Hazards have been identified, evaluated and that risks from major accident hazards (MAHs) have been

reduced to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) The Jubilee Field is operated with management systems in place that is capable of systematically and continually identifying hazards, assessing them, and eliminating or minimizing, in so far as reasonably practicable the risks to personnel at the facility over the life of the field The Jubilee Operations Safety Case scope covers routine Jubilee Field production operations. This involves the production, engineering, safety systems, equipment and activities associated with the:

Topsides process equipment and utilities FPSO facilities (including living quarters, safety systems and other systems onboard the vessel necessary for safe production and oil storage) Bow-mounted external turret with mooring systems Subsea equipment and utilities Helicopter operations Marine operations including oil offloading Emergency response facilities (eg, escape routes, temporary refuge, fire/gas detection, totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft (TEMPSC)) The foundation for the Safety Case is based upon the formal safety assessments of major hazards.

Field specific hazards and risks have been identified, assessed and managed through good design in line with inherent safety principles. The results of the individual formal safety assessments can be found in the Jubilee Operations Safety Case: Part 4 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and Hazards/Effect Analysis [1]. Safety Critical Elements (equipment, procedures and tasks) that prevent, control or mitigate the MAHs have been identified and performance standards that define the operational and maintenance requirements for safety critical equipment developed. Specific management arrangements (detailed in Jubilee Operations Safety Case: Part 5 Management of Safety Critical Elements [2]) have been developed based upon

performance standards for safety critical equipment. The arrangements provide the basis for ongoing assurance during operations that safety critical equipment will operate as intended and contingency plans if they fail to meet expected performance. A Safety Management System has been developed to ensure that hazards are continually identified, assessed and managed throughout the life of the project. The Safety Management System is detailed in Jubilee Operations Safety Case Part 2: HSE Safety Management System Description. [3]

In the case of conflict, regulations rules, codes and standards have been applied in the following priority order: Coastal State and Flag State Laws and Regulations International Regulatory Requirements, Codes and Standards Classification Society Rules MODEC Standards

Industry Standards Project Specific Specifications, Codes and Standards The full list of regulations, rules, codes and standards is given in the Jubilee FPSO Design Philosophy [7], Jubilee Functional Specification [8], Jubilee FPSO Technical Description [9]. Safety Case studies and risk analyses that have recommended additional requirements have been considered.
In order to comply with the ISM Code, each ship class must have a working Safety Management System (SMS). Each SMS consists of the following elements: Commitment from top management A Top Tier Policy Manual A Procedures Manual that documents what is done on board the ship, during normal operations and in emergency situations Procedures for conducting both internal and external audits to ensure the ship is doing what is documented in the Procedures Manual A Designated Person Ashore to serve as the link between the ships and shore staff and to verify the SMS implementation

A system for identifying where actual practices do not meet those that are documented and for implementing associated corrective action Regular management reviews

Major Hazard Assessment Operational hazards and risks associated with the Jubilee Field have been identified and the associated Safety Critical Elements (equipment, procedures and tasks) have been properly identified, developed and are being implemented along with a system for monitoring their on-going effectiveness. Safety critical equipment performance standards were developed to document risk based performance criteria derived from the assessment of major hazards. Maintenance, testing and assurance tasks are being developed to ensure that the performance criteria are met by operations. Identifying all MAHs through HAZIDs [18] and HAZOPs Conducting FSAs to assess hazards, verify and/or steer design decisions where practicable

Risk Reduction Efforts

As part of the effort to reduce risks to ALARP, ALARP [16] and Bow-tie diagram workshops [17] were conducted later in Safety Case development process to review the MAHs, the adequacy of planned controls and to identify any additional potential risk reduction measures to be considered at that stage of the project. Risk reduction measures were considered on a basis of the level and type of risk reduction gained against

the level of effort required (cost and schedule impact) to implement them. The ALARP workshop identified a number of potential risk reduction measures related to both design and operation of the facility. All operational measures, and some of the design measures were taken forward. A summary of the ALARP workshop findings is presented in the Jubilee Operations Safety Case Part 4: Formal Safety Assessment and Hazards/Effects Analysis

Evidence demonstrating risk reduction efforts in design include: Formal safety assessment process to assess and understand risk drivers, provide input into design Development of risk acceptance criteria Conducting a QRA that has demonstrated that all risks fall within the tolerable and/or broadly acceptable risk region and provided focus for risk reduction efforts Development of Bow-tie Diagrams ALARP Workshop Good Practice benchmarking from other MODEC FPSOs Engineering judgment by experienced FPSO experts (MODEC) Evidence demonstrating an effective Safety Management System: Continual HAZID/JSA processes Monitored SCE maintenance and compliance with assurance tasks Jubilee Operations Safety Case Part 6: Remedial Action Plan Communication and awareness of risk areas Competency Based Training Assessments (CBTA) [19] Management of Safety Critical Systems as detailed in the Jubilee Operations Safety Case Part 5: Management of Safety Critical Systems Case to Operate Procedure [20] Sharing of lessons learned HSE Management System audits with continual HSE improvement The HSE-MS is developed in accordance with MODECs Corporate Health Safety and Environment (HSE) Management System that ABS has certified complies with the requirements of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), the ISO 14001:2004 (Environmental Standard) and OHSAS 18001:1999 (Health and Safety Standard).

O&M Performance Objectives

Processes are in place to meet the following requirements: Identify Safety Critical Elements (equipment, people and procedures), performance standards, safe operating envelopes, maintenance, and risk management tasks and activities Clearly defined start-up, operating, maintenance, shutdown, and work management procedures are in place with authorities defined Key operating parameters and leading/lagging performance indicators are established, documented, and regularly monitored

Reliability and availability of safety critical Elements is assured through appropriate testing, maintenance programs and audits Control procedures with the appropriate level of authorisation exist for temporary disarming or deactivation/deviation of SCEs Modifications or temporary changes to the facilities or operations are controlled via a Management of Change Process endorsed by TGL Risks are assessed and managed with consideration of simultaneous operations Quality assurance procedures exist to ensure equipment replacement maintains design and operations integrity Operation and maintenance activities are undertaken by competent and trained personnel, capable of carrying out the required tasks and activities

Maintenance Management System

AMOS M&P, a computerized Maintenance Management System (MMS), has been integrated during the project phase to support the planning and performance of planned maintenance and integrity activities across both the FPSO and Subsea facilities [18]. AMOS M&P is pre-loaded with data necessary to forecast planned work, to generate work orders for planned tasks with categorization to identify priority activities (eg, SCEs). The following site-specific information has been developed for each major and unique equipment package. A list of planned maintenance routines using short titles (ie, as would be used on a Work Order

Master Schedule) and the operating hour interval or calendar interval prescribed by the factory or industry standard for scheduling the routine A list the spare parts required by part number A list of discrete tasks comprising each routine and the associated Job Safety Analysis (JSA) for each task A list of the tools and instruments required for each task A list of technical skills required for each task A detailed description of the work consisting of a numbered sequence of the tasks listed above with accompanying pass / fail criteria for quality control

Management of Change System

The purpose of Management of Change (MoC) is to allow for formal evaluation of possible safety, health, environmental and technical hazards brought changes to the FPSO or subsea assets. The purpose of the requirements within these MoC procedures is to help ensure that changes to these systems are recognized, documented, formally reviewed, and approved prior to their implementation in order to avoid potentially hazardous conditions that may affect personnel safety, the environment and/or the operations.

Modifications to said systems might also result in the need to change the facilitys operating procedures, training programs and other documentation, which must also be updated appropriately to reflect the physical modifications that have been made. The objective of the MoC procedure is primarily to ensure standards are maintained or improved in HSE and facility performance and secondly to enhance long-term business profitability for MODEC International offshore operations by ensuring MODEC Staff and Management are involved, informed and kept current, relative to changes proposed for the above defined facilities.

1.7.2 Coastal and Flag State Laws And Regulations

The FPSO will be registered in the Bahamas. Ghana National Regulations over and above international standards and Class Rules will be included as necessary.

1.7.3 International Regulatory Requirements, Codes and Standards

The following international Regulatory Requirements, Codes and Standards apply to the FPSO: International Maritime Organization (IMO) IMO International Convention on Loadlines 1966, as Amended by IMO Regulations A231 (VII), A319 (IX), A411 (XI), A513 (XIII), A514 (XIII) IMO International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, Including Amendments IMO International Convention for Prevention of Collision at Sea 1972, with Amendments 1981 IMO International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and Protocol 1978, and Amendments (MARPOL 73/78, Consolidated Edition 1991) and 1992 Amendments to International Labor Organization (ILO) ILO Accommodations for crews Other Guides

Appendix 1 IMO International Convention on Tonnage Measurements of Ships 1969, as Amended by IMO Resolution A493 (XII) and A494 (XII) IMO Code of Noise Levels on Board Ships, Resolution A468 (XII) IMO Safe Access to and Working in Large Cargo Tanks and Ballast Spaces, Resolution A272 effective Nov. 73 / A330 effective 75 IMO Recommendation on Method of Measuring Noise Levels at Listening Posts, Regulation A343 (IX) IMO Codes on Alarms and Indicators, Regulation A830 IMO International Life Saving Appliances IMO 1987: Basic Ship Carriage Requirements for GMDSS IMO / MARPOL Annex I (Oil), Annex IV (Sewage), and Annex V (Garbage) IMO International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), in force from July 2002

ISM International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, in force from July 2002 Radio Regulations of International Telecommunications Union 1990 Energy Institute Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15, Area Classification Code for Installations handling flammable fluids ISO Guidelines No. 6954 1984 Guidelines for the Overall Evaluation of Vibration in Merchant Ships VDI 2056 Criteria for Assessment of Mechanical Vibrations in Machines (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure)

1.7.4 Classification Society Rules

The vessel will carry an ABS classification that is the equivalent: +A1 Floating Production and Offloading System (FPSO), RFL (20) 2029 (Field Name), Offshore (country) Complying with relevant requirements of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the classification will cover the following areas: Vessel, including Structure, Equipment and Marine Systems (inclusive of Helideck and Cranes) Turret or spread mooring, including Structure, Riser Systems, Mooring Systems The following areas will be certified by the same classing authority as above: Production and Production Support Systems, including all items supported above the support stools on the main deck FPSO Structure TURRET AND MOORING SYSTEM Single Point Mooring (SPM). This system is an external bow-mounted turret, designed to allow the vessel to weathervane about its mooring. The turret structure, mechanical equipment, manifolds and swivel stack assembly (SSA) are designed to accommodate 17 risers. The mooring system provides a safe and reliable means to keep the FPSO permanently on station during and following all environmental conditions

of the hull The following ABS Rules and Guidelines will apply: Guide for Building and Classing Floating Production Installations Rules for Building and Classing Steel Vessels Rules for Building and Classing Single Point Moorings Rules for Non-destructive Inspection of Welds Guide for Building and Classing Facilities on Offshore Installations Guide for Underwater Inspection in lieu of Drydocking Survey Guide for Crew Habitability on Offshore Installations

including extreme storm conditions. In the offloading condition, the mooring system is capable of withstanding loads from the FPSO, as well as loads imposed by the shuttle tanker when tandem-moored. The mooring system consists of a total of nine anchor legs in a 3 x 3 taut-leg arrangement, with groups that are 120 degrees apart. Each anchor leg is composed of chain and polyester rope. Anchor legs terminate on the seabed at suction piles positioned according to the geotechnical profile of the site.

Turret Structure The SPM system is an external bow-mounted turret that allows 360-degree rotation (weathervaning) of the FPSO about the earth fixed mooring system, while transferring loads between the vessel and mooring and riser systems. The turret is located at approximately 26 meters forward of the vessel forward perpendicular and 30 meters above the keel.

The Turret Structural System includes the following structural modules: Turret Support Structure The Turret Support Structure is the forward extension of the vessel bow that supports the turret structure. It includes structural connections to tie into the vessel to provide the load transfer path for mooring and riser loads through the Main Bearing and into the vessel via the Turret Head. Turret Head

The Turret Head is an enclosed steel plate structure that surrounds the (geostationary) central Turret section and is supported by the Turret Support Structure. The Turret Head supports the Main Bearing and the Swivel Access Structure as well as the pull-in equipment during installation of the anchor legs and risers. All external loads induced by the vessel motions are transferred into the Turret Head through the Turret Support Structure at their interface Chain Table The Chain Table structure is supported by the Turret Head through the Main Bearing and is located below the Turret Head. The Chain Table supports the anchor legs by the trunnionmounted Chain Supports located at the lower, outer perimeter of the Chain Table and is also the land off location for the flexible Riser in their associated land off trunnons. Riser Handing Platform The riser handling platform is a temporary work platform that facilitates riser installation, and is installed beneath the Chain Table. The platform is removed after installation of the risers. Upper Turret Structure The Upper Turret Structure is located above the Chain Table and Main Bearing and is supported by the Chain Table. It consists of a cylindrical shaft at the center of the Turret with outer columns that support the Manifold Deck(s) and Swivel Stack Assembly. Swivel Access Structure (SAS) The Swivel Access Structure is a three-dimensional space frame structure mounted on top of the Turret Head and rotates about the Swivel Stack Assembly along with the vessel. This structure includes a main deck that supports the piping, electrical cables, swivel torque arms and umbilicals that are routed from the swivels to the vessel. In addition, small work decks are included to access the fluid swivels Process The FPSO Topsides facilities consist of the following systems, shown in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, and described in the following sections: Oil separation and stabilization train with four stages of stabilization for enhanced recovery, and two 100% HP separators The oil separation system consists of a single train designed for an oil flowrate of 120,000 bpd for an 36.7 API gravity crude, and a non-coincident peak water production rate of 80,000 bpd. At the inlet to the separation system are two 100% HP production separators performing three-phase separation at a normal pressure of 30 barg (435 psig) and temperatures of 49-60oC (120-140oF). Oil leaving the HP separators is further heated in two crude/crude exchangers and two crude heaters to a temperature of about 90oC (194oF) before arriving at the IP production separator. The IP production system performs three-phase separation at a normal pressure of 9 barg (130 psig). The pressure of the dehydrated crude is subsequently reduced, and enters the final stage of stabilization in the LP degasser The oil treating system conditions the oil stream to meet the product specification by removing BS&W, and reducing the crude salt content. An electrostatic treater in combination with flash vessel are installed for this purpose. Fresh dilution water is added to the process upstream of the electrostatic treater for salt content reduction and some of the water leaving the electrostatic treater is pumped upstream of the IP separator. Excess water is routed to the water collection/skim vessel of the produced water treatment system.Treated crude from the desalter is finally pumped back through the crude/crude exchangers and two sales oil coolers before entering cargo tanks in the hull. Three, 75% capacity three-stage LP gas compression trains and associated equipment

The single-train LP gas compression system includes all equipment between inlet and outlet shutdown valves, and the driver and its associated utilities. The LP gas compressor compresses to 30 barg (435 psig) high molecular weight vapor from the following items: LP degasser Electrostatic treater flash vessel TEG regeneration flash tank; and Flotation cell Three gas turbine generators rated at 28 MW with waste heat recovery units Dual-fuel (gas and diesel) turbine-driven power generators located on topsides supply main power to the facility. Two existing diesel engine power generators, located in the shipside engine room, aid in black start power generation and for commissioning until fuel gas is available for the gas turbine power generators. A new emergency diesel engine power generator will be installed in the accommodations block with direct access to the weatherdeck and will supply emergency power to electric loads of topsides, marine, turret and subsea. Turbine generators have an output of 11kV, 3 phases, and 60Hz and rated at 28.29 MW at 36.5 C. Inlet gas cooling system The inlet gas cooling system consists of one cooler and a separator, situated downstream of the HP separators / LP gas compressors and upstream of the MP gas compression system. Inlet gas coolers take vapor from the HP production separators and the LP gas compressor, cooling it through a process of heat exchange with a tempered cooling medium. The downstream safety gas KO drum serves as a common vessel for the collection of condensates. Condensed water leaving the safety gas KO drum is subsequently fed upstream of the crude/crude heat exchangers in the crude separation and stabilization process, where it is used to provide a small dilution effect. Gas dehydration and TEG regeneration system The gas dehydration system includes all equipment for dehydration of produced gas and the regeneration of the Tri-ethylene Glycol (TEG) used during dehydration. These facilities are designed for gas throughput of 160 MMscfd and to meet export gas water content specifications of 2 lb/MMscf. Two 100% capacity single-stage MP/HP (export) gas compression trains upstream of dehydration MP Gas Compressors are 1-stage electric motor driven centrifugal compressors, which take vapor from the 1st Stage separation and LP Compression and compress it to the pressure desired for dehydration. The MP gas compression system consists of two 100% trains of compression. It includes all equipment between inlet and outlet shutdown valves of the two compression trains and associated utilities for both suction and discharge. HP Gas Compressors are single stage electric motor driven centrifugal compressors, which take dehydrated gas from the TEG Contactor and compress it to export pressure. The HP gas compression system consists of two 100% trains of compression. It includes all equipment between inlet and outlet shutdown valves of the two compression trains and associated utilities for both suction and discharge. Two 100% capacity single-stage gas injection compression trains downstream of HP gas Compression Gas Injection Compressors are 1-stage electric motor driven centrifugal compressors. These compressors take gas from the HP Gas Compression system and compress it to the pressure required for gas reinjection. The gas injection compression system consists of two 100% trains of compression. It includes all equipment between inlet and outlet shutdown valves of the two compression trains and associated utilities for both suction and discharge.

Fuel gas conditioning system with two filters The fuel gas conditioning system consists of both High and Low pressure fuel gas subsystems: The High Pressure Fuel Gas Conditioning System provides clean fuel gas suitable for turbine combustion, and delivers superheated fuel gas to each of the end users at their required flow rates and pressure levels The Low Pressure Fuel Gas Conditioning System is designed for low pressure fuel gas requirements. This covers the fuel gas rate required for the marine Deck boiler, stripping gas for TEG regeneration, tank blanketing, flare pilot / purge, plus contingency The design basis for the system is that the fuel gas flowrate that ensures that peak system demands are met inclusive of the simultaneous operation of all turbine generators excluding spare. Produced water treatment system The system is comprised of a skim vessel, hydrocyclones, and induced gas flotation cell with educator and disperser. Water containing oil is routed to the water collection/skim vessel, through a de-oiling hydrocyclone and finally to an induced gas flotation cell for further treatment prior to being discharged overboard. Water quality is continuously monitored for compliance with 20 ppm maximum oil-in-water, and any offspec water is diverted to an off-spec produced water tank. Chemical injection system The chemical injection system consists of all equipment and distribution piping associated with chemical injection, including dedicated transfer and injection pumps, redundant pumps, storage tanks, and all instrumentation required, to the individual points of injection (or as it leaves the FPSO for subsea injection points). Assisting production facilities to meet their specifications for products and disposed fluids Protecting production facilities from corrosion and plugging Providing corrosion inhibition to subsea systems Providing various other fluids necessary to maintain subsea systems Seawater treatment system Flare/vent system with HP and LP flare knockout (KO) drums The Flare/Vent System ensures the safe egress of hydrocarbon fluids that are either relieving from process equipment, from PSVs and BDVs during process upsets or from the PVs during start-up, process upset conditions and loading storage tanks during production or an over pressurized condition of the storage tanks. Process cooling medium system The process cooling system consists of a closed circulation loop of inhibited fresh water, pumps and surge tank. The fresh water is cooled by cross-exchange with the lifted seawater. A cooling medium tank maintains flow to two 100% cooling medium circulation pumps within the system, and a surge tank is located upstream of these pumps. The circulating cooling water is supplied at a maximum of 32oC (89.6 F) to all suction and discharge coolers on the LP, MP, HP Gas Compressors, Flowline Circulation Pumps, Seawater Injection Pumps as well as the Sales Oil Cooler. The anticipated average return temperature for the Cooling Media is 55oC (131 F). Heating medium system The heating medium system is used to recover and use heat from the turbine generator waste heat recovery units. This heat subsequently assists in the phase separation of oil and water. The system heats water circulated by a pump around a closed system, from an expansion tank through a combination of heat exchangers on the process modules and heating coils within the flare knockout drums.

The system is divided into three distinct components: Circulation - Expansion tank and two circulating pumps. Heating water is supplied at a maximum of 120oC (248 F) to all heaters, and returns at an average of 80oC (176 F) Waste Heat Recovery - Achieved by circulating the medium through coils installed in the divertible exhaust duct stacks of the dual fuel gas turbine generators Heaters - Shell and tube heater types, including crude and dilution water heaters Instrument, utility, and nitrogen air system The system consists of all equipment associated with the production of utility air, instrument air, and nitrogen. The instrument and utility air systems provide air for the operation of control and shutdown valves, as well as for various other utility services on the topsides and in the hull. The nitrogen system provides LP Nitrogen for purging of equipment under maintenance, inert gas blanketing of the topsides, and buffer gas for compressor dry gas and barrier seals. In addition, the system provides a supply of HP Nitrogen for in-situ relief valve and instrumentation testing. Fresh water system including two reverse osmosis units The FPSOs fresh water system provides treated fresh and potable water for process, utility, and accommodation areas. Fresh water is generated by two 100% reverse osmosis units each capable of producing 6000 bpd. The outlet total soluble conductivity of the units is designed to be less than 500 ppm. Drain System including piping headers to LP flare KO drum and two pumps The drain system on the FPSO consists of the following three types of drains: Closed Drain System -The closed system collects drainage from all piping and headers associated with the intermittent collection of hydrocarbon liquids from process vessels depressurized for maintenance, as well as the collection of a few other (normally non-flowing) process streams. It includes a collection volume included as part of the LP Flare KO Drum. Open Drain System Hazardous Area Open Drains The hazardous open drain system collects drainage from all piping and headers associated with the collection of spillage in hazardous areas of the FPSO. These drains route to the slop tanks through a water seal. Open Drain System Non-hazardous Area Open Drains collects drainage from all piping and headers associated with the collection of spillage and rainwater in nonhazardous (utility, area classification derived) areas of the FPSO. These drains route to the slop tanks through a water seal separate from the Hazardous Area Open Drains Deck drains are normally open allowing rain and deluge water to drain into them. In the event of hydrocarbon spillage during planned maintenance or due to mishap, the drains can be blocked off. The outer edges of plated decks are provided with a 150mm high coaming plate, which allows containment of the spillage until clean-up can take place. This arrangement can be compared to open versus closed scuppers (deck drains) on a vessel. The discharge from both the open and closed drain systems is directed to a common drain collection tank. The design of the open drain system complies with local environmental discharge regulations, and considers run-off from areas protected by firewater deluge. Subsea flowline circulation system including two pumps and a circulation fluid heater Cargo Offloading System

The Cargo Offloading System consists of three centrifugal pumps located in a centralized pump room. These pumps are driven by steam turbines located in the main FPSO machinery spaces supplied with steam from either the Deck Boiler or the Engine room auxiliary boiler. Crude oil is discharged from the cargo tanks into a common offloading header from cargo pump discharge to the offloading header on main deck level. From the offloading header, the crude is routed through an approved fiscal metering unit (dual Ultra Sonic meters) then led to an offloading line to the stern of the vessel to an offloading station. From here, offloading hoses connect to the export tank. The inert gas system provides and distributes a source of oxygen-depleted inert gas for blanketing or purging cargo tanks, off-spec tanks, methanol tanks, and slop tanks.

Main and Emergency Power

Main power is supplied to the vessel by three dual-fuel (gas/diesel) turbine-driven power generators,located on topsides facilities. The turbine generators have an output of 11kV/3phase/60 Hz. Turbine generator fuel is produced gas. Upon total blackout, rapid transition to emergency generator occurs. UPS and battery back-up systems supply power to critical loads during the transition, in which no AC power is available. One emergency diesel generator as well as up to two refurbished existing shipside diesel generators supply power in the event of main power failure. The emergency diesel generator has an output of 450VAC/3-phase/60 Hz and is installed in a dedicated room outside the Accommodation. The Power System Control Panel (PSCP) allows manual control of the main generation for manual load sharing, manual synchronizing and initiating automatic synchronizing. The power distribution system has two primary operating levels, normal and emergency The seawater system provides seawater for utility/cooling requirements and treated as required for reservoir injection for pressure maintenance. The seawater system consists of three 50% lift pumps with an operating capacity of approximately 634,000 bwpd which take their suction from a water depth of 50 meters below the surface to take opportunity of the temperatures of around 25 Deg C and total suspended solids (TSS) of approx 7 mg/L. Pump caissons are used for water lifting with electrochlorination (at around 2.02.2 mg/l chlorine) injected to prevent marine growth occurring at the intake piping and to support the water injection treatment process. The Seawater from the lift pumps passes through a course filter before separating into the Seawater distribution, Seawater cooling water and Water Injection systems. Seawater Distribution System: The system is intended to provided seawater service to a number of the FPSO systems including the Electro chlorinator package and potable water production via the Reverse Osmosis units (2 X 100% units rated at 5,000 bbls/d. Seawater Cooling System: The system is intended to provide the cooling requirements for the Main process cooling medium system via Seawater/Cooling Medium cooler (HZZ-2910) which is also supported by a further two Seawater/Cooling Medium coolers (HZZ-2930 A/B) where the seawater supply for cooling is routed via the water inject treatment system after the SRU package. Seawater Treatment and Reservoir Injection System: The system is intended to take the course filtered seawater and further filter via multi media and cartridge filters to achieve a suspended solids quality of 40 micron or less particle size suitable for reservoir injection, further to this filtration the water is treated via the Sulphate Reduction Units, a De-aeration Tower and further chemical treatments (Oxygen Scavenger, Biocide and Anti scale) to condition the Seawater to ensure removal/prevention of suspended solids, marine growth and smaller particulates and meet a sulphate level of no greater than 50 mg/l and a Oxygen content of less than 10 ppb, in order to control biological fouling/reservoir souring and corrosion. On completion of the sea water treatment for

Reservoir Injection the sea water is pumped by 3 x 33% High Pressure pumps to a discharge pressure of approx to 345 Bar (5000 psig) for injection into the designated water injection wells via the Turret, Risers (X2) and the Subsea injection flow line. Excess sea water is there after discharged to the sea with discharge temperatures that comply with overboard temperature limitations for Ghanaian waters. Sample collection and analysis ensures that safe operations are being carried out with no environmental impact. Such collection complies with applicable codes and standards to guarantee that samples are accurate and appropriate. The FPSO is equipped with a laboratory to perform analysis onboard including: BS&W Water Content API Gravity Salinity Reid Vapor Pressure Sand Content Oil Content O2 Content Gas Dew Point SDI Humidity Cleanliness According to NAS 1638 Class 6 or better for hydraulic fluid

Key FSA and hazards/effects analysis studies and documents that support the Jubilee Operations Safety Case are detailed in the following sections. These studies comprise: Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study [3] Identify all health, safety and environmental hazards and their associated hazardous events that have the potential for personnel injuries, loss of assets and damage to the environment during the operational phase of the FPSO Rank the likelihood and consequences associated with the realization of the hazardous events Identify events which are MAHs to help define the types and scope of FSAs required Propose actions to manage the risks associated with the hazardous events Environmental Hazard Identification Study [4] Identify environmental hazards and their associated hazardous events that have the potential for significant impact to the environment Rank the likelihood and consequences associated with the realization of the hazardous events Propose actions to manage the risks associated with the hazardous events Use these events for input into the Jubilee Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) required by the Ghana Environmental Protection Agency Environmental Release Assessment [5] Based on the significant environmental events identified in the Jubilee Environmental Hazard Assessment [4]: Determine frequency and sizes of liquid inventory releases from the FPSO Determine the estimated clean-up cost of the release scenarios Present a listing of mitigation measures for each of the release scenarios Topsides and Turret Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study [6] Systematically identify and assess hazard and operability issues Make recommendations to safeguard the process and improve operability, as required Verify the integrity of the design Follow-up Topsides Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study [7] Review systems not previously reviewed during the initial Topsides and Turret HAZOP Study: Systematically identify and assess hazard and operability issues Make recommendations to safeguard the process and improve operability, as required Verify the integrity of the design Subsea System Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study [10] Safety Integrity Level Study [8] Classify critical shutdown loops for the FPSO in terms of a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Verify that critical shutdown loops classified SIL 1 or greater meet their respective SIL requirements List recommendations emerging from the SIL classification and verification sessions Marine Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study [9] Hazard Register [11] Create a central register of all hazards and their causes, consequences and safeguards identified in project safety studies, and HAZID /HAZOP workshops

Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) [12] Identify all representative fire, explosion and gas release scenarios on the Jubilee FPSO Determine those scenarios which can be considered credible major accident hazards Model jet and pool fire characteristics associated with these scenarios (as applicable) Gas Release and Plume Dispersion Hazard Analysis (GRA) [13] Identify and assess the characteristics of flammable and toxic release scenarios that could result in injury, loss of life, or impairment of egress routes, safety systems, or the Temporary Refuge (TR) Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) [14] Determine expected overpressures on targets of interest resulting from the ignition of credible gasleaks on the FPSO identified in the Fire Risk Analysis [11] Identify any additional safety issues related to potential explosion scenarios Escape, Temporary Refuge, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis [15] Assess whether or not the ETRER facilities meet performance targets for each of the major accident hazard scenarios Verify the performance of escape, evacuation, and rescue facilities should a major accident hazard occur Dropped Object Study [16] Determine possible dropped object scenarios including impacts to risers and subsea pipelines Quantify the probable frequency of dropped object incidents resulting in damage to risers and pipelines Quantify the probable frequency of a dropped object impact onto the FPSO deck resulting indamage to topsides targets Ship Collision Study [17] Quantify the risk of ship collisions to the Jubilee FPSO in terms of the frequency of collisions and the sizes of any resulting hydrocarbon releases Identify any differences in the consequences of ship collisions with the FPSO due to single or double hull construction Pipeline and Flowline SSIV Study [18] Assess and compare the risks associated with including and not including SSIV for the Jubilee field pipelines and flowlines Assess and compare the relative risk differential for hydraulically operated valves versus check valves Noise Study Report [19] Perform noise prediction studies to verify conformance to IMO Guidelines for selected topsides modules Perform airborne noise intrusion studies from the topsides modules to the selected accommodation/work and hull/marine spaces to verify conformance to IMO Guidelines Thermal Exhaust and Gas Dispersion Study [20] Identify all sensitive areas that may be unduly impacted by exhausts from the FPSO and after determining the extent of such releases, evaluate the impacts to those areas against defined acceptance criteria Provide recommendations to mitigate scenarios where the acceptance criteria are breached according to the ALARP principle Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) [21]

Determine risk to offshore personnel associated with normal production operation of the Jubilee FPSO Assess the risk with respect to the risk acceptance criteria, given in terms of individual risk per annum (IRPA) and Potential Loss of Life (PLL) Maritime Field Security Risk Assessment [22], [23] Bow-Tie Workshop [24] Review and validate the Bow-Ties developed for all relevant release scenarios Ensure the accuracy and completeness of the Bow-Ties in preparation for the ALARP Workshop ALARP Workshop [25] Review the identified hazard controls for the major accident hazards Brainstorm any additional design and operational risk reduction measures to be considered going forward Screen out risk reduction measures on the basis of risk reduction gained and effort to implement

SCEs are defined as pieces of equipment, procedures or tasks that function to prevent, detect, control and/or mitigate a Major Accident Hazard (MAH). The Jubilee Field definition of a MAH is a hazard with the potential to result in an accident with: Multiple fatalities or permanent total disabilities Extensive damage to structure at installation Massive effect to the environment (eg, persistent and severe environmental damage that may lead to loss of commercial or recreational use, loss of natural resources over a wide area or severe environmental damage that will require extensive measures to restore beneficial uses of the environment)

Performance Standards have been developed for all Safety Critical Elements that define key management information. For the Jubilee Field, the SCE Performance Standards contain the following information: Safety Goal: Defines the Safety Critical Equipments role in hazard management (ie prevention, mitigation, enhancing escape) MAH Reference: References the MAH for which the Safety Critical Equipment is a barrier or recovery measure SCE Scope: Lists the individual equipment pieces covered in the Performance Standard System Goal: Describes the overall functions of the Safety Critical Element Performance Criteria (with assurance tasks and references) Functionality: Defines the performance criteria the Safety Critical Equipment must meet and identifies the assurance tasks that must be carried out to ensure the performance criteria are met Reliability/Availability: Defines the how reliable the system must be as well as when it is required to be available Survivability: Defines the MAHs the Safety Critical Equipment is required to survive in order to mitigate the event Interdependency: Defines the interactions with other Safety Critical Equipment

Safety Critical Equipment should be able to perform its intended function with the required availability and reliability throughout its service. This is achieved through: Identifying maintenance, inspection and testing requirements to maintain the SCE in suitable condition Ensuring that maintenance, inspection and testing is carried out at the appropriate time by competent personnel Maintaining a record of these activities and any findings that arise Addressing any deficiencies (ie, failure of SCE to meet documented criteria) as soon as possible and taking temporary actions necessary to maintain risk to ALARP until rectified Safety Critical Equipment is given a unique code identifier within the AMOS system and formal reports are generated detailing the status of SCE maintenance (compliance with maintenance routine frequencies) and automatic reports generated on SCEs failing to meet performance standards. SCE maintenance routines that fail to meet their performance standard will be identified through generation of a priority one work order to rectify. The authorisation level for sign off of the AMOS routine will be at the Maintenance Superintendents level and the failure will be noted within the SCE section of the Facility Morning report until resolved. Failure of SCEs to meet their respective performance standards will be reviewed with the OIM to confirm if additional actions are required to maintain a Case to Operate, monitoring of the number and consequences of multiple minor failures will also be reviewed by the Maintenance Superintendent. Monitoring of SCE Performance via the AMOS Maintenance Management System is a leading safety and integrity performance Indicator linked into the overall performance monitoring within operations.