TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and

CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco (appellees) v TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja (appellant)1
August 18 1972 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. General; Definitions; Vesting of Succession Rights (Art. 777) The Son and the Evil Stepmother - Leigh

SUPERFACTS! Stepson Jose and stepmom Tasiana entered into a compromise agreement, a part of which said that Jose will pay Tasiana money in consideration of Tasianas share in the estate of her dead husband Francisco. Later, Tasiana contested this and said it was void, saying that heirs cannot enter into the agreement without first probating the will of Francisco. Court ruled otherwise, citing art. 777 and saying that a hereditary share is transmitted immediately after the death of the predecessor in interest, and there is no legal bar preventing a successor from immediately disposing of her respective hereditary share immediately after such death.

FACTS: - Francisco de Borja (Francisco), upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on October 6 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will in CFI Rizal. The will was probated on April 2 1941. - 1946: Francisco was appointed executor and administrator. 1952: their son Jose appointed coadministrator. April 14 1954: Francisco died, so Jose became the sole administrator. o While a widower, Francisco had a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. UH OHHH o Upon Franciscos death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in CFI Nueva Ecija. In 1955, she was appointed special administratix. - Relationship between children from the first marriage and Tasiana has been plagued with several court suits (including the 3 cases at bar and 18 pending cases haha!!!!) And the testate estate of Josefa has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. - October 12 1963: A compromise agreement was entered into by Jose and Tasiana:
o o 1) Agree to sell the Jalajala hacienda (Poblacion portion) in Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco 2) Jose obligated himself to pay Tasiana P800k, P200k of which is his share in the payment, and P600k as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano, and Matilde (siblings of Jose)2, considered as payment and settlement of Tasianas hereditary share in Franciscos estate and Josefas estate, and to any properties bequeathed in her favor by last will and testament or donation inter vivos or mortis causa by Francisco. The funds from this payment shall be taken from the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, Poblacion. 3) Tasiana assumes payment of the P30k obligation incurred by Francisco in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines. She also assumes to pay for her 1/5 share in the estate and inheritance taxes on Franciscos estate. (PP3,500). This will be deducted by the buyer of the Jalajala property from the payment to be made to Tasiana under paragraph 2, and paid directly to DBP 4) Buyer of the Jalajala Poblacion is authorized to pay Tasiana the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 (approximately P766,500), and issue in Tasianas name certified checks, who in turn will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose 5) In consideration of the payment to Tasiana, the parties mutually renounce, withdraw, and waive any manner of actions/suits. Tasiana also expressly renounces absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in Franciscos estate. 6) Tasiana, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4, shall deliver to Jose all the titles and documents belonging to Francisco which are in her possession 7) This agreement shall take effect upon fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned in paragraph 1 and upon receipt of the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property. The non-fulfillment of the sale will render this instrument null and void

o o o o

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA (special administratix appellee) v JOSE DE BORJA (oppositor-appellant) TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja (plaintiffapellee) v JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco (defendant-appellant)
2 Apparently, Joses siblings entered into some form of agreement with the stepmother before this compromise

agreement was made. This part of the agreement basically was just Jose superseding the former agreement with this new one

May 16 1966: Jose submitted for Court approval the agreement to the CFI Rizal and CFI Nueva Ecija. o Tasiana opposed in both instances. Sus o CFI Rizal approved the compromise agreement, but CFI Nueva Ecija declared it void and unenforceable. o Tasiana appealed CFI Rizals order of approval, while Jose appealed CFI Nueva Ecijas order of disapproval. Tasiana contests the validity of the compromise agreement on 3 grounds: o The heirs cannot enter into the agreement without first probating 3 the will of Francisco o It involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco and Tasiana o Even if it were valid, it ceased to have force and effect Tasianas contention is based on the ruling in Guevara v Guevara: the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory, and the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. o She also cites Rule 74 Sec. 1: explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate by agreement between heirs, upon the fact that the decedent left no will and no debts Therefore, Franciscos will having been submitted to the CFI Nueva Ecija and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, the circumstances bar the validity of the agreement. Joses contention is that at the time the agreement was entered into, the governing provision was Rule 74 Sec. 1 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. o Also cited the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran in Guevara v Guevara: if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless. :o

ISSUES: Was the Guevara doctrine applicable? NO RULING: CFI Rizal decision AFFIRMED. HELD: 1) Guevara v Guevara doctrine is not applicable. This is apparent in paragraph 2 of the agreement, which stipulates that P800k payable to Tasiana shall be considered as full settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by Francisco by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration o The provision shows that there was no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco among the heirs before the probate of the will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. o As a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such predecessor in interest (Civil Code art. 777), there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation would still be limited to what is adjudicated to the vendor heir - Moreover, as the surviving spouse of Francisco, Tasiana was his compulsory heir (Civil Code art. 995). Her successional interest existed independent of Franciscos last will and testament , and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will cannot apply to this case.

3 establish the validity of a will

2) Since the compromise contract was entered into by and Jose personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco on the one hand, and on the other, "he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco by his second marriage, Tasiana, it is clear that the transaction was binding on both, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. - Tasiana argues that while the agreement expressed no definite period, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, she said that the limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement entered into by her and Joses siblings Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, except that the consideration was fixed at P600k o However, Jose was not a party to this particular contract, making this argument invalid (duuuh). It also seems that the said contract was not even finalized as it bears no date as to when it was finalized. It also was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, as it contained a notarial ratification clause. - Furthermore, the compromise agreement with Jose provided in paragraph 2 that: of the P800k to be paid to Tasiana, P600k represent the pro-rata share of Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, which corresponds to the consideration of P600k in the agreement between Tasiana and Joses sibling. o This clearly shows that the compromise agreement entered into by Jose was designed to supersede the separate unformalized agreement with the other Borja heirs. o The 60 day resolutory term was also not repeated in the subsequent contract entered into by Jose, showing that it could not be applied to the formal compromise with Jose. 3) (Re: Hacienda de Jalajala): The Court ruled in favor of Jose in saying that the property was conjugal in character (therefore not private property of Francisco, as Tasiana contended). o Court cited Art. 160 of the CC: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. o Francisco was shown to have admitted that the hacienda was owned by the conjugal partnership in the reamended inventory that he filed as executor of Josefas estate (listed it under conjugal properties) 4) (Unimportant stuff here onwards!!!): Tasiana contends that CFI Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise agreement because she was not an heir in the estate of Josefa, which was pending settlement in the CFI Rizal, but she was an heir of Francisco, whose estate was the subject of special proceedings in CFI Nueva Ecija. o This is irrelevant. What was sold by Tasiana was only her eventual share in the estate of Francisco, not the estate itself. - Tasiana also argued that the contract with Jose is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with Francisco. o The point is without merit. The opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself a definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the agreement that would show that this recognition of Tasianas status as the surviving spouse of Francisco was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights. - Finally, Tasiana and CFI Nueva Ecija charge that the compromise agreement had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that CFI Nueva Ecija in its order declared that no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties, and that Jose himself had stated in a motion that the proposed amicable settlement had failed to materialize. o No proof that this statement was made referring to the compromise agreement. Moreover, if he was referring to the compromise agreement, it was natural for Jose to attempt to reach a new settlement before seeking judicial enforcement, as this would entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. o The inability to reach a novatory accord cannot invalidate the original compromise.