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How, if at all, does Hume's claim that a 'true judge' must 'preserve his mind free of all prejudice' differ from Kant's claim that a pure judgement of taste is 'disinterested'? During this piece, I shall be discussing David Humes insistence that a true judge must preserve his mind free of all prejudice as I interpret it. I shall then move on to Immanuel Kants notion that a pure judge of taste is disinterested before comparing and contrasting both viewpoints. I intend to conclude that the philosophers reasonings, conclusions and intentions behind these claims-- despite surface appearances --have little in common.

As an empiricist, David Hume encounters difficulty in explaining how it is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste (Hume,1757:300) with a seemingly subjective concept: appreciating or judging taste and beauty. In Of the Standard of Taste, Hume concludes that our undeniable inclination to judge Ogilby as an inferior writer to Milton is based on a rationalist concept: common sense. For Hume, our evaluative convictions are neither true nor false, yet some convictions are supposedly better than others, since some judges of them are superior. Hume sets out five criteria a superior or true judge (Hume,1757:331) must meet in order to hold this title which are: [s]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice (Hume,1757:331). The criterion we shall mostly be concerned with is that [a true critic] must preserve his mind free from all prejudice (Hume,1757:324).

Humes argument against prejudice relies on the assertion that [i]t is well known...[that] prejudice is destructive of sound judgement, and perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties (Hume,1757:327), since where [one] lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted (Hume,1757:331). It is not clear what Hume is referring to when he uses the term prejudice. It seems like a broader term than just bias of being friends or enemies of an author, but appears to delve even

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more deeply into denying ones own identity, individual being and... peculiar circumstances (Hume,1757:325). This seems like a reasonable and fair comment, as it is the case that we shouldnt be biased in a way which exerts preference over something based on our own particular experiences. For example, lets say that I had my hands completely mangled in a meat machine when younger which then had to be amputated. I now hold a deep-rooted resentment for anyone with hands, so judge all fine art as poor, offensive or ugly if the subject has hands on the end of her arms. What this demonstrates is that in order to be a just and fair critic, one must strip down his experiences so that no prejudice can corrupt our sentiment of beauty (Hume,1757:327).

However, since another criterion of becoming a true judge is to [perfect taste] by comparison (Hume,1757:331), it creates the impression that as a true judge one must adopt other-- more commonly accepted --prejudices in order to critique works of art within a context. As a result, it seems to me that Hume is wanting judges to discard their personal preferences and prejudice and replace it with an appeal to popularity. According to Hume, [a prejudiced persons] taste evidently departs from the true standard; and of consequence loses all credit and authority (Hume,1757:326) as a result of not adopting the social context the work of art is set in, so perhaps a better interpretation of Humes use of free-from-prejudice is flexible and able to adopt prejudices of others.

Ill now move on to Immanuel Kants views. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant sets out to discuss judgement of beauty in four sections (or moments). In the first of which, he claims that [t]he judgement of taste... is not a cognitive judgement, is not logical, but is aesthetic (Judgement,1:1:1). He goes on to argue that that which is aesthetic cannot be other than subjective (Judgement,1:1:1) since it is concerned with interior pleasure we individually experience from a representation in our minds of an object in the external world.

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For Kant, judgements of beauty are therefore based on sentiments or feelings, so if this is the case, what makes statements about beauty different from emotional attitudes? Kant holds that judging matters of taste is concerned with disinterested pleasure which expresses no desire for the object and in order to do so, [one] must preserve complete indifference [to it]... (Judgement,1:1:2). This means that although our judgements are rooted in pleasure, it is a pleasure distinct from our usual conception of physical pleasure. To offer my own example to illustrate this idea, to paint or look upon a naked man might make you feel awkward with no physical desire for him, yet you could appreciate the contours of his body and the shape of his thighs and find him beautiful from a purely aesthetic standpoint. Kants point here-- as I take it --is subtle. The idea is that we can recognise and cognitively reflect upon the beauty that the modes of representation (Judgement,1:1:5) of objects produces in us without having desire to possess or utilise them, or as Nick Zangwill put it: that disinterested pleasure has a desire-free 'causal-functional' role (Zangwill,1992:149).

In order to have a pure judgement of taste, we need to separate the object from its role or concept. For example, to judge the beauty of a chair, we need to detach our understanding, experiences and connection of that object with our concept of chair or for sitting on and regard it solely as the bunch of disinterested feelings that we have of it. This is the way the fine art student is today taught: to disregard any context or modes of identity and to just see what is there.

Having outlined Kants ideas on judgements of beauty as disinterested, it is clear that his concepts of beauty require some rejection of a posteriori experience, which is what Hume also insists that a true judge must do (to a degree) to be free from prejudice.

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Some commentators such as Peter Kivy have interpreted Humes ideas on freedomfrom-prejudice as a proto-Kantian point of view of the disinterested spectator (Kivy,1967:63). However, as I touched on earlier, Hume doesnt seem to be rejecting experience completely, rather advocating the adoption of a pseudo-identity through experience: that of the intended audience of the play. Hume wants to embrace social contexts and conformity after rejecting his own, whereas Kants idea of a pure judgement is that devoid of concepts or context since beauty is concerned with surface/superficial aesthetics. So Hume appears to be rejecting legitimate a posteriori experiences in place for changeable, fluid contexts and his true judge is reliant upon later compliance with others through a posteriori means. On the other hand, however, Kant insists that [t]he judgement of taste rests upon a priori grounds (Judgement,1:1;12) in that we have a precondition to view things as they are, not what they do or what we can do with them through a posteriori experiences. So in this extremely important respect, the ideas of both philosophers are opposing.

Even though Hume allows for a rational concept in his theory, his thinking is still influenced greatly by his empiricist thought. For him, a good sense of taste is improved by practice (Hume,1757:331) and perfected through comparisons with other experienced critics. His theory rests on the requirement for other minds and can therefore be considered as relative. Kant denies this empiricist way on the grounds that by viewing taste in a physiological, relative way1, we are treating beauty like a good wine which he would argue is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste (Judgement,1:1;2).

Im now going to move on to how both these arguments address the practical approach of explaining or reconciling differences in opinion of what is beautiful?. Hume asserts that there some judgements are better or worse -- discoverable through common sense -- about beauty.

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Hume highlights the fact that Milton is more of a genius that Ogilby, just like an ocean being bigger than a pond. If there is any disagreement about this, then someone must be wrong, as there is just reason for approving one taste, and condemning another(Hume,1757:300). Kant, on the other hand, leaves us a little confused about his stance on disagreements. With a subjective foundation to his theory, it makes it difficult to see how he can reconcile possible conflicts in opinion. One could possibly argue that the disagreement could arise as a result of one judge being more interested than the other but to be able to confirm which one would be impossible. Since, for Kant, judgement of beauty is a pure intuition known a priori, judges would require agreement instead of merely postulating: as Hume suggests they would. As a result, Kant leaves us more sceptical than Hume about our possible knowledge of beauty.

So, to conclude, both Hume and Kant use similar terminology such as concepts of imagination, feelings and subjectivity. They would seem to agree on the foundations of our experiences regarding beauty but even with such similar starting points, they end up in very different destinations. Their views have often been conflated with their ideas of freedom-from-prejudice and disinterest and, in my opinion, this is mistaken. This misunderstanding could possibly be down to translation issues or even down to poor writing or format that these two ideas have been considered as similar. On the surface -- separated from arguments -- the claims look as if they would achieve the same result: to be a fair, true judge without bias, however Hume appears to then add and justify some bias through experience, whereas Kant claims that true beauty can be judged through introspection and reflection. In order to understand and compare claims, you need to be able to examine the intention and background conditions. As wed expect from rival empiricists and rationalists, in the case of taste, Hume and Kant rarely agree on these.

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Humes argument seems contradictory in my opinion and leaves an idea of a real standard of taste too flimsy and open for interpretation and change. The examples he uses mostly apply to the performance arts, where society and context is important, but when you commit them to notions of the aesthetic arts such as fine art, they fall apart or become less relevant. Someone can appreciate a painting without knowing its history, value or context whereas (in my opinion) going to a drama play where you dont speak the language affords you little enjoyment. As a result, I see Humes argument to be too broad. In comparison to Hume, Kant sets out to explain nothing more than beauty. He doesnt explain what makes a poem beautiful, as he is concerned with aesthetics and the reflection of looking at things devoid of context. It leaves questions open concerning whether there are other types of deeper beauty, although Im sure Kant would afford these types new words or see them as resulting from other kinds of intuitions.

Humes theories appreciate and give room for relativity, cultural change and social differences to an extent, yet appear to still insist on something being superior to another regardless of other factors such as deep reflection. As a result, Humes ideas on a true judge would be more allowing, in my opinion, for modern or contemporary art to be beautiful. However, it is difficult to see how both he and Kant would attest to the beauty of some of the displeasing political art strewn with anger and blood from the Fluxus movement to which I, personally judge as the most beautiful type of art.

Footnotes 1 my understanding of Kants response to this empiricist viewpoint as outlined is due to Allison, H.E. 2001 Kants Theory of Taste pp130. New York, USA - Cambridge University Press Bibliography

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Hume, D. 1757 Dissertation IV Of the Standard of Taste in Four dissertations. Oxford, UK : University of Oxford - Electronically developed for iPad by ECCO-TCP Kant, I. 1790 The Critique of Judgement. Electronically developed for iPad by MobileReference Kivy, P. 1967 Hume's Standard of Taste: Breaking the Circle in British Journal of Aesthetics 7:1 January Edition. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press Zangwill, N. 1992 UnKantian Notions Of Disinterest in British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 32 No. 2 April Edition. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press