Prof.

RobLeachman IEOR130 Fall,2013

9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Definition:FMEAisasystematicapproachtothe managementofproductorprocess development.Itinvolves:

Identifyingallpotentialwaysaproductorprocess couldfail Identifyingtheeffectsorconsequencesofsuch failures Identifyingandimplementingmethodsormeasuresto eliminateorreducethechanceofsuchfailures occurring
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

FMEAgeneratesalivingdocumentforthe productorprocessdelineatingallknownfailure modes,theireffects,andthemitigation measuresimplementedtoprecludefailures. Formalapplicationsbeganintheaerospace industryinthemid1960s.Subsequently,FMEA wasadoptedbymanyotherindustries(e.g., automotive,semiconductors).

9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Developmentofanewprocessflowtofabricate integratedcircuitsisdividedintomodules correspondingtomajorprocesssteps(e.g.,a photolithographystepmodule,aplasmaetching stepmodule,andsoon). Typically,eachmoduleincludesoneormore measurementsperformedasthelastsubstep(s)of themodulethatprovethatnoneofthefailure modesarepresentbeforethesiliconwafersare passedtothenextmodule.
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

FMEAismosteffectivewhenperformedbeforea designisreleasedratherthanafterthefact
Thefocusshouldbeonfailurepreventionratherthan justfailuredetection

Assuch,FMEAisastandardengineering managementpracticeusedinthedevelopment ofnewproducts

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

DesignFMEA examinesthefunctionsofa component,subsystemormainsystem

Potentialfailuresfromincorrectmaterialchoiceor inappropriatespecifications Example:AirBag(excessiveairbaginflatorforce)

ProcessFMEA examinestheprocessesusedto makeacomponent,subsystemormainsystem

Potentialfailuresfromincorrectassemblyorexcess processvariationresultinginoutofspecproduct Example:AirBagassemblyprocess(carassemblyline operatormightnotinstallairbagproperlysuchthatit mightnotengageduringimpact)
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

BasicandSecondaryFunctions verbnoun descriptionsofwhatproduct(process)does.

BasicFunction:ingresstoandegressfromvehicle Secondaryfunctions protectoccupantfromnoise

FailureMode physicaldescriptionofafailure.
noiseentersatdoortoroofinterface

FailureEffects impactoffailureonpeople,equipment
driverdissatisfaction

FailureCause referstocauseofthefailure
insufficientdoorseal
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Identifypotential failuremode Identifypotential effect(s)offailure mode Identifypotential cause(s)offailure mode Determine severity

Determine occurrence Determinerisk prioritynumber (RPN) Determine detectability Identifyactions leadingto improvement
Rob Leachman

Evaluatecurrent controlsordesign verification process

9/3/13 FMEA

Severityisaratingcorrespondingtotheseriousnessofaneffectofa
potentialfailuremode.(Scale:110.1:noeffectonoutput,5:moderate effect,8:seriouseffect,10:hazardouseffect)

Occurrenceisaratingcorrespondingtotherateatwhichafirstlevel
causeanditsresultantfailuremodewilloccuroverthedesignlifeofthe system,overthedesignlifeoftheproduct,orbeforeanyadditionalprocess controlsareapplied.(Scale:110.1:failureunlikely,5:occasionalfailure,8: high#offailureslikely,10:failurescertain)

Detectionisaratingcorrespondingtothelikelihoodthatthedetection
methodsorcurrentcontrolswilldetectthepotentialfailuremodebeforethe productisreleasedforproductionfordesign,orforprocessbeforeitleaves theproductionfacility.(Scale:110.1:willdetectfailure,5:mightdetect failure,10:almostcertainnottodetectfailures)

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

TheRPNidentifiesthegreatestareasofconcern.It combinestheassessmentsofthe (1)Severityrating, (2)Occurrencerating,and (3)Detectionratingforapotentialfailuremode.

RPN=SeverityRatingxOccurrenceRatingxDetection Rating
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Theseverityis9or10(potentiallyhazardous failures),OR SeverityratingxOccurrenceratingishigh,OR RPN(severityxoccurrencexdetection)ishigh. NoabsoluterulesforwhatisahighRPNnumber. Rather,failuremodesoftenareviewedonarelative scale(i.e.,highestRPNisaddressedfirst).

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

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Companiesoftenidentifyspecialproduct characteristicswithanappropriatesymbolon theFMEAworksheet. Thesespecialcriticalcharacteristics(CCs)are typicallyitemswhichaffectregulatory compliance,suchasitemswhichrequirea warninggiventoconsumersorspecialprocess controls.

9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

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AsfirststepstowardgeneratinganFMEA document,itisoftenusefulto
Performafunctionalanalysis,then GenerateFMEAcauseandeffectdiagrams.

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

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Identifythebasicandsecondaryfunction(s) of productsorprocessesusingverbnounrelationships. Basicfunctions:specificfunctionswhichaproductor processisdesignedtodo.

Mousetrapexample:basicfunctionistoKillMouseor CatchMouse.

Secondaryfunctions:allotherfunctionswhichare subordinatetothebasicfunction(e.g.,closetrap).
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Afailuremodeistypicallyjusttheinabilityto performafunctionidentifiedinthefunctional analysis. Example:Describefailuremodesforacardoor:

Basicfunction:ingress/egressvehicle
Failuremodes:doordoesnotopen,doorsticks,door doesnotopenwideenough

SecondaryFunction:protectoccupantfromnoise
FailureMode:doordoesnotseal,doorheaderleaks
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Methods

Note:failuremodemayhave multiplecausesand/or multipleeffects Failure Mode

Machinery Material People Downstream Process EndUser Operation Environment Customer Safety Causes
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Effects
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Methods: Lackofproper warnings Machinery: Regulatornot functioning FailureMode Material: Bagmaterial tooabrasive People: Passenger toosmall Injurelightweight passenger

Environment: Passenger notwearing seatbelt

FMEA

Occupantunable toabsorbinflation force

Bruisepassenger incrash Killsmall children Effects

Causes
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PartorProcessName Design/Mfg Responsibility OtherAreasInvolved

AutomotivePassengerAirBagSystem

SuppliersandPlantsAffected ModelDate

EngineeringChangeLevel

Process Operation, ProductFunction orPurpose Inflateairbag

PotentialFailure Mode

Potential Effect(s)of Failure

S C E C V

PotentialCause(s) ofFailure O C C Sensorisnot functioning properly 2

CurrentControls EvaulationMethod D S R E * P T O N 6 16 96

RecommendedAction(s)

Bagdoesnot InjurePassenger 8 * openonimpact

Lighttonotifysystem ismalfucntioning

Addredundantsensorto monitorimpact

Restrain passenger

Occupantunable towithstand inflationforce

Injurelightweight Passengernot 8 * 4 passenger wearingseatbelt

None

10 32 320

1)Installswitchwhich deactivatesairbagsystem unlessseatbeltisworn 2)Consumereducationofair bagsystempotentialfailures

Bruisepassenger 3 incrash

Forceregulatornot Repeatabilitytestsin 2 3 working lab

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

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LastcolumnsofFMEAWorksheetareusedto identifyimprovementplan:
Recommendedactions Identifyresponsibilitytocompleteactions Identifytargetdatestocompleteactions ListactionstakenandreassessRPN

LikeotherQualityControlmethodologies,FMEA usesaMeasure Analyze Improve Control cycle.

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