Response To The Florida Bar UPL Case No. 20133090

J ohn F.
Harkness, Executive Director Ghunise Coaxum, UPL Bar Counsel

The Florida Bar Florida Bar Orlando Branch Office
651 East J efferson Street 1000 Legion Place, Suite 1625
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300 Orlando, Florida 32801-1050
Email: jharkness@flabar.org Email: gcoaxum@flabar.org
VIA U.P.S. No. 1Z64589FP297105664 VIA U.P.S. No. 1Z64589FP298281687
Lori Holcomb, UPL Counsel, Unlicensed Patricia M. Moring, Chair
Practice Of Law Standing Committee Fifth Circuit UPL Committee
The Florida Bar, 651 East J efferson Street Moring & Moring, P.A.
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300 7655 W. Gulf To Lake Hwy. Suite 12
Email: lholcomb@flabar.org Crystal River, Florida 34429-7910
VIA U.P.S. No. 1Z64589FP296185679 Email: pmoring@moringlaw.com
VIA U.P.S. No. 1Z64589FP298993695
February 5, 2014
RE: Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL) Investigation
of Neil J . Gillespie, Case No. 20133090(5)
Dear Mr. Harkness, et al:
This is my reply to the UPL Investigation of Neil J . Gillespie, Case No. 20133090(5), initiated
on the complaint of Mr. Rodems. Wet-ink signed documents were provided to each of you.
Table of Contents
Opening Statement No Harm To The Public, No Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL)
Section I P.2 I deny the accusations in Mr. Rodems UPL complaint against me
Section II P.2 I represent only my interest in the family Trust as permitted by law
Section III P.4 Mr. Rodems provided me legal advice on foreclosure, but not UPL
Section IV P.6 The term personal representative is unconstitutionally vague
Section V P.6 I represent only my interest in estate matters as permitted by law
Section VI P.9 I am unable to obtain adequate counsel, IFP granted nine (9) times
Section VII P.9 Not able to obtain adequate representation in 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
Section VIII P.10 Foreclosure legal advice from Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida
Section IX P.11 Not able to obtain adequate representation in foreclosure of HECM
Section X P.12 Referral to Gregory D. J ones by TFB Lawyer Referral Service (LRS)
Section XI P.13 J udge Hodges had authority to appoint counsel in 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
Section XII P.14 Eleventh Circuit had authority to appoint counsel in Appeal No. 12-11028
Section XIII P.15 Fla. Atty. Gen. had duty to represent me, F.S. 16.57 and F.S. 760.021
Section XIV P.16 Legal aid, a right in itself UN Special Rapporteur Gabriela Knaul
Section XV P.17 Right to counsel in civil litigation, Civil Gideon, American Bar Association
Section XVI P.19 Right to Counsel, without conflict of interest, Wikipedia
Section XVII P.19 Legal authorities, standard for review of nonlawyer pro se pleadings
Section XVIII P.22 Legal authorities for pro se self-representation, Petition No. 13-7280
Section XIX P.22 Sham order of Martha Cook attached to Mr. Rodems UPL complaint
Section XX P.24 Conclusion: No UPL, TFB Abuse of Power. U.S. Attorney M.D. Fla.
Note: Corrections noted throughout, and ongoing in nature.

Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL) Investigation February 5, 2014
of Neil J . Gillespie, Case No. 20133090(5) Page -2
In order to comply with The Bars page limits, separate volume appendices are posted on Scribd
at the URLs provided on the Index to Exhibits. The appendices are also available upon request.
Opening Statement - No Harm To The Public, No UPL
The Florida Bars webiste shows this statement on Unlicensed Practice:
Unlicensed Practice: The Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL) program was established
by the Supreme Court of Florida to protect the public against harm caused by unlicensed
individuals practicing law.
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/WebNodes.nsf/Nodes/CAB70A7265C39112852577E000485BCA
No member of the public was harmed by me representing myself or my interests as alleged in the
sworn complaint of Mr. Rodems dated May 1, 2013. I do not earn income from UPL.
Section I I deny the accusations in Mr. Rodems UPL complaint against me
UPL is a 3d felony subject to 5-yrs in prison (454.23), defined by Florida Bar Rule 10-2.1(a):
(a) Unlicensed Practice of Law. The unlicensed practice of law shall mean the practice
of law, as prohibited by statute, court rule, and case law of the state of Florida.
Mr. Rodems UPL complaint provided to me by Ms. Coaxums letter of May 14, 2013 alleges,
Neil J . Gillespie is not a lawyer. He has, however, represented a Trust in state and
federal court litigation, and as a personal representative of the Estate of Penelope
Gillespie in another case.
I deny Mr. Rodems allegation that I represented a Trust in state and federal court litigation,
and as a personal representative of the Estate of Penelope Gillespie... I represent only my
personal interest for myself, and my personal interest as co-trustee, as permitted by law.
I am not a lawyer. I appear pro se because I am unable to obtain adequate counsel. Mr. Rodems
misconduct in this matter since 2006 makes obtaining adequate counsel impossible.
Section II I represent only my interest in the family Trust as permitted by law
Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v Neil J . Gillespie et al (RMS v. Neil Gillespie)
Mr. Rodems complaint alleges, Neil J . Gillespie is not a lawyer. He has, however, represented
a Trust in state and federal court litigation....The cases are:
(1) Reverse Mortgage Solutions Inc v. Neil J . Gillespie and Mark Gillespie as Co-
Trustees of the Gillespie Family Living Trust, et al., pending in the Florida 5th J udicial
circuit, Case No. 42-2013CA-000115-AXXX-XX; Mr. Gillespie, acting as Trustee,
removed the case to the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala
Division, Case No. 5: 13-cv-00058-0C-WTH-PRL;
Mr. Rodems is wrong. I only represent my interest in the Trust. My co-trustee is my brother
Mark Gillespie. Lawyers of Kaufman, Englett and Lynd, PLLC (KEL) represent Mark Gillespie
et al. in the Reverse Mortgage Solutions case. Tiffany Caparas of KEL appeared (Exhibit 1) in
the Marion County case for Mark Gillespie and spouse and [successfully] moved to quash
service of process. (Exhibit 2)
Anthony J . Solomon, Esq. of KEL filed Notice of Consent to J udgment J uly 8, 2013 for
Defendants Mark Gillespie, J oetta Gillespie (f.k.a. unknown spouse) and Elizabeth Bauerle, now
known as Elizabeth Bidgood. The Notice of Consent to J udgment appears at Exhibit 3.
Plaintiffs counsel Danielle N. Parsons gave notice of dropping party defendant Unknown
Spouse of Neil J . Gillespie J une 19, 2013.
Florida Circuit J udge Hale Ralph Stancil presided and has advised me of engaging in UPL for
representing my interests in the Marion County case, which I removed to federal court.
Mr. Rodems wrongly relies on EHQF Trust v. S & A Capital Partners, Inc.
Mr. Rodems reliance in his complaint on EHQF Trust v. S & A Capital Partners, Inc. is belied
by the case holding, emphasized in this paragraph from his UPL complaint against me:
A non-lawyer trustee may not act as attorney for the trust. It constitutes an unlicensed
practice of law. EHQF Trust v. S & A Capital Partners, Inc., 947 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007)("The notice of appeal filed by appellant, a trust, was not signed by an
attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Section 454.23, Florida Statutes (2006),
prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law, provides no exception for representation of a
trust. Although Florida has not previously addressed the issue, other states have
concluded that a trustee cannot appear pro se on behalf of the trust, because the trustee
represents the interests of others and would therefore be engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law."). (bold and underline added)
Mr. Rodems argument in EHQF fails here because I only represent my own interests. The
lawyers at KEL represent my brother and co-trustee Mark Gillespie et al.
Furthermore, my homestead at 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala Florida is the only asset in the Trust,
and I am the only person with a viable interest in the home. Mark Gillespie, J oetta Gillespie and
Elizabeth Bidgood all gave notice of consent to judgment by and through lawyers at Kaufman,
Englett and Lynd, PLLC (KEL). Thus, they have no interest in the home.
Mr. Rodems has lied so much about the Trust, that I made it public as filed with my affidavit of
indigency in case 5:11-cv-00539 (Doc. 3) on PACER,
has not
Case 5:11-cv-00539-WTH-TBS Document 3 Filed 09/20/11 Page 1 of 37 PageID 76
I did not create the Trust and do not know its purpose. The grantor Trustees are deceased. No
living person knows the purpose of the Trust. The Trust is provided in Separate Volume
Appendix UPL B, Appendix 2, as filed in 5:11-cv-00539 with my statement about the Trust.
U.S.D.C., M.D. of Florida, Ocala Division, Case No. 5:13-cv-00058-0C-WTH-PRL
Senior US J udge Wm. Terrell Hodges presided in federal court with US Magistrate J udge
Thomas B. Smith, neither of whom advised that I engaged in UPL.
Reverse Mortgage Solutions Inc. v. Neil J . Gillespie is a wrongful foreclosure of my homestead,
and Home Equity Conversion Mortgage or HECM reverse mortgage, a Federal Housing
Authority "reverse" mortgage program administered by the Secretary, United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (Secretary or HUD). My homes value is $74,730 and
falling. The mortgage payoff balance is $114,889. The property is "underwater" by $40,159. A
HECM cannot be refinanced. A ruling J anuary 4, 2013 in Bennett v. Donovan held in part,
"HUD itself has the capability to provide complete relief to the lenders and mortgagors alike,
which eliminates the uncertainty of third-party action that would otherwise block standing."
There have been subsequent rulings in Bennett, and HUD filed a Notice of Appeal Nov-26-13.
I am one of two surviving HECM mortgagors, and the only surviving homeowner living in the
home, alone, in substantial compliance with the HECM Note, making this foreclosure of a
HECM premature. My bother Mark Gillespie of Fort Worth Texas is also a surviving borrower,
but he does not live in the home. The HECM becomes due and payable in full "if a mortgagor
dies and the property is not the principal residence of at least one surviving mortgagor....and no
other mortgagor retains title to the property." 24 C.F.R. 206.27(c).
Mortgagor Ms. Gillespie died in 2009. But I am a surviving borrower or mortgagor living in the
home as my principal residence, and retain title to the property. Therefore I dispute the
Plaintiffs allegations in its "Verified Complaint to Foreclose Home Equity Conversion
Mortgage". That means a substantial disputed issue of federal HECM law is a necessary element
of the Plaintiffs state law foreclosure claim that this HECM is due and payable.
Apparently Mr. Rodems agrees (below), so I question his motive in making this UPL complaint.
Section III Mr. Rodems provided me legal advice on foreclosure, but not UPL
Mr. Rodems provided me legal advice about this HECM reverse mortgage on J une 21, 2011
during his deposition of me in Gillespie v Barker Rodems & Cook, case 05-CA-7205, while I
was held coercive custody at the Hillsborough Courthouse.
On J une 1, 2011 Mr. Rodems corruptly got a civil bodily attachment arrest order issued to
depose me after case 05-CA-7205 closed and was on appeal in 2D10-5197. It was part of a
RICO racketeering scheme to force a coercive confinement settlement of my federal claims in
5:10-cv-503, Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit Florida et al, U.S.D.C. M.D.Fla. Ocala Div.,
as described in my Motion to Reconsider, Vacate or Modify Order in Appeal No. 12-11028-B in
the U.S. Eleventh Circuit found on PACER and posted on Scribed:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/95369974/Motion-to-Reconsider-RICO-C-A-11-12-11028-B
Prior to providing me legal advice, Mr. Rodems read the all the mortgage documents, and did not
advise me that if I represented myself it would be UPL. Rodems also read The Gillespie Family
Living Trust Agreement Dated February 10, 1997.
The transcript of the deposition shows where Mr. Rodems voluntarily provided me legal advice
but failed to inform me that appearing pro se to defend the foreclosure would subject me to his
UPL complaint and investigation for UPL by The Florida Bar. The pages appear at Exhibit 4.
Transcript, J une 11, 2011, page 107
16 [ Mr . Rodems] Q Okay. Let ' s go t hr ough t he i t ems t hat I
17 have r equest ed i n t he deposi t i on. The f i r st i t em
18 was t he t r ust and al l amendment s, modi f i cat i ons or
19 changes. You' ve pr ovi ded me wi t h a document whi ch
20 i s Exhi bi t 4. I s i t your t est i mony t hat t hi s i s a
21 copy of t he t r ust dat ed Febr uar y 10t h, 1997 and al l
22 amendment s or modi f i cat i ons or changes?
23 [ Mr . Gi l l espi e] A Let me t ake a qui ck l ook at i t .
24 [ Mr . Rodems] Q Yes, si r .
25 [ Mr . Gi l l espi e] A Yes, uh- huh.
9 [ Mr . Rodems] Q Okay. I f I r ead t hi s cor r ect l y, Mr .
10 Gi l l espi e, t he bor r ower f or t hi s r ever se mor t gage
11 was Penel ope M. Gi l l espi e, Nei l J . Gi l l espi e, and
12 Mar k Gi l l espi e as co- t r ust ees of t he Gi l l espi e
13 Fami l y Li vi ng Tr ust , an agr eement dat ed Febr uar y 10,
14 1997. Cor r ect ?
15 [ Mr . Gi l l espi e] A That ' s one way t o r ead i t . Bank of
16 Amer i ca doesn' t agr ee wi t h t hat .
17 [ Mr . Rodems] Q And I ' l l r ead t he accel er at i on cl ause
18 about when t he debt becomes due. " The Lender may
19 r equi r e i mmedi at e payment i n f ul l of al l sums
20 secur ed by t he secur i t y i nt er est i f a bor r ower di es
21 and t he pr oper t y i s not t he pr i nci pal r esi dence of
22 at l east one sur vi vi ng bor r ower . "
8 BY MR. RODEMS:
9 Q Wel l , I guess t hat ' s an i ssue bet ween
10 Bank of Amer i ca and al l of you f ol ks, but i t sur e
11 does appear t o me t hat you' r e a bor r ower and you' r e
12 st i l l l i vi ng t her e, and t her e i s no accel er at i on of
13 t he debt . I s t hat your under st andi ng, Mr .
14 Gi l l espi e?
15 A That ' s what I ' ve been t ol d.
Section IV The term personal representative is unconstitutionally vague
J uly 29, 2013 I gave notice to Ms. Coaxum and The Florida Bar that the term personal
representative is confusing to nonlawyers because there is no distinction between a court-
appointed personal representative of an estate, and the term personal representative used by
a testatrix in a will to appoint a personal representative. My notice appears at footnote 1, page 2:
The Florida Bar should seek clarification in the law for the term personal
representative. The term is used by a testatrix in a will to appoint a personal
representative; and the same term is used by a court to appoint by Order a personal
representative. This is confusing to nonlawyers.
The phrase personal representative does not provide guidance on which use is intended and
invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. This vaugness could be cured by calling a
court appointed personal representative an executor, a term used in other states.
The phrase personal representative makes the potential for UPL on whether a layman is able to
satisfy an undefined level of proof as to its meaning. The phrase personal representative fails
to provide the layman with a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited with explicit
standards. It is therefore unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Section V I represent only my interest in estate matters as permitted by law
Rodems complaint alleges, Neil J . Gillespie is not a lawyer. He has, however, represented...as
a "personal representative" of the "Estate of Penelope Gillespie" in another case....
(2) Estate of Penelope Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Florida, which was filed in
the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, Case No.
5:11-cv-539-OC-10TBS.
Mr. Rodems is wrong. I only represent my interest in the estate, as permitted by law.
Fla. Prob. R., Rule 5.030(a) Required; Exception. Every guardian and every personal
representative, unless the personal representative remains the sole interested person, shall be
represented by an attorney admitted to practice in Florida.
The exception allows me to represent my sole interest in matters of estate. No one has yet
petitioned for formal administration of the Estate of Penelope Gillespie.
Lituchy v. Estate of Lituchy, - So.3d -, 2011 WL 2135597 (Fla. 4th DCA J un 01, 2011)
The trial court denied the pro se petition for formal administration of the estate of the
appellant's wife, because the appellant was not represented by an attorney. We reverse,
because the petition states that the appellant is his wife's sole beneficiary. Thus, he is
entitled to file the petition without the necessity of an attorney. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.030(a)
(Every guardian and every personal representative, unless the personal representative
remains the sole interested person, shall be represented by an attorney admitted to
practice in Florida.) (emphasis added); Benedetto v. Columbia Park Healthcare Sys.,
922 So.2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
http://www.scribd.com/doc/90008415/FL-Rule-5-030-a-Pro-Se-Estate
Mr. Rodems bears ultimate responsibility for case 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
In the wrongful death of my Mother, RICO, Commerce Clause, Title 15 Interstate Commerce
Neither federal case against the Thirteenth J udicial Circuit would have been filed but for Mr.
Rodems misconduct, failure of The Florida Bar to properly regulate Rodems in the practice of
law affecting interstate commerce, referral of Robert W. Bauer by The Bars Lawyer Referral
Service, and RICO racketeering, etc.
My initial complaint for wrongful death under The Florida Wrongful Death Act, 768.16 -
768.26 Florida Statutes, was filed on the last day under the 2 years SOL, September 16, 2009.
Senior US J udge Wm. Terrell Hodges presided, with US Magistrate J udge Thomas B. Smith,
neither of whom advised that I was engaged in the Unlicensed Practice of Law.
The docket shows I filed Objections (Doc. 9) to a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 8),
withdrew my motion/affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 10), paid the $350 filing fee
December 2, 2011, filed a Response (Doc. 14) to an Order to Show Cause (Doc. 11), filed an
Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) J anuary 17, 2012 for my interest only
1
under Rule 20(a)(1),
F.R.C.P. [5] individually, a right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and
has question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs in this action, and my interest only in the
Estate of Penelope Gillespie, Fla. Prob. Rule 5.030(a) Exception, see Lituchy v. Estate of
Lituchy, and as permitted by Florida law. Separate Vol. Appendix UPL B, Appendix 1, shows,

1
6. Former plaintiff Mark J . Gillespie was removed from this first amended complaint.
7. Former plaintiff Elizabeth Bauerle was removed from this first amended complaint.
Notice of Filing (Doc. 4) September 20, 2011. Estate of Penelope Gillespie, et al.
v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit Florida et al, Case 5:11-cv-539-WTH-TBS U.S. District
Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division.
1. Certified copy, Last Will and Testament of Penelope Gillespie, the Decedent.
2. Certificate of Death, Penelope Gillespie, the Decedent.
3. Authorization of Mark Gillespie to Neil Gillespie to proceed as personal
representative of Penelope Gillespie, the Decedent.
Case 5:11-cv-00539-WTH-TBS Document 4 Filed 09/20/11 Page 1 of 8 PageID 113
Prior to filing First my Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) Mark Gillespie et al no longer wanted to
be part of this lawsuit, leaving me as sole interested person.
J udge Hodges wrongly dismissed my Amended Complaint (Doc. 15), which was legally
sufficient stated a claim of wrongful death. From 33, First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15)
33. Under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, the basis for an action for wrongful death
is a death caused by a wrongful act, negligence, default or breach of contract or
warranty. (768.19, Fla. Stat.). There must be evidence of a breach of duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiffs decedent, or an underlying tort. In the case of negligence, to
establish a cause of action in a wrongful death action, the plaintiff must allege and prove:
(1) the existence of a legal duty owed to the decedent;
(2) the breach of that duty;
(3) legal or proximate cause of death was that breach; and
(4) consequential damages.
In connection with the requirement in wrongful death actions of an underlying tort or
breach of duty, proof of the defendants violation of a statute or regulatory provision that
either is designed to protect a particular class of persons from their inability to protect
themselves or establishes a duty to take precautions to guard a certain class of persons
from a specific type of injury, establishes negligence per se. Florida Freight Terminals,
Inc. v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1978).
My First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) was legally sufficient, and alleged and proved a case of
wrongful death. In addition, the eggshell skull rule holds the defendant liable for unforeseen and
uncommon reactions to the defendants negligent or intentional tort,
Eggshell skull rule
Doctrine that makes a defendant liable for the plaintiff's unforeseeable and uncommon
reactions to the defendant's negligent or intentional tort. If the defendant commits a tort
against the plaintiff without a complete defense, the defendant becomes liable for any
injury that is magnified by the plaintiff's peculiar characteristics.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eggshell_skull_rule
Section VI I am unable to obtain adequate counsel, IFP granted nine (9) times
I am responding to this UPL complaint pro se without the benefit of counsel because I am unable
to obtain adequate counsel, as shown herein. Previously I was determined indigent and/or
insolvent, and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis nine (9) times.
Supreme Court of the United States, Petition No. 13-7280
Supreme Court of the United States, Petition No. 12-7747; and rehearing thereof.
Florida Supreme Court, Nos. SC11-858, No. SC11-1622.
Florida Second District Court of Appeal, 2D10-5197, 2D10-5529, and 2D11-2127.
Hillsborough Co., Florida, 05-CA-7205, F.S. 27.52 appointed public defender.
UPL Bar Counsel Ms. Coaxum wrote me J uly 25, 2013, 2 You do have the right to retain
counsel at any time during this investigation. I am financially unable to obtain adequate
representation. My right to obtain counsel is of little meaning if I am unable to pay the costs
associated with obtaining adequate counsel. The Supreme Court noted in Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . .He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he had a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
Section VII Not able to obtain adequate representation in 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
In each case Mr. Rodems complained about, I sought legal advice from lawyers licensed to
practice in Florida. No lawyer I consulted was able to adequately represent me. So I appeared
pro se for my interests as permitted by law. No lawyer I contacted advised me that I would be
engaged in UPL by representing my interests. Therefore I believe that I did not engage in UPL.
In the wrongful death case, 5:11-cv-00539, I contacted by email September 21, 2011 the
McMillen Law Firms online portal, and by email October 10, 2011 Morgan & Morgan. See,
Separate Volume Appendix UPL B, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4,
Appendix 3 Email request for representation, wrongful death, 5:11-cv-00539. Email of Neil
Gillespie September 21, 2011 to the McMillen Law Firms online portal. Email
Response of Scott R. McMillen September 22, 2011.
Appendix 4. Email request for representation, wrongful death, 5:11-cv-00539. Email of Neil
Gillespie October 10, 2011 to J ohn Bryan Morgan. Email response of Tim
Morgan, Morgan & Morgan, October 10, 2011.
Section VIII Foreclosure legal advice from Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida
In each case Mr. Rodems complained about, I sought legal advice from lawyers licensed to
practice in Florida. No lawyer I consulted was able to competently represent me. So I appeared
pro se for my interests as permitted by law. No lawyer that I contacted informed me that I would
be subject to a UPL complaint. Therefore I believe that I did not engage in UPL.
Legal advice sought and obtained in RMS v. Neil Gillespie Marion County 2013-CA-000115:
Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida granted my application for services J anuary 23, 2013.
The next day J anuary 24, 2013 at 12.36 PM I got a phone call from attorney Craig H. Benson on
behalf of Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida. Mr. Benson did not advise me of UPL.
The redacted application of Neil Gillespie made J anuary 17, 2013 to Community Legal Services
of Mid-Florida (CLSMF) appears at Appendix 5 to Separate Volume Appendix UPL-B
A transcript of telephonic legal advice J anuary 24, 2013 by Mr. Benson on behalf of CLSMF
appears at Appendix 6 to Separate Volume Appendix UPL-B
Mr. Benson provided foreclosure legal advice to me telephonically. The phone call was recorded
for quality assurance purposes. All calls on home office telephone extension (352) 854-7807 are
recorded for quality assurance purposes pursuant to the use exemption of Fla. Stat. ch. 934,
934.02(4)(a)(1) and the holding of Royal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. J efferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
924 F.2d 215 (11th Cir. 1991). This is, in part, a disability accommodation for me. It is also in
response to Mr. Rodems telephone harassment and the need to have a record available for the
purpose of impeachment, a quality assurance purpose.
Here my recorded telephone call with Mr. Benson, and the transcript of the telephone call, stands
to impeach another falsehood by Mr. Rodems, that I engaged in UPL.
Mr. Benson did not provide legal advice on whether I might engage in UPL by representing my
own interests. UPL was not discussed. Mr. Benson said he could not advise as to my brother and
his interests. Mr. Benson said he is not a trust attorney. Our family attorney ultimately could not
provide legal advice because of conflicts; he represented the Oak Run Homeowners Association
in the instant action; and he represented our family at the HECM loan closing, notarized the quit
claim deed, and witnessed other documents.
The transcript section below of my discussion with Mr. Benson shows this conceptual approach to
the lawsuit: Do I need two sets of answers, since I am being sued personally, and as co-trustee?
Transcript, J anuary 24, 2013, page 26
adequately
I was told CLSMF does not provide representation
2. MR. GILLESPIE: So I am just responding to
3. the -- myself personally and myself as a trustee,
4. I'm not responding for anyone else?
5. MR. BENSON: No, you can't respond for anyone
6. else. You can only respond for you as a trustee
7. and you as a person.
8. MR. GILLESPIE: And can I -- all right. So I
9. guess I need to put the answers separately.
10. MR. BENSON: Yes. Yeah, you have to do them
11. on separate pieces of paper.
12. MR. GILLESPIE: Or separate sections, yeah.
13. MR. BENSON: Well, separate -- it needs to be
14. separate documents completely.
15. MR. GILLESPIE: Oh, really?
16. MR. BENSON: Yeah, it's like if you were two
17. different people.
Fortunately I did not take that legal course of action. I only filed one response, a motion to
dismiss for my personal interest individually, and for my personal interest in the trust. I am only
one person, with two different interests. I am not two different people.
Section IX Not able to obtain adequate representation in foreclosure of HECM, RMS v Gillespie
I was not able to obtain counsel in the HECM foreclosure case, and reluctantly appeared pro se.
I unsuccessfully contacted the following lawyers and law firms for representation.
Mr. Craig Briskin, Esq., Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, 1250 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 300,
Washington, DC 20036. Mr. Briskin was co-counsel in Robert Bennett v. Secretary HUD.
Initially Mr. Briskin corresponded with me by email until he learned of Petition 12-7747.
Then he stopped responding.
J o Ann J enkins, President, AARP Foundation, 601 E St. NW, Washington, DC 20049
J effrey A. Klein, Esq., The Law Office of J effrey A. Klein, P.A., 747 S. Ridgewood Ave.
Suite 108, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114. Mr. Klein consulted with me by telephone J uly 5,
2013. Prior to the call Mr. Klein found my mortgage online, the image of which showed
change by interlineation. I provided Mr. Klein PDF copies of my HUD complaint and
exhibits J uly 17, 2013 as we agreed. After I was served the foreclosure lawsuit I contacted
Mr. Klein again. Later Mr. Klein declined to represent me, which denial email I forwarded to
The Florida Bar to J ohn F. Harkness, Executive Director, and Paul F. Hill, General Counsel.
Foreclosure defense lawyers I contacted, such as Mark Stopa and Matt Weidner would not
represent me. Lawyers who solicited me by mail would not take the case pro bono, or could
not provide adequate representation for one reason or another.
Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of Lawyer Regulation
Section X Referral to Gregory D. J ones by The Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service (LRS)
The Florida Bar LRS does not have a panel for UPL. I telephoned at 3:02 PM the LRS on J uly
31, 2013 for a referral to counsel for representation in the Unlicensed Practice of Law
Investigation (UPL) of Neil J . Gillespie, Case No. 20133090(5), following receipt of a letter
dated J uly 25, 2013 from Ghunise L. Coaxum, UPL Bar Counsel, Orlando UPL Department,
stating inter alia that there is no provision for indigent counsel appointment for me and UPL.
I asked for a referral in Marion County where I live. The woman who took my call provided a
referral for "legal malpractice" as a substitute for "Unlicensed Practice of Law" and said there is
no panel for UPL, and provided a referral to Gregory David J ones. The Florida Bars Online
referral service does not show UPL as a panel category either.
Eventually I spoke with Karen Kelly who reiterated the referral to Mr. J ones, and confirmed
there is no panel category for UPL. Clearly "legal malpractice" is a different are of law than
"Unlicensed Practice of Law".
TFB Lawyer Referral Service covers 47 counties in Florida. The remaining 20 counties are
served by local bar association lawyer referral services. Tampa is covered by the Hillsborough
Bar Association. So a referral to Mr. J ones in Tampa was improper. One might argue that the
rule does not apply to him due to a satellite office in Gainesville (Alachua County) or Inverness
(Citrus County) but I live in Ocala, Marion County.
Given that Mr. Rodems of Tampa made the UPL complaint against me, and SCOTUS Petition
No. 12-7747 was against the Thirteenth J udicial Circuit in Tampa, it would be professional
suicide for Mr. J ones to honestly represent me. In other words, Mr. J ones would be compromised
professionally by his duty to me as a client, and his ongoing practice of law in Thirteenth
J udicial Circuit in Tampa, Hillsborough County.
Unfortunately the Thirteenth J udicial Circuit is a dangerous and vindictive jurisdiction.
Hillsborough J udge Gregory Holders life was in danger for speaking out about judicial crimes
and misconduct in Hillsborough County:
"One law enforcement agent testified at trial that the corruption investigation team was
concerned that J udge Holders activities were being monitored by targets of the
investigation. J udge Holder was advised by federal law enforcement agents to carry a
weapon, and he was provided with a secure cell phone with which to communicate with
federal agents."
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/03/03-1171/Filed_08-19-
2005_MemoLawinSupportofRespMotforAttyFees.pdf
The above quote is found at footnote 8, page 8, to J udge Holders Memorandum of Law in
Support of Respondents Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees in SC03-1171 and is found on the
Supreme Court of Floridas website at the link above. J udge Holder spent $1.92 million dollars,
and many years of his life, defending his reputation during the corrupt J QC investigation of him.
That is why I am concerned for my safety. If the "targets of the investigation" - other judges -
would kill J udge Holder to silence him for reporting judicial misconduct, such persons would
give little thought to killing me for my reports of judicial misconduct.
Mr. J ones website stated that he was former Chairperson of Grievance Committee 13B, and a
member of UPL Committee. The Bar confirmed his past membership on a UPL Committee, a list
dated J uly 16, 2002, and 13th J udicial Circuit Grievance Com 7/10/1996 1998 Chair. In my
opinion it is unlikely a Bar insider like Mr. J ones could adequately represent me.
My letter of disengagement to Mr. J ones November 6, 2013 appears at Exhibit 5, and states,
Dear Mr. J ones:
This is a letter of disengagement.
Unfortunately you have not responded to several requests for disability accommodation.
Accordingly I no longer have confidence in our attorney-client relationship, and hereby
terminate that relationship to the extent one exists under The Florida Bar Lawyer Referral
Service (LRS) agreement, and Florida Bar rules generally.
I hereby release you from further obligation under the LRS referral.
Regarding $25 I paid you for the LRS referral, you may return the funds to me at the
address below, or you may keep the $25 if you believe you earned or are otherwise
entitled to the money, or you may donate the $25 to a charity of your choice, or you may
dispose of the money in any other lawful way. The ultimate disposition of the $25 I paid
you is your decision.
I hereby waive my claim to $25 I paid you by postal service money order on September
4, 2013. Sincerely,
Neil J . Gillespie
Section XI J udge Hodges had authority to appoint counsel in 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
U.S. Eleventh Circuit Non-Criminal Justice Act Counsel Appointment
On information and belief, J udge Hodges and the District Court had authority to appoint counsel
to represent me in 5:11-cv-539. The U.S. Eleventh Circuit adopted provisions for furnishing
representation for persons financially unable to obtain adequate representation in cases and
situations which do not fall within the scope of 18 U.S.C. 3006A, as amended -- but in which
the court believes that the interests of justice will be served by the presence of counsel.
Addenda Five, 11th Cir. R., Non-Criminal J ustice Act Counsel Appointment, (b)(2) shows cause
for appointment of counsel; I sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the interest of justice
would be served by the presence of counsel. I am disabled and believe a counsel appointment
was appropriate under the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. given the issues in this matter.
When a litigants health is at risk, appointment of counsel is appropriate. In an opinion decided
March 27, 2012 by J udge Richard Posner of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in a civil
rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Court suggested appointment of counsel because
withholding nutritious food would violate the Eighth Amendment. (Prude v. Clarke, No. 11-
2811; Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:10-cv-
00167-J PSJ .P. Stadtmueller, J udge.).
Attorney J eff Childers stated in the Non-Pecuniary Cost of Litigation section in his Economic
Analysis of this matter that Plaintiff is likely suffering from physical and emotional ill effects
resulting from the litigation, as described in Legal Abuse Syndrome,...In attempting to evaluate
the physical and emotional costs of going forward with the litigation, I considered both short and
long-term effects, and the opportunity cost [and the] loss of energy related to physical and
emotional side-effects. My estimate was $100,000....
Section XII Eleventh Circuit had authority to appoint counsel in Appeal No. 12-11028
Neil J. Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Florida et al
The U.S. Eleventh Circuit adopted provisions for furnishing representation for persons
financially unable to obtain adequate representation in cases and situations which do not
fall within the scope of 18 U.S.C. 3006A, as amended -- but in which the court believes that
the interests of justice will be served by the presence of counsel.
Addenda Five, 11th Cir. R., Non-Criminal J ustice Act Counsel Appointment, (b)(2) shows cause
for appointment of counsel; I sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the interest of justice
would be served by the presence of counsel. I am disabled and believe a counsel appointment
was appropriate under the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. given the issues in this matter.
When a litigants health is at risk, appointment of counsel is appropriate. In an opinion decided
March 27, 2012 by J udge Richard Posner of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in a civil
rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Court suggested appointment of counsel because
withholding nutritious food would violate the Eighth Amendment. (Prude v. Clarke, No. 11-
2811; Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:10-cv-
00167-J PSJ .P. Stadtmueller, J udge.).
Attorney J eff Childers stated in the Non-Pecuniary Cost of Litigation section in his Economic
Analysis of this matter that Plaintiff is likely suffering from physical and emotional ill effects
resulting from the litigation, as described in Legal Abuse Syndrome,...In attempting to evaluate
the physical and emotional costs of going forward with the litigation, I considered both short and
long-term effects, and the opportunity cost [and the] loss of energy related to physical and
emotional side-effects. My estimate was $100,000....
the Plaintiff is Neil Gillespie in case 05-CA-7205 in
Hillsborough Co. with Barker, Rodems & Cook et al
the Plaintiff is Neil Gillespie in case 05-CA-7205 in
Hillsborough Co. with Barker, Rodems & Cook et al
Section XIII Fla. Atty. Gen. had a duty to represent me in 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
and since 2007, see composite of letters from AG Bill McCollum at Exhibit 6.
Office of Bill McCollum to Neil Gillespie, Re: Mr. Rodems, November 7, 2007
Office of Bill McCollum to Neil Gillespie, Re: Statewide Grand J ury, November 5, 2010
Department of Legal Affairs, Office of Civil Rights
Fla. Stat. 16.57, as amended in 2003, authorizes the Attorney General to investigate
alleged civil rights violations under chapter 760.
Fla. Stat. 760.021, as added in 2003, provides that the Attorney General may
commence a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and other relief
against any person or group perpetuating discriminatory practices. Any damages
recovered shall accrue to the injured party.
People of Florida Entitled to be Represented by the Attorney General
Fla. Const. Art. 4(b) The attorney general shall be the chief state legal officer. There is
created in the office of the attorney general the position of statewide prosecutor. The
statewide prosecutor shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to
prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more
judicial circuits as part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or
has affected two or more judicial circuits as provided by general law....
Fla. Stat. 16.01(5) Shall appear in and attend to such suits or prosecutions in any other
of the courts of this state or in any courts of any other state or of the United States.
Only the Attorney General of Florida may represent the State of Florida in a federal court
action. A circuit court judge was without the authority to appoint an acting state attorney
to represent the state in an action pending before a federal court. State ex rel. Shevin v.
Weinstein, 353 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dis1. 1978).
Generally, in any proceeding in which the rights and interests of the people of the state
are necessarily involved, they are entitled to be represented in the proceedings by the
Attorney General. Watson v. Claughton, 160 Fla. 217, 34 So. 2d 243 (1948).
Neil J . Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit Florida et al, 5:11-cv-539-oc-WTH-TBS
My First Amended Complaint pled civil rights violations and disability claims:
J URISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights that was the proximate
cause of the wrongful death of Penelope Gillespie, for Defendants violation the
Plaintiffs rights guaranteed under the Constitution and Laws of the United States
including the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as to
Due Process; The Eight Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as to Cruel &
Unusual Punishment; and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as
to Equal Protection;
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C., Chapter 126, 12101
et seq., Subchapter II, Public Services, Part A, 12131 - 12134, Subchapter III,
Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities, 12181 -
12189, Subchapter IV, 12201 - 12213, including the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA) updates;
42 U.S.C. 1981. Equal rights under the law to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings; 42 U.S.C. 1982. Property rights of citizens to inherit, hold, and
convey personal property; 42 U.S.C. 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights (2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness; 42 U.S.C. 1986.
Action for neglect to prevent the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in
section 1985; 42 U.S.C. 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights (b) for
attorneys fees; 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq. the Federal Protection and Advocacy for
Mentally Ill Individuals Act,
18 USC 1346 (fraud and honest services);
18 USC 1951 (interference with commerce),
Title 15 of the United States Code pertaining to restraint of trade and monopolies
(anti-trust law); These violations of law are pervasive and ongoing in nature.
This Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367 for
Article 1, Section 2, of the Constitution of Florida, Basic rights that do not
include protection of persons with mental disabilities, in conflict with federal law.
Article 1, Section 21, Access to Courts;
Article 1, Section 17, Excessive Punishments, excessive fines;
Article 1, Section 9, Due Process; for claims under
The Florida Wrongful Death Act, 768.16 to 768.26, Florida Statutes.
Section XIV Legal aid, a right in itself UN Special Rapporteur Gabriela Knaul
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13382&LangID=E
GENEVA (30 May 2013) The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence
of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, today urged world governments to develop and
sustain effective legal aid systems as an essential component of a fair and efficient justice
system founded on the rule of law.
Legal aid is both a right in itself and an essential precondition for the exercise and
enjoyment of a number of human rights, including the rights to a fair trial and to an
effective remedy, said Ms. Knaul, presenting her latest report to the UN Human Rights
Council. It represents an important safeguard that contributes to ensuring the fairness
and public trust in the administration of justice....
See Exhibit 7 International legal authorities, Treaties of the United States
U.S. Const. Article VI, Clause 2 a ratified treaty of the United States is the Supreme Law of the
land and all state law provisions which conflict with the treaty are overridden by the treaty.
The right of all people to competent legal representation is essential to upholding the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 10, 1948, and essential to upholding the following Conventions and Principals:
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Signed by President Carter October 5, 1977, ratified J une 8, 1992
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)
Signed by President Bush December 9, 2003, ratified October 30, 2006.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. Signed by President Reagan April 18, 1988, ratified October 21, 1994
International Norms And Standards Relating To Disability
Basic Principals and Guidelines, on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
Basic Principles of J ustice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
Section XV Right to counsel in civil litigation, Civil Gideon, American Bar Association
The ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL J USTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSES SERVICES (3d ed. 1992),
and specifically, the revisions made to Standards 5-5.1and 5-5.2 and their commentaries.
(a) Standard 5-5.1 (footnote 7) Counsel should be provided in all proceedings for
offenses punishable by death or incarceration, regardless of their denomination as
felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise. An offense is also deemed to be
punishable by incarceration if the fact of conviction
may be established in a subsequent proceeding, thereby
Exhibit 7
Exhibit 7
Exhibit 7
subjecting the defendant to incarceration. (emphasis added in
response to UPL Bar prosecutor Ms. Coaxum, see next paragraph.
Ms. Coaxum wrote me J uly 25, 2013, 1: [The ABA subsequent proceeding standard applied]
You requested the appointment of counsel based on the argument that you are entitled to
counsel since the unlicensed practice of law is a third-degree felony. I do not have the
authority to appoint counsel to represent you in this investigation, nor am I required to do
so. While the unlicensed practice of law is a felony, it would have to be investigated as
such, charged and prosecuted by the Office of the State Attorney and not The Florida
Bar. This investigation is to determine any wrongdoing that may or may not conclude
with any civil remedies.
You based your request, in part, on the constitution of Florida, the United States and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Please note that the Sixth Amendment
standard for effective assistance of counsel does not apply in the civil context.
My request for counsel was not limited to Gideon v. Wainwright, the Sixth Amendment,
designation as a civil or criminal proceeding, or whether Ms. Coaxum had the authority or was
required to appoint counsel. My request was of a broad, general nature to include any rule or
law, including the Civil Gideon principal.
The standard for a constitutional right to counsel is based not on whether the hearing is
designated as civil or criminal, but rather on whether the defendants physical liberty
interest is jeopardized. The Court has recognized this standard in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, where it set forth that it is the defendants interest in personal freedom, and not
simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases, which
triggers the right to appointed counsel. 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981) (establishing that as a litigant's
interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel).
The American Bar Association (ABA) has long maintained that the potential deprivation of a
defendants liberty interest requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant who
faces potential incarceration in civil proceedings. Our history reflects unwavering commitment
to the principle that society must provide equal access to justice, including meaningful access to
legal representation for low income individuals, in adversarial proceedings.
The ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL J USTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSES SERVICES (3d ed. 1992),
and specifically, the revisions made to Standards 5-5.1and 5-5.2 and their commentaries.
(a) Standard 5-5.1 (footnote 7) Counsel should be provided in all proceedings for
offenses punishable by death or incarceration, regardless of their denomination as
felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise. An offense is also deemed to be punishable by
incarceration if the fact of conviction may be established in a subsequent proceeding,
thereby subjecting the defendant to incarceration.
The American Bar Association adopted the black letter and commentary ABA Basic Principles
of a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings, dated August 2010. The ABA Civil Right to
Counsel webpage has links to the ABA Toolkit for a Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings.
The Toolkit includes in one package, for the first time, the "ABA Basic Principles for a
Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings" and "The ABA Model Access Act," which
together provide two important tools for jurisdictions that are willing and able to
implement a civil right to counsel.
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/civil_right_to_cou
nsel.html
National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel: news, state statutes, articles, other sources.
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/
ABA Model Access Act (adopted by ABA House of Delegates, August 2010), ABA Resolution
Endorsing a Civil Right to Counsel (adopted by ABA House of Delegates August 2006), and
Gideons New Trumpet: Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel in Massachusetts A report of the
Boston Bar Association Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel. (9/2008)
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/sclaid/atjresourcecenter/do
wnloads/gideons_new_trumpet_9_08.authcheckdam.pdf
Gideon at 50 | Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/gideon_at_50.html
Section XVI Right to Counsel, without conflict of interest, Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_counsel
Whether counsel is retained or appointed, the defendant has a right to counsel without a conflict
of interest. If an actual conflict of interest is present, and that conflict results in any adverse
effect on the representation, the result is automatic reversal.[15] The general rule is that conflicts
can be knowingly and intelligently waived,[16] but some conflicts are un-waiveable.[17]
[15] Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
[17] See, e.g., United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Fulton, 5
F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 1993).
Section XVII Legal authorities, standard for review of nonlawyer pro se pleadings
Rights, Privileges and Immunities - I hereby invoke my Rights, Privileges and Immunities
guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1,
Constitution of the United States.
U.S. federal legal authorities supporting self-representation.
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
...right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution
U.S.C. 1654 - Appearance personally or by counsel.
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1654
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17. Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity; Public Officers
(a) Real Party in Interest.
(1) Designation in General. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. The following may sue in their own names without joining the
person for whose benefit the action is brought:
(E) a trustee of an express trust;
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_17
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(e) Construing Pleadings
Rule 8(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_8
Florida state legal authorities supporting self-representation.
Florida Constitution
Article I, Section 21: Access to courts. The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
Florida Statutes, 454.18,
any person, whether an attorney or not . . . may conduct his or her own cause in any
court of this state.
to include all First Amendment protections
Fla. Prob. R., Rule 5.030(a) Required; Exception. Every guardian and every personal
representative, unless the personal representative remains the sole interested person, shall be
represented by an attorney admitted to practice in Florida.
Lituchy v. Estate of Lituchy, - So.3d -, 2011 WL 2135597 (Fla. 4th DCA J un 01, 2011)
The trial court denied the pro se petition for formal administration of the estate of the
appellant's wife, because the appellant was not represented by an attorney. We reverse,
because the petition states that the appellant is his wife's sole beneficiary. Thus, he is
entitled to file the petition without the necessity of an attorney. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.030(a)
(Every guardian and every personal representative, unless the personal representative
remains the sole interested person, shall be represented by an attorney admitted to
practice in Florida.) (emphasis added); Benedetto v. Columbia Park Healthcare Sys.,
922 So.2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
http://www.scribd.com/doc/90008415/FL-Rule-5-030-a-Pro-Se-Estate
Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (1978).
Once a person has made a decision to represent himself, the Supreme Court should not
enforce any unnecessary regulation which might tend to hinder the exercise of such right.
The protection of the public is the primary goal in determining whether a particular act
constitutes the practice of law. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (1978)
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys
Under Equal Protection Clause (Art. XIV, sec. 1) and the doctrine of staire decisis, Florida must
follow U.S. Supreme Courts rulings, and other Appellate and Civil Courts on pro se pleadings.
Pro Se Pleadings Construed Liberally - The Courts have long held that pro se pleadings are to be
read liberally and if there is relief available that they have failed to request, the Courts should be
lenient and the pro se litigant should be afforded that available relief.
Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1983) Reversed and Remanded which held:
[26] a court should be particularly careful to ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant.
Herron v. Beck, 693 F.2d at 127. See also Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1129 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding district court abused its discretion... failing to afford to a pro se civil
rights litigant...
[37] The pleadings of pro se litigants ... subject to less stringent rules. ... , however
inartfully drafted, must be held to less rigorous standards than...by lawyers. Woodall v.
Foti, 651 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); see Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 368
(5th Cir. 1981)."
F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assoc., 66 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 1995) reiterating general rule and outlining
exception for pro se litigants ...
We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and construe them liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,1263 (11th
Cir. 1998)
We give a liberal reading to pro se filings because those litigants lack formal legal
training. See GJ R Invs., 132 F.3d at 1369 (Courts do and should show a leniency to pro
se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.).
In Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11 th Cir. 09/17/2003) the Court held: The law does not
entertain the legal fiction that every individual has achieved a state of legal omniscience; ... there
is no presumption that all of the citizens actually know all of the law all of the time. Practically
speaking, citizens must educate themselves about the law See West Covina, 525 U.S. at
241,119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that an individual can turn to these public sources to learn about
the remedial procedures available to him"); id. at 242, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that a citizen
could not reasonably be expected to educate himself about the procedures available to protect
his interests"); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1799-1800 (1985)
See Exhibit 8 for additional pro se case law, Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards
than those drafted by attorneys.
Section XVIII Legal authorities for self-representation, Petition No. 13-7280, Exhibit 9
Section XVIX Sham order of Martha Cook attached to Mr. Rodems UPL complaint
Order Prohibiting Plaintiff from Appearing Pro Se, November 15, 2010
Mr. Rodems attached an order of Martha Cook to his UPL complaint, Order Prohibiting Plaintiff
from Appearing Pro Se, November 15, 2010. The order is not signed.
Ms. Coaxum had a duty to strike the order as bad evidence but failed to do so. Ms. Coaxum is a
UPL Bar prosecutor. The prosecutor is obligated to seek truth and to "do justice." See Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 Cmt. (1) (1983)(describing prosecutors as "minister[s] of
justice"); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC7-13 (1981) (stating that prosecutors
must "seek justice"); ABA Standards for CriminaIJ ustice A 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty
of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict").
Martha Cooks order is meaningless
The fact that the legislature cannot set a judge's vacation days brings up a parallel and little
known corollary: a judge cannot order the clerk of court to do anything absent a legislative
mandate. In civil court, court orders routinely contain language that the clerk is ordered to do so
and so forthwith. Unless the clerk is made a party to the lawsuit, these orders are meaningless.
The Clerk is not a party to case no. 05-CA-7205, thus the order is meaningless.
Mr. Rodems wrote Clerk Pat Frank May 31, 2011, in part, (Exhibit 10)
On November 15, 2010, J udge Cook entered and Order barring the Plaintiff, Neil J .
Gillespie, from appearing pro se, and also directing the Clerks office not to accept any
more filing from Mr. Gillespie. Since that time, the Clerks office has accepted a number
of flings from Mr. Gillespie. A copy of J udge Cooks Order is enclosed. Would you
please explain why your office has not complied with J udge Cooks Order?
Clerk Frank and Counsel Mr. Bohner docketed my pro se filings for almost eight months (8)
after the order was entered November 15, 2010, because the order was meaningless.
Soon after getting Rodems letter, Clerk Frank and Mr. Bohner corruptly conspired to use her
and his official position, property, and resources within her and his trust to secure a special
privilege, benefit, or exemption for Mr. Rodems and Rodems various constituencies, including
those who received a gift of legal services and settlement benefit to state of Florida judges,
public officers, public employees, and my former counsel Robert W. Bauer and his law firm, in
my federal lawsuit against the Thirteenth J udicial Circuit Florida, case no. 5:10-cv-00503.
J anuary 24, 2014 I submitted sworn complaints for Misuse of Public Position, F.S. 112.313(6)
for the Honorable Pat Frank, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, an elected public
officer, and the Clerks counsel Dale Kent Bohner a local government attorney, in my civil
lawsuit in Hillsborough County, Neil J . Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, and William J .
Cook, Case No. 05-CA-7205. August 11, 2005 - J une 21, 2011.
In addition, successor J udge J ames Arnold did not obey Cooks order. J udge Arnold did not
follow the order from the day he assumed the case, November 15, 2010, through J une 21, 2011.
This made Mr. Rodems very angry, and he filed a motion April 26, 2011, Defendants' Motion to
Strike Pro Se Filings by Plaintiff. Rodems sent a cover letter to J udge Arnold that appears to this
response at Exhibit 11. Mr. Rodems wrote J udge J ames Arnold April 26, 2011, in part,
Dear J udge Arnold:
Enclosed please find a courtesy copy of Defendants' Motion to Strike Pro Se Filings by
Plaintiff which was filed on even date in the above-referenced matter. By Order of this
Court entered November 15, 2010, Mr. Gillespie is prohibited from filing any documents
pro see Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
Ryan Christopher Rodems
J udge Arnold also ignored Martha Cooks sham order because it was meaningless.
On J une 14, 2013 I submitted to The Bar AFFIDAVIT OF NEIL J . GILLESPIE ON J UDGE
MARTHA J . COOKS Order Prohibiting Plaintiff from Appearing Pro Se [A Sham Order]
of Neil J. Gillespie, Case No. 20133090(5)
Page-24
Relevant portions from my affidavit on Martha Cook's sham order,
2. I made this affidavit to impeach the "Order Prohibiting Plaintiff from Appearing Pro Se"
(the "Order"), a sham Order entered November 15, 2010 by Judge Martha J. Cook in this case.
(Exhibit 1). The Order is a sham and did not address a bona fide issue. Judge Cook corruptly
entered the Order during a conflict of interest, while she was a Defendant in my federal disability
and civil rights lawsuit. Judge Cook entered the Order with a corrupt motive, to stop legitimate
inquiry showing her personal and business financial affairs violated the Florida Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judge Cook recused herself in this case November 18, 2010, three days after entering
the Order. Judge Cook's recusal shows my motion to disqualify her was legally justified.
3. On May 1, 2013 Ryan Christopher Rodems submitted the sham Order, under penalty of
perjury, in his vexatious Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL)' complaint against me to The Florida
Bar, case 20133090(5) for representing myself and my related interest pro se in other cases.
Section XX Conclusion: No UPL, TFB Abuse of Power. U.S. Attorney M.D. Fla. Prior counsel.
The foregoing shows I did not engage in the Unlicensed Practice of Law. This UPL investigation
is an abuse of power by the Florida Supreme Court, by and through its arm The Florida Bar, a
Governmental Unit. Ms. Coaxum breached a duty as a Bar prosecutor by allowing Mr. Rodems
to use The Florida Bar vexatiously against me, a former client of his law firm. See Exhibit 12.
The Florida Bar is responsible for allowing Mr. Rodems to engage in extreme misconduct since
2006. Tampa Chief Discipline Counsel Bloemendaal wrongly dismissed February 9, 2005 my
complaint against Rodems' partner Mr. Cook. The Bar has defended her wrong decision since.
Also, see Assistant u.S. Attorney Roger B. Handberg, a failure ofjustice. Exhibit 13.
I retained counsel for matters described in 5:11-cv-539, which Rodems' misconduct negated.
Robert W. Bauer, a Florida Bar LRS referral; charged $31,863 fees that benefited him, not me.
David M. Snyder infonned Rodems in 2006 that "Mr. Gillespie's claim has survived a motion to
dismiss", and Rodems' counterclaim had "little chance of ultimate success given the limited
distribution and privileged nature...". Rodems rejected a settlement offer to pay me $6,224.78.
Seldon "Jeff' Childers detennined in 2009 that my actual damages were $7,143, not $6,224 as
plead in my pro se complaint; and that I suffered $100,000 in Non-Pecuniary Cost of Litigation.
Eugene P. Castagliuolo admitted disability, mental problems; ineffective, had conflict, flipped.
Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing document and that to the best
of my knowledge and belief the facts stated in it are true. Sincerely,
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net Posted on Scribd: http://www.scribd.com/doc/204856207
In The Supreme Court of Florida - The Florida Bar,
Arm of the Florida Supreme Court and a Governmental Unit
(Tobkin v TFB, 1:13-cv-20992-KAM, J an-10-2014)
INDEX TO EXHIBITS AND APPENDICIES
RE: Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL) Investigation of Neil J . Gillespie, Case No. 20133090(5)
Exhibit 1 Notice of Appearance, Tiffany Caparas, Esq. Kaufman, Englett & Lynd, PLLC
(KEL) for Mark Gillespie et al, 42-2013CA-000115-AXXX-XX, Marion County
Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v Neil J . Gillespie et al (RMS v. Neil Gillespie)
Exhibit 2 Defendants Motion to Quash Service of Process, KEL for Mark Gillespie et al.
RMS v. Neil Gillespie, 42-2013CA-000115-AXXX-XX, Marion County
Exhibit 3 Notice of Defendants Consent to J udgment, KEL for Mark Gillespie et al, J uly 5, 2013
RMS v. Neil Gillespie, 42-2013CA-000115-AXXX-XX, Marion County
Exhibit 4 Pages #107, #112, #113, J une 21, 2011 deposition, Rodems reverse mortgage legal
advice to Neil Gillespie while in custody on concocted civil contempt arrest order
Exhibit 5 Letter of disengagement to Mr. J ones, November 6, 2013
Exhibit 6 Composite, Office of Bill McCollum to Neil Gillespie, correspondence since 2007
Exhibit 7 International legal authorities, Treaties of the United States
Exhibit 8 Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys
Exhibit 9 List of legal authorities for self-representation, Petition No. 13-7280 (page 34)
Exhibit 10 Mr. Rodems letter to Clerk Pat Frank, May 31, 2011, re: sham order of Martha Cook
Exhibit 11 Mr. Rodems letter to J udge Arnold, April 26, 2011, re: sham order of Martha Cook
Exhibit 12 This UPL investigation is an abuse of power by the Florida Supreme Court
Exhibit 13 Assistant U.S. Attorney Roger B. Handberg, a failure of justice
Separate Volume Appendix UPL-B http://www.scribd.com/doc/204858305/
Gillespie Family Living Trust; Last Will and Testament of Penelope Gillespie;
email seeking wrongful death representation; transcript, legal advice, CLSMF
Separate Volume Appendix UPL-D http://www.scribd.com/doc/186736628/
Submitted in Support of Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel
Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, Hillsborough Co. Florida
Affidavit of Neil Gillespie on J udge Cooks Order Prohibiting Plaintiff from Appearing Pro Se
[A Sham Order], J une 14, 2013. Posted on Scribd http://www.scribd.com/doc/148673425/
Neil J . Gillespie v Barker, Rodems & Cook PA et al, No. 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co. FL
Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems & Barker,
Rodems & Cook, PA, J uly 9, 2010. Posted on Scribd http://www.scribd.com/doc/55960451/
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint w/motion to amend, May 5, 2010.
Posted on Scribd http://www.scribd.com/doc/55956605/
I
INTHECIRCUITCOURTOFTHE
FIFTHJUDICIALCIRCUITOF
FLORIDAINANDMARIONCOUNTY
GENERALJURISDICTIONDIVISION
REVERSEMORTGAGESOLUTIONS,INC., CaseNo.: 2013-CA-OOOl15
Plaiutiff,
v.
MARKGILLESPIE,etal.,
Defendants.
_-
NOTICEOFAPPEARANCE
ANDDESIGNATIONOFE-MAILADDRESS
COMES NOW, THELAW FIRM OFKAUFMAN, ENGLETT & LYND, PLLC,
specifically, Attolney.TiffanyCaparas t Esq.,andentersthisNoticeofAppearanceonbehalfof
Defendants, MARK .. JOEITA AKAUNKNOWN SPOUSE
OF MARK GILLESPIE, and requests that copies of all future pleadings, papers and
communicationsbedirectedtotheemaillistedbelow.
Pursuantto Rule2.516,theundersigneddesignatesthe following email addressesforthe
purposeofelectronic ofdocumentsandpleadingsinthiscase:
Kaufman,Englett&Lynd,PLLC
111 N. MagnoliaAvenue,Suite1600
Orlando,FL32801
PrimaryEmail: TCaparas@kelattomeys.com
Secondal'yEmail: KELinbox@kelattorneys.com
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
IHEREBYCERTIFYthatIhave [xl electronicallyfiled viathe FloridaCourtseFiling
Portal and furnished atrue and correct copy ofthe foregoing to Danielle N. Parsons, Esq., of
McCallaRaymerLLC, 225 E. Robinson St. Orlando,FL 32801,DNP@mccallaraymer.com; via
[x] Email, []U.S. Mail,[]Fax, []Delivery,todayFebruary1,2013.
KAUFMAN,ENGLETT& LYND,PLLC

FloridaBarNo. 89863
111 N. MagnoliaAvenue, Suite1600
Orlando,FL32801
Telephone No.: (407) 513.. 1900
PrimaryEmail: TCaparas@kelattomeys.com
SecondaryEmail: KBLinbox@kelattorneys.com
Attorney for Defendants: MARK GILLESPIE and
JOETIA GILLESPIE AKA UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF
MARKGILLESPIE
KELFile#13LAW34876
1
Mailing List:
Mark J Gillespie
7504 Summer Meadow Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76123
Email: mark.gillespie@att.net
Defendants
Marion County Courthouse
Clerk of the Circuit Court
110 NW 1st Ave
Ocala, FL 34475
KEL File NI3LAW34876
L. .
INTHECIRCUITCOURTOFTHE
FIFTHJUDICIALCIRCUITOF
FLORIDAINAND MARIONCOUNTY
GENERALJURISDICTIONDIVISION
REVERSEMORTGAGESOLUTIONS,INC., CaseNo.: 2013-CA-OOOl15
Plaintiff,
v.
MARKGILLESPIE,et81.,
Defendants.
---------------
I
DEFENDANTS'MOTIONTOQUASHSERVICEOFPROCESS
Defendants,MARKGILLESPIEandJOETTAGILLESPIEAKAUNKNOWN
SPOUSEOF GILLESPIE(hereinafter,the"Defendants"),byandthrOUgllthe
undersignedcounsel,filesthisMotiontoQuashServiceof ProcesspursuanttoFla.Stat.
48.031(5)andstates:
1. Theface of thesummons forthe Defendants indicatesthatPlaintiffhas attempted
toperfectserviceof processunderFla.Stat. 48.031.
2. It is well settled that a Plaintiff must strictly comply with the statutory
requirements for service ofprocess pursuant to Fla. Stat. 48.031(5), otherwise selvice of
processisimproper.
3. It is well settled that a Plaintiff bears the burden ofestablishing the Court's
jurisdictionbyproperserviceof process. See Torres v. Arnco Construction, Inc. 867So. 2d583
(Fla. 5thDist. Ct.App. 2004).
4. Service ofprocess must strictly comply with all relevant statutory provisions.
Walker v. Fifth Third Mortgage Company, 2012WL 5457220,No. 5D12-3187(Fla. 5thDist. Ct.
App. 2012) citing Shurman v. Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp.(Fla. 2001) (holding that
KBL FileII 13LAW34876
2
I .....
"statutes 'governing seryice of process are to be strictly construed and enforced") see also Re-
Employment Services, Ltd v. 'National Acquisitions Co., 969 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that "courts require strict construction of, and compliance with, the provisions of
statutes governing service ofprocess").
5. Plaintiff has failed to snictly comply with Fla. Stat, 48.031 (5) therefore service
of process in this instance on the Defendants must be quashed.
6. .Pursuant to Fla. Stat. 48.031 (5), a person serving process shall place, on the copy
served, the date and time of service and his or her identification number and initials for all
of Fla. 48.031(5) is properly satisfied when the process ..server the
date and time of service and his or her identification number and initials on the copy of the
summons served. Nirk v. Bank ofAmericQ
1
N.A.
t
94 So. 3d 658 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Failure to do so renders service improper. Vidal v. Suntrust Bank, 41 So. 3d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) see also Walker v. Fifth Third Mortgage Company, 2012 WL 5457220, No.
5D12-3187 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
7. The summons attached to this motion is in fact a true and correct copy of the
summons served onto each of the Defendants. See Exhibits "A" and "B". However, the true
and correct copy of each of the summons served onto the Defendants fails to include the date of
service and time of service on the face ofthe summons.
8. Because Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Fla. Stat. 48.031 (5),
service of process must be quashed. Vidal, 41 So. 3d 401; see also Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So. 2d
6] 3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
WHEREFORE, Defendants, MARK GILLESPIE and JOETTA GILLESPIE AKA
UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF MARK GILLESPIE requests this Court enter an Order quashing
KEL File #13LAW34876
I ..
serviceof enteran orderrequiring Plaintiffto perfect serviceofprocess in compliance
with applicable Florida law within 120 days ofthe Court's Order, and any further reliefthis
Courtdeemsappropriate.
DEMANDFORATTORNEYS'FEES
Defendants, MARK GILLESPIE and JOEITA GILLESPIE AKA UNKNOWN
SPOUSEOFMARKGILLESPIE,haveretainedtheundersignedfirmand isindebtedforafee
forwhichsaidDefendantsseekrecoveryfrom thePlaintiff pursuantto theinstrumentssuedupon
andthereciprocalfeeprovisionsof Fla. Stat.57.105.
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
IHEREBYCERTIFYthatI have [xl electronicallyfiled viathe FloridaCourtseFiling
Portal and furnished a true and COITect copy ofthe foregoing to Danielle N. Parsons, Esq., of
McCallaRaymerLLC, 225 E. RobinsopSt. Orlando, FL32801, DNP@mccallal'aymer.com;via
[x] Email, []U.S. Mail,[]Fax, []Delivery,todayFebruary1,2013.
KAUFMAN,ENGLETT&LYND,PLLC

TiffanyCaparas,Esq.
FloridaBarNo. 89863
111 N. MagnoliaAvenue,Suite1600
Orlando,FL32801
TelephoneNo.: (407)513-1900
PrimaryEmail: TCaparas@kelattolneys.com
SecondaryEmail:
MARKGILLESPIE
MailingList:
MarkJGillespie
7504SummerMeadowDrive
Ft. Worth,TX76123
Email:mark.gillespie@au.net
Defendants
MarionCountyCourthouse
Clerkof theCircuitCourt
110NW 1stAve
Ocala,FL34475
KELFile#13LAW34876
I
L _....
J.
-'
REVERSEMORTO'AGESOLUTIONS, INC.
Plaintit(
VS.
NEILl.GILLBSPIEAND MARK GILLESPIE
ASCO-TRUSTEESOFTHEGILLESPIE
FAMILYLIVINOTRUSTAG'REEMENT
DATBDFBBRUARY 10, 1997,etaI.,
Defendants.
-._....__........ __ ..J
INTHECIRCUITCOURTOFTHE FIFTHJUDICIAL
CIRCUITOFFLORIDAINANDFOR MARION
COUNTY
GENRALJURlSDICTIONDlVISION
CASEND. f 3 \ \ S-.....c..:f'\
SECTJONNO.
COOJ.,ACTIQNSUMMONS
YOUAREHEREBYCOMMANDBD to serve thissummonsand acopyofthecomplaintondefendant(s):
MarkGillespie
7504SummerMeadows Drive
Ft.Worth.TX76123
Alawsuithas beenfiled againstyou. Youhave20calendardaysafterthissummonsis servedonyou to
filoawritten responseto theattachedcomplaintwith theeterk ofthiscourt. Aphone callwill notproteetyou;
yourwritten response, includingthe'casenumbergivenaboveand1henamesoftheparties,must befiled ifyou
want-thecourtto hearyour sideof thecase. Ifyou donot file yourresponseOn time,you may Jose thecase, and
yourwages, nloneyandpropertymaythereafterbe takenwithout furtherwarningfrom thecourt. Thereare
othorlegal requirements. You may wanttocallan attorneyrightaway. Ifyou donotknowan at10n:-ey, you may
cal[ananomeyreferral serviceorlegal aid office(lisled in thephonebook)
I
!
If you choosetofile awrittenrosponse atthesamotimeyou nJe yourwrittenresponse tothe
t
courtat J10NW 1stAve, Ocala, PL34475. You mustalsomail ortakeacarbon copyorphotocopyofyour
writtenresponse tothe"plaintiff'sat10mey1 listed below:
!
DanielleN. Parsons
t
Fla. BarNo.:0029364
McCallaRaymer, LLC.
J.
225 13.. RobinsonSt.Suite660

Orlando)FL3280 I .
i
;
Phone:(407)6741850
f
Email:MRService@mccallaraymer.com

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BY: J.DELGADO
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....... ..... [)"'IZ"'IEpIl!":T"'OftllllTY
24-6 Process Service
Server:StanSikorski
Court10:S.C.H.-2482
Date: , Time:...........-1__
l
I
IMPORTANTE
USlcd ha lido demandado Jcgalmente. Tiene 20 dias contados apanlr del recibo de esla notificaclon para contestar la
porescrilo.ypresontarlaanle cstetribunal. Una )lamadatolefonicano 10 prolcgera. Si us1ed desea que el
consJdere su dcrensa. debe presentarsu respuesta poresc:rito. incluyendo el numero de calo'l los nombres de las
partes mtcresadla. Slusted no contesta)a demandaatlcmpot pudlesc pcrder elcasoypodriascrdcspojadodesusIngresos
'J propiedades. 0 privldodesusderechos
t
sin previo aviso del tribuanl. Existen ottosrequfsilos legales. Si10 desea puede
usedconsultar aunabogado inmedlatemcnlc. Si no ,onoc:e8 un abogado. puede lIamarauna de lasoneinasdoasistencfa
legal que.parenccnon lagui.lelefonica. .
Si dese.responderalademandaporsu cuenta, al mismo liempoen que prcsentasu rcspuesI. ante el tribunal dcbcra usted
enviar porcorrco 0 entrcgar una copla de su respuesta ara persona demonlnada abajo como .tpJaintitf/ PlanliffAttorney"
(Demandante0 Abogadodel Dcmandanle).
IMPORTANT
Despoursultcsjudiciaresont eteenreprisescontre YOUSe Vous avez20jours apartir de ladatedel'8ssignation
"de "tte<:ilatlon pourdeposeruneresponse ecrite 8 lapJainte ci-joJnre auprcs de cc tribunal. Un s'imploc:oup de telephone
est insuffisant purvousproteger. Vous etesobligede deposerVOlfe responseecrito,avecmontion du numerodedossiercia
dcssuset du nom des parties nommees ici, sl youse souhaitezque Ie tribuna! entonde votrO cause. Si YOUS ne pas
votreresponse ecriledans 10 delalrequis.vous risquczdeperdrc lacauseainsl que volresalaire, volreargent., elvos biens
peuvontetresaisis par18 suite, sansaucunpreavisu)terieurdu rribunal. IIyacrautresobligationsjuriduquosetvous pouvoz
requerir les services immediales dlun .vocal. Si vous ne connaiasscz pas d'avocate.YOUS pourrJez telophoner aun servicede
d'avoeau ouaunbureau jUridique(figl!rantarannll8iredetelephones) .. .. ....
Thisnoticej$ providedpursuant toAdministrativeOrderNo.2.03J9/96
ThisnoticeIsprovidedpursuanttoAdministrativeOrderNo.2010-490cn7/12/10
ENGLISH
Ifyou arc aperson with adisability who needs any accommodation in order to panicipate in this proceeding, you are
entitled.ar no cost toyou, to the provjsion ofcertain assislanc:e. Persons with adisabilitywhoneedany accommodation in
orderto paJ1lcJpalo shouldcall Tameka Gordon.ADA Coordinator, MarlonCountyJudicial Center. 110N.W. FirstAvenue.
Room 58S Ocat" FL 34475 at 3S2)401-6701 within two (2) working days of your receipt afthis notice; If you are hearing
impairedcall(800)955-8711: jfyouare voicehnpaired.call(800)955-8770.
SPANISH
De acuerdo con eJ Att8 de los Americanos con Imped'imento5. aquoJlas personas que de aJg6n scrvicio espec;al
para panlcipar en este proceso 0tener 8cceso aservlcios, programas 6actividades de La Cone dcberAn. dentro de un
peri6do rasonable antes de cualquierproceso0 de tener neeesidad de aceeso aservicios. programas0actividadest ponerse
en contacto con La OficinaAdminis....liv8 de la Cone, quo csti situadaen'MARION COUNTY JUDICIAL 110
N.W. rlRSTAVENUE, ROOM S8S OCALA. FL34475 68 los leJefonos 352)401..6701 6(800)9SS877J (TOO) YSi t
usa01 servacioFloridaRelayServiceal (800)9SS..8770 (V).
CREOLE
D'apre'ak6kl ret avekAktPouAmerikinki lnfim.toutmoun kigenyenyonW:zwen pouakomodas)'on pou yo
patisip6 nan pWOH obyen pou gin aks. Scvis, ak aklivit6 tibinal-la, nan yon Ian r6zonab anvan okin
oubyen scvis. pwogram oub)'en akllvit6 ret, yo kantl orIS Tribinalla ki nan MARION COUNTY
JUDICIALCENTER, 110 N.W. FIRSTAVENUE. ROOM SIS OCALA, FL34475 nim6ro 56 (352)41016701.
oubyen(800)9SS8171 (TDO) oubyen(800)9558170(V)anpasan paFloridaRelayService.
FRENCH
En Iccordance avec J'Acto Pour lesAmericaJns les personnes en besom d'une accommodationsclalepour
plrticiper, ces ou bien pouravolr au servke.progMmme. ou actiyit4de Ja Courtdoivenc,dans un temps
raisonablc. Ivant aucuneproceduresou besoin deservice,programmeou acdvit6. conllcterl'OfficoAdministrative
de (a Court. au num6roMARIONCOUNTYJUDICIALCENTBR. 110N.W. F1RSTAVENUE.ROOM585 OCALA.
PL 34475 Ie numero de1616phone(352)40f670'.au(800) 9558771 (TOO), ou (800) 955-8770(V)ou par Florida Relay
Service.
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REVERSE MOllTGAGBSOLUTIONS
J
INC.,
Plaintiff.
vs.
NEILJ.OlLLESPIEANDMARK GlLLESPIB
AS CO..TRUSTEES OFTHBGILLESPIE
FAMILY LIV1NGTRUSTAGREEMENT
DATEDFEBRUARY 10, 1997,et ai .
Defendants.
IN "fHECIRCUITCOURTOFTHE FIFTHJUDfCIA.L
CIRCUITOF fLORIDAINANDFOR MARION
COUNTY
GENERAl.,JUltlSDICTIONDIVISION
CASE NO_ ., \ \ S-CFtT
SECTIONNQ.
....._.__....l
CJVILACTIONSUMMONS
YOUARE HEREBYCOMMANDEDto serve thissummons and8 copyofthe complaint on defendant(s):
Unknown spouseof MarkGillespie
7504 SummerMeadowsDrive
Ft. Worth,TX76123
. . '.' Alawsuithas beenfiled againstyou. You have20calendardays afterthis summons isservedonyou to
response totheattachedcomplaintwiththe clerkofthiscourt. Afhonecall ,viU not protectyou;
your response, including thecasenumber given abo\'c and the names 0 the parties. must' be filed ifyou
wantthe courtto hearyour sideofthecase. If you do notIi Ie yourresponse on ti'ne,you may losethecase.and
your wages. money and property may thereafterbe taken \vithout further warningfrom the court. Thereare
otherlegal requirements. You maywant tocallan attomeyrightaway. (fyou do norknow an attorney,you may
callan attomeyrefelTal serviceorlegal aidoffice(listed in the phonebook)
I
If youchooseto fileIi writtenresponse at tho sometimeyou tileyourwrittenresponsetothe .:
("
courtat t10NW l.stAve,Ocala,FL3,44'75. You mustalsomailortakeacarboncopy orphotocopyof)'our 1
Vtrrittcn response to the "plaintiff'sattomeyCi listedbelow:
J.
i
I

DanieUeN. Parsons
Fla. Bar
McCallaRaymer. LLC
225 E. Robinson St. Suito660 I
Orlando. FL32801
f

I
Email:
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J.
1
J.DELGADO
BY:
..
I
l>EmTY OF COURT .r
f
24-6ProcessService
Server:StanSikorski
CourtID:S.C.H.-2482
Date: . Time: _
1MPORTANTE
Usted ha sido dernandado legalmente. Tiene 20 dias contados apartir del recibo de esta notificacion para contester 18
demandaadjunta, porescrito, ypresentarlaanteestetribunal. Una Ilamada teJefonica no ]0 protegera. Siusted deseaqueel
tribunal considere su defensa, debe presentnrsu respuesta porescrho. incluyendo el numero de e8SO y los nombres de las
partes interesadas. Si usted no contesta 18 demandaatiempo) pudjeseperderel casoy podriaserdespojadodesus ingresos
ypropiedades. 0 privadodesusderechos. sin previoaviso del tribuanl. Bxisten otros requisitos legales. Si]odesea puede
used consultar a un abogado inmediatemente. Sf no conoce a un abogado, puede Hamar a una de las oficinas de asistencia
legalqueaparencenen]a guiaterefoniea.
Si desea responder aJademanda porsu cuenta
J
a] mismo tiempoen que presenla su respuesta anteel tribunal debera usted
enviar por correo 0 entregaruna copia de su respuesla a la persona delnoninada abajo como tfPlainUID PlantiffAttorney"
(Demandante 0 Abogado del Demandante).
IMPORTANT
Des poursuites judiciaresont ere enreprises contre vous. Vous avez20joursconsecutifsapartirde 18 date de )tassignation
de cene cit.ation pour deposerune response ecritea18 plaintecijointeaupres de ce tribunal. Un simple coup de telephone
est insuffisant purvousprQteger. Vous ctes obligededeposer votre ecrite.avecmentiondunumerode dossierci...
dessus etdu nOln des parties nommees ici, si vouse souhaitezque Ie tribunal entende votrecause. Si vous ne deposez pas
votre responseccritedans Ie dclai requis, vous risque%de perdre Ja causeainsi que votresalaire votre argent.. etvos biens
peuventetresaisis par la sUite. sans aucun preavisulterieurdu tribunal. II ya d'autresobligationsjuriduqueset vous pouvez
avocat. Sivous.neconnaiassezpasd'avocatc. vous pourrieztelephoneraunser.vicede
referenced'avocats ou aun bureaud'assistancejuridique(tigurantaIlannuairedetelephones)
l-hisnoticeis providedpursuanttoAdministrativeOrderNo.2.031-9196
"fhisnotice is providedpursuanttoAdministrativeOrderNo. 20IO..49-Gen- 7/]2/] 0
ENGLISH
Ifyou are a person with a disability who needs any occomrnodation in order to participate in this proceeding. you are
entitled. at no cost toyou, to the provision ofcertain assistance. Persons with adisabilitywho need anyaccommodation in
order to participate shouldcallTamckaGordon,ADACoordinator. Marion CountyJudicialCenter, 110 N.W. FirstAvenue,
Room S8S Ocals FL34475 at352)401-670Iwithintwo (2)workingdays ofyourreceiptofthis notice; ifyou Dre hearing
impairedcall(800) 9558771; ifyouare voiceimpaired.call (800)955...8770.
SPANlSli
De acuerdo con el Actade los Americanos con Impedimentos. aquellas personas que nccesiten de algOn servicio especial
para participar en este proceso 0 tener acceso 8 servicios
J
programas 6actividades de La Corte deber4n, dentro de un
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JUDICIALCENTER, 110 N.W. FIRSTAVENUE. ROOM S8S OCALA, FL34475 nim6ro1616tbnn-nan sd (352)401..6701,
aubyen (800)955-8711 (TOO)ou byen (800)955-8710(V)an passn paFloridaRelay Service.
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de fa Court.. situ6au numero MARION COUNTY JUDICIALCENTER, JION. W. FIRSTAVENUB ROOM S85 OCALA,
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Electronically Filed 07/08/2013 07:33:04 PM ET
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
FLORIDA IN AND MARION COUNTY
GENERAL JURISDICTION DIVISION
REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., Case No.: 2013-CA-000115
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK GILLESPIE, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________
NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS' CONSENT TO ,JUDGMENT
Defendants, MARK GILLESPIE and JOEITA GILLESPIE AKA UNKNOWN SPOUSE
OF MARK GILLESPIE and ELIZABETH BAUERLE NKA ELIZABETH BIDGOOD
(hereinafter, the "Defendants"), file this Notice of Defendant's Consent to Judgment:
1. The Defendants, MARK GILLESPIE and JOETTA GILLESPIE AKA
UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF MARK GILLESPIE and ELIZABETH BAUERLE NKA
ELIZABETH BIDGOOD, have been named as Defendants in this action.
2. Plaintiff is seeking to recover the property located at 8092 SW 115th Loop,
Ocala, FL 34481 based on an "event of default" under the terms of the Adjustable Rate Note
(Home Equity Conversion) a/kIa "reverse mortgage".
3. Because this is a reverse mortgage, the Defendants have no financial liability
under the terms of the subject loan. See paragraph 7(a) of the Note and 9(a) of the Mortgage.
4. Defendants do not wish to contest entry of final judgment against Defendants.
5. The Defendants desire swift resolution to this action so they hereby give consent
to having Judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff in this action.
3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have electronically filed via the Florida Courts eFiling
Portal and furnished a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Angela M. Brenwald, Esquire, of
McCalla Raymer LLC, 225 E. Robinson S1., Orlando, FL 32801,
mrservice@mccallaraymer.com; via [x] Email Delivery, today July 5, 2013.
KAUFMAN, ENGLETT & LYND, PLLC
/s/ Anthony J. Solomon
Anthony J. Solomon, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 93057
111 N. Magnolia Avenue, Suite 1600
Orlando, FL 32801
Telephone No.: (407) 513-1900
Primary Email: asolomon@kelattorneys.com
Secondary Email: KELinbox@kelattomeys.com
MARK GILLESPIE
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Q
any invitation to people who access the website
YouSue.org to make a contribution?
A No.
Q Has there ever been?
A A long time ago there was when I first
started the website.
Q Was any money received?
A No.
Q Okay. Did you ever own a 1998 Chevrolet
hatchback?
A It was a 1998 Chevrolet Metro and, yeah,
hatchback, uh-huh.
Q And what has become of that vehicle?
A That was the car that was totaled when I
was driving as a courier.
Q Okay. Let's go through the items that I
have requested in the deposition. The first item
was the trust and all amendments, modifications or
changes. You've provided me with a document which
is Exhibit 4. Is it your testimony that this is a
copy of the trust dated February lOth, 1997 and all
amendments or modifications or changes?
A Let me take a quick look at it.
Q Yes, sir.
A Yes, uh-huh.
4
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,
think might be?
A (Tendering documents.)
Q All right. You're handing me a series of
papers that are clipped together, and the front page
has an exhibit sticker with the number 20 on it.
Tell me what this package of papers is.
A Well, that would be 20 of your questions,
which apparently has to do with real estate.
Q Okay. If I read this correctly, Mr.
Gillespie, the borrower for this reverse mortgage
was Penelope M. Gillespie, Neil J. Gillespie, and
Mark Gillespie as co-trustees of the Gillespie
Family Living Trust, an agreement dated February 10,
1997. Correct?
A That's one way to read it. Bank of
America doesn't agree with that.
Q And I'll read the acceleration clause
about when the debt becomes due. "The Lender may
require immediate payment in full of all sums
secured by the security interest if a borrower dies
and the property is not the principal residence of
at least one surviving borrower."
MR. CASTAGLIUOLO: Where are you,
Mr. Rodems?
MR. RODEMS: Page -- in the Adjustable
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Rate Home Equity Conversion Second Mortgage,
and I believe I am reading from --
MR. CASTAGLIUOLO: There are little,
tiny page numbers down on the bottom on the
left.
MR. RODEMS: Yeah. Paragraph 9 at Page
3.
BY MR. RODEMS:
Q Well, I guess that's an issue between
Bank of America and all of you folks, but it sure
does appear to me that you're a borrower and you're
still living there, and there is no acceleration of
the debt. Is that your understanding, Mr.
Gillespie?
A That's what I've been told.
Q Okay. And so this would be responsive to
Paragraph 20 of the documents to be produced,
correct, and that's why you put 20 on there?
A Yes.
Q And it may also be responsive to Number
2. Correct?
A Possibly.
Q Okay. Are there any other documents that
you believe may be responsive to Paragraph 2, which
requests documents -- that you've received from the
VIAU.P.S.No. lZ64589FP291939211 November6,2013
andEmail: gjones@rywantalvarez.com
GregoryD. Jones,AttorneyatLaw
Rywant,Alvarez,Jones,RussoandGuyton,P.A.
109BrushStreet,Suite500
Tampa,FL33602
RE: Letterof Disengagement: FloridaBarLRSreferralconsultation,UnlicensedPractice
of Law Investigation (UPL)of Neil J. Gillespie, Case No.20133090(5)
DearMr. Jones:
Thisisaletterof disengagement.
Unfortunatelyyouhavenotrespondedtoseveralrequestsfordisabilityaccommodation.
AccordinglyInolongerhaveconfidenceinourattorney-clientrelationship,andhereby
terminatethatrelationshiptotheextentoneexistsunderTheFloridaBarLawyerReferral
Service(LRS)agreement,andFloridaBarrulesgenerally.
IherebyreleaseyoufromfurtherobligationundertheLRSreferral.
Regarding$25 IpaidyoufortheLRSreferral,youmayreturnthefundstomeattheaddress
below,oryoumaykeepthe$25 if youbelieveyouearnedorareotherwiseentitledtothemoney,
oryoumaydonatethe$25toacharityof yourchoice,oryoumaydisposeof themoneyinany
otherlawfulway. Theultimatedispositionof the$25 Ipaidyouisyourdecision.
Iherebywaivemyclaimto$25 IpaidyoubypostalservicemoneyorderonSeptember4,2013.
Cc: JohnF. Harkness,ExecutiveDirector,TheFloridaBar,byemailonly:jharkness@f1abar.org
Cc: KarenKelly,Director,PublicServicePrograms(LRS),byemailonly: kkelly@f1abar.org
5
6
BILL MCCOLLUM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
o
~ OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Office of Citizen Services
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Telephone (850) 414-3990 , SunCom 994-3990
Fax (850) 410-1630, SunCom 210-1630
December 7, 2007
Mr. Neil 1. Gillespie
8092 Southwest 115th Loop
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
Thank you for contacting Attorney General Bill McCollum regarding Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
and the allegation of perjury by Mr. Ryan Christopher Rodems.
The Attorney General's Office does not have jurisdiction in this matter. By contacting The Florida Bar
you have contacted the appropriate agency to review your concerns. The Florida Supreme Court has
designated The Florida Bar as the agency responsible for reviewing grievances against lawyers
licensed to practice in this state. The Florida Bar's decisions are not subject to the Attorney General's
authority.
As the Governor's Office suggested, and as you wish to file a criminal complaint regarding alleged
perjury, please contact the local law enforcement agency and state attorney's office where the criminal
violation occurred. In Florida, the local police or sheriffs department and the elected state attorney in
each judicial circuit are responsible for investigating and prosecuting crime at the local level. Those
authorities operate independently and are not a part of the Attorney General's Office. If you have not
already done so, you may contact the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office and Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit State Attorney's Office at the following:
Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office
Post Office Box 3371
Tampa, Florida 33601
Phone: (813) 247-8000
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit State Attorney's Office
County Courthouse Annex, Fifth Floor
800 East Kennedy Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33602
Phone: (813) 272-5400
Otherwise, please continue with your private attorney if you need any legal guidance. An attorney can
give you the legal advice which our office is not at liberty to provide to private individuals. We hope
this proves helpful to you. Thank you for contacting Attorney General McCollum's Office.
Sincerely,
OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVICES
Florida Attorney General's Office
OCSlba
AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
o
NeilJ.Gillespie
8092 SW115
th
Loop
Ocala,Florida34481
VIAUS PRIORITYMAIL
DELIVERYCONFIRMATION
0306240000007670 1444
December5,2007
AttorneyGeneralBillMcCollum
OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral
TheCapitol
Tallahassee,Florida32399
DearAttorneyGeneralMcCollum:
GovernorCristencouragedmetoexpressmyconcernstoyouconcerningafraud
schemeperpetratedbymyformerlawyersattheTampalawfirmBarker,Rodems&
Cook,P.A. AcopyofGovernorCrist'sletterisenclosed,alongwithmyoriginalletter
andenclosllrestotheGovernor. Thefollowingisabriefdescriptionofthefraudscheme
andsubsequentattemptsbymyformerlawyerstoobstructjusticewhenIsuedthem. For
moredetailsaboutthismatter,pleaseseemylettertoGovernorCristandenclosures.
Myformerlawyerspressuredmetointerveneintheirpreviouslyfiledclass-action
lawsuitwhentheirinitialplaintiffprovedunqualifiedtorepresenttheclass. Thelawsuit
wascaptionedEugeneR. Clementv. AMSCOTCorporation,caseno. 8:99-2795-CIV-T-
26C,UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,MiddleDistrictofFlorida,TampaDivision. The
actionwascommencedDecember9, 1999,bytheTampalawfirmAlpert,Barker,
Rodems, Ferrentino&Cook,P.A. Mr. Alpert'sfirmdissolvedsoonafterhis
unsuccessfulrunforstateattorneyin2000,andfollowinghisinfamouscoffee-throwing
incidentagainstattorneyArnoldLevine. ThreelawyersfronlMr. Alpert'sfirmthen
formedanewlawfirm, Barker,Rodems& Cook,P.A,whoassumedthecase.
Barker,Rodems&Cook,P.A. failedtoprevailandthelawsuitwasdismissed.
Anappealwasfiled, andnegotiationspursued,becausethedefendantwantedtosettleso
thatabusinessdealcouldmoveforward. Thesettlementnegotiationsweremarkedbya
$5,000.00"unlawfulpayoffattempt"bydefenseattorneyJohnAnthony,followedbymy
ownlawyers' fraud, breachoffiduciaryduty, andbreachof contract,aschemedesigned
totakemostof thesettlementproceedsasattorneys' fees. Specifically,Barker,Rodems
& Cook,P.A. prepared,butdidnotsign,acontingentfee agreement. ThenWilliamCook
toldmethatthecourtawardedhisfirm$50,000.00inattorney'sfees inanattemptto
avoidthetermsof thecontingentfee agreement. Ireceivedanominalsettlementof
o
Attorney General Bill .ollum Page - 2
Office of the Attorney General December 5,2007
$2,000.00, as did the other two co-plaintiffs. However, had Barker, Rodems & Cook,
P.A. honored the terms of the contingent fee agreement, the three plaintiffs would have
received $8,224.78 each, and the law firm would have received $31,325.46. But because
my former lawyers failed their fiduciary duty to their clients, the law firm unlawfully took
an additional $18,675.54 by fraud and breach of contract.
My initial complaint to The Florida Bar was made June 7, 2004, TFB No. 2004-
11,734(13C), and was investigated by William L. Thompson, Assistant Staff Counsel.
Six months into the investigation Mr. Thompson was removed from the inquiry and left
the bar. At that point Susan V. Bloemendaal, Chief Branch Disciplinary Counsel, took
over and shut down the investigation on what appear to be inappropriate grounds. My
subsequent complaint about Mr. Cook's failure to report the $5,000.00 "improper payoff
attempt" from opposing counsel was dismissed (TFB No. 2006-11,194 (13D)). Likewise,
my complaint about Mr. Cook's failure to sign a contingent fee agreement and his failure
to account for the settlement proceeds in a Closing Statement, was dismissed contrary to
substantial evidence, bar rules, and supporting case law. (TFB No. 2007-10,004 (13D)).
When The Florida Bar failed to hold my former lawyers accountable for their
misconduct, I commenced a civil lawsuit, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and
William J. Cook, case no.: 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough County Circuit Civil Court. (Exhibit
A). At that time I was unable to find counsel willing to take the case, and I proceeded pro
see Since then I found a lawyer in Gainesville to represent me and the case is active. As a
pro se litigant I established a cause of action for fraud and breach of contract. (Exhibit B).
In retaliation my former lawyers countersued me for libel. (Exhibit C).
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. is represented by attorney Ryan Christopher
Rodems of the firm. During tIle time I represented myself, Mr. Rodems made a false
affidavit to the Court abollt an argument we had, where Mr. Rodems swore under oath
that I intended to attack him in Judge Nielson's charrlbers. Mr. Rodems' false affidavit
prejudiced the Court against me. When a recording of the argument proved Mr. Rodems
lied to the Court, Judge Nielsen recused himself. The case then went to Judge Isom who
was also prejudiced by Mr. Rodems' perjury, and she recused herself. Judge Isom said in
open court that I could bring Mr. Rodems' perjury to the attention of law enforcement.
You may consider this letter as my first attempt to comply with Judge Isom's directive.
Currently Judge Barton has the case and I am represented by attorney Robert W.
Bauer of Gainesville. Mr. Rodems' aforementioned perjury was calculated to obstruct
justice, intimidate me as a witness, and deny me due process of law. This matter has
consumed a considerable amount of legal resources, including (so far) three circuit court
judges and two interlocutory appeals to the Second District Court of Appeals.
HALT, the legal reform organization, has reviewed my civil lawsuit and provided
background information and case law for a fraud and breach of contract lawsuit against an
attorney in HALT's amicus curiae brief in the Illinois case of Cripe v. Leiter. HALT
argued that over-billing a client is not part of the practice of law, and that lawyers are
AttorneyGeneralBill.onum
o
Page- 3
OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral December5,2007
subjecttostatutoryconsumerprotectionlawindealingwiththeirclients. HALTalso
provideditsamicus brieffiled inthematterofMarkM. Hager,adisciplinarymatterin
tIle DistrictofColumbia. HALTarguedthatMr. Hagershouldbedisbarredforstealing
hisclientssettlementmoney. EnclosedyouwillfindcopiesofHALT'samicus briefs.
Inadditiontotheabovedescribedunlawfulbehavior,Barker,Rodems& Cook,
P.A. hascountersuedmeforlibeloveraletteraboutmyinitialbarcomplaint. Thelibel
counterclaimiscontrarytotheholdingofFloridaSupremeCourtcase,Tobkinv. Jarboe,
710 So.2d975 (1998),whichrecognizesabsoluteimmunityforacomplainantwho
followsTheFloridaBar'sgrievanceprocedures. Barker,Rodems& Cook,P.A.hasalso
accusedmeofcriminalextortionforutilizingTheFloridaBar'sAttorney Client
Assistance Program (ACAP),whichrequiresacomplainantmakeagood-faitheffortto
resolvethematterpriortomakingaformal complaint. Bothmattersaredescribedin
n10re detailintheaccompanyingexhibitsandletters.
ThusfarTheFloridaBarhasexcusedmyformerlawyers' misconduct,andhas
doneso inaparticularmanner. SusanBloemendaal,theChiefBranchDisciplinary
CounseloftheTampaoffice,haspersonallyintervenedonbehalfofmyformerlawyers.
OnseveraloccasionsMs. Bloemendaalhasreplacedtheindividualbarcounselwhowere
investigatingmycomplaints,andthenrenderedherowndecisionthatmerelyadoptedmy
former lawyers' defenses. OnotheroccasionsMs. Bloemendaalapparentlybypassed
assignmenttoindividualbarcounselaltogether,reviewedthecomplaintsherself,and
simplyreiteratedmyformerlawyers' positioninexcusingtheirmisconduct. Ineach
instanceMs. Bloemendaalplayedfastandloosewiththefacts, andreacheduntenable
conclusionsoflaw. Inotherwords,Ms. Bloemendaalwhitewashedmycomplaint.
Thelocalstateattorney,MarkOber,hasnottorespondtomycorrespondence.
MyletterstoMr. OberareenclosedinExhibitE,tabnumber47.
Thankyoufortheopportunitytobringthismattertoyourattention. Ihavedone
soattheencouragementof GovernorCharlieCrist. Shouldyouwanttopursuethis
matter,Icanprovideadditionalinformation. Forexample,Ihavetranscriptsofthecourt
proceedings,andtranscriptsofmyphonecallswithMr. Rodems. Ihavealso submitted
totheCourtPlaintiffsMotionWithAffidavitForAnOrderToShowCauseWhyRyan
ChristopherRodemsShouldNotBeHeldInCriminalContemptOfCourtAnd
IncorporatedMemorandllffiOfLaw. Themotionhasnotyetbeenheard. Themotionsets
forthMr. Rodems'perjurythatwascalculatedtoobstructjustice,intimidatemeasa
witness,anddenymedueprocessoflaw. JudgeIsomsaidIcouldbringthismattertothe
attentionoflawenforcement. PleaseinvestigatethisperjuryasJudgeIsomsuggested.
Sincerely,
< .. :.:/ L ~ ,
eilJ. l l ~ i e . ~
AttorneyGeneralBill.Ollum
o
Page- 4
Officeof theAttorneyGeneral December5,2007
cc: GovernorCharlieCrist(letteronly)
Enclosures:
ExhibitA: ComplaintForFraudAndBreachOfContract
ExhibitB: OrderOnDefendants'MotionToDismissAndStrike
ExhibitC: Answer,AffirmativeDefensesAndCounterclaim
ExhibitD: PlaintiffsMotionForPunitiveDamagesPursuantToSection768.72FloridaStatutes
ExhibitE: ListOfExhibits(1 through50)totheabovemotion
HALT' samicus curiae briefintheIllinoiscaseofCripev. Leiter
HALT' samicus curiae briefinthematterofMarkM. Hager
LetterfromGovernorCharlieCristdatedNovember21,2007
LettertoGovernorCharlieCrist,October22,2007(letteronly)
LettertoMr. FranciscoR. Angones,President,TheFloridaBar,October22,2007(letteronly)
LettertoMr. DonaldM. Spangler,Director,ACAP,October16,2007(letteronly)
LettertoMr. KennethLawrenceMarvin,DirectorofLawyerRegulation,October12,2007
LettertoMr. KennethLawrenceMarvin,Directorof LawyerRegulation,June20,2007
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a
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Office of Citizen Services
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Telephone (850) 414-3990 SUNCOM 994-3990
FAX (850) 410-1630 SUNCOM 210-1630
December 14,2007
Mr. Neil J. Gillespie
8092 Southwest 115th Loop
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
Per your request, we are enclosing copies of the documents you previously forwarded to
this office.
We will retain your information in our consumer files to help this office organize its
priorities. Thank you for contacting the Attorney General's Office.
Sincerely,
OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVICES
Florida Attorney General's Office
OCS/fb
Enclosures
ANAFFIRMAnVEACnON/EQUALOPPORTUNITYEMPLOYER
NeilJ.Gillespie
8092SWIIS
th
Loop
Ocala,Florida34481
Telephone: (352)854-7807
VIAFIRSTCLASSMAIL
December11,2007
AttorneyGeneralBillMcCollum
Officeof theAttorneyGeneral
TheCapitol
Tallahassee,Florida32399
DearAttorneyGeneralMcCollum:
ThankyouforyourletterdatedDecember7,2007.(copyenclosed). Inorderfor
metocomplywithyourreferrals,Iwillneedthereturnof thedocumentsIprovidedyou.
Alistof theenclosuresisprovidedbelow. Iamwillingtopaythecostof returningmy
documents. Youmaycallmeattheabovephonenumberforpaymentbycreditcard,or
youmaysendabillwiththedocumentsandIwillsendpayment. Pleaseadvise.
Sincerely,
ExhibitA: ComplaintForFraudAndBreachOfContract
ExhibitB: OrderOnDefendants'MotionToDismissAndStrike
ExhibitC: Answer,AffirmativeDefensesAndCounterclaim
ExhibitD: Plaintiff'sMotionForPunitiveDamagesPursuantToSection768.72FloridaStatutes
ExhibitE: ListOfExhibits(1 through50)totheabovemotion
HALT'samicus curiae briefintheIllinoiscaseof Cripev. Leiter
HALT' samicus curiae briefinthematterofMarkM. Hager
LetterfromGovernorCharlieCristdatedNovember21,2007
LettertoGovernorCharlieCrist,October22,2007(letteronly)
LettertoMr. FranciscoR. Angones,President,TheFloridaBar,October22,2007(letteronly)
LettertoMr. DonaldM. Spangler,Director,ACAP,October16,2007(letteronly)
LettertoMr. KennethLawrenceMarvin,Directorof LawyerRegulation,October12,2007
LettertoMr. KennethLawrenceMarvin,Directorof LawyerRegulation,June20,2007
1
Exhibit 7 - International legal authorities and Treaties of the United States
U.S. Const. Article II, Section 2 Constitutional Provision, Treaties of the United States
The Constitution provides that the president "shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur" (Article II, section 2)
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm
U.S. Const. Article VI, Clause 2 a ratified treaty of the United States is the Supreme Law of the
land and all state law provisions which conflict with the treaty are overridden by the treaty.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the J udges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#a6
Supremacy Clause The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which comprises
Article VI, Clause 2, establishes the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and U.S. treaties
as "the supreme law of the land." The text provides that these are the highest form of law
in the U.S. legal system, and mandates that all state judges must follow federal law when
a conflict arises between federal law and either the state constitution or state law of any
state...Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supremacy_Clause
Legal aid, a right in itself UN Special Rapporteur - GENEVA (30 May 2013)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13382&LangID=E
GENEVA (30 May 2013) The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence
of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, today urged world governments to develop and
sustain effective legal aid systems as an essential component of a fair and efficient justice
system founded on the rule of law.
Legal aid is both a right in itself and an essential precondition for the exercise and
enjoyment of a number of human rights, including the rights to a fair trial and to an
effective remedy, said Ms. Knaul, presenting her latest report to the UN Human Rights
Council. It represents an important safeguard that contributes to ensuring the fairness
and public trust in the administration of justice....
U.N. Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Corruption is a complex social, political and
economic phenomenon that affects all countries. UNCAC is the only legally binding
universal anti-corruption instrument.
7
2
Signed by President Bush December 9, 2003, ratified October 30, 2006.
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/
UNCAC, English PDF
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf
Entry into Force (online)
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=en
The U.N. Global Compact site anti-corruption resources
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/tools_resources/anti_corruption.html
UNODC's Action against Corruption and Economic Crime
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption/index.html
Article 6. Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies. 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance
with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as
appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as:
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this Convention and, where
appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of those policies;
(b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.
2. Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 of this article
the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal
system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their functions effectively and free
from any undue influence. The necessary material resources and specialized staff, as well
as the training that such staff may require to carry out their functions, should be provided.
3. Each State Party shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the name
and address of the authority or authorities that may assist other States Parties in
developing and implementing specific measures for the prevention of corruption.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_against_Corruption
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Signed by President Carter October 5, 1977, ratified J une 8, 1992
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Review of the United Sates of America has been canceled, postponed until March 2014
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/ReviewUSA.aspx
The Carter Center: www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1369.html
US Senate Executive Report 102-23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.), Report-Ratification ICCPR
3
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/senate_committee_on_foreign_relat
ions_report_o n_the_iccpr.pdf
Entry into Force (online)
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en
The United States declares that it accepts the competence of the Human Rights
Committee to receive and consider communications under article 41 in which a State
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.
The U.S. Department of State, December 30, 2011
The Florida Commission on Human Relations, Annex A to the Common Core Document
of the United States, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Human Rights Organizations
and Programs.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179782.htm
1. State, local, tribal, and territorial human rights organizations and programs play a
critical role in U.S. implementation of the human rights treaties to which the United
States is a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution, and
child pornography. This Annex contains information on state, local, tribal, and territorial
laws, enforcement mechanisms, and outreach programs related to the issues addressed in
the treaty reports...
Interpreting the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, by Kendra D. Presswood
The Florida Bar J ournal, December, 2013 Volume 87, No. 10
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/J N/J NJ ournal01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829
/e3a5261cda8a57c085257c2f005d3183!OpenDocument
Defining the Hourglass--When Is a Claim Under the Florida Civil Rights Act Time
Barred? by Meenu T. Sasser and Stafford N. Shealy, The Florida Bar J ournal, December,
1999 Volume LXXIII, No. 11
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/c0d731e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/67a
77147a133b44485256adb005d62b9!OpenDocument
FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR) - ACLU
https://www.aclu.org/human-rights/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Signed by President Reagan April 18, 1988, ratified October 21, 1994
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx
4
U.N. Audiovisual Library of International Law - CAC
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html
Definition of torture Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_against_Torture
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person,
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Convention Against Torture, Article 1.1
Actions which fall short of torture may still constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment under Article 16.
Ban on torture and cruel and degrading treatment
Article 2 of the convention prohibits torture, and requires parties to take effective
measures to prevent it in any territory under its jurisdiction. This prohibition is absolute
and non-derogable. "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever"[5] may be invoked to
justify torture, including war, threat of war, internal political instability, public
emergency, terrorist acts, violent crime, or any form of armed conflict.[6] Torture cannot
be justified as a means to protect public safety or prevent emergencies.[6] Neither can it
be justified by orders from superior officers or public officials.[7] The prohibition on
torture applies to all territories under a party's effective jurisdiction, and protects all
people under its effective control, regardless of citizenship or how that control is
exercised.[6] Since the convention's entry into force, this absolute prohibition has
become accepted as a principle of customary international law.[6]
Because it is often difficult to distinguish between cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
and torture, the Committee regards Article 16's prohibition of such treatment as similarly
absolute and non-derogable.[6]
The other articles of part I lay out specific obligations intended to implement this
absolute prohibition by preventing, investigating and punishing acts of torture.[6]
PSYOPS - Psychological Operations
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_Operations
5
Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR), or the basic aspects of modern psychological
operations (PSYOP), have been known by many other names or terms, including Psy
Ops, Political Warfare, Hearts and Minds, and Propaganda.[1] Various techniques are
used, and are aimed at influencing a target audience's value system, belief system,
emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior. It is used to induce confessions or reinforce
attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives, and are sometimes
combined with black operations or false flag tactics. Target audiences can be
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
KUBARK - The CIAs interrogation manual
Alice in Wonderland confusion technique KUBARK, page 76
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/CIA%20Kubark%2061-112.pdf
Alice in Wonderland
The aim of the Alice in Wonderland or confusion technique is to confound the
expectations and conditioned reactions of the interrogatee. He is accustomed to a world
that makes some sense, at least to him: a world of continuity and logic, a predictable
world. He clings to this world to reinforce his identity and powers of resistance.
Alice in Wonderland: The Power of Applied Confusion
Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, page 446
Oceana Pubns; by Doug Lovelace, Kristen E Boon, Aziz Huq
http://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Commentary-Terror-based-Interrogation-
International/dp/0195398149/
Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress - Florida Law
To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, a
compliant must allege four elements:
1. deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering;
2. outrageous conduct;
3. the conduct caused the emotional distress; and;
4. the distress was severe;
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 594-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
Section 784.048, Florida Statutes
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) Harass means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.
(b) Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.
The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or
other organized protests.
6
(2) A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(4) A person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence, sexual
violence, or dating violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against
domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other court-imposed prohibition of
conduct toward the subject person or that persons property, knowingly, willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the
offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Negligence per se Florida Law
Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas
354 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1978).
Statutes or regulatory provision that either are designed to protect a particular class of
persons from their inability to protect themselves or establishes a duty to take precautions
to guard a certain class of persons from a specific type of injury. Failure to do so
establishes negligence per se.
Eggshell Skull Rule, a defendant is liable for the plaintiff's unforeseeable and uncommon
reactions to the defendant's negligent or intentional tort. If the defendant commits a tort
against the plaintiff without a complete defense, the defendant becomes liable for any
injury that is magnified by the plaintiff's peculiar characteristics.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eggshell_skull_rule
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) - http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly, December 10, 1948
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Home Page
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Introduction.aspx
U.S. State Dept. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204710.pdf
A Magna Carta for all humanity - http://www.un.org/rights/50/carta.htm
http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspx
Basic Principals and Guidelines
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/496/42/PDF/N0549642.pdf
7
Basic Principles of J ustice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dbpjvcap/dbpjvcap.html
U.N. Enable: About Enable, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/disabout.htm
International Norms And Standards Relating To Disability
INTRODUCTION http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp001.htm
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
2.1 Review of provisions, ttp://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp202.htm
PART I. National Frameworks for the Protection of Rights of Persons with Disabilities
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp100.htm
PART II. The International Human Rights System
PART III. The Regional Human Rights System
PART IV. Towards a Rights Based Perspective on Disability
PART V. Rights of Special Groups with Disabilities
1
Exhibit 8 - Pro se pleadings held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys
Under Equal Protection Clause (Art. XIV, sec. 1) and the doctrine of staire decisis, Florida must
follow U.S. Supreme Courts rulings, and other Appellate and Civil Courts on pro se pleadings.
Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants'
pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. J enkins
v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd
240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of
controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the
achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its
effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment. Maty v. Grasselli
Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938).
Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should
endeavor to construe Plaintiffs Pleadings without regard to technicalities." Picking v.
Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Pro Se parties have the right to Appeal, and submit their briefs on appeal even though
they may be inartfully drawn, see Vega v. J ohnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998).
Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants consequences of technical
errors if injustice would otherwise result. U. S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
Moreover, the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the
allegations provide for relief on any possible theory. Bonner v. Circuit Court of St.
Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714,
716 (8th Cir. 1971).
The history of bias and prejudice against pro se litigants within the Courts is long.
Stephen Elias who had been with Nolo Press, the nation's leading publisher of self-help
law books, back in 1997, in an article Bias Against Pro Per Litigants ... stated:
From the moment they first contact the court system, most people who want to represent
themselves, without a lawyer, encounter tremendous resistance. Within the closed
universe of the courts, this bias is as pernicious as that based on race, ethnic origins or
sex.
People who cannot afford a lawyer are a rebuke to the organized bar's monopoly ,
because that monopoly is morally-if not legally-justified the ABA has admitted that 100
million Americans can't afford lawyers.
... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the
constitution and laws. Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905
8
2
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam)
Opinion by Circuit J udge Richard Posner in Prude v. Clarke, No. 11-2811, Court of
Appeals, 7th Circuit, decided March 27, 2012, the Court reaffirmed U.S. Supreme Court
rulings that complaints filed by unrepresented persons are supposed to be construed
liberally. E.g., McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir.
2006); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2010).
Case law and pro-se litigants - U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Pro se parties are provided wide latitude when their pleadings and papers are construed.
When interpreting pro se papers, court should use common sense to determine what relief
party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, C.A.11. Fla., 1992. In case of pro se
action, court should construe complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers in resolving motion to dismiss complaint. Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d
1459, C.A.11.Fla., 1990.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys,
and will therefore be liberally construed. Trawinski v. United Technologies, 313 F.3d
1295, C.A.11. Ala., 2002. Pro se pleadings are held to less strict standard than pleadings
filed by lawyers and thus are construed liberally. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249,
C.A.11. Ga., 2008.
Pursuant to the less stringent standard applied to a pro se litigant's pleadings, wildly
implausible allegations in the litigant's complaint should not be taken to be true, but the
court ought not penalize the litigant for linguistic imprecision in the more plausible
allegations. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, C.A. 11. Fla., 2008.
The Court of Appeals is to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, C.A.11. Fla., 2007. Pro se complaints are to be read
very liberally. Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365 C.A.5. Tex., 1976. Licensed attorney
could not be given advantage of liberal construction of complaint normally given pro se
litigants. Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, C.A.5. Tex., 1977.
Court will use common sense in interpreting frequently diffuse pleadings of pro se
complaints. U. S. ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d 259, C.A.5. La., 1976. In ruling
on summary judgment motion, court construes pro se complaint more liberally than it
would complaint of represented party.
Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, C.A.11. Fla., 1995. Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, C.A.11. Fla., 2008.
3
Pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, C.A.11. Ga., 1987. Pro se complainants are
held to less pleading standards less stringent than those applicable to lawyers. U.S. v.
Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, C.A.11. Fla., 2002. If a pro se complainant meets jurisdictional
requirements, a federal court can extend such leniency as justice requires in construing
the pleadings. Bolden v. Odum, 695 F.2d 549, C.A.11. Ga., 1983.
The pleadings of a pro se complaint should be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Shaw v. Briscoe, 541 F.2d 489, C.A.5. Tex., 1976.
Allegations of complaint, especially a pro se complaint, must be read in liberal fashion,
and they must be accepted as true in testing their sufficiency. Richardson v. Fleming, 651
F.2d 366, C.A.5. Tex., 1981.
Pro se pleadings are to be judged with a liberality unnecessary for those drafted by
skilled counsel. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A . Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d
765, C.A.5. Tex., 1972. Standard against which pro se complaints and petitions is
measured should be loose enough to accommodate in- artful pleader. Potts v. Estelle, 529
F.2d 450, C.A.5. Tex., 1976. Pro se complaints are to be read with especial liberality.
Patterson v. MacDougall, 506 F.2d 1, C.A.5. Ga., 1975.
34
Unlicensed Practice of Law (UPL) in the state of Florida
UPL is a 3d felony subject to 5-yrs in prison (454.23), defined by Florida Bar Rule 10-2.1(a):
Mr. Rodems UPL complaint against me appears in this petition at Appendix L and alleges:
Neil J . Gillespie is not a lawyer. He has...represented a Trust in state and federal court
litigation, and as a personal representative of the Estate of Penelope Gillespie...
I am not a lawyer. I appear pro se because I am indigent and financially unable to obtain counsel.
I deny Mr. Rodems allegation that I represented a Trust in state and federal court litigation,
and as a personal representative of the Estate of Penelope Gillespie... I represent only my
personal interest for myself, and my personal interest as co-trustee, as permitted by law:
First Amendment right to petition the Governmental for a redress of grievances.
28 U.S.C. 1654 - Appearance personally or by counsel.
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 17 capacity (a) real interest (1) own name (E) trustee of express trust
Fla Const, Art I, Sec 21: Access to courts. The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
Florida Statutes, 454.18, any person, whether an attorney or not . . . may conduct
his or her own cause in any court of this state.
Fla. Prob. Rule 5.030(a) Exception, see Lituchy v. Estate of Lituchy. I appear for my
own interest in the Estate. No one was appointed personal representative of the
Estate by Court Order. The last will and testament of my Mother names Mark
Gillespie personal representative and me as substitute personal representative.
Mark Gillespie, et al, represented in foreclosure by Tiffany Caparas Esq., Kaufman,
Englett and Lynd, PLLC; Notice of Consent to J udgment filed in 42-2013CA-000115
because they have no interest in the property. I only represent my interest in the trust.
Pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard, see Tannenbaum v. United States.
The Courts failed to make a counsel appoint for me on basis of mental, physical and
speech disability. I plan to make a new motion for counsel appointment ASAP.
Order of J udge Cook attached to Rodems UPL complaint is a sham. see U.S. v Terry
The ICCPR provides me additional rights to represent my own interest in a fair court.
I was a client of FLSMF and got legal advice on the foreclosure, no advice of UPL.
UPL by Mr. Rodems: Represented the state of Florida in 5:10-cv-503, J une 21, 2011, prohibited:
Only the Attorney General of Florida may represent the State of Florida in a federal court
action, Fla. Const. Art IV 4, F.S. 16.01, State ex rel. Shevin v. Weinstein.
Mr. Castagliuolo, misprision of felony 18 U.S.C. 4, J une 21, 2011 failed to report Rodems UPL.
UPL by Mr. Rodems: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, 05-CA-7205 (and 20 related cases),
prohibited by Fla. Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9, 4-1.10, and McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc.
UPL by paralegal Yolanda I. Martinez, McCalla Raymer, Rule 10-2.1(a), Ethics Opinion 70-62,
activity which requires the attorney's personal judgment and participation; Florida Court, see
emails Aug-07-2013 Gillespie-Martinez (Sep. Vol. App No. 2); District Court, see Rule 11
sanction motion (Doc. 15); Rule 55 motion for default judgment, (Doc. 16); Rule 72/Rule
60(b)(3) Verified Objection to Magistrate Order (Doc. 17); Affidavit 28 U.S.C. 144 (Doc. 22)
CLSMF
9
10
copy
BARKER,RODEMS& COOK
PROFESSIONALASSOCIATrON
ATIORNEYSATlAW
CHRISA BARKER Telephone8 1 3 4 8 9 ~ 1 1
400NorthAshleyDrive,Suite2100
RYANCHRISTOPHERRODEMS
Facsimile 813/489-1008
WILLIAM].COOK Tampa, Florida33602
April26,2011
TheHonorableJamesD. Arnold
CircuitCourtJudge
CircuitCivil,Division"J"
800E. TwiggsStreet,Room514
Tampa,Florida 33602
Re: NeilJ.Gillespiev.Barker,Rodems& Cook,P.A.,
aFloridaCorporation;andWilliamJ.Cook
CaseNo.: 05-CA-7205;Division"J"
DearJudgeArnold:
EnclosedpleasefindacourtesycopyofDefendants'Motionto StrikeProSeFilingsbyPlaintiff
whichwasfiledonevendateintheabove-referencedmatter. ByOrderofthisCourtentered
November15,2010,Mr. Gillespieisprohibitedfromfilinganydocumentsprosee
Thankyouforyourtinleandattentiontothismatter.
Respectfullysubmitted,
RCR/so
Enclosure
cc:NeilJ.Gillespie(w/encl)
11
1
Exhibit 12 This UPL investigation is an abuse of power by the Florida Supreme Court
This UPL investigation is an abuse of power by the Florida Supreme Court, by and through its
arm The Florida Bar, a Governmental Unit. Ms. Coaxum breached a duty as a Bar prosecutor by
allowing Mr. Rodems to use The Florida Bar vexatiously against me, a former client of his firm.
In 2001 the Florida Attorney General intervened in Neil Gillespie v. ACE Cash Express, Inc.
citing Florida RICO jurisdiction. Roger B. Handberg, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Economic Crimes Division, appeared for the AG and got a $500,000 settlement for Florida.
Mr. Handberg was present J une 12, 2002 at a mediation in Tampa and knew I was not satisfied
with Barker, Rodems & Cook (BRC) who represented me. On or about May 22, 2002 I called
the opposing counsel for ACE, Paul Watson, and told him I wanted to settle. That was after BRC
defrauded me and stole $7,143 in the AMSCOT case settlement November 1, 2001.
I wrote Mr. Handberg in 2007 about BRCs fraud no avail. Since 2007 I also made written
complaints to the Florida Attorney General about The Florida Bar and Barker, Rodems & Cook,
first to AG Bill McCollum, and later to AG Bondi. The $500,000 settlement agreement, and my
correspondence with Mr. Handberg appear at Exhibit 13. AG Bill McCollum at Exhibit 12.
The Florida Bar is responsible for allowing Mr. Rodems to conduct a state-sponsored reign of
terror against me since 2006. Susan Bloemendaal, Tampa Chief Branch Discipline Counsel,
made a bad decision February 9, 2005 to dismiss my first written complaint against Mr. Cook of
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Unfortunately The Bar has defended her wrong decision since.
Ryan Christopher Rodems - Conflict of Interest
The problems in this case were caused by Mr. Rodemss misconduct due to his conflict of
interest representing his firm against me, a former client. J udge Barton came to this conclusion.
J udge Baron agreed with J udge Nielsens Order, and suggested during a hearing J anuary 26,
2010 that I make a renewed motion to disqualify Mr. Rodems, whose misconduct was the
central obstacle in resolving this case. Transcript, J anuary 26, 2010, page 31:
1 [MR. GILLESPIE]...This is what the Judge wrote: "This
2 motion to disqualify is denied with prejudice
3 except as to the basis that Counsel may be a
4 witness and on that basis the motion is denied
5 without prejudice." Now, for Mr. Rodems being a
6 witness, the nature of this case is essentially he
7 is a perpetual witness. The transcripts show that
8 his representation is essentially on going
9 testimony about factual matters. Many times in the
10 transcripts he is confused. He is saying, Judge,
11 we -- Oh, I don't mean we, I mean I as my attorney
12 for the firm think this about my client, which is
13 actually myself. That confusion is evident in the
14 transcripts over and over again. I really believe
15 he needs to be disqualified because of his ongoing
12
2
16 testimony in this matter.
17 THE COURT: All right. Well, I assume there
18 will be a renewed motion to disqualify that will be
19 filed and then again set for a hearing once we
20 establish our procedure, but we can't do that until
21 we get what I directed you to produce within ten
22 days from Ms. Huffer.
Closing Statement Fraud - Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA
Clement, Blomefield, and Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation
William J . Cook and his two partners Ryan Christopher Rodems and Chris A. Baker concocted a
closing statement fraud when they represented me in the Amscot
1
case by asserting a phony
claim of $50,000 in court-awarded fees and costs. However the district court did not award
any fees. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice, and the matter settled for the
business reasons of Amscot while on appeal to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit, no. 01-14761-AA.
Mr. Cook and his partners took a 90% fee of a $56,000 total recovery, instead of a 45% fee
permitted by Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), which denied me and two other clients $9,143 each,
our lawful share of the $56,000 total recovery. This resulted in an unjust enrichment of $21,431
for Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., who paid me and the other two clients $2,000 each instead of
$9,143 each, causing each client a loss of $7,143. The preceding figures are not mine, but
determined in 2009 by Florida attorney Seldon J . Childers for me.
Mr. Cook claimed he was not required to disclose or itemize under Rule 4-1.5(f)(5) costs of
$3,580.67, or show $2,544.79 paid to Mr. Alpert, because AMSCOT Corporation separately
paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for
court-awarded fees and costs. But the claim to $50,000.00 for court-awarded fees and costs
was later determined false. There were no court-awarded fees of $50,000. Mr. Cooks Closing
Statement Fraud was a trick to evade the terms of the contingent fee agreement, and payment to
me of $9,143, my lawful share of the $56,000 total recovery. The closing statement is attached.
Prior to litigation I complained to The Florida Bar. In 2003 I called ACAP, RFA 03-18867. In
response Barker, Rodems & Cook accused me of criminal extortion. On J une 7, 2004 I made a
written complaint to The Bars Tampa Branch Office. Asst. Staff Counsel William L. Thompson,
opened TFB No. 2004-11,734(13C). Six months later Thompson was gone. Susan Bloemendaal
was then, and is today, Tampa Chief Branch Discipline Counsel. Ms. Bloemendaal closed the
file by letter February 9, 2005 without a finding of misconduct.
Barker, Rodems & Cooks former representation of client Neil J . Gillespie
Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA is a successor firm to Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook,
P.A. that formerly represented me in some of the same matters.

1
Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomefield, and Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation,
Case No. 01-14761-AA, U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
3
Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA (BRC) is a small, three partner law firm and Florida professional
service corporation formed August 4, 2000 with corporate officers, partners and key employee:
a. Chris A. Barker, Florida Bar ID no. 885568, president of BRC. (Barker)
b. Ryan Christopher Rodems, Florida Bar ID no. 947652, vice president of BRC. (Rodems)
c. William J . Cook, Florida Bar ID no. 986194, secretary/treasurer of BRC. (Cook)
d. Lynne Anne Spina, notary public and legal assistant. (Spina)
Prior to BRC, Messrs. Barker, Rodems, Cook and Ms. Spina were employed by Alpert, Barker,
Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., a law firm led by J onathan Alpert.
Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A (Alpert firm) was a law firm and Florida
professional service corporation that ended on or about December 8, 2000. The Alpert firm had
the following partners, associate, and key employee:
a. J onathan Louis Alpert, Florida Bar ID no. 121970 (partner)
b. Chris A. Barker, Florida Bar ID no. 885568 (partner)
c. Ryan Christopher Rodems, Florida Bar ID no. 947652 (partner)
d. David Dominick Ferrentino, Florida Bar ID no. 908754 (partner)
c. William J . Cook, Florida Bar ID no. 986194 (partner)
d. Scott J ames Flint, Florida Bar ID no. 85073 (associate)
e. Lynne Anne Spina, notary public and legal assistant
The Alpert firm is not a party to this action. BRC and the Alpert firm coexisted for a period of
four (4) months, August 4, 2000 through December 8, 2000.
The Alpert firm formerly represented me as a client in the AMSCOT case, and ACE Cash
Express case. I do not have a dispute with the Alpert firm. The Alpert firm is not part of this
litigation. I did not make complaints against the Alpert firm.
In addition to the loss sued for in Clement, Blomefield, and Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation,
no. 01-14761-AA, U.S. Eleventh Circuit, William J . Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
(BRC) represented or consulted with me on other payday loan cases where I did not waive
conflict, did not initiate civil litigation against BRC, and did not make Bar complaints against
lawyers at Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A:
Neil Gillespie v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., case no. 8:00-CV-723-T-23B, in United States
District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. (Circuit Court, Hillsborough
Consolidated Case No. 99-9730). This was a payday loan case like AMSCOT.
Other Matters Where BRC Formerly Represented Gillespie
William Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA consulted with me on disability and
employment matters where I did not waive conflict, did not initiate civil litigation against BRC,
and did not make Bar complaints against the lawyers at Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.:
4
EZ Check Cashing of Clearwater, National Cash Advance, Florida Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) and St. Petersburg J unior College. The payday loan
matters with EZ Check Cashing of Clearwater and National Cash Advance began as
Alpert firm matters. The matters with the Florida DVR and St. Pete J unior College were
brought to the Alpert firm during the period of coexistence of the Alpert firm and BRC,
but put on hold until BRC was in full operation.
Documentary evidence that BRC formerly represented me, for the purpose of disqualification:
J anuary 16, 2001 letter from BRC/Mr. Cook to Neil Gillespie about lawsuit EZ Check
Cashing of Clearwater.
March 27, 2001 letter from BRC/Mr. Cook to Neil Gillespie about matter with the Florida
Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation.
May 25, 2001 letter from BRC/Mr. Cook to Neil Gillespie about matter with St. Petersburg
J unior College.
May 30, 2001 letter from BRC/Mr. Cook to Kelly Peterson, branch manager of National
Cash Advance, This firm represents Neil Gillespie
Mr. Rodems representation of Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA against me was the ULP
The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 417 (Fla. 1980). the single most important concern
in the Court's defining and regulating the practice of law is the protection of the public from
incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation.
I am a member of the public, and a FORMER CLIENT, harmed by Mr. Rodems UPL.
Rule 4-8.6 Authorized Business Entities (d) Violation of Statute or Rule. A lawyer who, while
acting as a shareholder, member, officer, director, partner, manager, agent, or employee of an
authorized business entity and engaged in the practice of law in Florida, violates or sanctions the
violation of...the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar shall be subject to disciplinary action.
Unfortunately The Florida Bar has failed to administer, apply, and interpret The Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar in a fair and unbiased manner without favoritism, extortion,
improper influence, personal self-enrichment, self-dealing, concealment, and conflict of interest.
Attorney is an officer of the court and an essential component of the administration of
justice, and, as such, his conduct is subject to judicial supervision and scrutiny. State ex
rel. Florida Bar v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730 (1957).
The Florida Bar has not held Mr. Rodems accountable to the Standards of Professionalism found
in Florida Supreme Court Order SC13-688:
5
1.1 Standards of Professionalism: The Standards of Professionalism are set forth in the
Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of Professionalism, The
Florida Bar Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar
and the decisions of The Florida Supreme Court.
or Rules found in the Ethics Department Informational Packet Candor Toward the Tribunal, and
Rule 4-8.4(c), conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
Rule 4-8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The Florida Bar has not protected me from Mr. Rodems UPL as defined by Rule 10-2.1(a),
Rules Governing Unlicensed Practice, 10-2 Definitions
Rule 10-2.1. Generally
The Florida Bar has not protected me from Mr. Rodems UPL as prohibited by The Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, and case law like McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc, especially,
Rule 4-1.7 Conflict of Interest; Current Clients. Mr. Rodems representation of his firm
and partner against me, a former client violated (a) Representing Adverse Interests (2)
substantial risk that the representation of his firm and partner materially limited the
lawyer's responsibilities to me, a former client, by a personal interest of Mr. Rodems. See
Emergency Motion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel Ryan Christopher Rodems &
Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, J uly 9, 2010, 05-CA-7205, 190 pages and posted on
Scribed. http://www.scribd.com/doc/55960451/Emergency-Motion-to-Disqualify-Ryan-
Christopher-Rodems-Barker-Rodems-Cook-05-CA-7205-J uly-09-2010
Rule 4-1.9 Conflict of Interest; Former Client. A lawyer shall not (a) represent another
person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that persons interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client. (b) use information relating to the
representation to the disadvantage of the former client. (c) reveal information relating to
the representation about the client. Mr. Rodems firm and law partner represented me the
Amscot and ACE lawsuits, and consulted with me on disability matters with Florida
DVR in DLES case no: 98-066-DVR, and other matters. Id. at Emergency Motion to
Disqualify Ryan Christopher Rodems J uly 9, 2010.
Rule 4-1.10 Imputation of Conflicts of Interest (a) Imputed Disqualification of All
Lawyers in Firm. While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any 1 of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so. Mr. Rodems has an imputed disqualification because his law firm and partner William
Cook previously represented me. Id. at Emergency Motion to Disqualify Ryan
Christopher Rodems J uly 9, 2010.
6
McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995, see Exhibit 3.
[1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and
any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to
disqualify counsel, movant must show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and
that the matters in pending suit are substantially related to the previous matter or cause of
action. [3] In determining whether attorney-client relationship existed, for purposes of
disqualification of counsel from later representing opposing party, a long-term or
complicated relationship is not required, and court must focus on subjective expectation
of client that he is seeking legal advice. [5] For matters in prior representation to be
"substantially related" to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify
counsel, matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would
understand as important to the issues involved. [7] Substantial relationship between
instant case in which law firm represented defendant and issues in which firm had
previously represented plaintiffs created irrebuttable presumption under Florida law that
confidential information was disclosed to firm, requiring disqualification. [8]
Disqualification of even one attorney from law firm on basis of prior representation of
opposing party necessitates disqualification of firm as a whole, under Florida law.
Failure of The Florida Bar to Uphold Disability Statutes and Regulations, Etc.
The Florida Bar has not upheld disability statutes or regulatory provision that either are designed
to protect a particular class of persons from their inability to protect themselves or establish a
duty to take precautions to guard a certain class of persons from a specific type of injury. Failure
to do so establishes negligence per se. Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d
1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1978).
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)
Chapter 825 et seq., Fla. Stat., Abuse and Exploitation of Disabled Adults
Stalking or harassment, 784.048(2) and (4), Fla. Stat., and violation of court-imposed
prohibition thereof, which is crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (2000), see In re Fernando
MALTA-Espinoza, Respondent, DOJ File A92 717 834 - Eloy
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et. seq.
Federal Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801
Counsel appointment, C.A.11, Addenda Five, 11th Cir. R., Non-Criminal J ustice Act
ABA Basic Principles of a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings
Pro se pleadings held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys, Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam); I was wrongly sanctioned $11,550 thereof.
Under the Eggshell Skull Rule, defendant is liable for the plaintiff's unforeseeable and uncommon
reactions to the defendant's negligent or intentional tort. If the defendant commits a tort against the
plaintiff without a complete defense, the defendant becomes liable for any injury that is magnified by
the plaintiff's peculiar characteristics. http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eggshell_skull_rule
Main Office
400Nonh Tampa Street, Suite3200 300Nonh Hogan Street, Suite 700
o
o
Tampa, Florida 33602 Jacksonville, Florida 32202-4270
813/274-6000
904/301-6300
813/274-6200(Fax) 904/301-6310(Fax)
2110FirstStreet, Suite3-137
u.s. Department of Justice
501 WestChurch Street, Suite300
FonMyers, Florida 33901 Orlando, Florida 32805
239/461-2200 United StatesAttorney 407/648-7500
239/461-2219(Fax) 407/648-7643(Fax)
MiddleDistrictof Florida
Replyto: Orlando, Florida
August1,2007
VIAUNITEDSTATESMAIL
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115
th
Loop
Ocala, Florida34481
Re: YourJuly6, 2007letter
DearMr. Gillespie:
Thisis in responsetoyourJuly6, 2007letter. Asyou know, Iam nolongerwith
the FloridaAttorneyGeneral'sOffice. Ileftthatofficeattheend of2002, and Ihave
had no professionaldealingswithAceCash oranyofthe paydayloancasessincemy
departure. Forthatreason and others, IdonotbelievethatIamtheappropriateperson
towhomyourlettershould be directed. Asafederal prosecutor, Iam primarily
responsibleforprosecutingviolationsoffederal lawthatareinvestigated bylaw
enforcement. Yourrequestforan investigationneedsto bedirectedtoan investigating
agency.
Ihaveenclosedthematerialsthatyou sentme.
Sincerely,
JAMES R. KLINDT

By:
AssistantUnited StatesAttorney
13
o
o
Neil J. Gillespie
8092SW115
th
Loop
Ocala,FL 34481
Telephone:(352)854-7807
email:neilgillespie@mfi.net RECEIVED
U.S. ATTORNFY'S OFFlCE
llUL 09Z007
July6, 2007
MIDDLE DISTRICT at=: FLORIDA
ORLANDO
RogerB. Handberg,Assista
US AttorneyOffice
501 W. ChurchStreet, Suite
Orlando,FL32805-2281
ntUS Attorney
300
DearMr. Handberg,
Sometimeago,inyourpositionwiththeFloridaAttorneyGeneral,youroffice
intervenedinalawsuitwhereIwasaplaintiffina"paydayloan"lawsuit,Neil Gillespie
v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., caseno. 8:00-CV-723-T-23B,inUnitedStatesDistrictCourt,
MiddleDistrictofFlorida,TampaDivision. ImetyouduringamediationJune 12,2002,
attheofficeof GasperJ. Ficarrotta. JustpriortothemediationIcalledACE'scounsel,
PaulWatson,tocomplainaboutmyownlawyers' behaviorandtotrytosettlemy
involvementinthelawsuit. Iamwritingyouaboutthecrimesof myformerlawyers.
MylawyerwasWilliamJ. Cookof Barker,Rodems& Cook,P.A. Mr. Cook
beganrepresentingmewhilehewaswiththefirmAlpert,Barker,Rodems,Ferrentino&
Cook,P.A. Mr. CookalsorepresentedmeinanotherpaydayloancaseagainstAmscot
Corporation. ThatcasesettledOctober30,2001,andIsuspectedthatmylawyers
defraudedmeduringthesettlement,butIcouldnotproveitatthetime. Forexample,
Amscot'slawyer,JohnAnthony,initiallyofferedMr. Cooka$5,000.00"improperpayoff
attempt"tosettlethecase. ShortlythereafterMr. Cooktoldmethathehadreceiveda
$50,000.00court-awardforcostsandattorneys'fees, andthatthisawardtookprecedent
overourcontingentfeeagreement,therebylimitingmyrecovery.
In2003 IlearnedthatMr. Cookdidnotreceive$50,000.00incourt-awardedcosts
andattorneys' fees, andthatMr. Cookdefraudedme. IcontactedTheFloridaBar,but
myformerlawyersaccusedmeofextortionforutilizingBar'sAttorney Consumer
Assistance Program (ACAP)inagood-faithefforttoresolvemydisputewithout
litigation. In2005 Isuedmyformerlawyersforfraudandbreachofcontract,andthey
countersuedmeforlibeloveraletteraboutthebarcomplaint.
InitiallyIproceededprosebecauseIcouldnotfindalawyerwillingtolitigate
againstmyformerlawyers,inpartbecauseof theirreputation,whichIlaterlearned
Roger B. Handberg, s ~ n t US Attorney
o
Page - 2
July 6,2007
includes Mr. Alpert throwing coffee in the face of opposing counsel during a mediation.
Nonetheless I prevailed on Mr. Cook's motion to dismiss and Judge Nielsen found I
stated a cause of action for fraud and breach of contract. Ryan Rodems is representing
Mr. Cook and the firm, and shortly thereafter he filed a false affidavit about a threat of
violence. A voice recording of the conversation later proved Mr. Rodems lied,
committed perjury, and Judge Nielsen recused himself. The antics continued with Judge
Isom, and she recused herself. Now Judge Barton has the case. In April, 2007 I found a
lawyer in Gainesville willing to take the case, Robert W. Bauer, but the case has been
damaged due to Mr. Rodems perjury and obstruction ofjustice.
My former lawyers are incompetent, not just because they failed to prevail in any
of the payday loan claims, but because of the coffee-throwing and other antics. In my
view these lawyers are little more than criminals with law degrees. Their behavior is
outrageous, and certainly more grievous than that of the payday lenders they sued.
I am writing you today about the criminal fraud by my former lawyers. Also, I am
complaining about Mr. Rodems' perjury, obstruction ofjustice, and his threats of
criminal prosecution issued to me during the course of litigation. The local state attorney,
Mark Ober, has not responded to my correspondence.
Enclosed you will find Plaintiffs Motion for Punitive Damages Pursuant to
Section 768.72 Florida Statues, with supporting exhibits 1 through 50. I believe this
document sets forth the facts needed to assist with your evaluation of my request. Also
enclosed is an amicus curiae brief in the Illinois case of Cripe v. Leiter. Amicus HALT
argued that over-billing a client is not part of the practice oflaw, and that lawyers are
subject to statutory consumer protection law in dealing with their clients.
Thank you for your consideration.
enclosures
c o
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115
1h
Loop
Ocala,FL34481
VIAUNITEDSTATESCERTIFIEDMAIL
Articleno.: 70060100000733661075
October2, 2007
RogerB. Handberg,AssistantUS Attorney
US AttorneyOffice
501 W. ChurchStreet,Suite300
Orlando,FL32805-2281
DearMr. Handberg,
ThankyouforyourletterofAugust 1, 2007. Afterreadingyourresponse,Iam
confusedwhenyoudirectedmetoaninvestigatingagencyforaninvestigationofmy
former lawyers'criminalconduct. Inmy lettertoyouofJuly6, 2007,IwrotethatI
contactedthelocal StateAttorney,MarkOber,butthathedidnotrespondtomy
correspondence. IalsoprovidedyoucopiesofmyletterstoMr. Oberasexhibitsto
PlaintiffsMotionforPunitiveDamagesPursuanttoSection768.72FloridaStatues,
specificallythreelettersgroupedasexhibitnumber47,lettersdatedMarch7
th
, 16
1h
and
24
Ih
,2006. Inaddition,IwroteMr. OberonJuly 15,2006requestingareplytomy
correspondence,buthedidnotrespond. Isn'tMr. Ober,theStateAttorneyforthe
ThirteenthJudicialCircuit,theproperinvestigatingagency? Ifnot,whois?
ItakeMr. Ober'sfailureto replyoracknowledgemycorrespondenceasevidence
ofhistacitapprovalofmyformerlawyers' wrongdoing. TheStateAttorney'sfailure
deniedmycivilrightstoequalprotectionunderlaw,therightto dueprocess,protection
fromwitnessintimidationand/ortampering,andobstructionofjustice.
Icontactedyoubecauseasafederal prosecutor,youareresponsiblefor
prosecutingviolationsoffederal law. InthisinstancetheStateAttorneyhasdeniedmy
civilrights. Citizenshavefederal civilrightsthatparalleltheirstatecivilrights,and
historicallywhenthestatefailsto upholdacitizen'scivilrights,theU.SDepartmentof
Justiceacts. ThatiswhyIbelieveyouhaveboththeauthorityanddutytoact.
~ y ,
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"PADDOCK BRANCH POST OFFICE"
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10/02/2007 (352)861-8188 03:28:24 PM
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STATEOFFLORIDA
DEPARTMENTOFBANKINGAND FINANCE
AND
OFFICEOFTHEAnORNEYGENERAL
INRE:
ACECASHEXPRESS,INC.d/b/a
ACEAMERICA'SCASHEXPRESS, DBF CASE NO.: 9177-F-9/02
----------------
I
SETILEMENTAGREEMENT
TheFloridaDepartmentofBankingand Finance, Division ofSecuritiesandFinance
("DBF"),theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral (UAttorneyGeneral")and ACECash Express, Inc.
d/b/aACEAmerica'sCashExpress("Respondent"or"ACE")agreeas follows:
1. JURISDICTION. OBFis charged\vith the administrationofChapter516, 560,
and 687,Florida andtheAttorneyGeneral ischarged\viththeadministrationof

Chapters501, 559,687, 895" and 896, FloridaStatutes. Thisagreementapplies toFlorida
transactionsonly.
2. BACKGROUND.
AttorneyGeneral
a. TheAttorneyGeneral movedtointerveneas plaintiffintwo civil cases
thatwerependingagainst contendingthatACEhad violated Chapters501,
516, 559, 687, 895, and 896, FloridaStatutes, in connection withdeferred
.
depositcheckcashingservices.providedby ACE in Floridapriorto ApriL.2000.
Thosecasesare: Eugene aJld Neil Gille.. \pie alld .. ofFlorida,
Office qfthe Atlorlley Gellert,l, Depllrtnlent ofLegal Affairs liS. ACE Cash
Express. IIIC., Allerilative FinclJlcia/, IIIC ofthe Treas11re Il1e., Raymond
c. Henln1ig, DOllold H. Neusll1dl. Kll)' I). Zilliox, J. Schmitt, and unknowl1
FINAL
entities Gnd individuals, No. 9909730, in the Circuit Court for
the Thirteenth Judicial District of Florida (the "Clement" case); and Betls v. Ace
Cash 927 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 2002), (the "Betts" case). DBF was
not a named party in either case.
b. ACE and the other defendants disagreed with the claims made by the
Plaintiffs and the Attorney General in each of those cases.
c. The Attorney General's Inotion to intervene in the Betts case was denied.
d. In the Clement case, the individual Plaintiffs' clailns were dismissed with
prejudice, leaving the Attorney General as the sole Plaintiff. The Attorney
General's RICO claims were dislnissed with prejudice and are subject ofa
pending appeal before the Second District Coul1 of AppeaJ ofFlorida styled ..')tate
ofFlorida, Qffice ofthe AI/oriley General v. Zilliox, Case No. 2002-2340
(consolidated with Case No. 2002-3] 13). All of the claims asserted bythe
Attorney General in' the Clement case are to be settled pursuant to this
Agreement, with the Attorney General voluntarily dismissing their claims.
e. ACE 'and the individual defendants have denied and continue to deny that
they engaged in any wrongdoing., and this Agreement shall not constitute any
adlnission of any wrongdoing or liability on the part of ACE or any of the
individual defendants.
f. The, Attorney General and ACE wish to avoid the time and expense
involved, in further litigation.
FINAL 2
Department of Banking and Finance
g. Goleta National Bank, a national bank located in Goleta, California
("Goleta"), has offered loans to residents of Florida since April 2000. ACE has
provided agency services to Goleta related to those loans in Florida. On October
25 and 28, 2002. ACE and Goleta entered into separate consent orders with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States ("OCC"), pursuant
to which Goleta agreed, among other things, to generally cease the origination,
renewal and rollover of its loans in Florida and ACE agreed, among other things,
to generally cease providing services to Goleta related to the origination, renewal
and rollover of such Goleta loans, both by no later than December 31, 2002.
Goleta, ACE and the OC..c agreed that the loans provided by Goleta and serviced
by ACE were made pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 85 and that the interest rate charged
by Goleta was permissible under the laws of the United States for national banks
located in the State of California. DBF was not a party to the agreement between
Goleta, ACE, and the OCC..
h. ACE also offers a bill paying service through which it offers to accept or
receive voluntary utility payments from its Florida customers and, for a fee,
electronically transmit the payment to the utility. The DBF has informed ACE
that to offer this service, ACE should be licensed as a Funds Transmitter under
Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. ACE disagrees with the position taken by
the DBF, but, to avoid the expense and uncertainty of litigation. ACE agreed to
file, and has pending with OBF. an application to act as a Funds Transmitter
FINAL J
..,
underPartII.. Chapter560,FloridaStatutes. TheDBFwill issuethatlicense, as
well asthelicenseauthorizingACE toactasaDeferredPresentmentProvider
underPartIV, Chapter560,FloridaStatutes,onorbeforethe effectivedateofthis
Agreement. Aceagreesthatfuturetransactions involvingthetransmissionof
funds will begovernedbytheprovisionsofPart II, Chapter560, FloridaStatutes,
and ACE will complywiththoseprovisions in all futuretransactions.
i. ACE is licensedwith DBFas aCheck Casherunder PartIII, Chapter560,
FloridaStatutes.
PurooseandIntent
J. Thepartieswishtoresolveand to releaseanyclailnsthatwere asserted,or
could havebeenasserted,orcouldbeasserted, becauseoforarising from the
investigation,litigation,pr regulatoryreviewconductedbythe DBV orthe
AttorneyGeneral.
k. TheDBFagreesthatACEhas fullycooperatedwith itin this matter.
I. Itis theintentofthepartiesthatthisagreementbeimplementedpromptly,
and withoutinjuryorinconvenienceto ACE customers.
m. Itis.theintentofthepartiesthatOBF issueorrenewany authorizationor
licensenecessaryforACEto toofferservicesin Florida, including
deferredpresentmenttransactions.. checkcashing, bill paying
9
debitcard
transactions, money wiretransfersand otherproductsthatareauthorized
underFloridalaw.
n. It'istheintentofthepartiesthatthisagreementbeimplementedwithout
causingcompetitivedisadvantageto ACE..
FINAL 4
3. CONSIDERATION. ACE, the DSF, and the Attorney General agree as follows:
8. ACE will cease providing agent services to Goleta in connection with the
origination,:'-enewal, or rollover of any Goleta loans in the State of Florida by
December 31, 2002. ACE may, howevef, continue to provide services to Goleta
related to the servicing and collection of Goleta loans originated, renewed, or
rolled overin the State of Florida before January 1, subject to paragraph
3(g) below.
b. ACE has applied fOf.. and DBF agrees to issue upon the issuance of the
final order contelnplated by this agreelnent, a license with an effective date of
December 30, 2002, authorizing ACE to act as a Deferred Presentment Provider
under Part IV, Chapter Florida Statutes. ACE agr,ees not to enter into any
deferred presentment trapsactions in Florida unless such deferred presentment
transactions are completed in accordance with Part IV-, Chapter 560, Florida
Statutes. DBF agrees that ACE may act as a Deferred Presentment Provider under
Part IV, Chapter 560.. Florida Statutes, and as a Funds Transmitter under Part II,
Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, between December 30, 2002 and the issuance of
the final' order, provided that all such funds transmission .and .deferred presentment
transactions engaged in during this tilne period are otherwise completed in
accordance with Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, and Part IV, Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes. OBF agrees that this is consistent with the public interest and
will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any applicable law, including
but not limited t0
9
501 .. 516,559,560,687,895 and 896, Florida
Statutes, or an Rules related to those statutes.
FINAL 5
c. ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta so
that no Goleta loans entered into before 'the effective date of this Agreement will
be extendect (except for the custolners' five-day extension options that are part of
the terms ofoutstanding loans) or converted, without full payment by the Goleta
loan customers, to any other type of transaction. Where applicable., ACE agrees
that it will not otler deferred presentlnent services to a Goleta loan customer
unless that customer's Goleta loan is or cancelled in accordance with
paragraph 3(g)-below. DBF agrees that the continued services provided under
the Goleta loan prograln authorized by this and by paragraph 3(a)
above are consistent with the public interest and will not constitute a violation of
this Agreement or any applicable including but not lilnited to, Chapters 501,
516.. 559, 560, 687, 8951lnd 896, Florida Statutes., or any Rules related to those
statutes.
d. DBF agrees to issue to ACE licenses pursuant to Part II, Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes, and Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, with an effective date
of December 30, 2002 upon the issuance of the final order contemplated in this
Agreement. ACE and the DSF agree that, until the issuance of the final
contemplated in this. agreement.. ACE will continue to offer its bill paying service
in order to avoid injury to those customers who rely on that service. DBF and the
Attorney General agree that continuing to offer that service is consistent with the
public interest and will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any
applicable law, including but not limited to, Chapters 501 .. 516, 559, 560, 687,
895, and 896.. Florida Statutes, or any Rules related to those statutes.
FINAL 6
e. DBF acknowledges that no additional in.formation is needed from ACE for
it to issue the Ijcenses contemplated by this Agreement..
f: ACe agrees to paya total of $500,000 in settlement and for issuance by
DBF of authorizations, licenses, or other approvals necessary for ACE to continue
in business in Florida, and for the releases in paragraphs 7 and 8 below. Of the
$500.000 total settlelnent, ACE has agreed to pay $250,000 to the DBF
Regulatory Trust Fund in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs, and other
expenses incurred by the DBF in connection with this matter and, ACE has agreed
to deliver to the Attorney General, a contribution of$250,000 to the Florida State
University College of Law in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs and
other expenses incurred by the Attorney General in connection with this matter.
These amounts will be p ~ by check, and will be delivered to the DBF or the
Attorney General upon entry of the Final Order as provided for herein.
g. ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta so
that loans that are delinquent as of October I,2002. and remain unpaid as of the
effective date of this agreement, from customers who engaged in Goleta loan
transactions commenced or originated before October I, 2002 in Florida
(collectively" the "Goleta Loan Custonlers") need not be repaid,. and the debt
owed to Goleta from Goleta Loan Customers will be cancelled.
h. If Goleta, either directly or through ACE, its agent,. .has notified a credit-
reporting agency ofa Goleta Loan Customer's delinquent debt to Goleta, then
ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta for ACE to
notify the credit agency that the delinquent amount has been cancelled. .
FINAL 7
I. In addition to the amount specified in paragraph 3(f) above, ACE will pay
up to $15,000 for an independent audit of the loan cancellations provided in
paragraph above, the credit reporting notifications provided in paragraph 3
(h) above, and verification of compliance with the transition from the Goleta loan
product to the state licensed product contemplated in paragraph 3(b) and 3(c)
above. DBF will select the independent auditor, after consultation with ACE.
The independent auditor selected will be required to report to the DBF within 90
days of the selection.
j. The entry ofa Final Order by OBF in the form of the Attachment to this
agreement.
k. Within 10 days after the entry of the final order contemplated herein, the
Attorney General will with prejudice its lawsuit, Eugene R. Clement alld
Neil Gillespie and State ofFlorida. qffice ofthe Attorney General, Department of
Legal Affairs vs. ACE Cash Express, IIlC., Altemative Financial, Inc., JS ofthe .
Treasure Coast, blc.,.Raymond C. Hemmig, DOllald H. Neustadt, Kay D. Zil/iox,
RonaldJ. Schmitt, alld unknown emilies and Consolidated Case No.
9909730, in the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District of Florida, as to
all defendants.
1. Within 10 days after the entry of the final order contemplated in 30)
above, the Attorney General will dismiss with prejudice its appeal ofany orders in
the Clement case..litigation. including State ofFlorida, Office ofthe Attorney
General v. Zi//iox, Case No. 2002-2240 and Slale ofFlorida, Office ofthe
Attomey Gener,,1 1'. AItematil;e FiflCI/lc:i"t, /flC., Case No. 2002-3113.
FINAL 8
4. CONSENT. Without adlnitting or denying any wrongdoing, Respondent
consents to the issuance by the DBF ofa Final Order, in substantially the form of the attached
Final Order, which the terms of this Agreelnent.
5. FINAL ORDER. The Final Order incorporating this Agreelnent is issued
pursuant to Subsection 120.57(4),. Florida Statutes, and upon its issuance shall be a final
administrative order.
6. WAIVERS. Respondent knowingly and voluntarily waives:
a. its right to an adlninistrative hearing provided for by Chapter 120, Florida
Statutes,. to contest the specific agreements included in this Agreement;
b. any requirelnent that the Final Order incorporating this Agreenlent contain
separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Notice of Rights;
c. its right to the isslJance ofa Recommended Order by an administrative law
judge froln the Division of Adlninistrative Hearings or froln the DBF;
d. any and all rights to object to or challenge in any judicial proceeding,
including but not limited to, an appeal pursuant to Section 120.68.. Florida
Statutes, any aspect, provision or requirement concerning the content, issuance,
procedure or timeliness of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement; and
e. any causes of action in law or in equity, which Respondent may have
arising out of the specific matters addressed in this agreement. DBF for itself and
the DBF.Released Parties, this release and waiver by Respondent without
in any way acknowledging or admitting that any such calise of action does or may
exist, and DBF, for and the DBF Released Parties, expressly denies that any
such right or cause of action does in .fact exist.
FINAL 9
7. ATIORNEY GENERAL The Attorney Genera]9 for himselfand
his predecessors. successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and forever discharges ACE, its
predecessors, successors, aniliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors,
officers, attorneys, employees, agents.. franchisees and assigns, and Goleta, and its predecessors,
successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors, officers,
attorneys, employees, agents, franchisees and assigns (collecti,vely, the "ACE Released Parties"),
from any and all claims, demands.. causes of action.. suits, debts, dues.. duties, sums of money,
accounts, fees, penalties, damages, judglnents'l 'Iiabi-tities and obligations, both contingent and
fixed, known and unknown.. foreseen and unforeseen. anticipated and unanticipated, expected
and unexpected, related to or arising out of Goleta's or ACE's operations in Florida prior to the
effective date of this agreement. This release includes.. but is not limited to, any claims related to
any loans renewed, or rolled over.bY Goleta in Florida and any services provided by ACE
or its franchisees related thereto.. any clainls related to any violation of Chapters 501,516,559,
560,687, 772, 895 and 896, Florida any clailns related to check cashing services
provided prior to the effective date of Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida and any claims
related to any licensing requirements for the services provided by ACE to its customers in
Florida prior to the effective date of this agreement. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, this release also includes all claims asserted or that could have been or could be
asserted against the parties named as defendants or that could have been named as defendants in
ElIgel1e R Clen1ell1 alld Neil Gi//eSlJie clIld (!f Flori,la, ofthe Att()rlley Gel/era!, .
Departn1!11t ofLegal A.ffairs liS. Ex/Jress. IIIC., A/JerI/alive Financial, [IIC., ,)5' a/the
rreaS!,re (;oast. IIIC., Raynl011d !-!enlnlig, [Jollald H. Neustadt. Kay [J. Zilliox, ROl1ald J.
GIld l1111a,OlVII entities and iJ,divi,hlllls, No. 99 09730. ACE, for itself
FINAL 10
and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, accepts this release and waiver by the Attorney
General without in any way acknowledging or adlnitting that any such cause of action does or
may exist, and ACE, for and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, expressly denies that
any such right or cause of action does in fact exist. Respondent hereby releases and
forever discharges the Attorney General and his respective employees.. agents, and
representatives (collectively, the lL Attorney'General Released Parties") from any causes of action'
in law or in equity, which Respondent may have arising out of the specific matters in
this agreement. The Attorney General, for themselves and the Attorney General Released
Parties, accept this release and waiver by Respondent without in any way acknowledging' or
admitting that any such cause of action does or may exist, the Attorney General, for himself and
the Attorney General Released Parties, expressly deny that any such right or cause of action does
in fact exist.
8. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE RELEASE. The DBF, for
itself and its predecessors, successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and forever
discharges ACE and its predecessors, successors, subsidiaries and parent corporations,
shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys, elnployees, agents, franchisees andass-igns, and
Goleta, and its predecessors.. successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations,
shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys.. employees, agents, franchisees and assigns
(collectively, the "ACE Released Parties"), froln any and all claims, demands, causes ofaction,
suits, debts, dues, duties, sums of money, accounts, fees, penalties, damages.. judgments,
liabilities and obligations, both contingent and fixed, known and unknown, foreseen and
unforeseen, anticipated and un.anticipated, expected and related to or arising out of
the conduct of ACE and/or Goleta in connection with the offering of deferred presentment
FINAL 11
services or loans in \vhere such conduct occurred prior to the effective date of this
Agreement.. This release includes.. but is not liJnited to, any claims related to any.loans made,
renewed, or rolled over by poleta in 'Florida and any services provided by ACE or its franchisees
related thereto, any claims related to any violation of Chapters 501, 516, 559, 560,687, 772, 895
and 896, Florida LS'tatllles.. any claims related to check cashing selVices provided prior to the
effective date of Part IV, Chapter 560, F/orid(J .."Illlllles, and any claims related to any licensing
requirements for the services provided by ACE to its custolners in Florida prior to the effective
date of this Agreelnent. ACE, for itself and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, accept this
release and waiver by the Attorney General and the DBF without in any way acknowledging or
adtnitting that any such cause of action does or may and ACE
9
for itself and on behalf of
the ACE Released Parties, expressly denies that any such right or cause of action does in fact
exist.
9. EXCLUSION. This release does not include any claiIns under Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes, against franchisees of ACE related to deferred presentment transactions
engaged in after the effective date of Part IV.. Chapter 560" Florida Statutes, unless such
transactions were under the Goleta loan program.
10. ATTORNEYS' FEES. Each party to this Agreement shalJ be solely
for its separate costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution, defense or negotiation in
this matter up to entry of the Final Order incorporating this Agreelnent and the dismissals by the
Attorney General provided for in 3 (k) and 3 (I) above.
11. EFFECTIVE DATE. The effective date of this agreement is December 2002.
12. FAILURE TO COMPLY. Nothing in this Agreelnent limits Respondent's right
to contest any finding or determination made by DBF or the Attorney General concerning
FINAL 12
Respondent's alleged failure to comply with any of the terms and provisions ofthis Agreement
or of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement.
WHEREFORE. in of the foregoing. DBF. the Attorney General. and ACE
execute this Agreement on the dates indicated below.
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE
By: Date:
D N SAXON
Division Director
OFFICE 0t)TR
By:
Date:
RICHARD DORAN. Attorney General
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., d/b/a
ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS
By: Date:
ERIC C. NORRINGTON
Vice President
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF _
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority. personally appeared
as of ACE CASH EXPRESS. TNC.. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH
EXPRESS, who is personally known to me or who has produced
______--'- as identification. and who. after being duly sworn. states that he
has read and understands the contents of this Agreement and voluntarily executed the same on
behalfof ACE CASH EXPRESS. INC.. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS.
FINAL 13
Respondent'sallegedfailuretocomp1y any of thetennsarid provisionsofthisAgreement
oroftheFinalOrderincorporatingthisAgreement.
WHEREFORE.inconsidirationoftheforegoing, DBF,theAttome}"General,andACE
1.
executethisAgreementonthedatesindicatedbelow.
DEPARTMENT OF BANKINGAND FINANCE
By: Date:
DON SAXON
DivisionDirector
Date:
OFFICEOF
By:
RICHARDDORAN,AttorneyGeneral
ACECASHEXPRESS,INC.,d/b/a
ACEA RICA'SCASHEXPRESS
By: Date:
STATEOFFLORlDA
COUNTYOF
----
BEFOREME\the-undersignedauthority,personallyappeared _
as of ACE CASHEXPRESS,INC.,dIo/a ACE AMERICA"S CASH
EXPRESS,who is personallyknowntomeor\vhohasproduced
___________as identification,andwho, afterbeingdulysworn,statesthathe
hasreadandunderstandsth-econtentsofthisAgreementandvoluntarilyexecutedthesameon
behalfofACECASHEXPRE-SS.INC.,d/b/aACE AMERICA'8CASHEXPRESS.
FINAL 13
SWORNANDSUBSCRI.BEDbeforeme this__dayof ,2002.
NOTARY PUBLIC
StateofFlorida
Print Nalne:
My COlnlnission No.:
My C0111111ission Expires:
(SEAL)
FINAL 14
A
ACE Cash Express, Inc.
1231 Greenway Drive #600
Irving, Texas 75038
A"CE
(972) 550-5000
AIoIf",.."iC<\JIr'",'Ue
INVOICE
COMMENT GROSS DEDUCTION AMOUNTPAID
NUMBER DATE
12123/02 12123/02 Settlement
250,000.00 250.000.00
PAYMENTADVICE
WELLSFARGOBANK
A
CHECK
ACE Cash Express, Inc. NUMBER 005132
1231 Greenway Drive #600
Irving, Texas 75038
ACE
(972) 550-5000
AMf'CA'SGuNUJlfUJe
DATE AMOUNT
12/19/02 $**.... ~ 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
PAY TwoHundredFiftyThousand 00/1 00dollars**....*****************..*************************'*******....*****..*******'**'*
TOTHEORDEROF
FlordiaState UniversityCollegeofLaw
425WestJeffersonStreet
Tallahassee, FL32306 ..
.
liP
liP
II005 Ii :I 211 I:~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ?a?0I:..? 5 b30011811
8

Response To The Florida Bar UPL Case No. 20133090

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Response To The Florida Bar UPL Case No. 20133090

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J ohn F.

Harkness, Executive Director Ghunise Coaxum, UPL Bar Counsel

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