Time

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 93: TIME

CHAPTER 93: TIME 897
sperate ennui men suffer when they feel they are exasperated by its evanescence as an
emselves imprisoned in the present. object of thought.
Just as we seek and multiply diversions as Aristotle indicates SOlne initial difficulties ill
eans to escape from ourselves, so, according the consideration of time. It is not itselfa move-
Pascal, when we are dissatisfied with the ment, yet "neither does time exist without
esent, "we anticipate the future as too slow change.... Time is neither movement nor in-
coming ... or we recall the past, to stop its dependent of lnovement." Furthermore, ac-
rapid flight.... For the present is generally cording to Aristotle, time is a continuous quan-
inful to us... Let each one examine his tity. "Time, past, present, and future, forms a
oughts, and he will find them all occupied continuous "Thole." But the very nature of a
ith the past and the future.... The past and continuous quantity is to be divisible. pres-
resent are our means; the future alone is our ent moment, however-the 'no\v' \vhich is "the
d. So we never live, but we hope to live; link of time" and the dividing line bet\veen
d, as\ve are always preparing to be happy, it past and future-seems to be an indivisible
inevitable we should never be so." instant.
If the present had an extended duration,
Aristotle points out,it would have to include
parts, some of \vhich \vould be past and some
future. Hence though the present seems to be
a part of time, it is, unlike the rest of time,
indivisible; and though it separates past and
future, yet it must also somehow belong to both,
for otherwise time would not be continuous.
"The 'now' is an end and a beginning of time,
not of the same time however, but the end of
that "vhieh is past and the beginning of that
which is to come."
"If we conceive of some point of time which
cannot be divided into even the minutest parts
of moments," Augustine writes, "that is the
only point that can be called the present; and
that point flees at such lightning speed from
being future to being past, that it has no extent
of duration at all." Only past time and future
tilne can be called long or short. Only they have
duration. "But in \vhat sense," Augustine asks,
"can that which does not exist be long or short?
The past no longer is; the future is not yet."
The past and future, it seems, have duration,
or at least extent, but no existence. The present
exists but does not endure. "What then is time?
If no one asks me," Augustine says, "I know;
if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not
know." All the \vords with which we speak of
time and times "are the plainest and commonest
of words, yet again they are profoundly obscure
and their meaning remains to be discovered."
Augustine returns again and again to the
point that "we measure time in its passing."
But, he says, "if you ask me how I know this,
my answer is that I know it because \ve measure
HESE ARE ONLY SOME of the conflicting atti-
des toward time and mutability which ex-
ress man's desire for permanence, for theeter-
ity of a now that stands still, or his restless
ariness, his avidity for the novelties time
Ids in store. Wherever in the great. books of
etry, philosophy, or history men reflect upon
eir loves and aspirations, their knowledge
d their institutions, they face man's tempo-
lity. It is not that man alone of earthly things
s a time-ridden existence, but that his mem...
J and imagination enable him to encompass
ne, and so save him from being lnerely rooted
it. Man not only reaches out to the past and
ture, but he also sOlnetimes lifts himself
ove the whole of time by conceiving the
ernal and the immutable.
Man's apprehension of the past and future is
iscussed in the chapter on MEMORY AND IM-
GINATION. The bent of his mind or his striving
ward the unchanging, the everlasting, the
ernal, is considered in the chapter on CHANGE.
ere we are concerned wi th his examination of
ime itself.
Though the idea of time is traditionally
nked with that of space, it seems to be much
ore difficult to grasp. In addition to provok-
g opposite emotions from the poets, it seems
engage the philosophers in a dispute about
intelligi bility. This goes deeper than can..
flicting definitions or analyses, such as occur in
the discussion of both space and time. Whereas
time seems no less clear than space to some
thinkers, to others it is irremediably obscure.
Struggling to say "vhat it is and how it exists,
fearful meditation! where, alack,
Shall Tinle's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?
Or \vhat strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
Or 'who his spoil of beauty can forbid?
0, none, unless this miracle have might,
That in black ink my love may still shine bright.
But the poet may have the cast of a theolo-
gian rather than a lover. lie may, as Milton
does, stand not in awe or fear but in cantempt
of Time, willing to wait while Time runs out its
race. Milton bids Time
... glut thyself with what thy womb devours,
Which is no more than what is false and vain,
And mere!y mortal dross;
So little is our loss,
So little is thy gain.
For \vhen as each thing bad thou hast entomb'd,
And last of all thy greedy self consum'd,
Then long Eterni ty shall greet our bliss
With an individual kiss ...
Then all this Earthly grossness qui t,
Attir'd with Stars, we shall forever sit,
Triumphing over Death, and Chance, and th
Time.
A philosopher like Marcus Aurelius neither
defies nor despises time. He enjoins himself to
accept the mutability of all things as fitt"
and "suitable to universal nature.... D
thou not see," he asks himself, "that for thyse
also to change is just the same,
necessary for the universal nature?" To him it
seems "no evil for things to undergo change'
nor is he oppressed by the image of Time as '
river made up of the events which happen, a
a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has be
seen, it is carried away, and another comes
its place, and this \vill be carried away too."
For man to resign himself to time's passag
Pascal thinks, requires no special effort. "0
nature consists in motion," he says; "comple
rest is death." Time fits our nature, not on
because it "heals griefs and quarrels," but
cause time's perpetual flow \vashes away t
896
D
EVOURING Time," "wasteful Time,"
. "this bloody tyrant, Time"-Time is the
predatory villain with whom not only the lover,
but all men must contend. The sonnets of
Shakespeare make war upon Time's tyranny-
to stay "Time's scythe," to preserve whatever
of value can be kept from "the wastes of time,"
and to prove that "Love's not Time's fool"
entirely.
Yet, viewing the almost universal depre-
dations of Time, the poet fears that love may
not escape Time's ruin.
When I have seen by Time's fell hand defaced
The rich-proud cost of outworn buried age;
When sometime lofty towers I see down-razed,
And brass eternal slave to mortal rage;
"Vhen I have seen the hungry ocean gain
Advantage on the kingdom of the shore,
And the firm soil win of the waterv main,
Increasing store with loss and loss store;
When I have seen such interchange of state,
Or state itself confounded to decay;
Ruin hath taught me thus to ruminate,
That Time will come and take my love away.
This thought is as a death, which cannot choose
But \veep to have that \vhich it fears to lose.
The lover knows that he cannot save his love
from change and her beauty from decay. Time
is too much for him. But when the lover is also
a poet he may hope to defeat Time, not by
making his love last forever, but by making the
memory of it immortal. "Do thy "vorst, old
Time," he can say, "despite thy "vrong, My
love shall in my verse ever live young." Or
again:
Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
But sad mortality o'er-sways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
\Vhose action is no stronger than a flower?
0, how shall summer's honey breath hold out
Against the wreckful siege of battering days,
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?
MANY ISSUES ARE RAISED by absolute time or
infinite duration conceived as independent of
all bodily motions. Einstein, for example, chal-
lenges the classical notion of simultaneity, ac-
cording to which two event$ taking place a
great distance from one another are said to oc-
cur at the same time, that is, at the same moment
in the absolute flo,,, of time.
"Before the advent of the theory of relativi-
ty," he ,vrites, "it had always been tacitly as-
sumed in physics that the statement of time
had an absolute significance, i.e., that it is inde-
pendent of thestate.of motion of the body of
reference." But if the world of physical events
is a four-dimensional manifold in which the
time coordinate is always associated with the
space coordinates for any reference-body under
observation, then "every reference-body (co-
ordinate systeln) has its own particular time";
and, Einstein adds, "unless we are told the ref-
erence-body to which the statement of time
refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the
time of an event."
There is also the issue of the emptiness of
that part of absolute time or infinite duration
which comes before or after the existence of the
world, comparable to the issue concerning the
void or empty space beyond the borders of the
material universe. Those who regard time as
:CHAPTER 93;:- Tltv1E 899
is commonly used instead of. true time, ures\ve make use of to judge itslength. Dura-
an hour, a day, a month, a year." In-astronomy, tion in itselfis to be considered as going on in
Newton points out, absolute time "is distin- one constant, equal uniform course; but none
guished from relative, by.theequation or cor- of the measures which we make use of, can be
rectionof the apparent time. For the natural known to do so." It seems wrongto Locke. to
Jays are truly unequal, -though they are com- define time as the measure of motion\vhen, on
monly considered as equal, and used for meas- the contrary, it is motion-"themotion of the
ures oftime ; astronomers correct this inequality great and visible bodies of the \vprld"-,,,hich
that they may measure the celestial motidrisby measures time.
a more accurate time." What Locke calls "duration" seems to be the
Newton seems to be saying that time same as Newton's absolute time. It isin no ,vay
ures motion and also that it is measured by-it. relative to the existence of bodies or motion.
If his distinction between ab:soluteandrelative Just as space or,as he calls it, "expansion," is
time is ignored, his theory of time does not ap'" not limited by matter, so duration is notlimited
Jj)ear to be very different from that of Aristotle, by motion. As place: is that portion of infinite
who says, "not only do we measure the move-
rnent by the time, but also the time by the within the material world, and is thereby dis;..
movement." Insofar as movement or change tinguished from the rest of expansion," so time
involves a sequence in \"hichone part comes is "so much of infinite duration, as is measured
after another, time measures it by numbering by, and coexistent with, the existence and mo-
the befores and afiers. But we also judge the tions of the great bodies of the universe."
length of the time according to the duration of
the movement, and in this sense the movement
measures time.
As both Aristotle and Augustine point out,
time measures rest as well as motion, for, in
Aristotle's words, "all rest is in time.... Time
is not motion, but the 'number of motion' and
what is at rest can be in the number ofmotion.
Not everything that is not in motion can. be
said to be 'at rest'-but only that which can be
moved, though it actually is not moved.,"
But \vhere Aristotle, in defining time as the
measure of motion or rest, makes time an at-
tribute of movement, Newton regards absolute
time as the perfect measure of motion precisely
because its nature is independent of all physical
change. Only relative time depends on motion,
and that is the time which is measured by mo-
tion, not the measure of it. Those "who con-
f'ound real quantities with their relations and
sensi hIe measures, ' , Newton declares, "defile
the puri ty of rnathematical and philosophical
truths."
Distinguishing between duration and time,
Locke expresses in another ,vay the difference
benveen Newton and Aristotle. Tilne for Locke
is that portion of duration ,vhich consists of
defini te periods and is measured by the motion
of bodies. "We must, therefore, carefully dis-
tinguish betvvixt duration itself, and the meas-
but a.s an extensive manifoldcapafil
e
of beIng occupIed by things, and in \vhich
exist and move. ;,y
. As in what Einstein "the four-dimelI_
s10nalspace-time continuum" (which comprises
three spacecoordinates and one time COorc.1't..
)
. 1
nate tIme IS merely one dimension .. amon-
others, so in Newton's theory tirneand spaf,g
1
. e
are a so gIven parallel treatment. "Times
spaces," Ne\vton writes, "are as it were,t1.
e
places as well of themselves -as of. all othe
things. All things are.placedin time as to orc.1e:
ofsuccession; and in space as to order of situa-
tion. " Einstein criticizes Newtonian mechanics
for its "habitof treating time as an independent
continuum," yet Newton no less than Einstein
appears to conceive time and space alike as
dimensions, even if he conceives them in sepa;.
ration from one another.
But if time and space are something to be oC""
cupiedor filled, they can also be thought otas
unoccupied or empty. The opposition, discussea
in the chapter on SPACE, between those who
think of space in itself as empty, and those w
deny a void or vacuum, seems to be parallelea
here by the issue concerning empty time-time
apart fromaH change or motion, time in itsel,f1
Waiving for the moment the question whether
such time exists or is only a mathematical aD";
straction, we can see that this time may IDe
more susceptible to analysis than the time of'
ordinary experience, the time which, according
to Lucretius, no one feels "by itself abstractea
from the motion and calm rest of things."
Newton explains that he does not denne
time, space, place, and motion, because they
are "well known to all." But he observes that
men commonly "conceive these quantities un-
der no other notions but from the relation they
bear to sensible objects." I-Ie finds it necessary,
therefore, to distinguish each of them "into
absolute and relative, true and apparent, math-
ematical and common."
By "absolute, true, and mathematical time,"
Newton means that which "of itself, and from
its own nature, flows equably without relation
to anything external, and by another name is
called duration." In contrast, "relative, ar-
parent, and common time, is some sensible ana
external (whether accurate or unequable) meas"
ure of duration by the means of motion, whicn
THE. GREAT IDEAS
898
time, and we cannot measure what does not
exist, and the past and future do not exist. But
how do we measure time present, since ithas no
extent"; and "where does time come from,. and
by what way does it pass, and where does it go
,vhile we are measuring it? Where is. it
from the future. By \vhat
,vaydoes it pass?-by the present. Viheredoes
it go ?-into the past. In other words, it passes
from that which does not exist, by way of that
,vhich lacks extension, into that which is no
longer."
The more he reflects on time and its measure-
ment, the more Augustine is perplexed, the
more he is forced to say, "I still do not know
what time is." He realizes that he has been
"talking of time for a long time, and this long
time would not bea long time unless time has
passed. But how do I know this, since I do not
know what time is?" It seems to him true that
we measure time, and yet he must say, "I do
not know what I am measuring." It seems to
him that "time is certainly extendedness-
but," he must add, "1 do not know what it is
extendedness of."
Berkeley suggests that the difficulties in un-
derstanding time may be ofour own making.
"Bid your servant meet you at such a time in
such a plC\ce, and he shall never stay to deliher-
ate on the meaning of those words. . . . But if
time be taken exclusive of all those particular
actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely
for the continuation ofexistence or duration in
the abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a
philosopher to comprehend it.
"For my own part," Berkeley goes on to say,
"whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of
time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in
my own mind, which flows uniformly and is
participated by all beings, I am lost and em-
brangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no
notion of it at all."
To THOSE WHO conceive time as a mathemati-
cal magnitude or as a physical dimension, there
seeIllS to be no difficulty about its definition or
a precise statement of its properties. So con-
sidered, time appears to be no less intelligi ble
than space, for when it is so considered it is
being treated exactly like space-not as a prop-
erty of things, not as relative to bodies or their
THE GREAT IDEi\.S
tHE TWO MEANINGS OF eternity-infinite time
and utter timelessness-are discussed in the
chapter on ETERNITY. The distinction between
time and eternity, which is considered both
there and here, seems to be understood differ-
ently by those who contrast timelessness with
temporality and by those who equate eternity
with endless time. For the latter, the point of
difference between eternity and time seems to
be only one of infinite as opposed to limited
duration. Yet, as we have just observed, writers
like Newton and Locke also distinguish abso-
lute or infinite time (which they tend to iden-
900
relative to and inseparable from motion deny
the possibility of such empty time.
For PIato, as for Christian theologians like
Augustine and Aquinas, time itself is created
with the creation of the heavenly bodies and
their motions. As the story of the world's be-
coming is told in the Timaeus, the maker "re-
solved to have a moving image of eternity, and
when he set in order the heaven, he made this
image eternal but moving according to number,
while eternity itself rests in unity; and this
image we call time. .. . Time, then, and the
heaven came into being at the same instant."
Augustine undertakes to answer "those \vho
agree that God is the Creator of the world, but
have difficulties about the time of its creation."
He asserts that"there is no time before the
world. For if eternity and time are rightly dis-
tinguished by this, that time does not exist
without some movement and transition, while
in eternity there is no change, who does not see
that there could have been no time had not
some creature been made, which by some mo-
tion could give birth to change.... I do not
see," Augustine continues, "how God can be
said to have created the world after spaces of
time had elapsed, unless it be said that prior to
the world there was some creature by whose
movement time could pass." But the existence
of a creature prior to creation is .impossible.
Hence Augustine concludes that "if in the
world's creation change and motion were cre-
ated," then "the world and time were simul-
taneously created."
Though the existence of a creature prior to
creation is impossible, it is not impossible, ac-
cording to Aquinas, for the created world to be
coeval with its Creator. While he rejects the
opinion of those who assert that the world now
exists without any dependence on God, and
who deny that it vvas ever made by God, he
entertains, as possible, the vie'v that "the world
has a beginning, not of time, but of creation."
Those who hold this view, he explains, mean
that "it ,vas always made.... For just as, if a
foot were ahvays in the dust from eternity,
there would always be a footprint which with-
out doubt \vas caused by him who trod on it, so
also the world ahvays was, because its Maker
always existed."
It does not necessarily fo11o\v, Aquinas ad-
mits, that "if God is the active cause of the
world, He must be prior to the ,vorld in durq.-
tion, because creation, by which He produced
the \vorld, is not a change." But
Aquinas does not think that the question
whether the world and time began with crea-
tion or has always co-existed \vith its Creator,
can be resolved by reason. "The newness of the
world," he says, "is known only by revelation.
.. That the world did not always exist we hold
by faith alone; it cannot be proved demon-
stratively." In saying this, he is not unmindful
of the fact that Aristotle advances arguments to
show that there can be no beginning to either
time or motion. "Since time cannot exist and is
unthinkable apart from the moment, and the
moment is a kind of middle paint, uniting as it
does in itself both ... a beginning of future
time and an end of past time, it follows that
there must always be time.... But if thisis
true of time, it is evident that it must also De
true of motion, time being an attribute ofmo-
tion."
With one exception, all his predecessors, ac
cording to Aristotle, are in agreement that time
is uncreated. "In fact," he says, "it is just this
that enables Democri tus to show that all things
cannot have had a becoming.... Plato alone
asserts the creation of time, saying that it had
a becoming together with the universe." But
Aristotle's own arguments for the eternity of
time and motion do not seem to Aquinas to be
"absolutely demonstrative, but only relatively
so-viz., as against the arguments ofsonle of the
ancients ,vho asserted that the \vorld began to
be in some actually ilnpossible ways." As for
the present moment, or the notlJ of time,
requiring something which comes before as well
as after, Aquinas admits that "time cannot be
made except according to some noto," yet "not
because there is time in the first now, but be"
cause from it time begins."
The position of Aquinas, that arguments
the initiation or the endlessness of time are anI
dialectical, seems to be confirmed by Kant. I
the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique
Pure Reason, Kant sets forth as one of the
mological antinomies the opposed argume
for the beginning of the world and for a wo
wi thout beginning. The reasoning on ei ther s
being equal in its appearance of
CHAPTER 93: TIME 901
ther conclusion, according to Kant, is genuinely tify with eternity) from definite periods or lim..
demonstrated. ited spans of time, by making the one inde-
But those \vho, like Newton and Locke, sepa- pendent of, the other relative to and measured
rate absolute time or infinite duration from the by, motion.
existence of a world in motion, seem to be unaf- The question remains whether absolute time
fected by arguments which concern only the is real time or only a mathematical abstraction,
time of the material world, the time that is whether it exists apart from perceived time-
relative to motion. For them, absolute or in- the experienced duration of observable mo"
finite time is eternity. It may be empty of mo" tions or the elapsed time of events in succession.
cion, but it is filled with God's everlasting be- Considering this question, Kant says that
iog. "Though we make duration boundless, as "those who maintain the absolute reality of
certainly it is," Locke writes, "we cannot yet time and space, whether as essentially subsist..
extend it beyond all being. God, everyone ing, or only inhering, as modifications in things,
easily allows, fills eternity." God is not eternity, must find themselves at utter variance with the
says Newton, but He is eternal. "His duration principles of experience itself. For, if they de-
reaches from eternity to eternity... He en- cide for the first view, and make space and time
dures forever, and is every\vhere present; and, into substances, this being the side taken by
by existing always and everywhere, He con- mathematical natural philosophers, they must
stitutes duration and space." admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite
The issue is again brought into focus by the and eternal, which exist (yet without their be-
denial that God's eternity can be identified ing anything real) for the purpose of containing
with infinite or absolute time. "Even supposing in themselves everything that is real. If they
that the \vorld always was," Aquinas writes, it adopt the second view of inherence, which is
would not be eternal in the sense in which God preferred by some metaphysical natural philos-
is, "for the divine being is all being simultane- ophers, and regard space and time as relations
ouslywithoutsuccession." He distinguishes "the .. abstracted from experience ... they find
nowthat stands still" as the eternal present from themselves in that case necessitated to deny the
the continually shifting now in the flow of validity of mathematical doctrine a priori in
time's passing moments. For him God's ever- reference to real things."
lasting being does not endure through endless On Kant's own view, the synthetic judg-
tin1e, but rather exists unchanging in the eter" ments of mathematics can have the apodictic
nal present. "As eternity is the proper measure certainty of a priori propositions only if space
of being, so time is the proper measure of move- and time are themselves a priori forms ofintui-
ment; and hence," Aquinas writes, "according tion. As the a priori form ofspace makes possible
as any being recedes from permanence in being, the pure science of geometry, according to
and is subject to change, it recedes from eter- Kant, so the a priori form of time makes possible
and is subject to time." the pure science of numbers, i.e., arithmetic.
But whereas "space, as the pure form of exter-
nal intui tion is limi ted ... to external phenom-
ena alone," time, as "the form of the internal
sense," is for Kant"the formal condition a pri-
ori of all phenomena whatsoever."
Wi thout sharing Kant's theory of a priori
forms of intui tion, or of the foundations of pure
mathematics, other writers appear to agree to
SaIne extent with his denial of independent
reality to time. Aristotle raises the question
"whether if soul did not exist, time would exist
or not." He thinks the question may be fairly
asked because "if there cannot be someone to
count, there cannot be anything that can be
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 93: TIME
902
counted, so that evidently there cannot be
number"-for number is the counted or the
countable. "But if nothing but soul, or in soul
reason, is qualified to count, there \vould not
be time unless there were soul. " Yet
qualifies this somewhat by adding that "ifmove-
ment can exist wi thout soul, and the before and
after are attributes of movement," time Inay
exist as "these qua numerable."
Augustine takes a less qualified position. Ask-
ing what it is that time is the "extendedness
of," he answers: "Probably of the mind itself."
Insisting that neither future nor past time can
be measured because neither exists, Augustine
concludes that it is only passing time we can
measure, and that we can measure it only in the
mind. "It is in you, 0 my mind," he says, "that
Imeasure time.... What I measure is the im-
press produced in you by things as they pass
and abiding in you when they have passed ...
I do not measure the things themselves \vhose
passage produced the impress; it is the impress
that I measure when I measure time."
Yet William James, while giving a similar
analysis of our experience of time, insists that
time is objective as well as subjective. Time
and space relations, he writes, "are impressed
from without." The time and space in which
the objects of our thought exist, exist as inde-
pendently of the mind as do those objects them-
selves. "The time- and space-relations between
things do stamp copies within"; as, for exainple,
when "things sequent in time impress their se-
quence on our memory."
WILLIAM JAMES PROPOSES a solution of the mys-
tery of how time exists-at least how it exists
in experience. So far as our experience goes,
past and future can exist only in the present.
But how can these extended parts of time exist
in the present if the present is but a fleet-
ing Inoment, without any extent of duration,
"gone," as James says, "in the instant of be-
coming" ? His answer is in terms of something
he calls "the specious present."
Unlike the real present, the specious present
is "no knife-edge but a saddle-back, wi th a cer-
tain breadth of its o,vn on which we si t perched,
and from which we look in two directions into
time. The unit of composition of our percep-
tion of time is a duration, wi th a bow and a
stern, as it were-a rearward- and a forwat_
looking end. It is only as parts of this durat _
block that the relation of succession ofone end
to the other is perceived."
On the basis of some experimental evidence
James estimates that the specious present ma;
vary in length "from a few seconds to
not more than a minute." It has "a
vanishing backward and forward fringe; but its
nucleus is probably the dozen seconds orl
that have just elapsed."
The irreversible flow of time-the sUc'cesslon
of moments which constitute the motion oftfie
future through the present into the past'--oc-
curs in the specious present, though not, accora-
ing to James, without the accompaniment
observed or experienced change. "Awareness
change is . . . the condition on which ourp
ception of time's flow depends." But t
awareness must take place in the specious .pres-
ent "with its content perceived as having 0
part earlier and the other part later." In con
quence, James considers the specious present
be, not only "the original intuition of time,"
but also "the original paragon prototype of all
conceived times."
THE PROBLEMS OF TIME, its o\\tn process a
being as \vell as its relation to all other existen
and change, its character as an aspect of e
perience and as an object of thought, seem
belong to many subject matters-to psycholo
and to experimental or mathematical physi
to the philosophy of nature, metaphysics, an(l
theology.
For some thinkers-in our own time notan!
Bergson, 'Vhitehead, and Dewey-the conce
of time, of the burgeoning future, of the con
tinuum of events, seems to determine a who
philosophical outlook. If it is not equally de"
cisive throughout the tradition of the
books, it is at least of cri tical significance
speculations about the origin and end of
world, in the contrast between physical a
spiritual modes of being, in the considerat'
of the processes of life, thought, and feeli
and in the analysis of more inclusive conce
such as that of order.
The temporal relationships of succession
simultaneity, for example, may be the so
from which we derive the notions of prior, .p
erior, and simultaneous, but they are tradi-
ionally viewed as exemplifying rather than ex-
hausting these types of order. When Augustine
deals ,vith the perplexing theological question
of the priority of eternity to time, he finds it
necessary to distinguish "priority in eternity,
riori ty in time, priority in choice, priority in
origin."
When Aristotle deals with metaphysical ques-
tions concerning the order of cause and effect,
fpotentiality and actuality, of essence and
ccident, he differentiates bet\veen temporal
nd logical priority, and bet\veen priority in
thought and priority in nature. When Harvey
tries to solve the familiar biological riddle (which
arne first, the chicken or the egg?), .he .also
nds his solution in a distinction. "The fo\vl is
rior by nature," he writes, "but the egg is
rior in time."
Space and spatial relationships, no less than
ilue and the temporal, figure in the general
nalysis of order or relatedness and have a bear'"
ng on other problems in physics and philoso-
hy. But in addition to time's having more
gnificance than space for the theologian, time
Iso has peculiar importance for one subject
atter in which space is of much less con-
cern, namely, history and the philosophy of
history.
Besides the general view which the historian
takes of time as the locus of history, or the
edium in which the pattern of history un-
folds, the writer of history usually employs cer-
tain conventional time divisions to luark the
major phases or epochs of the story he has to
tell. Clocks and calendars record or represent
the passage of time in conventional units, but
these conventions have some natural basis in
astronomical time, solar or sidereal. In contrast,
the distinction between historic and prehis-
toric time, or the division of history into such
periods as ancient, mediaeval, and modern,
seems to be purely a matter of social or cultural
convention.
With Hegel, however, the division of the
whole of history into three epochs, and of each
epoch again into three periods, follows from the
dialectical triad of thesis, antithesis, and syn-
thesis which is the indwelling form of history's
development. The division of each of the three
Oriental, the Grae-

co-Roman, and the German worlds-into a
first, second, and third period produces in each
case the same pattern of origin, conflict, and
resolution. For the most part, Hegel does not
identify these three periods with ancient,me-
diaeval, and. modern times; yet in one case,
that of the German world, he does refer to the
second period as "the middle ages" and the
third as" the modern time."
Such ,vords as "ancient" and "modern" have
conventional significance for most historians.
Furthermore, the meanings of modernity and
antiquity are themselves subject to historical
relativity. In the tradition of the great books,
this appears most plainly in the references made
to ancients and moderns by writers whom we
today classify as ancient and mediaeval.
Thucydides, for example, begins his history
with a description of what is for himthe antiq-
uity of Greece. Nicomachus opens. his Intro-
duction to Arithmetic with a relnark about "the
ancients, vvho under the leadershipofPythago-
ras first made science systematic, defined philos-
ophy as the love of wisdom." Mathematics,
Aristotle says, "has come to be identical with
philosophy for modern thinkers."
In another place, Aristotle contrasts "the
thinkers of the present day" with "the thinkers
of old"; and in still another he speaks of "an-
cient and truly traditional theories." l..ike Aris-
totle in the sphere of thought, so Tacitus in the
sphere of politics frequently compares ancient
and modern institutions or practices.
In the Middle Ages, Aquinas speaks of the
"teachings of the early philosophers" and, as
frequently as Aristotle, he refers to ancient and
modern doctrines. c In the Renaissance, Kepler
treats as ancient a scientist who, in point of
time, comes tlluch later than those whom
Aristotle and .A.quinas call modern. Classifying
three schools of astronomical thought, he dis-
tinguishes an ancient one, which had "Ptolemy
as its coryphaeus," from two modern ones, re-
spectively headed by Copernicus and Tycho
Brahe.
Such references, which have occurred in all
three periods of the western tra1i tion, suggest
the probability that at some future date the
whole tradition with which we are now ac-
quainted will be referred to as the thought and
cuIture of ancient times.
4. The measurement of time: sun, stars, and clocks
3. The mode of existence of time
3a. The parts of time: its division into past, present, and future
3b. The reality of the past and the future in reiation to the existence of the present
3C. The extent of the present moment: instantaneity
7. The teluporal course of the passions: emotional attitudes toward tin1e and mutability
8. lIistorical time
8a. Prehistoric and historic time: the antiquity of man
8b. The epochs of history: myths of a golden age; the relativity of modernity
905
113, A 7, REP 5 366a-367c; PART III SUPPL, Q
84, A 3 985d-989b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
201a-202a
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 213b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 21
364a-c; PART II, DEF 5 373b-c; PROP 45, SCHOL
390b; PART III, PROP 8 399b; PART V, PROP 23
458b-d
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 432b-
435b
34 N E'VTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b;
9b-l0a; 12a-b; BK I, LEMMA II, SCHOL, 31b-
32a
35 LOCKE: Hunlan Understanding, BK II, CH XIV
155b-162a esp SECT 21-22, 159b-d; CH XV
162b-165c passim
35 BERKELEY: HUlnan Knou1ledge, SECT 97-98
431d-432a
35 HUME: HU1nan Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
124-125 S06a-507a esp DIV 125, 506d
36 STERNE: Tristra111- Shandy, 292a-293a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-33d esp 26d, 28a- b;
74b-76c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 188c-
18gb; 206c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 399a-b; 407a
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, \vhich are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER:Ilad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 93: TIME
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
PAGE SECTIONS: \Vhen the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in t\VO columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side ofthe page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Syn1posium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lo\ver half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brCickets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
Jatnes version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passinl" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the \-vork or passage cited.
1. The nature of time: time as duration or as
the measure of motion; time as a con-
tinuous quantity; absolute and relative
tinle
7 PLATO: Tinzaeus, 450c-451d
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 9b-c /
Physics, BK IV, CH 10--14 297c-304a,c; BK VI
312b,d-32Sd passilTI / Generation and Corrup-
tion, BK II, CH 10 [337a22-34] 439b-c / Meta-
physics, BK v, CH 13 [I020
a
25-33] 541c; BK XII,
CH 6 [I07Ib6-12] 601h
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 8--13
123b-129a I Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 5, 254c-d;
CH 16 260d-261c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 17-40
93h-99a; BK XII, par 8, 101b / City of God,
BK XI, CH 6 325c-d; BK XII, CH IS 351b-
352d
19 AQUINAS: Surnn1a Theologica, PART I, Q7, A3,
REP 4 32c-33c; Q 10, A I, ANS 40d-41d; A 4
43b-44b; A 6, ANS 45c-46d; Q 53, A 3 283b-
284d; Q 57, A 3, REP 2 297b-298a; Q 63, A 5,
ANS 329a-330c; A 6, REP 4 330c-331c; Q 66, A
4, REP 4 348d-349d; PART I-II, Q 31, A 2,
ANS and REP 1 753c-754a
20 AQUINAS: Sumnla Theologica, PART I-II, Q
TI-IE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
5. Temporal relationships: time as a means of ordering
sa. Simultaneity or coexistence: the simultaneity of cause and effect, action and pas"
sion, knowledge and object known
5b. Succession or priority and posteriority: the temporal order of cause and effect,
potentiality and actuality
5c. Succession and simultaneity in relation to the association of ideas
5d. Comparison of temporal with non-temporal simultaneity and succession: the prior
in thought, by nature, orin origin
I. The nature of time: time as duration or as the measure of motion; time as a continuous
quantity; absolute and relative time
2. The distinction between time and eternity: the eternity of endless time distinguished
from the eternity of timelessness and immutability
2a. A.eviternity as intermediate between time and eternity
2b. ,A.rguments concerning the infinity of time and the eternity ofmotion or the world
2C. The creation of time: the priority of eternity to time; the immutability of the
world after the end of time
6. The knowledge of time and the experience of duration
6a. The perception of time by the interior senses: the difference between the
ence and memory of time intervals
6b. Factors influencing the estimate of time elapsed: empty and filled time; illusions
of time perception; the variability of experienced durations
6c. Time as a transcendental form of intuition: the apriori foundations of arithmetic;
the issue concerning innate and acquired time perception
6d. The signifying of time: the distinction between noun and verb; the tenses of the
verb
6e. Knowledge of the past: the storehouse of memory; the evidences of the past in
physical traces or remnants
if. Knowledge of the future: the truth of propositions about future contingents; the
probability of predictions
904
THE GREAT IDEAS
3. The mode of existence of time
7 PLATO: Tintaeus, 450c-451a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, eH 4 [lb25-26] Sd; CH
6 [5a6-7] 9b / Physics, BK IV,CH 10 [217b29-
218
a
8] 297c-d; CH 14 [223a21-29] 303a
12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK I [449-482]
6c-7a
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII,CH 11--13
126a-129a
18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK XI, par 12-40
92b-99a / City of God, BK XI, CH 6 325c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10,
AI, REP 5 40d-41d; AA 4-5 43b-45c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 293d-294a
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV,
SECT 1-5 155b-156b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 98 432a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-33d esp 28a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25
121a / Philosophy ofHistory, INTRO, 186d-190b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-399b
3a. The parts of time: its division into past
J
present, and future
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a / Parmenides,
494c-495b; 502a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5a26-29l9c /
Physics, BKIV, CH II [219aIO_b2] 298d'-299b;
CH 12 [220
b
S-8] 300b; [22IaI4-19] 300d-301a;
CH 14 [222b30-223aI5] 302d-303a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 14 258d
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 13 259d-260b
93b-98c
19 AQUINAS: Stunma Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A
2, REP 4 41d-42c; A 4, ANS and REP 2 43b-
44b; A 5, ANS 44b-45c
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 87c-d /Objec-
tions and Replies, AXIOM II 131d; 213b-c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKII,CH XV,
SECT 9 164b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26h-d; I3la
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of flistory, INTRO, 153a-
156d
53 JAM:ES: Psychology, 398a-399a passitn; 413a
2c to 3a CHAPTER 93: TIl\1E 907
12 LUCRETIus: Nature of Things, BK 1[146-264] BK XI, CH 4-6 324a-325d; BK XII, CH 12 349b-
2d-4b; [483-634] 7a-8d; [951-151] 12d-14a 350a; CH 15-17 351b-354a; BK XXII, CH 30,
esp [988-17] 13h; BK II [89-141] 16a-d; 618a-d
[294-307] 18d-19a; [569-580] 22b; [148-1063] 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A
28b-c; [115-1174] 29a-30a,c; BK V [1-431] I, REP 2 127d-128d;Q 46 250a-255d; Q 61, A
61a-66d esp [55-70] 61d-62a, [235-246] 64a-b, 2 315c-316a; Q 66, A 3, REP I 347b-348d; A
[351-379] 65d-66a; BK VI [535-67] 87c-88b 4348d-349d
12 AURELIUS: Aleditations, BK V, SECT 13 271b; 20 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
SECT 23 272b; BK VI, SECT 15 275a-b; BK IX, Q 84, A 3, REP 5 985d-989b; Q 91, A 2 1017c-
SECT 28 293d-294a; BK x, SECT 7 297b-c; 1020c
SECT 27 299d 21 DANTE: Divine Contedy, PARADISE, XXIX [10-
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK XIII, 429a-b 45] 150b-c
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 888b- 32 11ILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [577-594] 187b-
891a I88a; BK VII [70-108] 218b-219b
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR I 35a-39d esp
CH 1-5 35a-37c; TR IX, CH 7--8 69c-70d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 21 49d-
50a; BK XI 89b-99b esp par 12-1792b-93c,
par 40 98d-99a / City of God, BK XI, CH 4-6
324a-325d; BK XII, cHlo-20348b-357a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A
2, REP 2 41d-42c; A4, ANS 43b-44b; Q 14, A12,
ANS 85d-86d;. Q 46 250a.. 255d esp A I 250a-
252d; Q 61, A 2 315c-316a; Q 66, A 4 348d-
349d; Q 75, A I, REP I 378b-379c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
Q77, A2, ANS and REP I 945a-946b; Q 91, A2
1017c-1020c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a; PART II, 162b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
224d
30 BACON: Novu1n Organun1, BK II, APH 35, 163a;
APH 48, 186b-d
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-c
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [6-10] 93b; BK V
[S77--599} 187b-188a; BK VII [70-97] 218b-
219a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 121 195a
34 NE\VTON: Principles,DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b;
LAW I 14a / Optics, BK III, 540a-541b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CHXIV,
SECT 26160c-d; CH XXIX, SECT 15 237a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 20a;26d; 130b-133c;
135a-137a,c; 152a-d; 160b-161d /Practieal
Reason, 334b-335c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 693c-
694a passim
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a
2c. The creation oftime: the priority of eternity
to time; the immutability of the world
after the end of time
ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon,
OT, Book of Wisdom, 7:17-18
'7 PLATO: J'imaeus, 450c-451a
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, eH I 119b-c;
CH 6, 122c-d; CH II, 126a; CH 13, 128c /
Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 165c-166b
50a; BK XI, par 12-16 92b-93a; par 40 98d-
99a; BK xII,par 40 109b-ll0a / City of God,
SECT 26-2 7 160c-161a; SECT 3-31 161c-162a;
eH XV, SECT .3-.8 162d-164b; SECT
165a-c; CH XVII 167d-174a passim, esp SECT
5 168d-169a, SECT 10 SECT 16 172a-b;
CH XXIX, SECT 15 237a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26d; 130b-133c; 135a-
137a,c; 152c; 160b..161d; 185a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, I90a-b;
206c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VII, 295b-c
2a. Aeviternity as intermediate between time
and eternity
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 9 10I b-c;
par 12-15 101d-l02c; par 18-22 103b-104b /
City of God, BK XII, CH 15 351b-352d
19 ,A.QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A
2, REP 1-2 41d-42c; A 3, ANS 42c-43b; AA 5-6
44b-46d
2b. Arguments concerning the infinity of time
and the eternity of motion or the world
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:1-2 / Nehemiah,
9:6-(D) II Esdras, 9:6 / fob, 38:1-13 /
Psalms, 90:2; 95:4-5; 102:25-26 ; 14:5-6;
119:9-91; 136:5-9; 148 :I-6-(D) Psabns, 89:
2; 94:4-5; 101:26-27; 13:5-6; 118:9-91 ;
135 :5-9; 148 :1-6 / Proverbs, 3 :19; 8 :22-29 /
Isaiah, 45 :12,18; 48 :13; 65 :I7-25-(D) Isaias,
45 :12,18; 48:13; 65 :17-25 / Jeremiah, 51 :15-
(D) Jeremias, 51 :15
ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon,
aT, Book of Wisdom, 7 :17-18 I Ecclesiasticus,
23:19-20 ; 24:9-(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 23:
28--2 9; 24: 1 4 / II Maccabees, 7:2 3-(D) 01',
II Machabees, 7:23
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthetu, 13 :24-3,,36-4.3,49-
50; 24 :J-35 / Mark, 13 :J-33 / Luke, 21 :5-33
/ John, 1:1-.3 / Colossians, 1:16-17 / Hebrews,
1:10-12 / II Peter, 3=3-13 / Revelation, 10:5-
6- (D) Apocalypse, 10 :5-6
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-c I Timaeus, 447b-c;
450c-451a; 460c-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, eH II [I04bI3-18]
I48a-b / Physics, BK IV, CH 13 [222
a
2g-
b
8]
302b; BK VI, CH 10 [24Ia27-b20] 325b-cd; BK
VIII, CH 1-2 334a-337b; CH 6 344b-346b; CN
8 348b-352a / Heavens, BK I, CH 2 [269b2-loJ
360c-d; CH 3 [27obI-26] 361c-362a; eN 9
[279aI2]-CH 12 [283b23] 370b-375d; BK II, CN
6 [288a23-25] 379d / Generation and Corrup-
tion, BK II, CH 10-II 437d-441a,c / Meteorol..
ogy, UK I, CH 14 [352aI6-353a27] 458b-459a!c;
BK II, CH 3 [356b2-357a4] 462b-d / Metaphyslc'
BK IX, CH 8 [1050b20-28] 576c-d; BK XI, C
[I063aI3--I6] 591b; CH 10 [I067a33-38] 596a;
XII, CH 6-8 601b-605a esp CH 7 [I072aIg_b
602a-d, [I073a5-II] 603b
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion ofAnimals, CH 4 [69g
b
7003.6] 234d-235a; CH 6 [700b29-70Ia7]23
2. The distinction between time and eternity:
the eternity ofendless time distinguished
from the eternity of timelessness and
immutability
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1:2; 18:IO-(D) OT,
Ecclesiasticus, 1:2; 18:8
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450b-451d
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 12 [22IaI9]-
CH 13 [222
b
29] 301a-302c; BK VI, CH 2 [2.33aI3-
bI 6] 315a-c; CH 7 [237b23-238aI9] 321a-c;
CH 10 [24IbII-20] 325d; BK VIII, CH 1-2 334a-
337b; CH 6 344b-346b; CH 8 348b-352a /
Heavens, BK I, CH 12 372d-375d esp [282
a
22-
283a2] 373d-374c, [283b7-22] 375c-d; BK II,
CH .3 [286a8-I3] 377c / Generation and Corrup-
tion, BK II, CH 9 [335a33-b2] 436d-437a /
Metaphysics, BK V, CH 5 [IOI5b9-16] 536a; BK
IX, CH 8 [I05ob6-27] 576b-d; BK XI, CH 10
[I067a33-38] 596a; BK XII, CH 6 [107Ib2-II]
601b; CH 7 [1072aI8-2.3] 602a-b; [1073a.3-II]
603a-b; BK XIV, CH 2 [I088bI4-28] 620d-
621a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VI,SECT IS 275a-b;
SECT 36 277c
16 KEPLER: Hannonies of the World, 1071b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR v, CH 7 20a-c /
Third Ennead, TR VII 119b-129a / Fourth En-
nead, TR IV, CH 7-8 161d-162d; CH 15-16
165c-166b
50a; BK XI 89b-99b esp par 8-17 91b-93c,
par 39-41 98c-99b; BK XII, par 13-20 l02a-
l03d; par 40 109b-110a; BK XIII, par 44 122d
/ City of God, BK XI, CH 5-6 324d-325d; CH
21 333a-d;BKXII, CH 12-19 349b-355a
AA 1-5 40d-45c esp A I, REP 5 40d-41d, A 2,
REP 2 41d-42c, A 3, REP 2 42c-43b, A 4 43b-
44b; Q 14, A 9, ANS 83b-d; r\. 13, ANS artd,REP
3 86d-88c; Q 42 , A 2, REP 2-4 225d-227a; Q
46, A 2, REP 5 253a-255a; Q 79, A 8, REP 2
421c-422b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XI
[106-108] 69d; PARADISE, XXIX [10-45] 150b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 271b
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 366d-
367a
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-
lIla
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 216d-217a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 20,
COROL 1-2 364a; PART II, PROP 44, COROL 2
and DEMONST 390a; PART v, PROP 23 458b-d;
PROP 29, DEMONST 459c; PROP 34, SCHOL 460d
32 MILTON: On Tinle 12a-b / Paradise LOSt,BK
VII [7-98] 218b-219a; BK XII [553-556] 331a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 121 195a; 25-206 211a
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL,
8b
906
TI-IE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 93: TIME 908
(3. The mode of existence of time.)
3b. The reality of the past and the future in
relation to the existence of the present
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [217b2g-218a
8J 297e-d; CH 12 [22Ib33-222a3J 301d; CH 14
[223a2I-2gJ 303a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 [II3gbIO-IIJ
388b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 14 258d
93b-98e
19 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A
4, ANS 43b-44b; A 5, ANS and REP 3 44b-45e;
Q 25, A 4 141a-d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53e
25 Essays, 293d-294a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 190a-b
53 JAMES: PJychology, 219b; 398a-b; 413a; 421a
3c. The extent of the present Inoment: instan-
taneity
7 PLATO: Partnenides, 505a-e
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [218a4-29]
297d-298a; CH II [2I9b9-220a24] 299b-300a;
CH 13 [222
a
IO'-23] 301d-302a; [222
b
I-I 4]
302b-e; BK VI, CH 3 [233b3J-234a23] 315d-
316b; BK VIII, CH I [25IbI6-28] 335h; CH 8
[263b26-264a6] 350e-d / Aletaphysics, BK III,
CH .5 [I002b5-8] 521b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 17 93b-e;
par 19"-20 93d-94b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q8, A2,
REP 2 35e,-36b; Q 10, A I, REP 5 40d-41d;
Q 42, A 2, REP 4 225d-227a
25 MONTAICNE: Essays, 293d-294a
SECT 10 157a; CH XV, SECT 9 164b-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-399a; 420a-b
4. The measurement of time: sun, stars, and
clocks
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:3-5,14-18 / Psahns,
14:19-20 ; 136:8i-9-(D) Psalms, 13:19-20 ;
135:8-9
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-10 esp 43:6--8-
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-11 esp 43:6-9
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [454-461 ]
44e-d
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [606-626] 496a-b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49d-50a; 70e;
7ge
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK V, 487d
7 PLATO: Republic, BKVII, 394d-396b / Tinzaeus,
450e-451d
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 12 [220
b
I5-3I]
300e-d; CH 14 [223bI2-224aI] 303c-d / Meta-
physics, BK X, CH I [I052b34-I053aI2] 579b-e
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK IV,
CH 10 [777bI6-24] 319d-320a
14 PLUTARCH: Nurna Pompilius, 58d-59a /
Solon, 74a / Caesar, 599d-600a
3b to Sa
16 PTOLEMY: L1ltnagest, BK II, 34b38a; BK III,
77a-86b; 104b-107a
16 COPERNICUS: Ret/oluiions of the Heaven!
Spheres, BK I, SlOb; BK II, 568a-576a; BK.n[
646a-652b; 672a-674s' '
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 7-8 122d-
124e; CH 11-13 126a-129a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 18-
2r
93e-94b; par 27-38 95b-98e / Cit)' of God
BK XI, CH 6 325e-d; BK XII, CH IS, 351d-352 '
19 AQUINAS: Sununa Theologica, PART I, Q roa
A6, ANS and REP 3-4 45e-46d; Q 67, A4
354a; Q70, A2, ANS and REP 3,5 364b-365a
20 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART III SUPPL
Q gI, A2, REP 3 1017e-1020c '
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, I [37-45] Ib-c'
PURGATORY, II [I-g] 54c; XV [I-IS] 75b-e;
[1-9] 91b-e; XXVII [I-6J 94c; PARADISE, x [28-
33] 120e; XXVII [106-120] 148b-e
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 267a-b
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK lIt
69b,d-70a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 497b-e
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 148b-
14ge; 167a-168a; THIRD DAY, 208b-e
30 BACON: Novunz Organum, BK II, APH 46 177c-
179a
32 MILTON: Song 011 May Morning I5b / Comus
[111-118] 35b-36a / Paradise Lost, BK IU[555-
587] 147b-148a; [726-732] 151a; BK V [r66-
170] 179a; BK VIII [66-69] 233b
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b;
9b-10a; 12a-b; BK III, PROP 20 291b-294b
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH I, 554b-557b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH xn,r
t
SECT 17-31 I58a-162a passim; CH XV, SECT
5--10 163b-165a passim; CH XXVI, SECT 3 217d-
218a
35 BERKELEY: Human KnouJledge, SECT 98 432a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 169a I
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 376a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART I, 219a-o;
251a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 400a; 407a-408a
5. Temporal relationships: time as a means
ordering
5a. Simultaneity or coexistence: the
taneity of cause and effect, action a
passion, knowledge and object kno
7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 519d-520b; 533b-e
. 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7bI5-saI2J 12
13a; CH 13 20b-d / Posterior Analvtics, BK
CH 12 [95aIO-23] 129d-130a; eH
134b-e / Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [218R8-29] 2
298a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 2 [IOI4a20
534b-c; BK IX, cn 9 [I05Ia4-131577a; DK
CH 3 [I07oa21-24] 59ge
19 AQUINAS: SUmn'la Theologica, PART I, Q
A 10 59a-d; Q46, A 2, REP I 253a-255a
5b to 6a
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 379a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-d: 32a-b; 83b-84d /
Practical Reason, 312a-c; 339a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 862b-863b [fn 2]
5b. Succession or priority and posteriority: the
temporal order of cause and effect, po-
tentiality and actuality
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7bI5-8aI2] 12b-
13a; CH 12 19d-20b / Posterior Analytics, BK II,
CH 12 129d-I31b; CH 16 [98bI6-24J 134e /
Physics, BK II, CH 6 [I98aS-I3] 275a; BK IV,
CH 14 [223a4-14] 302d-303a / Aletaphysics, BK
v, CH 2 [IOI4R20-25] 534b-e; CH II [IOI8
b
IS-I9]
53ge; BK VII, CH 3 [I029RS-6] 551e; BK IX, CH 8
[I049bI8-I05oa3J 575b-d; [I05ob2-6] 576b;
CH 9 577a-c; BK XII, CH 3 [I07oa21-24] 59ge;
BK XIII, CH 2 [I077aI4-I9] 608b-e; [I077a24-
30] 60&
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Anilnals, BK II, CH I
[646a25-bIO] 170b-e / Generation of Animals,
BK II, eH 6 [742RI6-bI7] 283b-d
19 AQUINAS: SU1nlna Theologica, PART I, Q3, A I,
ANS 14b-15b; Q46, A2, REP I 253a-255a; Q85,
A 3 455b-457a
20 AQUINAS : Summa Theo.logica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A2, REP 3 7e-8a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135e-
136b
28 HARVEY: On Aniraal Generation, 390e; 445e;
447a-b
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 87e-d / Objec-
tions and Replies, 159c-d
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 379a
35 HUME: Hunzan Understanding, SECT VII 470d-
478a esp DIV 60 477a-e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-d; 32a-b; 63b; 67d-
68b [fn I]; 76c-83b; 95a-d; 214b,d [fn I] /
Practical Reason, 311d-314d;331e-333a ; 339a-b
53 JAMES : Psychology, 399a
5e. Succession and simultaneity in relation to
the association of ideas
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 18, SCHOL
382a-b
35 LOCKE: l-Iuman Understanding, BK II, CH IX,
SECT 9-10 139d-140b
35 HUME: !-Itl1nall Understanding, SECT. III, DIV
19,457d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 361b-364a esp 362b-363b;
367a-370b esp 367a, 369a-b; 559a-560a; 559b-
561b [fn 2]; 852b-853a; 860b-861a
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 74a-b / Interpretation oj"
Drealns, 352b-e
. Comparison of temporal with non.;tem-
poral simultaneity and succession: the
prior in thought, by nature, or in origin
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 12-13 19d-20d /
Interpretation, CH 13 '[23aI8-26] 35b-e / Poste-
rior Analytics,BK I, cn 2 [7Ib33-72a5] 98b-e;
CH 27 119b / Topics, BK IV, CH 2 [I23aI3-19]
909
171e; BK VI, CH 4 194e-196a / Metaphysics,
BK III, CH 3 [999a6-'14] 517d; BK V, CH II
53ge-540a; BK IX, CH 8 575b-577a; BK XIII
t
CH 2 [I077aI4-bI4] 608b-609a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH I
[646a25-bIO] 170b-e / Generation of Animals,
BK II, CH6 [742aI6-,bI8] 283b-d / Politics, BK
III, CH I [I275a35-b2] 472b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 813a-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 8 91b-c;
par 11-12 92a-b;par 14 92e-d; BK XII, par 20
103e-d; par 40 109b-1IOa / City of God, BK X,
CH 31 319b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q3, A I,
ANS 14b-15b; A 6, ANS and REP 2 18e-19a;
Q16, A 4 97a-e; Q45, A3, REP 3 244a-d; Q 46,
A 2, REP I 253a-255a; Q 66, A 4, REP 4348d-
349d; Q 85, A 3, REP I 455b-457a; Q 94, A 3,
ANS 504a-505a
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A 2, REP 3 7e-8a; Q 110, A 4, REP 4350d-351d
28 GALILEO: Two Netu Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135e-
136b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390e; 445c;
447a-b
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP I 355d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 32-33
20a-d
6. The knowledge of time and the experience
of duration
6a. The perception of time by the interior
senses: the difference between the expe-
rience and memory of time intervals
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH II [219a4-9]
298d; [219b23-3I] 299c-d / Sense and the Sen-
sible, CH 7 [448a20_bI6] 687a-d / Memo1Y and
Reminiscence, CH 2 [452b7-453R4l 694b-695a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [459-463]
6d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 8 161d-
162d
92b-99a
2, REP I 41d-42c; Q 79, A 6, ANS and REP 2
419b-420d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 62, SCHOL
443c-d
35 LOCKE: Hurnan Understanding, BK II, CH VII,
SECT 9133a; CH XIV, SECT 1-16 155b-158a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knotvledge, SECT 97-98
431d-432a
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 292a-293a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-29d; 74b-76e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 130a-b; 131b; 396a-420b
esp 396a, 399a-400b, 405b-407a, 409a-b,
411b-418a, 420a-b
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 648a-b
/ New Introductory Lectures, 837e; 838b
THE GREAT IDEl\S CHAPTER 93: TIME 911
BK II, CH 19 [1393al-8] [IIS6
a
22-
b
S] 407d-408a; CH 6 [IIS8
a
l-9]409d
I Rhetoric, BK II, CH3[1380bS-7] 626a; CH
12-14 636a-638a
10 HIPPOCRATES: Fractures, par 1 74b,d-75a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n[I 10S-
1174] 29a-30a,c; BK III [912-977] 41d-42c;
[1053-'1094] 43c-44a,c; BK IV [IoS8-I072] 57d-
58a; BK V [170-173] 63b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BKII,SECT3 257a-b;
SECT 12 258b-c; SECT14 258d; SECT 17 259b-d;
BK III, SECT 14 262c; BK IV, SECT 3 263b-264a;
SECT S 264b; SECT 32-33 266b-d; SECT 35-36
266d; SECT 42-43 267b; BK V, SECT 10 270c-d;
BK VI, SECT IS 275a-b; BK VII, SECT 18 281a;
SECT 3S 282a; BK VIII, SECT 6 285d-286a;
BK IX, SECT 19 293b; SECT 21 293b-c; BK X,
SECT 7 297b-c; SECT 27 299d; BK XI, SECT 27
306b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid,BK I [441-462] 115a-b esp
[462] 115b
14 PLUTARCH: Aemilius Paulus, 225b-c; 229a-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 4, 14c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 10
par 13 22c-d; BK VIII, par 18 57d-58a; par
25-26 60a- b; BK IX, par 32--:-34 70a-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q40,
A6 796c-797a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII. [61-96]
[94-120] 20c-d; XV [22-99] 21b-22a;
XXVI [9-142] 39a-c; PURGATORY, XI [73-117]
69c-70a; XIV [91-126] 74c-75a; XXVIII [134-
144] 97c; PARADISE, XV-XVI 128b-132a;xXVII
[121-148] 148c-d
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK III, STANZA
122-124 70b I Wife of Bath's Prologue [5S83-
6410]
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 63d; 79c-d; PART
II, 150c; 154b-c; PART IV, 271d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d-7a; 33b-36a;
294b; 394a-395b; 403d-404b; 458b-c;. 478c-
479c; 540d-541c .
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT I, SC III [258-
261] 326b; ACT V, SC V [41-66] 350a-b / 1st
Henry IV, ACT V, SC IV [77-86] 465a-b I 2nd
Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [4S-S6] 483b /Henry V,
ACT I, SC I [22-69] 533b-c / As You Like It,
ACT III, SC II [319-351] 612c-d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC II [68-73]
32b; ACT III, SC II [196-223] 51a-b; ACT IV,
SC VII [111-124] 63c-d; ACT V, SC I [202-24]
66c-d I Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC III
[I4S-I74] 124a-b; ACT IV, SC IV [26-so] 128c;
sc V [221-226] 132c I Othello, ACT II, SC III
[376-387] 220d / Macbeth, ACT V, SC V [IS-28]
308d-309a / Winter's Tale, ACT IV, SC 1505c-d
/ Tempest, ACT IV, SC I [I48-IS8] 543b I
Sonnets, I-XIX 586a-589a; XXV 590a; XLIX
593d; LV 594c-d; LIX-LX 595b-c; LXIII-LXV
595d-596b; CXV--CXVI 603d-604a; CXXIII
605a
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 15c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric,
640c
10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, par I 19a-b I Epi-
demics, BKlII, SECT III, par 16 59b-c
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, 505a-506a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 23-2 5
94c-95a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 30
651c-d
A 13 86d-88c; Q 57, A 3 297b-298a;Q 86, A 4
463d-464d; Q 89, A 3, REP 3 475d-476c; A 7,
REP 3 478d-479c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12,
A I, REP 3 776c-777b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XVII [r3-
45] 132b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-d; 65b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 30-31385a-c;
PART IV, DEF 6 424b; PROP 62, SCHOL 443c-d;
PROP 66, DEMONST 444c
34 NEWTON: Principles, 1a-2a; BK III, RULE IV
271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV,
SECT 12 165b-c
35 BERKELEY: 11umanKnowledge, SECT 44420d-
421a; SECT lOS 433b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV-VII
458a-478a passim, esp SECT IV, DIV 21 458b-c,
SECT VI 469d-470d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 277c
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 177a-b; 184a
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [8S9I-8603] 209b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 366b
49 DARWIN: Origin ofSpecies, 59d-60a; 243b-c
51 TOLSTOY: Warand Peace, BK XIII, 584d-585b;
EPILOGUE II, 685a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 852b; 883a-884b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 387a,c
The temporal course of the passions: emo-
tional attitudes toward time and muta-
bility
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [67-623]
120a; [1211-1248] 125b-c
5 EURIPIDES: Trojan Women [643-683] 275c-d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 7b-8a; BK VII,
224d-225a
7 PLATO: Symposium, 154d-155a; 165b-166a /
Republic, BK I, 295d-296c / Theaetetus, 528c-
529a I Laws, BK VII, 717d-718d
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 2 [II7a26-34]
164a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK III, CH 6
[669aI8-20] 197c I Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [I094b28-
109SaI2] 340a-b;cH9 [I099b32-IIOOa9] 345b-c;
BK IV, CH 9 [II28
b
IS-21] 376a; BK VI, CH 8
[II42aI2-I9] 391b; CH II [II43b6-14] 393a;
BK VII, CH 3 [II47aI8-24] 397b-c; CH 14 [IIS4
b
8-15] 406a; [II54b20-30] 406c; BKVIII, CH 3
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK. II,
34] 640b-c
12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK I (449-4
82
]
6c-7a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK JI, 38d-39a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VI, cn 3 1901)-
191c
18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK x, par 12-36
74b-80d esp par 23-2S 77a-d
4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 79, A 6, ANS and REP .2
419h-420d
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART III, Q 12
A I, REP 3 776c-777b '
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c; 54a; 65b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41c-d; 439c-440a; 483b-
484b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 61d-
62c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, DEF 6 424b;PART V
PROP 21 458a '
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding,BK II, CH xv,
SECT 12 165b-c; BK IV, CH XI, SECT II
357b-c
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 79a-80a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 428a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 96b,d;
413b-d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 337c
42 KANT: Judgement, 579d-580a; 583d-584c
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 151c
46 HEGEL:. Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-
156d; 181b-182c; 190a-b; PART I, 237a-b;
239c-241a; 247b-c
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [57o-s8s]16a
49 DARWIN: Origin ofSpecies, 13c-14a; 42a; 152a-
180d passim, esp 153a-156a, 160d-162a, 1650-
166a,c, 179b-180d;217b-229a,c passim, esp
229c; 231d-233b; 238b-239a; 242c-243a /
Descent of Man, 255a-26Sd esp 255a-b,
265a-d; 332b-335a esp 332b-c, 335a; 336c-
337a; 348d-349d
50 MARX: Capital, 86c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 145a;
427a esp 424b-425b
54 FREUD: Origin and Developntent of Psydlto-
Analysis, 4a-b / General Introduction, 526c-
527c; 599a-b I War and Death, 760a.,.J;) r
Civilization and Its Discontents, 769a-770c
6f. Knowledge of the future: the truth of prop
sitions about future contingents; t
probability of predictions
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [463-512] 10
5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1415-1419] 224c I AlCi
[1159-1163] 247c I Helen [1688-1692 ]31
Andromache [I284-1288J 326c I Baccha
[1388-1392] 352a,c
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I,
7 PLATO: Laches, 36c / Theaetetus, 531a-532
8 ARISTOTLE; Interpretation, CH 9
910
(6. The knowledge of time atJd the experience oj
duration.)
6b. Factors influencing the estimate of time
elapsed: empty and filled time; illusions
of time perception; the variability of ex-
perienced durations
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 77a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH II [2I8
b
2I-
2I9aI] 298c-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 36, g8a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-
18] 57c
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT I, SC III [258-
261] 326b I As You LIke It, ACT III, sc II
[3I9-3SI] 612c-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, cn XIV,
SECT 4 155d-156a; SECT 7-12 156c-157c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 292a... 293a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 264b-268a ,esp 268b-269b
[fn 2]; 400a-411a esp 408a-411a; 417a-420a
esp 418a-420a
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 147d-148a;
164c; 335b-336d
6c. Time as a transcendental form of intuition:
the a priori foundations of arithmetic;
the issue concerning Innate and acquired
time perception
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV,
SECT 2-4 155b-156a; SECT 31
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-29d; 61a-62d; 68a-
69c esp 68c-69a;. 94b-95d; 100d-101h; 213d-
215a / Practical Reason,307d-308b; 313a-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 420R-b; 860b-
861a
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 648a-b
I New Introductory Lectures, 837c
6d. The signifying of time: the distinction be-
tween noun and verb; the tenses of the
verb
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a I Pannenides,
495a I Sophist, 57Sd-576b
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 2 [I6aI9-20]25b;
CH 3 [I6
b
6-19] 25d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q13,
A II, ANS 73c-74b; Q 14, A IS, REP 3 89b-
90b
6e. Knowledge of the past: the storehouse of
memory; the evidences of the past in
physical traces or remnants
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 1a-2b
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-
355a passim
7 PLATO: Laches,36c ICritias, 479d / Theaete-
tus, 538d-544a
8 ARISTOTLE: A4emory and Reminiscence 690a-
695d esp CH r [449b3-29] 690a:'c
8. Historical time
8a. Prehistoric and historic time: the antiquity
of man
5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [466-492] 548a-e
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49a-52a; BK IV,
124d-132b; BK V, 16tb
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-
354b
7 PLATO: Critias, 480a-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [783-
1160] 71b-76b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 413b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 164b-e;
179d-182c; 188c; PART I,209b; 235d-236a;
PART II, 260b-262e
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 171b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 13e; 153a-155b /
Descent of Man, 336a-337a; 343a-c; 349a-d;
589a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, B8la
ADDITIONAL READINGS
913
182e; 186e-d; 188e; PART I, 209b-c; 231 b-
232a; 241b-d; PART II, 25ge-d; 274a-275a;
278a-b; 282d-284a,c; PART III, 286c-287a;
PART IV, 315b-317d; 348a-b
50 MARX: Capital, 86d [fn 4]
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 265b
II.
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Physicists, BK II, CH 3
--. Outlines of Pyrrh0 nism, BK III, CH 1-20
PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology, (F)
CHAPTER 93: TIME
1.
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Gr;at Ideas.
KANT. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation)
--. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,
DIV I
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV
17 49ge-500b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 118a-119a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 79b-c; 900a,c
[n 163-164]
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 180c-
UGUSTINE. On Music
QUINAS. De Aeternitate Mundi
OBBES. Concerning Body, PART II, CH 7
INOZA. Cogita Metaphysica, PART I, CH 4; PART II,
Cll I
UME. A Treatise of llulnan Nature, BK I, PART II
CROSS-REFERENCES
for: Other discussions of time as a quantity and its relation to motion, see CHANGE sa; MECHANICS
IC; QUANTITY Sb; RELATION 6a; and for the measurement of time, see ASTRONOMY 7;
QUANTITY 6c.
Discussions relevant to the distinction between time and eternity, and to the problem of the
infinity of time and the eternity of the world, see ASTRONOMY 8c( I); CHANGE 13; ETER-
NITY 1-2; INFINITY 3e; WORLD 4a, 8.
Time in relation to theories of creation, see ETERNITY la; WORLD 4e(2).
Another treatment of the relations of succession and simultaneity, see RELATION sa; and
for the temporal aspects of such relations as that bet\veen cause and effect, potentiality and
actuality, and the various acts of the mind, see BEING 7c( I); CAUSE Ib; EDUCATION Sd;
IDEA Sd-.5e; RELATION 4f.
The analysis of memory and imagination as interior senses, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION I
SENSE 3b, 3d(2). '
Considerations relevant to the conception of time as a transcendental form of intuition and to
the related problem of the foundations of arithmetic, see FORM IC; MATHEMATICS IC;
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6C(2); MIND Ie(I), 4d(3); SPACE 4a.
The general theory of the parts of speech which involves the distinction bet\veen noun and
verb, see LANGUAGE 4a.
Other considerations of our knowledge of the past and the future, see HISTORY 3a ; KNOWL-
EDGE 5a (S); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4C; PROPHECY
Ia-Ib; TRUTH 3b(2).
The influence of time on human development, see EXPERIENCE 6a; LIFE AND DEATH 6b-6c;
MAN 6c; and for man's attitude toward time and change, see CHANGE I2b; PROGRESS S.
Other treatments of the problem of time and free will in relation to God's foreknowledge and
foreordination, see GOD 7b, 7f ; HISTORY sa; LIBERTY sa-sb; WILL 7c.
Other discussions of historical time and the antiquity of man, see EVOLUTION 7c ; HISTORY
4a (3), 4c; l\1AN 9c.
912 THE GREAT IDEAS 8 to 80
(7. The temporal course of the passions: emotional Sb. The epochs of history: myths of a golden
attitudes toward time and 111utability.) age; the relativity of modernity ,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 9-13 426d- 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 92b-d / Timaeus, 444a-
428a; PROP 16-17 428b-d; PROP 62, SCHOL 446d / Critias 478a-485d passim / States1nan
443e-d; PROP 66 444e-d; PART V, PROP 7 586e-58ge / Laws, 681b-d )
454b-e 8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34
32 MILTON: On Time 12a-bl Sonnets, VII 63b / [I83bI6-184b8] 253a-d / Heavens, BK I, Cll 3
Paradise Lost, BK XI [527-543] 310b-311a [27obI2-26] 361d-362a; CH 9 [279a23-33]
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 122-123 195a; 129-131 195b; 370e; BK II, CH I 375b,d-376a; BK IV, Cll 2
135 196a; 139-143 196b-200a; 164-172 202b- [308b29-32] 400b / Meteorology, BK II, ClI I
203b; 181 204b; 25-208 211a-b; 210 211h L354
a2
7-32 ] 460b / Metaphysics, BK I, ClI 9
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH [992a29-34] SlOe; BK XII, CH I [I069a25-
2
91
XXXIII, SECT 13 250a-b 598b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 536a 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, Cll I
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 35a-e; 401a-b [640b5-7] 163a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 335e 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 12 4b-c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 33ge / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par I, 26b-e
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 44ge-450a 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK II, CH 8, 193c'
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 102a-b; 254b-e; 350d- CH 9, 196b; BK III, CH 10 207b-d '
351b 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 81la
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a-e; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [324-337]
PART I, 258b 65b-e
47 GOETHE: Faust, DEDICATION 1a-b; PART II 13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, IV / Georgics, I
[4613-4678] 115a-116b; [11,573-586] 281b- [118-146] 40a-41a / Aenetd, BK I [254-2 9
6
]
282a 110a-I1la; BK VIII [306-336] 267a-268a
49 DARWIN: Descent of lv/an, 302b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, SIb; 58e-d; BK IV
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 221b-d; BK 72a-b; BK XI, 106b-d; BK XIV, 146b-147a:
VI, 262e; 267e; BK VIII, 305b-d; BK IX, 151d / Histories, BK II, 232d-233a; BK n/
356b-d; BK X, 394d; BK XII, 559d; BK XV, 255b-e '
63ge 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 7a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 324a; 433a; 711b; 759a- 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 909a
760b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XIII, par 49-51
54 FREUD: Origin and Developlnent of Psycho- 124a-d / City of God, BK X, CH 14 307c-308a;
Analysis, 16b-c; 17b-18a / Interpretation of CH 25 313c-314c; BK XV-XVIII 397b,d-507a,c
Dreams, 379c-380a / General Introduction, esp BK XV, CH 1-3 397b,d-399c, CH 21 415b-
579b-581b / Ego and Id, 704d-706d / Inhibi- 416a, BK XVI, CH 26 438e-439a, CH 37 444b-
tions, Sy'nptoms, and Anxiety, 740b-c; 743a- 445a, BK XVII, CH 1-4 BK XVIII,
744a / War and Death, 758a-d; 760a-b / CH II 477e-d; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d
Civilization and Its Discontents, 768b-770c / 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A
New Introductory Lectures, 837e 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 75, A I, ANS 378b-
37ge
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q97,
A I, ANS 236a-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XIV [94-120]
20c-d; PURGATORY, XXII [130-154] 87d-88a;
XXVI [91-1141 93d-94a; XXVIII [136-148] 97c;
PARADISE, XVI [16-39] 130a-e
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA
4
22a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 267c-d; CON
CLUSION, 282d
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I
81d-82b; BK III, 143b-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215b
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 27b-2
PART II,208a-e
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH
119b-e
32 11ILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XI [334]-BK x
[605] 306b-332a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 655 292b; 699 302b
Vacuum, 357b-358a
THE GREAT IDEAS
915
as false. Freud searches for in otherquar-
ters and by other methods. But the ancient
controversy in \vhich Sacrates engages with the
sophists of his day,who \vere wilHng to regard
as true \vhatever anyone wished to think, seems
to differ not at all from Freud's quarrel with
those whom he calls ."intellectual. nihilists."
They are the persons who say there is no such
thing as truth or that,it is o1!lly the product of
our own needs and desires. They-make it "ab-
solutely immaterial," Freuclwrites,' '\vhat
views \ve accept. All of them are equally true
and false. And no one has a right to accuse any-
one else of error."
.A.cross the centuries the arguments against
the skeptic seem to be the same. If the skeptic
does not mind contradicting himself when he
tries to defend the truth of the proposition that
all proposi tions are equally true or false, he can
perhaps be challenged by the fact that hedoes
not act according to his view. If all opinions are
equally true or false, then \vhy, Aristotle asks,
does not the denier of truth \valk "into a \vell or
over a precipice" instead of avoiding such
things. "Ifit ,vere really a matter ofindifference
what we believed, " Freud similarly argues,
"then we might just as well build our bridges of
cardboard as of stone, or inject a tenth of a
gramme of morphia into a patient instead of
a hundredth, or take tear-gas as a narcotic in...
stead of ether. But," he adds, "the intellectual
anarchists themselves \vould strongly repudiate
such practical applications of their theory."
Whether theskeptic can be refuted or Inerely
silenced n1ay depend on a further step in the
argument, in vvhich the skeptic substitutes
probability for truth, both as a basis for action
and as the quality of all our opinions about the
real \vorld. The argument takes different forms
according to the different ways in which proba-
hili ty is distinguished fro111 truth or according
iNTRODUCTION
Chapter 94: TRUTH
K... .... T.. OT everyone kno\vs Josiah Royce's clefi...
nition of a liar as a man\vho willfully
isplaces his ontological predicates, but every"':
fie who has ever told a lie. will recognize .. its
curacy. To restate the defini tion less elegant...
,lying consists insaying the contrary of\vhat
ne thinks or believes. To speak truthfully \ve
st make our speech conform to our thought,
must say that something is the case if \ve
ink it is, or that it is not, if \ve think it is not.
we deliberately say "is" when we think is
t, or say "is not" when we think is, we lie.
Of course, the man who speaks truthfully
ay in fact say what is false, just as the man
hose intent is to falsify may inadvertently
eak the truth. The intention to speak one's
nd does not guarantee that one's mind is
e from error or in possession of the truth.
rein lies the traditional distinction between
uth as a social and as an intellectual n1atter.
hat Dr. Johnson calls moral truth consists in
e obligation to say what we mean. In con-
ast VI/hat he calls physical truth depends not
the veracity of vlhat \ve say but on the
lidity of what we mean.
The theory of truth in the tradition of the
eat books deals largely vvith the latter kind of
uth. The great issues concern whether we can
o'\v the truth and ho\v we can ever tell wheth-
something is true or false. Though the
hilosophers and scientists, from Plato to
reud, seem to stand together against the ex-
erne sophistry or skepticism which denies the
'stinction between true and false or puts truth
terly beyond the reach of man, they do not
11 agree on the extent to \vhich truth is attain-
bIe by Inen, on its immutability or variability,
the signs by which men tell \vhether they
ve the truth or not, or on the causes of error
nd the means for avoiding falsity.
Much that Plato thinks is true Freud rejects
WHITEHEAD'JAn Enquiry Concerning thePrincipleioj
Natural Knotvledge, CH 6
--. The Concept of Nature, CH3
EINSTEIN. Relativity: The Special and the General
Theory
--. Sidelights on Relativity
MARITAIN. Theonas, Conversations ofa Sage, VI
McTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 33
BERGSON. Time and Free Will
--. Creative Evolution
--. Duree et simultaneite, a propos de la theorie
d'Einstein, CH 1-5
MANN. The Magic Mountain
DEWEY. Experience and Nature, CH 1-3,7,9
G. N. LEvVIS. Anatomy of Science, ESSAY III
HEIDEGGER. Sein und Zeit
EDDINGTON. Space, Time, and Gravitation
--. The Nature ofthe Physical World, CH 3
MEAD. Philosophy ofthe Present
SANTAYANA. The Realm of Matter,cH 4
BORING. The Physical Dimensions ofCons'Ciousness,
CH 5
WEISS, Reality, BK II, CH 6
B. RUSSELL. The Analysis of Matter, CH 28":"2.9, 32,
3
6
--. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits,
PART III, CH 5; PART IV, CH 5, 7
MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART II,
ell 13
CRESCAS. Or Adonai,PRopOSITION 15
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xv (3), XXXIX,
XL (9), L
JOHN OF .SAINT THOMAS.. Cursus Philosophicus
Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART I, Q
18
LEIBNITZ. NetlJ Essays Concerning HU1nan Under-
standing. BK II, CH 14-15
\VHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, .
VOL I, BK II, CH 7-10
HODGSON. Time and Space
LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3
FRAZER. The PART IV, BK III, CH 2
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 4; BK II,
CH 18
BOSANQUET. Science and Philosophy, 7
ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES II
(3)
POINCARE. The Value of Science, PART I, CH 2
MEYERSON. Identity and Reality, CH 6
CASSIRER. Substance and Function, sup v
ROBB. A Theory of Time and Space
WEYL. Space-Time-Matter
s..ALEXANDER. Space, Time, and Deity
PROUST. Remembrance of Things Past
914

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INTRODUCTION

Chapter 93: TIME

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