DELTA MOTOR SALES CORP V.

MANGOSING
(G.R. No. L-41667, April 30, 1976)
DOCTRINE:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer
jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is
made be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is
insufficient.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Pamintuan filed a cased against Delta Motor for breach of warranty and
recovery of damages. The summons for Delta Motor was served on Miranda,
a mere employee. Delta Motor was declared in default for not answering the
complaint and was found by the court to be liable for breach and damages.
Delta Motor filed a petition contending that Miranda was not a corporate
secretary and the service on Miranda was a mistake. The lower court denied
the motion. Hence, the petition. The issue is whether the service of summons
was proper. The court held that the service of summons was NOT proper
because Miranda, a mere employee, is not one of those mentioned in Rule
14, Sec 13 to whom service upon private domestic corporation or partnership
should be served. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor.
FACTS:
Pamintuan (Respondent) sued Delta Motor (petitioner) for the recovery of
the sum of P58,000 as damages and attorney's fees for allegedly selling
a defective Toyota car to Pamintuan and for failing to fulfill its warranty
obligation by not properly repairing the car (leaks emanating from its
windshield, doors and windows).
The summons for Delta Motor was served on its employee, Miranda, who
acknowledged its receipt by signing on the lower portion of the original
summons.
Delta Motor did not answer the complaint within the reglementary period
and consequently, Pamintuan filed a motion to declare Delta Motor in
default.
The lower court in its decision granted the motion and found Delta liable
for breach of warranty and damages.
That decision was served on Delta Motor which prompted Deltas
lawyers to file a petition to lift the order of default, to set aside the
judgment and for new trial.
Delta Motor alleged that Miranda was not the corporate secretary but the
secretary of a certain Ramos of the personnel department and that
service upon her was a mistake.
The lower court denied Delta Motors motion. Delta Motor appealed.
Pamintuan countered the appeal with a motion for execution. The lower

court granted Pamintuans motion for execution and refused Delta

Motors appeal.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON Delta Motor was properly served with summons
2. WON the court had jurisdiction to render the judgment by default against
it and to execute that judgment.
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Service upoin private domestic corporation or
partnership. If defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may
be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or
any of its directors.
For the purpose of receiving service of summons and being bound by it,
a corporation is Identified with its agent or officer who under the rule is
designated to accept service of process. Service of summons must be
made to the person named in the Rules. The secretary to whom the
summons was served was not one of those mentioned in the Rules, thus,
the service was insufficient.
2. NO.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant and of
the subject-matter of the action by virtue of the service of summons in
the manner required by law. Where there is no service of summons or a
voluntary general appearance by the defendant, the court acquires no
jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the case.
In the instant case the Manila court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta
Motor because it was not properly served with summons. The service of
summons on Miranda, who is not among the persons mentioned in
section 13 of Rule 14, was insufficient. It did not bind Delta Motor.
Consequently, the order of default, the judgment by default and the
execution are void and should be set aside.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION V. MIGUEL GARCIA

G.R. No. L-55935, July 30, 1986
DOCTRINE:
The can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of
cause of action even without a hearing. The trial court can consider all the
pleadings filed, including answers, motions and evidence then on record for
purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner Marcopper filed a complaint for quieting of title/reconveyance
against Respondent Garcia to declare the latters free patent over the subject
land void. Respondent Garcia filed his answer with counterclaim alleging that
he is the sole and exclusive owner of the land. Petitioner then filed its answer
to the respondent's counterclaim and filed a request for admission admitting
that admitted that it was not able to file any opposition against the issuance
of a Free Patent to the respondent because it had no knowledge of such
issuance. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss. The lower court
dismissed the petitioner's complaint for having no cause of action and for
being moot and academic. Hence, the petition. Petitioner raised the issue
that the motion to dismiss was not proper because no hearing on the merits
of the case was conducted. The SC held that the lower court had the
opportunity to examine the merits of the pleadings submitted by the parties.
The order of dismissal was in the nature of a summary judgment. The trial
court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of
cause of action even without a hearing
FACTS:
Petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation filed a complaint for quieting of
title/reconveyance and damages against private respondent Miguel
Garcia praying that Garcia's Free Patent No. 542586 and OCT No. P2186 of the Register of Deeds of Marinduque be declared void and
asked that a transfer certificate of title be issued in its favor for having
acquired it in good faith and for value from Buenaventura Paez who had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious possession,
occupation, cultivation and enjoyment thereof since about 1921.
The respondent alleged in his answer with counterclaim that he is the
sole owner of the land in question as the holder of a free patent and for
which, a corresponding certificate of title was issued by the Registrar of
Deeds; that Paez was just residing in a small portion of the land by mere
tolerance of the respondent. Respondent further alleged that Paez had
executed an affidavit of quitclaim over the land.
Petitioner then filed its answer to the respondent's counterclaim and filed
a request for admission. The petitioner admitted that it was not able to
file any opposition against the issuance of a Free Patent to the

respondent because it had no knowledge of such issuance but it did file

an action for the cancellation of such certificate of title upon its discovery.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that that the OCT of the
respondent had already become indefeasible; that petitioner's action for
reconveyance has prescribed; that even if the action had not yet
prescribed, the petitioner could not avail of the same since the land
before the issuance of the OCT is public and therefore, cannot be the
subject of reconveyance; and that the petitioner is guilty of laches and
inexcusable negligence in not protecting and asserting its rights, if any,
over the disputed land.
The lower court dismissed the petitioner's complaint for having no cause
of action and for being moot and academic
Hence, the petition. The petitioner contends that it is a well-settled rule
that when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the
issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the
complaint and the judge may not inquire into the truth of the allegations,
and find them to be false without a hearing

ISSUE:
WON the Motion to dismiss was proper
HELD:
YES. The rule on a motion to dismiss cited by the petitioner, while correct as
a general rule is not without exceptions. In the present case, before the trial
court issued the questioned order dismissing petitioner's complaint, it had the
opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with
counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to
the request for admission. It was but logical for said court to consider all of
these pleadings in determining whether or not there was a sufficient cause of
action in the petitioner's complaint. The order of dismissal was in the nature
of a summary judgment. The trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a
motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by
taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition
thereto. Furthermore, even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if
documentary evidence admitted facts sufficient to defeat the claim.
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground
for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its
sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint.
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated. Where the rules merely secondary in importance are made to
override the ends of justice and had been misapplied to the prejudice of the
substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced.