Southern Political Science Association

No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict Author(s): Idean Salehyan Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Jan., 2008), pp. 54-66 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30218860 . Accessed: 03/02/2014 21:59
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No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict

ofNorth Texas Idean University Salehyan
tensions between statesand the odds of Rebelgroupsoften increasing operateacrossnationalboundaries, Weak are rebels and are drawn intointernational states international conflict. incapable ofevicting unwillingly to their and transnational rebels in order undermine Rival states direct support opponents substitute conflicts. a are militarized These claims tested withactionthrough hostilities analysis of proxies. through quantitative sanctuaries across borders increase the theclaimthatrebel interstate (MIDs) since1945.Results support disputes arealsoassociated with increased torebel Other ofassistance groups conflict. forms ofan international probability hostilities.

of a simply domestic events,but have important behalfof rebelgroups-raisesthe probability a international confrontation between states as violent international for the (but system implications and Salehyan2007). Moreover, the about see Gleditsch whole. Otherstatesoftenbecomeconcerned direct contests between between of internal concrisesduring humanitarian relationship military periods fordoand indirect suchas refugee states externalities hostilities, flict, through support experience negative has notbeenthoroughly and have strong mestic flowsand economicdisruptions,1 explored. insurgents, on limitation of the literature civilwar Another wars. Accordof civil outcome over the preferences use transis that most researchers arms or indiintervention often intervene external actors directly ingly, as in order to affect fers,economic aid, and/ortroop deployments ofcivilconflict periods rectly during of which are of intervention-all In measures et al. addioutcome their 2001). certainly (Byman preferred forms ofsupport do notexhaust these often in internal conflicts tion,actorsinvolved span important-but common oneofthemost allpossibilities. national boundaries.These domestic-international types Perhaps of is the for rebel Lakes of in the Great reevident have been connections provision groups foreign support Bases on one's to name safehavensor sanctuaries andtheCaucasus, theBalkans, territory. gionofAfrica, with rebels borders national across a fewexamples. protection provide as state the on fromrepression dealofresearch there hasbeena great As such, agents by government outside oftheir force exercise in internal warsin recent intervention sovereign easily years cannot foreign showsthatover data collection Extensive and Enterline 2000;Carment territory.2 (see,e.g.,Balch-Lindsay and Rowlands1998; ElBadawiand Sambanis2000; halfof all rebelgroupssince 1945 (55%) have conin othercountries Meernik 1996;Regan2000,2002;Walter 2002).Much ductedoperations (Cunningham, and SalehyanN.d.). Tensions between to explain thecausesofforeign Gleditsch, seeks ofthisliterature are likely to ariseas as an independ- rebelhostand home countries others use intervention intervention; of are accused and outcomes hosts conflict to explain entvariable harboringpolitical oppoprocesses the successof nents and counterinsurgency of war and/or such as the duration operationsnear the for externalities create border international scholars have settlements. Yet, security largely negotiated of combination such the in neighbors.For interference that foreign dyads, ignoredthe possibility
and Gleditsch (2006). 1SeeMurdochand Sandler(2004) and Salehyan 2Empirically, thatmanycivilwarstakeplacenearinternational Buhaugand Gates(2002) demonstrate boundaries, support providing tools. as tactical use borders fortheclaimthatinsurgents Vol. 70, No. 1, January TheJournal 2008,Pp. 54-66 ofPolitics, Political ScienceAssociation @ 2008 Southern doi:10.1017/S0022381607080048 ISSN 0022-3816

in

on arenot anotherstate's domesticconflicts-particularly civil wars an interdependent world,

54

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NO SHELTER HERE: REBEL SANCTUARIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

55

and geosupportfor rebel organizations foreign the incentive and opprovides graphical contiguity forwar (Most and Starr1989). portunity I offer a newtheory In thispaper, violent linking actors to conflict between transnational states. Interintertwined in comconflicts areoften and intrastate two is and a neat between the dichotomy plexways, I argue that transnational oftenmisleading. rebels in neighboring states raisetheprobability ofinternathis tionalconflict; conventheoretically, challenges ofconflict that exclude tionaldyadic models nonstate thepotential actors and ignore internationalization of thedecision conflicts. In addition, to host "domestic" is examined. and support another state's rebels Weak which cannot states, preventforeign neighboring from rebels usingtheir territory, maybe drawninto conflicts not of theirchoosing.Rival international will often to rebel neighbors provide sanctuary organin izations order to undermine their rather opponents in than direct This engage military operations. suggests thatenemies the international sometimes substitute useofforce with for These support opposition groups. willbe examined claims below. This theory shedslight on sourcesof tension in international politicsthatare not accountedforby traditional interdyadic analysesof state-to-state For actions. relations between instance, Afghanistan andPakistan haverecently overallegations soured that isnotserious thelatter aboutcombating Al-Qaedaand on itsterritory. Talibanforces Israelinvaded Lebanon in order to rootout PLO basesthere, and in summer to attack In theGreat Hezbollah. 2006,againinvaded Lakesregion ofAfrica, Rwanda a warin Zaire/ fought DR Congoafter theperpetrators ofthe1994genocide as an insurgent forceacrossthe began to regroup border.Moreover, international rivalries are often For Iran pursued through proxies. example, longafter andIraqceased one continued to fighting another, they and host rebelforces. Thus, transnational support actors can becomea sourceoffriction between states and linkinterand intrastate conflict. Suchdynamics are absent fromcurrent theoriesof international conflict which focus on states as actors. The following section further theargudevelops ment thatextraterritorial rebel basescan spark hostilities betweenstates.Providing to sanctuary rebels creates or exacerbates tensionsbetween states~leadingto militarized disputes-and maybe used as a substitute for interstate warfare between rival dyads. Thethird section describes thedataandmethods tobe used in the statistical In particular, a timeanalysis. series crosssectional of international analysis conflicts is duringthe latterhalf of the twentieth century

conductedusing a variety of indicators and data sources. The fourth section the results of the reports statistical The final section concludes. analysis.

Rebelsand Transnational Interstate Conflict

A defining feature ofmodern is their states monopoly on the domestic use of legitimate force. All states, of their institutions or regardless political policies, workto prevent armed challenges to theirrulestates in theuse of coercion(Bates,Greif, specialize and Singh Hardin states 2002; 1997).Ordinarily, possess superior levelsof military resources, personnel, and organization relativeto potentialinsurgents, rebellion a costly and risky Political making strategy. theories of have rebellion, therefore, opportunity that of the level of collective emphasized regardless in society, is unlikely rebellion to break out grievance unlessthere are constraints on theability ofthestate to exercise force and policeitsterritory (Fearonand Laitin 2003; Herbst2000; Lichbach1995; Tarrow includefactors 1994; Tilly1978). These constraints suchas difficult terrain (Fearonand Laitin 2003) and militaries (Herbst 2000). poorly functioning However,thereis littlereason to expectthat to mobilize andsustain a rebelpolitical opportunities lion are limited to the geographic area of the state. Whilestates on theuse mayenjoya nearmonopoly of forcedomestically, anotherkey attribute of the state is territoriality and Walter (Kahler 2006),which that state and monitor implies power to regulate activities actorsis largely confined by subnational to its sovereign State boundaries are jurisdiction.3 international institutions that demarcate mutually exclusive zones of politicalauthority and are lines of military defense stateaggression againstforeign Kratochwil (Andreas 2003; 1986;Ruggie1993;Starr and Most 1976;Zacher2001). Therefore, 2006; Starr on theone hand,international borders establish areas in which thestate is free to prevent on the subversion; otherhand,theyserveas constraints on the movementof military/police forces.
3AsKrasner is never absolute. (1999) notes, sovereignty Military violations ofstrict can occurbycontract Westphalian sovereignty or imposition. Some governments, forexample, have agreedto allow foreign bases or police forces on theirterritory. military Forceful of otherstatesalso do occur. However, occupations violationsof sovereignty are certainly military costlyfor the as well.Transaction costsand thecostsofdirect initiator military confrontation makesovereignty violations difficult forallbutthe mostpowerful states.

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56

IDEAN SALEHYAN

state agentsare largely restricted in neighboring activities stateshave even Although by Insurgent nationalboundaries, frustrated U.S. rebel in and Iraq transnationally organized operations Afghanistan often conduct outside of the 2005). operations groups geo- (Staniland limits of their statein orderto evade graphic target state 2007). The poweroftransrepression (Salehyan International Conflict nationalactorslies in theirabilityto evade state and control (Keck and Sikkink1998; Most research on interstate conflict focuses on conregulation Keohaneand Nye 1971;Risse-Kappen on includstraints the use of force between of countries 1995), pairs dissent tradeinterdependence, distance, (Tarrow2005).4Multina- such as democracy, ing formobilizing can evadetaxation and powerratios(see, e.g.,Bennett tionalcorporations, forinstance, and Stam 1998; in one stateby shifting and regulation to Bremer1992; Oneal and Russett2001; Schneider, operations othercountries. transnational rebelscan Barbieri,and Gleditsch2003). For example,the Similarly, and support in areasbeyond mobilize resources their democratic peace literature arguesthatpoliticalinreach. For mobilization liberal norms constrain the use of state's stitutions and/or example, among target and refugee of force between whenthey democracies havea dispute diasporagroups communities-many withthe (e.g., Bueno deMesquita et al. 1999; Oneal and whichhave leftbecause of dissatisfaction conflicts to many to eluci2001; Schultz (Lischer Russett 2001),but does little regime-iscommon ruling be over. it is also 2007; Zolberg, Suhkre, datewhatsuchdisputes 2005; Lyons2006; Salehyan Thus, may to consider the issues that lead states to and Aguayo 1989).Bases, stockpiles, weapons training important and othersuch resources abroad provide fight, not just limitations on the use violence(see facilities, from Diehl Gartzke Hensel 2001; Vasquez rebelgroupssignificant 1992; 1998; protection government it is assumed that statesfight in moreone forces. countries, 1995). Usually, Holdingbases neighboring distributional issues such as for the military anotherover bilateral over,will be especially important and scarce of resources rebel because (see,e.g.,Fearon1995; usually territory organizations they operations freto project force overlongdistances.5 Hensel2001; Krasner lacktheability 1991). However, disputes of arise over "domestic" matters borders arenever Whileinternational politics, completely quently the natureof the regimein power and con- including forces are significantly inviolable, government thereis a in their transnational rebels conductduringcivilwars.For example, to attack strained ability on how ethnic conflicts of thehost growing of literature thesovereignty becausedoingso violates body if international raise the costs state.Borderviolations hostilities, may spark particularly substantially tiesarepresent of counterinsurgency 2002; kinship (Cetinyan Counterinsurgencytransnational operations. Saideman Trumbore and Moore Davis are boundaries across national 2001; 1997; hampered operations and 2003;Woodwell with theterrain lacksfamiliarity becausethestate 2004). to foreign intervention attention withthe host Despitegrowing population;it risksa confrontation have condemnation for in civilwars (see, e.g., Regan 2000), scholars international state;and it invites assistance the that and violations. possibility providing holdingneigh- neglected Clearing sovereignty to prevent rebel access may also to rebelsis especially likelyto provokea military boringterritory This suggests a source between states. costs (on governance confrontation entail significant governance the traditional conflict strikes of Limited cross-border Lake see costs, 1996). emphasis on beyond External bases are a or naturalresources. interstate but rebels territory tension, may occur,provoking ofsupport thatis particularly to giverise from thefullforce of repression efforts form are sheltered likely conflict when they have access to neighboring because,as opposedto finances territory.6 to interstate and equipmentthat may be deliveredover long a useful oftransnational 4Tarrow (2005) offers opposition theory counsuchbasesarelocatedin contiguous distances, Here, the groups,but focusesmainlyon protestmovements. tries.It is well knownthat geographic contiguity is on transnational insurgencies. emphasis in a increases the risk of armed conflict (Bremer dyad a perhapsunique exampleof a nonstate 5Al-Qaedapresents While Most and Starr 1992; 1989). patrons providing actorthathas globalreach. violent and finances to rebels be far and arms may away enter and states to extensively 60n rareoccasions, mayattempt of the offended the reach For Israel proof rebel government, beyond rid neighboring example, territory groups. Lebanonin order to oustthePLO and Rwanda southern invaded allowsinteron proximate territory viding sanctuary to defeat national oftheCongoin order theDemocratic invaded Republic armedconflicts to arise. Theseefforts based there. Hutu militias costly provedextremely a state's There aretwomainreasons why territory and so, such international and drewwidespread condemnation, are uncommon. used as a transnational rebel be by operations sanctuary may

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NO SHELTER HERE: REBEL SANCTUARIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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force. thestate control Thisdiscussion leads to myfirst First, maybe too weakto fully hypothesis: itsterritory and evictforeign Such states do fighters. rebelbasesin neighboring territories HI: External not have adequatecapabilities and facehighopporincrease theprobability militarized a interstate of costs for diverting resources tunity military/police between rebel host and homecountries. dispute towards another rebels. Second,rivalstates country's cover torebel forces may provide deliberately attacking theirenemies.Theyuse insurgent forces to further RivalStates and Substitution Effects aims their their vis-a-vis foreign policy neighbors. thatdo not support rebel Rebel host and home countries capableneighbors maycome into Strong, to becomehavens fortransnational conflict withone another fora variety of reasons. aimsare unlikely rebels. These states are both and the state home can retaliate the host for willing ableto restrict First, against rebel it was that weak Above, dissidents. Home countries will demand activity. argued neighbors harboring notbe abletoeffectively control their and thatthehoststaterid its territory of rebelsand can may territory rebelaccess. They are unwillingly led into threaten to use forcein orderto gain compliance. prevent rebels becausethey cannot hostgovernments do agreeto limit rebel conflicts by transnational Sometimes, access to their or retaliation. for in 1970 took actions to prevent territory access; foreign Jordan example, In other cases,rival evict thePalestine Liberation Yetweak neighbors maychooseto host Organization. and providesupport to opposistatesmay find it difficult to complywith these rebelorganizations there are hosdemands.Such statesare not capable of restricting tion movements. Clearly, preexisting tilities in such but rebel can rebel activities; cases, out foreign rebelsmay be support exacerbate driving them. It is well known that international rivalries are as even as more a confrontation so) just costly(or for a share of international conflicts withtheoffended stateand weakstates cannotmake responsible large reoccur(see, e.g., crediblecommitments to evict insurgents. disputes frequently Thus, as militarized andThompson thesestatesare drawninto conflicts 2002;Diehland Goertz thatare not of Colaresi 2001; In cases states confront their theirchoosing.Lebanon'sinability to root out the Thompson 2001). many withtheir own military resources. Yet in PLO and Israel'ssubsequent invasion in 1982seems opponents states can undermine their international addition, to fit thistype. Rivalneighbors, deliberby contrast, rather than rebels.These opponentsby supporting insurgencies atelyprovideaccess to transnational force. such a comes states willcontinue to hostforeign when directly using Pursuing policy insurgents International disthe benefits of creating in neighbors are withcosts and benefits. military instability cost resources and lives and may invitethe exceeded forretaliation (fora formal putes bythepotential intervention of allies and international see Rival states will be treatment, Bapat N.d.). dissupporters. By rebel and providing accessto cussedin greater below. assisting organizations depth statescan avoid the costs of direct Second, althoughextensivecounterinsurgencytheirterritory, Theserebel ifsuccessful actionsacrossthe frontier are costly, limited engagement. groups, forays military in the central will and strikes on foreign soil sometimes occur.Crosstoppling government, also govern the aftera civil war, freeing the stateof borderfighting, and "hot pursuit"raids fire, country stray costs. Yet states have intoforeign are to hostilities governance frequently greater territory likely provoke resources at theirdisposalrelative to rebel as the security and sovereignty of the host country military and international war may are violated. For example, Venezuelaand Colombia organizations, therefore, entail a likelihood of the have had a seriesof disputes greater to Colombian defeating opponent.7 relating to rebels rather than raidsacrosstheir byproviding frontier. support Third, In addition, counterinsurgency own efforts, states lose autonomy conflict externalities-such as economic upon their disruptions, relying in the conflict. If states are considered to be healtheffects, and refugee directing flows(Ghobarah, Huth, and their such a relaand Russett 2003; Murdoch and Sandler 2004; principals insurgents agents, and Gleditsch may lead to considerable effect tionship "agencyslack."8 2006)-that negatively Salehyan is a trade-off between costsand can sparkinternational incidents. Thus there avoiding adjacentcountries the rebelhome country Finally, may deploytroops defeattheir neartheinternational border to fight but 70f course, statesmay not need to completely insurgents, themthrough internal unrest opponents; weakening promoting such troopmobilization maybe seen as threatening maysuffice. to neighbors who cannotbe entirely certain of the 8For in example,RwandaarmedLaurentKabila's rebelforces intentof such actions,creatingsecurity-dilemma orderto oust the Mobutu Sese Seko government in Zaire,but worries. Kabilalaterturned on his former backers.

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58

IDEAN SALEHYAN

Whilethe choicebetween policyautonomy. foreign thiswillbe is an interesting subjectitself, strategies left forfuture research. of rivalgovernments Thereare several examples theirinternational that have soughtto undermine and support sanctuary providing opponents through After Iran violence. to rebels rather thanstate-to-state in conand Iraq stopped directly 1988,they fighting one another tinuedto pressure by supporting opposhelter to the Supreme sitiongroups.Iran provided in Iraq whileIraq CouncilfortheIslamicRevolution to the Mojahedinoffered supportand sanctuary in a never Honduras and engaged e-Khalq. Nicaragua the1980's butduring warwith one another, full-scale its rival to weaken Honduras providthrough sought ing bases to the Contras.Pakistanhas at times withIndiaoverKashmir itsconflict through pursued at other times and direct supthrough engagement portformilitants. effect a possiblesubstitution This suggests (on and Most Palmer see 2000; substitution, Morgan rivalsare knownto and Starr1984). International be proneto violenceagainstone another, yetthey for supportfor rebelorganizations may substitute we action. Therefore, directstate-to-state military disin international should see a decrease military rebel putes when rival statessupportand shelter Thisleadsto a secondhypothesis: organizations.

withvery are locatedin neighboring fewexceptions, additional states. discussed However, models, below, do not imposesucha restriction. For thedependent I employ international a dichotovariable, disputes, from mousvariable theMilitarized Interstate Dispute and Bremer (MID) dataset(Ghosn,Palmer, 2004),9 4 or 5 MIDs, namely which is coded"1" forcategory the actualuse of force.10 Because thosethatinvolve and collected over variable is binary the dependent time(BTSCS), I employ theBeck,Katz,and Tucker a countof method (1998) event-history byincluding and three cubicsmoothing peace years amongstates side." on the Accordingly, only splines right-hand is recorded and or onset, theinitial yearof conflict, from theanalysis. are excluded ongoing years is a variableof interest The main independent indicator coded"1" ifat leastone state dichotomous the otherstate.12 in the dyadis hosting rebelsfrom baseswas collected Data on external identifybyfirst in theUppsalaUniversity/ listed ingtherebelgroups Oslo Armed Peace Research International Institute, et al. 2002). Over 300 Dataset (Gleditsch Conflicts are listed in this data, and a rebel organizations and sourceswereconof variety primary secondary in if the rebelshad a presence sultedto determine and if so, in which countries externalterritory, and Salehyan Gleditsch, N.d.). Over (Cunningham, had someor rebel or 55%,ofthese half, organizations that in other extensive states,13 indicating presence todirectly use are lesslikely H2: International rivals is a widespread rebellion transnational phenomenon. rebel whentransnational one another against force is a variableforinternational rivalry Secondly, on their basesare located territory. included. This variable comes from William R. rivalries on international one. Thompson's is a conditional Note thatthishypothesis (2001) dataset This bases in- and is coded"1" forrivals (and "0" otherwise). H1 arguesthat the presenceof external of conflict the increases probability dependently CrisisBehavior alternative models,I use the International that H2 argues states. between dyads, 9In forcasesofrival and Moser1988) as thedependent data (see Brecher, Wilkenfeld, direct variable. withfewer willbe associated rebelsanctuaries in an thesameand areavailable aresubstantively Results It is onlineappendix. be expected. thanwouldotherwise uses of force rivalsengagein disputes knownthat international from no hostility thatranges '1TheMID datais a 0 to 5 variable 4 and 5 variable forcategory war.A dichotomous than otherdyads;yet,H2 expects to full-blown more frequently In an alternative in the literature. standard has become MIDs is not and sanctuaries effect of rivalries thatthejoint ofthe modelon thefull I runan ordered range logit specification, there is an interactive MID one. Rather, a simpleadditive with thismodeland areunchanged data.The mainfindings is somewhat are reported between rivals force effect wheredirect in an onlineappendix. of rebelsanctuaries. mitigated by theprovision are notreported theresults below,thecubicsplines section, 1"In
tables. in theregression

Data and Methods

I conduct a statistical To test these hypotheses, conflicts duringthe latter analysisof international ofanalysis are The units half ofthetwentieth century. 1999 and are 1946 to from (nondirected) dyad/years rebel to contiguous restricted bases, dyadsbecause

forrebelswas also considered. 12A variable formutualsupport withitsinclusion. Results remain unchanged measure forno, some, theoriginal data,thisis a three-part 13In refers to "Some" presence in other states. and extensive presence while"extensive" or sporadicuse of external limited territory, for a in othercountries presenceindicatesmajor operations usedhereis coded"1" for Theindicator oftime. sustained period do not change levelof external either thoughresults presence, is used. whenonlyextensive presence

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NO SHELTER HERE: REBEL SANCTUARIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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data is based upon foreign between policyhistories states andbelligerent statements addition in to public acts of aggression. It differs fromotherdatasets in thatit is not based upon the frequency of MIDs or This codingis partica minimum disputeduration. that rebel ularlyattractive, given the hypothesis forMIDs in cases of rivalry. is a substitute support To testHypothesis termbetween 2, an interaction basesand rivalries is included. Sincebothof external thesevariables are dichotomous (0, 1), thisinteractionterm takesthevalueof 1 forcasesin which both external bases and rivalries are present. In addition to foreign sanctuaries used bytransnational rebels-themainfocusofthisstudy-other forms of support to opposition groupsmayalso be to consider. have focusedon Scholars important transfers of armsand resources to rebels, and such assistance behavior conflict between mayalso increase states. Forcomparison in alternative models purposes, I include datacompiled byRegan(2000) on external in civilwar.This is a dichotomous intervention indicator coded "1" forcaseswhere third parties provided militaryor economic assistanceto rebel Thiswas also interacted withtherival organizations. state variableto test the substitution hypothesis. A finding thatotherforms of support to rebelsalso increaseconflict behaviorwould serveas a useful extension of the theory. Foreignsupportthrough direct transfers is somewhat different fromexternal basesbecause itis a voluntary choice the and by patron is necessarily thatdo not support the given by states status while sanctuaries exist quo regime, passive may in weakstates; can be given also,resources bydistant countries whileneighbors areneededforsanctuary. Several control variableswere added to the thelikelihood First, analysis. powerratios mayaffect of conflict, as weak countries shouldbe unlikely to confront very powerfulstates. The power ratio variableincludedhereis takenfromthe Correlates of War's (COW) Composite Index of National of (CINC) and is the natural Capabilities logarithm the stronger CINC score divided the sum party's by of the two nations'CINCs.14The CINC index is baseduponmilitary personnel, military expenditures, economicproduction, and population data. Second, alliance data, also from the COW project,was included(Singer, and Stuckley Bremer, 1972). This
14Asan alternative I include thenatural specification, log of the state's CINC divided state's CINC. Results stronger bytheweaker do not changesubstantially.

is a dichotomous indicator coded"1" ifthemembers of the dyad are part of a mutualdefense pact.'" data from thePolity was included to Finally, project controlfordyadicdemocracy; democracies are exone another. The pectedto be less likelyto fight indexis a 21-point scalefrom -10 to 10,which Polity includesinformation on institutional characteristics of the regime(Jaggers and Gurr1995). The Polity score of the leastdemocratic statein the dyadwas included to testthedemocratic peace hypothesis. To checkthe resultsagainsta well-established modelofinternational theresults war,I also replicate Oneal in and Russett This model (2001). reported includes information on all dyads, conspecification As above,the tiguousor not,from1946 to 1991.16 variable is a dummy variable forcategory dependent 4 and 5 disputes. The variables in thismodelinclude the"liberal triad": bilateral peace dyadicdemocracy, and international in trade, jointmembership organizations. Additional variables include thedyadic power and whether ratio,alliances," distance, contiguity, bothstates are minor and Oneal powers(see Russett fora full ofvariables used). Thesemodels description werealso estimated usingtheBeck,Katz,and Tucker (1998) methodforBTSCS data. All modelsemploy robust standard errors clustered by dyadto account foradditional of nonindependence observations.

Results
Table 1 reports the results usingcontiguous dyads. The first model includesthe variablefor external basesbyitself, while model2 alsoincludes therivals x base interaction. Model 3 compares these results with PatrickRegan's coding of foreign intervention on behalfof rebelgroups.Exceptfor defense pact in Model 3, thecontrol variables do notreachstatistical at conventional This is not levels.18 significance rivalries surprising giventhatthesevariables predict ratherwell. However,since these indicatorsare
data on external bases is onlyavailableforthe post16Because WWII period, thefulltimespan of the Russett and Oneal data cannotbe used. R&O alliance iscoded"1" for indicator ofalliance, 17The anyform which is different from thedefense indicator described above. pact I includea dummyvariable 18As an alternative specification, coded"1" forcaseswhere bothcountries havea Polity scoreof6 or greater. In such models, has a negative and jointdemocracy effect on conflict, the democratic significant supporting peace I include thePolity scoreoftheleastdemocratic state hypothesis. to be consistent with work (the"weaklink")in order byRussett and Oneal. In thisalternative forthe main model,thefindings variables of interest are substantively unchanged.

and CINC data weregenerated 'SThe MID, ICB, alliance, using theEUgenesoftware. See Bennett and Stam(2000).

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IDEAN SALEHYAN

TABLE1

Results, Regression Contiguous Dyads

1. Coef.(Std.Err.) 2. Coef.(Std.Err.) 1.672 (0.194)* -1.172 (0.257)* 1.552(0.155)* 0.190(0.312) -0.148 (0.126) -0.012 (0.012) 0.046(0.046) -3.499 (0.195)* 10197 333.9 3. Coef.(Std.Err.) 0.912(0.251)* -0.389 (0.328) 1.365(0.158)* 0.200(0.353) -0.258 (0.131)* -0.010 (0.012) 0.029(0.044) -3.155 (0.176)* 10197 283.07 1.147 (0.168)* 1.243(0.145)* 0.265(0.325) -0.147 (0.129) -0.016 (0.012) 0.047(0.047) -3.371 (0.186)* 10197 298.02

External Base Rivals X Base Intervention (Regan) X Intervention Rivals Rivals Ratio Power Pact Defense Democracy PeaceYears Constant N WaldchiA2

ondyads errors clustered Note: Standard not Cubic reported splines *p<.05 the and help interpret thisfinding To illustrate this should not be a mainlyincludedas controls, on the effects 1 substantive results, Figure displays majorconcern. of MIDs usingtheseestimates. theex- predicted to thekeyindependent variables, probability Turning the powerratio a baselineprobability, is positive and significant, To construct rebelbase indicator ternal weresetto and defense its set at was are rebel sanctuaries that evidence mean, Polity pact providing strong wassetto five. ofpeaceyears conflict. 0, andthenumber ofinterstate likelihood a greater with associated Figure in- 1 thencompares rivalries are also shownto significantly Interstate particpredicted probabilities given In the variables. ularvaluesof themainindependent as of an international creasethe likelihood conflict, riskof conthepredicted ofbasesor rivalry, 2 displays absence a ofhypothesis In support 2,model expected. and internabases External or rather 2%. is interflict effect between interactive low, statistically significant of raisetheprobability these variables tionalrivalries and external rivalries state bases;hence, independently to roughly 10% and 9%, respectively. The conflict ofone another. in isolation be considered cannot final The two rivalries and external bases for coefficients individual probpredicted display categories are present. whenboth of theseconditions that abilities conflict ofinternational thelog-odds provided give and internaof rivalries on The simpleadditiveeffect take variables both isset to0.When variable other the theinterac- tional bases is quite large, raisingthe predicted for thecoefficient thevalueof 1,however, to over20%. Yet,thiswould of conflict be addedto baseestimate; must tionterm nega- probability being the between is an interaction as there in be misleading a reduction indicates on theinteraction thesign tive, are conditions both When variables. two effecta additive than rather present, Thus, simple log-odds. with the predicted ofconflict- there is a moderating a very effect, which would high probability suggest of conflict conflict. reduces ofbothconditions thepresence risingto about 14% rather probability forthe moderate withthe Regan than20%. This indicates theseresults Model 3 compares support subwere a If there substitution of rebels. in support intervention perfect hypothesis. codingof foreign when wouldnever thenrivals and significant, stitution, is positive variable The intervention directly fight the the not is This for case; and economic that joint clearly usingproxies. support military indicating stillraisesthelikelihood ofbothconditions likelihood of presence witha higher rebelsis also associated thesingular evidence ofconflict additional effect, international yetnotas much conflict, beyond providing combined a were if there be would as risk of the raises rebel of that patronage simple expected groups will that states here is The argument whileneg- effect.20 the interaction conflict. term, typically However, not is ative, significant.19 statistically
in a model is included variable the Reganintervention '19When statistical its former loses the external with bases, signifialong in areavailable Theseresults basesretain cancewhile significance. an onlineappendix. versusmutual of one-sided 20Inmodelsnot shown,the effect rebel and two-sided One-sided is estimated. rebel support hosting and thereis a negative of conflict, both raise the probability between difference is little withrivalries. interaction Thus,there and mutualrebelsupport. one-sided

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1 Predicted FIGURE ofConflict Probabilities

0.25

intervention variableis also significant, but not its interaction.

0.2

theRelationship Exploring
Statistical correlations are good foridentifying broad but theytell us littleabout the empirical patterns, causal relationship behindthefindings. Correlations indeed reflect the be may theory, they underlying may or theymayhold forreasonsotherthan spurious, thoseidentified Above,I arguedthat by the theory. is likelyto supportto rebel organizations foreign cause tensionsbetweenstates.While all formsof can lead to conflict, sanctuaries in neighborsupport are especially to lead to military ing countries likely becauseproximity between rebel host confrontations, and homecountries allowsstates theopportunity to one another. The results demonstrate a robust fight correlation between external basesand interstate conbut is this causal? flict, relationship truly New MID narratives availablefromthe CorrelatesofWar project22 forthe 1990sallowus to geta bettersense of the issues that provoketensions between states. Thesenarratives givea short description of the events to MIDs. Table 3 listsall leading MIDs described in theonlinenarratives in whichat least one statewas hosting the other's rebelorganization(s). In other thisapproach words, deliberately selectscases that are coded "1" forboth disputes and external bases. The narratives thenallow us to ascertain whether thesepositive "hits"in theregression are forthe reasonsspecified or by the theory whether the relationship is not properly explained. the objective hereis not statistical inferTherefore, ence (whichwas done above) but rather, to look at theunderlying thatlead from theIV to processes theDV. It mustbe mentioned, that only the however, between rebel bases and conflict willbe relationship The direct substitution between explored. fighting and support for rebels is moredifficult to disentangle without extensive case analysis and will be leftfor future research. As can be seen, Table 3 includes several rivaldyads-such as India/Pakistan and Iran/ have one as well Iraq--which fought another directly as hosted rebelorganizations. Remember that the claimis notthatdirect warand support interstate for rebelsare mutually exclusive modesof conflict, but that thereis some substitution betweenthe two. Backingrebelfactions mayhave servedto decrease theprevalence ofinterstate in particular rival fighting
25, 2007) (lastaccessedJanuary 22http://cow2.1a.psu.edu

& 0.15

No Base, Non-rival

Base, Non-rival

No Base, Base, Rival Base, Rival Rival (Additive Model)(Interaction)

rebelsupport fordirect (i.e., on average)substitute hostilities rivals: some resources are chanagainst neled throughrebel proxies ratherthan directed at the state'sown military In some cases, efforts. rebel rather than however, support maycomplement substituteinternational hostilities.For instance, Rwandan troops supportedand foughtalongside local rebels in theDemocratic oftheCongo Republic andbenefited from thelatter's localknowledge. More research is clearly neededto disentangle and complex betweenrebel potentially endogenous relationships and international conflict. patronage These resultsare checkedagainstRussettand Oneal'sTriangulating in Table2. Peace(2001) dataset Model 4 in Table 2 replicates theR&O results forall but uses the and Tucker Beck,Katz, dyads,1946-91, for BTSCS data and includes (1998) specification variables forrivalry and external As before, bases.21 model 5 comparesthese resultswith the Regan The main R&O coding of foreignintervention. are in these that models, findings unchanged except trade dependenceand IGO membership are not significant. The results are robust to thisalternative specification.The variables forexternal bases,international and the interaction termbetween the two rivalries, continue to be significant and behavesimilarly to the results above.External bases and international rivalriesindependently increase theriskof conflict while decrease conflict relative to the additogether they tive effect. both continue to find Thus, hypotheses the Regan supportin this set-up.In comparison,
basic R&O modelwas compared withthecurrent models 21The Information Criterion (BIC) scores usingtheBayesian (Kass and 1995). Comparisonof BIC scores indicatesstrong Rafterty variables forrivalry and external supportin favorof including bases.

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62

IDEAN SALEHYAN

TABLE 2

and Onealdata Russett Results, Regression

4. Coef.(Std.Err.) 5. Coef.(Std.Err.) 1.384 (0.179)* -1.200 (0.305)* 1.334(0.135)* -0.126 (0.041)* -0.039 (0.011)*
-

External Base Rivals X Base

Intervention (Regan)

IGO Membership Allies

Distance
Non-Contiguous

Trade

X Intervention Rivals Rivals Power Ratio Democracy

-7.474 (11.361) -0.180 (0.062)*

-0.296 (0.346) 1.198(0.135)* -0.120 (0.041)* -0.037 (0.011)*

-8.173 (10.969)

0.770 (0.284)*

-0.001 (0.004) -0.397 (0.135)*

-0.486 (0.186)* -0.054 (0.039) -2.648 (0.511)* 27412 899.14
- 1.134 (0.207)*

-0.001 (0.004) -0.463 (0.138)*

-0.382 (0.184)* -0.061 (0.038) -2.505 (0.516)* 27412 860.72
- 1.200 (0.201)*

-0.183 (0.062)*

MinorPowers Peace Years Constant N Wald ChiA2

clustered on dyads errors Note: Standard Cubic not reported splines

< .05 *p

is difficult claimthat is a counterfactual butthis dyads, to substantiate. Thus,the moremodestaim of this of the presence linksbetween is to verify endeavor basesand actualMID events. rebel extraterritorial that confirm The MID narratives overwhelming are rebel activities civil wars and of out issuesarising Table 3 conflicts. for severalinterstate responsible external thatin 83% ofthecaseswhere demonstrates there bases and MIDs coincidedwithone another, thetwo.In only4 a relationship between was in fact or caseswas therelationship ofthe23 listed spurious while not a definitive coincidental. Therefore, simply above do identified test, the causal mechanisms While of cases. in the work to be at majority appear forrecent are onlyavailable histories conflict MIDs, that evidence thisset of cases provides preliminary fact the is in the statistical reflecting relationship effects. theorized underscore willserveto further A fewexamples In MID 4124, Eritreaaccused these connections. an Islamicmilitant Sudan of supporting movement, PresidentIsaias which was tryingto overthrow In addition,Sudan accused Eritreaof Afwerki.23 the to Sudaneserebelgroupsfrom shelter providing clashes there wereseveral south.As a result, military

between1996 and betweenthe two governments movedtroopsnear bothgovernments 1998.At first, in a speechgivenin and the international border, warned Julyof 1996, the Sudanesevice president a notto provoke a war.On July Eritrea 23, however, that the Sudanesenewspaper government reported invasion force backan Eritrean had beaten comprised of rebelssupported troops;subsequently, by regular was declaredin the Sudanese a stateof emergency months, provinceof Kassala. Over the following the Sudanese Sudaneseoppositiongroups,notably launchedatfrequently Army, People's Liberation in of and tacksfromEritrea, January 1997, made ofDawazin. thetown intoSudannear advance a major on Sudan, the Sudanese severalsuch attacks After Minister statedthat Eritrean Information support to a declaration of war forrebelgroupsamounted on the countries. between 26, Then, February 1998, Eritreanmedia sources reportedthat Sudan had on several attacks launchedair and artillery villages A few itwas of Eritrea. intheGologue later, days region theSudaEritrean that forces beganshelling reported nese villagesof Awad, Galsa, and Hadra. Further oftroopsto theborder bybothgoverndeployment of theconflict intoa an escalation threatened ments a summit was averted this war.However, full-scale by from in searches is supplemented conflict 23This bynews summary ofboth whenthepresidents in Mayof 1999, Qatar News Database;http://wwwBoundaries the International and resume to end hostilities diploagreed ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/newsarchive.html 12, countries (accessed January relations. matic 2006).

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TABLE 3

External Bases and MID's, Case Narratives B Country Thailand Bangladesh Pakistan Turkey Tajikistan Chad Sudan Burundi Sudan Thailand Iraq Angola Uganda Venezuela Israel Israel Turkey Iraq Venezuela Angola Turkey Angola Uganda Year 1995 1995 1993 1994 1993 1993 1994 1997 1996 1999 1995 1995 1996 1997 1993 1993 1996 1996 1994 1997 1999 1998 1998 MID Number 4002 4005 4007 4040 4054 4067 4078 4123 4124 4138 4158 4168 4170 4172 4182 4182 4191 4192 4219 4246 4289 4339 4339 Rebels Involved? yes no yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Notes Burmese rebels inThailand operating (incidental fire) over militants Dispute bombings byKashmir (costal dispute) in Tajikistan forces Afghanistan supporting Chadian border killed while guard pursuing rebels in Niger Both sides accuse oneanother ofsupporting rebels Cross-border between Burundi and fight in Tanzania refugees Eachside accuses the other ofsupporting rebels water (territorial dispute) enters PKK(Kurdish) Turkey Iraqto attack forces border (brief clash) Cross-border clashes rebel forces in against Uganda from Colombia Venezuela conflict, Spillover enters Colombia Israel attacks Hezbollah in Lebanon andSyria Israel attacks Hezbollah in Lebanon andSyria enters Iran andattacks a Kurdish Turkey village Iranenters Kurdish rebel forces Iraqto attack from warin Colombia Spillover guerilla in Congoin support intervenes of Angola rebels attacks Iranover PKKbases Turkey Failed in DRC,Angolan peacenegotiations for rebels support Failed in DRC,Ugandan peacenegotiations for rebels support

A Country Myanmar India India Greece Afghanistan Niger Uganda Tanzania Eritrea Myanmar Turkey Congo DR Congo Colombia Lebanon Syria Iran Iran Colombia Congo Iran DR Congo DR Congo

Percent Attributed: 83% Correctly

In MID 4002,Myanmar andThailand clashed severaltimesovertheissueof ethnic Karenrebels from acrossthe borderin Thailand. Myanmar operating These incidentstook place around the Burmese villageof Kawmooraand the Thai villageMae Sot, which lie directly theborder across from one another. On several the Burmese occasions, government pursued rebels on theother side oftheborder, violating Thailand'ssovereignty, and prompting a Thai militaryresponseto defendthe borderagainstfurther attacks.Stray Burmeseshells,directedat rebels, also threatened Thailand's landingon Thai territory and in security, response,the Thai government demandedthat Burmeseforcesstay at least five kilometers theborder. awayfrom

MID 4182 refers to a series of incidents between 1993and 2001 in whichIsraelclashed withLebanon and Syria overHezbollah in these countries. presence Cross-border attacks by Hezbollahoftenprovoked Israeli retaliation againstforceson Lebanese and in turnprovoked which a response Syrian territory, from thesegovernments. Lebanese and Syrian troops sometimes Hezbollah when fought alongside guerillas Israellaunchedattackson theirsoil, threatening a wider regionalwar. Recently, Israel again invaded Lebanonin orderto attackHezbollahin 2006. As theseexamplesdemonstrate, international conflicts occuras the result of rebelactivities and frequently for foreign support insurgent organizations-thus, civilwarsare often not simply domestic events but

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IDEAN SALEHYAN

inciteinternational tensions and theyfrequently incidents. military

Conclusion

This articleadvances a theoryof conflict which ties intrastate and international explicitly together the role of armedtransnadisputesand considers tionalgroups. For manycases of conflict, it maybe sufficient to look at dyadic interactions amongstates themselves. connections Yet, thereare oftenstrong between civil and international war as rebelsfrom find and safehavenin another, one country support Acknowledgments theiropponents and as statesseek to undermine This perspective to offers insurgent agents. through I thankNavin Bapat, AndrewEnterline, Kristian of armed expand our understanding significantly S. Gleditsch, Havard Strand,BarbaraWalter,and of civilwar focus whilemanystudies conflict. First, Michael Wardfor their comments and suggestions on actors units of analysis, on statesas independent I also thank earlier drafts. the Center forthe Study oftenextendbeyond the involvedsuch conflicts of Civil War and the International Peace Research in question. transofthecountry boundaries Second, of Oslo forproviding Institute financial assistance benationalrebelsfrequently give rise to tensions the of this and researchfacilities during writing tweenhost and home countries, internationalizing I indebted to Scott Gates for am especially thedistinction between paper. warsandblurring "domestic" I thank and the his assistance. theJOPeditor Finally, states can use a variety of modes of conflict. Third, reviewers for their useful anonymous suggestions. international their toolstoharm opponents, including Earlier versions were at the2005meeting of presented and so focusing on direct forinsurgencies, support PoliticalScienceAssociation, Washthe American thetradihostilities alonecan be misleading. Finally, DC and the 2006 meetingof the Peace rebel- ington, tionalemphasis on dyadicrelations-namely, OH. ScienceSociety, Columbus, interactions-should and state-to-state government thatbridge actors to includeadditional be expanded 4 October submitted 2006 Manuscript divide. thedomestic-international 6 April 2007 forpublication accepted research on the Manuscript and empirical Further theorizing sources of war is likelyto produce transnational References For instance, it would results. additional interesting in cases initiation to consider be worthwhile dispute and Security theLine:Borders Peter. 2003."Redrawing Home countries rebels. transnational may Andreas, involving 28 (2): International in theTwenty-First Security Century." for rebel the host statein retaliation be targeting 78-111. and forcross-border opcounterinsurgency support Enterline. 2000. "Killing Balch-Lindsay, Dylan,and Andrew erations.Yet, rival hosts may also use rebels to 1820of CivilWar Duration, Time:The WorldPolitics 44 615-42. Studies International 1992." in weaken their international (4): Quarterly. opponents preparation for andInternaNavin. betweenmechanisms Bapat, for an attack.Distinguishing N.d."State Support Insurgency State tional Conflict." Unpublished typescript. Pennsylvania a In addition, would be worthwhile. understanding University. decisionto workthrough proxiesrather country's 2002."Organizing Avner andSmita Greif, Bates, Robert, Singh. theirinternational than directly oppoconfronting 46 (5): 599-628. Resolution Violence" Journal ofConflict extension of this research. Beck,Nathaniel, nentsis an interesting Tucker. 1998. Katz,and Richard Jonathan Time-Series Cross-Section to seekand accept rebels also facea decision Finally, Analysis "TakingTime Seriously: with a BinaryDependentVariable."American Journal of This or rely ownmeans. assistance upontheir foreign 42 (4): 1260-88. Political Science external between choiceimpliesa trade-off funding andAllanStam.1998."The Declining Scott, Bennett, Advantages in directing their and autonomy operations. A CombinedModel of War Outcomesand of Democracy: between the interdependencies 42 (3): 344-66. Understanding Resolution Duration." Journal ofConflict to signifi- Bennett, war is also likely civil and international A Conceptual "EUGene: Allan 2000. and Stam. Scott, 26 : 179-204. Interactions Manual." International to armed conflict. policyresponses cantly improve

The current conflict in theSudanese ofDarfur region has spillover effects in neighboring Chad and has (see Human jeopardized regional peace and stability in Afghanistan RightsWatch 2006). The conflict involves transnational based in Pakistan insurgents and has become a major source of contention. theIraq conflict involves outside interference Finally, in states the and by region foreign fighters passing borders the porousborders. through Securing against movement of militant cooperation groups, security betweenstates,and regionalpeace initiatives may in thesevolatile stability improve regions.

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NO SHELTER HERE: REBEL SANCTUARIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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