Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2008-2009
Page 1 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
PERSONS
& FAMILY
RELATION
S
Professor E. A.
Pangalangan
Caveat lector.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Intersection of Modern
Constitutional Developments
and Traditional Family Law
Provisions of the 1987
Constitution
the
14th
ISSUES:
1.
2.
1.
2.
II. CIVIL
PERSONALITY
KINDS OF STATUS
A. as a member of society
- resident or non-resident
alien
or
non-citizen
B. as a member of family
- single, married or divorced
- parent or child; brother or sister
- legitimate, illegitimate or adopted
C. as himself
- age - sex
- mental condition
- occupation (not a status because not
inherent)
KINDS OF PERSONS
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS
1. inalienable
2. imprescriptible
3. cant be renounced
4. cant be subject to compromise
5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by
creditors
3.
NATURAL
- human beings
- products of
procreation
JURIDICAL
- artificial, abstract
- product of legal
fiction
Natural Persons
CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive
mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
within 24 hours after its complete delivered from the maternal womb.
PERSONALITY v CAPACITY
(These two concepts are intimately related but not
identical)
Personality is:
is product of capacity in law
external manifestation of capacity
synonymous to juridical capacity
Generally, cannot be limited
Specifically, may suffer limitations because its
merely the result of capacity to act
GELUZ v CA (1961)
2 SCRA 801
Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio
Geluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware
of
Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art
2206 which CA sustained
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does
not have civil personality. According to Article 40,
birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus
does not yet possess a personality to speak of
because it was aborted in uterus. The child should
be born before the parents can seek any recovery for
damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured. There could be no action for such
damages that can be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child for the injuries it received because it
lacked juridical personality. The damages which the
parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to
moral damages, in this case, for the act of the
appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However,
moral damages cannot also be recovered because
the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the
husband did not further investigate on the causes of
the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant, but was more
concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large
money payment.
Both under 15
older
Both over 60
younger
Under 15 and over 60 younger
Between 15 60
male or if same sex,
older
Under 15/over 60 & bet
between
the
15 and 60
5.
hacked him and his wife and 7 children. His wife and
six of the kids died.
Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended,
Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were
found guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons,
they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died.
Juridical Persons
HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences
so no need to use presumption. That the mother
(Angela) died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine
of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases
are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence
of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3)
circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about
resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first.
In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time, and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one
to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of
calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and laws governing them (CC, A
1)
2)
3)
1.
2.
4.
REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY
1. upon reaching age of majority
2. civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty
3. judicially
determined
competence
without
guardian (for the first two, no need for court
proceeding)
HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that
the sale of real estate, effected by minors who have
already passed the age of puberty and
adolescence and are near the adult age, when they
pretend to have already reached their majority, while
in fact, they have not, is valid, and they cannot be
permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from
compliance with the obligation assumed by them or
seek their annulment.
Their misrepresentation estopped them from
claiming the invalidity of the contract.
Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of the
Court. It does not favor the offender, come to
Court with clean hands.
A. Minority
RA 6809 - Lowers the age of majority from 21 to 18
Contracts
Art 1327 (1)
unemancipated minors cannot
give consent to contract no more
concept of uneman-cipated minors
because age of emancipation = majority
Art 35 (1), FC
void ab initio
Art 5, FC
male or female of the age
of
18
may
contract
marriage
Crimes
B. Insanity
Contracts
Art 1327 (2)
insane/demented cannot give
consent to contract
Art 1328 (1)
contracted in a lucid interval is
valid, but burden to prove lucid interval
on prosecution
Art 1399
restitution not obliged if not benefited
Crime
Art 12(1)
not exempt from criminal liability if lucid
interval
PRESUMPTION OF SANITY
a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient
b) insanity must prove to precede the act
Art 820
D. Prodigality
Art 92 (2), RC
E. Civil Interdiction
Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction
shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any
ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to
dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.
Art 54, CC Any male of the age of sixteen years or
upwards, and any female of the age of
fourteen years or upwards, not under
any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 80 to 84, may contract marriage.
(2)
Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements
executed by any person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced,
the
presence
and
participation of the guardian shall be
F. Family Relations
Art 37, FC incestuous marriage
Art 87, FC donation inter vivos not allowed bet
spouses
Art 215, FC disqualified to testify against each other
unless indispensable to crime against
him/another grand/parent
Art 1109, CC
prescription
does
not
run
between husband and wife, parent and
child (minority or insanity), guardian and
ward
Art 1490, CC
spouses cannot sell property to
each other unless:
(a) separation of property in marriage
settlement
(b) judicial separation of property
G. Absence
Art 390, CC after 7 years a person is presumed dead
for all purposes except succession; if 75,
5 yrs only
Art 391, CC if there is a danger of death (4 yrs only)
(a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane
(b) member of military or armed force in
war
(c) other circumstances of danger of
death
Art 124, FC if one spouse is incapacitated, other
spouse
may
assume
power
of
administration
III. PRE-MARITAL
CONTROVERSY
18 SCRA 994
Arceli
Santos
and
Apolinario
Tanjanco
are
CC Art 2176Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being
fault or
negligence,
is obliged
to pay for
the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation
betweenofthe
parties,
is called
a quasisweethearts.
Because
the
mans
promise
to
delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.
marry the woman, they continually had sexual
BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE
(1) property
(2) expectation (cultural and societal) they used
to value marriage as the only goal. Impairs
honor and purity of the deserted party
Why is there no success in claiming damages for
breach of promise to marry?
COMMIT TO MEMORY!!!
A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
1. civil (independent of any religion)
2. institute of public order and policy
3. natural (organic perpetuation of man)
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE
1. emancipation from parental authority
2. personal and economic relations between
spouses
3. personal and economic relations between
parent & child
4. family relationship
5. legitimacy of sexual union and family
6. modification of criminal liability
7. incapacity to make donations to each other
8. disqualification to testify against each other
MARRIAGE
Only between man and
woman
Specified duties and
rights of spouses
May not be subject to
stipulation or terminated
Breech of obligation not
actionable
ORDINARY
CONTRACTS
May be same sex
(pronounced as
B. Requisites of Marriage
1.
ESSENTIAL
intrinsic (Art 2)
REQUISITES
A. Legal capacity
a. Sex (must be between man and woman)
b.
c.
marriage
violates
ISSUE:
1. WON licensing law treats same sex as
impediment presented by the plaintiff
2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate
exercise of the States authority to regulation
conduct Court
HELD:
Marriage is a secular institution. No religious
ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners
(2 spouses and the State who defines the entry
and exit terms)
PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT:
1. law does not distinguish childrens family
background so why deprive children the
rights when they did not choose to be
born/grow up in such a family (coitus v non
coitus, e.g. adoption or assisted), failed to
address the changing realities of American
society
2. best interest of the child parents sexual
orientation
3. homosexuals are well off and economically
independent, anyway, the same is not
condition/requirement for heterosexual
couples.
2. FORMAL REQUISITES
extrinsic
(Art 3)
Art
Art
Art
Art
Art
PD 965
Art 17
Art 18
Art 19
Art 20
Art 21
Art 22
Art 23
Art 24
Art 25
Art 26
C. Ceremony
- No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is:
(Art 6)
a. personal appearance of spouses (No proxy
allowed. Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be
valid.)
b. take each other as husband and wife in
presence of solemnizing officer
c. sign marriage certificate
d. at least two witnesses of legal age
- Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8)
a. chambers of judge, open court, church, chapel or
temple
b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul
c. EXCEPT
- articulo mortis (Art 27)
- remote place, no means of transportation (Art
28)
- both parties written request, sworn statement
(Art 8)
MARTINEZ v TAN (1909)
12 Phil 731
Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to
the justice of the peace stating that they wanted
to enter into a contract of marriage.
The justice of the peace, the two contracting
parties, and two witnesses of legal age, then
signed a document ratifying the above petition
and affirming that the signatories were actually
present on the day indicated in the justice's
office.
Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate
of marriage. The justice pronounced them man
and wife.
Martinez and Tan did not live together as
husband and wife after the ceremony because
Martinez parents were against the relationship.
ISSUE:
WON the ceremony herewith described
fulfilled the formal requisite of a marriage ceremony.
HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a
statement that declares that they take each other as
husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the
declaration of the parties need not be verbal. Article
6 of the Family Code clearly articulates that no
particular form of marriage ceremony is required. For
as long as the contracting parties personally appear
before a solemnizing officer and make a declaration
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife, the formal requisite of ceremony is complied
with.
MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930)
55 Phil 1
Flaviana Perez was married to Pedro Madridejo in
articulo mortis. She died the day after the wedding.
The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to
send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary.
ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage
certification would render the marriage void.
HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of
the marriage certificate is a mere irregularity.
Consequently, the marriage was valid.
3. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solida
or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolub
children, the community of property during marriage, the au
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unla
Sec 3 (aa), Rule 131 of Rules of Court That a man and wom
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
-
1936
1941
V. VOID &
VOIDABLE
MARRIAGE
1943
1949
A. Void Marriages
1. GROUNDS
I.
II.
2.
3.
4.
5.
mistake of identity
6.
Age essential
requisite
Solemnizing
Officer formal
requisite
Marriage License
formal requisite
Legal
impediment
essential
requisite
Consent
essential
requisite
1.
III.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
-
TSOI v CA (1997)
266 SCRA 324
HELD:
(1) The root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts (there was no personal examination, but
Court cited Molina ruling saying that the personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not
required), and clearly explained in the trial court's
decision.
(2)
That
the
psychological
incapacity
was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of the marriage.
(3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
lies attributed to the respondent indicate a failure on
her part to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.
(4) That the Court of Appeals erred when it did not
consider the fact that the marriage was annulled by
the Catholic Church.
Through dicta, the Court also draw a distinction
between the wife's pathological lying and the
implications of Article 45(3) of the Family Code
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifying that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
IV.
1.
2.
V.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
VI.
VII.
3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY
*For provisions refer to the table in the appendix
1.
th
B. Voidable Marriages
-
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
For Par 4:
For Par 5:
IMPOTENCY
is
different
from
STERILITY.
Impotency cannot harden up, so no sex is
possible. Sterility, on the other hand, is
characterized by low spermatozoa count.
However, the fact that intercourse is possible,
there remains a possibility, no matter how low or
tiny, for the husband to sire a child.
- Old age is not a ground because one who
marries an old person should have been
prepared for the others impotence.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife
remains a virgin after three years of living
together, the presumption of impotency
commences unless proven otherwise.
FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to prevent collusion or suppression/fabrication of evidence between parties.
Stipulation of fact or confession of judgment not to be accepted.
(1)
(2)
(3)
VI. LEGAL
SEPARATION
HELD:
Petition of legal separation not granted
because there was intent to kill was not established.
The man only used his bare hands/fists.
*Maam Beth finds this ruling ridiculous because
FC, Art 57
Arnold Schwarzeneggers bare hands are in itself
1. Repeated physical violence against
lethal weapons. Likewise, what about martial artists?
a. petitioner
b. petitioners child
GANDIONGCO v PEARANDA (1987)
c. common child of petitioner and respondent
155 SCRA 725
2. Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or political beliefs
Mayand
1986Teresita
filedofpetition
for
legal separation
3. Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner, (b) petitioners child
(c) common child
petitioner
and
on the ground of husband Froilans
respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a practice
4. Respondents final judgment of conviction for more than six years, evenconcubinage,
if pardoned
petition for support and
5. Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction
payment of damages
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality
Oct 1986 Teresita filed a criminal suit
7. Bigamous marriage, here or abroad
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion
For which Froilan files certiorari that civil and
9. Attempt at the life of the petitioner
pendente lite should be suspended because of
10. Abandonment without justifiable cause for one year
3.
4.
5.
6.
*Maam Beths
Pangalangan)
mnemonics:
4C
and
RP
(Raul
with
his
the
to
b)
c)
F. Reconciliation
-
VII. DIVORCES
Is there divorce in the Philippines?
A. Foreign Divorces
FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the Philippines. Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go.
FC, Art 26 Marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere except when
1) one is below 18
2) bigamous, not under Art 41
3) mistake as to identity of other party
4) void under 53 for non-compliance
5) psychological incapacity
6) incestuous
7) public policy
B. Muslim Divorces
-
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
VIII. DE FACTO
SEPARATION
FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband
and wife shall not affect the regime of ACP except that:
1.
2.
3.
the DTI.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
-
classification
SUB-ISSUES
1. Dismissal of claims of son - Correct. Condition to
stay away from son is not one of the conditions
after arrest. There is failure to adequately allege
denial of equal protection
2. Allegation of custom or policy - A pattern
emerges that evidences deliberate indifference
on the part of the police department to the
complaints of Tracey and its duty to protect her.
Such indifference raises an inference of custom
or policy on the part of municipality.
3. Unidentified police officers - Okay because case
was dismissed even before plaintiff had an
opportunity to discover identity of unidentified
defendants.
4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law
claim- The court has discretion to exercise this
power. At the instant case, court declines to
exercise because needless decisions of state law
should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties, by
procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
applicable law.
PEOPLE v LIBERTA (1984)
64 NY 2d 152
Mario and Denise were married but when he
started beating her she sought temporary
protection from her husband.
The order was granted and Mario was directed to
move out, stay away from the family home, stay
away from Denise and he may only visit their
child once a week.
- Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not
allow him to go the house so they met instead in
the motel where Mario was staying on the
condition that they be accompanied by a friend.
However, the friend left upon their arrival at the
motel. Mario then attacked Denise, threatened to
kill her and forced her to perform fellatio on him
and to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2
year old son was there all the time and Mario
even forced Denise to tell their son to watch
what was happening. They were allowed to leave
afterwards.
- Mario was convicted for rape and sodomy both
in their 1st degrees. However, Mario contends
that:
o They are married thus he is covered by
marital exemption to rape and sodomy.
o Rape
and
sodomy
statutes
are
unconstitutional because it treats married
and unmarried persons differently.
ISSUES:
1. WON Mario is covered by the marital
exemption
2. WON the statutes are unconstitutional for
violating equal protection clause
HELD:
1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in
sexual intercourse with female by forcible
compulsion. Female is any female person not
married to actor.
Sodomy means engaging in deviate sexual
intercourse (sexual conduct between persons not
married to each other consisting of contact
between penis and anus, mouth and penis, or
mouth and vulva. Not married phrase means
there is marital exemption for both. But it has
exemptions. One of which is when spouses are
living apart pursuant to a valid and effective (a)
order issued by court of competent jurisdiction
requiring such living apart (b) decree of
separation (c) written agreement of separation,
they are considered to be not married. Thus,
forcible rape or sodomy in this instance would be
punishable. In this case, Denise and Mario were
technically, not married, by virtue of the
temporary order of protection.
2.
3.
HELD: YES
- In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate
home and to require separate maintenance from
the husband it is not necessary that the husband
should bring a concubine into the home.
Perverse and illicit relations with women
outside the conjugal home are sufficient
grounds.
- Ruling in Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo is not
applicable because in the Arroyo case the only
grounds that were alleged was cruelty and that
charge was not proven. In the present case, the
charge of cruelty was also not proven but the
Aurelia also accused her husband of infidelity
and that charge has been proven (repeated acts
of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears
to be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This
fact gives the wife an undeniable right to relief.
- Goitia v. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his
own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty
to support his wife. When he drives his wife
from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take
advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
applicable to the marital relations and repudiate
his duties.
ISSUES:
1. WON divorce is valid
2. WON Court may then compel Escao to cohabit
with Tenchavez
HELD:
1. Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree
cannot be recognized in the Philippines
especially if it was granted by court of the place
which was not the parties bona fide domicile
and on a ground not recognized by our law,
which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in
private international law, foreign decrees
(especially those confirming or dissolving a
marriage) cannot be enforced or recognized if
they contravene public policy.
2.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They
were having a stormy life prior to the separation
due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to
leave the house and threatened to ill-treat her if
she returned. Priscas situation is embarrassing
for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused
Priscas pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit
could lead to further quarrels.
2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo
are illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was
community property. Documentary evidences
even show that it was acquired by him before
their marriage.
3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly
maintenance = NO. Thats too much. P50 is
enough.
ATILANO v CHUA CHING BENG (1958)
103 Phil. 255
Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old,
married Chua Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on
May 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of
the Ching Beng. In October of that year, the couple
went back to Zamboanga for a vacation in Pilars
parents. She stayed behind, telling the defendant
that she would go back to him later. On September
1953, however, she filed a complaint of support
against her husband, alleging estrangement since
October 1952, incessant bickering and his inability to
provide a home for them without his parents.
Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support;
however, he expressed his desire to fulfil his
obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with him
in a domicile separate from his parents. As the
3.
4.
FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the fa
obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the abse
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits
properties.
allowance
wife
of $50
a month;
awarded
$800
CC, Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and
the rest ofofthe
family.
These
expenses
shall be met
for
wifes
as an alternative,
buy a
first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and
lastly
fromattorney;
the wife'sand
paraphernal
property. In case
modern house
there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements,
the elsewhere.
husband and wife shall contribute
proportionately to the family expenses.
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief
FC, Art 199 Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support,
liability
shall devolve
upon the
ff persons
the at
HELD:the
No.
To maintain
an action
such
as theinone
order herein provided:
bar, the parties must be separated or living apart
1. spouse
from each other. Parties are not living apart and
2. descendants in the nearest degree
wife has been supported in the same manner
3. ascendants in the nearest degree
without complaint. As long as home is maintained
4. brothers and sisters
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should
12 Phil
453
the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order
established
in the preceding Article shall be followed,
unless the concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child subject
to parental
authority,
in which case
child
shall be
- Arturo
Pelayo
is a physician
whothe
was
called
on
preferred.
by the defendants (parents of the husband) to
D. Management of the
Household
FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Art 70.
CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family,
and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver
the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly
approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.
YOUNG v HECTOR ()
740 So. 2d 1153
E. Exercise of Profession
FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the
other. The latter may object only on valid, serious and moral grounds
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1. the objection is proper
2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained
consent
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
CC, Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the
provided:
1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and
2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be
consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the
family.
RA 7192
Women in Development and Nation-building
Act
AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN
AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN
DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in
Development and Nation Building Act."
Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the role
of women in nation building and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The State shall provided women rights and opportunities
equal to that of men.
To attain the foregoing policy:
1. A substantial portion of official development assistance
funds received from foreign governments and
multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set
aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to
support programs and activities for women;
2. All government departments shall ensure that women
benefit equally and participate directly in the
development programs and projects of said
department, specifically those funded under official
foreign development assistance, to ensure the full
participation and involvement of women in the
development process; and
3. All government departments and agencies shall review
and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and
procedures to remove gender bias therein.
Sec 3. Responsible Agency. The National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) shall primarily be
responsible for ensuring the participation of women as
recipients in foreign aid, grants and loans. It shall
determine and recommend the amount to be allocated for
the development activity involving women.
Sec 4. Mandate. The NEDA, with the assistance of the
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall
ensure that the different government departments,
including its agencies and instrumentalities which, directly
or indirectly, affect the participation of women in national
development and their integration therein:
1. Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside
development programs or projects, provide income
and employment opportunities to women in the rural
areas and thus, prevent their heavy migration from
rural to urban or foreign countries;
2. Include an assessment of the extent to which their
programs and/or projects integrate women in the
development process and of the impact of said
programs or projects on women, including their
implications in enhancing the self-reliance of women in
improving their income;
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules
and regulations necessary to effectively implement the
provisions of this section.
Sec 9. Implementing Rules. The NEDA, in consultation
with the different government agencies concerned, shall
issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
effective implementation of Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act
within six (6) months from its effectivity.
Sec 10. Compliance Report. Within six (6) months from
the effectivity of this Act and every six (6) months
thereafter, all government departments, including its
agencies and instrumentalities, shall submit a report to
Congress on their compliance with this Act.
Sec 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason any
section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional
or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof which are
not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
HELD:
1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation,
appellee would never have agreed to be with
appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the
Girl Scouts Davao Council was ultimately a
result of Silvas deception and she should be
indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real
status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He
Sec 13. Effectivity Clause. The rights of women and all
should then stand solely liable for any and all
the provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon
its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther
newspapers of general circulation.
acted in good faith since Silva formerly
introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus
addressed which implied authority to use his
name.
F. Use of Surname
2. Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude
that no marriage had really taken place. It is not
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use:
proper for Esther to continue representing
1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname
(e.g.as
Miriam
Defensor-Santiago)
herself
the wife
of Saturnino considering that
2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname (e.g. Loi Ejercito)
at the time, he was still married to Priscilla
3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she Isabel.
is his wife,
such
"Mrs."
(e.g. CC,
Mrs.aFrancis
Pangilinan)
And
as as
per
Art 370
married
woman
is authorized to use husbands surname,
impliedly, it also excludes others from doing
CC, Art 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
likewise.
Sec 12. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Republic Act
No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, and
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules
and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed.
TOLENTINO
CAdamages
(1988)and other relief.
CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject
of an actionvfor
162 SCRA 66
- Private respondent Consuelo David Arturo
CC, Art 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
Tolentino (yes, the one who annotated the law)
in 1931.
SILVA v PERALTA (1960)
- Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943
110 Phil 57
pursuant to the law during the Japanese
Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger
occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on
sister Florence in the latters arrest and
the grounds of desertion and abandonment by
investigation.
the wife for at least 3 continuous years.
There, defendant met plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a
Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she
US citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then
died soon after the marriage.
started courting Esther and she later accepted
his proposal of marriage having been made to
- Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21,
believe that he was single. They started living
1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia
together as common-law husband and wife and
Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr.
Tolentino.
They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However,
- Consuelo David continued using the surname
no documents of marriage were prepared nor
Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already
prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction
Consuelo David from using the surname of her
former husband from whom she was divorced.
HELD:
1. Yes
- Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds
of actions, when there in no special provision
which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from
the day they may be brought.
Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years
from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she
married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She
acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she
obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino. The case was
filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she
obtained knowledge.
2.
-
No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced
woman may continue to use the surname of her
husband because there are no provisions for
divorce under Philippine law.
Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of
the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right
to use the husbands surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it, but neither can she
restrain others from using it (bias much?).
Art
371 is
not applicable because it
contemplates annulment while the present case
refers to absolute divorce where there is
severance of valid marriage ties.
Effect of
divorce more akin to death of the spouse where
the deceased woman is continued to be referred
to as Mrs. of the husband even if he has
remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent
would encounter problems because she was able
to prove that she entered into contracts with
third persons, acquired properties and entered
into other legal relations using the surname
Tolentino.
Petitioner failed to show the she
would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of
right.
There is no usurpation of the petitioners name
and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the
1.
2.
HELD:
X. PROPERTY
RELATIONS
BETWEEN
SPOUSES
FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract marriage may
shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art 14 to give c
agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX of this Code.
MARRIAGE
SETTLEMENT is an agreement
entered into before marriage and, in consideration
thereof, between an intended husband and wife, by
which the enjoyment or devolution of property is
regulated. A contract entered into by those who are
to be united in marriage, in order to establish the
conditions of their conjugal partnership with respect
to present and future property.
A. General Provisions
FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband
and wife shall be governed in the following order:
1. by marriage settlements executed before the
marriage
2. by the provisions of this Code
3. by the local customs
Art 67
Reconciliation
after
legal
separation:
Separation of property and forfeiture of the
share of the guilty spouse shall subsist, unless
spouses agree to revive their former property
regime
Agreement to revive former property regime
shall be executed under oath and specify
1. Properties to be contributed anew to the
restored regime
2. Those to be retained as separated
properties of each spouse
3. Names of all their creditors, address and
amount owing to each
Art
128
Art
135
Sufficient
causes
for
separation of property
Art
136
voluntary
judicial
ORDINARY DONATIONS
Express acceptance
necessary
Cannot be made by minors
No limit to donation of
present property provided
legitimes are not impaired
Grounds for revocation are
found in law on donations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than 1/5 of their present property
considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on the
wills.
DONATIONS OF
- present property takes effect upon
celebration of marriage
4. Void donations
WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS
1. between spouses during marriage
2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of
the other spouse and a person whom the
spouses is presumptive heir at the time of
donation)
REASONS FOR PROHIBITION
1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle
of unity of personality of spouses during
marriage
2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused
by stronger spouse, whether by abuse of
affection or threats of violence
3. protect creditors
4. prevent indirect modification of the marriage
settlement
PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO
1. common-law marriages
2. parties living in a state of adultery or
concubinage
* Reasons: possibility of undue influence and that if
ruled otherwise, those living in guilt would be better
off than those in legal union
NAZARENO v BIROG (1947)
45 OG 11 Supp 268
Alberta Aben
Daughter Alberta Mariano Meleno Nazareno
Andrea Rodriguez Juan Aben
308 SCRA 75
Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas
husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law
marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a
certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sumat, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to
1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the
Sum-at property in favor of the private
respondents who purchased the lots on the
strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at
property showing the seller, Maria, to be the
owner of the property in question.
In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice
Tait brought an action for quieting of title,
nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of
possession with damages against private
respondents, alleging that they are the children
and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They
claim that after the death of their mother, their
father sold the Otucan property and used the
proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in
Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983,
Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at
property to private respondents without their
knowledge and consent. They further alleged
that although the private respondents were
warned that the Sum-at property did not belong
to Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria
and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at
property so the deeds of sale are null and void
and did not transfer title to private respondents.
During the trial, petitioners and defense
presented several witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with
respect to the forgery of the deed of donation
should be given credence.
NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate
courts decision that Eillengers testimony is vague
and incredible and incapable of impugning the
validity of the public document. Forgery should be
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and
whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the
same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony
difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as
she anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel.
Petitioners should have presented handwriting
experts to support
their claim that Georges
signature on the deed of donation was indeed a
forgery.
2.
C. System of Absolute
Community
1. General Provisions
1.
2.
3.
separate
property,
deductible for his
share upon
FC, Art 94 The ACP shall be liable for:
liquidationchildren of either spouse; however, the support of
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
the designated
administrator-spouse
benefit of the
* Example
of ante-nuptial
debt in Parfor9:the
amortization
community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent
of conjugal dwelling or family vehicle
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent
* Difference
between Par 1 and Par 2
may have been benefited;
* Difference between Par 4 and Par 5
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the
by the family;
FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete agambling,
professional
or vocational
course,
or other activity
forshall
self- be borne
whether
permitted
or prohibited
by law,
improvement;
community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the commu
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
* To
discourage
giving double loss to the
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
course
or other gambling,
activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
paragraph
(7) of this
Article, the
support of illegitimate
gambler
reflection
of Catholic
virtues
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
payment
of which
shall
considered as advances
to be
* If
the winning
ticket
in be
a lottery/sweepstakes
given
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation ofto
the
community;
spouse
by a and
friend, it is considered a donation
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
ACP unless
expressly
provided
donor. (9), the
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities,
except
those falling
under by
paragraph
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
TABULAR FORM OF ART. 94 (Maam Beths
Lecture)
DEBTS &
OBLIGATIONS
TAXES &
EXPENSES
SUPPORT
2 incurred by:
4 including minor
1 of spouse,
or major repairs
upon community
property
common children,
legitimate
children
- For illegit:
exclusive/
separate OR ACP
advance, subject
to reimbursement
upon liquidation
6 commence or
complete
education
(professional or
vocational) e.g.
language, speech
power,
leadership, law,
culinary
- by either spouse
8 value
donated/promised
to children for
commencement
and completion of
education
- no age limit
administrator
-spouse,
both
spouses, or
by one
spouse with
the consent
of the other
incurred by one
without the
consent of the
other to the
extent that family
may have been
benefited
(E.g. failed
business which
was initially ok)
7 antenuptial
debts of either
spouse insofar as
benefited the
family (no
consent of other
spouse needed)
9 antenuptial
debts, that do not
benefit family, for
support of
illegitimate
children or
crime/quasi-delict
in case of
insufficiency of
mere
preservation of
separate
property used
by the family
10 litigation
between spouses,
unless groundless
5. Dissolution
2.
3.
FC, Art 101 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the other or fai
the aggrieved spouse may petition to the court:
1. receivership
2. judicial separation of property
3. authority for sole administration of ACP, subject to precaution
1.
An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
3.
D. Conjugal Partnership of
Gains
2. Exclusive Property
FC, Art 109 The following shall be exclusive property of each spouse:
1. General Provisions
3.
FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also apply to CPG.
Art 88
4.
5.
FC, Art 110 The spouses retain the ownership, possession, adm
properties. strict dominion
JOCSON v CA (1989)
170 SCRA 333
- Emilio Jocson Alejandra Poblete Moises
Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is
married to Ernesto Vasquez. The mother
Alejandra died intestate, and so did the father
Emilio in 1972.
- June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing
validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their
father) during his lifetime. He prays that the
following be declared null and void and that the
properties involved be partitioned between him
andhis sister:
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein
Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in
Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included
Emilios manifestation that the lands were
sold at a low price because it was his loving,
helpful and thoughtful daughter who bought
the property. He says his son possesses such
qualities too. He further claims that the sale
did not violate any law and that he did not
touch his wifes properties. He acknowledged
receipt of payment.
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling
2 rice mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to
Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged
receipt too.
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Adjudication with Sale executed March 9,
1969 wherein Emilio and Agustina, excluding
Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled
estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3.
Emilio sold his share to Agustina.
All documents were executed before a notary
public. Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the
Register of Deeds. Old certificates were
cancelled and new certificates issued in the
name of Agustina.
Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null and void because his fathers
consent was obtained by fraud, deceit,
undue pressure, influence and other illegal
machinations. He also alleges that property
was sold for a simulated price considering
that his sister had no work or livelihood of
her own. Also, he claims that the contract is
fictitious, simulated and fabricated.
2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with
additional allegation that he was deliberately
excluded and they intended to defraud him
of his legitimate share. He also claims that
defendants were employed in their parents
business and they must have used business
earnings or simulated consideration in order
to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad and daughter
living under same roof.
4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties
were all income-producitng.
5.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
ONEROUS TITLE
- TEST: origin of the money invested in the
purchase, e.g. if it came from the conjugal fund,
the property acquired is conjugal
SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE:
If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his
estate
o If the premiums were paid with the conjugal
funds, the proceeds are conjugal
o If the premiums were paid with separate
funds, proceeds are separate
o If the premiums were paid partly with
conjugal funds, and partly with separate
funds, the proceeds will be partly conjugal
and party separate
If the beneficiary is the other spouse
o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as
beneficiary himself and the other spouse:
Proceeds belong to the other spouse even if
the premiums are paid out of conjugal funds
but he/she should also reimburse half to the
conjugal partnership
o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse
gets the proceed with no obligation to
reimburse (considered reciprocal donations)
o If the insurance comes from a third person,
exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse
Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says
that onerous titles are separate property even if
CPG funds were used, subject to reimbursement.
LABOR, INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF
EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES
includes all income whether in form of wages,
pensions or retirement pay, honoraria, salaries,
commission, bonuses, back pays, practice of
profession, income from business even if capital
comes from the exclusive properties of one of
the spouses
teachers gratuity under special law is not
conjugal because it is remuneratory
FRUITS FROM COMMON AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY
stranger and found by one of the spouses, onehalf share of finder is conjugal
ISSUES:
1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on
grounds that the property is conjugal property,
which means Julia is prohibited from selling such
without consent of spouse.
2. WON issue of estoppel can be raised against
Ponciano.
HELD:
1. YES. Property is conjugal following the
presumption found in Art 160 CC, which states
that all property of the marriage must be
presumed to belong to the CP unless it be
proved that it pertains to exclusive
property of spouses. This presumption is
strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which provides
that such presumption must be overcome by one
who contends otherwise. The only character that
they could come up with to rebut the
presumption is Julias testimony, which is
contrary to Aranetas records as well as info on
mortgage contracts (which are favorable to her
husband).
Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage
in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property. That proof of acquisition of
property in dispute during the marriage suffices to
render the statutory presumption operative.
Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title
during the marriage. The records show that the
funds used to buy the lot and build the
improvements came from loans obtained by the
spouses. Art 161 states that all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband and
wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
are liabilities of the partnership. Thus, the lands
are conjugal properties of both spouses.
2. NO. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that
whenever a party has intentionally led the other to
believe a particular thing true to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising from his
act, declaration or omission, falsify it. It can be
invoked only between persons making the
misrepresentation and person to whom such
2.
c. Property Purchased by
Installment
the
funds
employed
for
its
acquisition,
a)
d. Rules on Improvement
Value of the
FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements, whether for utilityCost
or adornment,
made Resulting
on the
of
principal
increase
in
value
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts
or efforts of
improveme
+ either or both spouses
property at the
the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the nt
following rules: of the improved
time of the
principal property
improvement
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and
10.5 M (2 M + 5
the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the
M)
2 Mproperty of the owner-spouse
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
at the10.5
timeMof the
3.5
M
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained
5.5 M
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
10.5 M
2.
1.
2.
ISSUES:
1. WON the right of prescription may be waived or
renounced - YES
2. WON the second promissory note it binding on
the conjugal partnership - YES
HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to
prescription may be tacitly renounced resulting from
acts which imply abandonment of such right. The
prescription with regard to the first promissory note
had set it. However, the second promissory note
acknowledged the debt and even promised to pay
the same thus, the right to prescription was
effectively and expressly renounced.
- In Villaroel v. Estrada the debt barred by
prescription cannot be enforced by the creditor.
But a new contract recognizing and assuming
the prescribed debt would be valid and
enforceable.
Prescription only bars the remedy, which is the
payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt
itself. The new promise made by Confesor
constitutes a new cause of action.
CFI claims the second promissory note is not binding
pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift,
serving civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber real
property of the CP without her consent. Thus, the CFI
held that in signing the new promissory note alone,
Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife. HOWEVER,
Art 165 CC states that the husband is the
administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and
obligations which he contracts for the benefit
of the CP are chargeable to the CP. He,
Confesor, signed the second promissory note for the
benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable for obligation.
LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969)
30 SCRA 111
Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a
surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a crop
loan granted to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of
P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and
Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an
indemnity agreement wherein they bound
themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all
damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties,
charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and
nature which it may incur.
PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez
and Luzon Surety to recover the amount of
P4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees, and costs
of the suit.
- A third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez,
Ramon Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted
by Luzon Surety.
- A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the
satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum
of P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was
issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans
of the Garcia spouses, from their sugar
plantation registered in their names.
- Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled
in their favor.
ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing
of benefits received, can be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a 3rd party in favor of a surety
agreement. -NO
HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the CP. The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal property, however,
only obligations incurred by the him that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are
those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his
career, profession or business with the honest
belief that he is doing right for the benefit of
the family. Thus, there must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in this
case there is none. Nor can there be, considering
that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party
Ladislao Chaves. Acting as guarantor or surety for
another in an indemnity agreement is not an act that
would benefit the conjugal partnership.
While the husband, by signing the indemnity
agreement may be said to have added to his
reputation or esteem and to have earned the
confidence of the business community, such benefit
even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and
fanciful to come within the express terms of
the provision. To make a CP respond for a liability
that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
2.
FC, Art 125 Neither spouses may donate any conjugal property witho
may without the consent of the other, make moderate donations f
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
ISSUES:
1. WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is
valid - NO
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for an
annulment of contract - NO
3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by
acquisitive prescription - NO
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador
Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations - NO
HELD:
1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is
valid. NO
1.
2.
2.
WON Gimena and her children can ask for
annulment of contract - NO
3.
WON petitioners have acquired land by
acquisitive prescription - NO
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff
instances:
a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses, attempted to
have Gimena sign a ready-made document
purporting to sell the disputed lands to the
Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew land did not
belong to them.
b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining
Gimenas consent to the construction of
irrigation pumps on the lands. If they were the
owners, why did they have to get her consent?
c. Improvements were only being made in 1970
when sale was in 1951.
d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974.
e. No attempt to obtain Maximos signature despite
fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close
relatives.
Given that they did possess the lands, possession in
bad faith is covered by extraordinary prescription
which lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 and case
filed in 1976, 30 yrs had not yet lapsed.
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador
Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations - NO
Their right of action accrued from death of father in
1959 and they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art.
1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still within allowed
time.
* CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT: merely voidable
under CC, but under FC it is void (Art 125 FC)
TINITIGAN v TINITIGAN (1980)
100 SCRA 619
Severino Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a
motion in a pending case seeking judicial
approval of the sale of a 2-storey residential
house and lot which are conjugal properties
located at Pasay City.
Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the
property for P300,000 to Quintin Lim, was
necessary
to
pay
outstanding
conjugal
obligations that were overdue in the amount of
ISSUES:
1. WON sale of real properties of the spouses have
already been perfected. - NO
2. WON the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal property without his wifes written
consent. - NO
3. WON Court may intervene to authorize the
transaction. - NO
HELD: According to Art 124 FC, the law requires that
the disposition of a conjugal property by the
husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife. Otherwise,
the disposition is void. Even though Norma was
aware of, even caused the advertisement in the
newspaper, and participated in the negotiations for
the sale, mere awareness of a transaction is not
consent and her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity.
Art 124, FC also states that court authorization is
only resorted to in cases where the spouse
who does not give consent is incapacitated.
Petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent
Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts.
In the absence of such, court
authorization cannot be sought.
h.not
Liquidation
Assets
and
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
affect the regimeof
of CPG
except that:
1.
2.
3.
3.
5.
FC, Art 130 Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the c
same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
during
the liquidation
themarriages
estate of deceased,
FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties
of two or of
more
such
right cannot be impaired by Rule 83, Sec. 3
by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out
simultaneously
of the
Rules of according
Court which
a procedural
income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may
be considered
to theisrules
of evidence.
In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong,
rule.the same shall be divided between the different
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
FC, Art 135 Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
(BY PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT)
1. civil interdiction
2. judicially declared an absentee
3. loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228 and 229)
(PROOF
4.
5.
6.
OF CAUSE IS NEEDED)
abandonment or failure to comply with family and marital obli
abuse of power of administration granted in the marriage sett
de facto separation for at least one year and reconciliation is h
judicial
ISSUES:
1. WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may
be modified if the dispositive portion did not
contain the decision extensively discussed in the
body of the decision. - YES
2. WON the separation of the parties was due to
their agreement. - NO
3. WON Prima is entitled to judicial separation of
property. - YES
HELD:
1. The dispositive portion of the decision was
incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in
the body of the decision.
- The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the
trial court ruling should have been embodied in the
dispositive portion. It was based upon the findings
that Prima and Jose were legally married and the
properties mentioned were acquired during the
marriage although they were registered in the name
of a dummy.
2.
3.
2. Voluntary separation of
property
FC, Art 137 Once the separation of property has been decreed, the
FC, Art 142 The administration of all classes of exclusive proper
this code (Art 102 and 129).
to the other spouse (only acts as a trustee)
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the1.
spouses and their children.
2.
3.
4.
FC, Art 139 The petition for separation of property and final judgment granting the same shall be
administration is given in
local civil registries and registries of property.
FC, Art 140 The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors
E. Regime of Separate
Property
FC, Art 141 The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a
decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property
following instances:
1. civil interdiction terminates
ADVANTAGES:
2. absentee spouse reappears
1. ofsimple;
no common
hence no will not
3. when the court is satisfied that the spouse granted the power
administration
in the properties
marriage settlements
liquidation
again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration
4. when the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree
of legal
separation
common
life with the
2. neither
spouse
can resumes
be accused
of being
other
interested in others properties
5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof
6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact for a least one year, reconcile and resume common life
DISADVANTAGES:
7. when after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses,
1. voluntary
inconsistent
with the
life and be
they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No
separation
of community
property mayofthereafter
interest which marriage is supposed to
granted.
create
3.
4.
5.
WHEN
1.
2.
3.
family
ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who
usually is unemployed and dependent on the
husband for support
may lead to constant disputes on sharing
and family expenses
against Filipino custom which is trust and
sharing in the spouses
MAY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY EXIST?
by agreement in marriage settlement
decree by court in proper cases
separation of property cannot be converted
to any other property regime during
marriage
FC, Art 143 Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settle
shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisio
2.
b. partial
as to kinds of property
a. present property
b. future property
c. both present and future property
FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income
FC, Art 148 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the precedin
default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
proportion
The liability of the spouses to the creditors for family expenses shall,
however,to
betheir respective contributions. In the absence of proof t
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption sh
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party w
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in th
The foregoing rules shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
ISSUES:
1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted
in favor of Teresita
2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the
house with Isidro by the fact that they were
common-law spouses
HELD:
1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the
court, in the exercise of which appellate courts
will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse.
Although Teresita presented loans that she had
contracted during the period when said house
was under construction as proof of ownership,
evidence was wanting which would correlate
such loans to the construction work. Thus,
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is
petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported
and may not be permitted to override the prima
facie presumption that house, having been
constructed on Isidros lot at his instance, and
during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the
estate that should be under the control of the
Virginia
2. Before a common-law spouse can claim coownership of their spouses properties, there
must be a clear showing that the commonlaw spouse had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the
property involved.
JUANIZA v JOSE (1979)
89 SCRA 306
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro
Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendantappelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs.
Jose was the registered owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train resulting in the death
of 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.
In the resulting case for damages, the CFI
rendered decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the
mistress) to jointly and severally pay.
Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be
liable to pay for damages since the decision was
based on the erroneous theory that she was
living together with Jose as husband and wife
ISSUES:
1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of
the parties in a common-law relationship is
incapacitated to marry - NO
2. WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of
the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages
with the registered owner - NO
HELD:
1. It has been consistently ruled that the coownership contemplated in Art 144, requires that
the man and woman living together must not
be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Jose is legally married to Socorro, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of
the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose and
Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the
liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the
death of and physical injuries suffered by the
passengers.
2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can
neither be liable for damages caused by its
operation, because only the registered owner is
responsible.
VDA DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971)
37 SCRA 315
- Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st
marriage was with Rosario Diaz where they had
2 children. 2nd marriage was with Basilia Berdin
with 7 children. Later he died. Both marriages
were contracted in good faith.
As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a
retirement insurance and life insurance. The life
insurance was paid to Berdin and her children
who were the designated beneficiaries named in
the policy. The retirement policy did not
designate a beneficiary. Hence, the petition.
GSIS: to Rosario (8/16) and to Basilia (1/16
between Basilia and their seven children).
CFI: Same with GSIS.
ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the
retirement benefits because she was just the second
wife.
HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in good
faith and so it is just and fair for them to receive it.
Not just because the retirement does not name a
beneficiary, means that it should follow what was
2.
3.
SAGUID v CA (2003)
403 SCRA 678
Gina was then 17 years old and legally married,
when she met Jacinto. Since she was separated
in fact from her husband, she cohabited with
Jacinto. They lived in the house built on the lot of
Jacintos father.
Jacinto worked as a patron of their fishing vessel.
Gina first worked as a fish dealer (in
Marinduque), then as an entertainer in Japan.
After 9 years, the couple decided to separate.
- Gina asks that she be declared the sole owner of
the personal properties (appliances, furniture),
which she purchased with her income as fish
dealer during their cohabitation, and that 70,000
be reimbursed to her as her share in the
construction of their house. The latters funding
being fruits of her income as an entertainer.
- Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the
petitioner had no share in the construction of the
house and that she couldnt have bought the
mentioned personal properties as selling fish
was just a pastime for her. It was resolved that
both parties contributed to their joint
account (from which the funds for acquiring
said properties came from), but there is no
sufficient proof of their respective shares.
ISSUE: WON the properties in dispute shall be
adjudicated in favor of Gina alone - NO
HELD: Gina is not legally capacitated to marry, but
she nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art
148 of the FC shall apply to the properties acquired
during their cohabitation. Their share in the common
property shall be determined by the each of the
parties actual contribution. Therefore, since the
receipt presented as evidence only stated P11,413
was spent for the purchase of construction materials,
then this is amount which shall be given to Gina.
With regard to the personal properties, since there is
an absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina and
Jacintos actual contributions are of equal
amount. The amount of P111,375, said amount
shall be divided equally. Thus entitling Gina to a
reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her share.
SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007)
FC, Art
1.
2.
3.
4.
2. Support
FC, Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic
institution
public
policy
cherishes
andreferred to in the
Thesocial
education
of thewhich
person
entitled
to be
supported
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law training for some professional, trade or vocation, even beyond age of
the family shall be recognized or given effect.
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
195 Obligation to support each other to the whole extentFC, Art 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give s
spouses
persons in this order:
legitimate ascendants and descendants
1. spouse
parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate 2.
and descendants
illegitimate in
children
nearest of
degree
the latter
(grandchildren)
3. ascendants in nearest degree
parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate4. or brothers
illegitimate
and sisters
children of the latter
(grandchildren)
legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or mo
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
FC, Art 196 Brothers and sisters, not legitimately related, whether full or half-blood
If two
claim
support at the same time from one obligor, follo
each other to the full extent EXCEPT only when the need for support
ofrecipients
the brother
or sister,
child
will
be
preferred.
imputable to the claimants fault or negligence.
(2)
-
3.
4.
FC, Art 201 Proportion of support stipulated in Art 195 and Art 196: re
FC, Art 202 Support may be increased or reduced according to the red
of obligor.
FC, Art 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from
needs it for maintenance, but is payable only upon demand.
only separate property of person obliged to give support shall be answerable
in default of separate property, ACP and CPG will advance support,
* No obligation to pay arrears in support. Support is
liquidation
spouse
common
children of
spouse
children of
spouse by
another
marriage
Illegitimate
children of
either spouse
ACP/CPG
ACP/CPG
ACP/CPG (because they are
still legitimate!)
CPG: separate property of the
parent-spouse, but if the
same is insufficient, the CPG
if financially capable (read: all
legal obligations of the
community are covered). The
support paid to the child shall
be deducted from the share
of the parent-spouse at the
time of liquidation of the
partnership
FC, Art 204 The supporter have the option to fulfill the obligation
1. paying the allowance fixed
2. maintaining in the dwelling the person who has the right to
thereto
FC, Art 205 The right to receive support under this Title shall not be le
FC, Art 207 When the person obliged to support another unjustlyCC,
refuses
Art 305
or fails
Duty to
and
give
right
support
to make funeral arrangement shall be i
by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual,
support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
obliged to give support. This Article shall apply particularly when case
the father
of ascendants,
or motherthe
of paternal
a child under
shallthe
have
age
better
of majority
right.
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.
3. Funerals
CC, Art 307 The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed w
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the
funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arra
other members of the family.
CC, Art 309 Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wro
family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
are from
not members
of the
FC, Art 151 No suit between members of the same family shall HELD:
prosperBrothers-in-law
unless it should appear
the verified complaint
samemade
family as enumerated in Art 150. No
or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed earnest efforts toward a compromise are needed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject
of compromise
under
CC
HONTIVEROS
v RTC
(1999)
FC, Art 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the husband an
the dwelling house where they and their family reside and the land on
FC, Art 153 The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lo
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its bene
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
extent of the value allowed by the law.
FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among those me
and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actual
apply to court for an order directing the sale of the property under e
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum am
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum all
improvements introduced by the person/s constituting the family hom
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for the family hom
1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157
2 then to liabilities under the judgment and costs (A155)
3 delivered to the judgment debtor
2.
b.
FC, Art 161 For the purposes of availing of the benefits of a famil
constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family home.
Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
or attachment
FC, Artsale,
162 The
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
non-payment of taxes
applicable.
debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home
debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution
debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building
TANEO v CA (1999)
304 SCRA 308
Pablito Taneo filed an action against the
conveyance of his land to private respondent.
The money judgment of RTC was affirmed by CA.
Taneo alleges that the lands in question are
exempt from execution for being a family home
(extrajudicially constituted by his father as early
as 1964).
ISSUE: WON the family home is exempt from
execution
HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes
occupied prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted
from obligations incurred prior to that same date
(Aug 3, 1988). Art 162 is not retroactive
considering that the debt preceded the FC (1964).
Also, a family home should be erected on the
land owned by the members of the family
(owned by Plutarco Vacalares).
VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006)
497 SCRA 385
- Dr. Ong Oh granted P1M loan to Dolores
Ledesma
- Ledesma sold her house and lot located in
Tandang Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa
Versola for P2.5M. Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as
downpayment with remaining balance in
monthly installments
Spouses Versola applied for a 2M loan with
Asiarust Bank in order to raise the full amount
that Ledesma demanded
- However, the spouses were not able to get the
loan because Asiatrust Bank discovered a notice
of levy on execution was annotated on the title
in connection with Ledesmas obligation to a
certain Miladays Jewels, Inc., in the amount of
P214,284. Because of this annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real
Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2M
loan of petitioners.
Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the
RTC and CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr.
Ong Oh 1.5M with legal interest
Dr. Ong Oh filed a Motion for Execution and
because of this, the sheriff sold at public auction
the property of spouses Versola.
Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property,
thus a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in
favor of Dr. Ong Oh.
Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for Issuance
of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property
of spouses
Spouses Versola opposed said motion on the
ground that the property sold is the family home
of petitioners which according to them is exempt
from execution pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family
Code.
XII. PATERNITY
AND FILIATION
A. Legitimate Children
1. Kinds of Filiation
NO to Janet
b. BIOLOGICAL ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a
female with the semen from male without sexual
intercourse.
Even without the initial consent, the child
can still be legitimated so long as the
husband subsequently gives his consent
BEFORE the child is born through AI
Can be homologous (sperm of the husband),
heterologous (sperm of a donor) or
combined (a combination of the two)
That the child was born of AI is not reflected
in the birth certificate
A child can have as much as five parents:
FATHER
MOTHER
1. Biological (source of
1. Legal/social
sperm)
2. Genetic (egg donor)
2. Legal/Social
3. Gestational (not
surrogate)
*Maam Beth hates the word surrogate because it
is a misnomer.
IN RE BABY M. (1988)
109 N.J. 396
- Mary Beth Whitehead agreed for a fee of
$10,000 to be artificially inseminated with the
semen of another womans husband (William
Stern), to carry the child so conceived to term,
and after its birth, to surrender it to the natural
father and his wife Surrogacy contract means
absolute termination of parental ties to the
gestational mother upon birth
Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was
stated in the contract, rather she had multiple
sclerosis which may have serious implication on
her pregnancy
2. Impugned Legitimacy
FC, Art 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the follow
1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex with w
immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a. physical incapacity (impotence)
b. living separately
c. serious illness
2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not ha
provided in Par 2 Art 164
3. conceived through artificial insemination, the written autho
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influen
BLOOD TYPE
Fathers
blood type
O
O
A
O, A
O, A
O, A
O, B
AB
A, B
O, A, B,
AB
A, B, AB
B
O, B
O, A, B,
AB
AB
A, B
A, B, AB
O, B
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
FC, Art 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the mot
have been sentenced an adulteress.
Born before 180 days after solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived
during the former marriage, provided it be born within 300 days after the termination of the former marriage.
FC, Art 171 When can heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation o
A child born after 180 days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
1. if the husband should die before the expiration of the period fi
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the 300 days after the termination of the former
action
marriage.
2. if he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having d
3. if the child was born after the death of the husband
Illustration:
300 days
1st
2nd
Evidence by
Proofs by Petitioner
Respondents
WITHIN:
I. NO CONCEALMENT
1. absence of any
1. birth record stating
1 year from knowledge of birth or recording in the civil register - if husband,
orrecord
any of his heirs reside
in the
hospital
that
shesame
is theplace
where the birth took place
regarding
legitimate child of
2 years Not the same place but within the Philippines
Esperanzas giving
Proceso and
3 years Abroad
birth
Esperanza
2. absence
of Violetas
testimony
II. CONCEALED OR UNKNOWN TO HUSBAND OR HEIRS: period for filling
of action shall
be counted2.from
discoveryof
or Proceso
knowledge
that she is his child
of the birth of the child OR of the fact of registration of said birth birth certificate in
*Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct
action, not collaterally.
Why did the law impose a time limit to impugn
legitimacy of the child? Because it is in the best
interest of the child to avoid putting his/her status in
a state of uncertainty for a long time.
3.
4.
5.
Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital
certificate from the
Civil Registry of the
absence of Violetas
birth record
certificate of
Principal that
Proceso and
Esperanza are
registered only as
guardians and not
parents
testimony of the
cousin of Violetas
biological mother
ISSUES:
3.
4.
5.
6.
testimony of Benita
Lastimosa (alleged
bio mother) that she
is not her child
marriage contract
where Esperanza
was the mother
Deed of Sale when
Violeta was still a
minor and
represented by her
mother Esperanza
Deed of Absolute
Sale where Proceso
represented her as
father
1.
2.
HELD:
1. YES. The factual findings of the courts are
entitled to great respect. Moreover, the
absence of a record of birth of petitioner
Violeta in the Office of the CivReg General
puts a cloud on the genuiness of her birth
record. The records of the hospital show that
only one woman by the name of Benita
Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child
on the date of Violeta birth.
2. NO. Because this is an action to claim
inheritance of the respondents as legal heirs
of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that Violeta is an illegitimate child, but
that she is not a child at all.
CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC & CHUA LIAN KING
(1988)
166 SCRA 451
Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased
Sy Kao. As such, he filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the latter.
Private respondent moved to dismiss, due to lack
of action as well as petitioners capacity to file
such a case. It has been declared before that
petitioner is not the son of Chua Bing guan and
Sy Kao.
The latter flatly and unequivocally declared that
she was not petitioners mother. Therefore he
had no lawful interest in the estate of Sy Kao.
ISSUE: WON Sy Kao is the mother of the petitioner
HELD: No. Who better than Sy Kao herself would
know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More
than anyone else, it was her who could say that
petitioner was not begotten of her womb.
REPUBLIC v LABRADOR (1999)
305 SCRA 438
A childs birth certificate lists her name as Sarah
Zita Caon Erasmo, and her parents Rosemarie
Caon married to Degoberto Erasmo.
On March 1998, her aunt Gladys petitioned the
RTC Cebu to change Sarahs surname to Caon,
dropping Erasmo, and the first name of her
mother to Maria Rosario since her parents were
not married.
Gladys said Sarahs mother, her sister, lived
abroad with her foreigner husband.
The RTC granted the petition based on Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The solicitor-general
appealed.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
2.
B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to prove filiation
CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of t
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children
family in case of unlawful aggression.
ISSUE:
WON
Rodolfo
can
be
considered
acknowledged natural child by virtue of his birth
certificate as evidence.
Faustina
Bibiano
Pedro
Trinidad, niece of
Faustina
PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE
Handwritten note
alledgedly written by
Bibiano to the 18 yo
Raymundo with a
complimentary
ending su padre
School records,
report cards, school
receipts for
matriculation all
signed and paid by
Bibiano
Typewritten letters to
Atty. Faustino alleging
his personal
circumstance; as well
as typewritten
autobiography
asserting that his
father is a surgeon
Bibiano Baas
Dolores
Raymund
o
O
S
U
A
R T
S
RESPONDENTS
EVIDENCE
A sworn affidavit duly
notarized and executed by
Bibiano Banas declaring
that Raymundo Banas is his
brother, Pedros son
A sworn JOINT affidavit duly
notarized and executed by
Raymundo and Pedro Banas
correcting an error made on
the marriage certificate of
the former changing the
father of Raymundo from
Bibiano to Pedro
C O U R T
S A Y S
A public instrument
explicitly stating Pedro is the
father of Raymundo is
strong evidence that he
does not acknowledge or
have the intention thereof
that the latter is his son
If Raymundo really believed
that he is indeed the son of
Bibiano he could not have
consented to executing such
declaration; Trinidads
contention of the document
was contradictory and
therefore set aside.
MARIATEGUI v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 675
Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three
marriages with three different women and sired
three sets of children.
First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids
Baldomera: died, survived by kids surnamed
Espina
Maria del Rosario
Urbana
Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto
Second: with Flaviana Montellano, one daughter,
Cresciana
Third: with Felipa Velasco, 3 kids: Jacinto, Julian,
Paulina
He died intestate and the children from his 1st and
2nd marriages excluded the children from the 3rd
marriage in the extra-judicial partition of Lupos
properties.
ISSUES:
1. WON prescription barred private respondents
right to demand partition of Lupos estate.
2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly
filed the action for recognition, were able to
prove their successional rights of over the
estate.
What is the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
HELD: The children from the third marriage
continuously possessed the status of legitimate
children. Filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the
civil registrar, a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
1) WON prescription barred private respondents
right to demand partition of Lupos estate.
Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the
time limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filing an
action for recognition is inapplicable. Prescription
doesnt run against private respondents w/ respect
to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
havent expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. Prescription of an action for partition
doesnt lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner.
A co-owner cant acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owner absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to
the other co-owners.
Also, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible & cant be barred by laches. It is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership & for
segregation & conveyance of a certain property.
No valid repudiation was made by the
petitioners. Assuming the petitioners registration of
the subject lot was an act of repudiation of coownership, prescription hasnt set in when private
DE ASIS v CA (1999)
303 SCRA 176
- Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her
son Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action
for support and maintenance against the alleged
father Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation.
Vircel agreed to compromise that she would not
pursue the case if Manuel will withdraw his
counterclaim. After six years, Vircel filed an
action for support and maintenance of her son.
HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of
compromise. The action for support cannot be
barred by res judicata. The ratio behind the
prohibition against waving the right to future support
is the need to maintain ones existence. Paternity
and filiation (or lack of it) must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. The agreement entered
into by the petitioner and respondents mother for
the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support, which is in the nature of a compromise,
cannot be countenanced. The right to receive
support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to
a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art
2035.
** Legitime of a legitimate child: half of the parents
estate divided by the number of legitimate children.
C. Illegitimate Children
Generally, illegitimate children are those born of
parents who are not united by a valid marriage.
Under the CC, there were three main groups of
illegitimate children:
1. Natural children
2. Natural children by legal fiction
3. Spurious children
o adulterous
o incestuous
o sacrilegious born of persons who are
disqualified to marry by reason of
religious profession
o manceres those born of prostitutes
Under our law, there is no disqualification to marry
on the ground of religious profession. And we also
have no law which automatically classifies children
of prostitutes as illegitimate.
FC abolished all distinctions between illegitimate
children such that there are only two categories of
children today: legitimate and illegitimate.
However, an informal distinction between two groups
of illegitimate children was established:
1.
mother
is
ISSUE:
1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant
case
2. WON application of Family Code in this case
prejudice or impair vested right of respondent
should FC be given retroactive effect
3. WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took
effect.
HELD:
1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of
FC, thus CC provisions still apply. Art 285 CC
governs the case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC.
2. YES. If FC prevails over CC in the choice of
which should govern, it would prejudice
Antonias right which was vested upon her by
virtue of Art. 285, through the abovementioned suit for recognition.
3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court
never lost its original jurisdiction.
What is your understanding of a vested right?
It is not defined in Art 256 FC because it should be
on a case to case basis, taking into account all the
circumstances and facts. Subsequent change of law
should not affect the available cause of action.
JISON v CA (1998)
286 SCRA 495
Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco denied
paternity.
While
married
to
Lilia
Jison,
Francisco
impregnated the nanny of his eldest daughter,
Esperanza Amolar. The child was born and
enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition
as an illegitimate child.
Francisco spent for her education until she
became a CPA and eventually worked as Central
Bank examiner. It was her father who paid for
the burial expenses for her mothers death. And
it was through filiation with her father that she
previously was able to seek employment at
Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City.
She was able to name the members of the Jison
household as well as the staff in her fathers
office. She also claimed knowing the 3 children
of Francisco and Lilia. The last time she saw her
father was when she sought his blessings to get
married.
In sum, Moninas evidence and testimonies
showed that
a. she was close with Franciscos relatives
b.
6.
GUY v CA (2006)
502 SCRA 151
Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on
October 1992, leaving 10M worth of real and
personal properties
His known heirs are his surviving spouse and
Shirley Guy and children
Private respondents (minors Karen and Kamille
Wei), represented by their mother Remedios filed
a petition and prayed for the appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement
of Sima Weis estate.
Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the
petition of Remedios on the following grounds:
1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is
therefore no need to secure letters of
administration
2. That private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate
children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
3. That private respondents claim had been
paid, waived and abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios
RELEASE AND WAIVER CLAIM stating that in
exchange for the financial educational
assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabitilities
ISSUES:
1.
2.
HELD:
1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an
intent to abandon a right. The document does not
state with clarity the purpose for its execution.
Parents and guardians may not also repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.
Not having been judicially authorized, the Release
and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and
will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased. It must also be
emphasized
that
waiver
is
the
intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Private respondents
could not have possible waived their successional
rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
2. A ruling in the same would be premature
considering respondents have yet to present
evidences to prove their filiation. It is the duty of the
trial court.
AGUSTIN v CA (2005)
460 SCRA 315
Arnel Agustin had an extramarital affair with Fe
Prollamante which produced the child named
Martin. Arnel suggested to have the pregnancy
aborted which Fe refused.
Arnel allegedly took care of all the medical bills
in Martins birth and even signed his birth
certificate as the father. However, in the long
run, Arnel failed to give sustenance despite his
adequate financial capacity.
Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for
support. They also moved for DNA testing to
prove their cause of action.
ISSUES:
1. WON complaint for support can be converted
to a petition for recognition
2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered
in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioners constitutional right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination
HELD:
1. The action does not amount to conversion.
Rather, the DNA was necessity to establish
the respondents cause of action. Also, even
if the order would effect the establishment of
filiation, the integration of the two actions is
still lawful because the resolution of one
issue necessary in the determination of the
other issue.
2. No. Right to self-incrimination is considered
only in written and verbal compulsion.
Guillerm
o
Josefa
Felisa
Ramon Osorio
Nazario
Edilberta
Jose
Jacoba
Gorgonio
Luis
2.
3.
FC, Art 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and sh
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expres
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an ad
handwritten instrument is made by the father. PROVIDED, the
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifeti
shall consist one-half of the legitimate child. *As amended by R
GONZALES v CA (1998)
298 SCRA 322
Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and
brothers of Ricardo alleged that they are the only
heirs of the deceased. Honoria Empaynado
(partner for 27 years), Cecilia Abad Empaynado
and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion
alleging that they are the acknowledged natural
children of Ricardo. There was also another
illegitimate child with Dolores Sancho named
Rosemarie Abad.
The collateral relatives adduced the following
proofs:
o Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment
forms which did not state Jose as dead.
o Affidavits of Quiambao & Ramos claiming
that they know Jose died in 1971 & that he
was buried at the Loyola Memorial Park.
o A doctor who said Ricardo had gonorrhea
so he was sterile.
HELD: The Best evidence is Joses death certificate
which was not presented. Loyola Memorial Park
showed a certain JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to
a JOSEFA REYES and not JOSE SANTOS LIBUNAO
married to HONORIA EMPAYNADO. Also, Dr. Arenas
affidavit is inadmissible for tending to blacken
Ricardos reputation. The privilege of secrecy is not
abolished because of death. Respondents presented
his ITR where he declared Honoria as his legitimate
wife & the 3 as his legitimate dependents. He also
opened bank accounts for them and paid insurance
premiums. The evidence presented proved that the
three sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo.
Hence, they are entitled to inherit Ricardos estate.
Art 988 CC provides that in the absence of
legitimate descendants and ascendants, illegitimate
children succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.
REPUBLIC v VICENCIO (1998)
300 SCRA 138 - SUPRA
GAN v REYES (2002)
382 SCRA 357
Bernadette Pondevida wrote Augustus Caezar Gan
demanding for support for the their love child, 3 year
old Francheska Joy Pondevida, in order that she may
send the child to school. Gan denied paternity of the
chld, prompting Bernadette to institute in behalf of
her daughter a complaint for support.
HELD: In all cases involving a child, his interest and
welfare are always the paramount concerns. There
may be instances where, in view of the poverty of
the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse
him support until the decision of the trial court
attains finality. Cases involving child support are final
and immediately executory, even more so, cannot
be stayed by an appeal.
TONOG v CA (2002)
376 SCRA 523
Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a nursing student begot
a child with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The
child named Gardin Faith Tonog and the mother
resided with the Daguimols parents. Then, Dina
left for the US to work and the child was left in
the care of paternal grandparents and her father.
Daguimol applied for legal guardianship of the
child, which was subsequently granted.
Dina instituted action for remand of custody
ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on
TYP and Art 176 FC
HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded,
meaning the court can only rule on temporary
custody. The CA did not err in allowing Edgar to
retain in the meantime parental custody over Gardin.
A child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings and thrust into a strange environment
away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is
already 12 years old, her choice should also be given
weight. However, the decision should not be taken
against the fitness of the mother or the preference
or the father.
DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006)
496 SCRA 474
Petitioner Roberto and private respondent
Shirley became sweethearts while STUDYING
LAW in UST. Their studies were interrupted when
Shirley became pregnant and gave birth to
Robby. The two, nonetheless, never got married.
Roberto married another woman later on. He
never provided any financial support for Robby
except in two instances (1992 & 1993) when he
sent money for the schooling and when he gave
P7000.00 for the kids hospitalization expenses.
Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for
Robbys education since she was suffering some
financial problems. Roberto did not give anything
despite his fabulous wealth. He managed the De
Guzman corporations, has five luxurious cars,
owns a house in Ayala Heights Quezon City and
regularly travels abroad with his family.
Shirley then filed criminal complaint for
abandonment against Roberto.
Respondents evidence: Notarized copy of the
Gen Info Sheet of RNCD Development
Corporation showed that Roberto owned
P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate shares.
The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause
to charge petitioner with neglect of child under
Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA
7610
Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of
Justice who then affirmed City Prosecutors
resolution
Petitioners claims: (1) He is financially incapable
as all the alleged properties belong to his father.
His share was also in reality his dads; (2) Robby
D. Legitimated Children
FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and born outside of the wed
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impe
legitimated.
LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which
illegitimate children are considered legitimate, it
being supposed that they were born in lawful
wedlock.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are
considered legitimate because of the subsequent
marriage of their parents
In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by
nature, while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a
relation that did not in fact exist by nature.
REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION
1. child was conceived AND born out of wedlock
2. the parents were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other at the time
of conception
CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED
1. adulterous
2. incestuous
3. of marriages against public policy
4. of bigamous marriages but can be
ADOPTED to elevate their status
42 Phil 855
Doa Ana
Ramirez
Samuel
Bischoff
Felisa Castro
Wertmuller
Leona
Castro
Frederick
Dr. Ernest
FC, Art 181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their
descendants.
von
Emil Mory
Kauffman
FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in theirElena
rights, within five years
from the time
Leontina
their cause of action accrues.
Elizabeth
Federico
Carmen Maria
Ernesto
Esther
DE LOS SANTOS v LUCIANO (1934)
60 Phil 328
Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and
Josefa Esguerra before they were married. After
her parents got married, they begot two more
children: Antonio and Fortunato Escobar.
All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and
their two legitimate children. The children called
the spouses Tatay and Nanay. The other
children called Tomasa Manang, which is an
appellation given to elder sisters.
Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the
spouses until she married. The spouses
supported her, treated and presented her as
their daughter, and was publicly known as such.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ISSUES:
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child of
Samuel
2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is
valid
3. WON Leontina should be considered as a
legitimate daughter of Fred and Leona (being
born before the divorce decree, hence while their
marriage is subsisting)
4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are
entitled to their share in the estate.
5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of
forced heirs who dont appear to contest the
probate.
HELD:
1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she was in an
uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of
natural child & treated as such by Samuel.
Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible
since hes the custodian of church records.
Original document not needed since they have
shown that diligent search was made to find it,
to no avail. Thus, secondary evidence presented
by the priest is sufficient.
Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which
became Law 1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima
Recopilacion which provides that recognition
could be established by proof of acts on part of
the parent unequivocally recognizing the status
of his child. This is different from CC Art 131
provision which provides that acknowledgment
must be made in the record of birth, by will or in
other public instrument. Regardless of what
provision is applied, its sufficiently shown that
Leona was recognized.
XIII. ADOPTION
ADOPTION is a juridical act which creates between
two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION
Originally: mainly for the benefit of the
adopter, who are usually people who had no
children, so that they may experience the
joys of parenthood
Modern view: for the benefit of the children
to be adopted
o It has both social and moral purpose:
to extend to the orphan or to the
child
of
the
indigent,
the
incapacitated or the sick, the
protection of society in the person of
the adopter
o The adopted child remains an heir of
his parents by nature
CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION LAW: construed so as
to encourage the adoption of unfortunate children by
persons who can properly read and educate them
CHILD WELFARE PARAMOUNT: In determining
whether adoption shall be allowed, the welfare of the
child is the primary consideration.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for adoption is
done through proceeding in rem. No court may
entertain such a petition unless it has jurisdiction
over:
the subject matter of the case and over the
parties
the res, which is the personal status of the
person to be adopted as well as that of the
petitioners
ADOPTION AND LEGITIMATION similar in the sense
that in both of them the child is given the status of
the child born in lawful wedlock of the parents
adopting or legitimizing it
Persons
affected
Procedure
Carried out by
whom
Benefits
LEGITIMATION
Only natural
children
May take place
by extrajudicial
act of parents
(marriage)
Only by both
parents of the
child
Child receives
the same status
and rights as a
legitimate child,
not only in
ADOPTION
Strangers
(generally)
Always by
judicial decree
May be made by
one parent
Creates a
relationship only
between the
child and the
adopting parent,
relation to the
legitimizing
parents, but also
in relation to
other relatives
of the latter
months to
reconsider
8.
**but if no DVC was signed
(in cases where the child
9. File a petition for
was abandoned or left to
adoption Lawyers only
strangers)
come in at this point
i. locate unknown parents
(dahil pampagulo lang
*The fact that adopter has legitimate or illegitimate
through trimedia (TV, radio
sila)
or newspaper) (Sec 5)
children is no longer a barrier to adopting. This was
10. Decree of adoption (Sec
ii.
after
3
months
of
no
prohibited by CC and removed in PD 603, FC and RA
13)
claiming, petition for
8552.
11.
Issuance of Travel
Declaration of
Authority if foreign
Abandonment (DA) now
adoption
FC, Art 187 The following persons may not be adopted
becomes a ward of the
1. A person of legal age, UNLESS, he or she is
government
A child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse2. Declare the child
Prior to the adoption, said person had been consistently legally
considered
and treated
by the adopter as his or
available
for
her own child during minority
adoption
2. An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations
3. A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption
has been previously
or rescinded
*Preparation
of Home revoked
Study Report
ADOPTION OF ADULTS
1. No need to adopt adults because they are
old enough to take care of themselves.
2. If the only reason someone wishes to adopt
and adult is to share his material advantages
with another, he can do so by simply giving
the latter financial assistance and leaving
him something in his will.
3. Rational of adoption: to give poor, orphaned,
abandoned little children the advantages of
having parents who would love, support,
protect, rear and educate them until they are
old enough to take care of themselves.
4. EXCEPTIONS
a. If the adult is the parent in nature
because this would raise the status
of the illegitimate child
b. If
in
the
custody
since
childhood/minority, there is the
presumption that adopter really
wants to adopt the child but only
neglected to do so before the latter
reached majority.
PROCEDURE FOR ADOPTION ACCORDING TO RA
8552
(Maam Beth tabulated the procedure during lecture)
PROSPECTIVE
ADOPTIVE PARENTS
CHILD
1.
1.
2.
3.
Inquiry
Attend adoption forum
Application
4.
5.
6.
Placement issuance of
pre-adoption placement
authority (PAPA)
7.
FC, Art 183 A person of age, and in possession of full civil capacity an
support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate in keeping w
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption o
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the p
nature of the adopted or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the p
FC, Art 185 Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the follow
1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the ot
FC, Art 186 In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse ado
shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.
3.
4.
5.
6.
another.
A. 335
NCC enumerates those persons who
has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior
to the filing
of application
may
not adopt,
and agency
it hasthat
been
shown
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate
government
he/she
has thethat
legal
petitioners arent among those prohibited from
capacity to adopt in his/her country
adopting.
A. adopted
339 NCC
names those who cant be
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter the country
as his/her
son/daughter
requirements for residency and certification of qualification
is waived
the following
adopted
andforthe
minor Edwin isnt one of those
a.
b.
c.
married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4
father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or
consanguinity OR affinity of the Filipino spouse
stepmom.
III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination
of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
To say that adoption shouldnt be allowed when
accountabilities
the adopter and the adopted are related to each
IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of theexcept
other in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC
other,
b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter
PROVIDED
thatamong
the other
spouse has
is to preclude
adoption
relatives
no signified
mater
his/her consent thereto
how removed or in whatever degree that relationship
c. if the spouses are legally separated from each other
regarding
joint
C. Nature of adoption
proceedings
LAZATIN v CAMPOS (1979)
92 SCRA 250
- Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate and was
survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his
adopted twin daughters Nora L. De Leon
(married to Bernardo de Leon) and Irma Lazatin
(married to Francisco Veloso)
A month after Mariano Lazatins death, Margarita
de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding
before the CFI of Pasay. To the said proceeding,
Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne intervened
since they claimed to be admitted illegitimate
(not natural) children of Mariano with a woman
named Helen Muoz. Subsequently, one Lily
Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another
illegitimate (not natural) child
FC, Art 188 The written consent of the following to the adoptio
1. The person to be adopted, if 10 years or older
2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, o
3. The legitimate and adopted children, 10 years or older,
4. The illegitimate children, 10 years or older, of the ado
latters spouse, if any
5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be ado
Art III Sec 9, RA 8662
WHOSE CONSENT IS NECESSARY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Manuel
Ramos
Amelia
Ramos
Elaine
Elma
Eugene
ISSUES:
1. WON the adoption may proceed absent the
mothers written consent
2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by
the petitioners children in Guam not in the
presence of a Philippine consular office is
admissible
3. WON the petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees
HELD:
1. No. The petitioner failed to present actual
evidence regarding the mothers consent. It
cannot be said that she intends to abandon
them because she continually gives them
financial support no matter how minimal.
Also, the eldest daughter admitted that she
consults her regarding serious issues.
2. No. The authenticity of her childrens
affidavit was also not clearly established.
3. No. Her advanced age and instable source of
income puts doubt on her financial capacity
to raise the three kids in the US. That her
own children are willing the back her up is
untenable because the ability to support
must be personal to the adopter.
ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS
A Review of New York Law
Unmarried fathers should be given legal rights to
their involvement in the lives of their illegitimate
children. The New York legislature has adopted
specific statutory guidelines for identifying unwed
fathers who have a constitutionally protected
parental right which must be surrendered or
terminated before their child can be adopted.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
E. Effects of Adoption
CC, Art 365 An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter
FC, Art 190 Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopte
estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the ille
the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the
entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitima
third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then t
apply.
TAMARGO v CA (1992)
209 SCRA 518
Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to
adopt the 10 yo minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the
petition was granted, Adelberto shot and killed
Jennifer Tamargo using an air rifle. The parents of
Tamargo sued Adelbertos natural parents for
damages. The child though was acquitted for acting
without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the
Rapisuras should be the proper parties in this suit
since parental authority shifted to the adopting
parent from the moment the petition for adoption
was filed.
ISSUE: Who between the adoptive parents and the
biological parents should be held liable for the
damages incurred by the child?
HELD: Adelbertos natural parents are liable for the
damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred
prior to the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural
parents actual custody at the time of the accident.
The effects of adoption on parental authority cannot
be given retroactive effect.
SAYSON v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 321
Rafaela Eleno
Mauricio
Rosario
Basilisa
Remedi
Teodoro
Teodoro Isabel
Delia (adopted)
Edmundo
(adopted)
Doribel
ISSUES:
1. WON joinder of petition for adoption and
petition for a change of name is allowed by
the law
2. WON there is lawful ground for the adoptees
change of name
HELD:
1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in
one proceeding, the causes of action must: (a)
not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties and (b) arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of
the same nature and character.
There is no conceptual unity between
petition for adoption and petition for change
of name. The two actions are different and
unrelated from each other, and therefore,
two special proceedings which cannot be
joined as having one cause of action. They
must be instituted separately.
2.
F. Rescission
FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescis
1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for d
2. When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters dur
acts has definitely repudiated the adoption
EFFECTS OF RESCISSION
FC, Art 193 If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the
court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified
or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted
person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or
property or both.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted
arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters
and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries.
2.
3.
4.
5.
G. Rectification of Simulated
Birth
CRIME OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH
(Art VII Sec 21, RA 8522)
intended to curb or prevent such acts done
by people who want to avoid trouble and
H. Adoption decree
REYES v SOTERO (2006)
482 SCRA 520
Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco
filed a petition for issuance of letter and
administration and settlement and estate as the
niece of the decedent with the collateral
relatives of the decedent.
Chichioco alleged that the properties of the
decedent is with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes,
her grand niede and that she be appointed as
the administrator of these properties instead.
Reyes filed an opposition to the petition,
claiming that she is in fact the adopted child of
the decedent and her husband Serafin delos
Santos
and
that
the
appointment
of
administration is unnecessary since she is the
sole heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the
following:
o Certification from the Municipal Registrar
of Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of
Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by
Elena Lising and Serafin delos Santos.
o Certification of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC-Tarlac
City that judgment was
rendered on Dec 21, 1968 decreeing her
adoption by the spouses
o Judicial form no. 43: the adoption decree
which declares her adoption
o Decree of final distribution issued by PVAO:
benefits paid to her as daughter of
Serafin delos Santos.
Chichioco filed an annulment of the adoption
decree stating that documents presented are
false and fraudulent; and that petitioner and her
mother collaborated to make it appear that
petitioner is adopted by Elena and Serafin.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner herein should prove the
validity of her adoption due to irregularities raised by
private respondent.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the documents
presented by the petitioner sufficiently proved that
she is legally adopted by Elena and Serafin. It is
presumed that these documents are regularly issued
as they are issued under the seal of the issuing
offices and signed by the proper officers. The
adoption decree is a public document that is
required by law to be properly registered in the
I. Inter-country Adoption
* Governed by RA 8043 or the Inter-country Adoption
Act
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any child:
1. has been voluntarily or involuntarily
committed to the Department as dependent,
abandoned, or neglected pursuant to the
provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
may be the subject of Inter-Country Adoption;
2. Povided that in case of a child who is
voluntarily committed, the physical transfer of
said child shall be made not earlier than six (6)
months from the date the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment was executed by the childs
biological parent/s. The prohibition against
physical transfer shall not apply to adoption by
a relative or children with special medical
conditions.
WHO MAY ADOPT
Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad who has the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications under the Act may file an
application if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age;
(b) is at least sixteen (16) years older than the
child to be adopted at the time of the filing
of the application, unless the applicant is the
parent by nature of the child to be adopted
or is the spouse of such parent by nature;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all the
rights and responsibilities incident to
parental authority under his/her national law;
(d) has undergone appropriate counseling form
an accredited counselor in his/her country
(e) has not been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(f) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law
(g) can provide the proper care and support and
give the necessary moral values and
example to the child and, in the proper case,
to all his/her other children;
(h) comes from a country:
a. with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic relations;
b. whose government maintains a foreign
adoption agency; and
c. whose laws allow adoption; and
J. Adoption issues
THE PROS AND CONS OF INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION ACT1
Nationalistic reasons against IA
1. International pride political pressure to upgrade
internal system of social welfare
2. An unacceptable form of international charity
3. Belief that country and heritage is special and
children would be deprived of something
valuable if removed from it
4. Waste of human resources and exploitation by
Western neighbors
Best interest of the child
1. Remain in their biological families, or at least in
their home countries
a. Deprivation of cultural identity
b. Racial discrimination
c. Unnecessary separation from family
2. IA acts as an escape valve for LDCs and a
conscience-saving mechanism for developed
countries, it works to the disadvantage of all
children in these nations
a. limited response to the needs of children
by benefiting only a few, leaving millions
of homeless children in need of
assistance
b. IA reduces pressure on the nations to
improve their child and family welfare
programs
3. IA is dictated by the demands of would-be
parents in developed countries, rather than the
needs of the children involved
a. incentives for child trafficking and
trading likewise increase
b. will result to increase in number of
abandoned children, it will even
encourage more mothers who want
better life for their children
c. western people are adopting for their
own selfish needs, then it is not an
altruistic activity
4. IA facilitates child trafficking
*Too lazy to include the rebuttals which is the second
part. Its nice though. You might want to check it out
yourself.
XIV. PARENTS
AND CHILDREN
PARENTAL
FC, Art 212 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent p
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental aut
another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the chil
A. Parental Authority
General Provisions
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER THE PROPERTY
CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapaci
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
1. Custody
A. Determining the best interest of
the child
i. GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION
EX PARTE DEVINE (1981)
FC, Art 211 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
398 So. 2d 686
case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents
and are
obliged to obey
themteacher
as long
as they
McMClellan
Christoper,
a school
children are under parental authority.
Matthew Patrick and Timothy Clark
ESPIRITU v CA (1995)
246 SCRA 362
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first
met at Iligan City in 1976. In 1984, they again
met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and began to
maintain a common law relationship as husband
and wife.
2 years later, Rosalind was born. They then got
married in 1987 and later had a son, Reginald.
Their relationship deteriorated and they
separated in 1990.
Teresita then left the children and Reynaldo and
went back to California. Reynaldo brought the
children to the Philippines and left them to her
sister.
Teresita then filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against the petitioners. The trial court
denied the writ, but the CA granted the petition,
applying Art 363 CC which states that a child
below 7 yrs old shall not be separated from the
mother.
SANTOS v CA (1995)
242 SCRA 407
Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the
care of the latters parents ever since the child
was born. The grandparents were the ones who
provided support for the child, since Leouel
cannot afford to do so. Julia then left for the
States to work. The grandparents claim that Julia
has been sending financial support to her son.
On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child
from his grandparents. The grandparents then
filed for custody of the boy, which the trial court
granted.
Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents
have failed to show the he is unfit to be the
father and that the substitute parental authority
granted to the boys grandparents was
inappropriate.
The respondents claim that they are financially
well-off to take care of the son, while Leouel is
not. They can provide the child with an airconditioned room since he is asthmatic.
Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them.
Leouels use of trickery to abduct the child also
is a sign of his unfitness. They likewise claim that
they are in the best position to take care of the
child, and this should be the primary
consideration of the court.
ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper
custody
HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be
an unfit parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son
from the latters maternal grandparents does not
render him unfit. Also, disqualifying him as custodian
because of the nature of his work would mean
depriving all soldiers of their childs company. Only in
cases of death, absence or unsuitability of parents
may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparents.
(Mnookin article)
CRITICISMS AGAINST ALTERNATIVES
TYP results to protracted litigation. However, if
we do way with no presumptions, there is the
disadvantage of moving into the facts, and what
should be the hierarchy of the facts? Each and
every case will be litigated, and we end up
spending money and destroying families when
we could have done it by being civil.
How much weight should be given to the childs
choice?
When and where should we ask the child? Any
place where there are neither parents nor
lawyers like the chambers of the judge.
When do you ask? Not during the trial of course,
when the child would be fearful of hurting the
parents.
What is the advantage of flipping the coin? It is
perfectly random, like the way they pick people
in the draft, who will fight the war.
BUT we cannot flip the coin because application
to the governments capacity to decide on the
childs best interest. It symbolically ignores the
difference between the parties. Also, people lose
the opportunity or forum to vent, to flame which
is good for the soul.
Conclusion: accept the flaws of whatever
presumption we have.
FC, Art 220 The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
wards the following rights and duties:
1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruc
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionsh
3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and insp
4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
studies and morals;
5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
6. To demand from them respect and obedience;
7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circum
8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents
4.
RIGHTS OF PARENTS
1.
2.
DUTIES OF PARENTS
All others! So in effect,
parents have more duties
than rights
5.
FC, Art 222 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
1. emancipation of child
child so requires
2.
3.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the
Administration
and usufruct
two
circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension
of parental authority
or adoptare
such
other
measures as it may deem just and proper.
distinct things. There may be
FC, Art 224 The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than 30
days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.
FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or administration
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with thethe
care
of proceeds
the child whenever
committed
shalltoprovide
for The child
net
of such property
shall but
belong
the owner.
his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may
terminate
commitment
the
childwould
whenever
amount
not lessthe
than
that which of
the
owner
havejust
paid if the adm
and proper.
the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in
legitime.
FC, Art 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
Who
has authority
the
childs
property?
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case
of disagreement,
theover
father's
decision
shall
prevail, unless
1. parents unless minor or disinherited by
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
ascendant
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
- theMarie
Antonette
Loran
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where
property
or any part
thereofisLorenzo
situated.Emmanuel
The
family
lives
with
the
wifes
parents.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
Loran
cannot get along with his in-laws
the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shallHowever,
be heard and
resolved.
Marie
refuses
so Loran
leaves
alone. or
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory exceptown
whenplace.
the child
is under
substitute
parental
authority,
- the
Loran
wasrules
prevented
from seeing
his childn. So
the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case
ordinary
on guardianship
shall apply.
he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for
his 2 yo child.
FC, Art 226 The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired
with his work
industry
or by onerous
gratuitous
CA dismissed
hisorcase
because
WHC isorresorted
title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively
to the latter's
education,
unless the
to in cases
where support
rightfuland
custody
is withheld
title or transfer provides otherwise.
from a person entitled thereto.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and
ISSUE: WON a father may be deprived to see his son
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
SUBSTITUTE
PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
Grandparents, oldest
sibling or court appoint
guardian
Exercised in case of
death, absence or
unsuitability of parents
Subsidiarily liable for if
damages caused by act
or omission under the
supervision of people
with special parental
authority
Law is silent about
prohibition of corporal
punishment
SPECIAL PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
School, administrators
and teachers
Exercised concurrently
with the exercise of
parental authority
Principally and solidarily
liable for damages
caused by act or
omission of minor under
their custody,
supervision or
instruction
Cannot inflict corporal
punishment on the
minor
FC, Art 218 The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individ
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while
FC, Art 219 Those given the authority and responsibility under the pre
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsid
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be g
delicts.
CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the m
minor children who live in their company.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the perso
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
AMADORA
not during classhours,
what mattered was the
purpose
FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related ca
the person exercising the same:
1.
2.
3.
4.
FC, Art 232 If the person exercising parental authority has subjected t
abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such
FC, Art 233 The person exercising substitute parental authority shall h
the parents.
TERMINATION permanent
SUSPENSION temporary
a. ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion
temporal, perpetua or death)
terminated by:
i. service of penalty
ii. amnesty or pardon
b. judicial decree
C. Suspension or Termination
of Parental Authority
FC, Art
1.
2.
3.
FC, Art
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
FC, Art
carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon
ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child
pardon or amnesty of the offender.
Parents
Miguel
Vicenta
Mario
Petra
Juan
Sebastia
n
Vicenta, Mario and Petra were brothers and sisters.
Vicenta was married to Miguel; Petra to Juan. When
Vicenta died, Miguel, Mario and Juan entered into an
agreement covering the disposition of the properties
left by Vicenta; Mario and Juan were representing
their children, who are the heirs of Vicenta.
Sebastian, son of Petra and Juan filed a complaint as
special administrator of his deceased father, alleging
that Miguel has not complied with the said
contract/agreement.
ISSUE: WON Sebastian, being the son of the
deceased Juan Abiera has the right to ask for the
compliance with the said obligation
HELD: No. The true interested parties in the
obligation contracted by Miguel Orin are the children
of Juan Abiera, and not the latter, for the simple
reason that the obligation was executed in their
favor and not in favor of said Abiera. This being the
fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office as
administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no
right to ask for the compliance with the said
obligation. As such administrator, he has only the
right to institute such actions as correspond and
pertain to the estate which he is administering, and
no other action dealing with contracts and
obligations contracted in favor of 3rd persons or
others from whom he does not derive such right, can
be brought as such administrator. The right of Juan
Abiera to represent his children as father or guardian
of the same, and that he has not transferred nor
could he transfer to the administrator of his estate
such right from the mere fact that he was such
administrator. The said right attached to parental
authority or guardianship was extinguished when
Juan Abiera died.
CORTES v CASTILLO (1921)
41 Phil 466
- Maria Cortes Alejandro Herrera Acardio and
Bernardo
Maria committed adultery and was convicted but
Alejandro pardoned her and they reconciled.
However, Maria again committed adultery so
Rights of
the parents
Duties of
the child
Duties of
the parents
CC, Art
1.
2.
3.
4.
Art
11
Art
12
Art
13
Art
14
Art
15
Art
16
Art
17
Art
18
Art
19
Art
20
Art
21
Art
22
Art
23
Art
24
Art
Art
28
Art
29
Art
30
Art
31
Art
32
Art
33
Art
34
Art
35
Art
36
Art
37
Art
38
Art
39
Art
40
Art
41
Art
42
but
not
ISSUE:
1. WON the program violates the parents
constitutionally protected right to familial
privacy and parental liability
2. WON the program infringes into the free
exercise clause
HELD:
1. No. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate how
condom
availability
constitutes
unconstitutional interference by the state.
There was no coercive burden upon the
students:
a. Students are free to decline
b. Parents are free to instruct their
children not to participate
2. No. They were unable to demonstrate
sufficient facts to support any substantial
burden to religious exercise. They merely
alleged that the program contravenes
parental teaching on premarital sex: the not
only is it permissible but can be made safe.
3. Parents have no right to tailor public school
policy to meet their individual religious and
moral preferences.
F. Summary Procedure
REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006)
495 SCRA 844
- Ivy Joan Ernesto Carlos Iigo
The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad
initially won. Mother files a consolidated petition
for writ of habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC.