Molly Fassler` Professor Kind Phil 126 27 January 2014 Same Same but Different: The Contradictory Conclusions

of Argles Argument Argle, a rigid nominalist and materialist, is faced with the terribly difficult issue of reducing holes to material objects. Bargle, however, holds fast to the idea that holes are obviously not matter, because they are the exact opposite -- they are lack of matter (206). Argle quite creatively argues that holes are actually hole-linings (207). By doing so, he can indeed specify matter (the matter that makes up the lining of the hole) that makes up the hole, and thus his nominalism remains unaffected. Bargle though, remains unsatisfied with this reply, as do I. In his reply to many of Bargles objections, Argle seems forced to give an overly-complex description of how to account for certain properties we would typically ascribe to holes. Defining holes as hole-linings seems to lead to some absurd, contradictory conclusions, and even if they did not, they simply do not align with the attributes we intuitively ascribe to holes. Bargle illustrates great weakness with Argles theory by showing how it cannot really explain how we come to think of holes as voluminous. Bargle asks What is the volume of the hole itself?...And how do you decide? (209). Bargle wants to attribute specific volumes to specific holes, an intuition to which I think many of us would relate. If holes are hole-linings then hole-linings must be able to account for all of the same things as holes. This includes volume. If holes are hole-linings, then the volume of the hole-lining must be the volume of the hole too. But Bargle, and I assume many others, has no intuition

about the volume of a hole-lining. By laws of identity, the hole, being equal to the holelining, must have an equal volume to that matter that is the hole-lining. In a more logical form: 1. If something (a) is identical to something else (b), then the volume of a (Va) must be equal toe the volume of b (Vb). 2. A hole (a) is equal to a hole-lining (b). So 3., The volume of a hole must be equal to the volume of a hole lining. Bargle argues that a hole-lining does not have the same volume as a hole. Unlike holes, we do not have any intuitions about volumes of hole-linings. Indeed, we have no way to define where a hole-lining really is. Therefore, one of the premises, namely Argles proposal that a hole is equal to a hole-lining, must be incorrect. Hole-linings, insofar as they do not seem to have a clearly specifiable volume, do not seem to be able to account for our normal intuitions about holes and their volume. Argle does indeed admit that holes have volumes (209), so Bargles question is appropriate. In response, Argle explains further that a single hole is actually made up of many hole-linings. Some include more of the cheese, some include less. Therefore I need not decide, arbitrarily or otherwise, how much cheese is part of the hole. Many different decisions are equally correct (209). He believes this identification of hole with hole-linings helps his argument because he can now say there are a variety of hole-linings (and thus volumes) all of which can be identified with a singular hole, and so any answer to Bargles question of volume is correct because any hole-linings volume can be identified as an answer.

This response only seems to further prove Argles point. For if multiple hole-linings can be identified with one hole, and each of those hole-linings have different volumes, then they must be distinct hole-linings because they possess different characteristics. But all of these hole-linings cannot both be distinct things possessing individual volumes and the same hole. Perhaps they could each be part of the hole, just as a lip of a bottle is part of the bottle, and the multiple hole-linings volumes make up the holes volume. Argles attempt to clarify only makes his position murkier and more contradictory: Really there are many different holes, and each is identical with a different hole-lining. But all these different holes are the same hole. If I understand correctly, there are different holes that can be identified as different hole-linings, but all of these holes are really the same hole. If this sentence means what most would understand it to mean, then it is completely contradictory and absurd. For I, and I would guess most, understand different to mean distinct, and same to mean identical. This understanding leads to a conclusion that there are holes that are both distinct from and identical to each other. If we are attached to the law of non-contradiction, as I assume many are, this cannot possibly be the case. But Argle attempts to save himself by distinguishing his use of same from the same that we typically mean as identical. While his notion of same is not entirely clear to me, his conclusion is nevertheless unacceptable. If holes are not the same (in the typical sense of the word) thing as hole-linings then Argles theory loses its explanatory power. For if they are not identical, then they must possess distinct properties, and thus hole-linings do not completely account for holes. The alternative that hole and holelinings are identical proves to be equally bad for it leads us to a contradictory conclusion: that different holes are the same hole. And even if we allow that Argle leads us to the

contradictory conclusion in error, hole-linings, at least intuitively, do not seem to be able to be quantified in the same way that we quantify holes. They seem to be unable to account for the some of the properties that we intuitively ascribe to holes and therefore do not seem like an acceptable explanation of holes.

Works Cited Lewis, David, and Stephanie Lewis. (1970) "Holes." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48:2 206-12.