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The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance 1350-1550 Helen Nader 7 Open Conflict: Tendilla ver ! t"e Letrado
#$%&' One Mendoza was not willing to abdicate the role of leader. While the family in Guadalajara accepted the inevitability of this changing intellectual leadership with a graciousness verging on indifference, the count of Tendilla in Granada fought against the trend. onservative by nature and alienated from his Guadalajara cousins by property disputes, Tendilla!s family loyalties were directed toward the ancestral reference group rather than to the e"tended family of his own day. #rom Tendilla!s point of view, the family!s political power, its place in society, its heroes all were associated with the Trast$mara revolution and with the view of astilian politics and history laid out by %edro &'pez de (yala. Tendilla!s adherence to the family!s tradition, even at the e"pense of family unity, was reinforced by his two journeys to )enaissance *taly and by his isolation from the new intellectual centers of astile. When Tendilla tried to persuade the consejo real to adopt his policies, however, it was not just an academic dispute over intellectual issues. #or Tendilla, as royal governor of +pain!s largest convert population in a period of political and religious upheaval, every royal decree held life and death implications. Tendilla did not realize until too late that in a society that had come to regard tolerance and moderation as deviance, it was no longer profitable to maintain the Mendoza family tradition. *,igo &'pez de Mendoza, second count of Tendilla, was the eldest son and namesa-e of the first count of Tendilla .d. /0123../3 4e was educated in the household of his paternal grandfather and namesa-e, the first mar5uis of +antillana. 4e received his political and military #$%$' apprenticeship in the households of his father and his uncle, cardinal Mendoza. 4is father inherited one of the mayorazgos created by +antillana6 but with three sons and two daughters to provide for, he tried to increase his estate by service to the -ing. 4e was one of the staunchest supporters of 7nri5ue *8 and served as the -ing!s ambassador to 9icholas 8 in /0:0 and to %ius ** in /0:;. Tendilla, then si"teen years old, and his younger brother, <iego 4urtado de Mendoza, accompanied their father to #lorence and Mantua on this second embassy. *n /0=1, the father was rewarded for his services with the title of count of Tendilla, and he was appointed tutor of the -ing!s daughter, >uana, who was ta-en to live in the Mendoza family residence in ?uitrago. (fter 7nri5ue disavowed >uana!s rights to the throne in /0=;, the first Tendilla and his brother, the future cardinal, appealed to the papacy for a restitution of her rights and publicized this appeal by nailing copies of it to the doors of the churches in several important towns. When the appeal failed, the elder Tendilla handed >uana over to her new tutor, >uan %acheco, and seems to have retired from active public life. @oung Tendilla and his brother, <iego 4urtado, then entered the household of their uncle, the cardinal, and formed part of his entourage during the summer of /01A when he entertained the papal legate, )odrigo ?orgia, and arranged Mendoza support for *sabel as heiress of 7nri5ue. Tendilla and his father stayed out of the early stages of the ensuing succession war, and they are the only Mendoza not mentioned in *sabel!s statement of gratitude for the family!s support in /01:. (pparently the elder Tendilla remained loyal to >uana, but he also refused to support >uana against his own family and stayed out of the conflict in order to preserve the family!s unity.

The second Tendilla inherited his father!s title and estates in /0126 and in the ne"t twentyBfive years, he more than compensated for the disadvantages of having withheld early support from the winning side. 4e did this through the Mendoza!s traditional route to power and wealth BB outstanding military service in the wars against the Muslims, heavy investment of his private fortune in the diplomatic and administrative service of the crown, and a politically and financially profitable second marriage. *n addition, he and <iego 4urtado were favorites of their uncle the cardinal6 and through the cardinal!s patronage, <iego 4urtado became bishop of %alencia ./01C3, president of the consejo real ./0;CB/0;=3, and archbishop of +eville ./0;:3. <iego 4urtado followed in the footsteps of his uncle in more ways than oneD he too fathered illegitimate sons, became cardinal of +anta +abina, and resided at the royal court as protector of the family interests. With such #$%(' alliances, Tendilla!s career was bound to be favored by the atholic Monarchs6 but Tendilla himself was a man of e"ceptional political and military talents and had all the personal characteristics that modern historians consider typical of the Mendoza at their best BB charm, courage, boundless pride, lively intelligence, spar-ling wit, shrewdness, and prudence. (bove all, Tendilla displayed a flair for cutting the Gordian -not with a wit and ingenuity that made him a legend even in his own lifetime. *n /0;E, Tendilla married #rancisca %acheco, a daughter of >uan %acheco, his father!s rival as tutor to the princess >uana. This marriage culminated a series of moves ta-en by the Mendoza in /01;B/0;E to prevent the destruction of the %acheco by *sabel in the succession war. ?y this marriage, the Mendoza allied themselves with their traditional rivals in order to preserve that balance of powers within the -ingdom typical of the 7nri5uista political structure6 and Tendilla allied himself with a family already powerful in (ndaluda and active proponents of war against Granada. Tendilla too- an active leadership in all phases of the con5uest of Granada6 and the chronicles of the con5uest, especially %ulgar!s, are peppered with references to his military feats..A3 *n /0;0B/0;:, #ernando appointed Tendilla alcaide of the city of (lhama, newly con5uered from the Muslims, and because of its e"posed position deep in Muslim territory, dependent upon an e"tended supply line and e"tremely vulnerable to siege. Tendilla!s defense of (lhama is the first of his legendary deeds, recorded in detail by %ulgar, who received his information directly from Tendilla..C3 The winter of /0;0B/0;: was e"ceptionally wet6 and after several wee-s of rain, an old section of the city wall collapsed. Tendilla -ept this secret from the Muslim patrols by having lengths of cloth painted to resemble the fallen portion of the wall and draping them over the opening while the section was rebuilt from within. ( few wee-s later, the garrison began to threaten desertion because the supply train with their wages was months overdue and the merchants of the city were refusing to e"tend further credit. Tendilla improvised a form of currency consisting of slips of leather with a specific amount of money and Tendilla!s signature written on them, decreed that they were to be accepted at face value by the merchants, and promised to redeem them at full value when the siege was over. 4is ingenious use of the painted cloth and the leather currency were both modeled on the e"ample of #rederic- ** at the siege of #aenza in /A0E..03 *n /0;:, #ernando relieved Tendilla as alcaide of (lhama in order to appoint him ambassador to *nnocent 8***..:3 Tendilla!s instructions were #$%)' to achieve several formidable goalsD a treaty of peace between the pope and the -ing of 9aples6 renewal of the favorable bull of crusade of /0;A on a permanent basis6 a papal license granting the patronage of all ecclesiastical offices in the cathedrals of the -ingdom of Granada to the astilian crown6 and confirmation of a ?ull of /010 prohibiting the appointment of foreigners to +panish benefices. %ulgar, always favorable to the Mendoza, claims that Tendilla was chosen for this important embassy because he was fluent in &atin and a prudent negotiator..=3 *t is also li-ely that he was chosen because he already -new the powerful papal chancellor, )odrigo ?orgia6 because the Mendoza and ?orgia had already proved that they could wortogether against a hostile pope to the benefit of #ernando and *sabel6 and because Tendilla!s uncle, the

cardinal, wanted a member of his family invested with ade5uate powers to approach the pope successfully with a re5uest for the legitimation of the cardinal!s sons. *n order to avoid prejudicing the 9eapolitan issue, Tendilla was instructed to remain in a neutral city BB #lorence BB until the peace treaty was achieved, and then to report to )ome. 4e left +pain in March /0;=6 arrived in #lorence in >une6 struc- up a friendship with &orenzo d!Medici, for whom he arranged a marriage between &orenzo!s daughter and the pope!s nephew6.13 made a secret trip to )ome to speed the negotiations6 achieved a satisfactory treaty between *nnocent 8*** and #errante of 9aples on /A (ugust /0;=6 and entered )ome officially in +eptember /0;=. *n )ome, he Fdefended the honor of the astilian crownF by insisting on his precedence over all other ambassadors, even using force to displace the #rench ambassador from the seat of honor at a papal mass, and he added to his own legend by performing two feats of ostentatious consumption. The pope was offended by Tendilla!s sumptuous and fre5uent ban5uets, so he prohibited the )omans from selling charcoal or firewood to the +panish ambassador in order to prevent him from coo-ing. Tendilla solved this problem by buying a few houses, dismantling them, and using their timbers for firewood. *n another display of ostentation and ingenuity, Tendilla treated the entire papal curia to an elaborate ban5uet on the ban-s of the Tiber, serving each course on a different set of silver and throwing the soiled service into the river after every course. 4is biographers report that this made a tremendous impression on the guests6 but after they left, Tendilla ordered his servants to raise the nets concealed beneath the surface of the river, and they successfully retrieved all the service e"cept one spoon and two for-s. The incident, with its overtones from %etronius, was later repeated by the +ienese (gostino higi..;3 *n these incidents in )ome, as well as in his #$%*' defense of (lhama, Tendilla displayed a talent highly prized by #ernando BB an ingenuity in cutting through -notty problems without too much regard for legal or moral niceties. #ernando had adopted as his motto the words FTanto montaF .so much for that3 in admiration of (le"ander the Great!s cutting of the Gordian -not, and Tendilla!s unorthodo" but effective deeds could only have increased the -ing!s appreciation of his abilities. #urthermore, Tendilla achieved at least a limited success in most of his objectives during his embassy to )ome6 he arranged a peace between the -ing of 9aples and the papacy ./A (ugust /0;=36 the astilian crown received the patronage of the ecclesiastical offices of the cathedrals of Granada ./C >uly /0;= and /; <ecember /0;=36 the bull of crusade of /0;A .disli-ed by the papacy for financial reasons3 was renewed for one year ./ +eptember /0;13, largely through the efforts of )odrigo ?orgia6 the astilian monarchs received pontifical indulgences for royal hospitals in +antiago and Granada, and a cathedral in Granada .A; (ugust /0;136 cardinal Mendoza received papal legitimation of his sons6 and Tendilla and other members of his family received many indulgences for the building of monasteries and hospitals on their seigneurial lands. The only instruction he failed to achieve was renewal of the bull of /010 restricting +panish benefices to +panish nationals. #ernando renewed the campaign against Granada in /0;2, and Tendilla played a principal role in both the campaigns and the negotiations that led to the capitulation of /02A. (s a reward for these services, and through the influence of cardinal Mendoza, Tendilla was appointed captain general of the -ingdom of Granada and alcaide of the (lhambra. ( polychrome retablo in the cathedral of Granada commemorating the entry into the city of Granada on A >anuary /02A has aptly captured the political subtleties of this appointment BB though not the literal truth of the event itself BB by picturing the -ing and 5ueen entering the city side by side, flan-ed by cardinal Mendoza on their right and Tendilla on their left..23 This appointment was the high point of Tendilla!s career. (ll of his activities to this point BB military, administrative, and diplomatic BB had been successful, and his appointment as a territorial governor indicates the great confidence the atholic Monarchs had in his abilities and loyalty. *n later years,

Tendilla loo-ed bac- on the monarchs! confidence in his discretion with prideD On Tuesday, A >anuary /02A, this city came into the power of the -ing don #ernando and the 5ueen do,a *sabel after they had besieged it #$%%' for a long time. The same day, their highnesses appointed as alcaide and captain of the said city and of the fortress of the (lhambra *,igo &'pez de Mendoza count of Tendilla and lord of MondGjar, to whose discretion they entrusted all their guard and presidio with a considerable number of horses and infantes, and a few days later their majesties departed for atalonia, leaving to the abovesaid count the alcazar and city, residing in it more than twenty thousand Muslims../E3 When he accepted the appointment in Granada, he had every reason to e"pect that his affairs would continue to prosper. 4e had spent large sums in the royal service, especially during the defense of (lhama and the embassy to )ome, and by /02A he had not been ade5uately rewarded. 4is vassals in Tendilla had cancelled the debt of /:E,EEE maravedHs which he owed them, as their contribution to the defense of (lhama6 and the atholic Monarchs paid him the /,CEE,EEE maravedHs he had spent on his embassy. ?ut these were small recompense for what he had invested, and he e"pected that his governorship of Granada would bring him a profit. (ll the other territorial governorships with their incomes had been made hereditary by the atholic Monarchs just before the entry into Granada as a means of repaying the military aristocracy without alienating portions of the -ingdom of Granada from the royal patrimony. 9aturally, Tendilla assumed that his governorship would also be hereditary in his family, and he moved his household from Guadalajara to GranadaD IThe atholic MonarchsJ set me here as in a new birthplace, and * left what was mine and * disbanded my household there of servants of my grandfathers and of my father and my own children... it seemed to me that the -ing our lord had decided to ma-e these offices permanent in me and my successors forever..//3 #or a few years, his affairs continued to prosper. (lmost all of the property Tendilla bought between /02A and /:// was in the -ingdom of Granada, and it seems that by shifting his financial interests to Granada Tendilla e"pected to develop an economic and political preeminence there that would match the Mendoza!s position in Guadalajara. >ust as his ancestors had successfully shifted their interests from (lava to Guadalajara in the fourteenth century, Tendilla would have a Fnew birthF in the -ingdom of Granada. ?ut, as Tendilla himself recognized, this move cut him off from the rest of the Mendoza family and from his faithful servants. #rom this time on, his fortunes would no longer be dependent #$%+' upon those of the Mendoza family but upon his own political and financial success in Granada. Tendilla!s chances of success were worse than he imagined. *n addition to the usual problems of an administrator in the field who must prevail over powerful policyma-ers in the central government, he was to have difficulty communicating with the consejo real. ?y nature he analyzed problems in terms of how things really were, while the letrados in the consejo thought in terms of how things ought to be. (nd Granada was not what it ought to have beenD the newly con5uered -ingdom would une"pectedly suffer crop failure, famine, epidemic, invasion, religious revolt and repression, economic dislocation, and political confusion. The consejo!s disappointment in Granada would increasingly be e"pressed as dissatisfaction with Tendilla and all he stood for. (s captain general, Tendilla was directly responsible to the crown for the defense and public order of the -ingdom. (ll of the military forces were under his commandD a company of one hundred lances usually stationed in 8Glez M$laga where they could guard the coast from the fre5uent Muslim invasions from (frica6 one thousand infantry stationed in strategic fortresses around the -ingdom under the supervision of alcaides nominated by Tendilla and appointed by the crown6 and twentyBfive halaberderos as Tendilla!s personal guard. (s governor, Tendilla held final criminal jurisdiction over all

the military personnel in the -ingdom6 and as the leading citizen of Granada, he fre5uently acted as arbitrator in civil suits. When the monarchs were absent from astile, Tendilla was invested with the powers of viceroy for all of (ndalucHa6 but ordinarily there was no central administrative power in the -ingdom of Granada. The spiritual needs of the -ingdom were in the hands of #ernando de Talavera, archbishop of Granada6 and the senior royal secretary, 4ernando de Kafra, was entrusted with the tasof surveying the resources of the -ingdom for ta" purposes and assessing the pace at which the crown should move in the transition from a Muslim to a hristian fiscal administration. 7ach city had made its own arrangements for selfBgovernment as it capitulated to the hristians6 and in the final capitulation of /02A, the Muslims of the city of Granada were free to retain their language, religion, customs, and local forms of government. Technically, Tendilla!s powers were limited to military and police matters6 but because he was the only administrator with command over personnel throughout an otherwise heterogeneous society, he wielded an inordinate amount of political power in the -ingdom../A3 (lmost nothing is -nown about the history of Granada from /02A to /022, but this period has survived in the Ffol- memoryF as a golden age #$%7' of peace and prosperity../C3 <isputes over the interpretation of the terms of the capitulation were settled by Kafra to the satisfaction of both Muslims and hristians6 ./03 Talavera made every effort to convert the Muslims through education and e"ample, established a seminary to train priests in (rabic and in the missionary traditions of the church, and accommodated the new converts! Muslim dress, customs, and language. This period of peace was possible because both sides were willing to live in mutual toleration of one another, an attitude rooted in tradition and in the personalities of Tendilla and Talavera../:3 ?ut much of this mutual trust and cooperation was destroyed in <ecember /022, when isneros, archbishop of Toledo, visiting the city for the first time, engaged in a campaign of forcible conversion of the Muslims. Outraged by this violation of their treaty rights, the Muslims rebelled in the 5uarter of the city where isneros was lodged, the (lbaicHn, and a constable was -illed. (t first, Tendilla refrained from interfering in the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities, but finally he and Talavera went into the (lbaicHn to negotiate with the Muslim leaders. They agreed to submit when Tendilla, doffing his cap to the crowd, pledged that there would be no more forcible conversions and that no one e"cept the murderers of the constable would be punished if the insurrection was ended. (s a security for his pledge, Tendilla brought his wife and small children from the (lhambra and lodged them in a house in the heart of the (lbaicHn, ne"t to a mos5ue. The story of Tendilla ta-ing off his bonnet to the crowd and entrusting his wife and children to the Muslims became a legend Frepeated in Granada from father to son.F The violence had been controlled without further bloodshed and the reputations of Tendilla and Talavera were higher than ever with the Muslims. ?ut the -ing was irritated with Tendilla for having allowed the situation to get out of control in the first place, and he wrote to TendillaD F* am not surprised by the archbishop of Toledo who never saw a Muslim or -new them, but by you and the corregidor who have -nown them for so long.F./=3 9o sooner was the rebellion in the city ended than the Muslims in the (lpujarras heard of the forced conversions and rose up in revolt, attac-ing the hristian garrisons in GuGjar and MondLjar. This inspired another uprising in )onda and its surrounding territory. The greatest captains of +pain BB Tendilla, (lonso de (guilar, %edro 9avarro, Gonzalo #ern$ndez de 'rdoba, and #ernando himself BB succeeded in defeating the rebels, but only after some disastrous losses. When #ernando had written to Tendilla immediately after the uprising in the (lbaicHn, he had ordered him to proceed Fwith sense rather than rigorF6 but after the #$%,' uprising in the (lpujarras, the monarchs reversed the policy completely and issued a decree re5uiring all Muslims to be baptized or e"pelled from the -ingdom by // #ebruary /:EA. The *n5uisition of 'rdoba was ordered to begin in5uiries in the -ingdom of Granada, with jurisdiction over the newly converted Moriscos, despite the strenuous objections of the corregidor and Tendilla. #inally, the atholic Monarchs reformed the city government of Granada,

abolishing the Muslim council and establishing a single city government similar to those in most cities of astile but with some concessions to the peculiarly (rabic character of the population. The most important feature of this new government was a city council presided over by the royal corregidor BB the chief judicial and police officer of the city, appointed annually by the crown, directly responsible to the monarchs, and holding full e"ecutive and veto power in the administration of the council!s decrees. The political effects of these decrees and reforms was felt immediately. +ome Muslims left +pain or too- refuge in the wilderness of the (lpujarras rather than conform6 most submitted to baptism. The religious unification of the country had been achieved almost overnight, to the relief of both the monarchs and their zealous advisers. ?ut among the Moriscos BB the new converts BB there remained a memory, passed on from generation to generation, of two clear, incontrovertible factsD the conversions had been forced, and the atholic Monarchs had violated the terms of the capitulation by e"tending the *n5uisition!s jurisdiction to the new converts. The Muslims who had been a peaceful, cooperative citizenry, were overnight transformed into the Moriscos, a sullen, suspicious population. The unconverted outlaws in the (lpujarras began guerrilla operations against the hristian garrisons and e"torted food and shelter from the Moriscos6 while the unconverted Muslims who had emigrated to (frica inspired and led an almost continuous series of raids on the coast of Granada BB stealing stoc-, pillaging towns, and -idnaping hristians and Moriscos ali-e. Thus the immediate and permanent effect of the decrees was to place an everBincreasing strain on the military and political resources of the -ingdom. (t the same time, the decrees severely restricted the discretionary powers and jurisdictions of Tendilla and Talavera. The old hristian city council was a small group BB probably there were twelve regidores BB easily dominated by Tendilla and Talavera. (s a result of the reorganization of /:E/, the city council ac5uired its own meeting hall .the cabildo3 in the city ne"t to the sil- e"change6 the number of regidores was increased to twentyBfour6 and the new regidores were chosen from a population #$%-' over which Tendilla had not previously e"ercized direct jurisdiction. The first corregidor of the city, (ndrGs alder'n, had served from the con5uest until /:EE and wor-ed closely with Tendilla. (fter /:EE, the corregidores served only oneByear terms6 and although Tendilla boasted that he got along very well with each one of them until /:/0,./13 there was no chance to wor- out a permanent political understanding between them and Tendilla, a situation reflected in the minutes of the city council. ?efore /:E/, Tendilla!s name appears at the head of the list of regidores present6 but after /:E/, his name ta-es second place to that of the royal corregidor. ?y placing the new converts under the jurisdiction of the *n5uisition, the crown also too- the greatest step toward reducing the influence of the archbishop of Granada over his own diocese, and given Talavera!s own tendency toward toleration and moderation, placed him in the intolerable position of having to negotiate with the crown on behalf of the new hristians and in opposition to the advice of the archbishop of Toledo. The *n5uisition!s powers also intruded upon the jurisdiction of the city council and the corregidor. (mong the first citizens investigated by the *n5uisition were two of the city!s constables6 and when the corregidor, <iego &'pez de (valos, refused to hand them over to the *n5uisition, claiming that he not the *n5uisition had jurisdiction in the city, the atholic Monarchs replied with a cGdula ordering the corregidor to hand over the constables for penitence and forbidding him to submit a brief arguing that the *n5uisition was another jurisdiction, Fbecause everything is ours.F./;3 Tendilla!s jurisdiction was not affected directly by any of the decrees, but his credibility and his status as the principal representative of the crown were both diminished. The decrees directly contradicted the promises Tendilla had made to the Muslim leaders in the insurrection of the (lbaicHn and mar- a serious erosion of Tendilla!s freedom to act at his own discretion with the assurance that his actions

would be approved by the crown. #urthermore, one of the decrees of /:EE had ordered the removal of the chancillera .supreme court3 of iudad )eal to Granada. The decree did not alter the legal jurisdiction of either the chancillerHa or Tendilla, and the chancillerHa did not move to Granada until /:E:6 but it seems clear that the crown was intent upon establishing in Granada another representative of the monarchy with powers and influence e5ual to those of Tendilla. On a local scale in the -ingdom of Granada, the atholic Monarchs were ma-ing that same shift from a government by the military aristocracy to a government by letrados, which had long been accomplished in #$+&' the central government. #rom this time on, Tendilla and his successors fought a losing battle against the jurisdictional e"pansion of the *n5uisition and the chancillerHa of Granada. *n addition to all the increased problems of policing and defending the -ingdom and the city of Granada with diminished power, Tendilla suffered some personal losses that further wea-ened his influence at court and cast a gloomy shadow over the rest of his life. @ears later, Tendilla still remembered the tragic events of /:EA with a sense of lossD FWe lost two sons in one wee- and three daughters and another son a few days later and then the two lord cardinals and my brother %edro and the brothers of the countess and we consoled ourselves, each one IconsolingJ the other, for there is no other consolation.F./23 With the death of Tendilla!s brother, <iego 4urtado de Mendoza, archbishop of +eville and cardinal of +pain, Tendilla lost his most loyal and powerful support in the royal court. This was the first of a series of epidemics and natural disasters that plagued Granada for the ne"t few years, destroying the prosperity of the -ingdom and further wea-ening Tendilla!s military position. ?y /:/:, the -ingdom the atholic Monarchs and Tendilla had e"pected to be a paradise that would yield new riches had begun an irreversible trend of economic and demographic depression. The atholic Monarchs never returned to Granada after /:EAD there was not enough food in the -ingdom to support a royal visit, but Tendilla remained at his post through famine and plague, drought and flood, depression and depopulation. #rom his command post in the (lhambra, he policed the highways, built fortresses and watchtowers along the coast and the major commercial routes, filled posts left vacant by the plague, established a school for orphans, collected ta"es, supervised the sale and distribution of food to the poor, and organized and supplied e"peditions against the coast of (frica. Tendilla!s attention to duty during this series of local crises is e"emplary in itself. ?ut his efforts to maintain the peace and prosperity of the -ingdom of Granada ta-e on a heroic 5uality when they are viewed in the perspective of his involvement in the national political crises of the same period. *t was typical of the Trast$mara dynasty that the great political crisis of the reign of the atholic Monarchs revolved about the succession to the throne6 and it was typical of Tendilla that his own actions during the conflict were shaped by a single overriding consideration BB his personal loyalty to #ernando and to the Trast$mara dynasty BB with little concern for the policies followed by the constable as head of the Mendoza family. *t is a universally accepted custom in the writing of +panish history to #$+$' turn from domestic to foreign affairs after the great triumphs of /02A, on the assumption that the monarchs! reforms had brought peace and order to the -ingdom and that their preoccupation with foreign policy after /02A reflects a lac- of distractions from internal disorder..AE3 *n fact, a period of internal peace did follow the con5uest of Granada6 but it was largely due to the coincidence that a number of the principal political figures of the -ingdom died immediately after the con5uest, from >anuary through October /02A6 and there was a period of readjustment while new leadership developed..A/3 9or did it last long6 for beginning with the death of the crown prince >uan in /021, the royal family suffered a series of untimely deaths which threw the royal succession into doubt. ?y the time *sabel died in /:E0, it was clear that >uana, the atholic Monarchs! eldest surviving child, would inherit astile and (ragon, and her eldest son, harles, would succeed her. ?ut harles was only

four years old, and >uana was widely regarded BB even by her parents BB as too emotionally unstable to be capable of ruling alone. %hilip of ?urgundy, >uana!s husband, was the logical regent6 but both #ernando and *sabel were convinced that %hilip would sacrifice the wellBbeing of both >uana and +pain in the interests of his own 4apsburg dynastic ambitions in northern 7urope. #aced with nothing but unpalatable alternatives in disposing of the governance of her -ingdom, *sabel wavered and wrote a codicil to her will, contradicting the will itself. *n the end, it was not clear whether #ernando, %hilip, and archbishop isneros, together and in that order, should be regents, or %hilip alone. %hilip, with a show of German arms, assumed control of the government in the name of >uana6 but after he died suddenly in /:E=, it was not clear whether #ernando alone or isneros alone should be regent for harles .or for >uana3. (fter #ernando managed to assert his authority in the -ingdom and assume the regency in /:/E, it was debated whether or not he had the power, as he claimed, to appoint his favorite, the du-e of (lba, as his successor instead of isneros. 4istorians have heaped opprobrium on everyone who had a part in the succession and regency disputes. ?ut the legalities of both 5uestions were so confused BB especially by the codicil to *sabel!s will BB that the principal actors themselves were ma-ing decisions in conditions of chaos. True to the pattern of previous succession and regency disputes, the city councils split into factions. Municipal governments were paralyzed, and there were popular riots against >ews and conversos. <isaffected nobility tooadvantage of the chaos to seize longBcoveted cities and fortresses. (mbitious nobility formed mutual assistance alliances in the hope of becoming #$+(' -ingma-ers by swinging their support to the winning side at a crucial moment. ?ureaucrats smuggled papers, e"torted signatures, and buried documents in red tape. %relates used their prestige and influence as confidants to sway the confused >uana, the impressionable %hilip, or an indecisive ortes. ?ut even men of the greatest integrity BB the most scrupulous legist or the most loyal vassal BB found himself in the same position as (yala more than a century earlier and +antillana si"ty years earlier. *t had once again become impossible to discern a correct course of action. *n this situation, the only men who were able to follow a consistent line of action were those who disregarded legal and political considerations and acted on the basis of personal loyalties alone. These men were very fewD ?ernardino de 8elasco, the constable of astile, remained loyal to >uana and her son throughout6 don >uan Manuel remained loyal to the 4apsburgs, first %hilip and then his father, Ma"imilian6 (lba and Tendilla remained loyal to #ernando. When the ortes recognized #ernando as the regent of harles in /:/E and it appeared that the dispute was finally settled legally, no one was satisfied. Those who had supported #ernando were the most frustrated of all6 for #ernando was so s-illed at dissimulation, compromise, and opportunism that no one could read his true intentions6 and an action that appeared to be in his service one day might turn out to be a disservice the ne"t. #urthermore, #ernando became increasingly stingy about rewarding even the most devoted sacrifices BB he was suspicious of overBmighty subjects, his finances were perilous most of the time, and when he did have money he poured it into his wars in 9aples and 9avarre. These men who had supported #ernando lived in the hope of reward and were repeatedly disappointed. Tendilla had no delusions about #ernando!s character. 4e was painfully aware of #ernando!s stinginess, a serious political as well as personal defect6 and he had learned early to guard himself against #ernando!s duplicity. ?ut Tendilla had great faith in #ernando!s political s-ill and was convinced that no matter how blea- the -ing!s prospects appeared at the moment in the end he would triumph over his enemies. 7ven in /:E= and /:E1, when #ernando!s political star was at its nadir, Tendilla repeatedly urged his friends and relatives to give their allegiance to #ernando so they would be favored and not punished when he reclaimed his control over the government..AA3 Tendilla!s loyalty to the atholic Monarchs had first and always been a loyalty to #ernando rather than to *sabel. Tendilla and the cardinal remained fond of 7nri5ue *8!s daughter, >uana6 and the servants and

clients of >uana!s mother loo-ed to Tendilla for protection and patronage. On his deathbed, Tendilla was still being attended by the physician, #$+)' *,igo &'pez, who had been physician to >uana!s mother..AC3 There was also a strong bond of friendship and respect between Tendilla and #ernando, based on their common e"pertise in military affairs. Tendilla claimed that it was easier to discuss military matters with the -ing than with *sabel, and in the two months before *sabel!s death, Tendilla wrote to #ernando alone on matters of police and defense. Tendilla!s letters to the two monarchs jointly were impersonal and formal. The letters to #ernando alone have the more intimate and informal character typical of Tendilla!s letters to friends and family, and reflect devotion to #ernando personally..A03 This devotion, which we will see carried to an e"treme in Tendilla!s politics, was also carried to e"tremes in Tendilla!s personal life. 4is health and mood changed as #ernando!s health and mood changed. *n /:/C, #ernando became seriously ill and his health remained perilous until late in /:/0. Throughout this period, Tendilla was in bitter despair and often confined to his room by illness. When #ernando recovered and was again physically active, Tendilla!s mood became sunny and playful, and he stopped complaining about his aches and pains. When he heard that #ernando had actually started hunting again, he joyously wrote to an old friend to arrange his first hunting trip in many months. Tendilla had no personal sta-e in #ernando!s *talian venture, but he rejoiced over every victory as if it were his own. (nd he felt the greatest satisfaction when the newly elected &eo M ac-nowledged his debt to #ernando and praised his *talian policy..A:3 Tendilla!s loyalty to #ernando during the confusion from /:E0 to /:/: was also inspired by his assumptions about the nature of politics in the astilian monarchy. Tendilla regarded the monarchy as a partnership of the -ing and his vassals BB a partnership based on mutual aid in the e"pectation of mutual profit. 7very stage of Tendilla!s public career BB his participation in the con5uest of Granada, his governership of (lhama, his embassy to )ome, his governorship in the -ingdom of Granada BB was in the nature of an investment from which he hoped eventually to gain a profit of heritable income for himself and his sons. There is no suggestion in Tendilla!s letters that service to the crown is an obligation of the nobility. On the contrary, it is a voluntary act and has no implicit merit. *ts sole merit lies in the profit that will accrue to the noble family as a reward for service..A=3 Tendilla, of course, had many obligations to the crown as captain general of Granada, but he was careful not to confuse his official obligations and his politics. 7very service he performed beyond his official duties he regarded as a service to #ernando personally, and he e"pected #$+*' #ernando to recognize this. *t was because he regarded his support of #ernando and his position in Granada as investments that he was caught in an impossible choice. 4e had invested heavily and without reservation in #ernando!s enterprises BB probably more than any other nobleman e"cept the du-e of (lba BB and he could not afford to throw away that investment. Tendilla had sta-ed everything on #ernando6 and no matter how clear it became that harles and isneros should be cultivated for the sa-e of the family!s future, Tendilla could not compromise himself in #ernando!s eyes by establishing a good relationship with the -ing!s enemies. (gain and again he complains that he has never sent letters or messengers to #landers, yet his loyalty is rewarded with losses instead of profits..A13 *n politics, Tendilla maintained the same view of astilian society as a free enterprise system that had been e"pressed by Guzm$n fifty years earlier. *n the early Trast$mara period, the career of Tendilla!s grandfather, +antillana, had been living proof that Fas one!s power and privilege mount, one ta-es for oneself as much as one can of honors, offices, and vassals.F ?ut Tendilla!s career showed just as clearly that in the late Trast$mara period astile was no longer a free enterprise society and that his views were anachronistic. 7ven on political matters in which Tendilla could e"ercise more emotional detachment, he never moved beyond the assumptions of his ancestors, (yala, Guzm$n, and +antillana. Tendilla assumed that the

astilian monarchy was made up of a delicately balanced cooperative effort between the -ing and powerful political groups. The -ing!s ability to succeed in any venture was dependent upon his success in winning support from a substantial segment of the powerful groups and on his own abilities. Tendilla did not assume at any time that the -ing would have the support of all the nation6 and even more significant, he never assumed that it would be the duty of every vassal to support the -ing just because he was -ing. *nstead, he accepted without 5uestion a system in which the -ing was one of many political powers and had to negotiate with the other powers in the -ingdom to carry out any venture successfully. Once the -ing had ac5uired the support of a loyal group, Tendilla believed that he ought to do everything in his power to maintain this alliance BB the -ing owed allegiance to his supporters as much as they owed allegiance to him. This mutual loyalty between the -ing and his adherents, to Tendilla, was the essence of political life. 4e suggested several ways in which the -ing and his vassals could fulfill this ideal. #irst, the -ing must be loyal to his supportersD F%rinces cannot e"pect to succeed who, enjoying the support of only one party among their #$+%' peoples, wish to ma-e two, or indicate that they do not trust the party they already have by resuscitating an opposing party.F.A;3 4e also believed that it was a serious mista-e for the -ing to compromise with his domestic enemies in a period of crisis, for the shortBterm advantages would be more than outweighed by the disadvantage of having empowered and enriched those who would betray the -ing once the crisis had passed. 4e complained that *sabel had made a serious error when she appointed isneros BB a man who was not a privado and had never proved his loyalty BB as archbishop of Toledo and that #ernando had compounded this error when in /:E1 he had won a cardinalate for isneros after the archbishop had been openly disloyal..A23 With his ideas of a permanent state of balanced but competing powers, Tendilla never conceived of a state in which all parties would agree. *t was best to treat defeated parties with respect and dignity and leave the way open for them to cooperate with the -ing in the future. Tendilla repeatedly advised #ernando to e"ercise temperance in dealing with his enemies. 4e bitterly criticized #ernando for having e"cluded the mar5uis of enete from all the centers of power. (nd when #ernando stripped the mar5uis of %riego of his offices and some of his possessions in 'rdoba, Tendilla was shoc-ed and angry..CE3 (s much as he hated these two men and as much as he deplored their disloyal actions, he could not rejoice in their misfortune6 for the -ing, by destroying his enemies, was also destroying that balance Tendilla believed to be the essence of a stable society. *n this attitude, Tendilla was repeating the attitude of his uncle, the first du-e of *nfantado, who was willing to fight against and defeat the mar5uis of 8illena in the *sabelline succession war but refused to cooperate in the 5ueen!s attempt to destroy 8illena!s power. The vassals, in Tendilla!s view of society, had the daily and fundamental duty of giving counsel to the -ing. Tendilla too- this responsibility most seriously, and he -ept up a steady flow of letters of advice, recommendation, warning, and criticism to the -ing. 4e reinforced these with similar letters to his friends and agents at the court in an effort to ma-e sure that his ideas were clearly and accurately understood by #ernando. (mong all those who were bombarding #ernando with advice, Tendilla often found himself a lone voice, the single dissenter, but he was convinced that he and #ernando were in agreement on the necessity for his advice, although it won him many enemiesD That which the good servant has to do is to conform with the will of his lord and his highness does not e"pect that * will ever have to send #$++' to say of anyone that he does not do as he should because * haven!t won the enemies * have in any other manner e"cept by saying the truth and giving his highness my letters and memorials to those who wish to destroy me because of it..C/3

Tendilla persisted in this attitude, even when he believed that the -ing was following the advice of those who were his enemies. When the lord was ma-ing a mista-e, the loyal vassal must protect the lord!s interests even if it meant fighting against the lord himself. Throughout the last two years of his life, Tendilla believed that this was his own situation and he complained repeatedlyD F4ere * am fighting for his highness against his highness himself.F.CA3 Tendilla believed that #ernando was acting against his own interests because he was ta-ing the advice of men who were not 5ualified to counsel a -ing BB the bureaucrats. Tendilla was convinced that giving counsel to the -ing was both the duty and the sole prerogative of the nobility. This attitude was based on two assumptions. #irst, he believed that only the nobility had the military e"pertise to advise the -ing in matters of defense and public order. +econd, he believed that every policy BB whether religious, military, or economic BB should be judged by its conse5uences6 and the nobles, as the men on the spot, were the only persons capable of assessing the conse5uences of a given policy in their area of jurisdiction. Tendilla was scornful of bureaucrats who presumed to give military advice to the -ing and of clerics who recommended religious policies without any realistic assessment of their political conse5uences. (s usual, he could find a proverb to sum up his viewD F(dvice should come from where the action is.F.CC3 Tendilla!s particularist view of politics and society was one of the attitudes that lin-ed him most strongly with his ancestors BB and caused the most conflict with the new, centralizing royal government. *t must have been galling to men who had absorbed the hierarchical political theories of the letrados to see Granada, which the atholic Monarchs had carefully -ept in the royal jurisdiction, administered by this oldBfashioned and arrogant man with his e"alted view of the particularist, seigneurial regime. Once the first crac- appeared in Tendilla!s control over the Muslims .with the uprising in the (lpujarras3, the royal officials lost no time in attac-ing the problem, and Tendilla spent much of his energy in the last ten years of his life in an effort to have his jurisdiction and discretionary powers in Granada guaranteed by a royal document, with a permanent title of viceroy or a royal cGdula. (s we have seen, Tendilla lost the most important round in his battle against #$+7' the royal officials when the chancillerHa of iudad )eal was moved to the city of Granada in /:E:. 4is original wideBranging discretionary powers in judicial matters were severely curtailed by the presence of this royal court, and the letrados loo-ed bacon this move as a great victory for their profession..C03 Within the limitations imposed upon him by the presence of the chancillerHa, however, Tendilla continued to e"ercise his personal influence on the judiciary. 4e began to visit the chambers of the chancillerHa on the days when important cases were heard6 and he must have been successful in e"erting pressure on the proceedings, for in /:/0 the royal pesquisidor threatened to bring charges against him of interfering with the royal justice. Tendilla!s response to these charges is interesting because of its typical mi"ture of indignation and bravado and because it reveals his own assumptions about the origins of the lawD *f they are saying that * am absolute, let them say what * have done. *f they are saying that * rob, let them say how or in what. (lso they tell me that %e,aranda has repeated there Iat courtJ many of the evils being said against me and has said many slanders and here they have written it down. * swear by God that * don!t dare go to the house of the judges or of the president as often as * used to for fear that they will say * am dragging them by the ears. With all of this, don!t you fail to say that if they should put me on a mountain with deer and wild boars * will have them doing whatever * wish, and there is no prudent man who would do otherwise..C:3

7choing 8alera!s statements a generation earlier, he attributes the origins of his own power and status to a natural process, while he assumes that the powers of the chancillerHa and letrados are the imposition of an artificial law. *f he were stripped of all his titles and offices and troops, he would still become the leader and judge of his community by virtue of his own 5ualities of leadership. ?ecause Tendilla could not conceive of government with a being and e"istence apart from the personalities of its leaders and administrators, he could not conceive of duty to a state. *nstead, he continued to see the astilian monarchy in terms of a networ- of deudos. 4e assumed that this networdeveloped naturally out of a primitive state of anarchy because of the very nature of men and that since it was natural it was legitimate. On this basis alone, Tendilla was radically separated from the letrados who had ta-en up the idea of 4ispania BB the state as an abstract political, moral, and religious force to which everyone, including the monarchs, owed a duty and allegiance. While the letrados #$+,' were spea-ing of the monarchy in terms of 4ispania, Tendilla continued to spea- of it in terms of family BB the basic form of deudo. One of the most often repeated sentiments in his letters is that it is natural and proper that there should be loyalty and cooperation between parents and children, and he ma-es this observation in reference to national politics as well as the family affairs of his friends. When #ernando and %hilip signed the agreement of 8illaf$fila, Tendilla remar-ed that they were in agreement as fathers and sons should be..C=3 (nd he never believed that there could be real hostility between #ernando and harles, for Fthe prince must serve his grandfather and his grandfather BB since he will ma-e the prince his heir BB must wor- to leave him the greatest lord of the world.F.C13 *t was typical of Tendilla!s )enaissance attitudes that he never attempted to e"plicate them in a systematic way. @et it is only in view of his political ideas BB his e"traordinary loyalty to #ernando coupled with the traditional political attitudes of the Mendoza family BB that Tendilla!s actions in the succession crisis after /:E0 ma-e sense. (nd the contrast between Tendillas!s actions and those of his Mendoza relatives stri-ingly illustrates the divisions in the family after the turn of the century. +oon after *sabel!s death, both %hilip and #ernando began to solicit noble support..C;3 %hilip ac5uired the allegiance of the du-es of 9$jera and Medina +idonia, the mar5uis of 8illena, and the count of ?enavente, while #ernando received pledges of allegiance from the du-e of (lba, the mar5uis of <enia, the count of ifuentes, the adelantado of Murcia, and Tendilla. #ernando!s sonBinBlaw, the constable6 #ernando!s cousin, the admiral6 and the du-e of *nfantado all remained neutral during this early period, allying with each other in the name of >uana but refusing to commit themselves to either %hilip or #ernando. When >uana and %hilip finally arrived in astile .A1 (pril /:E=3, the majority of the nobles and prelates of astile rushed north to pay homage to them, including the party headed by *nfantado, the constable, and the admiral. This party, which had remained neutral in the earlier dispute between %hilip and #ernando, considered themselves to be paying homage to >uana, the legitimate heiress and, of course, sisterBinBlaw and cousin of the constable and admiral, respectively. The two greatest prelates of astile, who had previously remained loyal to #ernando, also gave their allegiance to %hilip. ?y midB>une /:E:, #ernando had been abandoned by all the highest prelates and nobles of astile e"cept (lba, <enia, ifuentes, Tendilla, and the adelantado of Murcia. #ernando was outmaneuvered6 and in a #$+-' series of moves subtly calculated to create the most sympathetic reaction, he abandoned the field to %hilip. On A1 >une /:E=, at 8illaf$fila, #emando agreed to abdicate the regency in favor of %hilip alone and to leave astile forever. On /C >uly /:E=, #ernando left 8alladolid for (ragon, where he secretly renounced the treaty of 8illaf$fila, declared that >uana was incapable of ruling and that %hilip was holding her prisoner, and embar-ed for 9aples. Those who had been loyal to #ernando throughout and were not privy to his renunciation of the treaty of 8illaf$fila accepted %hilip and >uana as joint rulers, believing that this was #ernando!s wish. Tendilla gave the oath of homage to %hilip and >uana on A2 (ugust /:E=,.C23 and the city council of Granada, under his leadership, instructed the city!s

representatives in the ortes to give the oath of homage to %hilip on their behalf, as coruler with >uana. .0E3 There was widespread suspicion, especially in the remote regions of astile and in (ndalucHa, that >uana was sane and that %hilip was -eeping her a prisoner. When %hilip died on A: +eptember /:E=, this suspicion was transferred to the provisional government formed under the leadership of the constable, isneros, and the du-e of 9$jera. *mmediately, parties reformed, this time with (lba, *nfantado, and the constable supporting the regency of #ernando in the name of >uana, while 9$jera, 8illena, and don >uan Manuel issued a <ictamen calling on Ma"imilian to assume the regency in the name of harles. With %hilip dead, #ernando in *taly, and >uana either insane or being held prisoner, chaos was inevitable. *n 8alladolid and Toledo, the city councils bro-e up into warring factions. There were riots and violence in Medina del ampo, Nbeda, (vila, and Toledo. The #lamenco party BB those who had issued the <ictamen BB tried to -idnap the infante #ernando .then three years old3 from the fortress in +imancas. The mar5uis of enete, always brash and opportunistic, -idnapped MarHa de #onseca from the convent of las 4uelgas, where she had been sent until the courts could decide whether enete would be allowed to marry her or not, and married her without royal permission and without legal resolution of her status. The mar5uise of Moya attac-ed and too- the alc$zar of +egovia from the troops of don >uan Manuel. The count of &emos laid siege to %onferrada, and Medina +idonia laid siege to Gibraltar. 9$jera armed his household cavalry and defied the authority of the provisional government. #ernando could not have anticipated %hilip!s death, but he had counted on his ine"perience and his foreignness to inspire a political crisis, and the chaos fitted into his plans perfectly. 4e wrote to the provisional government, promising that he would return to astile to govern and that he would authorize #$7&' isneros to govern until his return. *n the meantime, he appointed Tendilla as viceroy of (ndalucHa and the constable and (lba as his lieutenants in astile and ordered them to pacify the -ingdom. +atisfied with these arrangements, several of the most powerful nobles supporting #ernando left their positions in the provisional government in the hands of their lieutenants and returned to their estates. *nfantado left Garcilaso in his place and the admiral left (lonso TGllez in his. ?y the end of October /:E=, the rebellions in astile had been subdued by (lba and the constable without a single battle, and the military orders had organized their defenses to protect their own lands and lend support to the government!s cavalry. The greatest number of disturbances and the greatest number of rebellious nobility were in astile, but the most serious and persistent rebellions occurred in (ndalucHa6 and they brought Tendilla into the midst of a political conflict that continued in open warfare or smoldering intrigue for the ne"t ten years. (s soon as the news of %hilip!s death reached (ndalucHa, in the first wee- of October, Medina +iclonia laid siege to Gibraltar, claiming that %hilip had reinstated him in his family!s position as alcaide of the fortress in Gibraltar, of which he had been dispossessed by *sabel in /:EA. The conflict over Gibraltar was made even more bitter by the circumstance that the crown!s alcaide of the fortress was Garcilaso de la 8ega, who was actively involved in the provisional government. (s soon as the siege began, Garcilaso!s lieutenant in the fortress as-ed the surrounding cities for help6 and this re5uest was met by Tendilla, who was an"ious to assert his powers as viceroy over his rival, Medina +idonia, and who organized an e"pedition to rescue the city. The mar5uis of %riego, one of the most powerful noblemen in (ndalucHa, openly refused to obey the orders of Tendilla without an order from the consejo real signed by >uana. Tendilla immediately wrote to the consejo real BB presided over by isneros BB re5uesting such an order and then he FanticipatedF their response by persuading the chancillerHa of Granada to issue an order Fsigned by the 5ueen.F %riego did not send troops or any other help, but Gibraltar was able to hold out until Tenclilla brought relief and raised the siege, again without a battle.

Medina +idonia retaliated by forming an alliance with his relatives and friends in (ndalucHaD %riego, the counts of Nre,a and abra, and the archbishop of +eville, <iego de <eza. ?y this time it was -nown in (ndalucHa that isneros had placed one hundred of his five hundred cavalry in ?urgos as a guard on >uana, and it was widely assumed that #$7$' he was holding her prisoner. The alliance formed by Medina +idonia announced as its purpose the support and liberation of >uana, but it was clearly directed against the provisional government, especially Garcilaso. Then >uana, in one of her rare moments of political activity and in defiance of Hsneros, the consejo real, and the ortes, issued a decree annulling all the decrees and mercedes of %hilip. Thus, with one gesture, she removed the basis for the alliance!s appeal to her as the upholder of %hilip!s wishes and their claim that she was being held prisoner. ?y the end of the year, all resistance to the provisional government and to #ernando!s regency had been overcome, at least temporarily. ?y midB>anuary /:E1, the alliance of (lba, the constable, *nfantado, and Garcilaso had solidly committed itself to #ernando and was dominating the consejo real. >uana had rejected %hilip!s policies and dashed the hopes of those nobility who e"pected her to support their claims to the mercedes granted by %hilip, and she had foiled isneros!s attempts to force her to assume the government and thus preclude #ernando!s regency. #ernando had, without leaving *taly, subdued the rebellions, ac5uired the support of an important political bloc, and bribed or tric-ed into neutrality isneros and the Great aptain. When rebellions again erupted in the late winter and spring of /:E1, it was the leaders of the Mendoza family who dealt with them. *nfantado intervened in a dispute between two factions in Toledo and established a temporary peace in the city. Tendilla successfully retrieved the rebellious fortresses of Nbeda, &oja, (dra, )onda, and (lmerHa for the crown6 and he secured the ports of $diz, Gibraltar, and M$laga..0/3 ?y the time #ernando returned to +pain in the summer of /:E1, the political situation in the country had settled into the pattern it would maintain until his death. #ernando was accepted as the regent by everyone, and all parties now agreed that >uana would not or could not govern. *n /:/E, the ortes of astile recognized #ernando as regent, even if >uana were to die before harles came of age. *n effect, #ernando became regent for harles, and >uana lost all effectiveness as a ruler. )oyal documents continued to be issued in the name of Fla reyna do,a >uana,F but they were written by the secretaries at the orders of #ernando, and >uana was confined to the castle at Tordesillas for the rest of her life. The issue was no longer whether Ma"imilian would rule as regent for harles, or #ernando as regent for >uanaD now the issue facing the political factions had become whether to cooperate fully with #ernando and consolidate political power during his lifetime, or to defy #ernando and ingratiate themselves with the #lemish court. *n these #$7(' few crucial years before #ernando!s death, the astilian nobles were forced to choose between the old, native Trast$mara dynasty and the new, foreign 4apsburgs. *n this situation, the division in the Mendoza family became clearly and permanently fi"ed. The du-e of *nfantado!s moves in the succession crisis have most commonly been described as vacillating, but this vacillation was based not on wea-ness or indecision but on hardheaded and carefully calculated efforts to ma-e himself indispensable to whomever should emerge as the ruler, in the e"pectation that the new ruler would have to reward *nfantado because no -ing could afford to have such a powerful enemy. The constable!s first loyalties were to his sisterBinBlaw, >uana, and his nephew, harles. 7ven though #ernando was the constable!s fatherBinBlaw, it was only after #ernando emerged as regent for >uana and harles that the constable cooperated with the old -ing. <uring the ten years from #ernando!s reentry into astile .A/ (ugust /:E13 until harles arrived in +eptember /:/1, *nfantado and the constable maintained their cavalry at full strength, allied themselves with the powerful nobles in +pain, and cooperated with #ernando!s enemies in the astilian church and bureaucracy without engaging in any openly hostile actions against #ernando. The alliances they formed after #ernando!s death .AC >anuary /:/=3 indicate that their intention was to form a political

bloc so powerful that the new dynasty would be forced to favor it just as the atholic Monarchs had been forced to favor the Mendoza after their decisive role in the succession war from /010 to /0;E. *nfantado and the constable seem to have been little affected by 5uestions of legal rights, astilian nationalism, loyalty to the monarchy, or even loyalty to #ernando. *nfantado!s loyalties were strongly oriented toward the family only, while the constable was loyal to the new generation of his royal inB laws6 and they were successful in carrying most of the Mendoza with them to a position of strength which placed the Mendoza family in a favorable position under harles 8..0A3 ?ut the Mendoza under the 4apsburgs were not nearly as powerful as they had been under the Trast$mara, and this is in part due to the inability of *nfantado and the constable to unite the family behind their policy of dealing from strength. Tendilla especially refused to cooperate. Throughout the succession dispute, Tendilla remained loyal to #ernando and invested much of his personal fortune in maintaining the military strength of the -ingdom of Granada against those nobility in (ndalucHa who were trying to undermine #ernando!s position. When %hilip and >uana arrived in astile in /:E=, Tendilla offered to do homage to #ernando for the fortresses he commanded in (ndalucHa. #$7)' (fter rescuing Gibraltar from the du-e of Medina +idonia and manipulating the chancillerHa of Granada into assisting him, he se5uestered the properties of the duchy of Medina +idonia for #ernando. When several (ndalucian nobles formed an alliance in support of >uana in /:E1, Tendilla joined the alliance and persuaded a majority of the members to declare themselves a confederation in support of #ernando.
.0C3

Tendilla was also instrumental in separating his sonBinBlaw, the count of Monteagudo, from an alliance *nfantado had formed against #ernando. (fter #ernando was recognized as the regent of harles in /:/E, Tendilla never attempted to correspond with anyone at the #lemish court, and he refused to ally with those nobles who were withholding support from #ernando. 4e persistently tried to e"pose and discredit what he called Fel bando de Toledo,F a group of nobility in 9ew astile led by the mar5uis of 8illena and cardinal isneros, whom Tendilla believed to be disloyal to #ernando. Most of the nobles who were Tendilla!s neighbors in (ndalucHa formed a mutual assistance pact, Fla liguilla,F under the leadership of the Great aptain and the mar5uis of %riego6 and in /:/:, the liguilla allied with the bando de Toledo. +urrounded by these powerful enemies, Tendilla remained aloof from all alliances and continued to serve #ernando loyally. *nstead of trying to find a position of strength and then negotiate with the -ing, Tendilla gave his resources and his loyalty to #ernando without reservation. +ince #ernando could always count on him, there was never any need to negotiate the terms under which Tendilla would serve #ernando. Once the service was performed, Tendilla was in a wea- position to negotiate and had to depend on #ernando!s sense of justice and gratitude for his reward..003 Tendilla placed loyalty to #ernando above the family!s welfare6 and as a result, he placed his own immediate family in a wea-ened position and wea-ened the position of the Mendoza as a whole, by brea-ing up the family!s ability to present a united front in times of crisis. (s a result, the Mendoza received few rewards from either #ernando or the 4apsburgs. The wea-nesses that had developed within the family itself coincided with a major change in the government which made it difficult for the Mendoza .or the other nobles3 to deal directly with the crown during the si"teenth century. The bureaucracy created by 7nri5ue *8 and nurtured by #ernando and *sabel became the single most effective political bloc during the years from /:E0 to /:AE. While the traditional political blocs of the nobility bro-e up into smaller, less effective units6 while the astilian monarchs were outside the country, or insane, or not recognized by the ortes, or too ill to assume the responsibilities #$7*' of government, the bureaucracy plodded on with the business of the country BB collecting ta"es, notarizing contracts, issuing licenses, dispensing justice, supervising

municipal governments, and countersigning royal decrees. *n the last three years of #ernando!s life, from /:/C to /:/=, when the -ing was too ill most of the time to do more than maintain a pretense of governing, the bureaucracy emerged decisively as the single most influential political group in the -ingdom6 and during the almost continuous absences of harles, they solidified their position. More than most nobles, Tendilla was adversely affected by the increasing powers of the bureaucracy. The strength of the great noble families in the fifteenth century, and especially of the Mendoza, was their independence of the royal government. ?ut Tendilla could not detach himself from the royal governmentD he wanted to increase his fortune and therefore had to receive favors from the crown6 and he was an officer of the crown and could not act independently, as the events of /022B/:EE had shown. (s #ernando!s health failed after /:/C, his correspondence was ta-en over by the royal secretaries6 and Tendilla lost that direct communication with the monarch which was the most important privilege of the nobility. 4e was in the worst possible position for a noblemanD he had to ma-e his voice felt at court, but he could not do so in person. *nstead, he had to influence these new centers of power at court BB those who held the -ing!s pen, he called them BB and to do this he needed to use all the influence of his political powers in Granada and his connections among the nobility. Throughout the succession dispute, Tendilla had singleBmindedly placed loyalty to #ernando before his own interests6 and he had failed to build those alliances in Granada and astile that would have protected his own interests. (s all of astile prepared to meet the new 4apsburg rulers of +pain, Tendilla found himself isolated and wea-. Tendilla!s position became most clearly and dangerously evident in /:/0B/:/: when #ernando tried to collect enough political support in astile to appoint his favorite, the du-e of (lba, as regent for harles, a violation of *sabel!s will stipulating that cardinal isneros should act as regent after #ernando!s death. Tendilla, of course, supported #ernando on this issue and pledged himself wholeheartedly to (lba. This time Tendilla had chosen the losing side. ardinal isneros won the support of the nobles who had supported %hilip in the succession dispute and of most of the bureaucracy. ?y midB/:/:, even the constable and *nfantado had pledged their support to isneros. Tendilla was left with only a handful of allies and a plethora of powerful enemies. Tendilla!s most dangerous enemy was the archbishop of Toledo, #$7%' cardinal isneros, of whom he saidD F* would rather remain in the power of the Muslims and devils than the cardinal because * see him ambitious and, as you -now, he always wanted to put me down and humble me during the time when the -ing was absent.F.0:3 Much of this antagonism between Tendilla and isneros was based on simple rivalry between two men who wanted to have power in appointments and in military affairs. (fter Tendil- failed to win the bishopric of (vila for his son, #rancisco, in /:/0, he could not help but compare the influence his family had held when cardinal Mendoza controlled appointments and his own lac- of influence with isnerosD * have been so disappointed and grouchy since the vacancy of (vila that * only felt li-e snapping li-e a dying horse at whoever comes near me. The truth is that where the cardinal I isnerosJ ventures forth there is nothing to say. The cardinal my uncle said to the mar5uise of Moya, FTell the 5ueen that if she gives the archbishopric of +eville to a favorite it doesn!t bother me at all, but if she gives it to anyone e"cept my nephew * will never again live at her court.F Thus Ithe vacancy of (vilaJ was offered to a favorite..0=3 The antagonism between Tendilla and isneros was essentially a difference of attitudes toward the most pressing religious problem of Granada, the (rabic customs and clothing of the Moriscos. Tendilla, true to the traditions of his ancestors and aware of the political leverage this issue gave him, argued that these should not be forcibly changed, since they were irrelevant to the religious issues. isneros was e5ually convinced that these outer habits were symbolic of an inner apostasy, and he encouraged the

crown and the local authorities to enforce the most rigid edicts against Muslim clothing and customs. .013 The hostility between Tendilla and isneros on this issue had e"isted since the uprising of the (lbaicin in /022. ?y /:/0, it had become a battle to see who could control the decisions of the consejo real, the city council of Granada, and the nobility of (ndalucHa. Tendilla!s other major enemy, the Great aptain, was also increasingly powerful in the last months of #ernando!s reign, as his nephew, the mar5uis of %riego, and other dissident nobility attempted to reestablish control over local areas of (ndalucHa before a new regime could consolidate its position. Tendilla was hostile toward the Great aptain for several reasons, all arising from the incidents surrounding the Great aptain!s return from *taly in /:E1. #ernando had lured the Great aptain out of *taly by promising him the grand mastership of the #$7+' Order of +antiago and command of an e"pedition to (frica. Once bac- in +pain, the Great aptain plunged into the preparations for the (frican e"pedition, only to have #ernando cancel the whole underta-ing after the men and supplies had already been collected. *nstead of appointing him grand master of +antiago, #ernando made him alcaide of the fortress of &oja, just a few miles west of the city of Granada. Tendilla had hoped to receive this appointment himself, and he was angry with #ernando, not only for giving &oja to someone else but for giving it to an enemy in preference to an ally..0;3 (mong the royal secretaries, Tendilla most fre5uently dealt with the powerful &ope onchillos and the rising #rancisco de los obos, but he never trusted onchillos to be loyal to him or to the -ing!s interests in Granada. #or some time, Tendilla was successful in bribing both onchillos and obos to gain their cooperation, but in /:/0 both of them raised the price of their cooperation so drastically that Tendilla was unable to meet it. #or most of /:/0, Tendilla tried to ingratiate himself with onchillos with flattery, even while he was complaining bitterly to his agent Ortiz about the secretary!s avarice6 but when onchillos began to advise the -ing about military matters in Granada, Tendilla lost all control. The idea that a bureaucrat would presume to give advice on military matters, especially one who did not -now the terrain, and the disrespect toward himself which this advice implied made Tendilla furious. 4is pride as a nobleman and his jurisdiction as an administrator could not have been more deeply intruded upon..023 When #ernando became seriously ill in the summer of /:/: Tendilla realized that in addition to the cardinal and the Great aptain all the royal secretaries had become his enemies and were trying to turn others against him. (ll of his favors and patronage for obos and all of his bribes and flattery for onchillos had done nothing to win these men to his side when the -ing was at the point of death..:E3 *n addition to ac5uiring all these enemies in high places and low, Tendilla was in constant conflict with his cousin, the third du-e of *nfantado. They had chosen opposing sides in the succession disputes, and Tendilla had the lowest opinion of *nfantado!s judgment in political affairs. ?ut the real source of antagonism between them was litigation over the terms of the will of their grandfather, +antillana. *nfantado had ta-en up the claims of Tendilla!s sisterBinBlaw, atalina &aso de la 8ega, and succeeded in /:/: in obtaining a court order which prevented Tendilla!s tenants from harvesting the grapes on the disputed property. To Tendilla, the enmity of *nfantado was just the final straw #$77' in a long series of conflicts which had left him without allies in the face of increasing dangers. Tendilla!s relations with the rest of the Mendoza family were not much better. 4is sonBinBlaw, (ntonio de Mendoza, count of Monteagudo, had allied himself with *nfantado. 4is young cousin, the mar5uis of enete, had remained noncomittal throughout the succession dispute, pursuing personal interests rather than political affairs. +ince enete was alcaide of Guadi", one of the strategic fortresses of the -ingdom of Granada, Tendilla had to cooperate with him in the maintenance of public order, and especially in the policing of the highway between the cities of Guadi" and Granada. ?ut Tendilla was always suspicious of enete, and his spies in Guadi" fed this suspicion by reporting on various

occasions that enete was negotiating with the Great aptain, though he seems never to have committed himself to the Great aptain!s party. ?y late +pring in /:/:, Tendilla was isolated from the sources of power in (ndalucHa, and when he found that enete was again sending messengers to &oja to negotiate with the Great aptain, he complained to Ortiz in the most despairing .but typically pungent3 termsD 9ow you will see what the mar5uis of enete intends in Guadi". * find myself well placed here on the cross, one hand nailed in &oja and the other in Guadi" and my feet on the mar5uis of %riego and my head crowned by the corregidor of Granada and my side pierced by Kapata and obos..:/3 7ven at this late date, with his enemies gaining allies every day, his authority in Granada usurped by Fthose who have the -ing!s pen,F and rumors flying that #ernando was dying or already dead, Tendilla would not give up his policy of loyalty to #ernando. 4e could depend on the constable, *nfantado, and enete to guarantee that whatever else might happen he and his sons would not be completely ruined. The Mendoza in the past had wor-ed to prevent the destruction of their enemies, let alone members of their own family. <espite their inability to wor- together and their political antagonisms, they were still concerned about the preservation of the family, and even such an irresponsible and defiant Mendoza as enete too- the trouble to warn Tendilla of one of the Great aptain!s plots and to pledge his support Fto those of the Mendoza family, because the house was all one.F.:A3 ?ut this was not enough6 and in the end, Tendilla had to accept #$7,' defeat. *n his last report to Ortiz, two wee-s before his own death, he instructed Ortiz to compromise with #ernando!s enemiesD (nd they say that the du-e of *nfantado has allied secretly with the cardinal and they write to me from Guadalajara that they believe that the count of oru,a is secretly allied with the du-e of *nfantado. On my behalf say to the comendador mayor of astile I4ernando de 8egaJ and even to the du-e Iof (lbaJ when you spea- to him that my enmity with the du-e Iof *nfantadoJ is no more than that he does not want to give what is mine, which is a light thing and that whether * give in or he pays it can be agreed that it is not a thing which impedes.... Give him to understand that * am very much for the cardinal... for * am not able to do anything and they can do harm every hour..:C3 This is a pathetic reversal for a man who, eight months earlier, had pledged his support to (lba and the -ing in the strongest termsD F* will serve you for * am not dead yet nor do * intend to die until * bury a few more of those who wish me evil along with those whom * have already buried.F.:03 ?y /:/: Tendilla had outlived most of his own generation of the con5uest of Granada6 he had tied his own fortune to the prosperity of the -ingdom of Granada6 he had isolated himself geographically and politically from the rest of the Mendoza and most of the nobility6 he had lost his influence with #ernando6 and he had ac5uired powerful enemies among the bureaucracy and church hierarchy. ?ut Tendilla!s most serious political wea-ness grew out of his own conservative and infle"ible nature. The party to which he had committed himself had become the losing party and he -new it, but he refused to change his allegiance until it was too late to bring him any advantage. *nstead of lending his strength to a party that would welcome and reward it, Tendilla, by his reversal in the summer of /:/:, was simply accepting a fait accompliD cardinal isneros, Tendilla!s most hated enemy, would be regent of astile after #ernando!s death. 7ven the du-e of (lba, whom Tendilla had supported in the hope that he would become regent, had recognized this fact, but Tendilla, li-e #ernando himself, admitted defeat only on the point of death.

%erple"ed, angry, and frustrated, Tendilla continued until the last month of his life to believe that #ernando could save him from all of his difficulties if he could only brea- through the circle of Fthose who have the -ing!s pen.F ?linded by his e"aggerated confidence in #ernando, Tendilla could not see that the -ing had become apathetic #$7-' and given up the active leadership of (lba!s party. Thus isolated by geography, politics, and his own stubborn loyalty, Tendilla continued to act in a manner no longer relevant to the new realities uf astilian politics. ?y following this anachronistic policy of loyalty to the last of the Trast$mara monarchs, Tendilla brought about his own failure. Through this same policy, he refused to cooperate with the rest of the Mendoza and so destroyed the family!s ability to act as a single political bloc in periods of crisis. Throughout his career, Tendilla had followed the patterns established by his glorious ancestors6 and even after he -new that it would result in political and economic disaster, he could not bring himself to abandon the Mendoza tradition. (s he ruefully confessed to the royal secretary, #rancisco de los obos, a wee- before he died, F* never was able to leave aside a course of action once * too- it up.F.::3 9otes for hapter +even /. Nnless otherwise noted, the following biographical information on Tendilla is from MondGjar. This material is summarized in Gonz$lez %alencia, Vida, *, CB00. The recent biographical s-etches of Tendilla by epeda, F7l Gran Tendilla,F and 7milio Meneses GarcHa, appearing in *,igo &'pez de Mendoza, Correspondencia del conde de Tendilla, I (1508 150!"# $iografa, estudio % transcripci&n, in 'rchi(o )ocumental *spa+ol, vol. MMM*, Madrid, /2106 confuse Tendilla with several of his homonyms. A. (G+, )egistro General del +ello, 8**B/01;, f. /E;, /1 >uly /01;. C. >oa5uHn <ur$n y &erchundi, ,a toma de -ranada % caballeros que concurrieron a ella, Madrid, /;2C, **, CA2BC01. 0. MondGjar does not e"plain how Tendilla -new about the siege of #aenza. The defense of (lhama is described in MondGjar, ff. /12B/;Ev. :. +alazar, MB/C/, fols. ACAvBACC6 MondGjar, ff. /;0B/;=v6 (zcona, ,a elecci&n, pp. A2:BA2=6 Go,H Gastambide, F&a santa sede,F pp. 0=B:16 F arta de los )) a conde de Tendilla su embajador en )oma, orden$ndole 5ue no entendiese en los pleitos 5ue en la corte )omana seguHan %ero arrillo, vuestro cu,ado e (lvaro arrillo su hermano,F 'rdoba, /C May /0;=, +alazar, MB/, f. /C. =. ?ut the papal secretaly >ohannis ?urchardi notedD Fet 5uia comes nesciebat e"pedite lo5ui latinum, protonotarii responderunt alternatis vicibus.F ited by Gonz$lez %alencia, Vida, *, =. 1. F7l onde de Tendilla fuG enba"ador en )oma, y estando en #lorencia tom' amistad con &orenOo MGdicis, el 5ual desseava casar una hija con un sobrino del %apa *nocencio, y el onde lo effectu', y de allH vino a tener el capello el 5ue despuGs fuG %apa &e'n,F .loreto de an/cdotas % noticias di(ersas que recopil& un fraile dominico residente en 0e(illa a mediados del siglo 1VI, ed. #.>. +$nchez ant'n, in Memorial 4ist'rico 7spa,ol, vol. M&8***, pp. CABCC. ;. 7ugene #. )ice, >r., The .oundations of *arl% 2odern *urope, 1340 155!, 9ew @or-, /21E, p. ;:. MondGjar admits that other ambassadors are reported to have done these same things, but believes that they were all imitating Tendilla, f. /;=v. 2. The polychrome is reproduced in Tormo, F7l brote,F facing p. =/. /E. F7l dia Martes a <os de 4enero a,o /02A vino esta ciudad de Granada a poder del )ey <on Gernando y de la )eyna do,a *sabel despues de largo sitio 5ue la tenian puesto. 7l mismo dia hizieron sus (lteras (lcayde, y capitan de la dicha ciudad, y fortaleza del (lhambra a *,igo &opez de Mendoza

conde de Tendilla, y se,or de Mondejar a cuyo adbitrio cometieron toda su guarda, y presidio con no despreciable numero de cavallos, e infantes, y pasados pocos dias despues se partieron sus Magestades a atalu,a, de"ando al sobredicho onde en el (lcaOar y ciudad, habitando en ella mas de veynte mil Moros.F This is a note written in Tendilla!s hand in &atin in the margin of a copy of (eneus +ylvius! 5istoria de $ohemia, which Tendilla had brought with him from )ome. MondGjar gives only this +panish translation, ff. A/1BA/1v. //. FPuando el rey n. s. y la reina n. s. 5ue aya gloria me mandaron dar este cargo asentaron me a5ui como en nueva naturaleza y de"e la mia y deshize mi casa alla de criados de mis avuelos y de mi padre y mios y he la hecho aca con esperanza 5ue como el rey n. s. lo ha concertado a hacer duraran estos cargos en mi y en mis subcesores para sienpre.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, /E March /:/0. /A. Osuna A2CQ/6 +alazar, MB/A/, f. AAAv. #or an e"ample of his actions as arbitrator, see his decision in a dispute over the boundaries of the tGrminos of the cities of 8Glez M$laga and (lhama, given at 8entas del (lcaycerHa, opiador, A; >anuary /:E=. #or the powers and responsibilities of the captaincyB general, see >.*. )ubio MallG, F7l concepto hist'rico de capitanHa general,F reprint from )iario de 6ucat7n, /2BAE March /2C;6 idem, Introducci&n al estudio de los (irre%es de 8ue(a *spa+a, 1595 a 1:34, vol. *, ;rgines % <urisdicciones % din7mica social de los (irre%es, Me"ico, /2::, pp. /B/=. /C. * have relied on the (ctas del abildo and the following published wor-s for the general history of Granada in the si"teenth centuryD >ulio aro ?aroja, ,os 2oriscos del reino de -ranada, Madrid, /2:16 <ur$n y &erchundi, ,a toma de -ranada6 #rancisco ?ejarano, F7l almirantazgo de Granada y la rebeli'n de M$laga en /:/=,F 5ispania /: ./2::3, 1CB/E26 #rancisco ?ermLdez de %edraza, 'ntig=edad % e>celencias de -ranada, Madrid, /=E;6 >.&. ano de Gardo5ul and (. de ?ethencourt, F*ncorporaci'n de Gibraltar a la orona de astilla, /0C:B/:E;,F 4ispania A= ./2==3, CA:BC;/6 >uan de Mata arriazo, F artas de la frontera de Granada, /0CEB/:E2,F 'l 'ndalu?, // ./20=3, =2B /CE6 (lfonso G$mir +andoval, FOrganizaci'n de la defensa de la costa del )eino de Granada desde su recon5uista hasta finales del siglo M8*,F $oletn de la @ni(ersidad de -ranada, 1C ./20C3, A:2BCC16 Renneth Garrad, F&a industria sedera granadina en el siglo M8* y su cone"i'n con el levantamiento de las (lpujarras, /:=;B/:1/,F 2iscel7nea de *studios 'rabes % 5ebraicos, : ./2:=3, 1CB/E06 idem, F&a in5uisici'n y los moriscos granadinos, /:A=B/:;E,F $ulletin 5ispanique, =1 ./2=:3, =1B1;6 idem, FThe Original Memorial of <on #rancisco 9L,ez Muley,F 'tlante, A ./2:03, /22BAA=6 idem, F&a renta de las habices !de los mez5uinos! de las (lpujarras y 8alle de &ecrinD (lgunos datos sobre su administraci'n a mediados del siglo M8*,F 2iscel7nea de *studios 'rabes % 5ebraicos, A ./2:C3, 0/B0;. #rancisco 4enrH5uez de >or5uera, 'nales de -ranada, para%so espa+ol, ed. (ntonio MarHn Ocete, Granada, /2C06 <iego 4urtado de Mendoza, )e la guerra de -ranada, ed. Manuel G'mez Moreno, Memorial 4ist'rico 7spa,ol, vol. 02 Madrid, /20;6 T.<. Rendric-, 0tA Bames in 0pain, &ondon, /2=E6 Miguel (ngel &adero Puesada, -ranada# 5istoria de un pas isl7mico, 1C9C 15:1, Madrid, /2=26 F&a repoblaci'n del reino de Granada anterior al a,o l:EE,F 4ispania, A; ./2=;3, 0;2B:=C6 &afuente y (lc$ntara, 5istoria de -ranada6 4enri &apeyre, ,a -/ographie de lD*spagne morisque, %aris, /2:26 >osG #rancisco de &u5ue, -ranada % sus contornosAAA, Granada, /;:;6 #rancisco MartHn 4ern$ndez, @n seminario espa+ol pretridentino, el Eeal Colegio *cleci7stico de 0an Cecilio de -ranada, 13!C 183C, 8alladolid, /2=E6 7ri-a +piva-ovs-y, F+ome 9otes on the )elations between <iego 4urtado de Mendoza and <. (lonso de Granada 8enegas,F 'rchi(um, /0 ./2=03, A/ABACA6 idem, 0on of the 'lhambra# )iego 5urtado de 2endo?a, 1503 15:5, (ustin Te"as, /21E. /0. Many of Kafra!s reports to the monarchs are published in odoHn, vols. 8*** and M*. On Talavera, see Tarsicio de (zcona, F7l tipo ideal de obispo en la iglesia espa,ola antes de la rebeli'n luterana,F 5ispania 0acra, // ./2:;3, A/B=0. /:. F8ivir como !mudGjares,! dentro de la tradici'n establecida en los siglos "ii, "iii, y "iv sobre todo, no hubiera parecido intolerable a los granadinos. @ las dos personalidades cristianas m$s destacadas a

las 5ue se encarg' en un principio del govierno del reino y la ciudad, don *,igo &'pez de Mendoza, conde de Tendilla, primer alcaide y capit$n general de Granada y #ray 4ernando de Talavera, su arzobispo, parecHan estar dispuestas a esta clase de convivencia, de !mudejarismo! cl$sico, aparte de 5ue eran tolerantes y de car$cter apacible.F aro ?aroja, ,os 2oriscos, pp. /CB/0. /=. F<el arzobispo de Toledo 5ue nunca vi' Moro, ni los conoci', no me maravillo, pero de vos, y del corregidor 5ue tanto tiempo ha 5ue los conoceis de no haberlo dicho.F +eville, AA <ecember /022, transcribed in MondGjar, ff. AACvBAA0. This account of the uprising in the (lbaicin is ta-en from the history written by Tendilla!s youngest son, <iego 4urtado de Mendoza, )e la guerra de -ranada, and has been repeated almost verbatim by all later historians. The earliest published account of the uprising, by 4ern$n 9L,ez de Toledo, lac-s some of the dramatic embellishments of Mendoza!s version, %r'logo to ,a historia de $ohemia en romance, +eville, /:E2, ff. iiBiii. +ee also the anonymous F)elaci'n del caso de Granada... principio de la rebeli'n de los moros despuGs de la con5uista ./0223,F odoin, MMM8*, 00/B0026 and FMinuta de carta de los )) a 7nri5ue 7nri5uez encarg$ndole 5ue fuera a Granada y tratara de conformar a los arzobispos de Toledo y de Granada para 5ue con conde de Tendilla, con el Gran apit$n, con el corregidor y con el pes5uisidor, entendieran en la conversion de los moros.F +eville, C >anuary /:EE, ?9, M+ AA=Q/C1. /1. F@o nunca estuve mal con corregidor ninguno de los pasados antes muy bien con todos ellos hasta 5ue vino el pes5uisidor y este corregidor.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, /A >une /:/:. /;. F7 non fagades apuntamiento diciendo 5ue la *n5uisition es otro jurisdiccion por5ue todo es nuestro.F ited by (. otarelo y 8alledor, .ra% )iego de )e?aA *nsa%o biogr7fico, Madrid, /2EA, p. /02. /2. F+uplico a y. m. me haga saber 5ue hizo el termino 5ue esperavedes, y si <ios ordenare otra cosa de lo 5ue 5uemamos, hazed vos se,or y la se,ora do,a *sabel a cuyas manos beso la 5ue hadamos la condesa y yo 5ue perdimos dos hijos en una semana y tres hijas y otro hijo en pocos dias y despues a los se,ores dos cardenales y a mi hermano don %edro y a hermanos de la condesa y consolavamonos el uno con el otro 5ue no hay ninguna otra consolacion.F opiador, Tendilla to don *,igo Manri5ue, AA (pril /:/0. Tendilla often used his own losses and his own stoic conduct as an e"ample in consoling friends. When the royal secretary Miguel %Grez de (hnaz$n died, he wrote to onchillosD F9o se 5ue os diga sino 5ue mires a mi 5ue perdi a mi tio y mi hermano cardenales y despues a my muger y trabajo por vivir.F opiador, Tendilla to onchillos, : May /:/0. AE. The only historian to treat this internal history in detail is (zcona, Isabel, pp. 1E2B10A. A/. The constable, %edro #ern$ndez de 8elasco, and the adelantado of (ndalucHa, %edro 7nrH5uez, in >anuary6 7nri5ue de Guzm$n, du-e of Medina +idonia, and his rival, )odrigo %once de &e'n, mar5uis of $diz, in (ugust6 %edro de +tL,iga, count of Miranda, in +eptember6 and ?eltr$n de la ueva, du-e of (lbur5uer5ue, in October. Miguel &afuente y (lc$ntara, 5istoria de -ranada, comprendiendo la de sus cuatro pro(incias 'lmera, Ba/n, -ranada, % 27laga, desde remotos tiempos hasta nuestros das, %aris, /;:A, **, C00n. AA. Many of these arguments are summed up by Kurita and repeated by MondGjar, ff. AC/vBACAv. AC. F@,igo &opez fue fisico de la se,ora reyna do,a >uana tia de y. al. y sirvio la con mucha lealtad y mucho tienpo.F opiador, Tendilla to the -ing of %ortugal, CE (pril /:/06 F@,igo &opez mi fisico ya sabes se,or como es loco y si no lo sabes sabeldo. 7s muy cobdicioso y fantaseo se le 5ue agora puede cobrar /EE,EEE 5ue le deve la hija de la reyna de 5uando fue su fisico. <ijo me 5ue 5uiere ir alla a cobrarlos di le una carta para el rey de %ortugal.F opiador, Tendilla to 8argas, /A May /:/0. A0. F@ tambien le dezid 5ue en esto de las galeras no osa onbre hablar a su al. como a la reyna nuestra se,ora 5ue aya gloria.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, = (pril /:/0.

A:. (t one point during #ernando!s illness, he instructed Ortiz to tell the court that he .Tendilla3 Fni va a cabildo ni entiende en negocio chico ni grande ni habla a nuevamente convertido ninguno ni los consiente 5ue saban a el manera 5ue acaesce estar "v dias 5ue no aba"a aba"o e tres y 5uatro 5ue no sale de un estudio y de su camara.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, AC March /:/0 F%esado me ha por5ue v.m. no esta sano por5ue 5uisiera ir a comer los pollos y anades de azalla y si estais para ello todo es tres dias de tardanza en 5ue podamos ir daca y v.m. venir de alla sino 5ue creo 5ue es como el azor 5uando sopesa a la perdiz 5ue no 5uiere esperar a 5uien le 5uiere cojer y por esta no 5uerra v.m. volver. <e la corte no se nada sino 5ue el rey n.s. andava a monte en 8entosilla y en la torre del monte 5ue es cabo (randa. Otros decian 5ue habla poca caza y 5ue se tornaran presente.F opiador, Tendilla to )odrigo Me"ia, /C October /:/06 Tendilla to the comendador ma%or de Castilla, /0 >une /:/:6 Tendilla to >uan 4urtado de Mendoza, / +eptember /:/06 Tendilla to )odrigo Me"ia, /= >une /:/:6 Tendilla to the comendador ma%or de Castilla, /0 >une /:/:6 Tendilla to #emando, /C >une /:/:. A=. This attitude is the basis of his complaints about not receiving favors. #or e"ampleD F<igo asi 5ue yo tengo la necesidad 5ue <ios y el mundo sabe y cada dia vendo mi hacienda para comer y por esto es me necesario y forzado 5ue no puedo hacer otra cosa. +uplico a su al. 5ue me mande dar de tomar como lo da a otros 5ue tienen cargos.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, = +eptember /:/0. A1. F@o en todo el mundo no tengo en este reyno arrimo ny ayuda ninguna sino la vida del rey ny esperanza en onbre de #landes ny de (lema,a por5ue nunca vieron carta mia ny unas recomiendos y 5ue solo al du5ue d!(lba me he ofrecido de servir y seguir y el segundo es el a 5uien tengo de mirar como a se,or verdadero y 5ue por esto me parece 5ue puedo y devo seguramente pedille por merced.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. A;. FPue no espera poder mucho los principes 5ue no aviendo mas de una parcialidad en sus pueblos 5uieren hacer dos o se,al 5ue no se fian de la parte 5ue tienen por suya 5uando le resucitan otra contraria.F opiador, Tendilla to the comendador ma%or de Castilla, /0 May /:/:. A2. opiador, Tendilla to the bishop of M$laga, /: (ugust /:/06 Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, = October /:/0. CE. F4e tenydo pena y congo"a y a me pesado mucho del enojo 5ue en vuestra casa a avido.F Tendilla to 4ernando de 'rdoba, A2 >une /:E;, printed in epeda, FNn aspecto de la correspondencia,F p. 106 opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. C/. F%or5ue lo 5uel buen servidor ha de hacer es conformarse en la voluntad de su se,or y no espere su alteza 5ue jamas yo le tengo de enbiar a decir de nadie 5ue no haze lo 5ue deve por5ue no he ganado yo los enemigos 5ue tengo de otra manera syno diziendo verdad y dando su alteza mis cartas y memoriales a los 5ue por ello me 5uerrian destruir.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, : <ecember /:/0. CA. FPue yo estoy a5ui peleando por su al. con su al. mismo.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. CC. F<e donde vienen los hechos han de venir los consejos.F opiador, Tendilla to the alcaide de los donceles, /E >une /:E=. C0. ?ermLdez de %edraza, 'ntig=edad, pp. /=, /CAB/0/. ?ermLdez was a judge of the chancillerHa of Granada in the seventeenth century. C:. F+i dicen 5ue soy absoluto digan 5ue he hecho. +i dicen 5ue robo digan como o en 5ue. Tanbien me dicen 5ue %e,aranda ha confirmado alla 5uantos males se dicen de mi y a dicho diabluras y aca lo han escrito. >uro por <ios 5ue no oso ir a la casa de los oidores como solia ni al president tantas veces por5ue no digan 5ue los traigo por el oreja. on todo eso no de"es de decir 5ue si me ponen en el monte con venados y puercos jabalies les hare hacer algo de lo 5ue 5uisiere y no hay ningund onbre cuerdo 5ue no haga otro tanto.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, = October /:/0.

C=. F ostunbre es 5ue los amigos 5uando saben alguna buena nueva la digan a sus amigos por5ue ayan placer. 7l rey don #ernando y el rey don #elipe y la reyna do,a >uana n.s. estan juntos y amigos como <ios y la razon re5uiere 5ue esten padres y hijos.F #rom a speech Tendilla made to the Muslims of the (lbaicHn, reported in his letter to don &uis, opiador, IC >ulyJ /:E=. C1. F( buen seso a de servir el principe a su ayudo y su ayudo pues le ha de heredar a de trabajar por de"ar le el mayor se,or del mundo.F opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. C;. This account of the succession crisis is based on Geronimo Kurita y astro, 'nales de la corona de 'rag&n IKaragoza, /:1;B/:;:J, vol. 8*6 #ern$ndez (lvarez, ,a *spa+a de los Ee%es Cat&licos, vol. /1D A6 Ronrad 4Sbler, )er 0treit .erdinandDs des Fatholischen und GhilippDs I um die Eegierung (on Castilien, /:E0B/:E=, <resden, /;;A6 ano de Gardo5uH, F*ncorporaci'n de Gibraltar.F Tendilla!s activity during the succession crisis is described in MondGjar, ff. AA:vBAC2. My interpretation of the attitudes of the nobility in this crisis is based on the following documents from Osuna and +alazar, and differs in many important points from that of 7lliott, Imperial 0pain, pp. /CCB/0A. F onfederaci'n y alianza original... 5ue hicieron don <iego 4urtado de Mendoza hijo mayor de don *,igo &'pez de Mendoza du5ue del *nfantado... de una parte y de la otra don (lonso %imentel conde de ?enavente.F ?enavente, /A <ecember /022, Osuna, /;=EQAC6 F onfederaci'n original 5ue hicieron don ?ernardino de 8elasco, condestable de astilla... y do,a Mencia de la 8ega, su prima.F n.p., I/:EEJ, Osuna, /;=EQA06 F onfederaci'n y amistad original 5ue hicieron don #rancisco de la ueva, du5ue de (lbur5uer5ue... y don <iego 4urtado de Mendoza y &una, du5ue del *nfantado.F uellar, A= +eptember /:E/, Osuna /;=EQA:6 F arta de <iego %Grez a #ernando el at'lico comunic$ndole diversas noticias relacionadas con el conde de Tendilla, el adelantado de Murcia, y el mar5uGs de 8illena,F >umilla, A0 >uly /:E:, ?9, M+ AE.A/0 .//36 opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. C2. F7scritura otorgada por *,igo &'pez de Mendoza, conde de Tendilla, por la 5ue hace pleito homenaje por la fortaleza de la (lhambra de Granada a los reyes #elipe * y do,a >uana,F Granada, A2 (ugust /:E=, +alazar, MBAC, f. /E=. 0E. F*nstrucci'n 5ue se envi' a los procuradores de cortes de Granada y su reyno, opiador, I+eptemberJ /:E=. 0/. <u5ue de ?aena y de +an &Lcar la Mayor, F7l Gran apit$n y el maestrazgo de +antiago,F 5ispania, /C ./2:C3, /;2B/206 F7scritura original 5ue hicieron y otorgaron los condes de ifuentes y #uensalida... por5ue el se,or du5ue del *nfantado movido con buen celo de dar paz entre ellos y la dicha ciudad se lo enbi' arrogar con don (ntonio de Mendoza tHo del dicho du5ue y con %ero G'mez, se,or de la villa de %ros, dijeron 5ue davan su fe al dicho du5ue y hacHan pleito omenaje en manos del dicho don (ntonio de Mendoza, de 5ue guardaran la dicha paz.F Toledo, A; #ebruary /CE1, Osuna, /;=EQA=. F%rovisi'n del consejo de astilla, en nombre de la reina do,a >uana, para 5ue el conde de Tendilla prenda a (ntonio Manri5ue,F %alencia, : May :E1, +alazar, MB/C/, ff. AC;vBAC2. 0A. F7scritura de reclamaci'n original 5ue hizo y otorg' don <iego 4urtado de Mendoza, du5ue del *nfantado,F ?urgos, A2 October /:E1, Osuna /;=EQA1. 4ere *nfantado reveals his hardBheaded and materialistic motives for having supported #emando. *t is only in these rare statements of renunciation that the nobility stated their material motivesD the treaties of alliance and allegiance continue to claim the most e"alted and patriotic motives in their wording, just as *nfantado here claims that be is going to serve and follow harles as his prince and natural lord because he is the legitimate heir to the throne. <uring #ernando!s final illness, *nfantado and his eldest son .*,igo &'pez de Mendoza, conde de +alda,a3 signed a treaty of friendship with >uan de (rag'n, du5ue de &una .(ragon3, and (lonso de (rag'n, conde de )ivagorza. Fto better serve the -ing,F who is not named but is clearly harles. &una, C <ecember /:/:, Osuna, /;=EQA;. 9ote that *nfantado is here allying with #ernando!s (ragonese

relatives, who would hardly have felt the sentiments of Fmany astilian nobles, who hated #erdinand as a strong ruler and also as a atalan.F 7lliott, Imperial 0pain, p. /C:. +ee also F onfederaci'n... entre IelJ du5ue del *nfantado y <. <iego de $rdenas, adelantado de Granada,F Guadalajara, C #ebruary /:/=, Osuna /;=E, no number6 F onfederaci'n entre... *nfantado y *,igo de 8elasco, condestable de astilla,F ?erlanga, /A (ugust /:/=, Osuna, /;=EQA26 F onfederaci'n entre... *nfantado y don (lvaro de Ku,iga, du5ue de ?Gjar,F Guadalajara, /; +eptember /:/=, Osuna, /;=E, no number. 0C. opiador, Tendilla to Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. F arta del rey dirigida a todas las ciudades de (ndalucHa para 5ue asistan en lo 5ue necesitase mar5uGs de MondGjar 5ue se disponHa por su orden a dar posesi'n de sus estados al du5ue de Medina +idonia,F +alazar, MB/C/, ff. AE:vBAE=6 F<o,a >uana... manda al mar5uGs *,igo &'pez de Mendoza... 5ue vaia a poner en la posesi'n de la casa y estado de Medina +idonia a don (lonso %Grez de Guzm$n... y para ello llebe todas las gentes de pie, y de caballo 5ue fuere menester segLn 5ue mas largamente se contiene en las cartas y poderes 5ue sobre ello le mande dar,F Medina del ampo, 2 March /:/C +alazar, MB/C/, f. AE:v6 F arta del rey #emando 8 al corregidor de >erez de la #rontera . $diz3 orden$ndole 5ue ayude a mar5uGs de MondGjar dar posesi'n de los estados de su casa aIlJ du5ue de Medina +idonia por fallecimiento de su hermano.F Medina del ampo, AA #ebruary /:/C, +alazar, MB/, /Cv. 00. Tendilla was aware of this pattern and complained about it in /:E;D F omo se sabe cierto 5ue he de servir asy, asy y asy ponenme en la baraja.F Tendilla to Gonzalo del ampo, CE >une /:E;, printed in epeda, F(ndalucHa en /:E;,F p. 11. 0:. F@o 5uerria mas 5uedar en poder de los moros y de los diablos 5ue del cardenal por5ue yo le veo ambicioso y como vos sabes sienpre deseo abatir me y aba"ar me en el tiempo 5uei rey estuvo ausente.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. 0=. F7sto tan desesperado y rega,ado despues de la vacante de (vila 5ue no 5uerria syno morder a 5uantos llegan a mi como haca matada. 8erdad es 5ue donde el cardenal se atraviesa no hay 5ue decir. <i"o el cardenal mi tio a la mar5uesa de Moya, !<ezi a la reyna 5ue si da el arzobispado de +evilla a privado no me da nada. Mas si lo da a otro sino a mi sobrino ITendilla!s brotherJ, nunca mas viviera en su corte.! (si 5ue a privado se dio en ofrecimientos. 9i para v.s. ni para mi no tengo cauza ninguna ni fago otra cuenta sino 5ue v.s. medrara para 5uien es y my hijo para 5uien fuere.F opiador, Tendilla to the bishop of M$laga, 2 (ugust /:/0. 01. When Ortiz, on Tendilla!s orders, tried to spea- to the cardinal about easing the financial burdens of the Moriscos, the cardinal replied that Fera muy malo de"arllos ser moros.F Tendilla denied the implication that he, by supporting the Moriscos! re5uest to wear (rabic clothing without financial penalties, was giving the Moriscos license to remain Muslims. opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, AC March /:/0. 0;. The twentyBfive letters published by epeda in F(ndalucHa en /:E;,F were written immediately after &oja was given to the Great aptain. On the basis of these letters, epeda has concluded that Tendilla was simply supporting the protests of the citizens of &oja that they were being cut off from the royal power and being turned over to the whims of a nobleman .p. :;3, and that Tendilla!s gracious letters of congratulation to the Great aptain indicate a sincere desire to establish friendly relations with this powerful neighbor .p. :13. ?ut these letters to the Great aptain and other officials in (ndalucHa must be ta-en with a grain of salt, since Tendilla!s letters to Ortiz, where he e"presses his true feelings, show that he hated the Great aptain and was envious of his royal favors. 02. F7screviIdJme si tomo el secretario I onchillosJ el vasillo 5ue yo os juro a <ios tomandole o no sea la postre mas por5ue no diga 5ue le tengo por cobdicioso.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, I(pril /:/0J6 F+eria bien 5ue su alteza nola diese ITendilla!s letterJ a onchillos por5ue es descubierta la celada 5ue me 5ue"o en ella de ese rapaz de obos aun5ue no le nonbro.F /E May /:/:6 F+e 5ue don

Miguel Ide &e'nJ del conde de Nre,a es y dineros le da y a mi hace onchillos desservidor del rey y aun enemigo.F /E March /:/06 F9unca vi cosa mas donoso 5ue ver el esgremir 5ue hace el I onchillosJ 5ue dio el memorial y decir 5ue ha de guardar fuentes y rios y veredas y aguas 5ue a5uello es tan imposible hacerse con ninguna gente de guerra como bolar un buey 5uanto mas con docientos onbres. Maravillo me 5uien oso dar tal memorial a su al. y para 5ue lo viesen esos se,ores 5ue entienden en las cosas de guerra.F Tendilla to #rancisco de los obos, /A (ugust /:/06 F9unca vi cosa tan vana ni tal trastras, diciendo cosas imposibles de hacer por <ios 5ue no se guarde todo el reyno con 5uadrillas de mill y 5uinientos onbres y 5ue ellos roben y destruian mas 5ue los Moros y alli andara la cosa a saber si lo avian hecho los contrarios o los amigos. @o maravillado estoy por5ue donde hay capitan general no se les dice, !Tomad tanta gente,! y !Tened esta orden y esa,! y !?uscad 5uien lo haga,! sino 5ue de alla enbien el capitan y le den la orden como si yo fuese bestia o onbre 5ue acostunbrase estarme hilando.F Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, /A (ugust /:/0. :E. F?asta 5ue onchillos y obos acuerdan sy el rey muriese o le acaesciese algo semejante a lo de la otra vez de de"arme condenado con los vecinos y con los de la cibdad y enemigo no yendo les otro ynterese en ello syno el 5ue todo el mundo vee. (viendo yo hecho por obos mas 5ue ningun del reyno por5ue yo le hize dar la contaduria de Granada y yo le di lo del campo de <alias a pesar de todos yo le di agora la procuracion y le he hecho otras buenas obras 5ue no cuento a5ui.... (l se,or comendador mayor de alatrava dezi leeys con 5uanto estudio trabajan onchillos y obos y Kapata por su parte por enemistarme con estos en 5uien tengo parte.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. :/. F(y veres en 5ue entiende el mar5ues del Kenete en Guadi". @o estoy bien 5ue estoIyJ en la cruz la una mano enclavada en &oja y la otra en Guadi" y los pies en el mar5ues de %liego y la cabeza coronada del corregidor de Granada y el costado abierto por Kapata y obos.F opiador, Tendilia to #rancisco Ortiz, /A May /:/:. :A. F7n tal caso el no podia fallecer a los de Mendoza por5ue la casa era toda una 5ue me lo hazia saber.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:. Tendilla himself was not devoid of such family feeling. 4e voted for his cousin ?ernardino +u$rez de Mendoza, count of oru,a, in an election to fill the trezenazgo of the Order of +antiago vacated by the death of the royal secretary, Miguel %Grez de (lmaz$n. opiador, Tendilla to #emando, /: May /:/0. :C. F(ves de saber 5ue se an juntado el Gran apitan y el mar5ues de 8illena y el almirante y no se sy el condestable y tanbien dizen 5ue de secreto el du5ue del *nfantado con el cardenal y escriven me de Guadalajara 5ue creen 5uel conde de oru,a esta de secreto concertado con el du5ue del *nfantado y por5ue porventura al du5ue <alva por algund concierto 5ue terna con el du5ue del *nfantado se le hara algo grave el mostrase muy claro por mi dires al comendador mayor de astilla aun al du5ue cuando le hablardes 5ue mi enemistad con el du5ue no es syno sobre 5ue no me 5uieren dar lo mio 5ues cosa liviana y 5ue o callando yo o pagando el lijeramente se puede concertar 5ue a5uello no es cosa 5ue enpacha y all almirante 5ue como veres en su carta del conde de oru,a ha escrito al conde y es mucho del cardenal dalde a entender 5ue yo soy mucho del cardenal y al comendador mayor dezilde la verdad tanbien al de alatrava como al de astilla y aun sy os paresciere aun5ue no ayays de dar la carta larga a onchillos mostralda al comendador mayor y dezi 5ue no la 5uieres dar por no enemistar me pues yo no puedo hacer nada y ellos pueden da,ar cada ora.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco Ortiz, 1 >uly /:/:, postscript. :0. F7llos Ihis sonsJ y yo le serviremos 5ue aun no soy muerto ni esto de intencion de morir me hasta 5ue entierre otros pocos de los 5ue me 5uieren mal con los 5ue he enterrado.F opiador, Tendilla to (lba, A <ecember /:/0. ::. F9unca supe de"ar el camino 5ue una vez comence a andar.F opiador, Tendilla to #rancisco de los obos, 1 >uly /:/:.