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1 Introduction
2 - Intention, intentional binding and SoA are theorized to be
implemented by mechanisms involved in motor control, particularly by
Sense of agency (SoA) is operationally understood as (a) the
‘Comparator model’ (Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000)
experience or judgment of ‘me’ or some ‘other’ as the cause of action
- According to the Comparator model, SoA is due to prospective,
and its effects, and/or (b) the experience or judgment of intensity
predictive processes; but, according to Wegner’s (2002) ‘Apparent
(from low to high) of agency/control over action
mental causation model’, SoA is due to retrospective, inferential
- Recent research in SoA differentiates between implicit “feeling” of processes (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Voss, 2013)
agency and explicit “judgment” of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau & - Comparator model is more successful in explaining feeling of agency,
Newen, 2008) while Wegner’s model is more successful in explaining judgment of
- Measures of agency: Implicit – e.g., Sensory attenuation, Intentional agency
binding; Explicit- e.g., Verbal-report - So, ‘Optimal cue integration’ model (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Linder,
- Category mistakes in SoA domain: Confusions in demarcating 2009) is proposed synthesizing both prospective and retrospective
between intention, temporal awareness (as in intentional binding), aspects of SoA
voluntary (VS stimulus-driven) action and the SoA; They are all, - Now, SoA is hypothesized to occur at two stages – 1st at feeling level
mistakenly, categorized under the concept of SoA! and 2nd at judgment level; Also, feeling becomes an input to judgment
3- Reasons to doubt whether there is feeling of agency at all 4- Assumption of feeling of agency and Comparator explanation for it are in
- Introspection that phenomenal feeling of agency is never a content of actuality based in judgments (i.e., verbal reports) of agency in
consciousness psychopathological conditions such as anarchic hand and schizophrenia
- There is neural correlate for non-agency (Haggard & Chambon, 2012), etc.,
but, no clarity over neural correlates of feeling of agency (David, 2012) - If the feeling of agency is non-conceptual, what warrants that it is about
- Implicit measures could be measuring something else; For example, agency at all?
intentional binding is measuring awareness of time - Comparator model (as well as Wegner’s model) fail to account for the
- Over emphasis on motor actions in SoA experiments and over emphasis difference between ‘no self-agency’ and misattribution to ‘other-agency’
on the Comparator model in SoA explanations (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008)
- No clarity whether the agency over non-motor (e.g., thought) events Is the Intentional binding (IB) a legitimate measure of SoA?
involve comparator (Vosgerau & Newen, 2007) and its neural correlates - IB (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002) is a measure of temporal
- How can the feeling of agency be an input to judgment, when it can be awareness, but not of SoA
influenced through retrospective factors? (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, - IB effect does not not represent SoA (Ebert & Wegner, 2010), but a
2009) perception of causation (Buehner, 2012; Hughes, Desantis & Waszak,
- SoA falls under ‘metacognition’ domain (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), but 2013)
not under ‘consciousness’ domain - No clarity whether there is IB effect over non-motor events