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2008 TECHNEAU TECHNEAU is an Integrated Project Funded by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme, Sustainable Development, Global Change and Ecosystems Thematic Priority Area (contractnumber 018320). All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a database or retrieval system, or published, in any form or in any way, electronically, mechanically, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from the publisher
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Title Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems - A catalogue of todays hazards and possible future hazards, updated version Authors Ralph Beuken (Editor), Mara Reinoso Kiwa Water Research Sebastian Sturm and Joachim Kiefer - TZW Mia Bondelind, Johan strm , Andreas Lindhe, Lars Losn and Thomas Pettersson Chalmers University of Technology Ingo Machenbach, Esa Melin, Thor Thorsen, Bjrnar Eikebrokk, Per Hokstad and Jon Rstum SINTEF Claudia Niewersch, Daniela Kirchner RWTH Aachen University Frantisek Kozisek and Daniel Weyessa Gari SZU. Chris Swartz WRC SA / SWUE Jos Menaia - LNEC Quality Assurance Thomas Pettersson Chalmers University of Technology Deliverable number D4.1.4
(This report is an updated version of Deliverable D4.1.1/2)
Contents
Contents 1
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
5 7
7 9 9 9 10
Introduction
Background Objectives Methodology Todays hazards Future hazards
2
2.1 2.2 2.3
11
11 11 15
3 4
19 21 23
24 27 30 31 33 35 53 58 62 66 68 70
76
Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems TECHNEAU -5-
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Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems TECHNEAU -6-
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The main objective of WA 4 (Risk assessment and risk management) is to integrate risk assessments of the separate parts of a water supply system into a comprehensive decision support framework for cost-efficient risk management in safe and sustainable drinking water supply. The steps in the risk management process are represented in Figure 1. For a further description of the risk management process see Generic Framework and Methods for Integrated Risk Management in Water Safety Plans, TECHNEAU, 2007 [5].
Update
Report and communicate Risk Reduction/ Control Make decisions Treat risks Monitor
Figure 1: The risk management process and the position of hazard identification [5].
Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems TECHNEAU -7-
August, 2008
Another objective OF WA4 is to develop tools that the water utilities can apply when carrying out the risk assessment and risk management work. A conceptual structure model of the framework, which also includes the guides and tools that will be produced in WA 4, is presented in Figure 2. One of the first steps to be addressed in risk management is the identification and description of potential hazards, and therefore the TECHNEAU Hazard Database has been developed and presented in this report.
Guide on Integrated Risk Management Guide on Integrated Risk Analysis Guide on Risk Evaluation Guide on Risk Reduction/Control
TECHNEAU TRRDB WA 4 THDB TECHNEAU TECHNEAU RA Case Methods for TECHNEAU Decision Studies Risk Integrated Hazard support Reduction Risk Database Good tool Option Management examples! Database
TECHNEAU Toolbox
Figure 2
Conceptual structure model of the TECHNEAU Generic framework, including guiding reports and toolbox with the applied risk management tools provided in WA 4
Two different approaches for hazard identification can be applied: a bottomup approach and a top-down approach. The bottom-up approach has its origin in the recorded experience of the staff directly involved in operation and maintenance. In general, the information gathered is suitable for the assets of the water supply system. It has the disadvantage that focus can be given to well known incidents or that the subjective information can be used. The top-down approach is based on a description of a generic water supply process. As the supply process consists of a wide variety of potential elements, a generic list is extensive. The approach presented in this report is a top-down approach and can be used as a complement to the bottom-up approach.
Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems TECHNEAU -8-
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1.2 Objectives
The objective of this database is to help end-users working in water supply systems with the identification of relevant hazards by providing a catalogue with potential hazards of technical, environmental or human origin for the entire system. This report aims to guide end-users through the hazard identification process, providing a hazard database that could be used as a tool to identify hazards in a water supply system. In this report, the hazard database is also mentioned as THDB (TECHNEAU Hazard Data Base).
1.3 Methodology
One crucial aspect in setting-up a hazard identification database is the required level of detail. The database has to be generic for ease of use and at the same time be complete for providing sufficient information. The level of detail has been chosen so it can be regarded as a generic tool that can be applied in many different water supply systems. As the process of water supply is very complex, the database can never be a complete list but be used as a complement to the hazard identification process carried out by the local system experts. The authors opinion is that the most important aspects of the water supply process have been covered. Though, we realize that some parts are still missing, (e.g. the softening process) as this database mainly is intended to be used as a complement. The purpose of this document is a thorough review of the main existing hazards that may cause risks in the drinking water supply system. Existing national checklists and databases have been taken into consideration during the preparation of the hazard database [7] - [12]. Hazards derived from possible futures, described in WA 1, are also included into this report (Appendix 12). The description of the existing and future hazards will be used in the subsequent work packages in WA 4.
1.4
Todays hazards
Traditionally, hazard identifications are performed for separate parts of the water supply system. Within the TECHNEAU project, the water supply system is regarded as a whole and the identification of hazards is done from the raw water source to the consumers tap. The consequences of hazards are related to all the stages of the water supply and the chain of cause and consequences is evaluated through the process. Applying this holistic view helps water companies in preventing sub-optimization of risk management when focusing on specific aspects of water supply. The hazards identified in this report are internal as well as external. Internal hazards are mostly related to failures or the absence of infrastructure. External hazards are for instance source water contamination, degradation of mains due to aggressive soils or terrorist actions.
Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems TECHNEAU -9-
August, 2008
The hazards identified in this report are general hazards of technical, geographical or human origin, having direct effect on the infrastructure for water supply. Other types of hazards, for example of political or economical origin are not assessed specifically in this report. To limit the scope, the database focuses on the primary process of water supply, while supporting activities like buildings, constructions, electrical installations are not addressed.
1.5
Future hazards
To manage risks effectively it is important to identify todays hazards as well as future hazards. Based on a literature review, interviews, evaluation work carried out at Chalmers University of Technology, and contributions from WA 1 partners in the SEPTEDOR (Socio-cultural, Economical, Political, Technical, Ecological, Demographic, Organizatorial and Risk) analysis, major future trends have been identified. The implications of these trends for water supply have been studied and the following categories of hazards have been identified: Sabotage and terrorist attacks Conflicts New chemicals and changed chemical pathways Emerging pathogens Public concern Climate changes Aging distribution systems
The identified future hazards are presented in Appendix 12. For a more detailed description of the future hazards, see Report on trends regarding future risks, TECHNEAU, 2007 [4].
August, 2008
For a proper identification of hazards the boundaries and structure of the system have to be defined. Within this project the water supply system is defined as all physical and organizational structures for the supply of drinking water, stretching out from the catchment area to the customer (from source to tap). Hazards related to the handling of water by consumers at home are covered as well, as these types of hazards can be of importance for the quality of the consumed drinking water, especially for consumers that do not have in-house service connections. As defined in Chapter 1, the hazards identified are related to the primary process of water supply.
2.2 Structure of the Hazard Database
The water supply system is subdivided into 12 sub-systems, of which 10 are physical sub-systems representing the installations, one is a non-physical subsystem representing organizational aspects, and one is representing future hazards. A flow-diagram presenting these sub-systems is given in Figure 3. All hazards identified in these 12 sub-systems are listed in the hazard database presented in Appendices 1 - 12. The breakdown, as given in this flow-diagram, is related to the Generic system flow diagram as presented in the Water Safety Plans, which is described in the third edition of the Drinking Water Quality Guidelines of the WHO [2].
August, 2008
Figure 3: Water supply system subdivided into 12 sub-systems. (SW = surface water, GW = ground water, IW = Infiltration water)
The hazard database is presenting the identified hazards in a table at a subsystem level, as in Figure 2, but is also further sub-divided into component and element levels. At the component level the most important elements are given and at the element level the most relevant hazards are given in combination with a description of the cause of the hazard, the hazard type and the consequences. The format of the hazard database is derived from the Water Safety Plan approach [2]. The different components are presented in Table 1. A preview of the TECHNEAU hazard database is given in Figure 4. In the Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality [ 6] and Water Safety Plans [2] the following definitions are used: A hazard is a biological, chemical, physical or radiological agent that has the potential to cause harm. A hazardous event is an incident or situation that can lead to the presence of a hazard (what can happen and how). Within TECHNEAU a more broad definition of a hazard is given, as the project focuses on both water quality and water quantity. The hazard database makes use of the definitions given in Table 2.
August, 2008
7. Reservoirs and pumps (either directly after treatment or in the distribution system) 8. Transport and distribution (from trunk main to the water meter) 9. Internal piping 10. Consumer and taps (including communal taps) 11. Organization 12. Future hazards (related to the entire drinking water system)
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Sub-system
Element Component
Sub-system
August, 2008
Type of hazard:
Consequence description:
2.3
The identification of possible hazards has been carried out by reviewing literature, interviewing experts, from previous experiences from the WA 4 partners and from the case study work in WA 4. For an overview of the used literature, see Chapter 4. The sub-systems have been set up by the TECHNEAU partners, for the contribution of each partner see Table 3.
August, 2008
Table 3: Contribution of the TECHNEAU partners Sub-system 1. SW catchment 2. GW catchment 3. SW intake and transport 4. SW Infiltration 5. GW/IW abstraction and transport 6. Treatment 7. Reservoirs and pumps 8. Transport and distribution 9. Internal piping 10. Consumer and taps 11. Organization 12. Future hazards TECHNEAU partner Chalmers University of Technology TZW, SZU and Chalmers University of Technology Chalmers University of Technology TZW and SZU TZW and SZU SINTEF, RWTH and Chalmers University of Technology Kiwa Water Research Kiwa Water Research Kiwa Water Research WRC SA /SWUE SINTEF Chalmers University of Technology
In February 2007 the preliminary report version of this report has been made, see Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems [1]. This report has been updated with the information from six case studies carried out by the TECHNEAU partners in WA 4 and committed end-users. Through these case studies the database have been tested and improved (to this updated version). The contribution from each WA 4 partner for updating the database is given in Table 4. Testing of the database has also been done by the Riga Water Company.
August, 2008
Table 4: Updates and improvements by case-studies Responsible Chalmers SZU TZW End-user Case study town Gteborg Sweden Beznice Czech Republic Freiburg-Ebnet Germany Riga Latvia Parts checked Total THDB Total THDB Total THDB Total THDB (except treatment) Subsystem 6 Total THDB
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August, 2008
August, 2008
1. OBJECTIVES
3. ASSEMBLE A TEAM
6. PREPARATION OF MEETINGS
August, 2008
4 References
[1] Beuken, R., et. al. (2007) Identification and description of hazards for water supply systems, TECHNEAU (D4.1.1/2). Davison A, G. Howard, M. Stevens, P. Callan, L. Fewtrell, D. Deere, and J. Bartram (2005) Water Safety Plans, Managing drinking-water quality from catchment to consumer. World Health Organization, WHO/SDE/WSH/05.06. IEC (1996) IEC60300-3-9, Risk Management - Part 3: guide to risk analysis of technological systems, International Electrotechnical Commission. Rosn, L., and A. Lindhe (2007) Trend report Report on trends regarding future risks, TECHNEAU. Rosn, L., P. Hokstad, A. Lindhe, S. Sklet, and J. Rstum (2007) Generic Framework and Methods for Integrated Risk Management in Water Safety Plans, TECHNEAU. WHO (2006), Guidelines for drinking-water quality, First addendum to third edition. World Health Organization, Geneva.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[ 6]
Literature used as a reference for the TECHNEAU Hazard Database: [7] DVGW (2006) Richtlinien fr Trinkwasserschutzgebiete; I. Teil: Schutzgebiete fr Grundwasser. Technische Regel, Arbeitsblatt W 101, June 2006. Glucina, K., A. Alvarez, and J.M. Lan (2000) Assessment of an integrated membrane system for surface water treatment, Desalination 132, 73-82. Lipp, P. and G. Baldauf (2002) Application of out-in MF/UF-systems for drinking water treatment with air supported backwash three case studies, Desalination 147, 63-68. Lozier, J., M. Kitis, C. Colvin, J.H. Kim, B. Mi, and B. Marinas (2004) Microbial removal and integrity monitoring of high-pressure membranes, Awwa Research Foundation. Nadebaum, P., M. Chapman, R. Morden, and S. Rizak (2004) A Guide To Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment For Drinking Water Supplies, Cooperative Research Centre for Water Quality and Treatment, Research Report Number 11.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
August, 2008
[12]
Public Health Risk Management Plan Guides, Ministry of Health, New Zealand, available on the Ministry of Healths Web site: www.moh.govt.nz. Sturm, S. (2005) Schutz von Wassergewinnungsgebieten - Das neue DVGW-Arbeitsblatt W 101. Verffentlichungen aus dem Technologiezentrum Wasser, 28 (ISSN: 1434-5765), 7592, Karlsruhe. Technische Regeln der Deutschen Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.: W 213-3, W 213-1, W 213-4, 213-5, W 217, W 218, W 219, W 220, W 223-1, W 225, W 290, W 294, W 1000. Vrouwenvelder, J.S., J.W.N.M. Kappelhof, S.G.J. Heijmann, J.C. Schippers, and D. van der Kooij (2003) Tools for fouling diagnosis of NF and RO membranes and assessment of the fouling potential of feed water, Desalination 157, 361-365.
[13]
[14]
[15]
August, 2008
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad./ phys Unavail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Contamination of catchment zone Contamination of catchment zone Contamination of catchment zone (directly through the water, or indirectly through the air) Contamination of catchment zone Contamination of catchment zone Contamination of catchment zone
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
1.1.7
Emissions and leakage, oil spills (MTBE) by shipping or traffic Harbour activities
Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens) X Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens) Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens). Nutrient load in water. Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens)
3 and 4
1.1.8
3 and 4
1.1.9
3 and 4
Catchment zone
1.1.10
3 and 4
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Rad./ phys
Unavail.
X
Safety
To sub system
3 and 4
Rel. hazard
Catchment zone
1.1.11
Disrupted inflow such as failure of dams and extreme runoff Sewer overflows due to rainfalls or failures
Catchment zone
1.1.12
3 and 4
Catchment zone
1.1.13
3 and 4
1.1.14
Erosion into catchment with release of soil, sand or contaminants Earthquake, landslides
Contaminated water (chemicals) X Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals). Insufficient raw water. Contaminated water (salinity in elevated levels) X Insufficient raw water Warm raw water to the treatment. Contaminated water (pathogens, nutrient load, pharmaceuticals) Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals, nutrient load)
3 and 4
1.1.15
3 and 4
Catchment zone
Contamination by leakage of sea water into the fresh water Shortage of water Raw water temperature above 25 C Contamination of catchment zone
1.1.16
3 and 4
1.1.17 1.1.18
Drought, blockage of water upstream or abstraction Climate or cooling water from power plants Disposal of manure
X X X
3 and 4 3 and 4
1.1.19
3 and 4
Catchment zone
1.1.20
Runoff from agriculture and urban green areas containing fertilizers, sludge, herbicides, etc
3 and 4
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad./ phys
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
3 and 4
Rel. hazard
1.1.21
Continuous leakage from landfills, contaminated soils or waste dumps Discharges of treated wastewater X
1.1.22
3 and 4
Catchment zone
1.1.23
3 and 4
Catchment zone
1.1.24
Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals, radionucleids). Insufficient raw water. Contaminated water (pathogens)
3 and 4
1.1.25
Birds droppings or animals allowed to cross a protection zone Algae blooms (mostly during summer month's)
3 and 4
1.1.26
3 and 4
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2. Groundwater catchment
Element Hazard Ref. Hazardous event Type of hazardous event D 2.1 Catchment area
Catchment area Contamination of aquifers 2.1.1 Contamination by industrial operations (including continuous discharge as well as installations, construction work and other) Contamination by waste water (e.g. by WWTP, sewers, latrines, sewage collection pipes passed through catchment area, etc.) Leaching of contaminants by built constructions (e.g. landfills using waste or contaminated ground, dumpsites, traffic facilities, installations for handling, storage and deposition of waste materials or excavation residues, etc.) Traffic, incl. accidents (railway tracks, airfields, roads, parking areas, petrol filling stations, air accidents) loss of oil by cars or boats Construction activities with interference in subsoil (e.g. waterway construction, installations for handling or storage of hazardous substances, facilities for construction workers; etc.) (incl. accidents) X X X X Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals, radionucleids) Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals). Nutrient loan in water. Contaminated water (chemicals) 5
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad/ phys Unavail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.2
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.3
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.4
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.5
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Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
5
Rel. hazard
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.6
Increase of vulnerability due to mining activities, gravel pits, excavations uncovering the GW, construction of facilities for geothermal power purposes and /or small water supply systems Agricultural runoff and leach-out containing fertilizers, sludge, herbicides, etc. Manure spread or cattle in the zone
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.7
Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals). Nutrient load in water. Contaminated water (pathogens). Nutrient load in water. Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals)
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.8
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.9
Geophysical incidents (e.g. extreme hydraulic events such as torrential rain, floods, erosion, landslides, karstic land surface with open dolines; etc.) Accidents or spreading out of hazardous materials during recreational activities (e.g. mass rallies, fish ponds, shooting galleries, sports facilities incl. motor sports, horse-race grounds, zoo / animal reserves, camps, campsites; etc.), or military field exercises and training areas. Contamination by forestry activities, wild life activities, natural fowls, dead animals, bird pest (flu)
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.10
Catchment area
Contamination of aquifers
2.1.11
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
5
Rel. hazard
Catchment area
Infiltration of GW by alien water (e.g.: salt water intrusion, leaching of contaminated surface water... ) Shortage of ground water resources Reduced biological activity in the treatment Contamination of aquifers Contamination of aquifers
2.1.12
Wetlands & flood plains not hydraulically separated from the aquifer
2.1.13
Ground water aquifer is not sufficiently fed or water is abstracted by others Water temperature under 4C Radioactivity fall-out Terrorist and vandalism actions
Unavailability of raw water Reduced biological activity in the treatment Contaminated water
2.1.14
2.1.15 2.1.16
X X X X
X X X
5 5
Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals, radionucleids). Insufficient raw water. Contaminated water. Insufficient raw water
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Rel. hazard
3.1.2
4 and 6
3.1.3
4 and 6
Contamination and / or unavailability of water Shortage / unavailability of water Power failure Pipe burst
3.1.4
4 and 6
Pumping systems
3.1.5
4 and 6
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad./ Unaphys vail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
4.1.2
Intensive agricultural activities (farming, application of fertilizers and pesticides, wood preservatives etc.)
Contaminated water (pathogens, heavy metals, badly degradable organic compounds, nitrogen, phosphorous) X Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals) Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals, salts). Mechanical damage of abstraction sites. Contaminated water (chemicals)
Direct contamination of water source area Direct contamination of infiltration boreholes and surroundings (bank) Direct contamination of water source area
4.1.3
Sabotage acts, terrorism or vandalism. Discharges from wastewaters, landfills, runoff, accidents or natural disasters (e.g. earthquake, flooding, landslide, fire). Bloom of toxic blue algae
4.1.4
Catchment area
4.1.5
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Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Safety
Rel. hazard
Catchment area
Contamination of ground water system (infiltration) because of polluted source surface water Conflicts
4.2.2
4.2.3
Conflicting interests between ecological aspects and drinking water aspects Settling of pollutants from air
Political actions leading to water shortage Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals) Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals)
Contamination of ground water system Flood water entering the ground water system Failure of monitoring system
4.2.4
4.2.5
Flooding
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad./ phys Unavail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Contamination of ground water Contamination through openings ( e.g. well-head, ventilation pipe, grit chamber, stilling basin, overflow pipe, doors...) Security failure, causing contamination Soil setting and hydraulic bypass Soil setting, flooding, chamber buoyancy, corrosive soil materials Clogging of wells and pumps
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals) Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals) Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals)
5.1.5
Improper or missing bentonite layers. Improper maintenance concept, flood alarm and sump pump lacking
5.1.6
Well chamber
5.1.7
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad./ phys
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
6
Rel. hazard
Infiltration dams
5.1.8
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6. Treatment
Element Hazard Ref. Hazardous event Type of hazardous event D 6.1 Treatment, generic hazards
General Damage/destruc tion of treatment modules 6.1.1 Natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, storms); fires; poor construction conditions of the buildings; etc. X X X X X X X Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Damages to infrastructure. Contaminated water. Damages to infrastructure. 7
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad/ phys Unavail.. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
General
Nuclear contamination (directly through the water, or indirectly through the air) Insufficient quantity of raw water Insufficient quality of raw water Wrong sampling of the water
6.1.2
Nuclear accident
Raw water
6.1.3
02
Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Reduced knowledge about real water quality
Raw water
6.1.4
02
Raw water
6.1.5
Contamination at sampling points (especially with negative pressures); sampling points no easily accessible. E.g. ineffective removal of contaminants and control of DBP (Disinfected ByProducts), lack of specific knowledge due to outsourcing, etc..
Design
Inadequate design of the treatment process in relation to raw water quality (at all or due to peak pollution events) and to local conditions.
6.1.6
01
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
X
Safety
X
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Operation
6.1.7
E.g. not adequate coagulants or oxidants are used, improper pH value is maintained, no proper dose of coagulant or oxidants is used, lack of specific knowledge due to outsourcing, etc. Flow meter is not calibrated X
Flow control
Non-optimal flow
6.1.8
Use of materials
Contamination or wear due to the use of materials not suitable for contact with drinking water Submerging of pumps, etc and/or interruption of process Power interruptions
6.1.9
E.g. coatings, ion-exchange resins, iron not protected against corrosion, etc.
Installations in basement
6.1.10
Contaminated water. Damage to infrastructures. Safety and environmental impacts. Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply.
Electrical power
6.1.11
No or unstable electrical power; no or failing back-up; automatic operation control switched off during storms and lightning; etc. Inappropriate maintenance scheme
Maintenanc e of assets
6.1.12
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
Safety
X
Rel. hazard
Dosing of chemicals
6.2.2
(a) failure of dosing unit incl. power supply; (b) no sufficient supply available; (c) personal (operational) failure; (d) incorrect measurement Inadequate storage of chemicals
Use of chemicals
Staff getting into undesired contact with chemicals Blockages in screening sleeves
6.2.3
No
Screens
6.3.2
Dosing
6.4.2
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
Safety
To sub system
6.5 to 6.9 and 7
Rel. hazard
Insufficient flocculation
6.4.3
Improper coagulant mixing and/or flocculation; inappropriate flocculant or flocculation agent; improper pH control. Using polymers as flocculants containing nonflocculating-monomers Inappropriate pH, temperature and/or dispersing time of the dosing solution of flocculation agents, disturbing ingredients in the water the chemicals are dispersed with; precipitation due to stagnant regions in the water tank for flocculation agents build-up; etc. Insufficient turbulence for the initiation of aggregation; insufficient mixing of dosing mixture and water; influence of Ca, Mg, PO4, SO4, pH, acid capacity, dissolved organic matter; earth alkali (if polyacrylamid as flocculation agent); too short time between dosage of flocculant and flocculation agent; ozone in the water; existence of complex-binding organic substances or acid raw water when using aluminium as flocculation agent; etc. Failure of the dosing pump; power failure in an automatized controlled system
6.4.4
Inappropriate conditions during dispersion of flocculants or flocculation agents in the sedimentation basin.
6.4.5
Sedimentati on basin
Adverse conditions after adding the water-flocculant/ flocculant agent mixture to the water
6.4.6
6.4.7
Contaminated water
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
E
X
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
X
Safety
X
Description
Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens,...) Contaminated water (pathogens)
To sub system
6.5 to 6.9 and 7 6.5 to 6.9 and 7 6.5 to 6.9 and 7 6.5 to 6.9 and 7
Rel. hazard
Coagulation / flocculation process Coagulation / flocculation agents Settling tank Settling tank
Failure of the automatized, programmable control system Biological contamination during the flocculation Inadequate floc settling Improper design of setting tank
6.4.8
6.4.9
Microbiological activity when using flocculation agent contaminated by yeast Wind and/or low temperatures Retention time too short; mechanical failure of the stirrer; up flow velocity too high; weir overflow rate too high; insufficient sludge draw-off; retention time too short; reaction zone and/or clarification zone not sized correctly; wrong media specifications; poor bubble formation; etc. Air release nozzles not kept clean or blockages not cleared; floc carry-over takes place Insufficient sampling frequency at control point; inappropriate monitoring program; malfunction of measuring instruments due to construction, operation system or maintenance
6.4.10
6.4.11
Improper operation or inadequate desludging programme Failure of the monitoring of: physical (e.g. turbidity, flow, pH, Al/Fe-load), biological parameters (e.g. E. coli), pressure, chemical parameters
6.4.12
Monitoring system
6.4.13
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
X
Safety
Rel. hazard
Filter bed
6.5.2
8,1 or 2
Filter bed
Filter blockage
6.5.3
Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens, turbidity). No/insufficient water supply. Damage in the filter bed.
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
X
Safety
To sub system
6.6 to 6.9 and 7
Rel. hazard
Filter bed
Filter blockage
6.5.4
Undesired particles in the filter due to failure of micro sieves or inadequate design
Filter bed
Filter damage
6.5.5
Filter bed
6.5.6
Changes in quality due to high turbidity in raw water or high dosage of Fe Failure of the flue damper or the dosing pump
6.5.7
Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens, turbidity). No/insufficient water supply. Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens, turbidity). No/insufficient water supply.
Cleaning system
6.5.8
Backpressure of the cleaning water; erratic distribution of the cleaning media due to changes in the support layer or other destruction in the filter layers; contaminants of the manufacturing process in the filter; etc. Cleaning media contaminated; not discarding of the first filtrated water after the cleaning; microbiological activity due to insufficient cleaning; chemical contamination downstream of the filter.
Cleaning system
6.5.9
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Safety
To sub system
6.6 to 6.9 and 7
Rel. hazard
Cleaning system
6.5.10
Disruption during cleaning process or maintenance or repair in combination with only one existing filtrationline Poor construction or operation of backwashing concept; poor performance of air scourers; blocked nozzles; uneven distribution of water and air. Sand not replaced when required Poor filter performance after washing.
Cleaning system
Improper or infrequent backwashing or improper washing equipment Improper filter media Lower removal efficiency during the early stage of rapid filter operation (filter ripening) Refeeding cleaning water Contaminants in waste water Failure of the automatized, programmable control system Little local knowledge on operation and the condition of the installation
6.5.11
6.5.12
6.5.13
6.5.14
Wrong management of the feeding water Inappropriate cleaning water treatment Power failure, programmable errors
Contaminated water (pathogens). X X Environmental pollution, bad image X X X Several possibilities depends on the kinds of failures Inefficient operation
6.5.15
6.5.16
Monitoring
6.5.17
Monitoring on distance
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
E
X
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
X
Safety
To sub system
6.6 to 6.9 and 7
Rel. hazard
Monitoring
Failure of monitoring
6.5.18
Absent or insufficient monitoring of the pressure difference and operational pressure; inappropriate monitoring and sampling concepts; malfunctioning measuring instrument; no manholes existing; etc.
Unavailability of chlorine gas Malfunctioning dosing systems Particles in the water during the disinfection process Pathogens are protected against the disinfection Too short reaction time of disinfection agents in the water
6.6.2
Levels of gas bottles not checked; new bottles not ordered timeously; etc. Errors in chlorine solution concentration; blockages. Inappropriate pre-treatment X
6.6.3
6.6.B UV disinfection
6.6.4 X X X X 7
General
6.6.5
General
6.6.6
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
E
X
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
Rad/ phys
Unavail..
Safety
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
UV lamps
6.6.7
Decrease of lamp performance due to ageing or colour sediments on quartz tube. Electrical disruptions Incorrect specifications of lamps Power failure, programmable errors X
Improper installation Failure of the automatized, programmable control system Power fluctuations Particles in the water during the disinfection process. Formation of DBP (Disinfectant By Products) Excessive ozone concentration Insufficient disinfection due to inadequate design No or inadequate air compression No or inadequate oxygen No or inadequate ozone generation
6.6.8 6.6.9
X X X X X X X X X
Contaminated water (pathogens) Several possibilities depends on the kinds of failures Contaminated water (pathogens) Contaminated water (pathogens)
7 7
6.6.10
General
6.6.12
1,2
General
6.6.13
Insufficient contact time; insufficient reaction; too high dosage; etc. Insufficient contact time
No
Ozone contactor
6.6.14
X X X
X X X
X X X
7 7 7
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
E
X
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
Rad/ phys
Unavail..
Safety
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Ozone generator
No or inadequate cooling system in the ozone generator Ozone dose too low
6.6.18
6.6.19
6.6.20
6.6.21
Contaminated water. Ozone pollution in environment and staff. Contaminated water (pathogens) Contaminated water (pathogens)
Inadequate ozone dosing Decrease or irregular ozone transfer efficiency Insufficient disinfection Insufficient disinfection Insufficient disinfection Disruption of water to the disinfection Power fluctuations
6.6.22 6.6.23
X X
X X
7 7
Ozone contactor Ozone contactor Ozone contactor Pumping system Power supply
Unusually high content of organic matter in raw water Water usage exceeding design flow Bromide content in the raw water Pumps failure X X
X X X
1,2 5 1,2
X X X X
Contaminated water (pathogens) Contaminated water (pathogens) Contaminated water (bromate, pathogens) X No/insufficient water supply Contaminated water (pathogens)
7 7 7
6.6.27
6.6.28
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
X
Safety
X
Description
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
6.7.2
Membrane
Membrane fouling
6.7.3
Membrane
Membrane damage
6.7.4
Membrane
6.7.5
Membrane
6.7.6
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Rad/ phys
Unavail..
Safety
X
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Membrane
6.7.7
No discard of the first filtrated water after the cleaning; stored chemicals released into the water downstream of the filter Bacterial growth on permeate side or internal surfaces
Outlet of membrane, pipe system, internal surfaces Pipe system, pumps Cleaning
6.7.8
Burst of pipes, pump failure DBP (Disinfection By Products) Wear at membrane components Failure of the compressor/the pneumatic system, or of the automatized, programmable control system. Monitoring failure of the membrane Failure of the monitoring of: physical (e.g. turbidity, flow, TMP), biological parameters (e.g. parasites), pressure, chemical parameters
6.7.9
Plugging due to algal bloom, artefacts, accumulation; wear; wrong design Disinfection of the membrane
6.7.10
Cleaning
6.7.11
Frequent backwashing
Contaminated water. X X Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Several possibilities depends on the kinds of failures. Delayed or no detection of membrane failure Delayed or no detection of contaminants in the filtered water
6.7.12
Monitoring
6.7.13
No particle counter or bubble test, pressure decay test Inappropriate monitoring and/or sampling. Malfunction of measuring instruments. Power failure.
Monitoring
6.7.14
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Safety
Rel. hazard
Slow filter
Filter blockage
6.8.2
Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals). No/insufficient water supply. Contaminated water (pathogens, chemicals). No/insufficient water supply.
Slow filter
6.8.3
Inappropriate filtration speed, filter material, running time, cleaning, layer thickness, filter adjustment; insufficient removal of the top layer; inappropriate adjustments during start up phase; absent or insufficient monitoring of pressure differences and operational pressure; etc. Blocking of the overflow pipe; extreme rainfalls; too low freeboard; etc. Deterioration, erratic hydraulic stress; rumpling of the filtration layer by small animals or insects; disturbance of microbial fauna in the filter or out washing of filter organisms; etc. Negative pressure in the pipes between the filters and the reservoirs because any valve is closed.
Slow filter
Filter breakage, damage of the filter Filter breakage, damage of the filter
6.8.4
No
Slow filter
6.8.5
6.8.6
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
Safety
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Monitoring
Bad quality of the sand Failure of the monitoring of: physical (e.g. turbidity, flow), biological parameters (e.g. parasites), pressure, chemical parameters Insufficient removal of target contaminants due to intrinsically insufficient adsorption capacity Insufficient removal of target contaminants due to intrinsically insufficient adsorption capacity Insufficient removal of target contaminants due to intrinsically insufficient adsorption capacity
6.8.7
Wrong control of sand quality when renewing the material of the filter. Inappropriate monitoring and sampling concepts, malfunction of measuring instruments. Power failure. X
Monitoring
6.8.8
6.9.2
6.9.3
Loss of GAC during back wash (velocity of back wash too high)
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Rad/ phys
Unavail..
Safety
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Insufficient removal of target contaminants due to depletion and/or obstruction of adsorption capacity Insufficient removal and/or release of target contaminants due to depletion and/or obstruction of adsorption capacity Insufficient removal and/or release of target contaminants due to depletion and/or obstruction of adsorption capacity Insufficient production capacity due increased head loss and/or to need for increased back wash frequency
6.9.4
Elevated concentration of adsorbing (target contaminants, NOM) and/or pore blocking (particles, turbidity) materials in water due to events in raw water source or upstream process steps Overestimation of the filtration run time before reactivation is necessary X X
6.9.5
6.9.6
Velocity of backwash too high, so carbon with high load of adsorbed contaminants settles in deeper layers of the filter, where the concentrations of contaminants are much lower than in the top of the filter Increased head loss build up rates due to elevated particles concentrations (raw water or carry over) X
6.9.7
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Safety
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Insufficient production capacity due increased head loss and/or to need for increased back wash frequency Insufficient production capacity due increased head loss and/or to need for increased back wash frequency Stop the supply of water for the carbon filtration Escape of activated carbon to the treated water Carbon dust in the air of the plant Adverse and/or excessive biological activity in filter (causing oxygen depletion, biological contamination, etc.)
6.9.8
Increased head loss build up rates due to unsuitable (too small) GAC grain size
6.9.9
Increased head loss build up rates due to ineffective back wash protocol
6.9.10
Equipment failure (pumps, valves, nozzles, operating systems, etc) Failure / insufficient performance activated carbon retaining devices (sieves, supportive layer) Filling of activated carbon in dry state (not slurry) Too low filtration velocity or stagnant water in filters due to production halt. X
No water supply
6.9.11
Contaminated water (carbon particles) X Reduced safety for the staff Contaminated water (chemicals, pathogens)
6.9.12
No
6.9.13
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail..
Safety
To sub system
7
Rel. hazard
Adverse and/or excessive biological activity in filter (causing oxygen depletion, biological contamination, etc.) Adverse and/or excessive biological activity in filter (causing oxygen depletion, biological contamination, etc.) Adverse and/or excessive biological activity in filter (causing oxygen depletion, biological contamination, etc.) Adverse and/or excessive biological activity in filter (causing oxygen depletion, biological contamination, etc.)
6.9.14
Decrease in pH
6.9.15
6.9.16
6.9.17
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic Rad/ phys Unavail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
General
7.1.2
General
7.1.3
General
7.1.4
General
7.1.5
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail.
X
Safety
X
To sub system
8
Rel. hazard
General
Contamination of water
7.1.6
General
Contamination of water
7.1.7
Introduction of contaminants by improper use of material or operational errors Poor hygiene during reservoir construction, repair or cleaning
Reservoir
Contamination of water
7.1.8
Reservoir
Contamination of water
7.1.9
Intrusion of contaminants (e.g., bird and animal faeces), dust or vermin through improperly sealed access openings or hatches and faulty or fouled screening of vents and overflow pipes Intrusion of contaminants thought cracks in the reservoir roof
Reservoir
Contamination of water
7.1.10
Water with pathogenic and/or chemical contaminants, dust and/or vermin Water with micro organisms and/or chemical contaminants X Water with poor microbiological quality and with taste and odour
Reservoir
Contamination of water
7.1.11
Intrusion of contaminants thought cracks in the reservoir walls or floor Aging of water due to low turnover rates or uneven hydraulic mixing
Reservoir
7.1.12
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
X
Ref. OS.
6
Che mic
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
8
Rel. hazard
Reservoir
7.1.13
Reservoir
7.1.14
General
7.2.2
General
7.2.3
Pumps
7.2.4
Damage or destruction of network pipes due to water hammer, caused by absent or malfunctioning surge tanks
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail.
X
Safety
To sub system
8
Rel. hazard
Pumps
No/low pressure/flow in network water. Network water contamination No/low pressure/flow in network water. Network water contamination Excessive pressure in network water No/low pressure/flow in network water. Network water contamination Water contamination
7.2.5
Pump malfunctioning/failure
Pumps
7.2.6
Pump stoppage due to power failure/disruption and failing power back-up supply
Pumps
7.2.7
Excessively high pressure in the network due to wrong settings or deficient control of pumps operation Low pressure in the network due to wrong settings, deficient metering or deficient control of pumps operation Contaminants pulled in at the suction side of a pump
Pumps
7.2.8
Pumps
7.2.9
Pumps
Water contamination
7.2.10
Introduction of pollutants by improper use of material or operational errors Poor hygiene during pump installation, maintenance or repair
Water contaminated with chemicals and/or with taste and odour Water contaminated with pathogens and/or chemicals, and/or with taste and odour X Network sediments re-suspension
Pumps
Water contamination
7.2.11
Pumps
Water contamination
7.2.12
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Rad/ phys
Unavail.
X
Safety
Rel. hazard
Control valves
7.3.2
Control valves
7.3.3
Introduction of contaminants by improper use of material or operational errors Poor hygiene during installation, maintenance or repair of valves
Control valves
Contamination of water
7.3.4
7.3.5
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic Rad./ phys Una vail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Pipes
8.1.2
Pipes
8.1.3
Pipes
8.1.4
Pipes
8.1.5
Pipes
8.1.6
Pipes
8.1.7
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
E
X
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic
X
Rad./ phys
Una vail.
Safety
To sub system
9
Rel. hazard
Pipes
8.1.8
Intrusion of contaminated water due to low (negative) pressure in the network, in combination with cracks or leaking joints Migrating substances from polymer material (e.g. vinyl chloride leaching from PVC pipes) Leaching of contaminants from cement made or lined pipes
Pipes
8.1.9
Contaminated water (e.g. with vinyl chloride) Water contaminated with metals (e.g., aluminium, arsenic, barium, chromium, cadmium) X Water contaminated with PAHs and with taste and odour Water contaminated with chemicals (gasoline and diesel constituents, solvents, etc.) X Water contamination (pathogens, chemicals) due to backflow of nonpotable water or fluids into network Water of poor microbiological quality and with taste and odour Water of poor microbiological quality
Pipes
8.1.10
Pipes
8.1.11
Leaching of organic compounds from bituminous sealants and linings Permeation of organicpollutants in the soil through rubber joints or the (PE or PVC) pipe wall Backflow or back-siphonage of non-potable water (e.g., wastewater) or fluids (e.g., industrial)
Pipes
8.1.12
Pipes
8.1.13
Pipes
8.1.14
Pipes
8.1.15
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
X
Ref. OS.
6
Rad./ phys
X
Una vail.
Safety
To sub system
9
Rel. hazard
Pipes
8.1.16
Too high dosage of disinfectant residual (e.g., malfunctioning dosing pump(s)) "Re-suspension of sediments or sloughing of tubercle/biofilm due to rapid changes in water
Pipes
8.1.17
Wate r disco lorati on and incre ased micro bial conte nts X X X X
Manholes, fire hydrants, meter boxes, connections, hatches (all access points to the water)
8.1.18
Contamination of water with pathogens, toxins, toxic chemicals, or radioactive materials. Restriction on water use. Consumers' panic and loss of confidence No/insufficient water supply to consumers and fire fighting. Disruption of the system operational control.
8.1.19
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
E
X
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic
X
Rad./ phys
Una vail.
Safety
To sub system
9
Rel. hazard
Valves
8.1.20
Valve pit flood allowing contaminants intrusion thought defective valve sealing, in combination with low pressure in the network Inadequate settings or control, or malfunctioning/failure of pressure reducing valve Defective or clogged fire hydrant
8.1.21
Excessive pressure in the network. Increased pipe leakage/burst. X Fire fighting is hindered
8.1.22
No
8.2.3
Water flow is obstructed Water flow is obstructed Contaminants (microbial, chemical) enter into the network
9-10
8.2.4
9-10
8.2.5
Water meters
8.2.6
9-10
August, 2008
9. Internal piping
Element Hazard Ref. Hazardous event Type of hazardous event D O E OS Ref. OS.
8
Safety
Rel. hazard
General
9.1.2
10, 8
General
9.1.3
Pipe burst due to poor pipe material, excessive pressure, water hammer, building activities (e.g. drilling) Excessive pressure in the distribution system
10
General
9.1.4
10
General
Water contamination
9.1.5
10
General
Water contamination
9.1.6
Backflow or back-siphonage of contaminated water from other systems (e.g., waste, fire protection, garden watering and irrigation)
10
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Type of hazard Che mic. Rad/ phys Unavail. Safety External damage
To sub system
10
Rel. hazard
General
9.1.7
Microbial regrowth enhancement by relatively high water-temperature or heating of water by warm objects at close distance Loss of pipes' hydraulic capacity due to incrustation build-up Corrosion of plumbing system materials, which is promoted by low pH, temperature, insufficient or excessive alkalinity in the water Migrating substances from polymer material (e.g. vinyl chloride leaching from PVC pipes) Plumbosolvency of lead pipes, which may be promoted by water low-pH and low alkalinity Sediment accumulation and microbial growth in water stagnated at dead-end branches Iron corrosion from iron/steel pipes
9.1.8
10
9.1.9
10
Internal pipes
Water contamination
9.1.10
10
Internal pipes
Water contamination
9.1.11
10
Internal pipes
9.1.12
Water contaminated with pathogens (e.g., Legionella) and with taste, odour and colour "Discoloured water (red-water) with metallic flavour causing reddishbrown stains on laundry" Nuisance to customers and neighbours
10
Internal pipes
9.1.13
10
Internal pipes
Annoying noise
9.1.14
10
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
10
Rel. hazard
9.1.15
Microbial growth due too long residence time of water, warm temperatures, sediment accumulation or exposition of the water to light
Water heater
9.2.2
10
Burns
9.2.3
10
General
9.3.2
10
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
Unavail.
Safety
To sub system
10
Rel. hazard
General
Contaminated water
9.3.3
Failure of the contaminant removal process (e.g., exhaustion of the resin or carbon adsorptive capacity; UV lamp bulb/housing opaqued by dirt) Enhanced corrosion of plumbing system and appliances materials (e.g., lead, copper) due to excessive water softening Backflow of liquid waste streams (e.g., reverse osmosis, ionic exchange resins) or backwash water (adsorptive media filters) to the treated water lines Growth/release of micro organisms from treatment devices (e.g. granular activated carbon filters) Unsafe handling or storage of strong caustics/acids used for adsorptive media regeneration X
General
Contaminated water
9.3.4
10
General
Chemical contamination
9.3.5
10
General
9.3.6
10
General
Chemical injuries
9.3.7
10
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad/ phys Unav Saail. fety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Communal standpipes or ground tanks Open-top containers (buckets) Open-top or closed-top containers Open-top or closed-top containers Ground tanks Ground tanks
10.1.4
Not relev.
10.2.2
10.2.3
10.2.4
Soiled nappies or soiled children washed directly at the ground tank Poor condition and age of the containers, leaking containers X X
10.2.5
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad/ phys
X
To sub system
Not relev. Not relev.
Rel. hazard
Poor water quality from the containers Poor water quality from the containers
10.2.6
Top not fitted correctly over the tank allowing dirt and dust to enter the tank Biofilm formation from the inner walls of the ground tanks
10.2.7
August, 2008
11. Organization
Element Hazard Ref. Hazardous event Type of hazardous event D 11.1 Organization
Organization Disturbance of the process in general 11.1.1 Use of out-of-date guidelines X X X X X X X Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient From 1 to 10
Type of hazard Biol og. Che mic. Rad/ phys Unav Saail. fety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Organization
11.1.2
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.3
Inappropriate personal organization (e.g. no assignment of responsibilities, no responsible person, inappropriate qualification) Insufficient on-call-duty
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.4
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.5
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.6
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.7
From 1 to 10
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
To sub system
Rel. hazard
general
programming by unqualified staff 11.1.8 Operational fault in the automatized process due to inappropriate IT policy X X X X X X X
Organization
Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Danger to the staff or environment
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.9
Lack of feeling, unawareness of technical status of installations due to automatization Low quality of data input to information systems, incomplete, errors, etc
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.10
From 1 to 10
Organization
11.1.11
From 1 to 10
August, 2008
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad./ phys Una vail. Safety External damage
OS
Ref. OS.
Rel. hazard
Source water
12.1.2
1 to 5
Source water
12.1.3
Non accessible information. To prevent sabotage and terrorist attacks information regarding source water, treatment and distribution are classified. Due to this all necessary information might not be available to the personal and people in general.
1 to 5
Source water
Conflicts
12.1.4
Military conflicts
1 to 5
Source water
Conflicts
12.1.5
Political conflicts
1 to 5
Source water
Conflicts
12.1.6
1 to 5
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Rad./ phys
Una vail.
Safety
To sub system
1 to 5
Rel. hazard
Source water
New chemicals and changed chemical pathways New chemicals and changed chemical pathways
12.1.7
Discharge of new chemicals to source waters due to e.g. accidents or continuous leakage Discharge of chemicals due to new applications
Source water
12.1.8
1 to 5
Source water
Emerging pathogens
12.1.9
1 to 5
12.1.10 12.1.11
New precipitation and evaporation patterns The climate changes' effects on water quality (changed surface runoff and material transport effecting water quality) Physical damage (e.g. bombing attack) Intentional chemical contamination
X X X X X
No/insufficient water supply No/insufficient water supply. Contaminated water (including higher temperature of supplied water)
1 to 5 1, 2 and 4
12.2 Treatment
Treatment Treatment Sabotage and terrorist attacks Sabotage and terrorist attacks 12.2.1 12.2.2 X X X X X X Water shortage and technical damage Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Public concern, bad image. Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Public concern, bad image. 6 6
Treatment
12.2.3
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
X
Rad./ phys
X
Una vail.
X
Safety
To sub system
6
Rel. hazard
Treatment
Sabotage and terrorist attacks Sabotage and terrorist attacks Sabotage and terrorist attacks
12.2.4
People entering into the plant, sabotaging the process Cyber attack (e.g. manipulation of operational steps) Non accessible information. To prevent sabotage and terrorist attacks information regarding source water, treatment and distribution are classified. Due to this all necessary information might not be available to the personal and people in general. X
Treatment
12.2.5
Treatment
12.2.6
Treatment
Conflicts
12.2.7
Military conflicts
Treatment
Conflicts
12.2.8
Political conflicts
Treatment
12.2.9
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Che mic.
Rad./ phys
Una vail.
Safety
To sub system
6
Rel. hazard
Treatment
Emerging pathogens
12.2.10
12.3 Distribution
Distribution Distribution Sabotage and terrorist attacks Sabotage and terrorist attacks 12.3.1 12.3.2 Physical damage (e.g. bombing attack) Intentional chemical contamination X X X X X X Water shortage and technical damage Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Public concern, bad image. Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. Public concern, bad image. X X X Contaminated water. No/insufficient water supply. X If the personal operating the system does not have all necessary information, actions might be taken that introduce new risks to the system. Also people in general might, because of lack of information, act in a way that pose new risks to the system. Water shortage and health effects are possible. X Contaminated water. No/insufficient water. Technical damage. 7 to 9 7 to 9
Distribution
12.3.3
7 to 9
Distribution
12.3.4
Cyber attack (e.g. manipulation of operational steps) Non accessible information. To prevent sabotage and terrorist attacks information regarding source water, treatment and distribution are classified. Due to this all necessary information might not be available to the personal and people in general. X
7 to 9
Distribution
12.3.5
7 to 9
Distribution
Conflicts
12.3.6
Military conflicts
7 to 9
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
OS
Ref. OS.
Safety
To sub system
7 to 9
Rel. hazard
Distribution
Conflicts
12.3.7
Political conflicts
Distribution
12.3.8
7 to 9
Distribution
Emerging pathogens
12.3.9
7 to 9
Distribution
Aging distribution systems Aging distribution systems Sabotage and terrorist attacks
12.3.10
Damaged distribution system and possible intrusion of contaminants Increased retention times due to oversized systems
7 to 9
Distribution
12.3.11
7 to 9
12.4 Consumers
Consumers 12.4.1 Changed human behaviour after terrorist attacks leading to avoidance of tap water X X X X Indirect damage. Because of lack of trust in tap water people use water from other sources and if this water is of poor quality it might cause negative health effects Increased number of waterborne infections 10
Consumers
Emerging pathogens
12.4.2
Changed infection patterns (increased exposure to pathogens due to e.g. migration of citizens)
10
August, 2008
Element
Hazard
Ref.
Hazardous event
Type of hazard Biolog. Che mic. Rad./ phys Una vail. Safety External damage
X
OS
Ref. OS.
To sub system
10
Rel. hazard
Consumers
Public concern
12.4.3
August, 2008
STEP 2: Split up the system and make a system description Make a system description and, if necessary contact other stakeholders. Decide on the number of meetings needed and plan for these. The number of meetings needed depends on the complexity of the system, the parts of the systems that will be included and discussed and the available resources. Select the parts of the THDB that are useful for the specific location (some sub-systems or components may not be relevant for the system to be studied).
STEP 3: Assemble a team Select the participants for each meeting session: - Number of persons: responsible(s) + 2 to 4 experts - English speakers (THDB in English) - Different knowledge background: o Specialists: technical experts with deep knowledge of the most relevant processes and parts of the system o Generalists: people with overall knowledge and overall view of the system o Also invite non-technicians for other info (financial, consumers, laws) - Personality: cooperative, involved, open minded, not biased, etc.
August, 2008
STEP 4: Interviews with the experts (bottom-up method) Interview all the experts for their opinion on the most relevant hazards (bottom-up approach). Make a list of identified hazards structured according to the subsystems and components of the THDB.
STEP 5: Contact with participants and organization of meetings Set the dates, places and duration for the meetings. As these meetings are rather intensive it is advised to plan maximum half a day per meeting. Send the participants the THDB, the system description and an introduction based on the items mentioned in step 1 and 2. For a more efficient meeting it is advised to ask the participants prepare themselves by going through the relevant parts of the THDB and by consulting others if needed.
STEP 6: Preparation of the meetings Prepare a short presentation (for content see Step 7a). Prepare the material for the sessions, such as: - Overhead projector, screen and computer (so the THDB can be shown on the screen and direct input is visible for everyone) - Round-table setting - Flip-over and colour markers - Flow diagram of the system - Definitions of hazard, hazardous event, criteria for hazard identification should be put up on a blackboard during the sessions to help structuring further discussions
STEP 7: Hazard identification session 7a: Introduction The sessions with the participants could follow the following structure: Presentation of the participants. Objective of the hazard identification and aim of the meeting. Presentation of the definitions like: hazard, hazardous event, risk, risk management, etc. Presentation: THDB, system description, time-frame. Description of how to work: how to use the THDB, what to look for, how will the session be structured, set criteria for the hazard identification. Show the structure of the THDB, including different sub-systems.
August, 2008
7b: Hazard identification (top-down) For each component in the sub-systems: go through each row of the THDB asking participants if this hazard is expected to be relevant, if so indicate the result as a tick. A proposal for indicating relevant hazards is given in tip and ticks hereunder. Per component, make a list of the identified hazards and compare them with the bottom-up identified hazards.
7c: Definition of identified hazards Sum-up the list of identified hazards in each sub-system, ask the participants if they agree with the results or if changes are to me made. Evaluate the hazard identification activity.
STEP 8: Finalizing Make a draft report of the results. Following items are advised to be mentioned in the report: objective of the process, system description, short description of the THDB, identified hazards and an evaluation of the process. Ask for feed-back from the participants. Make changes to the draft document. Make a second draft report and discuss this with the management officers.
TIPS AND TRICKS FOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WITH THE THDB 1. The THDB contains a column called Relevant hazard? for marking identified hazards. Marks could be made in different ways, for example: a. By adding a tick when the hazard is considered relevant for the company. b. By ranking each relevant hazard, for instance: - X: hazard not relevant or not recognized as a problem for the company. - 0: recognized hazard for the company, but control measures have been taken. - 1: a minor risk that needs attention.1 - 2: a major risk for the company as a whole. During the meetings, some definitions could be shown on the blackboard: hazard, hazardous event, criteria for the evaluation.
2.
It is not intended to start evaluating risks at this stage, however to indicate the magnitude of the risk.
August, 2008
3. 4.
A flow chart of the system should be kept on a blackboard. It is advised to start with an explanation of the overall system, the parts that will be discussed during the session and then go through each sub-system. It is better to start with future hazards (sub-system #12), in order to avoid them being mentioned in other sub-systems. When going through the sub-systems of the THDB, it is advised to first show briefly all the component and elements of the sub-system to be discussed, so the participants would have an overview that can help them to identify the hazards. After going through each sub-system, the participants could be asked if they want to add something else that is not mentioned in the THDB. Since the most important information for the hazard identification is in the columns hazard and hazardous event, it could be useful to show only the first five columns of the THDB during the discussions and hide the last ones (hide type of hazardous event, type of hazard and potential consequences). It is useful to use different colours in the cells of the Relevant hazard? column. This can be done by using the conditional format option of MS Excel. (Path: Format/ Conditional formatting). For example, hazards ranked as 1 could be collared with orange, and hazards ranked as 2 could be collared with red.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. As the distribution sub-system consists of a large number of pipes in different circumstances, it could be helpful to define different typical situations for specific areas. Those situations would correspond to different pipe materials, diameters, regions, age and other characteristics.
August, 2008