Rule 117 Compilation

PART VI RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH
VALENCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 2004) Summary: Petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan, Bayani Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez, Nelson Gabutero, Jose Genilo, Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali extended contract of loan (worth Php 2,500,000) to Engr. Alfredo Atienza for the repair of Atienzas motor vessel which petitioners claim was necessary for the transportation needs of inhabitants of Oriental Mindoro which had just suffered three successive typhoons. Loan was supposedly extended by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro pursuant to the General Welfare clause or Section 16 of the Local Government Code. They were then charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an information filed in the Sandiganbayan: That on or about January 12, 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rodolfo G. Valencia, then Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, Pedrito A. Reyes, then Vice-Governor and Presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, Bayani Anastacio, Romualdo J. Bawasanta, Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Cesareo M. Cueto, Violeta D. Dakis, Jose A. Enriquez, Nelson B. Cabutero, Jose G. Genilo, Jr., Jose C. Leynes, Dante A. Manao, Remedios E. Marasigan, all members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, and Alfonso V. Umali, Jr., then Provincial Administrator, all of whom are public officials of the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of their official and/or administrative functions, and acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza, and mutually helping one another , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M. Atienza unwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds of Oriental Mindoro in the sum of P2,500,000.00 was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury. Petitioners filed a Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with the Ombudsman Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. This was followed by a Motion to Quash filed by petitioner Valencia on April 14, 1997. Reinvestigation was conducted. Two reviewing prosecutors recommended the dismissal of the complaint against all accused on the ground that their liability is civil in nature. In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the administrative case against which involved the same subject matter as the criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after finding that the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of the local chief executive.
Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and/or Motion to Resolve Motion to Quash Information but this was denied so they filed certiorari petition under Rule 65. PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: 1. Sandiganbayan erred in denying motion to quash based on the dismissal of the administrative case despite the following: a. subject matter in criminal and administrative case are one and the same b. degree of proof in criminal case is beyond reasonable doubt whereas in administrative case the proof required is only substantial c. that 2 prosecutors recommended dismissal of case as they found that contract of loan was entered into pursuant to general welfare clause of Local Government Code 2. Sandiganbayan erred in denying motion to quash considering that the facts alleged in the information have already become moot and academic and no longer constitute an offense. 3. No satisfactory reason was given by the respondent Ombudsman in delaying inordinately (close to three [3] years) the filing of the information against the petitioners. ISSUE: Should motion to quash be granted? NO. Facts which constitute the defense of the accused against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense o The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. o Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion only such facts as are alleged in the information and those admitted by the prosecutor, should be taken into account in the resolution thereof. o Matters of defense cannot be produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy. Facts which form the defense of the accused do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense o The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash (on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter) is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. However, inquiry into facts outside the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS/ PROF. ARNO V. SANIDAD FIRST SEMESTER, AY 2012-2013/ (D2015)
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information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof (People vs. Navarro). In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with violation of Section 3 (e), in relation to 3 (g), of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. ELEMENTS OF SEC.3(E): 1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. ELEMENTS OF SEC. 3(G): 1. The offender is a public officer; 2. He enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the above elements are averred therein. It sufficiently alleges that petitioners are public officials discharging official or administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with a private person which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage. RE: EARLIER RESOLUTION OF OMBUDSMAN WHICH RECOMMENDED DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST THEM SC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS. o The Ombudsmans resolution must be established as their defense duri ng the trial yet it was not even offered and admitted as evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It was merely attached to petitioners Supplemental Pleading in Support of Motion to Quash Information. Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear the approval of the Ombudsman. o In any event, the Ombudsman subsequently denied petitioners motion for reinvestigation. The fact that two prosecutors recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioners is of no moment as they themselves signed the Comment filed before this Court wherein they extensively argued against the instant petition. o The continuing objection and opposition of the prosecution to petitioners motion to quash the Information removes this case from the exception to the above-cited rule that in the determination of whether the facts alleged constitute an offense, only the allegations in the Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, should be considered. o Findings of the Graft Investigation Officer are contradicted by Ombudsman who found probable cause for the following reasons: In the credit agreement itself, while the problem of transport system was addressed in passing under its whereas clause the same was not mentioned in the body of the said agreement. There is no provision in the contract to obligate Engr. Atienza towards the improvement of transport service for the people of Oriental Mindoro. The loan was a private affair. It suits Atienzas personal aggrandizement. RE: DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST PETITIONERS SC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS o Basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. o Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
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presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. RE: RULING IN TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN SC; PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS. o Thus, the ruling in Tatad does not apply here. In that case, the 3-year delay in the preliminary investigation was exacerbated by the fact that the charges against petitioner were found to be politically motivated. In the case at bar, there is no indication that the complaint against petitioners was filed to serve political ends. Neither is the delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive. On the contrary, what appears is that the prosecutors exercised extreme care in verifying, evaluating and assessing the charges against petitioners by having investigations before the NBI then the Ombudsman before making a finding of probable cause. Petition dismissed, TRO lifted. ANTONE VS. BERONILLA (2010) Petitioner: Myrna Antone Respondent: Leo Beronilla Perez, J. March 21, 2007 - Antone filed a complaint against Beronilla for bigamy alleging that her marriage with him in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when he married one Cecile Maguillo in 1991 Prosecution filed the information: That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity. Beronilla moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense He says that on April 26, 2007, RTC already declared his marriage with Antone null and void. Decision became final on May 15. Facts alleged do not constitute an offense because the marriage was declared null and void from the beginning. Declaration was retroactive. Thus, there was no first marriage to speak of. Antone says: Beronillas act has all the essential requisites of bigamy it was consummated before the RTC declared the first marriage null and void. Motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence RTC: Quashed information, dismissed the case says that because of the declaration of nullity, Antone was never married to Beronilla. First element of bigamy is missing. CA affirmed.
Issue: Was the information properly quashed on the ground that its facts do not constitute bigamy? Held: NO. Its facts constitute the offense charged. Quashal was improper.
Other issues: CA also affirmed motion to quash because 1. The information should have been filed by the Sol Gen in behalf of the People since the case was a criminal one 2. There was double jeopardy dismissal of the case by the RTC is tantamount to an acquittal SC says: 1. The case affects the interest of the State and the People, so it did not opt to dismiss the petition on a technical ground. Instead, Sol Gen was required to comment. 2. Elements of double jeopardy: 1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction 2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction 3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges 4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent rd 3 and 4th elements are NOT present RTC and CA orders set aside. Case remanded. RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY DOMINGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE (2000) DAVIDE, JR, CJ. Panfilo Domingo seeks to nullify the resolution of Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the info against him for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act 1987 PNB filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant. Also included DOMINGO, the President of PNB at the time of the questioned transactions, it appearing from the evidence on record that he was involved in the case DOMINGOs subpoena was returned unserved Preliminary investigation persisted (this time, dropping the complaint against Marcos because he was out of the country and thus out of the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan) and after a finding of probable cause to implead DOMINGO in the case, Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order directing him to submit a counter-affidavit, which he did. Resolution was issued by prosecution officer Baldos recommending that DOMINGO and Rodolfo M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 3019; complaint against Marcos was recommended dismissed for being moot and academic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T. Venus for lack of merit THIS IS THE INFORMATION FILED:
Ratio: RTC and CA acted in excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion when it sustained Beronillas motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information. SC agrees with Antone that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence Definition of motion to quash: the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. This motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information, for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the information TEST in considering a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense: Whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. In this case: All essential elements of bigamy under RPC 349 are alleged in the information. (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity The documents showing the declaration of nullity of the first marriage should NOT have been considered at all because MATTERS OF DEFENSE cannot be raised in a motion to quash. Exceptions to the rule: (1) When the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution (2) When the rules so permit (ex: because of extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy) (3) When facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction xxx. Even taking into consideration these exceptions, there is still no justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash. Why? Because the showing of the documents of the dissolution of the first marriage will not serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial. Family Code Art 40: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. In essence, under FC 40, a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated.
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That on or about the month of July 1980, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of the Philippine National Bank, a government financial institution, and hence a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office and conspiring and confederating with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and with RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Construction and Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP), a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality cause undue injury to the Philippine National Bank and grant unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the following manner: accused RODOLFO M. CUENCA, capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP, requested the latters assistance and intervention in securing the approval by the Philippine National Bank Board of Directors of the application of the CDCP for a U.S. $40 Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing the collateral requirements of CDCP, as a result of which accused Panfilo O. Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by President Marcos in relation to accused Cuencas requests, facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Board Resolution No. 144 whereby the U.S.$40 Million Standby Letter of Credit applied for by CDCP to secure the principal and interest on its loan with the Republic National Bank of Dallas was approved, notwithstanding a collateral deficiency by CDCP on its previous accounts with PNB, and again subsequently recommended to the PNB Board of Directors the approval of Board Resolution No. 180 amending Board Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use its loan proceeds secured by the aforementioned letter of credit for its other international projects and thereafter allowed CDCP to forego its collateral requirements, which act of the accused inflicted undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCPs ob ligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the latter had defaulted in the payment thereof, amounting to U.S. $29 Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount. 1992 - DOMINGO filed a petition for reinvestigation with Sandiganbayan; this was tread as a Motion for Recon; subsequently denied by Special Prosecutor 1993 DOMINGO filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information against him on the grounds that: (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. - Motion was denied, hence this petition. Upon arraignment, Domingo refused to enter a plea; hence, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for him Issue: Was the denial of Domingos Motion to Quash valid? YES, IT WAS A VALID DENIAL. CONTENTIONS OF DOMINGO:
The filing of the complaint with the Tanodbayan on 26 May 1987 produced no legal effect and could never be deemed to have validly interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, considering that effective 2 February 1987, the Tanodbayan was divested of its authority to conduct preliminary investigation unless duly authorized by the Ombudsman
COURT SAYS ON THIS: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: o (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; o (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and o (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted WHEN PRESCRIPTION PERIOD HAS RUN: The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years." This was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which increased the prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326: SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.(emphasis added) This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts o IN THIS CASE: the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed o Government could not have known the crime at its commission; The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions
1.
ON PRESCRIPTION a. The prescriptive period commenced to run in July 1980 when the crime was allegedly committed, and was only tolled on 6 February 1992, when he was impleaded as party-respondent by Prosecutor Diaz-Baldos
WHEN PRESCRIPTION PERIOD IS INTERRUPTED: Second paragraph of Section 2 of Act. No. 3326, as amended, provides that it is "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." o Whether the running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1 September 1987, when DOMINGO was impleaded as an accused, or on 30 July 1992, when the information against him was filed with
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o o
the Sandiganbayan, is immaterial; for only about one or six years, respectively, has elapsed from the date of the discovery of the alleged offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in R.A. No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The motion to quash on the ground of prescription was, therefore, correctly denied.
CONTENTIONS OF DOMINGO:
2. ON FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFO COURT SAYS ON THIS: The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts asseverated would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted o The information need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial Charged against Domingo and Cuenca: violation of Section 3(e), in relation to Section 4(a), of Republic Act No. 3019
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. -- (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal relationship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
The info specifically stated: (1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the president of PNB, a government financial institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private individual, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the CDCP, who conspired and confederated with DOMINGO, capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association with then President Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP; (2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation to his office and while in the performance of his official functions; (3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Resolution No. 144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCPs obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the CDCP defaulted in the payment of the loan amounting to US$29 Million (4) That such undue injury was caused by his facilitation of the approval of the Letter of Credit and the waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby granting unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount; and (5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality All of these correspond to the elements of the offense charged against: o The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: o (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; o (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; o (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; o (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and o (5) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
PEOPLE VS. VELASCO (2000) FACTS: -The present case originated from criminal charges filed against Honorato Galves, the Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, his bodyguard. They were charged with murder and frustrated murder for an alleged shooting. Galvez was also charged with unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence. -After trial at RTC Quezon City, a consolidated decision in 1996 found Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt but acquitted Galvez due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him of the charge of illegal carrying of firearm, finding the act was not a violation of law. -Now the government assails the acquittal of Galvez in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and Sec. 1, Art VIII of the Constitution. It believes that the respondent judge's acquittal of Galvez constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It claims that Velasco disregarded facts and evidence, and that the evidence should be re-examined by the court. It wants the acquittal to be nullified. -NOTE: the Court said the case was moot because Galvez was killed by alleged assassins and Velasco was dismissed from the service, but it decided to rule on the issues anyway. ISSUE: Can the case be reviewed without violating the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy? NO. Can the case be reviewed under a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? NO.
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RATIO: - The Court extensively went into the history of the rule on Double Jeopardy. - Jeopardy comes from the Latin jocus, meaning joke/jest/game and the French term "jeu perdre" which means a game one might lose. The concept existed in Greek, Roman, and Babylonian societies. Historically there has been much repugnance against double jeopardy, but it was in England where it was formally institutionalized. - Double Jeopardy is a maxim of common law, "based on the universal principles of resaon, justice, and conscience". Blackstone: "once a man is fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent juristiction, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime." The rule then became part of the legal system in the English colonies in America. - Despite the rule, in US vs Ball, the US SC said that the double jeopardy rule could not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction was set aside. It also held that under the Fifth Amendment, the verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant's jeopardy. The government may not subsequently seek a new trial by means of appeal. - When the Philippines was ceded to the US, we adopted the custom of double jeopardy under Gen Order 58. - In the case of Thomas E Kepner, a lawyer accused of embezzlement and acquitted, he claimed the US Govt's appeal to the Phil. SC constituted double jeopardy in the light of US jurisprudence. As objection, the Atty Gen and SolGen of the US contended that the criminal system prior to the entry of the USA allowed the appeal of a judgment of acquittal to the Supreme Court, because it was considered not as a new trial but as an extension of preliminary proceedings. The US SC rejected the government's argument and held that the proceedings after Kepner's acquittal placed him twice in jeopardy by essentially subjecting him to a new trial. Generally, the ruling in Kepner has been held ever since, though there have been times when the SC deviated from it. - Pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same offense - The interests underlying these three (3) protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be not subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same offense. The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions. - In United States v. Scott the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2) venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge; and second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal. - Under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." This is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve determination of evidence. However, this rule does not apply to the Philippines. - The records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. - The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Citing the members of the Constitutional Convention, they rejected the proposal to allow appeal from acquittal permissible even on questions of law.
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-The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide: Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information x x x x - The requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression. - Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion. - Errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction. One cannot file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, because while the evidence may not have been evaluated correctly, it was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts it from the requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. PANGANIBAN, SEP OPINION - Petition at bar should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) the former accused is already dead, so this Petition has become moot and academic; (2) the petitioner has failed to show that public respondent had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. - People v. CA & Maquiling: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a proper remedy to challenge an acquittal on the ground that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. - It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent. - Even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. A ruling issued without jurisdiction is necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal. PEOPLE VS. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA AND MANUEL OPULENCIA March 6, 1987 J. Feliciano (Motion to Quash Nature and Grounds Double Jeopardy)
FACTS: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police, together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building." Opulencia admitted that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency. Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. The Batangas City Court GRANTED the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery, and it appearing that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, ANOTHER INFORMATION against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16. Before he could be arraigned, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
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Judge Relova GRANTED the Motion to Quash: The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which were done at one instance on a particular date between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But the information said that from November, 1974 to February 1975it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations. ARGUMENT OF PEOPLE: The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance of Batangas City is not the same as theft of electricity. o The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices. Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer. o The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the offender, or an intent to appropriate and steal electric fluid. o The elements of theft are DIFFERENT from the unlawful or unauthorized installation of wiring: (1) That personal property be taken; (2) That the personal property (taken) belongs to another; (3) That the taking be done with intent of gain; (4) That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; (5) That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Also, theft of electricity can be done even without illegal or unauthorized installations.
ISSUE: WoN the second information for theft [of electricity] violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. HELD: YES! The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear in Yap vs. Lutero. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all
the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. The accused also conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was INTEGRAL with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices. The dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an ACQUITTAL of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a BAR to another prosecution for the same offense.
appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments. Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.
RATIO: Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. The argument of People is correct under the first sentence of Art. IV (22). However, this case must be examined under the second sentence of the section. The first sentence is the general rule; the second sentence is the exception to the general rule. In Yap v. Lutero: There are two kinds of double jeopardy: against punishment for the same offense, and against punishment for the same act. Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be
PEOPLE VS. DEL CARMEN (1951) Facts: An information for malicious mischief against Maria Del Carmen, et al. for removing and destroying (actuated by feelings of hate and resentment) the banguera and media agua of Felix Versozas house was filed at the Manila Municipal Court. - After the prosecution presented its evidence, the defendants moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the removal or destruction of the property had been inspired by resentment. The court granted this. - The same fiscal who filed the earlier info filed another info against defendants for coercion before CFI Manila. The info read: by means of violence, force and intimidation prevented Felix Versoza from leaving intact the banguera and media agua and forcibly removed the same by means of hammers, etc. - Defendants motion to quash on the grounds of double jeopardy (DJ) and insufficiency of allegations was sustained by the CFI. Prosecution appealed, saying there is no DJ bec the second info charged am offense different from the first. The rule against DJ applies only to protect the accused not against the second punishment for the same act but against being tried for the same offense. SUPREME COURT: The act complained of in the 2nd info is the same one which formed the basis of the info for malicious mischief. In the first info, the defendants were charged for having removed and destroyed the banguera. In the second one, Versoza was prevented from leaving intact his house because the defendants had removed the banguera. - While the rule against DJ prohibits the prosecution for the same offense, it is elementary that the accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Else, an unlawful act or omission may give rise to several prosecutions depending on the prosecutions ability to imagine as many offenses as can be justified by the act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the prosecutions theory, rape may become coercion by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended from remaining a virgin. - This case is a reminder for prosecuting officers to be careful and comprehensive in criminal investigations by determining definitely, before filing the info, the offenses in fact and law committed. PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA AND FRANCISCO GAPAY 1983 Relova, J. RESOLUTION style case. Facts: 1. October 17, 1971: Incident happened (accused bumped victim doesnt say explicit facts); the next day, an information for Serious Physical Injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck and on that same day, the victim (de la Cruz) died; Private respondent was arraigned two days later;
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2.
3.
October 24: an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed; This was dismissed by City Court (upon motion by private respondent) on November 17 on the ground of double jeopardy; City Court decided: Melo v People: where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at a time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the second offense; However, the doctrine in that case does not apply because in People vs. Buan (22 SCRA 1383): Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury; Once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury.
been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for the charge of serious physical injuries only three days after the incident, two days after the filing of the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The only sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the accused was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a charge for homicide even before it could be filed. In such a case, there would be a trifling with the processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its authority to prosecute an accused for the correct offense. Either the assistant city fiscal was naively new to the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the accused, in which case remedial measures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the affirmance of the order of dismissal in line with the many protections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal prosecutions. MANANTAN VS. CA Feb 29, 2011 Topic: Double Jeopardy - Rule 117, secs. 3(h), 5 and 7; Rule 120, sec. 5 FACTS: Sept. 25, 1982: Fisal Ambrocio invited Ruben Nicolas to catch shrimps at his farm. They drank beer with Manantan before they proceeded to the farm using Manantans Toyota Starlet, where they consumed more beer. Manantan, Nicolas and some others returned to Ambrocios house with a duck; they ate and drank. They went bowling and also went to a nightclub after, where they yes, you guessed it drank some more. When they decided to go home, Manantan drove the car. He was driving at a speed of 40km/hr along Maharlika Highway in Isabela when they met a passenger jeep with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right. The two vehicles COLLIDED and the Toyota turned turtle. Ambrosio and Nicolas were both brought to the hospital. Ambrosio suffered minor injuries. Nicolas DIED. DEFENSE VERSION: o basically the same as prosecutions, except that Manantan didnt drink beer and he was driving slowly. TC: NOT GUILTY. Acquitted from homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. CA: Modified in that Manantan is CIVILLY LIABLE for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the accident. o at time of accident, Manantan was drunk because he consumed at least 12 beer bottles between 9am-11pm.
Issue: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered. NO. Held: GENERAL RULE: One who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or Identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. EXCEPTION: rule of Identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution because in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Melo v People. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy; or stated differently, Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense; Jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused As stated, the victim died the same day the information was filed and accused was arraigned two days later or October 20; so, when the information of homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on October 24, accused was already in double jeopardy; In his memorandum, the Solicitor General mentioned that on October 21, the City Fiscal motioned for the abeyance of the hearing and arraignment because there is information that the victim died, and the information would have to be amended; be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim died on October 18, a day after the accident and arrest of accused, and that on October 20, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly; Affirmed. Concurring. Guttierez Jr., J.: constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that the arraignment, while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspicious circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanery sufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process. Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the inevitably slow pace of work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of cases with the Fiscal or before the various salas, it is most surprising that the accused could have
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ISSUES: (1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? (NO. THERES NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY.) (2) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240? (NO.) RATIO: ISSUE # 1: CA awarding indemnity to respondents does NOT place appellant in double jeopardy. PETITIONER SAYS: TCs finding that he was not negligent was the basis for his acquittal, not reasonable doubt.
In finding him liable for damages, CA placed his acquittal in suspicion and put him in DOUBLE JEOPARDY
RESPONDENTS SAY: TC acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Civil liability not extinguished in crim cases if acquittal based on reasonable doubt. SC SAYS: For DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO EXIST, there must be: o a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second o first jeopardy must have terminated; o the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. IN THIS CASE: o petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. o Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. o In modifying the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. ISSUE # 2: PETITIONER SAYS: - CA erred in awarding damages since respondents did not pay corresponding filing fees. Non-payment of fees violates Manchester Doctrine where in The Court ac quires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees. RESPONDENTS SAY: - Manchester doctrine inapplicable. Assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. SC SAYS: At the time the information was filed (1983), the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. These were the applicable provisions when respondents appealed the CIVIL ASPECT in 1989.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
DISP: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SALAZAR V. PEOPLE (2003) Petitioner: Anamer Salazar Respondents: People and J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation Callejo, Sr., J. Facts:
An information for estafa was filed against Anamer Salazar (petitioner) and co-aacused Nena Timario with the RTC. Prosecs evidence: Salazar bought 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers and gave a check as payment drawn against Prudential Bank by one Nena Timario in the amount of P214,000. Upon presentment, the check was dishonoured (closed account). Salazar was informed of such and she replaced it with another check, which, however, was returned as DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). Salazar filed a Demurrer with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that: o the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused. Petitioner filed MR on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to RoC Rule 33. TC denied.
Issue: W/N Salazar was denied due process when she was not accorded her right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
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Held: Yes. Ratio:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the civil action. The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. PROCEDURE: o If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor. o After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. o In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court. o If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated. o This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. o Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused. IN THIS CASE, the civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action. The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
PEOPLE VS. LACSON (April 2003) Resolution J Callejo Sr This involves a previous case regarding the PNP's involvement with the Kuratong Baleleng massacre/case/shootout MfR by the sSate praying that: 1. Sec 8, Rule 117 (provisional dismissal) NOT be applied in this case. And 2. the Time Bar rule in Sec 8, Rule 117 should also NOT be applied in this case. People: the requisites required for a provisional dismissal to be granted is not present. Specifically, the respondents failed to pray for a provisional dismissal. The heirs of the victims were also not informed of a provisional dismissal. SC: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived SEC 8, RULE 117 IS NOT GRANTED. Requisites 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. Reason for requiring conformity of accused: to bar him from asserting double jeopardy A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
PAGE 11
consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. In this case: The respondents only prayed for a judicial determination of probably cause and for the warrant of arrest to be withheld. They admitted that they did not pray for a provisional dismissal of the case. TIME BAR WILL ALSO NOT BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED IN THIS CASE. Generally, a procedural rule, such as Sec 8 Rule 117, will be retroactively applied. But in this instance, it will not for if it will, the State will be prejudiced and actually have less than 2 years to revive the case. The resolution of the lower court judge was executed on March 31 1999. The rule became effective on Dec 1, 2000. The state will have less than 2 years to pursue the case. Commencement of 2 years march 31, 1999. it will end on March 31 2001, but the state would only commence an action on Dec 1, 2000, because that's the only moment they would have been informed of the existence of such rule. PEOPLE VS. LACSON PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON,respondent. | CALLEJO, SR., J.| 2003 Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;[1] (b) Motion for Reconsideration;[2] (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;[3] (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.[4] The main issue here is the time bar against the refiling of the criminal cases against Lacson after the March 29, 1999 dismissal by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. (n) Respondent Lacson: the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate. Prospective application of Section 8 Rule 117 would give the petitioners more than two
PAGE 12
years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. the rule should have retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. There was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. The revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar. Petitioners: assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. T The petitioners assert that the refiling of the cases under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had not yet even commenced to run. ISSUE: WON the time bar in sec 8 rule 117 should be applied retroactively or prospectively. Held: Prospectively. (Short Answer)It would be a denial of the States right to due process to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule.
if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
Long answer:) The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule Effected year 2000 was fixed by the Court for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. 4. In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the timebar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
Other parts of the case: JUDICIAL ADMISSION BINDS RESPODENT: When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent. The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not hold water. the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court NO NEED FOR REMAND: There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC[50] and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist.[ IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes. LOS BANOS VS. PEDRO Time-Bar (Rule 117, Sec. 8) April 22, 2009 J. Brion Los Banos, et. al. = private prosecutor and the PNP Boac checkpoint team Pedro = accused FACTS: May 13, 2001 (a day before the elections and during the COMELEC gun ban) Pedro, along with three others, was riding at the rear portion of a Toyota Hi-Ace cruising along the national highway in Boac, Marinduque. The car in which Boac was riding was stopped by the PNP at a checkpoint. When the team of PNP men opened the rear portion, one of them saw a gun carry case beside Pedro. They asked him to open the case. The case was opened and it contained: firearms and ammunition. He was made to present his COMELEC authority to carry the firearms but he failed to present one. The checkpoint team of the PNP accosted Pedro to the police station for an inquest. The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro:
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999[22] should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):
PAGE 13
Violation of Election Gun Ban carrying firearm outside residence or place of business without any authority from COMELEC Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed an Information against Pedro before the RTC for violation of PD 881 [Omnibus Election Code], Article 22, Section 261(q) in relation to 264, which reads Pedro filed a motion to quash on the following grounds: Contains averments which, if true would constitute legal excuse or justification Facts charged do not constitute an offense To support his argument that there is legal excuse for him to carry the firearms, he attached an alleged Comelec Certification exempting him from the gun ban. RTC quashed the information without notice or hearing for the prosecution. Los Banos (Private Prosecutor) moved to reopen the case The certification was falsified No notice of hearing and actual hearing prosecution was deprived of due process RTC reopens case. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order to reopen case: LEGAL BASIS: the dismissal became permanent due to the Time-Bar Rule in Sec. 8, Rule 117 The Public Prosecutor also did not express his approval of the motion to reopen case Public prosecutor thereafter manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case. RTC: rejected Pedros position RULE 116, Sec 8 refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, hence, not applicable here or offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case RTC thereafter sets arraignment date for Pedro Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition CA: denied Pedros petition (2005) Pedro filed an MR stating: December 10, 2001 provincial prosecutor received the order to quash the information which means that applying the Time-Bar Rule, the case can no longer be prosecuted after December 10, 2002 (NOTE: NO DATE WAS GIVEN WHEN LOS BANOS FILED A MOTION TO REOPEN THE CASE) CA: Pedros case should not be reopened. Time Bar Rule applies. ISSUE: WoN Pedros case should be reopened? YES. THE RTC WAS WRONG IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION, HENCE A VALID INFORMATION STILL STANDS AND PEDRO SHOULD BE TRIED. THE TIME-BAR RULE ALSO DOESNT APPLY HERE AS PEDRO FILED FOR A MOTION TO QUASH, THE REQUISITES OF A PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL FOR THE TIME-BAR RULE TO APPLY WAS NOT MET IN THIS CASE. Time bar rule: Rule 117, Sec. 8, par 2: The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
PAGE 14
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The requisites are sine qua non for the application of the time-bar rule, as stated in the second par. of Rule 117, Sec. 8. The time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the state to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lap of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the state to prosecute the accused. DOCTRINE: COMPARISON OF QUASHAL OF INFORMATION AND PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL Quashal of Information Provisional Dismissal Sec. 3 expressly stipulates the grounds. Sec. 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. The express delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with closely-defined characteristics under the ROC. As to consequences after quashal: The accused is not subjected to double jeopardy upon reopening of Sec. 4: the complaint or information can be the case after a provisional dismissal. amended Sec. 5: the complaint or information may be Rather, it just creates a bar to further re-filed except for the instances in Sec. 6 prosecution under the special terms Sec. 6: limits the re-filing which Sec. 5 allows of Sec. 8. Sec. 7: defines double jeopardy in relation to ground stated in Sec. 3(i) for motion to quash This is filed to question the efficacy of the complaint A case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of wither the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to conditions of Sec. 8. Requirements of the form of a motion to quash do not apply to a provisional dismissal. A provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information
The form and content of a motion to quash are under Rule 117, Sec. 2.
Assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information
Allowed before arraignment
May be ordered even when the trial
proper is already underway as long as the requisites are present An information quashed stays quashed until revived. The grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. Impermanent until the time-bar applies, thereafter it becomes a permanent dismissal.
Prescription is an immediate consideration. The re-filing is based on whether or not the action can still be brought.
No re-filing whatsoever after the timebar. Prescription is not an immediate consideration.
DOCTRINE #2 Doctrine Due to the differences in consequences of a quashal of information/complaint and a provisional dismissal, the failure of the RULES to state under Section 6 (limitation to refiling of the case under Sec. 5) that provisional dismissals under Section 8 bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another. Section 8 operations in a world of its own separate from those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply. In this case: RTC was wrong in quashing the information based on the grounds cited by Pedro because the Information was valid Pedros motion to quash was based on a Comelec Certification attached to his motion to quash which signifies that his motion to quash was not the appropriate remedy for him No hearing was ever called for the motion to quash Pedro misappreciated the nature, function and utility of a motion to quash as a consequence, a valid information still stands on the basis of which PEDRO SHOULD BE ARRAGINED AND STAND TRIAL
PAGE 15

Rule 117 Compilation

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Rule 117 Compilation

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PART VI RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

Held: Yes. Ratio:

Allowed before arraignment

May be ordered even when the trial

No re-filing whatsoever after the timebar. Prescription is not an immediate consideration.

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