Case digest under Jurisdiction Civil Service Commission vs. Andal G.R. No.

185749 December 16, 2009 Facts: Herminigildo L. Andal (respondent) holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. On 24 January 2000, he filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT) and was admitted to take the examination. The examination results showed that respondent passed the examination with a rating of 81.03%. On 25 January 2000, Arlene S. Vito (Vito), claiming to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination, presented a handwritten authorization allegedly signed by respondent. Upon verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of respondent which Vito presented, there appeared a dissimilarity in the facial features. Bella A. Mitra, then Officer-in-Charge of the Examination, Placement and Services Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), issued a Memorandum on the alleged "impersonation" of respondent and the matter was referred to the Legal Affairs Division to conduct a fact-finding investigation. On 29 November 2000, the CSC-NCR formally charged respondent with dishonesty. A formal investigation of the case was scheduled on 4 June 2001, 21 November 2001, 5 February 2002, and 10 July 2002. Notices were sent to respondents last known address as indicated in his Application Form but respondent failed to appear on the scheduled hearings. Respondent was deemed to have waived his right to appear at the formal investigation and the case proceeded ex parte. the Decision dated May 25, 2005 of the Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), Quezon City, finding him guilty of Dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with accessory penalties of disqualification from re-entering government service, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and bar from taking any civil service examination, pursuant to Section 57 of the Uniformed Rules, is AFFIRMED.

Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has disciplinary jurisdiction to try and decide administrative cases against court personnel.

Held: The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the Court of Appeals cited Section 6, Article VIII6 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all

courts and the personnel thereof. The Court of Appeals further stated that what the CSC should have done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case. In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, thus: Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v. Civil Service Commission. In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. The CSC contends that respondent is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC when he voluntarily submitted himself to the CSC-NCR and was accorded due process, citing the Ampong case. In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She voluntarily went to the CSC regional office, admitted to the charges leveled against her and waived her right to the assistance of counsel. She was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed her answer to the charges against her and even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling of the CSC. In short, Ampong did not question the authority of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated in the proceedings before it. In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSC-NCR. He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that as an employee in the Judiciary, "the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him vests with the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court." It cannot therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC. This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 22 September 2008 and the Resolution dated 2 December 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100452. Accordingly, we DENY the instant petition. Nonetheless, weORDER the Civil Service

Commission to refer the case of respondent Herminigildo L. Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him. Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction Barrameda vs. Rural Bank of Canaman Inc. G.R. No. 176260 November 24, 2010 Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the August 15, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 82711, modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC-Iriga), in Civil Case No. IR-3128, by ordering the consolidation of the said civil case with Special Proceeding Case No.M-5290 (liquidation case) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 (RTC-Makati). It appears from the records that on March 17, 2000, petitioner Lucia BarramedaVda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce Rex and Adden, all surnamed Ballesteros, and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. IR-3128. In her complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2) parcels of land located in San Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur, each with an area of 357 square meters; that on March 6, 1995, without her knowledge and consent, her children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her husband wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot the two parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico); that, still, without her knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of RBCI which mortgage was being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia was occupying Parcel B and had no other place to live. She prayed that the deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver, and the subsequent mortgage in favor of RBCI be declared null and void having been executed without her knowledge and consent. She also prayed for damages. In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico which represented her share in the estate of her husband. The extrajudicial partition, waiver and mortgage were all executed with the knowledge and consent of Lucia although she was not able to sign the document. RBCI further claimed that Parcel B had already been foreclosed way back in 1999 which fact was known to Lucia through the auctioning notary public. Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. IR-3128 WITH THE LIQUIDATION CASE DOCKETED AS SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. M5290 BEFORE BRANCH 59 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY.

Held: This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. As regards Lucias contention that jurisdiction already attached when Civil Case No. IR-3128 was filed with, and jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the liquidation case before the RTC-Makati, her stance fails to persuade this Court. In refuting this assertion, respondent PDIC cited the case of Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal where it was held that the time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial, viz: It is the contention of petitioners, however, that the placing under receivership of Respondent Bank long after the filing of the complaint removed it from the doctrine in the said Morfe Case. This contention is untenable. The time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial. It is the execution that will obviously prejudice the other depositors and creditors. Moreover, as stated in the said Morfe case, the effect of the judgment is only to fix the amount of the debt, and not to give priority over other depositors and creditors. The cited Morfe case11 held that "after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise." Thus, to allow Lucias case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well. Anent the second issue, Lucia faults the CA in directing the consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-3128 with Special Proceedings No.M-5290. The CA committed no error. Lucias complaint involving annulment of deed of mortgage and damages falls within the purview of a disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of R.A. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act). The jurisdiction should be lodged with the liquidation court. Section 30 provides: Sec. 30.Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank: (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community; (b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the BangkoSentral, to meet its liabilities; or (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or (d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without

need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution. For a quasi-bank, any person of recognized competence in banking or finance may be designated as receiver. The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court but shall not, with the exception of administrative expenditures, pay or commit any act that will involve the transfer or disposition of any asset of the institution: Provided, That the receiver may deposit or place the funds of the institution in non-speculative investments. The receiver shall determine as soon as possible, but not later than ninety (90) days from take over, whether the institution may be rehabilitated or otherwise placed in such a condition that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public: Provided, That any determination for the resumption of business of the institution shall be subject to prior approval of the Monetary Board. The power and authority of the Monetary Board to close banks and liquidate them thereafter when public interest so requires is an exercise of the police power of the State. Police power, however, is subject to judicial inquiry. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably and could be set aside if it is either capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or is tantamount to a denial of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation is proper considering that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over Lucias action. It would be more in keeping with law and equity if Lucias case is consolidated with the liquidation case in order to expeditiously determine whether she is entitled to recover the property subject of mortgage from RBCI and, if so, how much she is entitled to receive from the remaining assets of the bank. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Under Cause of Action Barangay San Roque vs. Pastor G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000 An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property. Facts: Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8,

1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

Issue: WON the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.00. Held: The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise: "The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land involved that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved is located. "The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real property is included in a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, Real actions are those affecting title to or possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of mortgage on, real property. x xx" The value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the

litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997 amendmTheir reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules. To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand."17 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs. ents to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.

Parties to Civil Actions AngvsAng G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012 Facts: On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and EmAng (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners. Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay their outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six Hundred Seventy-One U.S. Dollars and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23), inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation. On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States of America (USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against

the respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint7 for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.

Issues: WON Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not the real party in interest in the case. Held: Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 2.Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.