THEORY OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGET

Braslia, 14 March 2013

Coordination of Cities
Board of Participatory Budgeting
Roberto Rocha da Silva, Master in Political Science from UNB

THEORY OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGET

INTRODUCTION

The political demands of the people never seem to be fully satisfied or satisfied by the axiom that says that the Administration
"Human needs were endless and the material and human resources are always limited and contingent."
To address these needs ever more intense, larger, varied and urgent desired by citizens is that the new institutional political
arrangements are always arising due to two basic questions that engage the creative minds of thinkers in the world of political
theory as a function of pursuit of improvement in two of the most important structural political institutions in formulating a new
definition of citizenship.
These two fundamental questions (basic) are:
a) governance;
b) governance.
Since the ages of the Egyptian Empire, through the empires of China, Assyrian, Inca, coming after the experiences recorded in

detail about the Republican administrations in the Roman Empire, and especially during the Hellenistic their experiences with
democratic and republican theorists of political sociology have been sought to extract the best way to reconcile political systems
with the systems of government in every civilization, in every age, from three-time geographic divisions: the West, the Eastern
world and new world (Americas).
Democracy is the central structural element of this work. The goal is to design the ultimate evolutionary changes in the form of
construction processes and support the theoretical model used increasingly popular participation in indirect representative
participatory-called mini-parliaments, or mini-chamber proto-councilors who are plenary and forums of local legislative sessions
Participatory Budgeting.
Being a variant of participatory budget-participatory parliamentary representative, participatory budgeting needs to mirror the
traditional parliamentary organization to be so a form of political organization parental (mock) chambers Representative (city
councils, chambers of state representatives, federal and the senate), where MPs, councilors (OP councilors, delegates and
attendees) plenary sessions and forums Participatory Budgeting represent the present and proposed community platforms.
So therefore, nothing that candidates for the positions of directors and delegates of the Participatory Budgeting are elected by
the community after performing campaigns, platforms that defend proposals calls OP priorities in their election campaigns, form
associations around proposals (priorities) closed (blocks within the community, district, area, city, neighborhood, street) just as
do political parties and their candidates in political elections.
In this case the PB delegates are analogous to the role of councilors, state representatives, federal, and counselors are OP role
analogous to that of federal senators, following rules, processes and procedures similar to partisan elections, using the same
instruments, institutions political, judicial and electoral practices.

I - The History and Trajectory of PB in Brazil

I.1 - Participatory Budgeting (PB)
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a semi-governmental mechanism of participatory democracy that allows citizens to influence or
co-decide on public budgets, usually the investment budget of municipalities, through processes of community participation.
These processes are developed in open assemblies and staged periodic and semi-direct negotiation with the government.
In Participatory Budgeting retires (shares up) portion of power to a bureaucratic elite passing it directly to society.
With that civil society is the perception that accurate and can occupy spaces (political representation) that before you were
"stolen". [1]
The implementation of the OP came up with the stage of democratization and the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, when it
was proposed, established and encouraged popular participation in setting government policies, through the creation of Sector
Councils for Public Policy as spaces of social control .
The constitutional changes aligned to the popular will and the vision of shared policies enabled the deployment in Porto Alegre
(RS), Participatory Budgeting in 1989, taking as its starting point the proposal for public discussion of the budget and resources
for public investments .
Many municipalities have adopted the co-popular participation in local government based on the model of Porto Alegre (RS) as
is the case of:
One. Saint-Denis (France)
2nd. Rosario (Argentina),
3rd. Montevideo (Uruguay),
4th. Barcelona (Spain),
5th. Toronto (Canada)
6th. Brussels (Belgium)
7th. Belm (Par),
Eight. Santo Andr (SP),
9th. Aracaju (Sergipe)
10. Blumenau (SC)
11. Recife (PE),
12. Olinda (PE),
13. Belo Horizonte (MG),
14. Atibaia (SP),
15. Guarulhos (SP) and
16. New World (MS).
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
With different methodologies in each county in which the OP runs, their meetings are usually held in the sub-city regions,

neighborhoods or districts in thematic discussions and / or territorial, also electing delegates to represent a theme or territory in
negotiations with government .
These delegates form (elected councilors) a Council annual addition to dialogue directly with city officials on the feasibility of
performing the works approved in the assemblies, also will propose reforms in the rules of operation of the program and
establish the priorities for investment in according to technical criteria for lack of public service in each area of the county.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)

I.2 - Birth of the idea of participatory budgeting in Brazil

The experiences of public management in which popular participation received preferential treatment, especially with regard to
public resources, and therefore the budgets in Brazil began to develop from the 1970s.
The experiences mentioned in most publications and research on the subject, as having been the pioneers are the Old Town
City Hall in the Holy Spirit and of Lages, State of Santa Catarina, where the mayors of then adopted as a strategy for budget
formulation meetings with the people, neighborhoods, to hear directly from stakeholders needs.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
In the following decade, the 1980s, Brazil has entered an era called by many scholars "participationist" because popular
participation has become not only a practical way to exercise political, but in a "utopia" or "flag" policy in itself.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
This sentiment gained momentum, as the crisis deepened military dictatorship, and as the population increasingly mobilized
(neatly) in favor of more democratic forms to the Country
Thus, certain social movements, especially when linked to social pastoral Catholic church, defended the "voice and time" of the
people, politicians considered "progressive" advocated the decentralization policy to "bring decisions closer to the people," and
when governments assumed , sought to promote decentralized forms of government.
The campaign of "Direct Elections Now" calling for the right of the people directly elect
a president, expressed the sentiment of the population fundamentally want to be present on the political scene.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
With the inauguration of President Jos Sarney in 1985, the first civilian president after the military coup of 1964, was the
convening of the "constituent", which formed after the 1986 elections, incorporated, its bylaws, various participatory
mechanisms for accommodate the demands of citizens and bring them to the attention of Members constituents.
The feeling "participationist" was strong enough to mobilize the formation of a "Pro-Plenary Popular Participation in
Constitutional" besides collecting petitions of over 12 million people to the proposals for incorporation constituents to the
Federal Constitution, which gave complete on October 5, 1988.
The 1988 Constitution incorporated the right to direct exercise of citizenship as one of the assumptions of the Brazilian State,
why are increasing legal and institutional innovations in order to expand the scope of popular participation in public policy.
(Direct participation of the people through referendum, popular initiative and referendum)
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
I.3 - Participatory budgeting in Brazil
In this context, various experiences of participatory management planning and execution of the public budget, were being tested
in several cities, such as Diadema (Sao Paulo) or Vila Velha (Esprito Santo - 1970s).
In both cases bodies were constituted with the presence of residents to discuss the use of the municipal budget.
Normally valued up residents' associations as legitimate bodies representing the residents, and thus, these associations were
invited to join the advisory bodies such as municipalities took knowledge of the needs and demands of the population.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
The experience of participatory budgeting emerged in the city of Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul, in the management
of Olivio Dutra, the Workers Party (PT) in 1989 as a result of pressure from grassroots to participate in government decisions .

Since 1986, UAMPA - Union of Neighbourhood Associations of Porto Alegre had participated in discussions for the planning of
the municipal budget, still under the leadership of Mayor Alceu Collares, PDT.
However from the experiences observed between different processes in relation to the Budget, which was implanted with the
management of the Workers Party, which was created is a methodology whereby each citizen who did this to "Regional
Plenary" could vote about what kinds of needs the city government should meet.
This methodology, in their counting of votes, consider the location of the vote, giving greater weight to those areas of the city
due to the lack of provision of public services, among other criteria.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
After the votes by investment areas and applied the formulas of weighting of votes, according to the criteria previously approved
then elected delegates up for plenary, and advisors to the Board of Participatory Budgeting (COP), where specified the works
that could make the service viable percentage allocations of resources to areas of public policy (education, health, public
transport, sanitation, housing, etc..) and by regions of the city.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
This management model, which exists since 1989 in Porto Alegre [2], has gained recognition of the population, and assigned
partial responsibility for the permanence of PT ahead of city of Porto Alegre for sixteen years.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo) [3]
The construction process of Participatory Budgeting and Municipal Councils, with the active and growing participation of the
community, became the strongest element, richest and most importantly the Popular Administration in Porto Alegre. [4]
Raul Pont(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
The current administration, under the leadership of the Popular Socialist Party, maintains the operation of the OP, with changes
in its format.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
In 1996 the Istanbul Conference, Habitat II UN, or Cities Summit recognized the Participatory Budget as "Successful Practice
Management Local."
Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre has become a reference for the world.
The UN considered the experience as one of the 40 best practices of urban governance in the world.
The World Bank recognized the process of popular participation in Porto Alegre as a successful example of joint action between
government and civil society.
Representatives of Brazilian municipalities, and foreign scholars from around the world come to Porto Alegre in order to meet
your OP.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo) [5].
I.4 - Other experiences
Due to the longevity and importance acquired by its results, the participatory budget in Porto Alegre won national and
international projection, creating new paradigms of institutionalized citizen participation by municipal governments. (Available at:
http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
In Brazil, according to research from the National Forum of Popular Participation [1] Between 2001 and 2004, 140 municipalities
had initiated experiences of participatory budgeting.
In European countries, it is estimated that this number rising from 50 cities in 2005
From Porto Alegre to Europe: Potentials and Limitations of Participatory Budgeting.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
Other Latin American cities such as Montevideo, Caracas or Buenos Aires, or even countries like Peru, has constituted forms of
participatory budgeting, adapting them.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)

The city of Belo Horizonte innovated by adopting the Digital Participatory Budget, through electronic voting over the Internet
where any citizen can vote and opine in the works of their choice via the World Wide Web
During the administration of Marta Suplicy (PT), between the years 2001 and 2004, the Municipality of Sao Paulo adopted the
OP with some other innovations:
a) The "Participatory Budgeting Child", [6] differentiated system of participation in all public schools demands for investment in
schools and neighborhoods, implemented last year;
b) The ease of representation of delegates to nine social groups considered vulnerable (women, blacks, Indians, homelessness,
GLBT, disabled, young, elderly, children and adolescents);
c) And, training courses for delegates, advisers and technicians prefecture.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
Jos Serra said in a Sabbath Diary of S. Paul, during his campaign for mayor that: "Participatory budgeting is pure marketing"
and "My participatory budgeting will be real, not demagoguery it is today."
Nevertheless, with the electoral defeat of the PT in the next election, and inauguration of Mayor Jos Serra, the OP was simply
discontinued in So Paulo.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo) [7]
Participatory budgeting allows people to discuss budget and public policy. Your goal is to ensure direct participation in setting
priorities for public investments. Thus, the decision on municipal resources is shared between the executive, legislature and the
public.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo)
I.5 - In the State of So Paulo
Between 1997 and 2000 there were, in the State of So Paulo, 23 cities with Participatory Budgeting, nine of which were
administered by the PT, the PSDB seven, and the other by the other political parties.
Among the major municipalities that adopted participatory budgeting, can cite American, Bernardino de Campos, Caapava,
Catanduva, France, Guarulhos, Itapecerica Sierra, Jaboticabal, Maua, Mogi Mirim, Bauru, Santo Andr, So Carlos, and
several others.
(Available at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oramentoamento_participativo) [8]

II - Typical Democracies
1 - Representative Democracy
Representative democracy is the act of a person or group being elected, usually by vote, to "represent" a people or a
population, that is, to act, speak and decide on "behalf of the people." The "people's representatives" are grouped in institutions
called political parties, parliament, city councils, state legislatures, senate, congress or assembly of the republic.
The modern concept of democracy is dominated by the form of plebiscitary democracy and electoral majority in the West, we
call representative democracy or liberal democracy.
Despite its widespread acceptance - especially in the post-Cold War - liberal democracy is only a form of balanced
representation of interests, understood in a global concept of equality.
The modern notion of democracy has developed throughout the nineteenth century and established itself in the twentieth
century and is linked to the ideal of popular participation, which dates back to the Greeks, but it has been enriched by the
contributions of the French Revolution, the English Liberal and Representative Government, finally, the American Revolution,
which were release experiments of Man and affirmed their autonomy.
1.2 - Characteristics of representative democracy
Parliaments are the meeting places of the representatives.

While direct democracy in ancient Greek participation in the democratic process was limited to some members of society, in the
modern representative democracy, universal suffrage could quantitatively ensuring the participation of the vast majority of
citizens. But qualitatively the mechanisms limiting the performance of participants in the democratic game.
Representative democracy becomes formal, legal, structural and permanent separation between leader and led.
One of the mechanisms that will enhance the separation between leader and led refers to the level of technical knowledge
required for those who will represent "the people." The motto of Listapartecipata Italian, it's "The control of the government in
the hands of the people (and not just on election day)" well illustrates this point.
2 - Participatory Democracy
The regime of participatory democracy or deliberative democracy is a regime where there are effective mechanisms intended to
control exercised by civil society on public administration, not only reducing the democratic role to vote, but also extending
democracy to the popular sphere, collective and social.
Participatory democracy is regarded as a model or ideal justification for the exercise of political power ruled in public debate
between free citizens and equal conditions for participation. Argues that the legitimacy of political decisions comes from
processes that discussion, guided by the principles of inclusiveness, pluralism, participatory equality, autonomy and social
justice, give a reordering logic of traditional political power. [1]
Deliberative democracy is like a model or process of political deliberation characterized by a set of theoretical and normative
assumptions that incorporate the participation of civil society in the regulation of collective life. It is a concept that is
fundamentally grounded on the idea that the legitimacy of the decisions and actions of public deliberation derives political
collectivities of free and equal citizens. It constitutes, therefore, a critical alternative theories "realists" of democracy, the
example of "democratic elitism", emphasize the private and instrumental politics. [2]
HELENA HAHN-LGIA LCHMANN
3 - Direct Democracy
A direct democracy is any form of organization in which all citizens can participate physically in the process of decision making.
One of the earliest forms of ancient democracies were direct democracies.
The most striking example of the first is the direct democracy of Athens where the people gathered in the streets and there was
taking political decisions. In ancient Greece the "People" was composed by people with title Athenian citizen. However, women,
slaves, poor, illiterate, foreign and mestizos had no right to that title, exclusively for men who were children and grandchildren of
Athenians. In the current world system which is closer to the ideals of direct democracy is the semi-direct democracy in
Switzerland [1].
Already under a direct democracy, citizens do not delegate its decision-making power. Decisions are made through general
assemblies. If you happen to need a representative, this only gets the powers that the legislature wants to give you, which may
be revoked at any time. Thus, in direct democracy, the power of the representative resembles what is conferred by a warrant
officer.
Pure direct democracy, as such, does not exist in any modern country nationally. There is today only for decisions strictly local
or parochial in some Swiss cantons (Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus), and a certain city in Sweden (Vallentuna).
4 - Semi-Direct Democracy
However, the term direct democracy is also used to describe mixed systems, where direct democracy and indirect coexist, his
name would be more correct semi-direct democracy. [2]
In these systems, semi-direct democracy, beyond the existence of elected representatives who takes most of the decisions on
behalf of citizens, they also have the opportunity to influence them through grassroots initiatives, referendums and plebiscites
(ratification decisions of Representatives) .
Switzerland, for example, is officially considered a "semi-direct democracy" [2], and with the representative system of
referendums and plebiscites coexisting, only in the canton of Glarus and semi-canton Appenzell Innerrhoden [3] democracy is
virtually direct, with people gathering outdoors in the village to make decisions [2].
More than half of national referendums between 1900 and 1993 - 52 percent - took place in Switzerland. [4]
Another way to analyze, conceptualize all democracies as direct, because all power emanates from the people who exercise it
directly with a delegation representing the conditional (on the assumption that representatives fulfill their pre-election programs
agreed with the citizen, can not the compliance result in forfeiture of office through legal action) or, directly, without delegation
guests.

4.1 - Powers basic (semi-direct democracy)

One. Representation: Represent has no decision-making power. The assembly sends the representative obeys.
2nd. Vote: a discussion meeting always seeks consensus. Decisions are ratified by calls to vote. If there is a controversy where
consensus is not possible, then you can make a call votes. In this case, the majority wins (e.g., a majority of 50% plus one).
3rd. Blocking: a system of direct democracy, seeks to preserve the minority opinion through this feature. If the majority's
decision is intolerable, the minority can manifest a lock (or veto). Depending on the system used, this could prevent the decision
is carried out, or requires a second vote. In the latter case, mostly would have to modify his proposal, so that a greater number
of people voting in its favor (for example, a majority of 2/3).
4th. Plebiscite: proposition taken directly to the voter's decision.
5th. Referendum: proposal passed indirectly by representatives and taken to the voter for confirmation or rejection.
6th. Recall of mandate (Recall): The mandate of a legally elected representative is ressubmetido to a direct vote of the voters,
who decide to maintain, or forfeiture, this mandate.
7th. Popular initiative: a minimum number of voters has direct proposition for approval of other voters.
4.2 - Examples of cases of direct democracy:
a. In self-managed enterprises
b. In anarcho-syndicalists unions
c. In social movements, like the anti-poll tax movement of the years 1990 - 1991 in UK
d. Direct democracy was attempted in several Communist revolutions in order to eliminate authoritarian forms of social
organization, and / or prevent the emergence of these
and. Experiences from Brazil, such as:
and) the Plebiscite on the form and system of government;
e.b) referendum disarmament;
and c) or more specifically the deployment in Porto Alegre [5] Participatory Budget, where direct democracy (neighborhood
assemblies that had yet restriction on the participation of representatives of associations, cable-election and more active
citizens) lived with practice representation in the decision-making process on the release of funds from the public fund (there
was no possibility of achieving up the operationalization of a viable system open to the direct vote of all voters);
ed) or Digital Participatory Budget in Belo Horizonte, where a small part of the budget is put to a vote via the Internet directly to
the voters by region of the city, where it can choose from a group of works predetermined by the city.
f. As the political system in Switzerland since 1890 (see below)
g. In the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation - EZLN in Chiapas, Mexico
On the political side, in general terms, [6] we can define direct democracy as one of six forms of "government", namely:
(1) Freedom without restraint;
(2) Direct democracy with consensus;
(3) Direct democracy with rule of the majority;
(4) Democracy delegated;
(5) Representative democracy;
(6) open dictatorship of a minority.
4.3 - Semi-Direct Democracy in Switzerland
In Switzerland, a simple majority is sufficient in cities and states (called cantons and half-cantons). Already the national level
may be necessary "double majority" whose intention would be confirmation of any law created by a citizen. [2]
Double majorities are, first:
a) the approval by a majority of voters, then
b) most of the states where the vote would have been approved.
A law created by a citizen can not be approved if the majority of the people approve, but most states.
The double majority was established in 1890, copying the model prevailing in Congress, where MPs vote representing people
and senators, states. Apparently this method has been very successful since 1890 [2].
In contrast to the concept of plebiscites promoted by governments for support to government policy already established, such as

the constitutions of France [7] and Austria [8] (or even Brazil), in the semi-direct democracy in Switzerland not responsibility of
the government or the parliament's decision to refer any matter to the popular decision. Consequently the instruments of direct
democracy in Switzerland are the means that people have to oppose, and to control, policies created by government and
political parties. [9]
5 - Democratic system
In Switzerland people have the last word on key issues, a system called the semi-direct democracy. Besides parliament,
ordinary citizens can participate in the drafting of the constitution and the laws. And the Swiss do not refrain from doing so. [10]
In Switzerland, unlike most countries where referendums, not for the government or the parliament's decision to refer any matter
to the popular decision, but to its people.
At least four times a year Swiss citizens receive an envelope of the Swiss Confederation, of his or her Canton Commune and
are asked to opine on specific issues.
Unlike pure representative democracies, Swiss voters may manifest often, thus constituting a supreme political body, not just
episodic.
The vast majority of voting is done in secret using ballot boxes, sealed envelopes or sending by mail.
In two cantons still uses the system "Popular Assembly" (Landsgemeinde), where citizens vote in public, holding hands.
6 - Amendment of Constitution
Upon a petition of one hundred thousand people (about 1.34% of the population), the Swiss people can force the government to
submit a new article to the vote, an amendment or a constitutional revision [10].
6.1 - Monitoring and control of parliament
Another very important tool of semi-direct democracy is the Swiss referendum, which allows citizens to accept or reject
decisions made by Parliament. Some laws require a mandatory referendum before they enter into force, is what is called a
mandatory referendum. In other cases, citizens who want to oppose a particular bill passed by Parliament in Switzerland should
try to gather 50,000 signatures (about 0.67% of the population), and thus have the right to call a referendum optional, you may
revoke that law.
One of the major beneficial consequences of this system of popular control of parliament is that of proposing laws, knowing that
a law when approved by him may be revoked by the people looking to consult all groups in society that it might oppose, trying
reach a consensus as broad as possible before approving it.
"As a recall David Butler and Austin Ranney, on many occasions, in Switzerland, the most successful cases of using
referendum are those who do not occur (...)" [11]
6.1.1 Landsgemeinde
Tyranny is the most efficient way and instrument of governance.
For me, this is the most complete concept about politics. Without the dominance is not achieved legitimacy to establish
hegemony, whether the head in an institution about their subordinates, whether in a prison, whether in Guantanamo or in
Bangu, whether it is a tyranny of Saddam Hussein or the commanders FARC, finally to achieve obedience must be to achieve
domination, which is the force able to get the subordination of the will to obey.
In a tyranny, can live for a long time with the uprisings and coup attempts, or can be obtained direct obedience, under duress
and coercion, but nothing guarantees the continuity of this process, and the increasing direct and indirect costs to keep it.
It is at this point that establishes the only advantage of democracy and liberalism. Is there a covenant of obedience compulsory
and voluntary adherence to the leader chosen by a process that Weber called domination, which tends to be of the rational-legal
domination. There may be other variants of domination too democratic or tolerated in a democracy like those dominations from
the charism and tradition. I would also add the domination meritocratic which derives from the expertise, domination consensual
relations which derive sentimental and formal domination based on media position given by celebrities of all kinds.
Modern democracy depends on the acceptance by the majority that transforms according to Rousseau the general will through
the artifice of legitimacy by legal procedure, formally accepted by members of the social contract that covers everyone and
excludes no one (Rousseau).
Democracy needs a plebiscitary process that does not imply in any way guarantee the best choice, this is not your goal, but
subordinate to the legitimacy of the outcome chosen and anointed (or project or government program or action) by choice the
majority. We know how most often is far from the information, the quality and expertise.
This is the huge flaw of democracy: most popular and least near the meritocracy.
Political practice has shown that the remedy for a faltering democracy in crisis or has been the tyranny, even if provisional and
temporary. Democracy has taken advantage of tyranny to fix their ills.
The remedy of democracy is the dictatorship (Plato, book VIII, Plato's Republic).

Dictatorship has no sustainability without domination, hence the plebiscitary character and folksy legitimacy of the electoral
process leading to democratic governance, and unable to get out of this vicious circle democracy dialectically pursues his
dream of becoming a stable continuous, turbulent and eternal.
IV - Governance and Governability
Throughout the life cycle of the Political Science Discipline since its creation as a new branch of Political Sociology and Social
Psychology has been glorified and mythologized the concept of direct democracy based on the history of democracy Greek
philosophers of the time, about It was 500 years before the Christian call.
Never has there been controversy that once there was a period in history where Greek citizens gathered in the agora to discuss
and decide on meeting the targets of political and administrative Greek city-state as rated didactically without controversy until
then as a process direct democracy.
The old sense of the word democracy denoted equality among participants and also required the physical presence of citizens
in political action in command, and the state represented there by the Greek city-state.
Democracy was born junction of concepts: (demo = people) + (cracy = government), without middlemen, called direct
democracy, popular, indivisible, united and egalitarian.
These utopian concepts and general people and government, could hardly unanimity among theorists as criteria for theoretical
constructs that can support ontological categories analytical underpinning the political science or any other science related to
social behavior.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to set up what would be the concepts of people and the concept of government. How
would such a definition of people able to be uniquely identified, according to the expectations of cognition noticeable on such an
object or sociological fact that it is the people. Who are the people, as the people would be conceptually?
The concept of equality, in any genre or situation, is one of the most elusive and unlikely utopias that can be built within any
theoretical science (metaphysics, empirical or dialectic), except in those pure and symbolic-as, for example, the Mathematics
and Geometry, why both deviate from the real world to cingirem to the world of abstract representation and ideal, contradicting
one of the legacies of the dialectic that says: "In nature nothing is repeated, everything changes constantly," intuitively and
easily verifiable but methodologically non-symbolized and unprovable axiom as a self-justified (or deductivism inductivism),
which falls in a typical infinite regress that trap dictated by practical limits of empiricism in context of justification: it is an intuitive
concept as is also the whole concept deductive.
The concept of people flying up in having to decipher it before nebulous philosophical and sociological perspectives that abound
in the various theories on the concept of mass, especially in the technical literature generally enriched by ideologies that prevail
teleology to justify their schools conceptual that the fund choices are merely ad hoc copyright.
To not stop talking about the concept of rich people would choose the Pareto approach taken by the Italian economist and
sociologist, who created the concept of dual elite / mass, as it turns out, is just a personal choice as all or other possible
choices.
Pareto always sees society divided naturally into two parts: between a ruling elite and mass. This mass was separated from the
people by a ruling elite system privileges that identify the elite in their prerogatives.
This concept says that the elites are necessary and mandatory, but these elites should be natural and to be competent and
meritocratic deserve the legitimacy of the masses.
The mass would be indistinct, so theoretically egalitarian. In some theories these masses could take gradations as increase its
capacity for action by increasing privileges, forming steps determined by differential access to resources of power elite, forming
divisions in different social classes, or in other societies estamentais formed by division in social castes.
In the limit, and outside the Paretian theory, we could have upper and lower classes within the class system: the sub-elites, and
these classes over the top forming a system of super-elite dominant over the sub-elites and the lower mass.
Karl Marx may notice only two social categories to divide society between: the proletarians and capitalists. The proletarians
would be the people, the capitalists would be the elite. A third category was formed by Marxist called marginalized outcasts or
lumpesinato.
In the middle ages we observe a system of division of power between the elites of the clergy and the monarchy, and below, the
serfs and vassals.
In pre-colonial imperialist capitalism could perceive the division of society between: settlers, slaves, plebeians and the native
indigenous or native.
As we saw complex is unequivocally characterize what would be the people.
In defining the concept of government again find ourselves in another jungle of theories and definitions chosen according to the
teleology and taste the analyst, all schools immersed in ideological commitments, ethnological, religious, political, economic,
and so are merely choices.
Steering systems are usually described by the form of governance and governance that characterize them.
GOVERNANCE
Governance is the ability to equip themselves with systems of representation, institutions and processes of governing bodies, to
manage themselves up in an autonomous movement.

This ability of consciousness (the autonomous movement), organization (institutions, corporate bodies), conceptualization (the
representation systems), to adapt to new situations is a characteristic of human societies.
It is one of the traits that distinguish them from other societies living beings, animals and plants.
The Corporate Governance aims to increase the likelihood of resource providers to ensure you the return on your investment,
through a set of mechanisms of Directors. The legal and constitutional.
These are the Bretton Woods institutions - the World Bank, International Monetary Fund - the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which put her in fashion.
Governance encompasses, in fact, all the legislative, executive and judiciary, administration, government, parliament, courts,
local communities, the state administration, the European Commission, the United Nations system ...
The gradual emergence of states, the principles and methods of peaceful governance in societies ever more populated and
always more complex are the signs, and for some, the very definition of civilization. [1]
Now the corporate governance consists precisely in the creation of mechanisms to minimize the information asymmetry
between the management and the owners of the property or of relevant interests (hence to have evolved from consideration of
other stakeholders to shareholders), so to allow monitoring as closely as possible the association's objectives to that
stakeholder management: maximize firm value.
GOVERNABILITY
Governability is the set of conditions (instruments, mechanisms, rules and institutions) necessary for the exercise of power.
Understands the form of government, relations between the powers, the party system and the balance between the political
opposition and situation. Relates to the ability to decide policy. The Governability expresses the abstract possibility of
performing in public policy.
Governance thus concerns the legal and structural conditions of a particular government to promote the changes needed.
Already Governability is related to the ability to put into practice the conditions of Governance. Governance is the potential to
transform the governmental act in public action, able to articulate the government's actions.
The Governability derives also the legitimacy given by society to the state and its government, while governance is the
comprehensive financial and administrative capacity of an organization to implement policies.
Conditions without adequate Governance Governability is impossible, although this can be disabled.
On the other hand, good Governability can increase the legitimacy that a government gives its people, thus increasing the
governance of the country.
Note, therefore, that Governability relates to process and has to do with governance with structure. The second means the
existence of a policy framework, legal and social environment that enables the development and implement public policy. First,
the government's ability to manage well, articulate the various interests and effectively deploy these existing policies.
GOVERNANCE (government): MEETS THE SUPERSTRUCTURE (static) STATE.
GOVERNABILITY (administration): MATCHES THE PROCESS (dynamic) PUTTING INTO PRACTICE THE COMMAND OF
THE STATE.
governing capability (management strategy).
Not to mention the various other theoretical categories can be summarized in just two possible types of governance throughout
the political history of human civilizations organized, generalizing them into two groups most inclusive possible that could
synthesize and completely describe in general terms the skills of perception that would be a government, in all its nuances:
Oligarchy and Polyarchy.
Even being generic is not lost in the generalization quality or the fundamental elements of the construct knowable "government"
as a theoretical concept.
Direct Democracy: a myth that needs to be undone
It became a myth to believe that during one period of history that occurred about 2500 years ago approximately, in the Greek
city-states during the era of philosophers, a process characterized as direct democracy has existed.
In this process called direct democracy, citizens gathered in the square, called Agora, to decide and implement actions
pertaining to administrative acts and political mediations without any middlemen or other institutions.
To participate in direct democracy required the requirement was to be a Greek citizen.
To be recognized as Athenian citizens were required:
One. being male;
2nd. Unless the slave;
3rd. have the right level of income;
4th. to be literate;
5th. Unless the foreigner.
The issue that undermines the thesis of the existence of direct democracy in Greece was of the philosophers is: what proportion
of people in the population that was part of direct democracy, without turning it into a narrow ruling elite, representative, indirect

and unpopular?
The hypothesis that rises in this dissertation is that the spoken Greek direct democracy had less representation than would exist
in the current modern democracy, perhaps less than in the Roman Republic and its political institutions of governance
senatorial.
Let's try to quantify through qualification requirements for participation in the Greek direct democracy.
The gender criterion excluded 50% of the population, since there were men at first criterion, then the second criterion would
exclude a new proportion of men who were slaves, the third criterion would exclude a majority of the population who do not
have any income qualified, the poor and destitute, and finally the criterion excluded a portion of schooling residual but significant
despite the existence of public education invented by the Greeks.
The relevant fact, but completely absent from studies of Greek democracy ignores a crucial element for the practical realization
of the popular democratic assemblies, majoritarian and general public: how to gather hundreds, maybe thousands of people, in
a square or in a closed container in large crowds at a time when there were no sound systems, amplifiers so that participants
could be heard by the audience?
This last factor is the coup de grace in the last possibility of a direct democracy of the masses: the mass media did not exist in
ancient era, major newspapers, bookstores, publishers, press, radio, television, which would remove the mass participation of
the class policy and even less popular participation in direct mass democracy mythological Greek.
It was all calends, this history of direct democracy, in fact, this story of Greek democracy.
This brings us back to the question of the whole universe of possible systems of government, meeting or summarized in two
ways:
Tyranny;
Parliamentarism.
Or if you have a tyranny (oligarchy, monarchy, dictatorship, pure presidentialism), or has a parliamentary system (polyarchy,
bipartisan, multi).
The consequence of trying to escape these two alternatives is the crisis of presidentialism, which attempts to resolve or coopted by corruption of parliamentarians.
Cooptation or Corruption
These two alternative governance tool intended to destroy the system of checks and balances between the branches and cut
each other their respective institutional functions:
Govern, manage, legislate.
1 - The executive legislates;
2 - The legislative power misgoverns and blocks the executive;
3 - The executive power co-opts legislators, or restraint;
4 - The legislative power blocks, undermines and controls in order to paralyze the executive branch.
The question is how to get the governance, in equilibrium, or, what would be the best system of government more stable:
Tyranny or parliamentarism, as only alternatives actually present in the historical materialism of mankind?
Firstly, taking the discipline of Physics Dynamic borrowed definitions of systems in equilibrium, only to argue, remember that
there are four possible situations of equilibria:
Balance unstable;
Balance stable;
Dynamic balance;
Balance indifferent.
In the system in unstable equilibrium like a cone that can support it on its side or base, not on the vertex, to obtain certain
degrees of freedom in equilibrium, but not all degrees of freedom of movement possible.
In the system in stable equilibrium the likeness of a perfect sphere where any position allows finding the perfect balance in all
degrees of freedom of movement, since in a perfectly horizontal plane.
In the system in dynamic equilibrium similarity only in a bicycle motion, gyro-pendulum, if you can maintain balance with certain
degrees of freedom of movement.
In indifferent equilibrium system the system always seeks to adapt to different situations regardless of the position in which
meets all degrees of freedom of movement, as found in a soft pliable dough, in any type of ground plane.
The typical governance of tyranny is obtained by sudden ruptures in movements and in stable equilibrium.
A typical parliamentary governance is achieved dynamically through continuous corrections in governance, similar to the system
in dynamic equilibrium.
The presidential system gets its governance similar to a system in unstable equilibrium, which admits only a few degrees of
freedom, and where there are some positions impossible quest for balance, with the vertex of the cone.
The only way to achieve balance in the presidential system would be obtained through participation in the governance of all

executive partisan forces supporting and opposing the government, and this would be a coalition government total, typical of
some types of schemes parliamentary cabinet .
V - Is the OP a semi-NGO - Non-Governmental Organization semi?
V.I - Introduction
According to some studies, some of the projects financed by the World Bank [1], NGOs participated as project implementing
entities in 57% of cases, compared with 11% of cases where NGOs act as entities that participated in the drafting thereof.
This suggests that, for government bodies, is more attractive to divide tasks or services with NGOs than to a division of power
between the state and NGOs.
In [2] the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century governments refused demands from social movements and
NGOs for participation and transparency in the development of social programs, making them social movements and NGOs
suffer from strict state control.
Governments have recognized that these claims are not based on recognition of participation as a right of these entities, but
rather as a mechanism to continue exercising power over them. Thus, in many cases, the participation of NGOs is limited through a process of co-option - for those who have the financial resources (government and donor agencies).
Nevertheless, the process of democratization of the government's interest by NGOs, the effects of this transition (for more
participation and transparency) [3] have been more formal than real.
The study of the relationship Member NGOs in Brazil can be concentrated on three aspects: the question of legacy or
inheritance policy, questions of autonomy, and institutional transformation.
Vai to analyze and extract from the historical and political context of the time that NGOs have emerged as well, like how it
comes to developing the relationship of NGOs with the state.
During the period of the military dictatorship in 1964, the interactions between the state and social organizations were marked
by four traditional features: clientelism, authoritarianism, political cooptation and manipulation [4].
These characteristics have made many times, the state was seen as an adversary by NGOs, being responsible for the socioeconomic difficulties of the population. With the transition to democracy, there is a rapprochement of relations between the state
and NGOs, however, even with a limited participation by the NGOs Which suggests that a lot of these dictatorial period features
still present today.
The other important aspect interactions Member NGOs is the issue of autonomy of the latter. It is believed that NGOs working
on more independent, have more ability to resist hegemony government, acting more ideological in their dealings with
government agencies.
It is contradictory to criticize an NGO, ideologically, government programs if it is financially dependent on the government.
In countries outside of Central Europe, much of the funding comes from the NGO contracts "partnership" with the government.
As a result, these organizations have "confiscated" his right to stand as true NGOs, with an own ideological perspective, the fact
of losing one of its main characteristics, that is independence [5] hence loss of autonomy.
This leads us to another issue of the autonomy of NGOs that is the problem of self-sustainability. The financial resources of
NGOs are limited in this case, being passed by funding agencies - government and donor agencies - primarily for the execution
of projects, without going through the issue of strengthening the institution.
Finally, the issue of institutional transformation is another aspect to be considered in interactions Member NGOs. Thus, what
are the methods or mechanisms present to increase the participation of civil organizations? What must be done to end the
authoritarian legacy and patronage that has been inherited from the authoritarian regime?
This institutional transformation [6] should be based on decentralization mechanisms in the formation and implementation of
public policies in decentralized relations between the state and civil society through channels decentralized and devolved, or
community. This with the objective of increasing the transparency of public administration, narrowing the distance of the
solutions to popular demands and ways to ensure more effective and democratic participation.
Based on the premise of solidarity and voluntary cooperation, thus the so-called Third Sector has developed into the world,
becoming a partner in the development of society.
It is part of a tripartite concept whose stakeholders are the state, the market with its capitalist logic (classical, neoclassical or
Keynesian), and the community of volunteers who coordinated offer alternative means to solve problems or routing of society.
The Non-Governmental Organizations NGOs are part of the political and social agents of the Third Sector (foundations,
institutes, community organizations, social service entities, the class associations, religious bodies and commissions of rights
citizen) organized nonprofit.
NGOs working in what can be identified as the set of activities of civil society organizations, so organizations created by
initiatives (private) citizens, which aim to provide services to the public (health, education, culture, housing, civil rights, human
development, environmental protection [7]).
Historically [8] Third Sector entities emerged with autonomy from the state, cultivating, in many cases, a distance and even
hostility toward the state.
In Central Europe the democratic process ensured the Third Sector entities maintaining their autonomy, while that made
possible a greater and closer cooperation in their relations with the state.

Already in the peripheral countries, the resumption of democracy, resume interrupted by periods of dictatorship, has made the
relationship between the state and the third sector were gradually discontinued, such relationships ranging from a ban or severe
restriction of activities of non-governmental organizations, to the conversion of these instruments or appendages in the state.
The Third Sector [9] consists of a wide range of social organizations that are neither state nor market, and can perform duties
traditionally assigned to the state. According to the Provisional Measure No. 1591, dated October 09, 1997, is defined
operationally as social organizations:
"Corporations of private, nonprofit, focused on activities relevant social value, which are independent of concession or
permission of the Government, created on the initiative of private second model provided by law, recognized, promoted and
supervised by the State" [10 ].
Thus, several entities are in this sector, such as welfare organizations (orphanages, nursing homes, hospitals), scientific
societies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), self-help groups, unions, sports associations, neighborhood, private
foundations, among others.
In Latin America, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged in the late 50's.
NGOs are characterized by organizations of political-social initiative created by groups of professionals and technicians active
social activism, or pastoral groups of the Catholic Church.
The groups predominantly informal work developed training and promotion of grassroots communities with marginalized sectors
and had possibilities of relationships with European cooperation agencies of Catholic origin, which financed their activities [11].
In Brazil, the NGOs are part of a phenomenon started in the decades 50/60 - in the interval between the end of populist
dictatorship of Getlio Vargas and the beginning of the military dictatorship of 1964 - in which the Brazilian civil society began to
organize into projects relatively autonomous associations and politicians.
This phenomenon infrastructure polyarchic (pluralism) - typical of societies where it operates the diversity or plurality of power
centers - would be graduating in the diversification and expansion of collective action, cooperative movements, public utility
associations and non-governmental organizations [ 12] in the wake of seed corporatist regime left by Vargas.
At this stage NGOs characterized by being led by people from the middle class intellectual and activist, who would later be
faced with the military dictatorship began with the coup d'etat in 1964.
During the 70's and 80 NGOs subdivided, initially, between two fields:
a) the development of social, citizenship, human rights, and:
b) the environmentalists occupied with issues related to the degradation and / or environmental and ecological preservation in
urban and rural.
NGOs occupied areas of activity at the local level, projects with short-range, or low visibility and assisted with the presence of
the Catholic Church. During this period 70% [13] of the resources of NGOs were from non-governmental organizations, religious
bodies and multilateral international cooperation. Relations with official bodies were still, for most NGOs, restricted to a
minimum, or even existed.
Then, from 1988 multiply [sic] references in academic production, print and electronic media, on a set of actions conducted by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as concrete evidence of a process of reconstruction of civil society in Brazil .. . part of
a newfound democracy in the country. [14]
V.II - The relationship between the state and NGOs is complex.
With the democratization of the political system, new forms of relationships between the actors (agents) collective political
present in civil society and the state. This relationship varies from activity execution services through contracts, even those that
involve social and economic change more broadly.
This opens an ideological debate whether welfare actions contradict the liberal ideal, and even more so if it belongs to the
socialist ideas, liberal or communitarian. In that falls within the Third Sector in the conceptual-ideological political spectrum.
The solution to the social dilemma Bentham's utilitarianism in altruism versus liberal version is that people, mostly, are perfectly
capable of self-regulation, self-restraint, self-control.
For this to come check up is necessary to reduce the power of government in the direction of democratic individualism: [15]
obey punctually, to censure freely.
Macaulay, Thomas Babington [16] (1800-1859) thinker contrary to the group of utilitarians, departed this set of axioms to the
refutation of utilitarian theory based on the principles that engendered the utilitarian theory, especially the one principle that
human actions would be commanded by / to the pursuit of maximizing pleasure featuring individualistic rationality.
Considered a priori, superficial and irrefutable (in Popperian sense - anti-scientific): an unscientific dogma in poperiana
methodological perspective [17]. Not found in analyzing historical evidence that human actions in the past could be justified by
the principle of seeking pleasure, so that could not be proven factually nothing more than conjecture loose in a subjective
context without any possibility of a generalization.
ON (NON) NGO implies that more distancing State: implies removal of state control. Born because the state failed to make its
social obligation. For that NGOs sought funding outside the state scheme. Hence N NGO.
This independence from the state allows NGOs to advocate against the state when necessary to defend minority interests or
outside the government agenda, whether for reasons political, moral, religious, sexist, material, ethnic, cultural, regional, age, or

any other demands that could partidarizar, embarrass or contradict the government.
NGOs in Brazil arose precisely to help the victims of political persecution at the time of the military dictatorship of the '60s, for
that NGOs were required to perform illegal actions often to protect the activists, persecuted victims and policies. NGOs not only
contradicted the political interests but also began to counter the economic interests.
Thus, these actions against incisive interests and the repercussions of the actions of NGOs in this early period of their existence
caused repercussions abroad and created constraints and incidents for our diplomacy and our rulers. Governments were urged
to constantly change their schedules when visiting abroad and very embarrassed to have to answer questions about tortures
and disappearances of citizens (political prisoners, leftists revolutionary guerrillas) enemies of the military regime.
The society recognizes NGOs ethical heritage bequeathed by this fight, and the result is that with this support and the strength
of the external pressure the state recognizes NGOs as an interlocutor, and thus passes to attract NGOs for their ball control, to
tame it, domesticate it, control it and direct it, perhaps, absorb your prestige or part thereof.
With that the state sets an expectation to obtain the following advantages:
a) Credibility;
b) Eficfia;
c) Respectability;
d) Economicity;
e) Specialization.
How can not always attract NGOs for their sphere of control then we evaluate the possibilities of forming an alliance between an
NGO and the State through the mathematical model proposed by Sorokin, which allows us to evaluate and conclude that the
Government will try to partner with the NGOs, even if it could not help him transfer material to the NGO.
V.III - The variables of this model Sorokin (Pitirim Aleksandrovich Sorokin) are:
a) Advantages:
One. - The services provided by NGOs interested in the government;
b) Policy
One. - The company put more trust in NGOs than in the state;
c) Economic
One. - Costs are infinitely smaller (political, social, financial, and material)
V.IV - Conclusions:
The state tries to attract NGOs to its sphere of influence to try to control them according to their political projects, NGOs have
realized its importance to the state and resist this control.
The state, in turn, gives up this pressure and transfers financial support to NGOs.
Sorokin algorithm parameters:
a) Grants;
- Resources of power, economic, material, political and social shifts that government to NGOs;
b) Advantages
- Benefits that the State obtains this transfer of resources;
c) Costs
- Costs of this process of concessions;
d) Portfolio that the State does to take advantage of these concessions.
The calculation that the state makes to gain advantages in a partnership with the NGO (NGO alliance-state) depends on the
benefits obtained from this relationship, which can be:
I - The State takes advantage anyway, so it can:
a) make a covenant;
b) do not ring, but transferring benefits to NGOs
in this case: the costs can be high, and in this case the State has to make concessions to the NGO, and ultimately, make
investees to attract NGOs if they are less than the costs and benefits concessions.
II - The State does not get benefits, but needs the NGOs
a) In this case: concessions will be made, and the costs are not considered, ie, the costs would be high, because the most
important is the involvement of NGOs, or;

III - The state gets no benefits and no NGO

a) The State will not make concessions, and limit costs equivalent to the advantages obtained from this alliance, which will
necessarily be formally established.
b) The State would not invested for the alliance with NGOs
Subtitles:
E = government
B = NGO
Cases:
E > B (Te = 1)
And it means that hegemonic waive covenants;
E < B (Te = 2)
Means that B is as important or more than E or not to make an alliance with E, based on their expected utility function;
B > E (Tb = 1)
B < E (Tb = 2)
And it will not press to form an alliance with B (Te = 1) that:
Ie < Xe + Cb
Caption: Used
Xe = Advantages And it expects to get from B
Ie = E Investments that do to attract B
Cb = B Concessions that does not press E to E alliance with B
And pressing the alliance of B (Te = 2), because:
Xe < Ce
And press for alliance with B (Te = 3) if:
Xe > Ce
With control of E on B
Xe < Cb
Without control of E over B.
Scenario 1:
E=B
There is no superiority, so there is no expectation of forming the alliance.
Scenario 2:
And pressing the alliance with B.
1 - E is successful ----> B transfers advantages for Xb E;
2 - And is unsuccessful ----> B does not transfer to E. advantages Xb
(As utilities are different regarding who receives, then: Xe Xb is different from, or not necessarily equal).
If Xb < Cb then B> E. (Tb = 1)
Expected B obtain their alliance
If Xb > Cb then B < E (Tb = 2)
The pressure to form alliance with E B can be:
1 - unsuccessful;
2 - successful.

Xb = cost of alliance to B
Yb = B that makes concessions to E and to avoid pressures on the alliance with B.
Utilities concessions:
Y = value of concessions to E (And How to realize this value received from B).
Yb = Value of concessions to B. (As B realizes that value transferred to E).
(Ye different Yb, because the utilities to E, and B are different).
The existence of compromise may not be enough to prevent the E pressures on the ring with B, and E may not pressed even if
it receives grants B, if the cost of the pressures is greater than the advantages that can be obtained from E B .
There are two types of players:
Case 1:
E> B (Te = 1)
Case 2:
E < B (Tb = 1)
Case 3:
E = B (Te = 2, Tb = 2)
Case 1: And when has a great performance in the industry, enough to threaten and refusing alliance with B, then E gets nothing
by accepting concessions from B to stop pressuring him
Case 2: B does not form alliance this alliance if the cost exceeds the benefits (Cb > Xb) And why not push B.
Case 3: the absence of pressure is not necessarily obtained if E does not know whether it can be successful if you press B, and
E also not known whether the alliance Cb costs are greater than the benefits that Xb B can transfer to E .
With (Cb < Xb) when there is no pressure guild and when no disputes between E and B.
1 - If Ce > Xe, then press B And not knowing this does not make concessions to B E.
2 - If Ce < Xe, then E can push for an alliance with B, even though B And to make concessions in order to discourage the
pressures of E.
But the pressures of E may fail. And this case can then try not to press the alliance with B, this is the case in which B never
make concessions to E.
When the cost of pressures on B E to form alliance with B (Ce < Xe) making concessions with B to E is smaller than the
concessions with the advantages of part B, and when the cost of pressures to form the E alliance with B is greater than the
advantages without concessions on the part of B, and knowing this, B should not make concessions to E.
Game with incomplete information:
Messages (m):
m=1
B offers concessions to E
m=2
B to E offers no concessions
B does not know that this is kind And (if Te = 1, Te = 2, Te = 3) what is the action of a function m B = D, type of action (a).
Actions:
a=1
B does not form alliance
a=2
B form alliance
And observe whether or not B offers concessions, and using Bayes rules decide whether the alliance presses or retreats.
Based on the beliefs (B):
p = belief that Te = 1
E> B

Probability of B offer concessions to E

q = belief that Tb = 1
(Ce > Xe + Ye)
And Probability not press for alliance with B.
r = belief that Te = 2
(Ce < Xe)
And Probability pressing the alliance with B.
Te = 3
(Xe < Ce) B without concessions
Te = 3
(Xe > Ce) with concessions B
And notes that B offers concessions and concludes that B is less powerful than E. If B does not offer concessions, and nothing
can be concluded about the power of B. The probability that E> B is given by:
(P) / ((q + r) + Q (1 - q - r)) = F (1: 1)
F (1, 1) means the belief that T = 1, and m = 1.
F (Te, m)
For m = 2 means that concessions are not made by B to E.
B may think that E is sufficiently strong enough to dispense grants of B, or E may think not push without receiving concessions
And, depending on the value of Xb.
Given the messages and notices of B, E decides to maximize their utility function of their expectations. If B chooses a = 1, B
receives a play off to zero.
The decision to form an alliance when B is made by calculating its expectation maximization of the utility function is positive or
negative.
The formation of the alliance will succeed only with:
Te = Tb and second different from 2.
(E < B) and (Cb > Xb)
This expectation of success in the formation of the alliance is the product F (2, m) (1 - r)
F (2, m) both cases
F (2, 1) = ((1 - p) (q + r)) / ((q + r) + p (1 - q - r))
F (2, 2) = 1
The expectation of failure in the formation of the alliance is because: 1 - [F (2, m) (1 - r)]
When F (2, 1) (1 - r) > 0
B will form an alliance, then:
F (2, 1) (1 - r) = ((1 - p) (1 - r) (q + r)) / ((q + r) + p (1 - q - r))
Where:
(1 - p) ---> E <B
(1 - r) -> And sometimes presses the alliance with B.
(Q + r) -> E B presses the alliance
p -> E -> B
(1 - q - r) -> E -> B,
And just presses the alliance with B if B makes concessions to E. When p tends to zero the game becomes complete
information, then B tends to form alliance. Otherwise B predicts a failure in the formation of the alliance.

Considering the costs of pressures Cb to B and the advantages gained by the alliance with B, B form alliance where:
((1 - p) (1 - r) (q + r)) / ((q = r) + Q (1 - q - r)) > C / X
Considering the cost pressure on the alliance made with B on E, and the advantages of E (Xe), and can press or not. The
expectation E is given by:
(1 - q) (-Cb) + q (Xb - Cb) = qXb - Cb
q is the factor reduces the expectation of the utility function of B form the alliance.
If:
q > Cb / B Xb form alliance
If:
q <Cb / Xb B will not form alliance
VI - Diagnosis of Problems of Governance in the OP
There is a predisposition for the state seek to maintain alliance with an NGO, otherwise you can try to maintain control over an
NGO.
In the case of the OP, it is difficult to classify it as a pure NGO or institution as the Third Sector, would be more appropriate to
classify the OP as a quasi NGOs, or semi-NGOs (co-ONG, proto-NGO, NGO-pan, sub-NGO, NGO infrastructure, pseudoNGOs).
There are conflicts in this middle path as historical institutions whose existence the OP is not in the public or private sectors,
getting under semi-public due to its main feature is that the lack of autonomy, which is sponsoring the State undertakes its
expectation autonomy policy, making it to face or oppose the government that sponsors politically, and gives them all the
material and logistical support to operate.
Within this framework where the state believes that opens the doors to the community to interfere in what should be its
exclusive competence of the budget execution is expected to return by the state that welcomes community in OP is the political
legitimacy that sustains governance.
This conflict of jurisdiction between the OP and the government can highlight:
One. Dissintonia between:
a. Needs;
b. Possibilities.
I. Techniques
II. Legal
III. Budget
IV. Time
V. Policy
2nd. Deficiency of expertise of the participants in the PB community
a) Legislation
b) basic and executive projects
c) Bid
d) Operation of state bureaucracy (LDO, LOA, PPA)
The proposals must be born of the community with a minimum of feasibility, within the expectations of the government's plans,
within the budgetary possibilities and within legal frameworks. For this, the participating community would need to be preorganized, and this is only feasible through a semi-semi-permanent community organization without being professionalized nor
partisan. This is the biggest challenge the OP to be efficient and not turn into a dream machine only (utopia).
I see no alternative but to create a semi-popular parliament for every neighborhood, street or core of the debate OP closest to
the community is as small as possible to have the participation and integration of all citizens.

VII - General Hints For A New OP:

Proposals for the new method of Participatory Budgeting process:
Parliamentary Budget
One. Elections for local councilors, Members (delegates) of the OP;
2nd. Deadline for voting records of the candidates and their platforms delegate priorities;
3rd. Election of delegates and their platforms after the deadline for defense and electoral campaign;

4th. Determination of results and approval of any winners.

On the platforms of the candidates for the positions of delegates shall include projects, values and source of resources for the
implementation of the proposals contained in the priorities of the OP, and for this the GTIOP CROP and the Regional
Administrations should provide technical advice to groups linked to candidates; applications will not be accepted loose,
applicants should organize themselves into interest groups locally organized to present their priorities articulated programs with
the community.
There will be no re-election or reappointment of delegates to the end of the term, nor for staggered terms.
Will not be allowed to participate in partisan political clubs and plates of delegates candidates.
Forums for discussion of the delegates should function as deliberative bodies for delegates to discuss ways to actualize the
implementation of the OP and prioritized proposals to organize the defense and monitoring of them plays in the fields relevant
government authorities and instituted the three powers and the three public spheres, municipal, state and federal agencies plus
state inspectors and auditors as prosecutors and courts of auditors and their authorities.
In a not too distant future, the OP himself could implement its own system of priorities, awarded by municipal and / or state,
becoming a political agent of the third sector as a semi-NGO acting as a co-parliament a popular participatory democracy
participatory deliberative popular.

VIII - References
One. MAHFUS, Julius Caesar. The construction of citizenship in search of social hegemony. Jus Navigandi, November 2000.
2nd. DAYS, John Marcus Pires. Participatory Budgeting in the City of So Paulo - Clashes and Confrontations at the Circuit of
Power - Sao Paulo: Pontifical Catholic University of So Paulo, Program Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2006, p. 72
3rd. ANDRIOLI, Anthony Ignatius. Von der Beteiligungshaushalt Porto Alegre / Brasilien: Ein Beispiel fr Deutschland?
Universitt Osnabrck., In Academic Area. (Portuguese version).
4th. Interview with Raul Pont Pont wants to create 'capital of citizenship'. Porto Alegre: Perseus Abramo Foundation (APF),
August 12, 2008.
5th. PORTO ALEGRE, prefecture. History of Participatory Budgeting.
6th. MENA, Fernanda. Citizenship: Project encourages children to opine on management in SP. Sao Paulo: Folha de S.
Paulo, Gilberto Dimenstein in, only So Paulo, Community Journalism, Folha Online, March 31, 2004.
7th. RIBEIRO, Silvia. Serra: "Participatory budgeting is marketing the PT.", Elections 2004, Terra.com, September 10, 2004,
19:19
Eight. OAK, Maria do Carmo A. et al. Participatory Budgeting in the State of So Paulo, BNDES

IX - Bibliography
ALVES, Mrcio Moreira. The Power of the People - Participatory Democracy in Lajes. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1980.
ANDERSON, Perry. Balance of neoliberalism. In: SADER, Emir & GENTILI, Pablo. Post-Neoliberalism - The political and
social democratic state. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1995.
Avritzer Leonardo y NAVARRO, Zander (eds.). Democratic Innovation in Brazil. So Paulo, Cortez, 2003.
ARROW, Kenneth J. La organizacin de la actividad economic: Cuestiones relevant a la eleccin de la allocation versus fuera
en el mercado del market. In: Ms HAVEMAN, Robert H. & MARGOLIS, Julius. Un anlisis del spent y las gubernamentales
policies. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1992.
Azevedo, Sergio de. Participatory Budget and Management Popular: Preliminary Reflections on the Experience of Betim.

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BENEVIDES, Maria Victoria and Dutra, Olivio. Participatory Budgeting and Socialism. New York: Perseus Abramo Foundation,
2001.
DAGNINO, Evelina. Civil Society and Public Spaces in Brazil. Sao Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2002.
DAYS, John Marcus Pires. Participatory Budgeting in the City of So Paulo - Clashes and Confrontations at the Circuit of
Power - Sao Paulo: Pontifical Catholic University of So Paulo, Program Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2006, p. 73 and
following (in Portuguese)
FIGUEIREDO, Rubens & LAMOUNIER, Bolivar. Cities that succeed; innovative experiences in Brazilian public administration.
Brasilia: MH Communications, 1996.
Fishburn, Peter C. The teory of social choice. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973.
SON, Tarsus and SOUZA, Ubiratan of. Participatory Budgeting: The experience of Porto Alegre. New York: Perseus Abramo
Foundation, 2001.
LCHMANN, Ligia Helena Hahn. Possibilities and limits of deliberative democracy: the experience of participatory budgeting
in Porto Alegre / Ligia Helena Hahn Lchmann. Campinas, SP: (s. n.), 2002. Advisor: Rachel Meneguello. Thesis (Ph.D.) - State
University of Campinas, Institute of Philosophy and Humanities.
Giddens, Anthony. Beyond left and right Cambridge: Polity Press, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994.
PIRES, Valdemir. Participatory budgeting: what it is, what it does, how it's done. Sao Paulo: Ed Manole, 2001.
MEADOW, Eleuterio F. S. (1993) Methodology of Economics: Individualism & holism. Impulse, Piracicaba, vol. 6, no. 13, p.
29-48, 1993.
Sanchez, Felix R. Participatory budgeting - theory and practice. So Paulo: Editora Cortez, 2002.
SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa. Democratizing Democracy: Paths of Participatory Democracy. Col. Reinventing Social
Emancipation, Vol.1. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Civilization, 2002.

X - NGO - Non-Governmental Organizations

[1] Bebbington, Anthony; FARRINGTON, John, ibid.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Symes, Kimberly G.; Popular Participation and The Redefinition of Relations Between Nongovernamental Organizations and
Local Governments. In: Policy Research Report. USA Austin: Univ Texas, 1997.No. 119.
[5] Commonweath FOUNDATION; Relationships Within The Framework of NGOs Which Operate; Available in sl, access
<1996>.
[6] Kimberly Symes ibid.
[7] Merege, Luis Carlos; NEDER, Ricardo Toledo. Of State Budget and Control Policy. In: Journal of Political Economy, [S.L. :
S.N.], 1984, Vol 4, No 1, p. 57, 70, Jan / Mar 1984.
[8] SANTOS, Boa Ventura de Souza. Reinventing Solidarity and Participatory State. International Seminar on Society and State
Reform. So Paulo SP, 1998.
[9] In recent decades, the concept of the Third Sector has received various names such as: Independent Sector, Nonprofit
Sector, Voluntary Organizations, Grassroot Support Organizations, Nonprofit Sector, among others.
[10] MODESTO, Paul. Administrative Reform and Legal Framework of Social Organizations in Brazil. International Seminar on
Society and State Reform. So Paulo SP, 1998.
[11] Mendes, Luiz Carlos Abreu. Whither NGOs? Counseling of Informal Support Organisations Structured. Dissertation.
Department of Management at the University of Brasilia - UNB, 1997.
[12] NEDER, Ricardo Toledo, Non-Governmental Organizations in the (Re) Construction of Civil Society in Brazil: Dynamics,
Subjects and Linkages Between Public and Private in the 90's. Research Paper Series - No. 10, Fundao Getulio Vargas, Sao
Paulo SP, 1996.
[13] Merege. Loc Cit.
[14] NEDER, Ricardo Toledo, ibid.
[15] FULLER, T. Bentham, Jeremy. MILL, James. In: STRAUSS, L. CROSPEY, J. History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: SN.
p.717.

[16] British politician and historian, wrote a new code of laws and began writing and left the work unfinished History of England.
[17] POPPER, K. R. The logic of scientific discovery. LONDON: Hutchinson, 1965. P. 32. Karl Popper is an advocate of the idea
of scientific methodology based on insecurity and tentativeness of scientific truths, which are only valid if they can be checked
and if they can or while resisting test of falsifiability.