1

CASE DIGEST-COMPILATION
CONSTI-1
RIEL VILLALON
1.

CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991 FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising t he Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education. ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

2. ECHEGARAY

v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

PARTIES: Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted repri eve which is an executive function.

HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

3. ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong. With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues: WON RA 7675 is in: 1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule". 2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress. Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district. In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

4. Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53

Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Quezon City councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income, land area and population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 8535 2) a certification attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of Novaliches city in terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991. Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons: 1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden of proof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF, NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law 2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of Novaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he didnt. 3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass media publicizing the creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation 4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can also serve as seats of government. 5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the ordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities. NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose

5. G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec x---------------------------------------------------------x

Facts Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper. 2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections. 3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

1.

Ruling: The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2.

Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3.

The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts. However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

6. AQUINO vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Issue: Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of

Aquino from the position in the electoral district. Held: The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lea se agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

7. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300 Facts: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to since childhood in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for disqualification meritorious. Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. Held: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Taclobanbecame petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

8.

Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao

Facts: After
SEC quo

Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the warranto Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel

before any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholderof IPI, may

intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held: Ordinarily,

by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman

Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI However, in certain respect salient of circumstances the militate matter against the in litigation. interventionof

Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the casebefore the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to findthat there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

9. Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998 Facts: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warrantounder Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. Issue: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws? Held: No. The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate whocomprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Betweentwo unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Supreme Court.

10. People vs Jalosjos

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed todischarge mandate

as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,

inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable byimprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. 11. Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998

. Facts: Petitioners contend that when the Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano) moved for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that became R.A. No. 8240, leading the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo asked, What is that, Mr. Speaker?, the Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question What is that, Mr. Speaker? was a privileged question or a point of order which, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to adjourn. Issue: whether the process of which led to the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 was illegal for noncompliance with internal rules of the House of Representatives Held: No. there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the conference committee report on what later became R.A. No. 8240 was railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is there any need for petitioners to invoke the power of the Supreme Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting R.A. No. 8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.

12. Santiago vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application forlegalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed: x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the C ourt has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. xxx Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order

13. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. PETE PRADO

Direct Filing Facts; Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law.

Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional. - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. - Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

14. Sampayan vs Daza

213 SCRA 807

HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and qualifications of members of Congress Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative candidate: (1) cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC before election; (2) quo warranto case filed with HRET after proclamation

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of their congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced his status as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III). Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

RULING: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his position asCongressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of its members. The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate ofcandidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Dazas proclamation.

15. Rasul vs Comelec

Facts:

Private respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta was proclaimed as the 12th winning candidate in the May 1998 senatorial elections. Petitioner Santanina Rasul questioned the said proclamation. She argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when, acting as a National Boardof Canvassers, it declared that the remaining uncanvassed certificates would no longer affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the twelve (12) winning candidates. She contends that if the number of registered voters who have yet to cast their votes where special elections have been suspended is combined with the uncanvassed votes from other areas of the country, there is a possibility that the 12th ranking senatorial candidate, Teresa Aquino-Oreta could be dislodged by the l3th placer, Roberto Pagdanganan. The petitioner submits that the inclusion of Aquino-Oreta among the winning candidates was premature and based on incomplete canvass. Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court is proper remedy. Held: Petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy for the petitioner. Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provide that "(t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have anElectoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members..." The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners , including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word sole in the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner is contesting the proclamation of Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning candidate, her proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

17. Bondoc vs. Pineda Case Digest

Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792 G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991 Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of

Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

18.
Guingona v. Gonzales G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 Campos, Jr., J. Facts: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDPLABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member

of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. Issue: whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the Commission on Appointments Held: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

19. Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Comm.

19. Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation When not Allowed It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief. ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted. HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction o f Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the provinc e of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

20. Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance

G.R. No. 115455 235 SCRA 630 (1994) FACTS RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively. Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. ISSUE Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. HELD

No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate. SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

21. Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990 GR 87636 -EN BANC

Facts: December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president December 29, 1988 President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general provision. February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 only. April 11, 1989 this petition was filed January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to admit supplemental petition same issues but included SEC 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831) SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the GAB thereby violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459) SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of appropriations in the exec branch of government (page 460) ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional. HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.) The provisions are inappropriate because o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations o Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the legislative the subject matter of the provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that manner they attempt hide it in the GAB If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1) DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

22.
Estrada vs Desierto This case concerns the office of the President. Erap alleged that he is the President on leave, while GMA claims she is the President. In the May 1998 elections, Erap was elected President, GMA was Vice-President. Erap was then accused of receiving millions in jueteng money. An impeachment trial was started. The senator-judges ruled against opening the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence that Erap had a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The

prosecutors walked out and the people held a rally on EDSA. Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to GMA as President, and Erap left Malacanang and issued a press statement.1 On the same day, he also signed another letter.2 Issue: Does the case at bar involve a political question? Held: NO. The Court has jurisdction to determine whether or not there has been GADLEJ. Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. These cases are inapplicable because in those cases, the government was a revolutionary one and EDSA I. In this case, GMAs is not revolutionary in character. The oath she took at the EDSA shrine is the oath under the 198 7 Constitution. EDSA I involved the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government, while EDSA II is an exercise of people power freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances. EDSA I presented a political question while EDSA II involves legal questions and is intra-constitutional. Issue: Whether Erap is a President on leave while GMA is an Acting President.. or did he resign? Held: Erap resigned. For there to be resignation, there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The diary of Exec Secretary Angara serialized in the Inquirer shows the state of mind of Erap. It reveals that Erap had decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. Erap also expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. He also said, Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) Erap and GMA were also entering into negot iations about Erap resigning but they were cut short when GMA had already taken the oath before she could sign their agreement. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit ofreconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense. Is Erap only temporarily unable to act as President? This involves an examination of Article VII Sec 11. o The HR had issued a resolution recognizing GMA as the President. Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by GMA as President. o Both houses have recognized GMA as the President, implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Erap is no longer temporary. Congress has rejected Eraps claim of inability. Issue of immunity: The Court rejects his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. o The scope of immunity that can be claimed by Erap as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against Erap are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.

23. Marcos Vs. Manglapus

177 SCRA 668 G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty
TATEMENT FROM (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

24. Webb vs De leon

WEBB VS. DE LEON EXECUTIVE POWER. This is the Hubert Webb- Vizconde Massacre case. Hubert is co-accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide. Jessica Alfaro is the star witness. Alfaro qualified under the Witness Protection Program, RA 6981. Thus she was not included in the Complaint or Information Hubert contends that the DOJ failed to include Alfaro in the information for her alleged conspiratorial participation in the said crime. Hubert challenges the law, RA 6981 claiming that it constitutes an intrusion into the judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power to discharge an accused as a state witness, (under the Rules on CrimPro).

ISSUE: Can the DOJ (the executive branch) approve the discharge of a state witness SC: VALID. The PROSECUTION OF CRIMES pertains to the executive department, whose principal power and responsibility is to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is THE RIGHT TO PROSECUTE THEIR VIOLATORS. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a WIDE RANGE OF DISCRETION, and the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which DEPENDS ON A SMORGASBOARD OF FACTORS WHICH ARE BEST APPRECIATED BY PROSECUTORS.

The law is valid in vesting the DOJ with the power to determine who can qualify as a witness and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Further, the Rules on CrimPro apply only because the courts have already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused to be a state witness is NOT AN INHERENT JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE. Courts do so only as part of the exercise of their jurisdiction. Further, the Rules of CrimPro are not beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass the law protecting a witness and granting her certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in court. Thus, Huberts challenge to the validity of RA 6981 cannot succeed.

25. Civil Liberties Union vs. ES

prohibition against holding another office or employment Petitioners assail constitutionality of EO 284: allowing members of cabinet, Usecs, Asecs to hold other government offices in addition to their primary positions. They contend that this runs counter to Sec 13 which provides that members of Cabinet, deputies, assistants, shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure EO 284: allows these people to hold not more than 2 positions. The Secretary of Justice Ordonez, issued an opinion stating that the members of Cabinet may hold another position if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions. (Thus, this is the legal basis relied upon in issuing EO 284) The petitioners further argue that the E0284 adds to the exceptions under Sec 13. They contend that the phrase unless otherwise provided by this constitution, should refer only to the following exceptions: o 1) the VP may be appointed as member of cabinet o 2) the Sec of DOJ is an ex-officio member of the JBC. Petitioners further argue that the exception under Article IX-B Sec 7(2) on the Civil Service Commission applies only to officers and employees of the civil service, and cannot extend to Article VII Sec 13 (the Cabinet, etc)

ISSUE: Does the prohibition under Sec 13 (on the prohibition against Cabinet members) admit exceptions made for appointive officials under Article IX-B Sec 7(2) SC: NO. Although Article IX-B Sec 7(2) already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in government, the framers of the Constitution saw it fit to FORMULATE A SIMILAR PROVISION under Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, VP, members of Cabinet from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. Evidently, the intent was to IMPOSE A STRICTER PROHIBITION on the President and his official family. In fact, the wording of Sec 13 in Article VII is stricter. The disqualification is ABSOLUTE because there are no qualifications made. The prohibition under Article VII is all-embracing and covers BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE office or employment. Looking closer into Sec 13, second sentence again there is a sweeping, all-embracing prohibition imposed on the President and members of Cabinet, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials, nor members of Congress, nor members of civil service, AFP. This is another proof of the intent of the framers to treat the President and members of his official family A CLASS IN ITSELF. Commissioner Foz stated: We actually have to be stricter with the President and members of Cabinet because they exercise more powers, and therefore more checks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possiblilty of abuse. In short, Article IX-B Sec 7(2) lays the general rule applicable to both elective and appointive officals. Article VII Sec 13 on the other hand is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, VP, Members of Cabinet. BUT the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by these executive officials 1) WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION 2) IN AN EX-OFFICIO CAPACITY, 3) AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND 4) AS REQUIRED BY TH PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF SAID OFFICIALS OFFICE. (meaning they can hold another office) The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office since they are MERELY AN IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS. For example, it would be absurd if the President cannot be the chairman of the NSC. The term ex-officio means from office or by virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived from official character, not expressly conferred upon the individual, but rather annexed to the official position. It also means any act done in official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment than that conferred by the office.

Note also that the additional duties must not only be closely related to , but must be required by the officials primary fun ctions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or alien to the primary function, then it would be prohibited. Because ex-officio position is really part of the principal office, then it follows that there would be no right to receive additional compensation. These services are already paid for and covered by the compensation from his principal office. (not entitled to per diem, honorarium, allowance, or any other euphemism) LAW IS NULL AND VOID.

26. Sarmiento

III vs. Mison

SARMIENTO VS. MISON APPOintments which do not need CA confirmation Petitioners as taxpayers assail constitutionality of Misons appointment as Commisioner of Bureau of Customs. They contend that the appointment has not been confirmed by the CA. The Consti provides for 4 groups whom the President shall appoint: 1) head of executive departments, ambassadors, consuls, officers of the AFP with rank of colonel or naval captain and above, other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Constitution: a) members of the JBC, b) Chairman / commissioners of CSC, Comelec, COA c) members of regular consultative commissions. 2) all other officers of Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law 3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. 4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the President alone The first item is uncontested, they clearly require the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th items are the ones disputed. As to the 4th group, it is argued that since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that the absence of such law, a lower-ranked officer has to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CA. consequently, higher ranked officers should be appointed by the President, also subject to confirmation by the CA

ISSUE: Does the position of Commissioner of BoC require CA confirmation? SC:VALID APPOINTMENT The 2nd, 3rd groups do not require CA confirmation. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitation or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. It is only in the first sentence of Sec 16where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions enumerated therein require the consent of the CA. As to the 4th group, the clear and express intent of the constitution was to exclude presidential appointments from CA confirmation, except the appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16. Thus, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments. In short the word, ALONE, appears to be redundant. It is thus evident that the position of COMMISSIONER OF THE BOC, (a bureau head), is NOT ONE OF THOSE WITHIN THE FIRST GROUP of appointments where consent of the CA is required. As already said, the constitution deliberately excluded the position of bureau heads from the appointments that need the CA confirmation. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the BOC, under Sec 601 of the RA 1937.

27. Blaquera vs Alcala

Facts:

On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government

departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of
presidential control over the executive departments

Held:

The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executivedepartments, bureau or offices under him. When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifyingthe acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

28. LLAMAS

v. EXEC. SEC. ORBOS, OCAMPO III

October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 99031) PARTIES: Petitioner: RODOLFO D. LLAMAS Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III

FACTS: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.

HELD: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

29.
DRILON VS. CA reopening of a case after pardon 1970s: Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon charged with double murder in the military courts. Sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. He later joined KBL (Marcos party) where he was designated as campaign manager. (Because of this, his sentence was reduced to 6 years) After Edsa I, then justice secretary Ordonez wanted to conduct preliminary investigation against Ganzon for the murders. Ganzon claimed that he had been extended an absolute pardon by President Marcos, and having been previously convicted, he cannot be tried anew. The RTC denied the MTD, but the CA granted the MTD. Drilon, as the new justice secretary claims that there exists no evidence to prove that Ganzon was pardoned.

ISSUE: Can Ganzon still be prosecuted? SC: NO MORE. The record shows that Ganzon had already been arraigned by the military court, pleaded not guilty, but convicted and sentenced. He served time until 1978, when he was placed under HOUSE ARREST by President Marcos. Since Ganzon served already 6 years and released, the court cannot tolerate any further reinvestigation. The 6-year service of sentence and subsequent release are significant since if President Marcos ordered Ganzons release after 6 years of imprisonment, Marcos unavoidably commuted Ganzons life imprisonment to 6 y ears. If Ganzons sentence had already been commuted, he has therefore served his sentence fully, and if he has served his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated. Under the Constitution, the pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable. So is commutation of sentence, in which the President reduces a sentence. It extinguishes criminal partially, and has the effect of changing the penalty to a lesser one. The commutation of sentence need not be in a specific form. It is sufficient that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 with no terms or conditions, except that he should remain in house arrest. This house arrest cannot be considered as a continuation of his sentence, because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of taking a person into custody. Also, the exact terms of the house arrest are not known. Hence, irrespective of the pardon, Ganzon has served his sentence and cannot be reinvestigated for the same offense, much more undergo further imprisonment to complete his sentence. The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off too lightly is immaterial. We cannot ignore the legal effects of Marcos acts.