\e hope that inestors will ind lPA commentaries helpul to understand application o the same inestment

discipline in arious markets, and can reer to particular items that interest them.
Past perormance is no guarantee o uture results and current perormance may be higher or lower than the
perormance shown. 1his data represents past perormance and inestors should understand that inestment
returns and principal alues luctuate, so that when you redeem your inestment it may be worth more or less
than its original cost. Current month-end perormance data may be obtained by calling toll-ree, 1-800-982-
432.
You should consider the Iund's investment objectives, risks, and charges and expenses carefully
!"#$%" '$( )*+",-. /0" 1%$,2"3-(, 4"-5)6, -0" 7(*48, $!9"3-)+" 5*4 2$6)3)",: ,56", 305%;",: 5*4 $-0"%
<5--"%, $# )*-"%",- -$ -0" 2%$,2"3-)+" )*+",-$%. 16"5," %"54 -0), 1%$,2"3-(, 35%"#(66' !"#$%" )*+",-)*;.
/0" 1%$,2"3-(, <5' !" $!-5)*"4 !' +),)-)*; -0" ="!,)-" 5- ===.#25#(*4,.3$<: !' "<5)6 5-
3%<>#25#(*4,.3$<: -$66?#%"" !' 3566)*; @?ABB?CAD?EFGD $% !' 3$*-53-)*; -0" 7(*4 )* =%)-)*;.
Sales charges ary depending on leels o inestment.

H+"%5;" H**(56 /$-56 I"-(%*,
As o December 31, 2012

!"#$%&#$'( *+, -+. / -'01 2 -'01344 5 -'01344 /6 -'01344 78#9' &#9':;8<#44



"#$ %&'()'*+ ,-.,/ ,0-11/ ,0-11/ 2-1./ 3-14/ .-,4/ ,0-5./


67# 300 80-12/ ,5-00/ ,5-00/ ,0-24/ ,-55/ 4-,0/ 2-,,/



50/ 9:300;<0/ =%>% :-0,/ ,:-40/ ,:-40/ ,,-:0/ 3-44/ 2-24/ 2-2</



** Annualized. Inception o lPA Crescent is June 2, 1993.
A redemption ee o 2.00 will be imposed on redemptions o shares within 90 days. Lxpense ratio as o most recent prospectus is
1.25.
15,- 2"%#$%<5*3" ), *$ ;(5%5*-"" $# #(-(%" %",(6-, 5*4 3(%%"*- 2"%#$%<5*3" <5' !" 0);0"% $% 6$="%
-05* -0" 2"%#$%<5*3" ,0$=*. /0), 45-5 %"2%","*-, 25,- 2"%#$%<5*3" 5*4 )*+",-$%, ,0$(64
(*4"%,-5*4 -05- )*+",-<"*- %"-(%*, 5*4 2%)*3)256 +56(", #6(3-(5-": ,$ -05- =0"* '$( %"4""< '$(%
)*+",-<"*- )- <5' !" =$%-0 <$%" $% 6",, -05* )-, $%);)*56 3$,-. J(%%"*- <$*-0?"*4 2"%#$%<5*3" 45-5
<5' !" $!-5)*"4 !' 3566)*; -$66?#%"": @?ABB?CAD?EFGD.
1o iew portolio holdings rom the most recent quarter end, please reer to the end o this document or at
www.paunds.com.
Portolio composition will change due to ongoing management o the und. Reerences to indiidual
securities are or inormational purposes only and should not be construed as recommendations by the
lunds, Adisor or Distributor.
1he discussions o lund inestments represent the iews o the lund's managers at the time o each report
and are subject to change without notice. 1hese iews may not be relied upon as inestment adice or as an
indication o trading intent on behal o any lirst Paciic Adisors portolio. Security examples eatured are
samples or presentation purposes and are intended to illustrate our inestment philosophy and its
application. It should not be assumed that most recommendations made in the uture will be proitable or
will equal the perormance o the securities.
1

1he Russell 2500 Index consists o the 2,500 smallest companies in the Russell 3000 total capitalization
unierse. 1his index is considered a measure o small and mid-capitalization stock perormance. 1he Standard
& Poor's 500 Stock Index ,S&P 500, is a capitalization-weighted index which coers industrial, utility,
transportation and inancial serice companies, and represents approximately 5 o the New \ork Stock
Lxchange ,N\SL, capitalization and 30 o N\SL issues. 1his index is considered a measure o large
capitalization stock perormance. 1hese indices do not relect any commissions or ees which would be
incurred by an inestor purchasing the stocks they represent. 1he Balanced Benchmark is a combined index
o which 60 relects the Russell 2500 Index and 40 the Barclay Goernment,Credit Index. 1he
perormance o the lund and o the Aerages is computed on a total return basis which includes
reinestment o all distributions.

7(*4 I),K,

Inestments in mutual unds carry risks and inestors may lose principal alue. Stock markets are olatile and
can decline signiicantly in response to aderse issuer, political, regulatory, market, or economic
deelopments. Certain unds may purchase oreign securities, including American Depository Receipts
,ADRs, and other depository receipts, which are subject to interest rate, currency exchange rate, economic
and political risks, this may be enhanced when inesting in emerging markets. Small and mid-cap stocks
inole greater risks and they can luctuate in price more than larger company stocks.
1he return o principal in a bond und is not guaranteed. Bond unds hae the same issuer, interest rate,
inlation and credit risks that are associated with underlying bonds owned by the und. Lower rated bonds,
callable bonds and other types o debt obligations inole greater risks. Mortgage securities and asset backed
securities are subject to prepayment risk and the risk o deault on the underlying mortgages or other assets,
deriaties may increase olatility.

1he lPA lunds are distributed by UMB Distribution Serices, LLC, 803 \. Michigan Street, Milwaukee, \I,
53233.

2



Dear Shareholders:
!"#$"%#&
lPA Crescent returned 10.33 in 2012, compared to the S&P 500`s 16.00. Our concerns - telegraphed last
year in similar letters - largely materialized, so we maintained our conseratie inestment posture in 2012.
1he U.S. economy grew anemically and our national debt hit highs. On aerage, consensus estimates or U.S.
corporate earnings disappointed. In act, 2012`s Q3 earnings were lower than those in Q3 2011. \orrywarts
by nature, we continue to seek to delier equity returns while trying to aoid permanent losses o capital. Our
inested exposure marginally outperormed the broad indices, but not to the extent that we would preer. \e
inest more aggressiely when industry groups and asset classes are alling rom aor, as well as in periods o
general market olatility ,downside,. listorically, our strongest absolute and risk-adjusted returns stem rom
those periods.
1he ourth quarter`s winners and losers are as ollows
1
:
()*( +, -%..#$/ 0 12/#$/
-%..#$/ 12/#$/
Lowe's Microsot
Aon Occidental Petroleum
Orkla A1P Oil & Gas

Clearly, 2012 was the year that wasn`t as ar as stress and distress was concerned, and a conseratie strategy
didn`t pay as well as a more aggressie approach. Publicly traded securities were neither particularly cheap
nor expensie at the beginning o 2012 and we eel the same way now, and there`s an ongoing risk o a rush
to the exit once it`s decided that the easy money policy should end. Central banks kept a heay hand on the
rudder o the economy, which surely led to led Chairman Ben Bernanke and Luropean Central Bank ,LCB,
Chairman Mario Draghi receiing more thank you notes than Santa Claus this holiday season. 1he lederal
Resere is orcing people into risk assets. \ou can own a one-year 1reasury Bill and receie 0.12, or you
can assume more interest rate risk and own a 10-year 1reasury Note and collect all o 1.3 a year
2
. I that`s
all you`re going to get or braing the risk o a rate rise, inestors are increasingly asking themseles, \hy not
just own stocks, or other risk assets`
Sometimes, in the quest or return, risk can be coneniently redeined, i not wholly ignored. \e hae
recently seen inestors ,both institutional and indiidual,, rationalizing the assumption o more risk. "#$%&'$
( )$*#%+,#$+% recently reported that, "Institutional inestors are turning to riskier assets to improe
perormance in the persistent low-yield enironment, but they are doing so without dramatically increasing
the risk leel o their oerall portolios.`
3
\e hope they`re right.
Artiicial and unsustainably low cost o capital pererts capital allocation decisions. lear o not haing enough
income pushes the elderly to own more equities or riskier bonds. Companies will ind that they can inest
capital that wouldn`t otherwise meet their return-on-capital hurdles ,ROC,. In general, inestors are more
able,willing to assume greater risk, and they sometimes orsake liquidity in the process, een though they
might hae near-term needs or that capital. It`s easier to spend capital when it`s sitting on your balance

1
Reer to the portolio holdings listed on page 15 o this document or at paunds.com.
2
As o January 15, 2013.
3
Drew Carter, Risky Assets Don`t Lqual Riskier Portolio,` "#$%&'$ ( )$*#%+,#$+%, Noember 12, 2012.
345 6$#/7#.8 39.:
\ear-end Commentary
,
8;
+9<$8#$




December 31, 2012



3


sheet, earning essentially nothing. And companies that should die are kept alie by an endless supply o
cheap money. \e eel like we`e allen down the rabbit hole. 1raditional inestment decision-making
processes hae been hijacked by zero-interest-rate-policy ,ZIRP,.
As we learned rom Japan, low interest rates are not a panacea. Japanese interest rates hae been close to
zero percent since 2000, but Japan has had negligible real GDP growth in the last two decades, persistent
delationary pressures and budget deicits that hae, as a result, let the country with a debt-to-GDP ratio o
250, and its benchmark Nikkei stock index
4
more than 0 o its peak. Clearly, low interest rates don`t
always hae the economic impact one would hope. \e can`t help but wonder what our own consequences
will be rom the led`s actions. \e hae spoken o potential economic ramiications in past commentaries, so
we won`t repeat them here, but we hae little ability to handicap how things will unold.
5

\e also hae no idea how the securities markets and economy will perorm, particularly oer the short-term.
\e are in the business o inesting when there`s opportunity - our deinition, not someone else`s. Should
stocks continue to grind upward oer the next ew years, we beliee you may be better o haing more
exposure to other, less conseratiely postured unds. Are we wrong 1ime will tell. Our deinition o right
and wrong may be skewed because we neer worry about our perormance lagging oer the short-term, and
we don`t always consider losing money a mistake. 1he question that guides us, is, what kind o risk should
we assume or the potential o an always uncertain reward`

=72.2>?
\e are generally more concerned about what people aren't discussing, rather than what's in the headlines.
lear o alling o the liscal Cli occupied most people at the end o 2012, stoked by the count-down clocks
on certain teleision networks. \e always belieed there would be some ineectual short-term solution`
that would raise reenues ,i.e., taxes,, but aoid the politically charged ,but necessary, spending cuts.
It wouldn`t pass muster i the Smith amily spent >145,000, but had only >100,000 in annual household
income, so why is that kind o budgeting acceptable or the U.S. Goernment \hat i the >45,000 deicit
brought the Smith amily`s household debt up to >664,000 - 6.6x their annual income - the same debt ratio
as the U.S. Goernment \ou`d hope that the Smiths would cut their spending. But i instead they mirrored
the actions by the U.S. Goernment in the recent liscal Cli negotiations, then the Smiths would hae
reduced their outlays by a mere >1,559. A lender would not hae allowed the Smiths to hae gotten
themseles into such inancial straits, but the magic o paper money allows our nation`s leaders to lout
prudence and common sense.


Oicials in deeloped countries continue to administer economic medicine with an eye to palliatie rather
than curatie care. By keeping interest rates low and monetizing the debt, Congress can postpone hard
decisions. Congress recently approed tax increases without much in the way o spending cuts. 1he ocus on
aoiding pain and suering at the expense o healing will only cause greater problems later. Misplaced aith

4
Nikkei index is an index o 225 leading stocks traded on the 1okyo Stock Lxchange.
5
paunds.com,docs,quarterly-commentaries-crescent-und,crescent-2012-q2-inall698L2B66A2.pdsrsn~6
Sml Lhs uS CovernmenL
lncome $100,000 $2,469,000,000,000
8udgeL $143,403 $3,390,000,000,000
uefl cl L/new debL -$43,403 -$1,121,000,000,000
Lndl ng debL $664,237 $16,400,000,000,000
8ecenL budgeL cuLs $1,339 $38,300,000,000
Source: lPA, Oice o Management and Budget.
4


in the expert` guidance o the academic elite leads us down a path where soereign borrowings balloon, and
iat money papers oer temporary problems, ensuring that they become permanent instead. ,See our recent
piece titled Blind laith aailable on our website.
6
, Lconomists are aced with a prisoner`s dilemma. A
country can`t sae its way to prosperity ia austerity, nor can it spend its way to prosperity ia debt
accumulation. Certain decisions can allow economies to eel supericially good - but like any laustian
bargain, a price will ultimately be paid. lor example, just one o the many dangers o continuous Quantitatie
Lasing ,QL, is demand impairment, which limits a company`s ability to raise prices to coer cost increases.
1he late economist Ludwig on Mises said this about the challenges o understanding the longstanding
ramiications o economic decisions: No ery deep knowledge o economics is usually needed or grasping
the immediate eects o a measure, but the task o economics is to oretell the remoter eects, and so to
allow us to aoid such acts as |an| attempt to remedy a present ill by sowing the seeds o a much greater ill or
the uture.`

lere`s an example o eeling supericially good. In 2012, 2.4 million more people gained employment,
causing the ranks o the unemployed to decline by 843,000, and the unemployment rate to drop to .8, its
lowest leel since the recession.




1he optics look good until one cleans o the lens, but this is actually the worst economic recoery since the
Depression. In act, 2.2 million people hae exited the labor orce in the last year and an additional 39,000
are currently seeking a job.
8
1hose who are working aerage just 34.5 hours a week, less than the pre-2008
aerage o 39.2 hours per week. linally, we also still hae 8 million people who are employed only part-time
or economic reasons.




And in 2012, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program ,SNAP, had almost as many new participants
as there were jobs created. Against the backdrop o 2.4 million additional jobs, the number o people on ood
stamps rose by 1.9 million to a total o 4 million people, or 15 o the population.


6
paunds.com,docs,special-commentaries,blind-aith---inal-10-31-12.pdsrsn~2

\illiam \hite, Ultra Lasy Monetary Policy and the Law o Unintended Consequences,` published by the lederal Resere Bank o
Dallas, August 24, 2012. Ludwig on Mises citation on page 2.
8
U.S. Bureau o Labor Statistics ,BLS,.
Lmployed unemployed unemploymenL
uec-11 140,896 13,049 8.3
uec-12 143,303 12,206 7.8
lncrease/(decrease) 2,409 (843) -0.7
Lmployed
parL-Llme for
economlc
reasons
noL ln labor
force
ersons who
currenLly wanL
a [ob
uec-11 8,168 87,212 6,133
uec-12 7,918 89,443 6,332
lncrease/(decrease) (230) 2233 397
Source: Bureau o Labor Statistics
Source: Bureau o Labor Statistics
5





Central banks maintain the iew that by keeping yields low, asset prices will expand, creating wealth and
igniting animal spirits. But that pushes us back to trickle-down economics. Because the aerage person
doesn`t hae much o an inestment portolio, it`s no wonder we haen`t seen the GDP boost the led hoped
or.
-.# /0'$',&%+ oered an especially succinct commentary on the LCB`s aggressie and potentially destructie
easy monetary policy, and we quote the headline here because it could easily be applied to similar policies in
the U.S. and Japan: 1he LCB and OM1: O11, OMG or \1l`
9
One shouldn`t entirely ault the lederal
Resere or reckless policy, howeer. I our elected oicials had taken the running room the led proided at
the outset and aected genuine change, then we`d hae sustained real growth at this point. led action did
help our economy aoid a depression, and it set the stage or Congress to act. Unortunately, continued led
action aords elected oicials the luxury o aoiding the necessary, painul action. And, one cannot assign all
the blame to \ashington D.C. -- most o the rest o the nation also wants someone else to pay or the
shortalls.

Our inancial ecosystem has become impossibly complex, but somehow people hae aith that the economy
can be guided remotely, like a drone piloted by a skilled armchair captain ar rom the ield o battle.
\e know that we can`t determine the outcome, let alone predict the timing. And, or that matter, I would
argue that whateer expert,s, gets both right will be astly outnumbered by those who are wrong. \e wait
or the end o QL with trepidation because we ear the unarticulated exit strategy. \hen interest rates do
start to tick up ,which could be a while based on led statements,, interest on the national debt would soar i
the led unloaded treasuries. Likewise, mortgage rates would climb i the led unloaded agencies at a time
interest rates were creeping up. Dallas led President Richard lisher told CNBC that he's worried the U.S.
Central Bank is in a "lotel Caliornia" type o monetary policy because o its "engorged balance sheet."
10

Loking lyrics rom the amous song by 1he Lagles, lisher said he eared the led would be able to "check
out anytime you like, but neer leae."
11

\e`ll end the economic discussion on an upbeat note, otherwise it would be hard to justiy our 61 exposure
to stocks. U.S. housing is in a recoery that we expect to be sustainable. . Auto sales continue to rebound,
helped by the oldest leet in U.S. history ,at ~11 years,. And although the consumer is still leeraged, he has
paid down some debt. Consumer Debt as a o Disposable Income has declined rom 129 in 200 to
10 in the third quarter o last year, but it`s still well aboe 95 seen in 2000.
12







9
Buttonwood`s Notebook, 1he LCB and OM1: O11, OMG or \1l` -.# /0'$',&%+, Sept. , 2012. Acronym translation: LCB
,Luropean Central Bank,, OM1 ,outright monetary transactions programme,, O11 ,oer the top,, OMG ,oh my God,, and \1l
,what the ,.
10
globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com,2012,12,dallas-ed-richard-isher-ed-risks.html
11
Mike Shedlock, Dallas led Richard lisher: led Risks lotel Caliornia` Monetary Policy,` Mish`s Global Lconomic 1rend
Analysis, Dec. 14, 2012.
12
lederal Resere Bank, Richmond.
SnA
uec-11 44,709
uec-12 46,609
lncrease/(decrease) 1,900
Source: Bureau o Labor Statistics
6


@."#/8>#.8/
1he ollowing two charts
13
show aluations aboe aerage but not wildly extended. As long as interest rates
remain low and companies meet their earnings expectations, the stock market should be ine. loweer,
we`e shared our skepticism as to the sustainability o low interest rates, and we beliee earnings growth will
be anemic when compared to the past. Looking back to the 190s, the price,earnings ratio
14
,P,L, is about
10 aboe aerage, ater haing increased rom 19.9x to 21.1x last year.
15


A%/82$%7 4B= C *)DE#<$ 5"#$<F# =<$.%.F/



It`s harder to deelop a sanguine iew when looking at the bond market. Goernment bond yields are at all-
time lows, and so are the yields on the high-grade and high-yield corporate bond indices, as eidenced in the
ollowing chart.
16







13
Price to Diidend is a aluation ratio o a company`s current share price compared to its per-share diidend. Price to Reenue is a
aluation ratio o a company`s current share price compared to its per-share reenue. Price to Larnings is a aluation ratio o a
company`s current share price compared to its per-share earnings.
Shilrpe is a aluation ratio o a company`s current share price compared to its per-share earnings that is calculated by Shiller, Robert J.
1$2&$# 34+4 5'6#7+ 8.&22#7.
14
Price to Larnings Ratio ,P,L, is a aluation ratio o a company`s current share price compared to its per-share earnings.
15
\e preer to look at the P,L smoothed oer time by irtue o using 10-year aerage earnings in the denominator.
16
1he Barclays Intermediate U.S. 1reasury Index includes all publicly issued, U.S. 1reasury securities that hae a remaining maturity
o equal to or greater than 1 year and less than 10 years, are rated inestment grade, and hae >250 million or more o outstanding
ace alue. 1he Barclays Intermediate US Corporate Index tracks the intermediate term ,1-10 years, sector o the United States
corporate bond market. Barclays U.S Corporate ligh-\ield Bond Index is composed o ixed-rate, publicly issued, non-inestment
grade debt.
Source: Shiller, Robert J. Online Data Robert Shiller and Bloomberg. Data as o December 26, 2012.
7


G2.: E%#H:/I J2"#$.>#.8 0 62$K2$<8# A%F; J$<:# 0 A%F; E%#H:



\e wrote in our 3
rd
quarter commentary that we had reduced our \al-Mart exposure. lor similar aluation
reasons, we hae reduced our holdings in a host o other larger cap, quality companies. \e also reduced our
exposure to energy companies. Although our exposure to the energy sector had shrunk rom 20.0 in 2008
to 9.3 at the end o 2011, we still expected these inestments to share in the upside o an improing global
economy. 1hat has not proen to be the case, largely due to poor capital allocation decisions in the industry,
new technologies that hae increased both the accessibility and aailability o oil and gas supplies, and the
higher cost o those new technologies. 1he inestments became too much o a call on the commodity, and
less o a call on the business ranchise. \e ended the year with 6.2 inested in the energy sector, and we
hae redeployed that capital in businesses we beliee hae better organic growth prospects and management
teams that make better capital allocation decisions.

Lower growth rates in the U.S. continue to drie us oerseas and into inestments that hae some
combination o better growth rates and cheaper aluations.

97':;# <7:=#22#% >4,6#7+
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert ,GBL, is a Belgian holding company run by Albert lrere, a man widely reerred to
as the \arren Buett o Lurope.` 1he company owns signiicant stakes in a ariety o established
companies including 1otal ,energy,, Laarge ,cement,, Pernod ,alcoholic spirits,, and GDl Suez ,utility,.
1hough the arious underlying companies all hae leerage o arying degrees, the holding company is
essentially debt ree, allowing or a simple sum o the parts ealuation.
Our attraction to GBL was not just the 25-30 discount to NAV at which the shares hae traded, but also
that the arious parts o the company were generally out o aor and relatiely inexpensie at low double
digit earnings multiples. By purchasing a collection o inexpensie companies ia a holding company trading
at less than NAV, we iewed ourseles as eectiely taking adantage o a double discount.
\e put GBL in the category we term ininite duration bonds
1
.` \e naturally recognize that this is an equity,
but unlike a bond it should hae a rising coupon. Assuming diidends were reinested in the security,
GBL`s USD-based returns oer the past decade hae been in excess o 10, which beats the roughly .4
U.S. dollar-based compounded return or the Luro Stoxx 50, a collection o leading Blue-chip companies
based in the Lurozone.
18
Moreoer, gien that Belgium-based holding companies are not subject to capital
gains taxes on the sale o assets, we would argue that the GBL discount is perhaps less justiied than that

1
Ininite duration bonds reer to bonds that we think will continue to oer a aorable risk,reward relationship.
18
Bloomberg.
0
3
10
13
20
23
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2003 2008 2011
1reasury Plgh Crade CorporaLe Plgh ?leld
?ear
Source: Morningstar
?
l
e
l
d

8


applied to holding companies domiciled in jurisdictions with less aorable tax policies. \hile we see no
catalyst or narrowing the gap between GBL`s market aluation and NAV, our purchase price was
accompanied by a diidend yield o roughly 4.5.

17?24 @8@
Norway-based Orkla has all the characteristics o a classic Contrarian special situation with a catalyst. At the
time o our purchase, the company was iewed as an unwieldy conglomerate with actiities in branded
consumer goods ,think a Scandinaia-ocused Unileer,, hydro power, aluminum industrial products ,SAPA,,
specialty chemicals ,Borregaard,, solar ,RLC,, and a signiicant minority interest in a priately-held paints and
coatings business ,Jotun,. As i the aorementioned smorgasbord o actiities was not suiciently complex to
discourage analysis, Orkla also had a portolio o publicly traded securities and a collection o Scandinaian
real estate inestments.
Our interest in the name was piqued by a publicly announced plan to reduce the diworsiication`
19
actiities
and reocus primarily on the branded consumer goods business. Despite being buried in what had been
widely regarded as a poorly run conglomerate, the branded goods businesses has a history o maintaining
long-standing, best-in-class brands and has shown that it can deelop successul new products. Although
Orkla lacks global brands, about 80 o sales are in the Nordic region, roughly 80 o sales come rom
products with 41 market positions, and about 0 o sales come rom its ten largest product categories.
1he catalyst or change in Orkla`s capital allocation strategy stems rom action taken by the Chairman o the
Board, Lrik Stein lagen, a Norwegian billionaire who made his ortune in the grocery business ,which was,
coincidentally, a big buyer o Orkla branded goods products,. Mr. lagen owns about 25 o Orkla, and
since it accounts or a meaningul portion o his net worth, he has a ested interest in the success o the irm.
Mr. lagen`s early restructuring moes included the appointment o a new CLO whose mandate is to
improe the oerall proitability o the branded goods segment. As o late, the business has exhibited the
ability to earn LBI1A
20
margins o 10 to 12, with capital turnoer o 1.5x to 1.8x, resulting in pre-tax
returns on capital employed o 16 to 21
21
. \hile these metrics are aboe that o the aerage public
company, management will be the irst to tell you that Orkla is nonetheless perorming below its global peers.
Based on our discussions with industry analysts, competitors, and third-party adisors, we beliee the
reocused company has room to improe both operating margins and return on capital through arious sel-
help initiaties, some o which hae already been implemented.
\e began purchasing Orkla in Noember 2011 on the belie that, net o conseratie aluations or non-core
businesses, we were purchasing the branded goods business at roughly 10-11x ater-tax earnings, assuming no
improement in proitability. \e iewed this price as oering a margin o saety
22
in combination with
optionality on improement in the core business, accretie mergers & acquisitions, and an economic recoery
that would allow a realization o non-core businesses in excess o our ascribed alue. \hile the story has not
yet completely played out, thus ar, the plot is unolding as we had hoped. 1hough the aluation is no longer
as compelling as it was at our time o purchase, the current price remains suiciently reasonable that we
intend to stick around or the second hal o the show.
\hile we wish there was more to be excited about in the portolio today, we don`t just sit and wile away our
time waiting or the door o opportunity to reopen. \e spend our days ,and many nights, researching

19
A term that was coined by legendary inestor Peter Lynch in his book, "One Up \all Street," where he suggested that a business
that diersiies too widely, risks destroying their original business, because management time, energy and resources are dierted rom
the original inestment.
20
LBI1A is a corporation's proit or a particular period beore taking into account interest payments on debt, tax, and amounts or
depreciation and amortization o assets.
21
www.orkla.com
22
Buying with a margin o saety,` a phrase popularized by Benjamin Graham and \arren Buet, is when a security is purchased or
less than its estimated alue. 1his helps protect against permanent capital loss in the case o an unexpected eent or analytical mistake.
A purchase made with a margin o saety does not guarantee the security will not decline in price.

9


businesses we`d like to own. \e can`t tell you when that door will open, but it always does, which saes us
rom dislocating our shoulder ,and the alue o the capital entrusted to us, in a utile attempt to knock the
door down.

A&B. C&#2D E3&%+7#%%#D
1he quest or income in a low yield enironment droe high yield up 15.59 in 2012.
23
I we could repeat
the year, we would make the same decision to maintain little exposure to the asset class. Aailable yields in
2011 were too low to justiy the risk inherent in owning high yield bonds, but it`s worse now. 1he chart
below makes high yield bonds look reasonable relatie to U.S. 1reasury yields, with spreads around their
historic aerage.
24



G<.L 2M 5>#$%7< N#$$%HH 1?.7; A%F; E%#H: @.:#O PEQNR "/S
5"#$<F# 2M T 0 *) E#<$ USVS Q$#</9$? E%#H:/

But a reasonable spread is only good enough i you hae an acceptable starting yield, and therein lies one o
our issues with the high yield market. \ith 10-year treasuries yielding an artiicially and unsustainably low
1.9, the high yield bondholder, on aerage, receies just a 6. yield-to-maturity.
25
In our opinion, this ails
to justiy the interest rate and credit risk assumed, particularly in light o the weak coenants embedded in
many o these issues.
Inappropriate assumption o risk is a hallmark o inesting. It eeds both bull and bear markets. Usually one
thinks o inestor ear driing asset sales, but there`s also the ear o not making enough that causes people to
pile into inestments. lor example, inestors hae been aggressiely buying corporate bonds now because
they need the return that their money market unds or conseratie bond portolios can`t oer them. 1his
leads to a perect enironment or sellers o debt ,i.e., borrowers,, and sell they hae. As the table below
relects, >80 billion o high-yield debt has been issued in the last three years, and that doesn`t include the
billions o dollars issued in the leered loan market. 1hat is more than any other period in history. 1he
aerage oer the last three years is about equal to the combined totals or 2006 and 200, the years preceding

23
Source: Morningstar. BoA Merrill Lynch US ligh \ield Master II Index.
24
Data as o December 31, 2012. BoA Merrill Lynch US ligh \ield Master II Index alue, which tracks the perormance o US
dollar denominated below inestment grade rated corporate debt publically issued in the US domestic market. 1o qualiy or inclusion
in the index, securities must hae a below inestment grade rating ,based on an aerage o Moody's, S&P, and litch, and an
inestment grade rated country o risk ,based on an aerage o Moody's, S&P, and litch oreign currency long term soereign debt
ratings,. 1he \ield to maturity ,\1M, o a bond or other ixed-interest security, such as gilts, is the internal rate o return ,IRR,
oerall interest rate, earned by an inestor who buys the bond today at the market price, assuming that the bond will be held until
maturity, and that all coupon and principal payments will be made on schedule.
25
BoA Merrill Lynch US ligh \ield Master Index II, as o December 31, 2012.
Source: Bloomberg.
?
l
e
l
d

10


the 2008 meltdown.
A%F; E%#H: W#& @//9#/
*XY( D ()*(


It`s so easy or corporate borrowers that companies and Leeraged Buyout ,LBO, irms are alling all oer
each other, borrowing to reinance, to recapitalize, or to make acquisitions. \e look orward to a time when
buyers are more circumspect, and prices o existing issues decline. I`m conident that, in the uture, we`ll own
distressed bonds that were born during this binge.

6<K<7%8? Z%/79//%2.
Gien the lund`s asset growth since our October 2008 reopening, we thought we should spend some time
discussing the capacity o the lPA Crescent lund. \e closed lPA Crescent to new capital in lebruary 2005.
At the time, we told inestors that we would consider reopening when two things occurred: An expansion o
the team and its capabilities, and identiiable inestment opportunities. Oer the next ew years, we added
analysts with strong and, just as important, broad capabilities. \e reopened the lund in the ace o declining
securities markets and a rapidly deteriorating global economy - a ripe enironment or deploying capital.
Since reopening, we hae continually ealuated closing the und to new inestors. \e hae remained open
so ar because we beliee the lund`s size and asset lows hae not materially impacted our ability to achiee
the lund`s goals.
Capability: 1he team now stands at nine dedicated analysts ,including our three-person inestment
committee,, up rom just two when we closed in 2005. 1he larger team gies us the luxury o retaining in-
house knowledge in a ariety o disciplines. 1he deeper bench has expanded our opportunity set, allowing us
to maintain our high standards o research analysis or each and eery inestment, whether it be
restructurings, actiist roles, distressed corporate debt, discounted mortgage whole loans, international
equities, speciic industries, or unique asset classes. 1he successul implementation o our rigorous research
process amongst all o our team members, gies me conidence that we hae the capabilities and capacity to
manage the increased asset base. In act, we recently began interiewing to add a new member to the team,
and though we are early in the interiew process, we hae been delighted thus ar by the quality o the
candidates.
Opportunity: \hen thinking about closing, we also think about the inesting enironment --both the current
opportunity set and our expectations or uture opportunities. Currently, we ind limited prospects.
loweer, we beliee the uture opportunity set will be substantial. As we hae ot discussed, we are
managing capital in the ace o Central Bankers` grand experiment` that we do not beliee will end well,
omenting olatility and creating opportunity. \e continue to maintain a more deensie posture until the
allout. 1hough underperormance might be the price we pay in the interim should the market continue to
rise, we beliee in ocusing on the preseration o capital beore considering the return on it. 1he imbalances
Source: Barclays Capital. As o December 31, 2012.Unit o measure is in billions. Ba, B, Caa signiy Moody`s ratings.
11


that we see, coupled with the current positioning o our lund, gie us conidence that oer the long term, we
will be able to inest our increased asset base in compelling absolute alue opportunities.
lund lows: \e are sensitie to the negatie impact that substantial asset lows ,in or out, can hae on the
management and perormance o a portolio. At present, asset lows are not material relatie to the size o
the lund, so we beliee that the portolio is not harmed. loweer, while members o the Inestment
Committee will continue to be aailable to existing clients, we hae restricted discussions with new
relationships so that our attention can be on inestment management rather than asset gathering.
lor now, we are satisied with the team`s capabilities, the lund`s positioning, and the impact o asset lows.
As ellow shareholders, should anything cause us to doubt the likelihood o meeting our stated objecties we
will close the lund as we did beore, and,or return capital to our shareholders.

62.7H9/%2.
Our success, such as it may be, is dictated primarily by two actors: 1, A rigorous and replicable process by
which we analyze businesses and assets that oer what we beliee are superior prospectie returns as well as
the saety cushion o a discounted price, and 2, Patience. Our willingness to wait or opportunity -- and
when ound, to wait or that inestment to succeed -- means that our trading department sometimes gets a
tad bored, and some clients get anxious. \e are neither. \e occupy ourseles by continuing to learn new
businesses that may or may not end up in the portolio. \e know there will be more bad news, and with it
more olatility and inestment opportunity, but we neer know when. 1hat means our results will lag at
times, as they hae in the past and will in the uture. But it also means we will lead at other times, and we`e
done that in the past and hope to do so in the uture. \e are in the arbitrage business, but not in the
traditional merger-arbitrage sense o the term. \e engage in time arbitrage. \e tend to buy early, aerage
down, and then wait until our thesis is proen correct, and then we exit. 1his can happen quickly, or it may
take years. \hile a quick success is easy or inestors to digest, one that takes longer can be tough or clients
to stomach.
\e think in years, not in months or een days, in all aspects o our business
and we look or associates who think similarly. In 2012, Crescent added two
new members to the team and had one departure. \e hire when we beliee
that an analyst will succeed in our rigorous and disciplined approach. 1he
turnoer on our inestment team is extraordinarily low, and we owe at least
part o that success to a long interiew process.
\e recently isited the Los Angeles County Museum o Art ,LACMA, and
were struck by an exhibit that reminded us that support or the stock and
corporate bond market can change in an instant. >#*&+4+#D F4%% by artist
Michael leizer is composed o a 456-oot-long slot constructed on
LACMA's campus, oer which is placed a 340-ton granite megalith. At >10
million, it`s pricey ,says the Philistine, and not without risk, though the
people walking under it may hae orgotten - or decided to ignore - the act
that they are doing so in earthquake prone L.A. \e`ll take the long way around.

Respectully submitted,
Steen Romick
President
January 22, 2013



12

CUSI]SLDCL 1ICkLk SnAkLS SLCUkI1 Mk1 kICL Mk1 VALUL CCUCN kA1L
MA1UkI1
DA1L
CI NL1
ASSL1
VALUL
017173100 ? 286,200 ALLLCPAn? CC8C8A1lCn 333.42 $ 93,997,204.00 $ 0.97
026874784 AlC 3,168,300 AML8lCAn ln1L8nA1lCnAL C8Cu, lnC. 33.30 182,440,990.00 1.84
032634103 Aul 3,322,000 AnALCC uLvlCLS, lnC. 42.06 148,133,320.00 1.49
03324A108 8uu 2,160,400 AnPLuSL8-8uSCP ln8Lv SA/nv - Au8 * 87.41 188,840,364.00 1.90
37389103 ACn 6,380,300 ACn* 33.60 334,744,680.00 3.38
013417304 A88S 3,447,200 A88lS C8Cu, lnC. 14.94 31,301,168.00 0.32
009873397 8AC 3,801,200 8Ank Cl AML8lCA CC8C8A1lCn 11.60 44,093,920.00 0.43
064038100 8k 4,491,400 8Ank Cl nLW ?C8k MLLLCn CC8C8A1lCn 23.70 113,428,980.00 1.16
136383101 CnC 3,176,300 CAnAulAn nA1u8AL 8LSCu8CLS LlMl1Lu * 28.87 149,443,333.00 1.31
172738102 CSCC 10,977,200 ClSCC S?S1LMS 19.63 213,701,980.00 2.18
3,171,611 CCun18?WluL PCLulnCS, L1u. - A * 4.06 12,884,033.37 0.13
3,171,611 CCun18?WluL PCLulnCS, L1u. - 8 * - 0.00 0.00
123381801 Cl1 2,743,600 Cl1 C8Cu 38.64 106,089,984.00 1.07
172967424 C 1,781,300 Cl1lC8Cu 39.36 70,468,228.00 0.71
C2334l103 CCv 4,831,700 CCvlulLn LC * 37.74 280,137,138.00 2.82
126630100 CvS 6,803,000 CvS CA8LMA8k 48.33 329,021,730.00 3.32
29338C109 LSv 1,633,400 LnSCC LC - Au8 (1) * 39.28 96,827,932.00 0.98
81vxkn7 CLnM_Mk 33,231,200 CLn1lnC MALA?SlA 8L8PAu * 1.16 61,819,318.08 0.62
38239308 CCCC 236,000 CCCCLL 709.37 181,398,720.00 1.83
70973288L C8L8_88 1,661,327 C8CuL 88uxLLLLS LAM8L81 S.A. * 79.33 131,824,137.72 1.33
3002463uL PLn_C8 920,000 PLnkLL AC & CC. kCAA * 68.32 63,033,088.00 0.64
428236103 PC 2,991,800 PLWLL11-ACkA8u 14.23 42,633,130.00 0.43
009978810 lC 9,332,300 ln1L8u8LlC C8Cu Cl CCMAnlLS 11.02 103,043,946.00 1.06
478160104 !n! 1,870,000 !CPnSCn & !CPnSCn 70.10 131,087,000.00 1.32
6483809 4432_! 2,130,300 kAC CC8C8A1lCn* 23.93 33,228,240.33 0.36
348661107 LCW 3,920,000 LCWL'S CCMAnlLS 33.32 139,238,400.00 1.40
394918104 MSl1 11,263,000 MlC8CSCl1 26.73 301,113,430.00 3.04
674399103 Cx? 2,019,000 CCCluLn1AL L18CLLuM 76.61 134,673,390.00 1.36
681904108 CC8 3,846,000 CMnlCA8L 36.10 211,040,600.00 2.13
68389x103 C8CL 3,823,000 C8ACLL CC8C8A1lCn 33.32 194,089,000.00 1.96
C8k_nC 21,881,000 C8kLA ASA 8.72 190,872,339.20 1.92
C1PL8 287,093,334.00 2.90
690768403 Cl 3,813,100 CWLnS-lLLlnClS 21.27 123,687,177.00 1.23
716768106 L1M 913,000 L1SMA81 68.34 62,331,100.00 0.63
4712798 8nC_l 2,084,000 8LnAuL1 S.A.* 33.68 111,868,703.20 1.13
779382100 8uC 1,423,000 8CWAn CCMAnlLS* 31.27 44,339,730.00 0.43
0884709 1SCC_Ln 31,096,030 1LSCC LC* 3.46 169,773,104.19 1.71
4162791 PC_l 2,830,886 1PALLS S.A.* 34.63 98,719,623.14 1.00
883336102 1MC 3,363,000 1PL8MC llSPL8 SClLn1lllC lnC. 63.78 227,373,700.00 2.29
89417L109 18v 1,261,000 1PL 18AvLLL8S CCMAnlLS 71.82 90,363,020.00 0.91
81213!1 unA_nA 2,973,147 unlLLvL8 n.v. * 38.04 113,113,080.30 1.14
931142103 WM1 1,293,000 WAL-MA81 S1C8LS 68.23 88,337,830.00 0.89
931422109 WAC 2,173,000 WALC8LLn 37.01 80,496,730.00 0.81
94973v107 WL 2,023,000 WLLLCln1 60.92 123,363,000.00 1.24
938102103 WuC 1,830,000 WLS1L8n ulCl1AL 42.49 78,606,300.00 0.79
83uM1?0 W_Ln 10,134,960 W LC* 14.43 146,238,331.34 1.47
984121103 x8x 11,380,000 xL8Cx CC8C8A1lCn 6.82 77,611,600.00 0.78
1C1AL CCMMCN S1CCk (LCNG): 6,329,023,313.06 63.82
026373103 AM (419,800) AML8lCAn C8LL1lnCS - A 16.89 (7,090,422.00) -0.07
033484101 Av8 (100,400) AvALCn8A? CCMMunl1lLS 133.39 (13,613,236.00) -0.14
03946k101 88vA (201,130) 8AnCC 8lL8AC vlZCA?A A8CLn1A8lA, S.A. - Au8 * 9.42 (1,894,644.60) -0.02
23960109 uLl (417,600) uCuCLAS LMML11 23.30 (9,730,080.00) -0.10
297178103 LSS (88,200) LSSLx 8CL81? 18uS1 146.63 (12,934,330.00) -0.13
302182100 LS8x (383,427) Lx8LSS SC8l1S, lnC. 34.00 (20,813,038.00) -0.21
!"# %&'()'*+ !,*-
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./01.0/2./
13

CUSI]SLDCL 1ICkLk SnAkLS SLCUkI1 Mk1 kICL Mk1 VALUL CCUCN kA1L
MA1UkI1
DA1L
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VALUL
!"# %&'()'*+ !,*-
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./01.0/2./
313747206 l81 (107,300) lLuL8AL 8LAL1? lnvLS1MLM1 18uS1 104.02 (11,161,346.00) -0.11
40414L109 PC (226,700) PC, lnC. 43.18 (10,242,306.00) -0.10
44106M102 P1 (182,300) PCSl1ALl1? 8CL81lLS 18uS1 23.42 (4,269,466.00) -0.04
471109108 !AP (102,900) !A8uLn 31.70 (3,319,930.00) -0.03
6642860 7201_! (12,983,600) nlSSAn MC1C8 CC., L1u. 9.33 (121,379,781.32) -1.22
C1PL8 (10,386,021.33) -0.11
71714l104 MC (320,700) PA8ML8lCA 14.24 (4,366,768.00) -0.03
8l (401,000) l1nL? 8CWLS lnC. 10.64 (4,266,640.00) -0.04
73278L103 CCL (143,000) CCL 42.32 (6,031,760.00) -0.06
882681109 1x8P (148,300) 1LxAS 8CAuPCuSL - A 16.80 (2,494,800.00) -0.03
92276l100 v18 (61,800) vLn1AS 64.72 (3,999,696.00) -0.04
1C1AL CCMMCN S1CCk (SnCk1): (2S0,414,48S.47) -2.S2
31,286,138 LnuLAvCu8 llnAnClAL 8LS1C8A1lCn lunu, L.. 112.8926 33,319,734.89 0.33
34,416,274 u.S. lA8MlnC 8LAL1? 18uS1 l, L.. 100.172 34,473,469.99 0.33
7,782,827 u.S. lA8MlnC 8LAL1? 18uS1 ll, L.. 99.2233 7,722,377.78 0.08
1C1AL LIMI1LD Ak1NLkSnIS: 77,S17,S82.66 0.78
31,439,397,000 !? SWA1lCn 02/27/14 0.00016 94,911.07 0.00
16,806,330,000 !? u1 09/09/14 0.02330 4,332,783.00 0.03
16,728,380,000 !? u1 09/09/14 0.02349 4,329,678.92 0.04
118,300,000 Lu8 Cu88LnC? 02/19/13 (118.3M Lu8 [ 1.31728) (0.00210) (230,796.00) 0.00
60,000,000 C8 Cu88LnC? 02/23/13 (60M C8 [ 1.62776) 0.00290 171,600.00 0.00
4,400,000,000 !? Cu88LnC? 02/26/13 (4.48 !? [ 82.289) (4.46100) 2,749,626.03 0.03
194,330,000 !? u1 03/24/22 (194.33M !? [ 0.07323) 0.07637 14,842,309.30 0.13
1C1AL DLkIVA1IVLS]IU1UkLS 26,690,312.S2 0.27
1C1AL C1nLk SLCUkI1ILS 104,207,89S.18 1.0S
681904An8 6,939,000 CMnlCA8L lnC. 3.73 12/13/23 148.123 10,308,018.73 0.7900 10/1/2012 0.10
63934LAL2 9,193,000 nAvlS1A8 ln1L8nA1lCnAL CC8. 3.00 10/13/14 91.730 8,434,377.30 3.7300 12/13/2023 0.09
1C1AL kLILkkLD S1CCk & CCNVLk1I8LL 8CNDS: 18,742,S96.2S 0.19
00208!AL8 136,713,000 A1 ClL Anu CAS CC8C8A1lCn 11.873 03/01/13 10.00000 13,671,300.00 11.8730 3/1/2013 0.14
00208SAu2 23,843,000 A1 ClL & CAS CC8C8A1lCn ul 1L8M LCAn 03/01/14 84.30000 20,149,023.00 0.20
026331u3 3,486,000 S8lnCLLAl llnAnClAL SL8vlCLS 3.83 06/01/13 101.62300 3,342,647.30 3.8300 6/1/2013 0.04
026331C8 3,100,000 S8lnCLLAl llnAnClAL SL8vlCLS 3.73 09/13/16 90.00000 4,390,000.00 3.7300 9/13/2016 0.03
026331C6 8,980,000 S8lnCLLAl llnAnClAL SL8vlCLS 6.30 09/13/17 88.30000 7,947,300.00 6.3000 9/13/2017 0.08
026331S2 13,366,000 S8lnCLLAl llnAnClAL SL8vlCLS 6.90 12/13/17 90.00000 13,829,400.00 6.9000 12/13/2017 0.14
LP8471748 3,339,031 CCun18?WluL PCLulnCS, L1u.10 03/08/18-lk12 8LC S * 167.36470 3,923,122.09 10.0000 3/8/2018 0.06
LP8431609 8,348,932 CCun18?WluL PCLulnCS, L1u.10 03/08/18-lk12 * 167.36470 13,973,198.47 10.0000 3/8/2018 0.14
Ln361036 194,034 ll8S1 uA1A CC8C8A1lCn 09/24/14 1L8M LCAn 99.32400 193,110.36 9/24/2014 0.00
439743lC3 6,976,000 ln1L8nA1lCnAL LLASL llln. 3.873 03/01/13 101.23000 7,063,200.00 3.8730 3/1/2013 0.07
43974v880 1,612,000 ln1L8nA1lCnAL LLASL llln. 6.623 11/13/13 103.72200 1,671,998.64 6.6230 11/13/2013 0.02
43974v849 3,313,000 ln1L8nA1lCnAL LLASL llln. 3.63 06/01/14 103.74200 3,721,371.30 3.6300 6/1/2014 0.06
43031uAP4 20,649,000 lS1A8 llnAnClAL lnC. 3.70 03/01/14 102.37300 21,139,413.73 3.7000 3/1/2014 0.21
43031uA18 6,912,000 lS1A8 llnAnClAL lnC. 6.03 04/13/13 100.30000 6,946,360.00 6.0300 4/13/2013 0.07
43031uAW1 18,783,000 lS1A8 llnAnClAL lnC. 3.873 03/13/16 100.00000 18,783,000.00 3.8730 3/13/2016 0.19
43031u8u2 4,930,000 lS1A8 llnAnClAL lnC. 3.83 03/13/17 97.30000 4,826,230.00 3.8300 3/13/2017 0.03
Ln322669 6,016,977 klCn C8Cu 12/28/14 1L8M LCAn 8 * 98.74800 3,941,644.78 12/28/2014 0.06
Ln322673 12,789,693 klCn C8Cu 12/28/13 1L8M LCAn C * 99.23700 12,692,109.96 12/28/2013 0.13
74971xA83 13,230,000 CLnCn LnL8C?, lnC. 7.623 06/13/14 107.00000 16,296,100.00 7.6230 6/13/2014 0.13
1C1AL 8CNDS & NC1LS: 184,902,7S2.0S 1.86
1C1AL CCkCkA1L 8CNDS 203,64S,348.30 2.0S
7863148S7 (6,810,000) SAlLWA? lnC. 3.93 08/13/20 99.93100 (6,803,301.10) 3.9300 8/13/2020 -0.07
1C1AL 8CNDS & NC1LS (SnCk1): (6,80S,301.10) -0.07
14

CUSI]SLDCL 1ICkLk SnAkLS SLCUkI1 Mk1 kICL Mk1 VALUL CCUCN kA1L
MA1UkI1
DA1L
CI NL1
ASSL1
VALUL
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./01.0/2./
313741C14 36,403 lnMA CCL #323282 7.3 07/01/28 116.17900 42,293.08 7.3000 7/1/2028 0.00
18,329,829 MC8 A81lClA1lCn 9.73 02/11/14 100.00000 18,329,829.20 9.7300 2/11/2014 0.19
340780AA3 19,373,336 lLC8luA MC81CACL 8LSCLu1lCn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2012-4A 36.78971 7,128,129.96 0.07
834864AA3 9,910,861 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2009-2 44.72000 4,432,137.00 3.2400 2/13/2049 0.03
83486AAA9 6,423,670 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2010-1 30.38000 3,230,103.97 13.6777 9/13/2047 0.03
834868AA7 33,312,488 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2010-2 30.42000 16,896,996.46 6.8747 2/28/2037 0.17
834861AA8 16,816,193 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2010-3 30.03000 8,413,142.24 11.6140 7/31/2038 0.08
83486WAA1 23,347,318 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2010-4 46.73000 11,938,261.81 8.3633 8/31/2049 0.12
83486xAA9 48,194,444 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2011-1 32.74290 23,419,147.63 7.2971 6/30/2039 0.26
83486uAA3 30,731,410 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2011-2 33.32040 16,447,373.43 12.4473 9/13/2030 0.17
83487CAA3 19,287,393 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2012-2 38.30390 7,426,473.43 1.4380 3/13/2047 0.07
83487lAA7 33,164,189 S1AnWlCP MC81CACL LCAn 18uS1 SL8lLS 2012-4 44.40700 13,613,362.33 0.16
1C1AL MCk1GAGL 8ACkLD SLCUkI1ILS 13S,339,4S4.S6 1.37
1C1AL MAkkL1 VALUL: 56,S14,996,224.S3 6S.70
CASn & LUIVALLN1S (NL1 CI LIA8ILI1ILS): 3,401,700,S91.46 34.30

1C1AL NL1 ASSL1S: 59,916,696,81S.99 100.00
* lndlcaLes forelgn securlLy.
orLfollo Poldlng Submlsslon ulsclosure
LxcepL for cerLaln publlcly avallable lnformaLlon lncorporaLed hereln, Lhe lnformaLlon conLalned ln Lhese maLerlals ls our confldenLlal and proprleLary lnformaLlon and ls belng submlLLed Lo
you for your confldenLlal use wlLh Lhe express undersLandlng LhaL, wlLhouL our prlor wrlLLen permlsslon, you wlll noL release Lhese maLerlals or dlscuss Lhe lnformaLlon conLalned hereln or
make reproducLlons of or use Lhese maLerlals for any purpose oLher Lhan evaluaLlng a poLenLlal advlsory relaLlonshlp wlLh llrsL aclflc Advlsors.
ou shou|d cons|der the Iund's |nvestment ob[ect|ves, r|sks, and charges and expenses carefu||y before you |nvest. 1he rospectus deta||s the Iund's ob[ect|ve and po||c|es, sa|es
charges, and other matters of |nterest to the prospect|ve |nvestor. |ease read th|s rospectus carefu||y before |nvest|ng. 1he rospectus may be obta|ned by v|s|t|ng the webs|te at
www.fpafunds.com, by ema|| at crmQfpafunds.com, to||-free by ca|||ng 1-800-982-4372 or by contact|ng the Iund |n wr|t|ng.
lnvesLmenLs ln muLual funds carry rlsks and lnvesLors may lose prlnclpal value. SLock markeLs are volaLlle and can decllne slgnlflcanLly ln response Lo adverse lssuer, pollLlcal, regulaLory,
markeL, or economlc developmenLs. CerLaln funds may purchase forelgn securlLles, lncludlng Amerlcan ueposlLory 8ecelpLs (Au8s) and oLher deposlLory recelpLs, whlch are sub[ecL Lo
lnLeresL raLe, currency exchange raLe, economlc and pollLlcal rlsks, Lhls may be enhanced when lnvesLlng ln emerglng markeLs. Small and mld cap sLocks lnvolve greaLer rlsks and Lhey can
flucLuaLe ln prlce more Lhan larger company sLocks.
1he reLurn of prlnclpal ln a bond fund ls noL guaranLeed. 8ond funds have Lhe same lssuer, lnLeresL raLe, lnflaLlon and credlL rlsks LhaL are assoclaLed wlLh underlylng bonds owned by Lhe
fund. Lower raLed bonds, converLlble securlLles and oLher Lypes of debL obllgaLlons lnvolve greaLer rlsks.MorLgage securlLles and asseL backed securlLles are sub[ecL Lo prepaymenL rlsk and
Lhe rlsk of defaulL on Lhe underlylng morLgages or oLher asseLs, derlvaLlves may lncrease volaLlllLy.
orLfollo composlLlon wlll change due Lo ongolng managemenL of Lhe fund. 8eferences Lo lndlvldual securlLles are for lnformaLlonal purposes only and should noL be consLrued as
recommendaLlons by Lhe lunds, Advlsor or ulsLrlbuLor.
1he lA lunds are dlsLrlbuLed by uM8 ulsLrlbuLlon Servlces, LLC, 803 W. Mlchlgan SLreeL, Mllwaukee, Wl, 33233.
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