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Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise Author(s): Franoise Dastur Source: Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 4, Contemporary French Women Philosophers (Autumn, 2000), pp. 178-189 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810684 . Accessed: 26/08/2011 16:53
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of the Event: Phenomenology WaitingandSurprise1

FRANQOISE DASTUR Translated revisedby the editor Dastur,translation by Franqoise

accountfor the suddenhappening How, asksFran,oiseDastur,can philosophy in particular the and thefactualityof the event?Dasturasks howphenomenology, as offering such workof Heidegger, Husserl,andMerleau-Ponty, maybeinterpreted is always an account.Shearguesthatthe "paradoxical surprise capacity of expecting in phenomenology," in question andfor thisreason,sheconcludes,"Weshouldnot andthethinking connectthem;openof theevent.Weshould oppose phenomenology Thearticle withopenness to unpredictability." mustbe identified ness to phenomena in thesetermson a phenomenology of birth. offersreflections

Can philosophy account for the suddenhappeningand the factualityof the event if it is still traditionallydefined, as it has been since Plato, as a thinking of the invariability and generality of essences?This is the general question fromwhich I will begin. The question of time and of the contingency of time has always,as EdmundHusserlrecalls at the beginning of his On thePhenomTime(1991), constituted the most cruof Internal enologyof theConsciousness cial problemfor philosophy.This problemmarksthe limits of its enterpriseof intellectual possessionof the world.Fortime, which is, as Henri Bergsonsaid, the stuffof which things aremade,2seems to escape conceptual understanding in a radicalmanner. showsin his Phenomenology As MauriceMerleau-Ponty (1962), of Perception philosophy can give neither a realist nor an idealist solution to the problem of time. It does not succeed in locating it either in things themselves or in consciousness. If, on the one hand, we consider time to be no more than a
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dimension of reality,we can no longer explain the relationshipbetween what comes firstand what follows. The successionof events can only be established by consciousness, a consciousness which requires,in orderto have a general view of the succession of events, not to be completely immersedin time. But what if, on the other hand, we considertime to be a mere constructionof consciousness?Temporalityitself becomes incomprehensible, insofaras it is the essence of time to be incompletelypresentto consciousness,to remainincompletely constituted, as Husserlwould say.Fortime, precisely,is not identical to being, it is a processwhich is alwaysin becoming. It is alwaysof the orderof the process,the passage,and that which comes. Thereforerealism(which immersesthe subject in time to the point of destroyingall possibility of a timeconsciousness)and idealism(which places consciousnessin a position of overviewing a time which no longerproceeds),areboth unableto clarifywhat they pretend to explain, that is, the relation of consciousness to time. For in both cases, what remainsout of rangefor a philosophical inquirywhich wants to see in time either a realityor an idea is preciselyits transitionalcharacter,its nonbeing or non-essence, which is not, but proceeds. Philosophy cannot succeed in accounting for the passageof time when it takes the form of a simple realismor idealism. In both cases it is led, inescapably,to think of the connection of the differentpartsof time as alreadyrealized either in the object or in the subject. But this "time-synthesis," farfrombeing must on the be considered the most difficult given, contrary philosophical problem.Its solution shouldbe consideredthe most importanttask of philosophy.This "true" philosophy,which wouldbe neither realistnor idealist,should be able to account for the discontinuity of time and for the fact that there are, for us, events. Such a philosophy should be able to explain the discontinuity of time, or what we could name the structuraleventuality of time.3The word eventuality should not be taken here in its normal meaning of possibility.4Speaking of the eventuality of time does not mean that time could "be"or "not be." It should, in my view, mean that time is in itself what bringscontingency, unpredictability,and chance into the world.I would like to demonstratethat this "true"philosophy which could take into account the contingency of time is nothing other than phenomenology itself. What is phenomenology, in fact? For Husserl, it was nothing other than the restitution of the most original idea of philosophy which found its first coherent expressionwith Plato and Aristotle and which constitutes the basis of Europeanphilosophy and science. Husserldoes not see in phenomenology, as did Hegel, who was the firstto make an importantuse of this word, a mere propaedeuticto philosophy as such. He considers phenomenology to be the propername of a philosophy which no longer situates truth beyond phenomena. And when Heidegger declares in one of his Marburger that Vorlesungen

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"thereis not an ontologybesidesphenomenology but scientificontologyis himself 1979,98), he situates nothingelse thanphenomenology" (Heidegger in continuity with Husserl whilegivinga moreradical formto his thinking. all thatseparates is precisely the idea them,whatunitesboththinkers Beyond thatthereis nothingto lookforbehindphenomena, behindwhatshowsitself itself.It is nothingotherthanphenomenality to us.The objectof philosophy is not the idealworld of a being-in-itself whichwouldbe completely separated "tothe the maximof the return fromus. This is whyHeidegger appropriates the with which Husserl first defined themselves" 1962, 50) things (Heidegger The is theretaskassigned to phenomenology (Husserl 1970b,252). question as Goethealforeto findan accessto the phenomena because, themselves, in themselves the doctrine" are (Goethe 1968,432).5The readysaid,"they such as metaphysical task is to abstainfromall speculation, construction, of an abstract And one should whichcouldleadto the elaboration ontology. whichendeavor to identify deductions phenomena putasideall psychological andsubjective experience. canbe identified Butthisdoesnot meanthatphenomenology bythe mere in section to 7 of of whatis given experience. When Heidegger, description are proximally "Andjust becausethe phenomena andTime,declares Being andforthe mostpartnotgiven,thereis needforphenomenology" (Heidegger ideas.As earlyas in TheIdea one of Husserl's 1962,60), he only appropriates does haddeclared that the taskof phenomenology Husserl of Phenomenology, there'andjustneed at thingsasif theyare"'simply not consistonlyin looking fora conscioushow theyconstitute themselves butin showing to be 'seen,"' as it had been in classicalphilosophy, ness which is no longerconsidered, of theirimages(Husserl the merecontainer 1964,9). To let the constitutive constituted whichis at the originof the completely object operation appear, that the existenceof this objectbe, as whichcomesinto viewforus,requires thissuspension orputto one side.Thisepoche, Husserl says,putinto brackets to of the ontological validitythat thingshaveforus in dailylife is, according the accessto the philosophical whatindicatesin a decisivemanner Husserl, attitude.Butthis doesnot amountto the philosopher turning awayfromthe On the conto accessa celestialworldof eternalessences. realworldin order in the natural as as are one lets given phenomena they thingsappear trary, attentiveto their whichis oursin dailylife.In thisway,one becomes attitude and givenness.What Husserlcalls "phenomenological modesof appearing doesnot permitone to escapefromthe sensibleto an intelligible reduction" of ideal into the stability of becoming world.It doesnot permita movement of whatis given to us. It lets character the temporal essences.It lets appear of whatwecall"reality." at the origin ofphenomenalization theprocess appear which thiskindof philosophy calls"transcendental Husserl phenomenology" of that whichtranscends consciousness, allowsus to attendto the apparition

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that is, to the birth of the object which consciousness constitutes as its opposite. Husserlcannot remainon the level of a static phenomenologywhich could only account for the alreadyconstituted object, for what is empiricallygiven. Very early on he feels compelled to develop a genetic phenomenology whose task is to elucidate the process at the origin of the opposition of subject and object. The entire phenomenology of temporalitythat Husserldevelops in his Lessonsin 1905 can be considered as a phenomenology of the advent of the subject to itself. For what is at stake in these Lessonsis to bring to light what Husserlcalls "whatis ultimately and trulyabsolute"(Husserl 1962, 216): this enigmatic intimacy of consciousness and time at the origin of the double constitution of worldand subject.Such a taskis paradoxical.It meansallowing the appearanceof the conditions of all appearingand bringing to light the processof "the segregationof the 'within' and the 'without"'(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 118) which Merleau-Pontysays is "never finished"(jamaischosefaite) ( 1968, 237), but, on the contrary,alwaysin becoming. Husserltries in his Lessons to reconstitute "afterthe event," with the help of such concepts as protention, retention, and original impression,the movement of the temporalization which remains in itself invisible. In this regardhe remains in close proximity to Kant, who had alwaysaffirmedthe invisibility of time and who defined schematizm,the process by which consciousness constitutes the object, as "an art concealed in the depths of human soul" (Kant 1933, 183). The phenomenology of the becoming of subject and world can therefore des Unscheinonly be a phenomenology of the inapparent (Phanomenologie baren),to quote one of Heidegger'sexpressionsfrom his last seminar in 1973 (Heidegger 1977, 137). But in his structureof eventuality this inappearance or invisibility of time does not referto a level transcendingperception.On the contrary,it refersto the genesis of perception itself. The limit that phenomenology encountershere is not external but internal. It can only be discovered in and by the phenomenological attitude. For such an invisibility is not, as Merleau-Pontyrightly underlines,an absolute invisibility,but the invisibility of thisworld. It is the dimension of invisibility which is implied in the visible itself and which can therefore only be discovered within the visible (1968, 225). This is the reason why, in his unfinished last book The Visibleand the Invisible(1968), Merleau-Pontysketches the outlines of an "ontology from within" (Merleau-Ponty1968, 225), of an "endo-ontology"(226) which constitutes the true achievement of his Phenomenology (1962). of Perception But is such a phenomenology of becoming, which identifies itself with an ontology which remainsinternal to phenomenality,and which pretendsto let the dynamic characterof phenomenality appear,alreadyin itself a phenomenology of the event? Forit is possibleto think the coming of time, its advenire, its coming up to us, without properlythinking its suddenrise, its coming out of

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fromwhich the itself, which refersto the Latin verb evenire,literallyex-venire, word "event"comes. But what is an event, in fact?At first,we can only define it as what was not expected, what arrives unexpectedly and comes to us by surprise,what descends upon us, the accident in the literal meaning of the Latin verb accido from which the word accident derives. The event in the strong sense of the word is therefore always a surprise,something which takes possession of us in an unforeseen manner, without warning, and which brings us towardsan unanticipatedfuture.The eventum,which arisesin the becoming, constitutes excessive in comparisonto the usual represomething which is irremediably sentation of time as flow.It appearsas something that dislocatestime and gives a new formto it, something that puts the flow of time out of joint and changes its direction. So the event appearsas that which intimately threatens the synchrony of transcendentallife or existence, in other words,the mutual implication of the differentpartsof times: retention and protention for Husserl;thrownness und Entwurf)for Heidegger.The exteriorityof the and project (Geworfenheit event introduces a split between past and future and so allows the appearance of differentpartsof time as dis-located.The event pro-duces,in the literal meaning of the word, the difference of past and future and exhibits this difference throughits suddenhappening.The event constitutes the "dehiscence" of time, its coming out of itself in differentdirections, which Heideggercalls the fact that it never coincides with itself, and which Levinasnames "ekstasis," dia-chrony(Levinas 1987, 32). Forthe event, as such, is upsetting. It does not integrate itself as a specific moment in the flow of time. It changes drastically the whole style of an existence (Husserl 1970a, 31). It does not happen in a world-it is, on the contrary,as if a new worldopens up throughits happening. The event constitutes the critical moment of temporality-a critical moment which nevertheless allows the continuity of time. This non-coincidence with oneself which allows the possibility of being by them or even destroyedby them, open to new events, of being transformed is also that which makesof the subject a temporalbeing, an ex-istant being, a being which is able constantly to get out of itself. Openness to the accident is thereforeconstitutive of the existence of the human being. Such an openness gives human being a destiny and makes one's life an adventure and not the anticipated development of a program. It becomes clear that a phenomenology which obeyed its own injunction to return to things themselves could not be content to remain an "eidetic" phenomenology-the thinking of what remains invariable in experience. It must become, accordingto the young Heidegger'sterminology,a "hermeneuan interpretationof all that can be found in existence and is tics of facticity"6: not reducible to ideality, which is essentially variable and transitory.Such a

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couldno longerbe a thinkingof beingandessenceonly.It phenomenology mustalsobe a thinkingof whatmaybe andof contingency. It shouldnot be of phenomenality. It mustalsobe a thinkingof only a thinkingof the a priori the a posteriori andof the "after event." The question is not to oppose radically a thinkingof beingor essenceto a thinkingof the otheror of the accident. Ratherit is a matterof showinghow a phenomenology of the event constitutesthe mostappropriate of the phenomenological accomplishment project. It is not the destitution orthe impossibility of phenomenological as discourse, somethinkers of the radical of the Other-I meanLevinas, butalso exteriority in his lastwritings-seemto believe. Derrida What in Husserlian andHeideggerian couldmakepossiphenomenology ble a phenomenological of the event? Weshould thisin thinking tryto answer a syntheticandorganized mannerin orderto defendthe thesisof a possible of the event. Forthe momentI mustbe contentwith some phenomenology reflections on the possibility of a phenomenological discourse on the phenomenon of expectation andsurprise whichcouldbe derived fromthe analyses of Husserl andHeidegger. even if it hasbeenpartially Againstall expectation, expectedandanticisuch is in fact the "essence" of the event. Based on this we couldsay pated, withoutparadox that it is an "impossible The possible." event, in its internal is the which in a contradiction, impossible happens,in spiteof everything, or marvelous manner. It comes to us or from that terrifying always bysurprise, sidewhence,precisely, it wasnot expected. The difficult taskof phenomenolis to therefore think this to excess thatis the event.The pheogy expectation of eventuality is in a similar of nomenology positionto the phenomenology Death,as an event, is also that which always mortality. happens againstall that nevertheless expectation,alwaystoo early,somethingimpossible happens.It comesto uswithoutcomingfromus. It takesplacein the impersonal manner of this event thathappens alsoto othersandit is the mostuniversal eventforlivingbeings.One couldsaythatdeathis the eventparexcellence, it neverpresently It doesnot openup exceptthatit is neverpresent, happens. a world, butrather closesit forever. It doesnot constitute a blankorgapinside or a diachronic momentwhichcouldbe the originof a new contemporality of possibilities. It is the simple,simultaneous destruction of synfiguration That is whydeath,farfrombeingan event,hasbeen chronyanddiachrony. definedby Heidegger as the possibility legitimately parexcellence (Heidegger forus a possibility that we will neverrealize, 1962,307). Deathremains not even in suicide, whichis onlya wayof escaping the essential of death passivity whichdefines humanexistencemostdeeply(see Heidegger 1962,299-311). But if death is for us the pre-eminent as Heidegger possibility, says,this

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implies a redefinitionof the traditionalconcept of possibility.For in the philosophical tradition,possibilityis opposedto reality.It is consideredsomething less than reality.But here, in the light of death, possibility is defined as something morepre-eminentthan realityand cannot be comparedto it. In the phenomenological perspective, possibility is the locus of excess with regardsto reality.This allows us to consider possibility as a higher categorythan reality. Possibilityis something other than a categorywhich is a structureof things. It is a structureof existence, an existential, as Heideggercalls it, since the mode of being of human existence is not the mode of being of the res (that is, realitas),but the mode of being as having to be (in other words,as possibility). Because the human being is a mortal being and, in existing, has a constant relation to its own death, it constantly remains in the mode of possibility.It remainsin the mode of a structuralanticipation towardsits own being, which remainsunrealizedfor as long as it exists. In fact, this determination of possibility as existential in Heidegger had alreadybeen preparedin Husserl'sintentional analysis. Husserl himself underlines in his CartesianMeditations (1960) the originality of this kind of intentional analysis in comparisonwith the ordinary,unbracketedanalysis of human life. This originalitycomes from the specificityof intentional life that can never be understood as a totality of data, but rather as an ensemble of significations.What does it mean for consciousness to be in the mode not of something "alreadygiven," but of signification?According to Husserl it imin other words,the of the intention in the intention itself,"7 plies "asurpassing in what is exceeds act fact that the intentional given itself. always with deals not given data, but with only Phenomenological explanation is not merelythe theoryof the potentialities. This means that phenomenology correlation of noesisand noema, or of the cogitoand of its cogitatum,but esin the intentio of the intentum tablishesthe principleof the necessarysurpassing the "object"of consciousness, is never itself. This implies that the cogitatum, given once and for all. It can alwaysbe explicated in a more complete manner in regardto the context in which it appears,or, as Husserl says, in regardto its internal and external horizon. The original operation of the intentional analysisconsists in unveiling the potentialities implied in the actual state of consciousness.The intentional analysiscan thereforebe consideredas the basis of a phenomenology of expectation. This is a phenomenology of the tension of consciousnesstowardsan object which remainsopen to the validation or invalidation of its anticipations according to the development of forever new horizons. We could even say that excess is the rule here, because there is alwaysan addition in what is experienced which can never be completely correlated with the intention. It can even be consideredas at the originof the intentional movement itself, in the sense that a total fulfillment of intentionality, or a

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complete adequacyof the signification to the object, would entirely destroy them. It becomes clear that, accordingto Husserl,there is a parallelbetween the perception of an object and the perception of the other human being. In both cases, there arepartswhich arenot perceived,but areonly "appresented," as Husserl says. This means that their existence is co-implicated in what is actually perceived:for example, the hidden faces of a cube, or the actual exof others. That there is a part of experience not acperiences (die Erlebnisse) tually present is the rule of intentional phenomenology,since the mere idea of a complete fulfillmentof the intention would destroythe basisof intentionality. The intentional relation to the other human being cannot be understood as a special case of the generalintentional relation to objects. On the contrary, it must be understood as the very matrix of intentionality. It unfolds itself where expectation will never be completely fulfilledand where the menace of non-fulfillment can never be completely avoided. If there is the foundation for a phenomenology of expectation in Husserlian intentional analysisas well as in Heideggerianexistential analysis,could one find the basis for a phenomenology of surprisein these philosophies?Is not the very idea of a phenomenology of surprisean absurdity? We know that it is possible and even necessaryto hope beyond all hopes and to "expect the unexpected"as Heraclitus says in fragment 18 (Heraclitus 1987, 19). To my mind there is no doubt that Husserland Heideggerwere able to thematizethis openness to the indetermination of the future, but what is happening when this excess implied in the event fracturesthe horizon of possibilities in such a mannerthat the mereencounter with the event becomes impossible? How can we account for these moments of crisis, of living death, of trauma,when the whole rangeof possibilitiesof a human being becomes unable to integratethe discordanceof the event and collapses completely? Two examples could be mentioned here: the mourningof a loved one and religious conversion. In both cases a transition is made not with regardsto a loss of a particularpossibilitybut with regards to the radicalloss of the totality of possibilitieswhich we call a world.In such criticalperiods,we experience our event. In spite of having expected incapacity to experience the traumatizing the death of somebody seriously ill, it remains a surprise.It feels beyond all It is the unanticipation. What happens is "not included in the program." foreseen, in the true sense of the word. It is what contradictsand ruinsexpectation in its very structure. Such experiences are very rare, and Husserl and Merleau-Pontyexplain that ordinaryexperience presupposesan originaryfaith in the stability of the world and the presumptionthat experience will alwayshave the same "style" (Merleau-Ponty1968, 3-4; Husserl1970a, 31). But we find a strikingimageof such "existential"crises in psychosis.The schizophrenic,for example, experiences the loss of what seems evident to other human beings. S/he experiences

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the lossof worldandthe breaking of the ordinary coherence of experience.8 condemned to terror andto the impossibility of communicatS/he is therefore haslostthe abilityof ingwiththingsandotherhumanbeings.Sucha subject andof experiencing oneselfto eventuality the reconfiguration of posopening sibilities eventrequires thata newandunexpected fromus.Forit is the event in a new configuration itselfwhichrequires of possibilities. One integration doesnot decidefreelyto changeone'sworld, orto becomeconverted. Wecan of the eventneitherin the activenorin the passive voice.It canchange speak us andeven "happen" to usonly if we arein the rightdisposition. This is prewhichis missing in the psychotic ciselythe "disposition" person. We can speakaboutthe event only in the thirdvoice and in a pasttime, in the modeof "ithappened to me."We neverexperience the greateventsof Thisis quiteclearasfarasthe first ourlife ascontemporaneous. greateventof to the ourlife is concerned. Wedidnot askforourbirth,andthis is testimony Tobe bor meansthat factthatwe arenot at the originof ourownexistence. we areconditioned by a pastthat wasneverpresentto us. It can only be apthesedeterminations of ourexistencethat us by assuming by later, propriated to ourbirth. a surprise in us in relation we havenot chosen.Thereis therefore of ourbeing. of born which is constitutive It is the permanent surprise being of this proto-event. In each It is testimony to the uncontrollable character of the proto-event of birth.It is as if we renew event thereis a repetition forthe "first in a newevent,thisradical noveltyof whathappens experience, of event as the with the as well itself,whichin time," impossibility coinciding the from the future. disconnects its sudden past apparition andit is in a waythe The existingbeinghasno controloversucha surprise the collaboration eventwhichgivesthe order here,butto be ordered requires
of the one who obeys. One is not completely passive in relation to the event, even if its meaning still remainsobscure.We keep tryingto give a meaning to

that of everything it. It is only in relationto this attempted interpretation behavior is nothingotherthanthe beingin (andthis interpretative happens Husserl asa trauma. thataneventcanbe experienced of the human) theworld withinourintentional bothsawa passivity andHeidegger activityitselfanda did andnot chosen.Husserl of existencewhichcan onlybe assumed facticity did so by tightly so with his theoryof passivegenesisor synthesis. Heidegger of the human to the world asthe beingthrown beingand facticity connecting of the of facticityinto the configuration as the incorporation existentiality callsman. of thisprospective beingthat Heidegger project andthe thinkingof the event.We We shouldnot opposephenomenology with opento phenomena mustbe identified shouldconnectthem;openness is This paradoxical ness to unpredictability. capacityof expectingsurprise in TheVisible declares in questionin phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty always of our hasneverspoken... of the passivity that "philosophy andtheInvisible

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(1968, 221). This passivityof our activity, as Valeryspoke of a bodyof thespirit" which happensin activity is nothing other than the processof temporalization us as thinking beingswithout being the productof ourthought. Foras MerleauPonty underlines,"Iam not even the authorof that hollow that formswithin me by the passagefrom the present to the retention, it is not I who makes myself think any more than it is I who makes my heart beat" (1968, 221). New as our initiatives may be, they come to be born in this field of being that is human spirit, in which something, or the absence of something, can be inscribed.A great, contemporaryFrench phenomenologist, Henri Maldiney, createda new word,"transpassibilite," to expressourcapacityto undergoevents, insofaras this implies for us an active opening to a field of receptivity (Maldiney 1991, 114). To lack the capacity to open oneself to what happens, no longer to welcome the unexpected, is in fact a markof psychosis. Phenomenology privileges neither the interiority of expectation nor the exteriority of surprise.It establishes as preliminaryto experience neither the receptivity of the subject nor the activity of the object. It tries to think the strangecoincidence of both. One could demonstratethat Heideggertried to think this almost unthinkablecoincidence of Being and "man." He attempted this by means of the word Ereignis. means not (the Ereignis only "happening" ordinarymeaning of the word in German) but also, following its double etyand "appearing to mology in both popularand scientific use, "appropriation" view."In takingthis position I am arguingagainstthose contemporary thinkers who have declaredthat the thinking of the event and the thinking of the other requiresa mode of thinking other than the phenomenological one. There can be no thinking of the event which is not at the same time a thinking of phenomenality. NOTES We verywarmly thankthe editorof Etudes forpermission to rePhinomenologiques this versionof the article.Ed. produce 1. Lecture 1998, in the seminar given in Prague, September organized by the Institute of Philosophy. version of "Pour une phenomenologie de Simplified English l'evenement: l'attenteet la surprise," Etudes 25, 1997:59-75. PMnomenologiques 2. See, forexample, (1963, 71-72) andBergson Bergson (1944,371-72). 3. See, in this regard, the remarkable articleby ClaudeRomano, "LePossible et l'evnement"(Romano1993),fromwhichI havedrawn muchinspiration. shouldbe aware 4. Here,the reader of differences betweenthe connotations of eventualite in the sensegivento thiswordby Francoise Dastur hereandeventuality in in this context,refers moregenerally to possibility, Eventualite, English. chance,unand the whereas the Englisheventuality refers certainty, contingency, hypothetical, eitherto thatwhichultimately or to a possible, fixedevent.Ed. results,

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5. Cited in Heidegger (1976, 12). 6. "Ontologie der Faktizitat)" was the title of Heidegger'ssummer (Hermeneutik semestercourse of 1923. See Heidegger (1923). 7. See Husserl (1960, 48): "Phenomenological explication makes clear what is included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum (for example 'the other side') by making present in phantasy the potential perceptions that would make the invisible visible." 8. See, for example, the discussionin Blankenburg(1991), cited in Dastur(1997). Ed.

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