What Is Husserl's First Philosophy 1982

International Phenomenological Society
What is Husserl's First Philosophy? Author(s): Jeffner Allen Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Jun., 1982), pp. 610-620 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107381 . Accessed: 18/10/2013 07:16
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DISCUSSION WHAT IS HUSSERL'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY? The first article on Edmund Husserl's First Philosophy (1923/24), volume I, Critical History of Ideas, states,
. . . the has entereda period of new activity Husserl'sphenomenology in thatit refers one directly ofideas is to be recommended criticalhistory to the systematicfundamental problems of phenomenology.In the of thoughtphilosophically without future,no one can treatthe history
entering into it.'
The summary of First Philosophy, volume I, compiled by Ludwig Landgrebe, makes brief reference to the necessityof a historical introduction to phenomenology as firstphilosophy (FPI, p. 298).2 To inquire into the sense and significance of such comments, we ask: What is Husserl's firstphilosophy? To arrive at an exegetic and analytic response to this question, we propose an examination of the following topics: I. Phenomenology as First Philosophy II. First Philosophy as a Critical History of Ideas III. Critical Reflections on the "Necessity" of First Philosophy Throughout the examination we suggest that the unique sense and significance of First Philosophy, volume I, lies entirelyin the issue of whether and how it accomplishes something which could not be accomplished otherwise. While this criterionis difficultto determine, it is only from its quite rigorous standpoint that the specific characteristic of Husserl's firstphilosophy can come to light and that the introductoryremarks, cited above, can be justified.3
'Dieter Henrich, "Uber die Grundlagen von Husserls Kritikder PhilosophRundschau, vol. VI (1958), pp. 1, 26. ischen Tradition," Philosophische 2Husserl,FirstPhilosophy(1923/24), Part I: CriticalHistoryof Ideas, trans. to thistext References forthcoming). Allen (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, Jeffner will be abbreviatedFPI, followedby the German pagination. FirstPhilosophy,volume I, is the edited and completedtextof the 3Husserl's course which Husserl gave under that title, wintersemester1923-1924, at the in Husserl's written The originalmanuscript, of Freibourg-im-Breisgau. University of the as was his custom,was expanded either just priorto thebeginning shorthand, of thatsame year. The first later,duringthewinter course,winter1923, or slightly lecture took place November 2, 1923, and the last lecture of First Philosophy, was made, at typedtranscription volumeI, was givenDecember 18, 1923. The first Husserl's request, by his assistant, Ludwig Landgrebe, during the winter
610
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as FirstPhilosophy I. Phenomenology but fell was introduced by Aristotle philosophy" The term"first period, by into disuse when replaced, in the post-Aristotelian a wordwhichcame intouse bychance. Husserladopts "metaphysics," maintainingthat its literal sense may the term "firstphilosophy," purposeof thenew discipline serveas an indicationof the theoretical of phenomenology. to be selfseems, initially, The literalsense of first philosophy which,among the variousphilosophies evident.It is thatphilosophy thefirst. The ways as a whole,is precisely philosophy whichcomprise also seem to be clear enough: in whichsuch a disciplineis "first" in reasons. It is first for intrinsic is "first" 1. Firstphilosophy All othersciences,includingmetaphysics value and dignity. itself, presuppose it and, accordingly, are "second" The primacy is not posited of thenewdiscipline philosophies. is based on an orderwhich at randombut, Husserlmaintains, the sciencesbear in themselves. because it is guided bythe teleologiis "first" 2. Firstphilosophy accal idea ofscience.The sciencesare createdbypurposeful of thesciencesstandunderguidingideas. All thetruths tivity; whichis guided sciencesare subordinateto first philosophy, by the supremeteleologicalidea of science itself.The teleounity forthe sciences,a logical idea indicatesan all inclusive unitywhich expands endlesslyand strivesforwardin ever way of explaining higherforms.This is Husserl'spreferred the primacyof phenomenology. is "first" discipline ofthebeginas a scientific philosophy 3. First of philosophy is thebeginning first philosophy ning. In itself, withitsownproblems as such. It is a self-contained discipline,
1923-1924. A second transcription(listed at the Husserl Archives under and notationsmade by Husserl, but MT3/F34Ia) contains numerouscorrections none of themseems to be later than 1928. The textpublishedby Rudolf Boehm is in accord with the original manuscript,takinginto account the later corrections and notations. Part II of First Philosophy(1923/1924) is entitled Theory of the volume VIII of theHusserliana series.InPhenomenologicalReduction and forms by concerningthe compositionof the textis givenin the "Introduction" formation Ideengeschichte Teil: Kritische Rudolf Boehm, ErstePhilosophie(1923/24), Erster (Husserliana, vol. VII), ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,1956), pp. xi-xxxiv,and in the "Avant-proposdu traducteur,"by Arion L. Kelkel, in Husserl,PhilosophiePremiere(1923/1924), deuxieme partie: Thgoriede la reducde tion phenomenologique, trans. Arion L. Kelkel (Paris: PressesUniversitaires France, 1972), pp. vii-xlvi.
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concerning the beginning of philosophy. All other sciences are preceded by phenomenology as firstphilosophy, which founds them with respect to their method and theory. The beginner of firstphilosophy does research into the origins of thought: beginners of second philosophies reproduce, in their own insightfulthinking,the truthspreviouslythought by first philosophers. In sum, the ways in which the new discipline is "first" form variants on the same foundational theme: there is an intrinsicorder to all philosophies, for all philosophies are guided by a teleological idea of philosophy itself. Yet, this foundation for the primacy of first philosophy is, in itself, not clear at all. The task of first philosophy is to fulfill the idea of first philosophy and, in doing so, to lead us to be beginning philosophers. It encompasses a theory of rational life, a theoryof theoretical, axiological, and practical reason. In that its task has not been fulfilled by any philosophical systems, past or present, "it is a matter of nothing less than a reformof philosophy as a whole and, included in that, a universal reform of all sciences as such" (FPI, p. 17). The theoretical purpose of the new discipline of phenomenology is radical, going to the roots of all philosophy. However, insofar as the purpose of first philosophy is indicated by its literal sense, which itself,restson an unclear foundation, its task is not immediately selfevident. Unclear notions of intrinsic order and teleology appear to obscure, at least initially, the theme of phenomenology as first philosophy. Nevertheless,it is, perhaps, by means of theirclarification that firstphilosophy comes to accomplish something which could not be accomplished otherwise. We will begin such a clarification by situating Husserl's firstphilosophy in its proper context. II. First Philosophy as a Critical History of Ideas
... in theseconsiderations it is a matterof nothing less thanuncovering the unity of motivationgoing through the centuriesand which, as insofaras it wanted to developmentaldrive,has lived in all philosophy become true philosophy,and in all philosophicalmethod insofaras it wanted to become truemethod. (FPI, pp. 141, 142)
The "unity of motivation" may be understood as a systemof experience.4 The unified systemis constituted by the interrelation be4Husserl,Ideas: General Introductionto Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 134.
WHAT Is HUSSERL'SFIRST PHILOSOPHY?
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tweenobjects indicatingand objects indicatedin actual experience, beyonditself to possibleexperience, in actual experience whichrefers and in possibleexperiencewhichpointsto new possibleexperiences, ad. inf. History,the historyof ideas in general, and particular in thehistory of ideas maycomprise suchobjects.The unity moments ariseswhen"certainobjectsor statesof affairs ofmotivation of whose indicate to him the realityof reality someone has actual knowledge in the sensethathis beliefin certainotherobjectsor statesof affairs, as the realityof the one is experienced(thoughnot at all evidently) a beliefor surmisein the reality "5 The conof the other. motivating ofsuchsystems ofexperience tents mayconcernthings alreadyknown and stillundiscovered. The relation betweenthese or wholly unknown is not arbitrary but, rather,is guided by the content statesof affairs whichthe object posited alwaysalreadyincludeswithinitself.With history, runningthroughout respectto the formof the motivation Husserlwrites,
genesis,whichis such that past, present,and future,become unitarily
constituted over and over again.... We call it furthermore a formal regularity pertaining to a universal But, within this form, life goes on
with a as a motivatedcourse of particular constitutedperformances of particularmotivations and motivational which, systems, multiplicity
according to universal laws of genesis, produce a unity of universal
foritself itself in, so to speak, the genesisof the ego. The ego constitutes unityof a 'history.'6
in the motivation running betweenobjectsinThe formalregularity dicating and objects indicated forms a descriptiveunity which, thoughoftencoveredby the sedimentof prejudicesand presuppositions, underliesour various researches.Indeed, Husserl claims, it which are formsan "essentialtype,"or "essentialconfigurations,"' presentin history and which can be uncoveredonly insofaras we a strict follow procedure.At thispointtherearises,to methodological of be sure, an essentialquestionto whichwe will return:Is the unity subjectivity, to be equated with motivation, constituted by reflecting the teleologicalidea whichis said to guide first philosophy? we proceedto an examination of thetypeofmethod If, however, of "the unityof motivationrunning appropriatefor investigation the centuries,"we find ourselvesconfronted with the throughout
trans.J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & 5Husserl,Logical Investigations, Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 270. 6Husserl,Cartesian Meditations:An Introductionto Phenomenology,trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,1960), p. 75. 7Husserl,Ideas, p. 135.
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issue: How is the unity of motivation disclosed? and, related inseparably to that, What is the unity of motivation disclosed? Here it is clear that the proper context of Husserl's First Philosophy, volume I, is neither that of an empiricism, for which historywould be an accumulation of objective facts which occur in cause-effect sequence, nor that of an idealism, for which history would be the accomplishment of a world-spirit.The appropriate context for Husserl's firstphilosophy is, rather, that of "eidetic" history, the historyof ideas and, even more significantly, the historyof the exemplary moments, the crucial paradigmatic moments, which form turning points in the development of philosophical thought. Since it is an eidetic history,individual philosophers are presented insofar as their thought contributes to the essential typology of philosophical consciousness. Husserl's project is also that of a "critical" history, namely, one that endeavors to break through customary assumptions about the historyof ideas in order to discover its fundamental problems and the relation between them, as seen from the perspective of the present-day philosopher. Husserl's eidetic and critical history claims to be an account of the meaning of so-called objective historical facts and a rendering, as is often insufficiently established by idealist accounts of history,of the foundations of historyin individual subjects. Eidetic and critical historyis accomplished by a specific methodological approach to history:the historical reduction. The term "historical reduction" was introduced by Rudolf Boehm as a distinctiveway into phenomenology, as having a subject matter and approach other than that of the generally acknowledged three ways to the transcendental phenomenological reduction: the Cartesian way, the path of intentional psychology,the critique of the positive sciences and ontology. It has been used subsequently by numerous philosophers to designate the particular procedure used by Husserl to investigate the meaning of history.8In the most general terms, the historical reduction involves (1) a setting aside of customary accounts of objective facts of history,(2) description, from the viewpoint of the present-day philosopher, of the idea-content of major turning points in history,and (3) reduction of the historyof
8RudolfBoehm, "La Phenomenologiede i'histoire," Revue international de philosophic, vol. LXXI (1965), pp. 55-73; David Carr, Phenomenologyand the Problem of History(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 110-33; Arion L. Kelkel, "Avant-propos du traducteur," in Husserl,PhilosophiePremiere (1923-24) deuxieme partie: Thgoriede la reductionphenomenologique,pp. xxiv.
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ideas to the fundamental interconnections betweenits most significant moments,together with disclosureof the unityof motivation which"has livedin all philosophy insofar as it has wantedto become the historicalreductionis a true philosophy...." Accordingly, specificmethodology developed to accomplish a specifictask: the of history from thepointofviewof a criticalhistory understanding of ideas. Description of the basic stagesof the historical reductionwill precede criticalreflections on it. If we turnto the initialstep of the historical reductionwe find that,by a retrospective glance[Rickblick] at thehistorical tradition, it is possibleto disengagethemeaningof history from itsnaive objective facticity. Such meaning, which is at firsthidden fromitself, becomes visiblewhen we "place ourselvesin the motivation of the in thehistorical beginning, theSocratic motivation whichdetermined and Platonic reaction[to the scepticism of the Sophists]and thereby determined thedevelopment of theidea of a philosophy havinga new which was usefulforit" (FPI, p. 32.) sense, and of a methodology Thus, the senseof history is disengagedfromhistorical factwhenwe place ourselves withinthe beginning,that is, when we look back at thepast byreliving thenecessary and inevitable standit, albeit from point of the present. Yet, one may ask, whyis theretrospective and glance necessarily inevitably rootedin the present? Why does Husserlproposean overcomingof the past as it has been viewedcustomarily (by themodernof the past (as it emergesin the day philosopher) by wayof a reliving present situatednessof the contemporary philosopher)?Any approach to history as an objectivecollectionof factswould consider Husserl'sproposala violationof thehistoricity itself. of history Or, in other words, how are we to understandHusserl'sstatement, made withreference to Kant, that"to takeoverhis[Kant's]system as it is or to improveits details,thisis not whatis necessary above all else, but - and to rather,to understandthe ultimatesense of his revolution understandhim betterthan he himself, the trailblazer, but not the was capable of doing" (FPI, p. 286).9 Here theparenthetic perfecter, remarks speak forthemselves, for theyindicate the oftenunnoticed and yetinescapablepositionality There is of any approach to history. no nonpositional point- a point whichwould, in principle,have to
9Husserl,"Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,"trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl, SouthwesternJournal of Philosophy, vol. V (1974), p. 55. This article also formsa supplementary textto FirstPhilosophy,Part I.
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-from which to view history. To understand that be outside history everyviewing of historyis positional is to begin to see historycritically and eidetically. Suspension of the natural, objectivistic attitude toward history, and establishment of one's positionalityas a viewer of history,enables the philosopher to undertake a description of the idea-content of those turning points central to the historyof thought. Salient features of Husserl's account include the fact that (1) each of the turning points is comprised by a juncture of theoretical, axiological, and practical reason, i.e., by a transformationand renewal of the life of reason as a whole, and (2) each of the major paradigms evidences a fundamental shift in the "preliminary forms" of intentionality, perhaps the major concept of phenomenology in general and certainly the major concept of Husserl's work. More specifically, and with respect to those philosophers whom Husserl finds to stand out above all others: 1. Socrates is viewed as a reformerof ethical life, of a life of pure reason, that is, "a life in which man, in untiringself-reflection and radical justification, submits himself to a critique- an ultimately evaluative critique-of the goals of his life and then, of course, by means of this, to a critique of the ways he lives his life and the specific means he uses" (FPI, p. 9). 2. Plato is seen as extending the Socratic principle of radical justification, both as "creator of the problem of philosopy and the science of method, namely, the method of systematically actualizing the supreme teleological idea of 'philosophy,' which is inherent in the essence of cognition itself," and as founder of the doctrine of social reason, of a truly rational human community, a theme which determines "the essential character and destiny of the development of European culture" (FPI, pp. 13, 17). Moreover, with Plato, genuine cognition, genuine truth (valid in itself, determinant once and for all) and being in the true and genuine sense (as the identical substrate of truthswhich are determinant once and for all), become essential correlates (FPI, p. 13). sketch of the science of 3. Aristotleis examined as giving the first subjectivity,namely, as a psychology. 4. The Sophists are considered as those thinkersfor whom the naive pregivenness of the world became problematic and, along with that, the world itself with respect to the fundamental possibilityof there being knowledge of it and with
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regardto the principalsense of its being in itself.With Profirstappears as that in tagoras and Gorgias, subjectivity whichall conceivableobjectsreceivefora whichor through conscioussubjecttheircontentand sense (FPI, p. 60). 5. Descartes is understood as having discovered that which even though antiquityremained imperceptible, throughout feltin some way: the absolutely lack of it alwaysmade itself necessarybeginningof philosophyin the ego cogito. By the ego as the Archimedeanpoint upon which establishing may be founded,he givesrise to an engenuinephilosophy of philosophy (FPI, p. 62). new turnin the history tirely at a scienceofthe attempt 6. WithHume, Husserlfindsthefirst if an attempt at a pure egology, pure givensof consciousness, only Hume had not posed the I as a pure fiction.In fact, sketchof a Husserl writesthat Hume's Treatise is the first though in the formof a purelysenpure phenomenology, (FPI, p. 157). sualisticand empiricalphenomenology 7. In Kant's work, Husserl maintains, philosophybegins to move, albeit naively, within the framework of the phenomenologicalattitude. With Kant thereis realized "a in itself in theessential senseofphilosophy turnpredelineated its development from the natural to the transcendental method of cognition,fromthe positiveor dogmatic to the cognitionand science of the world." Or, as transcendental revolution incipient "at Husserlwrites, last, thephilosophical emergingphilosophyof the modern age in the historically became fact. With its appearance there was revealed to philosophy itself the methodological form essentially thatis to say, truephilosophy, to it as scientifically necessary developments the genuineteleologicalidea whichall further (FPI, activity" purposeful to realizein consciously muststrive pp. 285, 286).1 pointsin of the major turning Descriptionof the idea-content of thought, the history by means of an eideticand criticalreflection a need forthethird itself ofphilosophy, containswithin on thehistory of ideas to reduction:reductionof the history stage of the historical together moments, betweenitsmostsignificant thebasic relationships with disclosure of the unity of motivation which pervades it itsdevelopment. Indeed, the thirdstageof the reduction throughout
'0 Ibid.
618
has, in part, already been accomplished: we have seen how such relationships and the unity of motivation are disclosed, but we have not determined what, precisely,is the unityof motivation that is disclosed. We have viewed its specific content with respect to particular moments in the history of philosophy. We have not established whether and how it is related to our earlier analysis of motivation, to the teleological idea of philosophy, to the idea of first philosophy. Accordingly, we must expand and deepen our descriptive approach to Husserl's historical reduction by a critical reflection on the unity of motivation which it both discloses and presupposes. III. Critical Reflections on the "Necessity" of First Philosophy To the extent that the unity of motivation is disclosed by the historical reduction, First Philosophy, volume I, may have a necessity of its own. In contrast, to the extent that the unity of motivation is presupposed by the historical reduction, First Philosophy, volume I, may in some way not be necessary at all. Or, as Husserl writes in Ideas, volume I,
. .. the concept of motivationundergoeson essentialgroundsvarious are not dangerous, changes, but the equivocationsthat arise therefrom and even appear to be necessary, as soon as thephenomenological states of affairsare cleared up.11
We will examine this state of affairsby inquiring furtherinto what is the unityof motivation and, at the same time, by continuing the third stage of the historical reduction. More precisely,we will consider the motivational unity(1) as a regulative principle for the unityof thinking and willing, as exhibited in the ideal of a rational humanity, and (2) with reference to the historical reduction and to Husserl's formulation of the Cartesian reduction. In one sense, the unity running throughout historymay be seen as a regulative principle determinant for the relation between thought and will, philosophy and human culture, the historyof ideas and the historyof deeds. It brings togetherthe idea of philosophy as a universal science which provides the foundation for all knowledge and the philosopher's will to attain clarityconcerningsuch a rigorously founded science. It unifies the autonomy which arises with the subject's self-understanding and self-criticismand the freedom which emerges with the subject's self-responsibility. Landgrebe writes,
11Husserl, Ideas, p. 134-35. Slightalterationshave been made in the English translation.
WHAT Is HUSSERL'sFIRST PHILOSOPHY?
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is ... establishing of phenomenology] It [Husserl'shistorical-teleological forman's activity and behavior a "regulative"principledeterminative of history is discovered onlywhenit is takenup bythe ... This teleology and who therebytakes upon himselfthis will of the one who reflects is to establishhisown existence... it (thisteleology) datum whichserves a task posed to the beginning philosopher by his own historyand grasped in resolve. 12
is disclosed as a principlefor the As such, the unityof motivation axiological,and practical, renewalof the lifeof reason, theoretical, of a rationalhumanity. that is, as a principleforthe development ofmotivation is somewhat ambiguous In another sense,theunity in meaning.Fromtheperspective of thehistorical reduction, it forms In the of all philosophy and it foundsphenomenology. the beginning of the thenaive and anonymous accomplishment historical reduction is seen as always unitybecomes a themein its own right.Its identity and elaboratedprogressively alreadypositedin itshiddenbeginnings in the historical process,i.e., as the supremeteleologicalidea which of ideas. Recoveryof the unityof motivation is guides the history as leading to the necessity of a new absolutebeginning of understood in transcendental of the Fromthestandpoint philosophy subjectivity. which founds subjectivity Cartesian reduction,it is transcendental philosophyabsolutelyand, moreover,it is the ego cogito that constitutes the sense of history,liftingit out "above the play of philosophicalsystems" (FPI, p. 286).13 Accordingto Husserl'sformulation of the Cartesian reduction,the unityof motivationperwhichmustbe vadingthehistory of ideas appears as a presupposition of thesystem ofmotivated foundedanew, albeit in terms experience, whichwe discussedin SectionII. Of course,one mightsay thatboth each forms of the reduction are necessaryand complementary, in it own way. The historical reduction leading into phenomenology simply shows us the teleological idea which philosophy, until was unable to realizefully, butwhichcan be realized phenomenology, anew by the beginningphilosopherwho carriesout the Cartesian reduction.However,one mightalso say thatbeginnings and absolute in kind,such thatthe historical is are different reduction beginnings unnecessary,for in that it does not offer absolutely grounded foundphenomenology. knowledge, it cannot genuinely In sum, the waysin whichFirstPhilosophy, volume I, is and is
12Ludwig Landgrebe, "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism," in R. 0. Elveton, The Phenomenologyof Husserl: Selected Critical Readings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books), pp. 284, 285. "Kant and the Idea of TranscendentalPhilosophy,"p. 55. 13Husserl,
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not necessary, correspond to the equivocal meanings of the concept of motivation. First philosophy is necessary to the extent that it accomplishes what could not be accomplished otherwise,that is, insofar as it discloses, rather than presupposes, various meanings of the concept of motivation. For instance, firstphilosophy is indispensable in that it discloses the unity of motivation as a regulative principle leading to the ideal of a rational humanity. It is indispensable in that it delineates a way into the method and content of the philosophical tasks of the present age, bringing them to light in a way which is not done by any other approach to philosophy. As such, it marks the beginning of a period of new activity for Husserl's work, leading, eventually, to his concern with historyand the teleology of reason in and Sciences Transcendental The Crisis of European Phenomenology. It also refers us to the fundamental problems of phenomenology, for in the tension between the several senses of the concept of motivation it clarifies and keeps open, in particular, an ongoing problematic concerning what it means to be "first,"what is the relation between historicityand apodicticity, and what is the scope and significance of "presuppositionless" philosophy. Furthermore, First Philosophy, volume I, is necessary for anyone who wants to treat the historyof thought philosophically, for it initiates and carries out an eidetic and critical, that is, a phenomenological, view of First Philosophy, volume I, is the historyof ideas. Most significantly, necessary as first philosophy, as a science of the originarysources of philosophy, forit attempts to lead the truthof the unityof motivation to its deeper and deepest epistemological grounding. The unity of motivation, whose sense it elucidates, serves as both the primal institution and the final institutionof firstphilosophy itself. In response to the question "What is Husserl's firstphilosophy?" we propose that First Philosophy, volume I, presentsthe ongoing task of going to the roots of thought, of reflectingon and thereby constitutingthe unity of motivation pervading historyand, at the same time, of carryingon such reflectionswithin the givenness of the unity of motivation that is always already constituted. In that its aim is the reactivation of the older and oldest motives of thinkingand the shaping of completely new ones (FPI, p. 287),14 it proposes nothing less than an unending reformof all philosophy. JEFFNER ALLEN.
DEPAUL UNIVERSITY. 14Ibid., p. 56.

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International Phenomenological Society

WHAT Is HUSSERL's FIRST PHILOSOPHY?

WHAT Is HUSSERL'SFIRST PHILOSOPHY?

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

WHAT Is HUSSERL'sFIRST PHILOSOPHY?

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

WHAT Is HUSSERL's FIRST PHILOSOPHY?

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

WHAT Is HUSSERL'sFIRST PHILOSOPHY?

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