1.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. 2. Equal Protection of the laws signifies that all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The guarantee does not require that persons or things different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. What it prohibits is class legislation which discriminates against some and favors others when both are similarly situated or circumstanced. Where there are reasonable grounds for so doing, persons or their properties may be grouped into classes to each of which special legal rights o liabilities may be attached. ************************************************************************************* People of the Philippines vs Cayat Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native nonChristians from Christians. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of

their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause?

Held: The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Quinto vs Comelec G. R. No. 189698 FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid. HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive

officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. RULING: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that: 1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law; 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

GUTIERREZ vs DBM ABAD, J.: These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units as required by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59) while the said allowances and other fringe benefits are not included insofar as members of the police and military are concerned. The Facts and the Case Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation. Thus: Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. -- All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. The Issue: Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause. The Courts Ruling At the heart of the present controversy is Section 12 of R.A. 6758 as quoted above. . As will be noted from the first sentence above, all allowances were deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates except the following: (1) representation and transportation allowances; (2) clothing and laundry allowances; (3) subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on board government vessels; (4) subsistence allowances of hospital personnel; (5) hazard pay; (6) allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and (7) such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may be determined by the DBM. But, while the provision enumerated certain exclusions, it also authorized the DBM to identify such other additional compensation that may be granted over and above the standardized salary rates. In Philippine Ports Authority Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit, the Court has ruled that while Section 12 could be considered self-executing in regard to items (1) to (6), it was not so in regard to item (7). The DBM still needed to amplify item (7) since one cannot simply assume what other allowances were excluded from the standardized salary rates. It was only upon the issuance and effectivity of the corresponding implementing rules and regulations that item (7) could be deemed legally completed. Clearly, COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It is not

payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. As defined, cost of living refers to the level of prices relating to a range of everyday items or the cost of purchasing those goods and services which are included in an accepted standard level of consumption. Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the cost of living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the standardized salary rates. Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. But as respondents pointed out, while it may appear that petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of these issuances, they are in fact attacking the very constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is actually this provision which allows the uniformed personnel to continue receiving their COLA over and above their basic pay, thus: Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base pay of uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police shall be as prescribed in the salary schedule for these personnel in R.A. 6638 and R.A. 6648. The longevity pay of these personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A. 6638, and R.A. 1134 as amended by R.A. 3725 and R.A. 6648: Provided, however, That the longevity pay of uniformed personnel of the Integrated National Police shall include those services rendered as uniformed members of the police, jail and fire departments of the local government units prior to the police integration. All existing types of allowances authorized for uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Integrated National Police such as cost of living allowance, longevity pay, quarters allowance, subsistence allowance, clothing allowance, hazard pay and other allowances shall continue to be authorized. Nothing is more settled than that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally. In any event, the Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that Congress intended the uniformed personnel to be continually governed by their respective compensation laws. Thus, the military is governed by R.A. 6638, as amended by R.A. 9166 while the police is governed by R.A. 6648, as amended by R.A. 6975. Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other national government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas. 2-A Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 2-b. PANFILO LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999 2-b-1. BASCO VS. PAGCOR, May 14, 1991

No violation of the equal protection clause if Congress would legalize cock-fighting and horse racing since police power could regulate gambling. PAGCOR vs. BIR ISSUE : W/N PAGCOR IS EXEMPTED FROM VAT. YES. Facts: With the passage of Republic Act No. (RA) 9337, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) has been excluded from the list of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) that are exempt from tax under Section27(c) of the Tax Code; PAGCOR is now subject to corporate income tax. The Supreme Court (SC) held that the omission of PAGCOR from the list of tax-exempt GOCCs by RA 9337 does not violate the right to equal protection of the laws under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, because PAGCORs exemption from payment of corporate income tax was not based on classification showing substantial distinctions; rather, it was granted upon the corporations own request to be exempted from corporate income tax. Legislative records likewise reveal that the legislative intention is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax. With regard to the issue that the removal of PAGCOR from the exempted list violates the non-impairment clause contained in Section 10, Article III of the Constitution which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed the SC explained that following its previous ruling in the case of Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna 366 Phil. 428(1999), this does not apply. Franchises such as that granted to PAGCOR partake of the nature of a grant, and is thus beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. As regards the liability of PAGCOR to VAT, the SC finds Section 4.108-3 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 16-2005, which subjects PAGCOR and its licensees and franchisees to VAT, null and void for being contrary to the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by RA 9337. According to the SC, RA 9337 does not contain any provision that subjects PAGCOR to VAT. Instead, the SC finds support to the VAT exemption of PAGCOR under Section 109(k) of the Tax Code, which provides that transactions exempt under international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory or under special laws [except Presidential Decree No. (PD) 529] are exempt from VAT. Considering that PAGCORs charter, i.e., PD1869 which grants PAGCOR exemption from taxes is a special law, it is exempt from payment of VAT. Accordingly, the SC held that the BIR exceeded its authority in subjecting PAGCOR to VAT, and thus declared RR 16-05 null and void insofar as it subjects PAGCOR to VAT for being contrary to the NIRC, as amended by RA 9337. PAGCOR is subject to income tax but remains exempt from the imposition of value-added tax. With the amendment by R.A. No. 9337 of Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the list of government corporations exempt for income tax, the legislative intent is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax. However, nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided that PAGCOR can be subjected to VAT. Thus, the provision of RR No. 16-2005, which the respondent BIR issued to implement the VAT law, subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337. (Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011) ROMA DRUG vs RTC of GUAGUA Equal Protection Access to Medicine Roma Drug, owned by Rodriguez, was raided by the NBI upon request of Smithkline a pharmaceutical company (now Glaxo Smithkline). RD is apparently one of 6 pharmacies who are directly importing 5

medicines produced by Smithknline from abroad. RD is not purchasing those medicines via local Smithkline the authorized distributor of Smithkline in the Philippines. Smithkline Phil avers that because the medicines were not purchased from a Philippine registered counterpart of Smithkline then the products imported by RD are considered as counterfeit or unregistered imported drug product as defined by RA 8203 Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs. Notwithstanding RDs motion for reconsideration, the provincial prosecutor recommended that Rodriguez be tried. Rodriguez assails the constitutionality of RA 8203 averring, among other things, that it has violated his right to equal protection as it banned him access from such medicines. ISSUE: Whether or not SLCD violates equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of RD. The SC denounced SLCD for it violated equal protection. It does not allow private 3rd parties to import such medicines abroad even in cases of life and death nor does it allow the importation by 3rd parties in cases wherein the stocks of such medicine would run out. It discriminates at the expense of Filipinos who cannot travel abroad to purchase such medicines yet need them badly. Nevertheless, the flawed intention of Congress had been abrogated by the passage of RA 9502 Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008 and its IRR. This law does not expressly repeal SLCD but it emphasized that any medicine introduced into the Philippines by its patent holder be accessible to anyone. It provides that the right to import drugs and medicines shall be available to any government agency OR ANY PRIVATE 3rd PARTY. The SC noted that this law provided and recognized the constitutionally-guaranteed right of the public to health. People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng Political Law Equal Protection Probation Law Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the

Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional. Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals, Manila RTC Judge Guillermo Loja Sr., et al Equal Protection Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circ 960 which banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad w/o permission from the CB. The circular was issued in 1983. Any violation thereof constitutes a criminal offense. In 1991, 8 informations were filed against Marcos accusing her of maintaining a foreign account in Switzerland from 1968-1991. On 21 Dec 1991, 14 more informations were filed against Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera for the same offense. In January 1992, 11 more informations were filed. The RTC consolidated the cases and Marcos was arraigned in Feb 1992. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circ 1318 and CB Circ 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circ 960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash based on the new circular. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her. ISSUE: Whether or not Imeldas right to equal protection had been violated by CB Circ 1353. HELD: The SC ruled against Imelda. The SC said Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture. Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with

grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent. Mario Gumabon et al vs Director of the Bureau of Prisons Equal Protection Hernandez Doctrine Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished under Art 134 of the RPC. Their offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was

promulgated by the SC. Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed to rebellion as it is necessarily absorbed therein. Hence, without such complexion the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor? ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Panfilo Lacson vs Sandiganbayan, Executive Secretary, et al Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249. HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). Humberto Basco et al vs Philippine Amusements & Gaming Corporation Equal Protection Gambling PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A dated Jan1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under PD 1067-B also dated Jan 1, 1977 to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino Philippine Tourist. The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socioeconomic projects, thus, PD 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective. Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy: Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.

Basco and other lawyers assailed the validity of PAGCOR averring among others that it violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of PAGCOR violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC found Bascos petition to be devoid of merit. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in their petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and

they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila Inc vs The Board of Transportation et al Equal Protection Phasing Out of Old Taxis in MM but not Elsewhere On 10 Oct 1977, BOT issued Circ 77-42 which has for its purpose the phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis which are 6 years older. The law is set to be immediately implemented in Metro Manila first before it would be implemented elsewhere. Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the NCR. TOMMI assailed the constitutionality of the law. It avers, among other things, that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause by the implementation of the said circular. HELD: The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOTs reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection. HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could

chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Patricio Dumlao et al vs COMELEC Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65 Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not

be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho Equal Protection Delegation of Powers Administrative Bodies Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and nonuseful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537. HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power. Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. Ramon Ceniza et al vs Commission on Elections, COA & National Treasurer Equal Protection Gerrymandering **Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. ** Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in

provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. United Democratic Opposition vs Commission on Elections Equal Protection Access to Media In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL Marcos Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations

nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant to Resns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws. ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELECs denial of their request. HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense.

Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting) Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people. Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial. Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Antero Sison Jr. vs Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben Ancheta et al Equal Protection Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that thered be a higher tax impost against income derived from professional income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as a professional businessman, and as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. There is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation. ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm. HELD: The SC ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. According to the Constitution: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. However, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation complained of conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform. There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.

What misled Sison is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. Citizens Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs Judge Ricardo Puno, Register of Deeds Manila Equal Protection Purchase of Land Barrio Obrero In 1956, Resolution 542 was passed by the Register of Deeds Manila which provided that only Filipino laborers whose wages do not exceed P180.00/month or P6.00/day and at the same time residents of Manila may be allowed to purchase lands in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila. On 10 Oct 1966, Maria Barcelon mortgaged her 180 sq. m. land located in Barrio Obrero to CSICI. CSICI foreclosed the property due to nonpayment and later bought the land. CSICI later sought to register and consolidate the land before the Register of Deeds but then Justice Puno denied the request pursuant to Resn 542 as CSICI does not meet the qualification. CSICI averred that Resn 542 is null and void. It averred: As may be seen from Sec 4 of Resn 542, only laborers earning not more than P180.00 a month, or P5.00 a day are qualified to buy Lands in Barrio Obrero. Employees working in offices or establishments and earning as much but who are not laborers cannot buy lands in that area. Also persons who are engaged in some calling or occupation earning as much are not also qualified. It should not be overlooked that the intention of the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila contained in Sections 97, 98 and 100 of said Charter is to help the poor people of Manila to acquire residential lands on easy terms. CSICI points out that there is no substantial difference between these laborers to those mentioned in the Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 542 violates equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled against CSICI. CSICI, which is a corporation and not a lowly paid worker, is not competent to raise this claim. For even if the SC sustain it, no benefit can accrue to CSICI who will nonetheless be disqualified to acquire the lot. Moreover, in the absence of manifest abuse of power, the SC not vent to substitute their judgment for that of the City of Manila which is tasked by its Charter to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to residents, giving first priority to the bona-fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. Obviously, the questioned resolution merely seeks to implement the Charter provision. Peralta et al vs Commission on Elections et al Equal Protection 1978 Election Code Block Voting

Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, subparagraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination. Hawaiian Philippine Co. versus Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia Inc., et al Equal Protection Sugar Cane Industry Hawaiian is a sugar milling company while Asociacion is a corporation organized to represent sugar cane planters in Negros Occidental. In 1953, both had a contract which would include 12 crop (years) until the 1963-1964 crop. For the 1st 6 years, the sharing would be 63% to 37%, Asociacion being the highest getter. And from the next 5 years itd be 63.5% to 36.5% and in the 63 -64 crop year itd be 64% to 36%. In 1961, Asociacion made known its intention to buy out Hawaiian which was reluctant at first but later agreed at a selling price of $14M. The sale was never actualized and Asociacion initially sought to restructure the contract to a 70%-30% sharing. Eventually, Asociacion severed ties with Hawaiian and Asocicion established its own milling company, the Agricultural Industrial Development Company of Silay-Saravia. Apparently, Asociacion is authorized by law to break existing contracts by virtue of RA 809. Hawaiian assailed the constitutionality of the said law: Secs 1, 4 and 9 of RA 809, Secs 4 and 5 of RA 1825 and Sec 3 of RA 1072 amending Sec 9 of Act 4166, for being violative of the constitutional guarantees against impairment of the freedom of contracts, denial of equal protection of the laws, taking of private property for public use without due process and without just compensation and impairment of vested

rights and (2) validity of: aforesaid laws for being violative of treaty commitments previously entered into by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled that there is no such violation. RA 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations, hence whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and existing contractual obligations is constitutionally permissible. RA 1825 and RA 1072 amending Act 4166 covering as they do the same subject, i.e. sugar production, partake of the same nature as RA 809 and for the same reasons as above stated, cannot be considered constitutionally objectionable. Sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products, that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in field and factories, that it is a great source of the states wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement therefore, redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn, and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al Equal Protection In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Flores vs COMELEC

FACTS: In an election held in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, on March 28, 1989, the Petitioner Roque Flores was deemed to have the highest number of votes for a kagawad position, which was proclaimed by the board of canvassers. During the 1982 elections, he was voted as punong barangay in accordance with Section 4 of Rep. Act 6679. However, private respondent Nobelito Rapisora protested the election before The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot in question which only indicated Flores should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to the other candidate who has the same surname. He further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the equity of incumbent rule, which states, in the event that there would be 2 or more candidates having the same full name, if the ballot only states such full name, the vote would be entitled to the incumbent. For that reason, the lower court sustained the private respondents contention and afterwards declaring him as the punong barangay. ISSUE: Whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule RULING: The court maintained that the position of punong barangay is different from that of kagawad. A kagawad assumes a position that is legislative in nature, whereas a Punong Barangay is mainly an executive officer. Therefore, the petitioner can not insist that he was running for punong barangay when in truth, what was stated in his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As a result, the 4 votes in question can not be counted in his favor on the erroneous grounds that he was still the incumbent punong barangay at the time of the election. It then follows that the petitioner losses the title of being the incumbent punong barangay on the election day making him not entitled to the benefits of equity-of-the-incumbent rule. The result was that the 4 contested votes were considered stray, declaring the private respondent as the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum, Abra for garnering the highest number of votes for a kagawad position. The petitioner argues that he could not have run for reelection as punong barangay because the office was no longer subject to separate or even direct election by the voters. That may be so, but this argument goes to the wisdom of the law, not its validity, and is better addressed to the legislature. From the strictly legal viewpoint, the statute does not offend the equal protection clause, as there are, to repeat, substantial distinctions between the offices of punong barangay and kagawad. Precisely , the reason for divesting the punong barangay of his position was to place him on the same footing as the other candidates by removing the advantages he would enjoy if he were to continue as punong barangay while running for kagawad. Petition is dismissed.