the Court of Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not sufficient justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent orders contrary to the appellate courts proscription. Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the necessary consequence of the appellate courts decision is to put back the complainants to their former status prior to the issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the Order of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of the properties subject of the settlement proceedings remains vested in complainants and will continue to be so until declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the intestate proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an order from the appellate court that will revert the titles to complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from its decision annulling the questioned cancellation.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991 cannot be condoned. Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. She issued two (2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which were titled in the name of complainants. We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and serious misconduct. 11 Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show proper respect for, and due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court. 12 By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance of her duties that prudence and circumspection which the law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of which she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission which would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice. 13 As Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence of the court is gone and popular respect impaired."cralaw virtua1aw library WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service; consequently, she is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.

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