Language Power and Persuasion

Charles S. Areni
University of Sydney

John R. Sparks
University of Dayton

ABSTRACT
Powerless language involves the use of various linguistic markers (i.e., hedges, intensifiers, deictic phrases, overly polite language, tag questions, and verbal and nonverbal hesitations), which signify relatively low social status in a given communication context. Powerful language suggests higher social status and is characterized largely by the absence of these markers. The results of a laboratory experiment indicated that language power influenced attitudes toward a hypothetical new consumer electronics product, regardless of whether the communication was presented in print versus videotape. For both print and video modalities, speakers using powerful language were more persuasive than speakers using powerless language. However, powerless language had the additional effect of generating more thoughts about the speaker. These results are discussed in terms of the multiple roles postulate of the elaboration-likelihood mode. 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The idea that language reflects social power is a not a new one. Over three decades ago Lakoff (1975) explored language and gender, and proposed that certain patterns of speech constituted a female register, which was associated with low social power. Subsequent research on language and social power examined how particular language markers convey the impression of speaker social power, and the subsequent effects

Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 22(6): 507525 (June 2005) Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/mar.20071
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on message and speaker evaluation. OBarr (1982) analyzed courtroom transcripts and identified specific speech markers used by witnesses high versus low in social power. The testimonies of expert witnesses of both sexes contained several speech markers typical of high social power, and the testimonies of nonexpert witnesses of both sexes was more likely to contain speech markers associated with low social power (see also Hosman & Wright, 1987; OBarr, 1982). Moreover, experimental research found that, regardless of speaker sex, speakers using language styles associated with high social power were evaluated more favorably than speakers using language associated with low social power (Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & OBarr, 1978). OBarr identified powerless speech as characterized by the frequent use of (a) nonverbal hesitations (e.g., umm, ehh, etc.), (b) verbal hesitations (e.g., you know, I mean, etc.), (c) deictic phrases (e.g., that man there), (d) formal language (e.g., yes sir, therefore, etc.), (e) tag questions (e.g., thats how it happened, isnt it?), (f) hedges (e.g., I guess, sort of, etc.), and (g) intensifiers (e.g., he really did, it was very, very dark, etc.). On the other hand, high-status speakers were characterized largely by the absence of these speech markers. OBarr (1982) called this speaking style powerful language. OBarrs (1982) initial conception of powerless language was as a unified group of language markers whose frequency of use collectively covaried with the status of the speaker. However, later research adopted a molecular view, examining the specific effects of individual power markers. This stream of research identified tag questions, hedges, and verbal and nonverbal hesitations as the strongest indicators of low power speech in experimental settings (Bradac & Mulac, 1984a, 1984b). Subsequent manipulations of powerful versus powerless language tended to focus on this subset of powerless speech markers. Initial examinations of the effects of language power found that, although it influenced perceptions of the source, it had little or no influence on attitudes for print communications (Gibbons, Busch, & Bradac, 1991). However, subsequent research found that language power influenced persuasion when communications were presented via audio or videotape (Sparks & Areni, 2002; Sparks, Areni, & Cox, 1998). As discussed in greater detail below, the elaboration-likelihood model (ELM) accounts for the moderating role of communication modality on the effect of language power in persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991). However, language power has unique characteristics that produce a myriad of effects on persuasion. These effects are discussed below in terms of the multiple-roles postulate of the elaboration-likelihood model.

THE ELABORATION-LIKELIHOOD MODEL OF PERSUASION The elaboration-likelihood model (ELM) refers to a continuum of persuasion processes, anchored at one end by the peripheral route and at the
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other by the central route. When motivation and ability to think about a given topic are both high, message recipients elaborate on relevant arguments, and persuasion follows the central route. Under these conditions, resulting attitudes are based on whether the arguments presented make a convincing case for the position advocated. However, if either motivation or ability is limited, elaboration likelihood is relatively low and persuasion follows the peripheral route. In these instances, attitudes may be influenced by simple cues such as the persuasion context (i.e., preexisting mood, uncomfortable temperature, pleasant surroundings, etc.), irrelevant aspects of the communication (i.e., an unattractive speaker, a credible spokesperson, pleasant visual elements, etc.), and/or the use of simple heuristics (i.e., experts are always right, you get what you pay for, etc.) (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). Within this basic framework, communication variables can influence persuasion in five ways: (1) as a peripheral cue, (2) as an elaboration enhancer, (3) as an elaboration inhibitor, (4) as a biasing influence on argument processing, and (5) as a relevant argument. Importantly, the ELM posits that a given variable may influence persuasion in more than one of these roles (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991). Previous explications of the ELM have suggested that variables operate in the first role when elaboration likelihood is relatively low, in the second and third roles when elaboration likelihood is at moderate levels, and in the fourth and fifth roles when elaboration likelihood is relatively high. However, in many tests of the ELM, variables specified as peripheral cues have been temporally and/or spatially separated from the central arguments in the communication. That is, cues are perceptually distinct from arguments, and this separation may overly simplify the role(s) of these variables in persuasion (cf. Munch & Swasy, 1988; Swasy & Munch, 1985). The research reported below examines the effects of language powera variable that is, by definition, intertwined with the text of presented argumentson elaboration and persuasion. It tests the prediction that, although language power operates as a simple cue when elaboration likelihood is restricted, when elaboration likelihood is relatively high, language power both biases and inhibits the processing of presented arguments. Language Power as a Peripheral Cue Previous research has demonstrated that language power operates as a peripheral cue when elaboration likelihood is relatively low. More specifically, under these conditions language power influences an audiences perception of the speaker or source of the communication, which then serves as a simple heuristic for forming or modifying attitudes toward the focal topic. For example, Sparks et al. (1998) reported that audio and video messages produced more favorable attitudes when the language used was powerful as opposed to powerless. However, language power had litLANGUAGE POWER AND PERSUASION 509

tle or no effect on persuasion when the message was presented in print. For print messages, the quality of presented arguments was the dominant influence on attitudes. Likewise, Sparks and Areni (2002) found that a speaker was more persuasive when he used powerful rather than powerless language, but only when the communication was presented on audiotape. Language power had little or no effect on attitudes when the communication was presented in the form of a printed transcript. Presumably, the real time nature of the audio and video messages limited the audiences opportunity to respond to message content (MacInnis, Moorman, & Jaworski, 1991). Moreover, the audio and video formats may have increased the salience of the actual speaker (e.g., voice qualities, intonations, mannerisms, etc.), thus diverting attention away from relevant arguments (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983); hence language power influenced persuasion via the peripheral route. By contrast, message recipients could process the print communications at their own pace, without inference from the speakers gestures, speech patterns, etc., so language power was inconsequential. As shown in Figure 1, this suggests the following specific predictions for the effects of language power as a peripheral cue:
H1: When a message is presented in a video format, powerless language operates as a negative peripheral cue.

H1(a): Under these conditions, message recipients form less favorable attitudes when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H1(b): Under these conditions, speaker-related thoughts are more negative when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language.

Figure 1. Predicted effects of language power on persuasion in the video modality condition.
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H1(c): Under these conditions, language power has little or no influence on the valence of argument-related thoughts. H1(d): Under these conditions, the effects of language power on attitudes are mediated by the valence of speaker-related thoughts rather than argument-related thoughts.

Powerless Language as a Distracting Influence Bradac and Street (1990) and Sparks and Areni (2002; Sparks et al., 1998) have discussed yet another effect of language power within the ELM framework. The various linguistic markers characteristic of powerless language represent disruptions to the flow of the discourse (Bradac & Street, 1990). This may have the effect of distracting audiences from processing message content. For example, Gibbons et al. (1991) and Sparks and Areni (2002) found that audiences generated fewer message-related thoughts when a speaker used powerful rather than powerless speech. The disruptions created by powerless language appear to redirect message recipients thoughts toward the speaker (cf. Munch & Swasy, 1988). Along these lines, both Gibbons et al. (1991) and Sparks and Areni (2002) reported a greater number of speaker-related thoughts when the communicator used powerless as opposed to powerful language. Within the ELM, variables have a distracting influence on argument-related processing when elaboration likelihood is otherwise high (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976; Munch & Swasy, 1988), as with print media (Sparks et al., 1998). Hence, as shown in Figure 2, the distraction effect suggests the following hypotheses:
H2: When a message is presented in a print format, powerless language distracts message recipients from processing presented arguments.

Figure 2. Predicted effects of language power on persuasion in the print modality condition.
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H2(a): Under these conditions, message recipients generate more speaker-related thoughts when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H2(b): Under these conditions, message recipients generate fewer argument-related thoughts when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language.

Language Power as a Biasing Influence Additional research on language power suggests a third role within the ELM framework. Numerous studies have found that powerless language creates the perception that the speaker is unsure or lacks confidence in what he or she is saying (Bradac & Mulac, 1984a, 1984b). This may have the effect of encouraging message recipients to doubt the speaker and generate counterarguments attacking his or her position (Sparks & Areni, 2002). In addition, given that language style is embedded in the text of presented arguments, it may be difficult for audiences to separate the effects of one variable from another. For example, the use of hedges (e.g., may, probably, could, etc.) is an indicator of powerless language (i.e., a peripheral cue), but it may also be viewed as weakening the substance of key assertions (i.e., a weak argument) (Areni, 2002). Together, these effects point to language power as a biasing influence on the processing of relevant arguments. Hence, the following hypotheses are advanced:
H3: Language power acts as a biasing influence on the processing of relevant arguments when a message is presented in a print format.

H3(a): Under these conditions, message recipients form less favorable attitudes toward the product when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H3(b): Under these conditions, speaker-related thoughts are more negative when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H3(c): Under these conditions, argument-related thoughts are more negative when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H3(d): Under these conditions, the effect of language power on attitudes is mediated by the valence of argument-related thoughts rather than speaker-related thoughts.

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METHOD These hypotheses were tested via a laboratory experiment with a 2 (videotaped versus printed transcript) 2 (powerful versus powerless language) 2 (strong versus weak arguments) factorial design. One hundred twenty-one undergraduate students enrolled in a business course at a midwestern university were recruited to participate in a study involving the evaluation of a test ad. They received two percent credit toward their overall mark as an incentive to participate. Respondents were randomly assigned to experimental conditions and processed in groups of 1012. Procedure For all conditions, the experimenter entered the room, distributed a questionnaire, and asked respondents to leave it facedown. When all respondents had received the questionnaire, they were asked to read the instructions on the first page while the experimenter read them aloud. Each respondent was exposed to only one experimental stimulus. Respondents in the print conditions were told they would read a verbatim printed transcript of a person giving a testimonial about a computer product and they were to evaluate the testimonial on a number of different dimensions, including its suitability for use in an actual advertisement. The hypothetical focal product was the Scann-X computer scanner. After the transcripts were distributed, respondents had 5 minutes to read the transcripts, each of which was approximately 600 words in length. The 5-minute exposure time was designed to be adequate for processing message content, allowing for the scrutiny of each argument. After all respondents finished reading the transcripts, they were instructed to complete their questionnaires. They had 10 minutes for this task. Respondents in the video conditions were told they would view a 1to 2-minute videotape of a person giving a testimonial about a computer product and they were to evaluate the testimonial on a number of dimensions, including its suitability for use in a television commercial. After this point, the procedures for print and video conditions were the same. When time had elapsed, the questionnaires were collected and respondents were debriefed regarding the studys purpose. There was no deception in any aspect of the experiment. No attempt was made to alter respondents motivation to process the content of the stimuli. Independent Variables Video Versus Print Modality. Communication modality was manipulated by varying whether the testimonial was presented as a written

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transcript versus as an actual videotape (MacInnis et al., 1991). In order to create the latter condition, a professional actor and film crew were hired. Language Power. Language power was manipulated according to the presence versus absence of speech markers associated with powerless language. The language used in the powerless condition contained speech markers commonly associated with a powerless language, including six tag questions (e.g., . . . isnt it? . . . right?), 12 hedges (e.g., I guess, I think), 18 verbal hesitations (e.g., . . . you know . . . , Lets see now . . . ), and 12 nonverbal hesitations (e.g., um, ah). The frequency of these indicators is consistent with those reported by OBarr in his original work on language power (Ericksen et al., 1978; OBarr, 1982). The powerful version of the testimonial was characterized by the absence of these indicators (see OBarr, 1982). Argument Quality. Both the strong and weak arguments were based on actual magazine advertisements for computer scanners. Briefly, the strong arguments stated that the Scann-X (a) scans files in 510 seconds, (b) captures colors and details perfectly, (c) comes with five photoediting software packages, (d) automatically adjusts for transparent media, (e) is easy to install in minutes, (f) has a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week, toll-free technical assistance telephone line, (g) costs less than $200, and (h) comes with a 5-year warranty. By contrast, the weak arguments stated that the scanner (a) scans files in 510 minutes, (b) captures black-andwhite graphics for simple diagrams, (c) comes with a photo-editing software package that costs $150 extra, (d) requires a special transparency cover to adjust for transparent media, (e) can be installed in about an hour, (f) has a 900 technical assistance telephone line available from 9 to 5 on weekdays, (g) costs $300, and (h) comes with a 30-day warranty. Dependent Variables Attitude Toward the Product. To measure attitude toward the product, respondents answered the question, If you were in the market for a new scanner, how would you rate the purchase of the Scann-X on six 7-point scales anchored by undesirable desirable, harmfulbeneficial, badgood, foolishwise, unfavorablefavorable, and negativepositive. The results of an exploratory factor analysis revealed a single factor solution; the first factor accounted for 85% of the variance, and no other eigenvalue exceeded 1. Factor loadings exceeded .86 for all six items, and internal consistency was more than adequate ( .96). The mean of the six items was the measure of attitude toward the product. Valenced Thought Indices. Respondents listed any and all thoughts you had while (reading versus viewing) the endorsers testimonial. These
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can include things related to the speaker, the actual product, or anything else you might have thought aboutincluding things completely unrelated to the testimonial. In order to foster distinct cognitive responses, respondents were instructed to list each thought on a separate line. Two coders, one a professional market researcher and the other a postgraduate research student, assigned individual cognitive responses to the following categories: (a) positive argument-related thoughts, (b) negative argument-related thoughts, (c) positive thoughts about the speaker, (d) negative thoughts about the speaker, (e) other positive thoughts, and (f) other negative thoughts. Both coders were blind to the experimental hypotheses. Intercoder agreement was 81% across all categories, with discrepancies resolved via discussions between the experimenter and the two coders. Following procedures adapted from Greenwald (1968), the valenced index for argument-related thinking was the difference between the number of positive argument-related thoughts and the number of negative argument-related thoughts. Likewise, the valenced index for endorser-related thinking was the number of positive speaker-related thoughts minus the number of negative speaker-related thoughts. Extent of Argument-Related Thinking. The extent of respondents argument-related thinking was measured as the total number of argument-related thoughts. Extent of Endorser-Related Thinking. Likewise, the extent of endorser-related thinking was measured as the total number of speakerrelated thoughts.

RESULTS H1(a) and H3(a) predict that language power influences attitude toward the product when the message is presented in a video versus print modality, respectively. These hypotheses were tested via a three-way ANOVA with message modality, argument quality, and language power as the independent variables, and attitude toward the product as the dependent variable. Not surprisingly, there was a main effect of argument quality (F1,114 58.3, p .001, 2 .29). Respondents reported more positive attitudes when they were exposed to strong (M 4.9) rather than weak (M 3.3) arguments. However, contrary to previous research, the argument quality modality interaction was not significant (F1,114 1), indicating that argument quality influenced persuasion even when the endorsement was presented via videotape. As predicted, the main effect of language power attained significance (F1,114 18.3, p .001, 2 0.09). Attitudes toward the product were more favorable when the endorser used powerful (M 4.6) as opposed to powerless (M 3.7) lanLANGUAGE POWER AND PERSUASION 515

guage. However, the language power modality interaction effect was not significant (F1,114 1), indicating that this effect was apparent in both the print and video conditions. Hence, both H1(a) and H3(a) were supported. H1(b) and H3(b) predict that language power affects the valence of speaker-related thoughts when the message is presented in video versus print formats, respectively. These hypotheses were tested via a threeway ANOVA with modality, argument quality, and language power as the independent variables, and the valence of speaker-related thoughts as the dependent variable. The main effect of language power on the valence of speaker-related thoughts was highly significant (F1,114 73.7, p .001, 2 .36). However, the language power modality interaction did not achieve significance (F1,114 1). Further analyses indicated that the effect of language power on the valence of speaker-related thoughts was significant in both the video and print conditions (video: F1,54 37.7, p .001, 2 .38; print: F1,60 35.4, p .001, 2 0.34). In both cases, respondents had fewer unfavorable thoughts when the speaker used powerful rather than powerless language (video: Mpowerful .67, Mpowerless 3.1; print Mpowerful 2.2, Mpowerless .19). Hence, the data support both H1(b) and H3(b). H3(c) and 1(c) predict that language power influences the valence of argument-related thoughts when the message is presented in print, but not when it is presented in video, respectively. These hypotheses were tested via a three-way ANOVA with modality, argument quality, and language power as the independent variables, and the valence of argument-related thoughts as the dependent variable. The results indicate a main effect of argument quality (F1,114 39.8, p .001, 2 .23). Not surprisingly, respondents reported more favorable argument-related thoughts when the speaker presented strong (M .40) rather than weak arguments (M 1.7). However, the language power main effect was nonsignificant (F1,114 1). Moreover, neither the argument quality modality (F1,114 1) nor the language power modality (F1,114 1) interaction effect attained significance. Hence, neither H1(c) nor H3(c) is supported. H1(d) posits that language power influences attitude toward the product via its effect on the valence of speaker-related thoughts when the message is presented in a video format. The criteria for mediation were based on Baron and Kenny (1986). Briefly, a variable mediates the effect of an experimental factor on a dependent variable if (a) the effect of the experimental factor on the mediator is as large or larger than its effect on the dependent variable, (b) the mediator is correlated with the dependent variable, and (c) when the mediator is introduced as a covariate, the effect of the experimental factor on the dependent variable wanes or is eliminated altogether. H1(d) was tested via three 2-way ANOVAs and two 2-way ANCOVAs performed on the data from the video conditions. Language power and
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argument quality were the independent variables, and attitude toward the product, valence of speaker-related thoughts, and valence of argument-related thoughts were the dependent variables. The effect of language power on the valenced speaker-related thought index was larger (F1,54 37.7, p .001, 2 .38) than its effect on attitude toward the product (F1,54 14.9, p .001, 2 .13). However, neither the second nor the third criteria were met. When the valenced speaker-related thought index was included as a covariate, it was not predictive of attitude toward the product (F1,53 1.43, p .20). Moreover, with the covariate in the model, the effect of language power on attitude toward the proposal was approximately the same (F1,58 15.9, p .001, 2 .11). Hence, H1(d) was not supported. The valenced argument-related thought index did not fare any better as a mediating variable in the video condition. The effect of language power on this index was not significant (F1,54 1), failing a criterion necessary for mediation. Hence the effect of language power on attitude toward the proposal was not mediated by either valenced thought index in the video condition. This overall result is discussed in detail below. H3(d) predicts that language power influences attitude toward the product via its effect on the valence of argument-related thoughts when the message is presented in print. However, with the valenced argument-related index as the dependent variable and argument quality and language style as independent variables, the data did not produce a significant language power main effect (F1,60 1). In the absence of a significant effect, argument-related thoughts do not appear to mediate the effect of language style on attitude. Therefore, the data do not support H3(d). H2(a) and H2(b) posit that when the message is presented in print, powerless language redirects thought toward the speaker and away from relevant arguments, respectively. As a result, message recipients generate fewer argument-related thoughts and more speaker-related thoughts when the speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. Two 3-way ANOVAs were conducted with modality, argument quality, and language power as the independent variables and number of argument-related thoughts and number of speaker-related thoughts as the two dependent variables. The three-way ANOVA for speakerrelated thoughts revealed a main effect of language power (F1,114 58.0, p .001, 2 .31). However, the language power modality interaction effect was nonsignificant (F1,114 1). Additional analyses revealed the effects of language power were significant regardless of modality (print: F1,60 24.15, p .001, 2 .26; video: F1,54 34.2, p .001, 2 .36). In the video condition, more speaker-related thoughts were generated when powerless (M 3.75) rather than powerful (M 1.55) language was used. Likewise, for the print version respondents generated more speaker-related thoughts in the powerless (M 2.97) versus powerful (M 1.21) language condition. Hence, these results support H2(c), with
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the qualification that a similar effect of language power also emerged in the video condition. With respect to the number of argument-related thoughts, the main effect of language power did not achieve significance (F1,114 1), nor did the predicted language power modality interaction (F1,114 1). Hence, H2(b) was not supported. The result of each hypothesis test is summarized in Table 1 (see also Table 2).

Table 1. Summary of Hypothesis Tests. Research Hypothesis Language Power as a Peripheral Cue H1(a) When a message is presented in video format, message recipients form less favorable attitudes toward the product when the Supported speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H1(b) When a message is presented in video format, speaker-related thoughts are more negative when the speaker uses powerless as Supported opposed to powerful language. H1(c) When a message is presented in video format, language power has little or no influence on the valence of argument-related Not Supported thoughts. H1(d) When a message is presented in video format, the effect of language power on attitudes is mediated by the valence of Not Supported speaker-related thoughts rather than argument-related thoughts. Powerless Language as a Distracting Influence H2(a) When a message is presented in print format, message recipients generate more speaker-related thoughts when the speaker uses Supported powerless as opposed to powerful language. H2(b) When a message is presented in print format, message recipients generate fewer argument-related thoughts when the speaker Not Supported uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. Language Power as a Biasing Influence H3(a) When a message is presented in print format, message recipients form less favorable attitudes toward the product when the Supported speaker uses powerless as opposed to powerful language. H3(b) When a message is presented in print format, speaker-related thoughts are more negative when the speaker uses powerless Supported as opposed to powerful language. H3(c) When a message is presented in print format, argument-related thoughts are more negative when the speaker uses powerless Not Supported as opposed to powerful language. H3(d) When a message is presented in print format, the effect of language power on attitudes is mediated by the valence of argumentNot Supported related thoughts rather than speaker-related thoughts. Status

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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations Related to Hypothesis Tests.

Video Stimuli

Condition N 16 14 15 13 5.69 4.15 3.52 2.63 0.46 1.22 1.48 1.41 -0.38 -3.07 -1.00 -3.08 0.96 1.82 1.31 1.75 0.86 -0.29 -2.53 -1.92 1.45 1.90 1.85 1.78 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

Attitude toward the Proposal

Valenced SpeakerRelated Cognitive Response Index Mean 1.25 3.57 1.87 3.92

Valenced ArgumentRelated Cognitive Response Index

Extent of SpeakerRelated Thinking SD 1.13 1.50 1.36 1.71

Extent of ArgumentRelated Thinking Mean 1.36 2.21 3.13 3.08 SD 1.31 1.48 1.51 2.78

LANGUAGE POWER AND PERSUASION Print Stimuli Attitude toward the Proposal N 17 16 15 16 5.09 4.71 3.92 3.13 1.04 1.22 1.13 1.14 0.06 -2.50 -0.47 -1.81 Mean SD Mean Valenced SpeakerRelated Cognitive Response Index SD 0.75 1.79 1.19 1.33 Valenced ArgumentRelated Cognitive Response Index Mean 0.47 0.44 -1.40 -1.00 SD 0.94 2.00 1.84 0.59 Extent of SpeakerRelated Thinking Mean 1.59 3.25 0.80 2.69 SD 1.33 1.98 1.01 1.25 Mean 1.00 1.31 2.00 1.94

Argument Quality

Language Style

Strong Strong Weak Weak

Powerful Powerless Powerful Powerless

Condition

Extent of ArgumentRelated Thinking SD 1.17 1.54 1.41 1.65

Argument Quality

Language Style

Strong Strong Weak Weak

Powerful Powerless Powerful Powerless

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DISCUSSION The results reported above generally support the prediction that language power plays multiple roles in the persuasion process, depending on the modality in which the message is presented. But the actual effects observed differed from those predicted by H1(a)3(d). As shown in Figures 3 and 4, neither speaker-related thoughts nor argument-related thoughts mediated the effect of language power in persuasion, regardless of whether the message was presented on video versus print. There are at least two explanations for this result. First, it could be the case that language power influences persuasion at an unconscious level, such that message recipients are unaware of the specific language features influencing their attitude. Thought-listing tasks only capture conscious thinking subsequent to actual exposure to the message. It is not obvious that such an approach can detect subtle effects of language variables, and as a result, cognitive responses may not be correlated with attitudes. Instead, the thoughts listed may be formed well after exposure in order to complete the task requested by the researcher. However, it should be noted that the results regarding the effect of powerless language on speaker-related thoughts supported H2(a), suggesting that the thoughts listed captured concurrent cognitive responses as intended. A second and related explanation is that it was simply too difficult to distinguish between the powerless language markers versus the quality of the arguments. Ancillary data provide evidence of confusion between the effects of language power versus argument quality. Respondents indicated their perception of the endorser on 21 seven-point semantic-differential scales. They were instructed to circle the number that best reflects your opinion of the speaker. The positive anchors were intelligent, reliable, polished, assertive, honest, powerful, easy to understand, likable, strong, active, effective, dependable, aggressive, influential, knowledgeable, arrogant, competent, convincing, professional, friendly, and composed, and the negative anchors were unintelligent, unreliable, unpolished, timid, dishonest, powerless, hard to understand, unlikable, weak, passive, ineffective, undependable, not aggressive, not influential, ignorant, humble, incompetent, unconvincing, unprofessional, unfriendly, and not composed, respectively. Exploratory factor analysis revealed a single factor solution, so speaker rating was defined as the mean score for these 21 items. A subsequent three-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of argument quality on speaker rating (F1,108 6.2, p .001). Again, subjects rated the speaker more favorably when he presented strong (M 3.9) rather than weak (M 3.5) arguments. Respondents also reported their assessment of the reasons presented for buying the product on five 7-point scales. The positive anchors were valid arguments, persuasive, clear ideas, strong, and convincing, and the negative anchors were invalid arguments, unpersuasive, unclear ideas,
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weak, and unconvincing, respectively. A second exploratory factor analysis revealed a single factor solution, so argument rating was defined as the mean score on these five items. Another three-way interaction indicated a main effect of language power on respondents ratings of the presented arguments (F1, 108 24.5, p .0001). Respondents rated the arguments has being more convincing when the speaker used powerful (M 4.1) as opposed to powerless (M 3.0) language. Together, these results suggest that the effects of language power and argument quality were intertwined with respect to cognitive responses to the testimonial, subjective ratings of the speaker and the presented arguments, and attitude toward the featured product. This may have compromised the value of both valenced thought indices as potential mediators. The difficulty in distinguishing between the effects of argument quality and language power may point to a limitation of previous tests of the ELM. In particular, Areni (2002, 2003) has criticized the empirical definition of argument quality within the ELM. Strong (weak) arguments are typically operationalized as those that generate primarily favorable (unfavorable) cognitive responses in pretests. However, the actual construction of pretested arguments may confound the actual strength of the supporting evidence with various linguistics markers. The research reported above improves on previous empirical manipulations of argument quality by removing the effects of power markers via an orthogonal manipulation. But there are likely to be several other categories of language markers that also influence persuasion. Future research would benefit by creating orthogonal manipulations for each of these language marker categories, hence isolating the effects of argument quality on persuasion. It is interesting that argument quality influenced persuasion when respondents were exposed to the video versions of the testimonial. Under these conditions it was predicted that message recipients would follow the peripheral route to persuasion, where argument quality has little or no role. However, it is important to remember that the ELM describes a continuum of elaboration, anchored by the central and peripheral routes to persuasion; it is a matter of degree rather than an absolute dichotomy. Experimental manipulations of high versus low ability or motivation necessarily create two points on that continuum, but it is not always possible to equate conditions across studies (Areni & Lutz, 1988). Hence, a reasonable interpretation is that the video condition was actually in the low to moderate range of the elaboration continuum; thus some evidence of the central route to persuasion was observed. As shown in Figure 3 and 4, there was evidence for the hypotheses regarding the effect of language power on message recipients thoughts. The speech markers in powerless language had the effect of directing thoughts toward the actual speaker. Not only did the number of speakerrelated thoughts increase when powerless language was used, but language power also influenced the corresponding valenced thought index.
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Figure 3. Observed effects of language power on persuasion in the video modality condition.

Figure 4. Observed effects of language power on persuasion in the print modality condition.

In this sense, powerless language is similar to the use of rhetorical questions in persuasive communications (Munch & Swasy, 1988; Swasy & Munch, 1985). Given the relationship between language power and female versus male registers in speech, the gender of the respondent was included in each of the ANOVAs reported above. In no case did gender produce a significant main effect or interact with the other variables in the model. However, a more likely scenario is that language power interacts with the gender of the speaker to influence persuasion and perceptions of the speaker. Future research would benefit from manipulating speaker gender and language power orthogonally to examine possible contingencies. One possible scenario is that female speakers using powerful language may
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be perceived to be more assertive and arrogant than males using the same language, whereas male speakers using powerless language may be seen as more uncertain and lacking in confidence than females using the same language. This would appear to be a fruitful avenue for future research. Taken together, powerless language appears to act as a negative peripheral cue and as an attractor of attention, and these combined effects make it a rather potent force in persuasion, particularly in contexts where the source of a message is likely to be salient (i.e., public speaking, testimonial advertising, public relations, sales presentations, etc.). Its influence in guiding attention means that it renders otherwise persuasive elements impotent. Moreover, this may not only weaken the effects of central arguments, but also the effects of other peripheral cues. Given its effect as a negative cue, this is likely to produce unfavorable attitudes, regardless of the merits of the featured product. So an acknowledged expert with excellent reasons for advocating a position already accepted by an audience may, nevertheless, fail to be persuasive if he or she uses powerless language. As with many other laboratory tests of the ELM and other persuasion theories, the arguments presented in the strong, and especially the weak, argument conditions may seem somewhat artificial and irrelevant to actual advertising claims (Areni, 2002). However, the strong and weak arguments described above were based on a content analysis of several actual ads for computer scanners. Both the strong and weak conditions were intended to capture the upper and lower limits of the performance standards of actual products. For example, the departmental scanner of one of the authors actually does require 510 minutes for visually complex images, whereas the fastest claim made in an ad was in seconds. Nevertheless, in future research more attention could be paid to the realism of the stimuli without compromising the advantages of laboratory experiments for developing stimuli that capture construct validity.

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Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to: Charles Areni, School of Business, Economics & Business Building (H69), University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia (c.areni@econ.usyd.edu.au).

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