CONSIDERATIONS IN UNIT SUBSTATION DESIGN TO OPTIMIZE RELIABILITY AND ELECTRICAL WORKPLACE SAFETY

By David B. Durocher Senior Member, IEEE Industry Manager Eaton Corporation

ABSTRACT Many legacy low and medium-voltage unit substations installed today are based upon older designs that took advantage of reduced first cost opportunities allowed by existing installation codes and standards. Fast-forward to how these substation designs fair in safety and reliability today, particularly in industrial process applications found in cement, pulp and paper, petroleum & chemical and others, some of the exercised opportunities applied in the past begin to look more like liabilities than assets. Legacy engineering decisions once thought to be prudent take on new meanings today, particularly when these decisions are viewed through the lens of emerging new workplace safety standards. The critical issue of addressing destructive arc-flash hazards associated with persons working on or around energized electrical equipment must now be considered. Because traditional substation designs often appeared to involve some compromise regarding both safety and reliability, a design team of a major process industry user took a fresh look at unit substation design. The design review took place in conjunction with construction of a Greenfield plant built in the spring of 2009 in the USA. This paper will review the design limitations of traditional unit substation configurations, offer an overview of the alternatives considered by the Greenfield site project team, and discuss technical and safety validation of the design that was ultimately selected and installed. Economic comparisons to traditional designs, changes in the owner operating and safety procedures for plant personnel as a result of the engineering design changes, and overall design acceptance by operations will also be reviewed in this paper. Index Terms Process Industries, Power Distribution, Unit Substations, Design for Safety, Electrical Workplace Safety. INTRODUCTION Low and medium voltage unit substations are applied universally across most every industry. At the treetop level, unit substations are used simply to transform medium-voltage, typically 15 to 25kV, to a lower distribution voltage, typically 0.48 to 4.16kV, for application in supporting a host of various motor and process equipment loads. Fig. 1 shows a typical low-voltage unit substation. In this case, the primary assembly at the left is a medium-voltage fused load break switch. For this example, we will assume the primary voltage is 13.8kV. For assemblies in North American industry, this assembly is typically designed to metal-enclosed switchgear standard ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.20.3 [1]. This assembly includes a loadbreak isolation switch with ratings of 600 or 1200 amperes and a medium-voltage current-limiting fuse, appropriately sized to protect the transformer. The primary switchgear is close-coupled to a substation transformer, either dry-type or liquid filled. The substation transformer is designed to ANSI/IEEE Standard C.57.12 with wall-mounted primary and secondary bushings. There are many different substation transformer design alternatives to choose from, beyond the scope of this paper. Good information on the alternatives can be found in other technical papers, including [3]. In this case, the transformer rating is shown at 2000kVA. With a secondary distribution voltage at 480Y/277 volts, the low-voltage bushings are shown close-coupled to metal enclosed low-voltage switchgear. In Fig. 1, the low-voltage switchgear consists of a 3200 ampere secondary main bus and secondary metering, with no secondary main circuit breaker, connected to four 1200 ampere feeder circuit breakers. There are again variations on low-

978-1-4244-6409-8/10/$26.00 2010 IEEE

voltage switchgear designs. For process industry applications, most frequently these assemblies are manufactured to UL1558 Standards [4]. This unit substation assembly, installed indoor or outdoors, remains the stalwart of power distribution systems of today. In some applications, the primary metal-enclosed switchgear and transformer may be mounted outdoors and a secondary air terminal chamber at the transformer will cable-feed to indoor lowvoltage switchgear. Without a doubt, the integrated design shown here has been low cost and reliable performer and in this configuration, continues to be applied in many industrial systems to this day. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS In anticipation of the upcoming project, the design team for the Greenfield site took on the task of investigating existing unit substation configurations carefully to identify where there may be some inherent hidden flaws in the design. It is important to note that prevailing codes and standards regarding installation of this equipment had an impact on the unit substation design. In the US, the prevailing installation document that applies is the National Electrical Code (NEC) [5]. Lets investigate two areas of this code that impact the design and installation of the unit substation presented here. NEC Article 240.21(C)2 Overcurrent Protection Article 240.21(C) of the NEC addresses required overcurrent protection, specifically related to transformer secondary conductors. The article states that a set of conductors feeding a single load shall be permitted to be connected to a transformer secondary, without overcurrent protection of the secondary. The article defines six conditions, specified in 240.21(C)(1) through 240.21(C)(6), under which secondary overcurrent protection is not required. Sorting through the six options for our closecoupled unit substation example, points us to the condition outlined in 240.21(C)(2) which most closely applies. This condition gets fairly involved, with four different sub-conditions, all which must apply in order to satisfy the exception of no secondary protection. Relevant language in these sub-conditions includes: 240.21(C)(2): Transformer Secondary Conductors Not over 3 m (10 ft) Long. (1) The ampacity of the secondary conductors is a). Not less than the combined calculated loads on the circuits supplied by the secondary conductors b). Not less than the rating of the device supplied by the secondary conductors or not less than the rating of the overcurrent-protective device at the termination of the secondary conductors. The first item (1) a) above requires that the engineer perform calculations to determine the total conductor load and then specify a conductor size to support the calculated load. Referring back to the Fig. 1 example, note that the secondary conductor is specified at 3200A. So, although the total connected rated load of the secondary feeder breakers is 4800A (four breakers rated at 1200A each), the NEC allows the

480Y/277V 13.8kV
3200A 125E
1200A

2000kVA
5.75%Z

1200A

1200A

1200A

Fig. 1: Typical Unit Substation today: Primary metal enclosed load interrupter switchgear, fused load-break switch. Transformer close-coupled liquid filled or dry/cast resin. Secondary switchgear metal enclosed with low-voltage power circuit breakers, shown here with four feeders and no main breaker.

designer to assume a load diversity and size the secondary bus as some lower value. The second item (1) b. in essence states that the secondary conductor ampacity be either greater than the overcurrent device at which the conductors terminate (in this configuration, there is no such device) or greater than conductor or bus rating in the equipment where the conductors terminate. From this language, it seems clear that secondary bus protection for the unit substation is not required. There is ongoing debate in some circles regarding the word device in this article, as some see the term device to mean something other then the switchgear. Interestingly, the NEC Code Making Panel supporting this Article is reviewing this language and considering future revision to clarify the meaning. This aside, note also that Article 240.21(C) includes a Fine Print Note stating For overcurrent protection requirements for transformers, see 450.3. NEC Article 450.3 Equipment Transformers Article 450.3 of the NEC addresses secondary overcurrent protection of transformers. Note 2 for Table 450.3(A) states: Where secondary overcurrent protection is required, the secondary overcurrent device shall be permitted to consist of not more then six circuit breakers or six sets of fuses grouped in one location. Traditionally referred to as the six disconnect or six handle rule, this provision allows the user to forego secondary overcurrent protection in a unit substation, provided there are no more than six feeder devices in the assembly. For the example shown in Fig. 1, this is clearly the case, so this assembly could be installed without concern that the design would violate the applicable installation code. APPLICATION WAKE-UP CALL Although the six feeders no main unit substation passes all requirements outlined in the applicable standards, the unit substation equipment manufacturer and the project team investigating design alternatives were not satisfied this was the best approach. Earlier experiences in industrial plants where arc-flash studies have been performed as outlined in NFPA-70E [6] using calculation methods in IEEE1584 [7] yielded some very revealing and disturbing results. In the event of a secondary bus fault, the NFPA-70E standard requires that the upstream overcurrent protective device be used in determining the available arcing current. In this case, the current-limiting fuse on the primary of the substation is the device used in the calculation. Specifically, Fig. 2 below shows calculations revealing arc flash energies 2 at the secondary switchgear in excess of 700 calories/cm . These levels are defined in IEEE1584 as UNAPPROACHABLE, where effectively no Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) would be adequate in safeguarding personnel should a bus fault occur while persons were working on the energized substation. In many existing facilities, unit substation feeder devices were used as a lockout/tagout point while downstream equipment was being serviced or maintained. The elevated arc flash energies effectively made it unsafe to rack-out a secondary feeder breaker while the secondary bus was energized. In process industry applications where electrical workplace safety is paramount and energized lockout/tagout is common, the six feeders no main unit substation design was simply no longer a practical option. A number of vintage unit substations that employed the configuration shown in Fig. 2, have effectively been upgraded to improve reliability and electrical safety. Although beyond the scope of this paper, one such upgrade is presented in the case study outlined in [8]. Returning to the primary current-limiting fuse in the unit substation shown in Fig. 2, selecting the rating of this fuse to account for transformer inrush results in a melting time requirement up to 12X the transformer rated primary current for 0.1 seconds. In the 2000kVA substation shown in Fig. 2, a 125E fuse is applied. A bolted secondary fault would result in a primary current of less than 1000 amps, resulting in a fuse clearing time of over 2 seconds. The example calculation assumes an arcing fault of 10,000 amperes on the secondary bus, resulting in a fuse clearing time of 160 seconds. In either the case of a bolted fault or an arcing fault, the secondary arc flash energy on the secondary bus of this unit substation design is UNAPPROACHABLE. In addition, should a bus fault occur while this assembly was energized, the likely result beyond extremely high arc flash energies would be extensive equipment damage caused by the heat energy developed before the primary fuse would clear. In a process industry environment, this translates to hours or perhaps days of downtime. In the end, the primary fuse in the 13.8kV fused loadbreak switch shown in Fig. 2, is intended to protect the transformer, not the secondary bus. Adding a secondary main circuit breaker would resolve this issue of protection in some applications. This would in

480Y/277V 13.8kV
3200A 125E
1200A

2000kVA
5.75%Z

1200A

1200A

1200A

Arc Flash & PPE

Bus Fault at 480V Switchgear 10kA Secondary Arcing Fault At 13.8kV = 348A primary fault 125E fuse clearing time = 160 seconds

NFPA70E: Fault at 480V Switchgear Bus 31.8kA Symmetrical Fault current 1167 AF Boundary 702.4 cal/cm2 @ 18 UNAPPROACHABLE NFPA70E-2009: Category 4 is highest category @ 40 cal/cm2

Fig. 2: Limitations of existing unit substation designs have been identified for existing plants after arc-flash hazard assessments in accordance with IEEE1584 have been performed. In this example, an arcing fault at the unit 2 substation secondary bus results in a calculated incident energy of 702.4 cal/cm .

effect protect the secondary bus downstream of the main breaker. However, the bus from the transformer secondary terminals up to the main is still not adequately protected. In applications where the primary assembly and transformer are outdoors and cable connected to the secondary switchgear, the secondary bus protection issue becomes more problematic. Clearly, an opportunity existed for the project design team to consider design alternatives that would offer better performance, both in reliability and workplace safety. A PATH FORWARD VIA PRODUCT TECHNOLOGY Recognizing the limitations of the legacy unit substation design, the project team worked with the power distribution equipment supplier to review alternative designs that might offer improved performance. Because of the extreme hazard and potential for extended outage time, the group quickly dismissed the age-old approach of installing unit substations based on the six feeders - no main design. The strategy was to look at designs that included a secondary main overcurrent protective device (in this case, a lowvoltage power circuit breaker) and then investigate design alternatives that might offer advantages to this design approach. The group recognized that adding a secondary main device would add cost and was interested in alternatives that might perform as well, or better, than the secondary main design. The group considered several emerging technologies that might offer improved performance. Three technologies were considered and ultimately applied. These are discussed below: 15kV Vacuum Primary Circuit Breaker One technology that appeared promising was in the area of medium-voltage vacuum circuit breakers. The group believed that application of a low-cost circuit breaker in the primary of the unit substation, providing both primary and secondary current protection, would be a desirable alternative to the traditional fused load-break switch. Although vacuum circuit breakers have traditionally involved higher space and cost than a fused switch, some manufacturers had developed newer vacuum breakers that looked promising. Fig. 3 shows and example of one such design available. In the North American markets, vacuum circuit breakers are manufactured to ANSI Standard C37.20 [9]. Inspired in part by a trend toward global design

standards, traditional designs have given way to newer offerings that are smaller, lighter, and have improved functionality. As is shown in Fig. 3, although the newer design vacuum breakers are only available in limited ratings, most offer a smaller size with fewer parts. Notably different from traditional vacuum circuit breakers, the new design includes an integral trip unit with linear trip actuator. This actually offers improved performance with reduced clearing times, in part due to the smaller sized component. Where traditional vacuum circuit breakers require 5 cycles total clearing time, the newer vacuum breaker 15kV Vacuum Circuit Breaker 15kV Vacuum Circuit Breaker 25H X 20W X 18 D, 330 lbs can in some applications, 31H X 29.5W X 25D, 460 lbs ANSI C37.20 Rated at 25 and 40kA clear a fault within 3 ANSI C37.20 Rated at 25, 40 and 50kA 600, 1200,2000 and 2500A ratings 1200, 2000, 3000 and 5000A ratings cycles. In unit substation Integral trip unit with linear trip actuator External relay required applications where higher 2-step stored energy mechanism 2-step stored energy mechanism ratings are not as important as in mediumFig. 3: Newer design 15kV class vacuum circuit breakers are manufactured to voltage switchgear linethe same standards as previous versions, but are smaller, lighter, and have ups, the newer design increased functionality. Shown above is a comparison of the newer design at breaker offers a viable left and traditional design at right. The new design shown includes an integral multifunction trip unit. alternative.

Zone Selective Interlocking Zone selective interlocking for low and medium-voltage circuit breakers has been an available technology for many years and most all manufacturers offer this feature as a standard offering for low-voltage power circuit breakers. The application is reviewed here and discussed relative to Fig. 4 below. Fig. 4 shows the configuration of a typical low-voltage switchgear assembly in a low-voltage substation with a main power circuit breaker and three feeder circuit breakers. Zone selective interlocking is a functionality of the circuit breaker tripping system. In M1 this example, all four breakers (the main and thee feeders) are SD= connected together with a ZSI 0.5S Control common zone control wires circuit. The main and feeders are selectively (2) Bus Fault coordinated so that the X breaker nearest the fault F1 F2 F3 clears first. A slightly longer short time delay setting for the main SD= SD= SD= breaker is used to assure 0.2S 0.2S 0.2S the system is selectively coordinated. In the event of a downstream fault X (1) Downstream Fault shown at (1) on Fig. 4, the feeder breaker nearest the Fig. 4: A block diagram example of unit substation low-voltage switchgear is fault would trip, following shown with zone selective interlocking applied. In the event of a bus fault, the short-time delay setting the ZSI controls will trip the main breaker with no intentional delay. of 0.2 seconds or 12.5

cycles on a 60 hertz system. If however a bus fault shown at (2) on Fig. 4 occurred, the main circuit breaker would be called upon to clear the fault. Without zone selective interlocking, the breaker short-time delay trip setting of 0.5 seconds or 30 cycles would dictate the clearing time. A zone selective interlocking (ZSI) control connection between all circuit breakers adds intelligence to this system. When a bus fault occurs, ZSI allows the main breaker to interrogate the feeder breakers in the zone to determine if they see a fault as well. If all report back that there is now downstream fault, then the main breaker will trip with no intentional delay. The ZSI feature is simple to enable and can offer significant advantages in reducing potential arc flash hazards described previously. For a typical low-voltage system capable of delivering 35,000 amperes symmetrical fault current, calculations in accordance with IEEE1584 show that adding ZSI can reduce the 2 2 incident energy from 43.7 calories/cm to 7.0 calories/cm . The NFPA70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the workplace defines the first condition above as UNAPPROACHABLE and the second as Hazard Risk Category 2, a significant difference. Multiple Settings Groups One final technology applied in todays power distribution systems is a newer capability offering multiple settings group capability for protective relays used with circuit breakers. Although this capability has been a feature for several years on a few higher-end protective relays used in medium-voltage systems, several tripping systems applied in integral trip units of low-voltage power circuit breakers now also include this feature. In a similar concept described above in ZSI applications, use of multiple settings groups for circuit breaker tripping enables the tripping system to respond differently for different system conditions. Again, referring to Fig. 4, if a downstream fault condition existed, the feeder circuit breaker setting would dictate that the 0.20 second short-time delay setting time out before the breaker trips. The power systems engineer determines this setting to assure coordination with downstream overcurrent protective devices and system loads so that the device nearest the fault trips first. In some cases for instance, large downstream motors may have high inrush currents or long acceleration times that will affect the short-time setting of the feeder breakers in the unit substation. As discussed previously, adding an intentional delay to a breaker clearing time comes at the cost of higher incident energy and arc-flash hazards. When personnel are working in downstream equipment, such as a low-voltage motor control center, the opportunity for a dropped tool or accidental contact of a tool or probe between an energized conductor and ground is increased. As this could lead to a higher incident of short circuits or arc-flash incidents, it is often prudent to reduce trip settings to enable the upstream circuit breaker to trip faster. Multiple settings groups effectively allow for the power systems engineer to establish one group of protective settings during normal operations and another maintenance mode setting that can be used while personnel are working in downstream equipment. Fig. 5 illustrates application of the multiple setting group technology. At the left of Fig. 5, the integral Long-time, Short-time, Instantaneous & Ground (LSIG) integral trip unit mounted in the low-voltage power circuit breaker is equipped with an on-off switch that enables a second group of settings. In the normal mode, the power systems engineer settings are based on a selectively coordinated system, while in the maintenance mode, the LSIG settings are replaced with an instantaneous only setting, effectively disabling the normal short-time settings. The result is a faster clearing time of the circuit breaker should a downstream fault occur. At the right of Fig. 5, note that the before and after coordination curves are shown to demonstrate the impact of the maintenance setting. The selectively coordinated curves set at the left shows the main and feeder circuit breaker curves and plots a short-circuit current of 5,600 amperes. Note that due to the short-time delay setting for the feeder circuit breaker, the time to clear this lower level fault is extended. The curve set on the far right shows the maintenance mode enabled, which effectively shifts the instantaneous setting of the feeder breaker to the left. The result in this example is a reduction in arc-flash energy from 11 2 2 calories/cm to less than 4 calories/cm . This demonstrates the advantage of the multiple setting group feature. The maintenance (or instantaneous only) mode actually allows for faster clearing times than the normal instantaneous settings, in part because the tripping system responds to peak currents as opposed to the normal RMS or root mean squared currents. Since the tripping system is not burdened with the additional

RMS calculation before sending a signal to the circuit breaker to trip on overcurrent, the time to actually open the breaker contacts during a fault is reduced. Typically, instantaneous clearing times can occur in 3 cycles rather than the standard 5-cyle trip for this class of circuit breaker. Although clearing in an additional 2 cycles (32 milliseconds) seems insignificant, this actually can mean a difference in the Hazard Risk Category, typically reducing the hazard from HRC2 to HRC1. It is important to understand that the multiple settings group capability does represent a trade-off on two different fronts. First, depending on the instantaneous setting selected, selective coordination of the system may be compromised. In the Fig. 5 example, note that the curve to the far left of the plot (brown in color) represents an across-the-line start of the largest motor fed by this substation feeder breaker. In the selectively coordinated setting, starting this motor would assure this motor could be started without a feeder breaker trip. However, in the maintenance mode, note from the curve set at the right that the feeder breaker would indeed trip. Second, application of multiple settings group functionality dictates that facility maintenance practices be revised and then adhered to. Maintenance persons will need to adopt a process where the maintenance mode could be safely engaged while downstream energized work is being performed, and also be assured that the protective settings were returned to normal after maintenance is completed. It would be typical for the maintenance mode settings to be enabled with a lockable switch and door-mounted light so this alternative maintenance setting could be included in the facility lockout/tagout procedure. Finally, it is important to note that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) clearly prohibits work on energized equipment. Specifically, OSHA 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1910.333 (a)(1) [9] requires that live parts be deenergized before an employee works on or near them. There is simply no argument that turning the power off results in the safest working condition. However, in some process industry environments, deenergizing the power system is simply not practical and at times can result in an even greater hazard.

LSIG Trip Unit

AF Current = 5.6kA

HRC = 3 (11 cal/cm2)

AF Current = 5.6kA

HRC = 1 (< 4 cal/cm2)

Fig. 5: Newer designs of stand-alone and integral circuit breaker trip units include capabilities for multiple settings groups. Selectively coordinated settings can be overridden by an instantaneous only setting while downstream maintenance is being performed. At the center are the selectively coordinated coordination curves. At the right, the feeder breaker instantaneous setting is shifted, enabling the breaker to clear the fault faster during a lower level arcing fault.

THE GENESIS OF A NEW SUBSTATION DESIGN Application of the various technologies discussed in the previous section came to fruition in upgrading several existing unit substations at an integrated pulp and paper mill in the Western United States. Following a facility wide effort to update power systems studies to achieve compliance with NFPA70E, the site engineering team discovered that most of the areas of very high or UNAPPROACHABLE incident energies as calculated by the system study were at the secondary bus of low-voltage unit substations. In fact, the results of the study include actual calculated incident energy values for one of the 2000kVA substations reviewed previously with the results as shown in Fig. 2. In this facility, since most existing unit substations were already installed, adding new protective devices such as a secondary main low-voltage circuit breaker was not practical. There simply was no room to add new assemblies. Fig. 6 shows what was ultimately installed. The existing unit substation was upgraded by removing the medium-voltages fuses in the existing fused load-break switch, and replacing them with a new fixed-mount vacuum circuit breaker. Adding a vacuum breaker with an integral overcurrent trip unit at the primary allowed the ability to add secondary current sensors at the transformer secondary spade connections, resulting in secondary bus overcurrent protection. In addition to the integral trip unit, a second overcurrent protective relay along with primary current transformers was added to protect the transformer, a necessary addition after the primary fuses were removed to make room for the vacuum breaker. In this application, the site engineering team elected to add multiple settings group functionality to the vacuum breaker integral trip unit. This allowed for an additional maintenance setting that could be used when necessary. In this case,

Improved Unit Substation Design

LV Substation with Retrofit Vacuum Primary Breaker
50/51 Relay

15kV Vacuum Breaker

86 ST Integral 50/51 Relay

Before
Arc Flash Study Results Sym. Fault at 480V Switchgear Bus AF Boundary Cal/cm
2

After
31.8kA 18 1.4 1

31.8kA 1167 702.4 Unapproachable

NFPA70E HRC

Fig. 6: Unit substation retrofit included a vacuum breaker installed at the primary. Both primary and secondary overcurrent protection was installed, reducing incident energy at the secondary switchgear main bus from 702.4 2 2 cal/cm to 1.4 cal/cm .

the maintenance setting was used primarily when the existing secondary draw-out power circuit breakers were being racked onto or off of the energized secondary bus. The site routinely used the secondary feeder breakers as a convenient systems location to perform lockout/tagout of downstream loads. In a continuous process environment, it was not practical to deenergize the unit substation to perform this work. Before the substation upgrade, the extremely high incident energies at the secondary bus effectively prohibited removal of secondary feeder breakers. Further details outlining this unique solution

that improved both the safety and reliability of unit substations at this mill site are explained in the award winning paper referenced previously [8]. THE GREENFIELD SITE DESIGN SELECTION Drawing upon new technologies and unit substation retrofit experiences described previously, the design team for the Greenfield industrial plant drove toward the optimum design. The group determined early-on that secondary bus protection, either via a secondary main circuit breaker, or from a vacuum primary breaker with secondary current sensors was required. Past experience proved that selection and application of a primary fuse to protect the transformer and expect this device would also adequately protect the secondary bus, was a poor design approach. Because the new site required both low-voltage (480Y/277V secondary) and medium-voltage (4160Y/2400V secondary) unit substations, the design team decided to move to application of a primary load-break switch over a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker at the primary as a standard platform for both low and medium-voltage unit substations. A product was commercially available that was configured as shown in Fig. 7. Note from the section-view at the right that the incoming power enters at the top-rear of the assembly. The incoming cable termination is designed to accommodate a typical drip loop and also has room so that medium-voltage cables can be looped in and out of the assembly to feed an adjacent unit substation. Above the load-break switch is a distribution class lightning arrestor to protect the incoming of each substation. Bus runbacks on the load-side of the switch include current transformers, connected at the vacuum breakers to support primary overcurrent protection of the transformer. The vacuum breaker in the lower compartment includes an integral trip unit. Note also at the lower rear of the assembly is a snubber network, the purpose for which is described below.

LA Line

LB Switch

Vac Bkr

Snubber

Load

Fig. 7: Greenfield site included 11 low and medium-voltage unit substations, each with a primary load-break switch over a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker configured as shown. This replaced previous fused loadbreak switch designs, adding secondary bus overcurrent protection.

Vacuum Interrupters and Chop Currents One phenomenon which is not widely discussed or understood is the potential for voltage transients that occur when the vacuum interrupter in a vacuum circuit breaker opens an inductive load. One of the physical characteristics of all vacuum interrupters (VI) is a phenomenon called chop current. When the contacts of a VI open, current continues to flow through the arc drawn across the contacts within the vacuum bottle. In an ac sine-wave, as the current approaches zero, the energy across the arc cannot be sustained within the vacuum. When the arc energy reaches a low current level, the arc is immediately

quenched and the current is driven to zero nearly instantaneously. The current value where the energy collapses to zero for a VI is known as the chop current. All VIs have this chop current characteristic and this value will typically be published by the VI manufacturer. Often on the order of 6 to 10 amperes, chop current is a function of the VI design itself, including geometry, material composition, hardness of the contact surface and other physical characteristic. Because energy cannot be created or destroyed instantaneously, driving current to zero with very high di/dt results in corresponding voltage transient dv/dt, when switched into an inductive load. Although VIs are typically applied in medium-voltage switchgear and motor controllers where hundreds of feet of cable connect the vacuum breaker element to the supported load, in this unit substation application the vacuum circuit breaker is often within 10 feet of the transformer primary winding. Transient studies performed by the equipment manufacturers power systems engineering group proved that voltage transients caused failure of the primary winding of a number of substation transformers. Fig. 8 shows one such transformer, a vacuum pressure impregnated (VPI) dry-type design that failed turn-toturn at the first primary winding. In this application, voltage transients caused due to VI current chop exceeded the Basic Impulse Level (BIL) of the transformer design. Fig. 9 shows the results of a transient study with the VI opening as a chop current of 6 amperes as shown at the left, resulted in a corresponding voltage transient as shown at the right. Note from Fig. 9 that the negative peak voltage transient is nearly 150kV, exceeding the 95kV BIL rating of most 15kV class substation transformers.
Transformer Failure On VI De-Energization
Flash/Burn Marks

Coil to Coil Failure

Fig. 8: Unit substation dry-type transformer field failure likely caused by VI switching transients.
Current Waveforms Without Snubbers
150

Voltage Waveforms Without Snubbers

60 40 20 0 - 20 - 40

Ichop
+6 amps

100

50

- 50

- 100

- 60
- 150

-150kV!

Fig. 9: Chop current of the vacuum interrupter shown at left result in very high voltage transients shown at right.

To curtail the severe voltage transients caused due to the VI in close proximity to the transformer inductive load, the equipment manufacturer designed a simple Resistor-Capacitor AC snubber network. This snubber, comprised of three single-phase 15kV class capacitors and series connected resistor

elements, was connected on the load terminals of the vacuum breaker assembly. The snubber assembly was mounted as a component in the substation primary medium-voltage load break switch and fixed vacuum breaker assembly. Fig. 10 shows a photo of one of the three-phase snubbers at the center and three single-phase assemblies at the far right. At the left, the resulting impact from adding the R-C snubber as calculated from the transient study shows that the peak voltage transients have been significantly reduced in this example to a level below 30kV.
Voltage Waveforms With Snubbers
30

20

10

- 10

- 20

- 30

-30kV

Fig. 10: Addition of an R-C snubber assembly installed in the primary metal-enclosed switchgear to attenuate voltage transients. A single-phase resistor capacitor snubber shown at center and three of these assemblies mounted in the switchgear at right.

Putting it all Together Since the site would apply cast resin coil design transformers, the entire unit substation assembly was designed for close-coupled indoor application. A rigorous analysis of several alternative unit substation configurations was completed as a part of the process. Particular focus on the unit substation first cost for various alternatives was reviewed to assure the improved design alternatives were not adding significantly to the cost. Table I shows the first cost of several alternative designs considered. Note that the values shown are estimates, as the relative magnitude comparing one design versus another is the relevant issue. Because the economic modeling suggested that applying a primary load-break switch over a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker with an integral trip unit was the best overall selection, the design team elected to establish this approach as the Greenfield site standard for both low-voltage and mediumvoltage unit substations. The team selected a metal-enclosed assembly at the primary of each unit substation, built to the ANSI Standard C37.20.3 [10]. As shown in Table I, a metal-clad assembly, built to the ANSI Standard C37.20.2 [11] was also considered. This design included a draw-out vacuum breaker and no visible load-break switch. Ultimately, the metal-clad draw-out design was dismissed, as it proved more costly and lacked the feature of a visible blade incoming disconnect device, a valuable feature which was used as a part of the company lockout/tagout safety procedure.
SUBSTATION ALTERNATIVES 2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & FUSE, LIQ TRX, 3200A MCB, 4-800A FCBS 2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & VAC BKR, LIQ TRX, 3200A BUS, 4-800A FCBS 2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & FUSE, CAST TRX, 3200A MCB, 4-800A FCBS 2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & VAC BKR, CAST TRX, 3200A BUS, 4-800A FCBS 5000kVA: 13.8kV TO 4160Y/2400V, 600A LB SW & FUSE, LIQ TRX, 1200A MCB, 2-1200A FCBS 5000kVA: 13.8kV TO 4160Y/2400V, 600A LB SW & VAC BKR, LIQ TRX, 3200A MCB, 4-800A FCBS TABLE I PRIMARY SWGR $19,000 $31,000 $17,000 $29,000 $19,000 $31,000 SUBSTATION XFMR $90,000 $90,000 $165,000 $165,000 $175,000 $175,000 SECONDARY SWGR $88,000 $72,000 $86,000 $70,000 $118,000 $85,000 TOTALS $197,000 $193,000 $268,000 $264,000 $312,000 $291,000

THE NEXT GENERATION OF UNIT SUBSTATION DESIGN The design team selected the new unit substation design based on leveraging power distribution equipment technologies to improve system safety and reliability. The selected design was applied to 11 new unit substations installed at the plant site; two medium-voltage unit substations (10MVA and 5MVA with a secondary voltage of 4160V) and nine low-voltage substations (all at 2000kVA with a secondary voltage of 480Y/277V. Both medium-voltage and low-voltage substations were installed with high resistance grounding systems, application described in [12] and [13], which eliminated the possibility of a phase to ground fault, further enhancing system safety and reliability. A typical low-voltage substation one-line diagram is shown in Fig. 11. In this application, the project team applied the smaller, low-cost vacuum circuit breaker technology and also zone selective interlocking as described in Section IV above. From Fig. 11, note that the 15kV class vacuum breaker is connected to primary bus current sensors, and a separate overcurrent relay with current transformers mounted at the secondary bus is set-up to shunt trip the primary vacuum breaker in the event of a secondary bus fault. In this configuration, the multiple settings group capability of the vacuum breaker integral trip unit was not used. Instead, the team elected to opt for a zone selective interlocking scheme, with control connections between the separate overcurrent relay and the secondary low-voltage power circuit breaker trip units. In this scheme, a bus fault would result in the primary vacuum breaker tripping with no intentional short-time delay. The design team made the choice to not take advantage of the faster clearing times available with the multiple setting group capability discussed previously, primarily because the company felt that revising their established safety procedures for lockout/tagout could potentially cause confusion for plant operators. By definition, the multiple setting group approach required that the system studies be run in two different protection

Substation One-Line

As-Installed Primary Protection

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Fig. 11: Greenfield site installed unit substation design. Metal enclosed primary switchgear; 15kV load-break switch over a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker. Integral breaker trip unit used for primary transformer protection, separate overcurrent relay mounted in the secondary switchgear with 86 lockout relay and shunt-trip used for secondary bus protection. ZSI connection between secondary overcurrent relay and all 480V low-voltage power circuit breakers.

modes and required that operators would engage the instantaneous only mode during maintenance and also remember to switch things back to the normal settings after maintenance was performed. An alternate configuration that takes advantage of the multiple setting group capability is shown in Fig. 12. In this case, secondary bus protection is supported by current sensors connected to the vacuum circuit breaker integral trip unit, and primary protection is accomplished via a separate overcurrent relay connected to primary current transformers. There is a slight advantage in applying this configuration as opposed to the selected configuration discussed above and shown in Fig. 12. Using the multiple settings group capability in a maintenance mode improves the primary breaker clearing time from 5-7 cycles down to 3 cycles thus, reducing the downstream arc flash energy should a bus fault occur. The tradeoff here is of course that maintenance and operations need to embrace this approach and be willing to adopt new lockout/tagout procedures to support this. Results from this new approach were very significant. After the power systems design studies were completed and all settings were completed in the field, the facility was outfitted with arc flash and shock hazard labels. The studies confirmed that the entire electrical system, both low and medium-voltage, delivered arc flash hazards below 8 cal/cm2, or a Category 2 PPE requirement. This was very welcome news to plant operations, since the facility PPE standards included company provided Category 2 PPE for all electrical maintenance personnel. So, no special PPE was necessary on the rare occasion that work be required on energized equipment anywhere in the facility. The design team was very pleased with these results.

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Fig. 12: Alternate unit substation design. Metal enclosed primary switchgear; 15kV load-break switch over a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker. Integral breaker trip unit with multiple settings group maintenance feature used for secondary bus protection, separate overcurrent relay mounted in the primary switchgear with 86 lockout relay and shunt-trip used for primary transformer protection. ZSI connection between integral overcurrent relay and all 480V lowvoltage power circuit breakers.

CONCLUSIONS As new challenges emerge in power distribution systems reliability and electrical workplace safety, it is the responsibility of the systems designer to seek out new approaches and solutions that address them. Stepping back and looking at the big picture, the systems designer has an onerous responsibility in specifying or selecting the best designs. Design decisions made today will impact cost, safety and serviceability of the installed systems for 40 or 50 years during the useful life for the owner. Studies have shown that this cost is an order of magnitude of 7 to 10 times the installed cost of the power distribution equipment. The work by the project design team in this effort is considered a significant step forward in innovation in unit substation design. In the current environment of emerging codes and standards such as NFPA70E, focused on improved electrical workplace safety, the obvious first choice for any power systems designer is to design the hazard out. Industry must continue to increase focus on Safety By Design as the most effective approach in minimizing electrical hazards while improving system reliability. Developments such as those described in this paper are considered a driving force in establishing accomplishing this objective. REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] American National Standards Institute ANSI/IEEE Standard for Metal-Enclosed Interrupter Switchgear, November 2001 American National Standards Institute ANSI/IEEE Standard for Three Phase Power Transformers, March 2000 (?) Considerations in Application and Selection of Unit Substation Transformers, IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Volume 38, May-June 2002, pgs 778-787. UL1558 Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear, February 1999. National Fire Protection Agency NFPA70 National Electrical Code, 2008 Edition. National Fire Protection Agency NFPA70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 2009 Edition Standard 1584, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. September 2002 Distribution Equipment Modernization to Reduce Arc Flash Hazards, Hopper, W.S, Etzel, B.L., IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Volume 38, Volume 44, Issue 3, May-June 2008, pgs 940-948 29CFR1919.301 to .399, OSHA Sub Part S, Electrical Installations, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC, 2007 American National Standards Institute ANSI C37.20.3-2001, IEEE Standard for Metal-Enclosed Load Interrupter Switchgear, November 2001. American National Standards Institute ANSI C37.20.2-1999, IEEE Standard for Metal-Clad Switchgear, October 1999. R. Beltz, I. Peacock, W. Vilcheck, Application Considerations For High Resistance Ground Retrofits, Conference Record, 2000 IEEE IAS PPIC, pgs X-XX. A.S. Locker, M.S. Scarborough, Advancements in Technology Create Safer & Smarter HRG Systems, Conference Record, 2008 IEEE IAS PPIC, Pgs X-XX