AIR FORCE REVIEW

Vol 1, No 1
 TAKING OFF
Lt Col Jose Tony E Villarete PAF
Director, Office of Special Studies

In line with the vision of the Commanding General

Philippine Air Force, LTGEN BENJAMIN P
DEFENSOR JR AFP, of a faster, stronger and better
Philippine Air Force, the Office of Special Studies
(OSS) has come up with this new version of PAF
doctrine and strategy publication. The Air Force
Review, successor of the OSS Digest is published
quarterly, aims to increase the AFP personnel’s
awareness of the existing doctrines of the PAF and
activities related to doctrines development and to
stimulate discussions about air power, strategic
development and matters affecting national security.

In an effort to keep pace with the CG’s vision, this maiden issue is an
attempt to produce a responsibly faster publication through the dedication and devotion
of the reinvigorated editorial staff. Contributions from the major units and the different
functional staffs, as well as from the visiting fellows sent to RAAF Aerospace Center, were
solicited. Likewise, variety of topics were covered from a wider sources, ensuring a
stronger base of ideas for the publication. We continuously strive to come up with articles
that would contribute towards better doctrines and strategy, which, separately or
collectively, add value to the service the Philippine Air Force provides to the country and
people.

For this year, the OSS intends to focus on air power awareness through multi-
media methodology, doctrine formulation and revision, initiating the review and revisions
of the PAF Basic Doctrine, developing a relevant air strategy, and conducting
“conceptual” activities such as the CG’s PAF Annual Air Power Symposium, regular
publication of the Air Force Review and holding of the Doctrine Family Conference.
OSS will likewise continue to oversee the RAAF-Aerospace Center Attachment Program
and conduct special studies in support of the CG’s vision of a faster, stronger and better
Philippine Air Force.

The Editorial Board expresses its sincerest gratitude to those who contributed
articles and shared their valuable ideas which could immensely enhance the Command’s
efforts towards a dynamic doctrines and strategy development. We look forward to a
more active participation of units and staff offices for the coming issues. Let your voice in
print be heard through the Air Force Review !
 UPWIND
On the visionary leadership of
LT GEN BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR JR AFP
Commanding General, PAF

"The new PAF relies moreon the true imperatives of airpower, on speed and agility,
on the element ofsurprise, and on accuracy. The new PAF counts more on less - less
equipment,less people, less air assets, but delivers more... and with quality results.
Inshort, less for more!"

If he were using pilot lingo, the exchange

would have gone like this:

"Tower, Air Force Six-Niner, number

one outbound, ready for max perf takeoff.”

“Air Force Six-Niner, you’re cleared for

max perf take off.”

Max Perf stands for maximum

performance, a term used when an aircraft
takes off using the shortest possible distance
and rises at maximum climb angle to gain
altitude or clear an obstacle fastest on full
power. The same term applies well to PAF’s
“Six-Niner” Lt General Benjamin P Defensor
Jr., who has by far demonstrated a penchant
for pushing way down the throttle.

But the words he used last 10 October 2000 were clear and simple: ”Today I assume
command of the Philippine Air Force. And I sign.”

The Flight Plan

However, his engines, long primed, were running. Shortly thereafter, he met all
Commanders and Headquarters PAF Staff Officers and articulated his vision for the Air
Force during his tour of duty. His vision which is a characteristics of his personality and
crafted in the year of the Sydney Olympics, is simple enough, but goes into the basics:
Faster, Stronger, Better.

Faster, Stronger, Better PAF

 Faster PAF means faster response to all threats, external and domestic; faster delivery
of basic services in support of government programs; and faster rescue, relief and
humanitarian assistance in calamities and crises. In short, faster actions.
 Stronger PAF means stronger presence within the islands and over the fringes of
national territory to discourage and deter foreign aggression, secession, insurgency;
stronger basing to assure ready assistance to communities; and stronger organization,
trained, disciplined, enlightened and empowered to meet all missions and objectives of
the Air Force. In short, stronger teams.
  Better PAF means better weapons, better platforms, better systems, better doctrines,
safer air assets, better procedures and better ways that separately or collectively add
value to the service the Air Force gives to the country and people. In short, better
means and capabilities.
(It’s the gospel according to ACTS: Actions, Capabilities, Teams, Systems. Or Best
Actions suited to Core Capabilities by Dream Teams supported by Right Systems)

The Arrowhead Strategy

For the PAF to be faster,

stronger, better, the new
Commanding General laid out
three strategic imperatives:

Brilliance in the Basics means

going back to the basics and
going forward and upward a level
higher, and this entails not only
mastery of the context of soldiery,
of office administration, of project
management, or of leadership
and command in the Air Force at
all echelons, but more importantly
innovation and resourcefulness.

Completion of the Core emphasizes individual and unit endeavor in all levels to fill up the core
competencies or special strengths of the Air Force rooted in the five pillars of modernization:
doctrines development, force and organizational development, capability and materiel
development, base development, and human resource development. Each unit and
individual will take himself to task by pursuing projects and missions that will build capability in
these five areas and add value to the service of the Air Force through leading and taking charge,
through innovation and combination of the old and the new.

Richness in Results underlines the orientation of the Air Force on the importance of outcome of
effort in all activities. It stresses the imperatives of outcome management based on the future,
and not on the past or present since the Air Force is focused not on preparing to win the wars of
the past or of the present, but the conflicts and challenges of the future. Richness in results
likewise means results fashioned out of exploiting opportunities instead of merely solving
problems. Problem-solving merely sustains maintenance; exploiting opportunities bear the
signature of out-of-the-box thinking and carry the future direction of the Air. To produce
results, resources must be largely directed to opportunities rather than to problems.

Upwind Mileage

Seven weeks into his charted course, Air Force Six-Niner has kept true to his heading.
The following have been the gains so far.

Brilliance in the Basics

 Brilliance, Discipline and Professional Attitude in all Ranks through the Dismissal of
Erring Personnel and Recognition of Outstanding Achievers.
  “CBW” Program. No, it’s not Chemical-Biological Warfare. It’s the (Chest-Bigger-than-
Waist) Fitness Program launched via Tuesday and Friday Morning Runs and Taebo
sessions.
 Increased Operational Readiness Rates of airlift and tactical aircrafts like the UH-1H
helicopters and the C-130s. For the past several years, PAF helicopters had been
experiencing structural damages largely attributed to age. After the new CG, PAF
approved of a novel test method, the defects were lessened and a new efficiency was
attained.
 Increased Safety Awareness and Achievements. To this day, PAF has not registered
a single aircraft incident or accident.

Completion of Core Capabilities

 Revitalized Tactical Airpower Doctrine through a Seminar Workshop for AFP doctrines
experts and planned publication of a PAF Strategic Assessment Magazine.
 Groundwork for airpower laid out through construction of the Airpower Institute at
AETC courtesy of the CSAFP.
 Enhanced Base Development through the construction of the additional buildings and
welfare facilities for pilots and personnel at AETC and pursuit of joint arrangements at
Mactan with civilian entities on the maintenance of C-130s.
 Strengthen Organizational Effectiveness through assignment of best Commanders
and Staff Officers in key positions following the retirement of former CG, PAF, Lt Gen
Florendo.
 Improved Operational Capability through approval of recovery of two OV-10s, upgrade
of C-130s and Nomads, safety job on UH-1H fleet, and operationalization of the Airborne
Tactical Identification System for Visayas and Mindanao.
 HRD Buildup through the formal adoption of the personnel database buildup, computers
and networks, and the select procurement of the next batch of airmen to serve in the Air
Force.
Richness in Results

 A new level of unit discipline and adherence to the Chain of Command has been
defined in the ranks.
 PAF Units have been turning in 85% ratings in fitness reports.
 OR Rates of air assets have shot up to 90%.
 Zero aircraft accidents and incidents for the past seven weeks.
 PAF Air Bases undergoing intensified beautification.
 CG, PAF has personally visited most of the major air bases and stations of the PAF
to articulate the new plans and programs.
 Morale of airmen has been boosted by new housing projects.
 The PAF has a new achieving character based on the strength of the achievements
of the PAF Chief as previous TOC Commander, and latest contributions of key
units.
Pressing On

In his latest remarks to the personnel of 15th Strike Wing, the CG, PAF stressed the
significance of moving ahead in the field with a new character.

“We are giving shape to an emergent PAF for the millennium, a surging PAF, a new
PAF. For the old PAF was the PAF of the seventies and eighties, which relied more on
numbers, on more planes, more assets, more equipment, more platforms but less results.”

“The new PAF relies more on the true imperatives of airpower, on speed and agility,
on the element of surprise, and on accuracy. The new PAF counts more on less – less
equipment, less people, less air assets, but delivers more…and with quality results. In
short, less for more.”

“As the PAF demonstrates with consistency quality airpower, the AFP will demand it.
The country will demand it. The people will demand it. It will be the strategic future of all
our operations. And it will be the determining factor in internal security operations and
national security.” AFR
 AIR POWER
The Decis iv e Force
Major Guillermo A. Molina Jr. II PAF

“The AFP campaign in Mindanao last year carried in bold letters the superior
advantage of tactical airpower, not merely as support force, but as lead and decisive
force.”

Last 17 March 2000, an urgent message crackled through the SSB of CTG Davao.
“Nasaan ang mga eroplano niyo. Kahit isa lang!” It came from the Army, requesting close
air support to retake Kauswagan, that fell under the control of the secessionist MILF
forces. The caller knew the situation would not change for the next several hours. It was
close to sundown. The choppers could not take off.

The following day, the OV-10s came and quickly

struck Camp John Mack, the forward point of enemy
resistance. “The accuracy of the pilot was
remarkable,” recalls an Army officer of 4ID, based in
Iligan. “The concrete bunker got a direct hit, killing
more than a dozen rebels inside. We couldn’t believe a
female pilot did that. After that, it was easier for our
boys to come in.”

Elsewhere in Central Mindanao, the MILF forces seized Narciso Ramos highway, the
main economic pipeline from Cotabato to Iligan. Given to the 6ID to retake, the highway
quickly became a “toll collection” stretch for the secessionists. Then came the Air Force
with its dreaded bombs. In a matter of days, the stubborn enemy was forced back,
following heavy losses, two kilometers away from the highway, and commercial and public
transport resumed.

By the end of two months, the AFP, led by deadly tactical airpower, had overrun
several major enemy camps that took years to build, among them Apo Hill, Camp Bilal,
Camp Sarmiento, Camp Rajah Muda, and Camp Bushra, the second biggest camp next to
Camp Abubakar.

Finally on 09 July, Camp Abubakar, the MILF’s main headquarters and seat of
rebellion, and the biggest base of enemy-held territory fell to the combined assault of the
major services. But it was the heavy ordnance of the Air Force that carried the big stories
all week. According to Lt Col Delizo, “seventy-five percent of the destruction was done by
the Air Force.”

Lead and Decisive Force

The AFP Campaign in Central Mindanao last year carried in dramatic bold letters the
superior advantage of tactical airpower, not merely as support force, but as lead and
decisive force. It was decisive because by its introduction it quickly changed the pace,
tempo, and complexion of the battlefield, created the breakthroughs, and decided the
ultimate outcome. It led because it was the first to engage and take out targets, the first
to provide support and cover, and the quickest to deploy units and fighting soldiers
around the battlefront.

Without the timely crucial sorties, the campaign could have lasted longer and
Mindanao would have bled to waste. And the difference with the anti-secessionist
campaigns in the seventies would not have been marked in heavy contrast.

Unprecedented Impact

The effectiveness of tactical impact was unprecedented.

In the seventies, the greatest number of aircraft in PAF arsenal flew, but the period
also recorded the most number of downed aircraft due to hostile fire. Sibalu Hill and the
Burning of Jolo represented the biggest two tactical engagements on record. The former
involved 60 fighters, F-5s and F-86 Sabres, taking off on one-minute intervals from Mactan
for concentrated aerial bombings in Jolo. In addition, it committed to action almost the
same number of T-33 jets, C-47s “converted” into gunships, and the longest “skyline” of
UH-1H Hueys.

The latter took everything from the Air Force, including the proverbial kitchen sink –
fighters, AC-47s, helicopters, rocket-bearing U-17s, and even T-34 trainers taken out of the
PAF Flying School. It involved close to 3,000 troops, many of whom died in battle. Two
pilots are now immortalized as PAF facilities: Col Antonio Bautista, in whose honor the
PAF air base in Palawan is named, who was killed by rebels after he had bailed out of his
F-86, and Lt Elum, who went down in flames, right in his hometown of Jolo.

In the campaign last year, the picture was totally different. The PAF orchestrated over
1,800 combat missions without a single aircraft getting hit, while accounting for the
destruction of seventy-five percent of the enemy camps and strongholds – a record
unprecedented not only in combat operations and flight safety.

Together with Philippine Army and Marine forces, the Air Force helped destroy 13
major enemy camps and 33 satellite camps, including Camp Bushra, a major training
camp, and Camp Abubakar, the MILF “General Headquarters” and center of gravity,
without a single plane or pilot downed or lost, or a single forward Air Force base
threatened or touched.

Strategic Consequences

Also, the strategic consequences contrast in substance.

Back in the seventies, because of lack of will-shattering airpower capability, the anti-
secession effort raged and simmered and broke out again and left permanent socio-
economic and political wounds aside from the stretching the resources of the Armed
Forces. The destruction and damage to enemy morale, in military terms, was not crippling
enough. In the words of PAF Chief Lt Gen Defensor, “the conflict was pampered. It kept
coming back."

The MNLF problem eventually got contained by a political concession, but the bearing
of arms as a way of life took deeper roots and continues to define a Southern Philippine
cultural divide. It wasn’t long before the MILF came into being, spawned by MNLF’s
acceptance of the Tripoli Accord.
 Meanwhile the experienced and
weakened resource base hampered the
AFP’s efforts to modernize. The
difficulty got exacerbated when the US
Foreign Military Sales Program was
stopped in the eighties as a political
arm twist. The AFP, which had
depended heavily on FMS, lost its main
support artery. Consequently, the PAF
radar system plummeted into “filament
status.” The country’s eyes in the skies
virtually shut down. Not surprisingly,
too, the AFP never got strong enough
to build up and establish a “deterrent”
presence in the KIG.

It may be too early to look at the strategic effects of last year’s campaign. But there is
little doubt that the enemy’s military capability has been downgraded, as purposely
sought. Even as the government had to underwrite the campaign with heavy outlays, if
only to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, the ultimate prize
hasn’t been as heavy. It took only three months to finish the campaign and significantly
destroy the enemy’s warfighting capability. It took only the right number of tactical assets,
mostly OV-10s and MG-520s and UH-1Hs to carry it through. The effort did not affect PAF
security cover in other areas of the country. And collateral damages to life and property,
normally expected to run high, as a matter of fact, cost comparatively less than expected
in the many years of socio-ethnic rages in the Philippines.

Opening Salvo

Airpower, or tactical airpower in particular, definitely opened the new century with
flourish and promise, and the Filipino nation has not been prouder seeing a new breed of
flying heroes bannered, that included women, whose skill, grace, and guts found no lower
distinction.

Unfortunately, the doctrinal basis for applied tactical airpower remains buried in old
century thinking. Its application remains woefully CAS-based, or based on Army decision
making.

The problem is traceable to the early years, when the Army called all the shots, when
the Air Force was still an Army Air Corps, and flying was purely seat-of-the-pants and
open cockpit. Given its manifest lack of modern gadgets to help pilots find and fix targets,
the Air Corps, even as it became an independent branch of service in 1947 as the
Philippine Air Force, simply relied on Army ground instructions. It became a bad habit.

Not surprisingly, the battle doctrines of the Air Force followed the lines of the Army.
Even as airpower consciousness and advocacy gained grounds in the eighties, nothing on
paper supported airpower’s main strength, which is battlefield air interdiction (BAI). It has
been close air support (CAS) all the way.

Subsequently, despite its virtual stand-alone platforms and service independence, the
PAF has been consistently relegated to a support category in tactical campaigns.
Irrespective of the nature of mission, it has not merited the complementary or lead
category in any major offensive.
Eagle Declawed

The implications of restricting the Air Force or, strictly speaking, airpower to a
support role, specifically close air support role, are tremendous. It is almost like
debeaking, declawing, and clipping the wings of an eagle, and training it to scratch and
pick the ground alongside with the chickens, and now and then directing it to fly certain
heights and distances only, never trusting its own eagle eyes, and its unerring sense of
kill.

Despite the great advances in aviation technology, that have made possible the
determination of targets by thermal imaging, the scrutiny of submerged objects from
upwards of ten miles, the remote sensing and actual engaging of military objectives
beyond the horizon, and the near real time transfer of voice, image, and data from
battlefront to command centers, airpower appreciation and application in the Philippines
has remained in the backwash. Result: unupgraded systems under a backward mindset.
As joke, aviation communications has become “point-to-point.” A heli lands in the middle
of nowhere and, below the din of rotors, gestures for instructions and the Army personnel
points the direction of battle. Turo-turo.

Key Casualty: BAI

One key casualty in the process is the necessary development of battlefield air
interdiction (BAI) capability, the core airpower capability of any modern Air Force.
Interdiction, which empowers air elements to hit targets behind, well forward or away from
friendly forces in the arena of battle, and targets deep into enemy territory to decisively
destroy, disrupt, delay, or diminish enemy warfighting capability, is not yet fully embraced
by AFP battle doctrines. The Joint Operations Manual makes no mention of interdiction,
only close air support. On the other hand, the basic PAF airpower doctrine, giving
emphasis on interdiction, needs to be formalized yet.

In effect, the Air Force continues to be disenfranchised, an eagle that lacks legitimate
claim to the skies.

Close air support, as amply demonstrated last

year and throughout the history of PAF, guarantees
tactical success. But interdiction is crucial to the
strategic effects of applied airpower since it not only
impacts against fielded forces; it transcends Warden’s
five rings and directly hits home, right into the enemy’s
leadership and command and control ring. This was
overwhelmingly demonstrated in the Gulf War during
Desert Storm. In modest application, this was likewise
shown in our punishing strikes against enemy lairs,
formations, communications towers, and bunkers in
Mindanao. We brought the battle to enemy. As a result,
Al Hadj Murad and Hashim and MILF Spokesman Eid
Kabalu lost direction and control over the battlefront
forces after their command shelters were reduced to
rubble. Murad himself , seriously wounded, had to be
tunneled out by his men and became a non-factor for
the rest of the campaign.
Factors to Decisiveness

The decisiveness of airpower inherently lies in the ability of the Air Force to intervene
quickly, maneuver fast, penetrate deeply and focus the overall force of the campaign.
These abilities are, of course, tied to the fact that the Air Force is neither bound by
traditional physical limits nor time concepts.

This decisiveness likewise depends on how properly the tenets of airpower are
observed, namely; centralized control, decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility,
synergistic effects, concentrated purpose, and persistent and balanced operations.

Lastly, it is best assessed from an offensive, not defensive employment, otherwise its
potential to surprise, to shatter, and make the enemy submit is drastically diminished.

The Force must be Unleashed

Over a span of four decades, the AFP has been employing tactical airpower with little
understanding of its true imperatives. Fortunately, for all strategists, operations experts
and commanders, one constant that has become the saving grace of the nation is the
vaunted skill of the PAF pilot. The AFP’s resounding success in Central Mindanao is the
latest testament to that.

Lt General Benjamin P Defensor, Jr, the present Commanding General of the Air
Force, who directed all tactical operations in Mindanao as TOC Commander last year,
summed it best:

“The Mindanao campaign very clearly demonstrated that command of the air is
decisive in any engagement. It does not matter that from a global or regional perspective,
our Air Force is considered small. What is important is we have shown that our Air Force
makes a difference when needed.”

True airpower cannot remain fettered for long, and certainly not in the face of the new
and emerging challenges in the region. The role of the Air Force must merit new footing
and a higher controlling view of the ground below, given its speed, range, precision,
flexibility, concentrated lethality, and force-multiplier effect as well as rapid deployment
capabilities. Its upgrade, more than ever, must secure the priority attention of the
government considering the recent reduction of territorial forces in Mindanao and
increasing encroachments in the Kalayaan area.

In this unfolding century, it can no longer be disputed: he who has control of the air
and space controls everything underneath. No matter how we look at it, airpower is the
way to go. The future is here. The future is now. The future is in the skies.

Airpower, the decisive force, must be fully unleashed.

 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVs)
and the PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE
A Research and Development Concept
Major Noel L Patajo PAF

Since its creation in theseventy's, the research and development efforts of the Air
Force Research and Development Center (AFRDC) were focused on the self reliance
concept of aircraft manufacturing to include air munitions and other aircraft ground
equipment (AGE). With the mandate, the AFRDC became the tool of the PAF for
indigenous efforts such as aircraft, weapons, munitions, AGEs, etc. Through the years,
the AFRDC gained a certain level of expertise in aircraft design, propulsion,
communications, ordnance and explosives.

The PAF has proven that aircraft design is its core competency, hence, several
aircraft that were designed, manufactured and test flown for the last several years only
lacked the funding for commercial production. While man or the pilot is essentially a prime
component of the aircraft system, the need to remove the stigma of human casualties in
air operations opened several efforts for unmanned platforms. There are severely
dangerous missions or completely boring and strenuous chores such as extended
surveillance that logically presented the unmanned platform alternative.

Technology is swiftly moving around the research and development efforts of the
AFRDC such that remotely piloted toy planes metamorphosed into Remotely Piloted
Vehicles (RPV) - operational platforms for combat reconnaissance and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). The availability of the off the shelf technology empowered the aviation
enthusiast to expand the "hobby" into potent platforms, hence, the core competency of
the Air Force as regards RPVs and UAVs is seriously challenged. The Army, for instance
has already developed a working prototype of the UAVs and such effort is receiving the
needed funding.[1]

If the Air Force continues with its paradigm of "the man in the aircraft systems,"
the UAVs program of the Army maybe the beginning of the early "High Noon of Air
Power"[2] for the PAF.

What is a UAV?

The Australians defined UAV as "an aerial vehicle without an on-board human
operator that uses aerodynamic forces to support its flight path in a desired, non-ballistic
path under autonomous or remote control to carry lethal or non-lethal payloads."[3]

The Development of UAVs

The UAVs have been around since the dawn of aviation.[4] The level of
technology, however, prevented the full autonomy of the remotely piloted platform. The
early UAVs still relied on the skillful pilot on the ground.

The UAV of today is the result of an evolutionary process that has ebbed and
flowed throughout history of military aviation.[5] One of the first successes in the field of
UAV was the British "Queen Bee"- a radio controlled pilotless version of the DH82a Tiger
Moth- developed as a target drone for the Royal Navy between 1934 and 1943.[6]

During World War II, the Germans led several developments in several radio
controlled weapons such as the least known Henschel Hs 293 and Fritz X guided bombs,
Enzian rocket, and radio controlled aircraft filled with explosives. The most noted was the
V1 "Buzz Bomb". Capable of either air or surface launch, the success of the V1 was
indirect in the disproportionate defense response by the Allies.[7]

At the end of World War II, several successes in UAVs were due to parallel
technology development. Through the years, UAVs remained an open option for air forces
of the world.

In the Philippines, it is ironic that the Army is trying to lead the Air Force in
developing UAVs. The Army prototype flew with an on-board camera for recording an
area. The tapes were downloaded upon landing of the UAV. The report revealed several
shortcomings on several systems of UAVs prototype.[8]

UAV System Components

Current technology allows the development of fully autonomous airborne systems

known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.[9] Broadly, the following developments contributed
to the acceptance of UAVs:

1. Availability of compact, lightweight, inexpensive motion detecting sensors

essential to the flight control system, including carrier phase Differential Global
Positioning Systems (DGPS);

2. Compact lightweight low-cost computing power for autonomous flight control and
development; and

3. The mature aeronautical and control system design capabilities, and the ability to
draw upon the extensive worldwide UAV knowledge base.

Key Technologies for UAV Developments

The core competency of the air force is synonymous to the following core
technologies for successful development of UAVs:[10]

A. Airframes - the flight platform is obviously a key component of a UAV system.

Given the unique requirements for specific tasks, the airframes and their flight
performance should be developed to suit them e.g. high maneuvering performance
required for low level terrain-following.

B. Propulsion Units - this is particularly significant for high altitude and/or long
endurance requirements. Likewise, there maybe special fuel or engine material-property
requirements.

C. Autonomous Flight Controllers - the key to wide application potential of UAVs.

Globally, only few UAVs are capable of completely autonomous operations.

D. Launch and Recovery - key phases of UAV flight. Launch and recovery
requirements are often dependent on task and operational requirements. Current
 launching techniques range from the use of runways, catapults and rockets, to the use of
trucks. Current recovery techniques range from the runway landings to the use of
parachutes and nets.

E. Navigation and Guidance - the common availability of Global Positioning Satellite

Navigation Systems has a prominently positive impact on navigation in general, and
likewise their use in UAVs. The integration of satellite navigation and inertial sensor data
with flight control systems enable wider application potential for UAVs.

F. Self-Protection - safety for the possibly valuable on-board sensors and airframes,
from external interference and damage, to keep costs low.

G. Ground Control Station (GCS)- the UAVs would need to be monitored from the
base in some form, and the possibility to update task requirements mid-way through
mission.

H. Payloads - innovation and imagination remains the key to using UAVs to carry
payloads and sensors, ranging from surveillance sensors to possibly express parcel
delivery systems.

I. Data Communications - Storage, Processing, and Dissemination - secure data

links, and information technology.

Types of UAVs[11]

At present, there is no generally accepted classification system for UAVs.

Potentially, UAVs can be classified in several ways, according to criteria such as control
system, sensor and mission. Two distinct groups result if the classification is based on
the control system: the RPV and the autonomous UAV. While sharing features, their
operation is quite different. An RPV follows the data link commands of a remote station to
achieve a specific air mission. UAV can be further classified based on whether they are
either expendable i.e. single mission like a missile or recoverable to a particular friendly
location, not necessarily an air field. The succeeding figure 1 shows the types of UAVs.

Another classification system used by

the US is based on the general capabilities of
altitude, range and endurance. This system
employs three broad categories of Tier I, Tier II,
or Tier III, with sub categories such as Tier II
Plus and Tier III Minus.

A USAF RQ-1A Global Hawk (Tier II+ HAE).

Category Designation Max Alt Radius Speed Endurance Example

Tier I Interim- Up to Up to 250 60-100 kts 5-24 hrs Pioneer
Medium 15,000 ft km Searcher
Altitude
Endurance
Tier II Medium 3,000 ft to 900 km 70 kts More than Predator
Altitude 25,000 ft cruise 24 hrs (used in
Endurance Bosnia)
Tier II Plus High Altitude 65,000 ft Up to 5000 350 kts Up to 42 hrs Global
Endurance max km cruise Hawk (to
fly in Dec
99)
Tier III Low- 45,000 ft to 800 km 300 kts Up to 12 hrs Dark Stars
Minus observable 65,000 ft cruise (in service
High Altitude 99)
Endurance

LAYER Description
Layer 1 Capabilities and Technologies that can only be acquired from overseas
UAV Component Autonomous Flight Controller, Data Communication
System
Layer 2 Capabilities and Technologies the PAF desires some measure of self-
reliance
UAV Component Navigation and Guidance, Launch and Recovery
System
Layer 3 Capabilities and Technologies for which we want to be self-reliant
UAV Component Air Frames, Propulsion, Pay Loads, Self Protection
System

Figure 2: Tier Classification and Characteristics

The approach to the PAF R&D on UAVs may follow the "reverse engineering"
process anchored to the remote model aircraft hobby. The possibility of expanding the
principles governing the aeromodelling aircraft may provide the key to the UAV effort of
the PAF. From the above table, the PAF has some degree of expertise on some
component system of the UAV. The aircraft manufacturing and engineering done in the
Layang and several R&D are concrete basis for the level of expertise as regards layer 3
while the effort to manufacture mobile communication systems shows certain promise for
layer 2 and 1 components of UAV.

Possible Uses of UAV

The sensing application made possible by the UAVs transcends the pure military
application of reconnaissance and surveillance of military targets. The UAVs may also be
used on mineral exploration, media resources, environmental control and monitoring,
telecommunications, crop monitoring, and EEZ protection.[12] While the main goal of the
PAF should be to provide battlespace data to surface commanders, the possibility of
UAVs contribution to non-military efforts are reasons enough to embark on UAV R&D.

The UAV has been with the air forces since the dawn of aviation. The desire of the
land forces to see the battlefield beyond the reach of the human eyes explains the
motivation of the Army to study the UAVs. The Air Force has the core competencies as
regards the core components of the UAVs. Hence, it is but rational for the PAF to be the
lead in the UAV R&D.
 The UAVs can be a vehicle of the PAF to contribute to national development whilst
improving its long range surveillance of wide areas other than the forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA).

The AFRDC is a plus for the Air Force since it has vast experiences on major
components of the UAV systems.

In view of the foregoing, this paper recommends that PAF put the UAV R&D at the top
of the self-reliance project. The higher headquarters may not outrightly support the UAV
effort of the PAF. Hence, this paper further recommends that the Command allocates, at
least, research costs for in-depth feasibility study of the UAV for the PAF.

[1] Brigadier General Benjamin Defensor remark during the 1st Command Conference dtd
March 2000 at the
Hall of Flags, Minutes of the Command Conference
[2] Stephens, Alan, High Noon of Air Power, Canberra 1999
[3] Wing Commander M. Lax and Wing Commander B. Sutherland, Paper No. 46: An
Extended Role for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Royal Australian Air Force, Canberra
July 1996
[4] K.C. Wong, Dr, Aerospace Industry Opportunities in Australia Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs)- Are
They Ready This Time? Are We?, p 2 Royal Aeronautical Society, Sydney
[5] Op Cit, p 12
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] A check with J-5 dtd 13 April 2000 confirmed that the Army has an on-going UAV
funded project.
[9] Wong, K.C., UAVs Over Australia-Market and Capabilities
[10] Ibid
[11] Wing Commander M. Lax and Wing Commander B. Sutherland, Paper No. 46: An
Extended Role for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Royal Australian Air Force, Canberra July 1996
[12] K.C. Wong, Dr, Aerospace Industry Opportunities in Australia Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs)- Are
They Ready This Time? Are We?, p 2 Royal Aeronautical Society, Sydney
 ROLE OF BASES IN AIR POWER
Projecting Air Power

Col Emmanuel P Tabique PAF (GSC)

“Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundmen, and not

the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers.
It must be clearly understood by all ranks that they are expected to fight and die in the
defense of their airfields.”

-Winston S Churchill

Air Power is the ability to protect military force in the third dimension – which
includes the environment of space – by or from a platform above the surface of the earth
as defined by the PAF air power manual. However, air power depends on the
effectiveness of a number of component elements. These elements include platforms,
weapons, bases, logistics, command and control assets, people, sustainability, training
and morale.

The role of the bases as an element of air power should be emphasized as most air
vehicles depend on ground support facilities, particularly airfields. Aircraft need base
support if they are to operate at maximum sortie rates. Bases increase the range of action
and for easy recovery of committed aircraft.

The PAF
Modernization highlights this importance, as
bases development is a major component of
the program. The program requires
development of new bases, upgrade
existing facilities on existing major bases,
forward operating bases and air station for a
credible air force, able to meet the
requirements of air defense, counter-air,
tactical air operations in support to surface
forces' operational requirements, disaster
relief, environmental protection and national
development activities.

STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

Defense preparedness entails continuous monitoring of the strategic environment

to detect deteriorating scenarios or adverse changes and projecting a credible defense
force that can act as an effective deterrence against provocations or hostile military action
as well as addressing border security concerns vital to our national security. Essential to
this end is the establishment of facilities on bases for detection, identification and
response at the shortest time possible.
 The air power manual provides the necessary guidelines in the formulation
of our strategy as we reexamined and scanned the environment. The present force
structure needs to be sustained. Its core capabilities must be developed with new
technologies in pursuit of its mandated mission. The Philippine Air Force must be
modernized. It is the symbol of air power and a vital component of our national security.
It has to provide air defense for the country and the deployed surface forces, gain and
maintain air superiority, conducted integrated and joint warfare operations with ground
and naval forces and support national government objectives.

In the attainment of its objective, PAF bases should provide the necessary
facilities and infrastructure to support the command and control system for our air
defense network. This network will consist of series of land based radars, forward/counter
air operating bases strategically located throughout the country, deployment of air assets
to monitor and respond to external threats and intrusions in our borders and Exclusive
Economic Zone.

Bases Characteristics

The role of bases is to

generate and recover air power missions.
There are three major functions performed
by bases: Operations Support includes Air
Traffic Control, air defense, ground defense
and security, base or wing level command
and control, intelligence exploitation
facilities, fire-fighting and rescue services;
Logistics includes first and second line
maintenance, flight line and air movement
facilities, fuel and storage facilities, motor
transport, accommodation and catering
facilities; and Administration includes
personnel, resource and financial
management facilities, medical
infrastructure and training facilities.
Damage or destruction of airbase facilities, which degrades the ability of a base to
carry on with any of these functions, would affect the conduct of air operations. The key
vulnerabilities are, therefore, as follows:

Aircrew, aircraft, main operating surfaces, fuel installations, munitions areas,

logistics areas, and command and control centers, navigation, sensor and
communications sites and personnel accommodation.

The Threat to Bases

Air and surface attacks on deployed forces could drastically reduce the
effectiveness of air power operations by destroying high value assets or disrupting sortie
generation. Equally, missile or terrorist attacks on deployed force could create strategic
impact to weaken resolve. Threats to fixed installations arise from a number of sources
such as: hostile surveillance and reconnaissance, air attack/ground attack, information
attack and sabotage to vital installations.

It is imperative that careful planning considerations for bases development

should consider not only its operational requirements to support air operations but also to
ensure that security, safety and environmental issues are addressed properly in relation to
any possible threat.

Attributes of Effective Bases

Bases should have the following attributes: self-contained, basically providing the
utilities necessary for an effective and efficient accomplishment of the mission; must be
safe from any operational hazards; secured from any possible enemy intrusion,
surveillance and aggression; modular and expandable to provide future expansions and
necessary development required; environment friendly; if possible, address the socio
economic development of the area; it must have hierarchy of functions and must be linked
with other bases and command centers, provide facilities for the command and control
requirements.

The bases and support system development of the PAF Modernization program
should develop a level of capabilities that will ensure appropriate support for an effective
and sustained air operation activities against hostile forces and/or counteract external
threats to our territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country.

The role of the bases as an element of air power must be given equal emphasis as
any degradation or absence may reduce the effective application of air power.

“It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying
his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air”.

-General Giulio Douhet

 PAF COMMERCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM
The Key to Logistics Effectiveness?
Col Jose C Nano GSC (PAF)

“The power to retain a strong in the world depends ultimately, not on the possession
at any moment of the ships, engines, and munitions of war, but on the extent and variety
of the nations industries and the possession of knowledge to apply the resources of the
industries quickly and effectively to the problems of war”

-A. E. Leighton, Father of Australian Munitions

Production, 1920

Leighton’s words are just as significant in the contemporary context as they were
eighty years ago. Industry is indeed an integral part of a nation's military power and is an
important determinant of its strength. The trend among Armed Forces of the world now is
to focus on its core military competencies and activities, then outsource the rest.
Documents on Commercial support are evidence to the many benefits of its application.

The United States practised outsourcing since the Civil War. This practice was
since made a government-wide policy. Elsewhere, Australia started its own Commercial
Support Program (CSP) in 1987 in compliance with a Defense Department policy. Now,
even countries in the Pacific Rim are beginning to see the strategic advantage of involving
the civilian sector in Defense.

The Commercial sector’s participation in National Security has permitted the

military to focus its resources to where it is really needed, resulting in cost efficiencies as
well as benefits to its national economy. This commercial sector-Defense relationship is
referred to in many terms. Outsourcing, commercial support, commercial contracting or
simply contracting, depending on a country’s preferences, but by and large, the common
thread is the performance of a military service support activity by a civilian contractor.

The Philippine Air Force has embarked on

commercial contracting. It is a timely
complement to its present mode of
administrative and logistical support. In the
past, the PAF has traditionally focused its
efforts within its organization for every bit of
efficiency it can muster. However, present
budget realities makes it imperative to
complement this effort with efficiencies that is
available from outside its organization, the
commercial sector. Efficiency does lead to
effectiveness.

It is stressed that the PAF Commercial Support Program is not simply an

outsourcing activity. It is based on a philosophy of open competition. To be awarded a
contract, commerce must be able to offer value than what can be achieved in-house.
While there are opportunities for the civilian industry to develop and sustain Defense
support capability, there will be an increase in the depth of support for the PAF leading to
enhanced operational preparedness and effectiveness.

Similar to the SRDP program, the PAF Commercial Support Program will assist in
the achievement of a Defense objective aimed at strengthening our national support base
through a strategic partnership with civilian industry.
 THE FOCUS AND DIRECTION OF THE PAF
RESERVIST & RETIREE AFFAIRS PROGRAM
Reservist Based Air Power
Col Fernando V Doria GSC (PAF)

In line with the AFP vision of transforming itself a self-reliant, compact,

reservist based, professional and service-oriented organizations, responsive to the needs
of the country, the PAF Reserve Force endeavors to develop its available key resources
which come from a base of reservist individuals and private organizations. These key
resources are the technical and skilled personnel, numbers of air assets, maintenance and
communication facilities & equipment, aerospace medical facilities including buildings,
warehouses & hangars as well as other Air Force technologies.

The Air Reserve Force component shall

be developed into a readily mobilizeable, well
organized, adequately trained and properly
equipped components. Their development
shall conform to the total force concept of
mobilizing our national resources for defense,
strengthened through the sound integration of
the Citizen Armed Force to the Regular Armed
Force.

For the past years, the PAF though the Air Reserve Command had sustained the
reserve manpower build-up to form the nucleus of the PAF Ready Reserve Force
formations. Likewise, Air Reserve Command implemented a regular program on the
conduct of organizational and maintenance training as well as their attendance to career
courses to enhance their career development as a requirement for promotion in ranks and
designations. Additionally, to ensure the organizational preparedness and operational
readiness of the Ready Reserve Force, assembly tests were undertaken by ARC to the
different designated mobilization centers nationwide.

Strengthening the RRA Program

The Office of ACofAS for RRA, A-10, in coordination with the Air Reserve Command,
conducted a seminar on 22 Nov 00 in order to rectify policies and procedures affecting the
implementation of the Reservist and Retiree Affairs Program of the Command. The
seminar was participated by ARC Staff Officers, ARCen Commanders, the 1st & 3rd ARW
Commanders, RATSG Comdr & Staff and other senior officers of Air Reserve Command,
PAF. Also in attendance are the officers of OA-10, HPAF, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City.

The seminar is aimed to institutionalize policies and procedures in the

implementation of the RRA and the ROTC program of the Command. Comdr, ARC officially
opened the seminar with a welcome remarks anchored on the provisions of RA 7077,
commonly known as the Citizen Armed Force or Armed Forces of the Philippines
Reservists Act of 1991 - "An act providing for the development, administration,
organization, training, maintenance and utilization of the Citizen Armed Force of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and for other purposes."

Highlights of the seminar include the discussion of the following topics:

1. Lecture on the Air Force Reservist/Retiree Affairs Program by the Assistant Chief
of Air Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, A-10.

st rd
2. Briefing of the Dep WC, 1 ARW; WC, 3 ARW; and Comdr, RATSG on the
different concerns of their respective units.

3. Lecture on the Sources of Reserve Commission and the Utilization of Reservists

by the Director for Reserve Force Development, OA-10.

4. Lecture on the PAF Affiliated Reserve Units and Affiliation of ROTC Units by the
Executive Officer, OA-10.

5. Presentation of flow-charts as guide for the regular activities of RRA by the Chief
Administrative Branch, OA-10.

Top of Page
Where are we now?

The Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, A-10 stressed a
point during the RRA seminar to trickle the implementation of the RRA program. With the
present number of PAF reservists at hand vis-à-vis the number required for the 15-year
Reserve Force Build-up for the PAF to be attained by the year 2011, can we effectively
handle the mission as mandated?

Looking back, we have in our list

1,225 Reservist Officers & 110,595
Reservists EP; yet we have no working
system in updating their records much
more in monitoring their status in the
reserve force build-up. He emphasized
that with such a figure, do we have the
system of monitoring, locating or
communicating with the reservists? How
about their training requirements? How
effective do they respond if they are
mobilized and be called upon? These are
the challenges posed upon the Office of
the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for
Reservist and Retiree Affairs, A-10.

Administration of the Air Reserve Force

In consonance with the mandate of RA 7077, the PAF shall continue to procure and
commission qualified individuals and units with the Air Reserve Force based on the
sources identified and defined from existing AFP and PAF rules and regulations.
 Further, the Air Force Reserves need to be fully trained in order to maintain the
highest state of readiness as well as update and/or upgrade their present level of skills
and knowledge on AFP/PAF doctrines and tactics.

Maximum opportunity shall be afforded the Air Reserves to update their skills
through compulsory or voluntary training. Such training has for its principal purpose the
enhancement of the readiness of the individual reservists and reserve units to respond to
the call of service. Professional military schooling and skills training will be in accordance
with the constitutional concept of the Citizen Armed Force in any accessible training
center. Priority for training shall be given to the Ready Reserves with technical
qualifications. Personnel in the standby reserve units may volunteer to undergo training to
upgrade their skills as well as for adjustment of ranks where they are qualified.

Conclusion

The Air Force Reserve Component, specifically the Ready Reserve units shall be
organized, trained and maintained as a mobilizeable reserve, subject to call at any time to
augment regular armed forces of the PAF in particular, not only in times of war or
emergencies, disasters and threats to peace and order, security and stability in any
locality, but also during the need to provide assistance in relief and rescue and other
civilian assistance activities.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australia
or that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this
document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.

MARITIME AIR SURVEILLANCE FOR THE

PHILIPPINES
Protecting the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Kalayaan Island Group
Col Alfredo Ramirez GSC (PAF)

The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands situated across vital sea lines of
communications connecting the Middle East to North-East Asia and North America. This
archipelagic nature of its land area gives it a coastline of 17,460 kilometers. In order for
the Philippines to maintain its sovereignty, it needs to monitor regularly its vast sea and
air approaches which are vital for its defense, security and economic development.

Like other sovereign nations, the responsibility for the defense and security of the
Philippines is the constitutional duty of its armed forces. As stated in the Philippine
Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is mandated as 'the protector of
the people and the state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the state and the integrity
of the national territory.' Inherent to the mission and function of the AFP is the
maintenance of military control over national territory, airspace and territorial waters. In
order to accomplish this control, the AFP needs to collect intelligence data throughout the
nation's areas of interest and to conduct operations across the Philippines, its territories
and its maritime approaches.

The main vulnerabilities of the Philippines are its vast maritime approaches and
ability to monitor activity levels in these areas effectively. The major approaches are
across the west and north-west of the South China Sea, on the south by the Celebes Sea,
and the north by the Bashi Channel and Straits of Luzon. The national interests in these
areas are not only military in nature but also significant in value to civil agencies of the
government.

During peacetime, the AFP is also tasked to

support the national government's socio-economic
and development programs. With this task, most of
the surveillance requirements of the military and
civil government agencies often overlap. Some of
these activities are coastal surveillance, air traffic
control, remote sensing, survey and mapping.
Additionally, the enforcement of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in
November 1994, establishing the 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), has significantly
expanded the coastal surveillance needs of the
country.
 One of the functions of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for national security and well-
being is air surveillance for air intercept and air-to-surface operations. Its principal task in
air-to-surface surveillance is target detection, acquisition and identification in support of
air maritime and ground operations. Over the past decades, however, this vital task has
not been given due importance because of financial constraints and other priorities.
Among those priorities, the primary concern has been the support of ground force
operations against the communist and secessionist movements. Emphasis on the
conduct of counter-insurgency operations has drained the defense resources, with the
focus of support being concentrated on the Philippine Army (PA). As a result, the
capabilities of the PAF and the Philippine Navy (PN) have been maintained at very modest
levels. As an example, PAF maritime patrol and combat aircraft have provided only a
limited capability for maritime surveillance and interdiction.

Republic Act Nr. 7898, known as the AFP Modernization Act, was signed into law on
23 February 1995. For the PAF, this Act has provided the opportunity to develop its
surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic capabilities which at present are almost non-
existent. These capabilities are vital for the protection of the extensive maritime areas and
the growing transnational threats posed by piracy, smuggling, poaching and illegal
fishing. Included in the equipment acquisition and capability development are six long
range patrol aircraft to be equipped for surveillance purposes. With this development, the
PAF needs to develop a doctrine and concept for operations for its maritime air
surveillance capabilities to optimize operation.

Presently, the peaceful developments within the country, the greater political stability
and the changing strategic environment in the region have shifted the focus of the AFP to
wider security challenges. In particular, one of the most significant issues is the dispute
over the Spratly Islands by the Philippines and five other nations: China, Taiwan, Vietnam,
Malaysia and Brunei. There have been several incidents already in this area, the latest
occurring in February 1995 when China occupied Mischief Reef, an island claimed by the
Philippines. This incident and the increasing global concern over the threats to the
environment have heightened the need for the Philippines to develop an effective maritime
surveillance system.

The aim of this paper is to develop for the Philippines a maritime air surveillance
doctrine and concept for operations. To achieve this aim, the following objectives will be
addressed:

· to identify the role of the AFP in maritime air surveillance;

· to promote the importance of maritime air surveillance for the security and
interest of the Philippines; and
· to improve the capability of the PAF in maritime air surveillance.
 One of the national policies of the
Philippines government is to address maritime
security as a priority concern. The policy
recognises that the Philippines has more water
than land to control. In addressing this
concern, the AFP plays an enormous role, such
as patrolling and securing the territorial
boundaries, and implementing maritime laws
and regulations. The Philippine Navy is the
lead agency of the government in the
implementation of maritime laws, with the air
assets to detect and possibly to strike, when
necessary, identified targets. Maritime air
surveillance is an invaluable tool of the
national government in securing its
sovereignty and protecting its natural
resources.

Chapter Two of this paper defines the Philippine strategic circumstances and their
relation to maritime surveillance. It will generally outline the nature of security since this
is the very essence of why maritime surveillance is conducted by a nation. Also defined
will be the Philippine concept of national security, to give the reader an insight into what
developmental strategy the government is undertaking towards the security of the nation.
The Philippine geography will also be given emphasis to show initially the magnitude of
the surveillance tasks facing the country. Lastly, the chapter will identify the current
external concerns of the Philippines. For example, the South China Sea is viewed as a
potential flashpoint because of the disputes in the Spratlys. Another issue is the growing
transnational threats which may have great impacts on the economy and security of the
nation.

Chapter Three defines the issues of maritime air surveillance, both for military and
civil tasks. Defining these tasks is important in order to gain a working knowledge of their
size, value and use as they have an impact on many people and agencies to varying
degrees. In doing so, the paper will describe the importance of maritime security in order
for the nation to establish control in the maritime sphere. It will also outline the Philippine
maritime areas.

Chapter Four determines the maritime air surveillance doctrine and concept for
operations. The seven principles of operation in surveillance and reconnaissance
activities will be discussed to guide personnel involved in the planning and collection
process. As the command and control system is not included in the scope of the study, it
will be described in general terms only for the strategic, operational and tactical levels. To
avoid confusion, however, it is necessary to mention the delineation of responsibilities in
the conduct of air surveillance and reconnaissance operations. In addition, the concept
for operations includes civil-military integration. This is an integral task of the military
during peacetime, as support for the national surveillance program is determined mostly
by civil imperatives. One of the most important topics of this chapter is planning and
control as these provide the basis for the success and failure of an operation. This paper
will outline in detail the planning considerations, determination of tasks, and the
surveillance and reconnaissance procedures.

Chapter Five identifies the role of the PAF in maritime air surveillance and its
relationship with other Services and agencies. In order to have a clearer view of why air
surveillance is a major activity of the PAF, the strategic air surveillance objectives will
initially be discussed. Aside from the AFP, several other government agencies need air
surveillance products. These particular agencies and their peculiar requirements for aerial
surveillance will be described.

Chapter Six identifies the capabilities required for maritime air surveillance, the
current capabilities of the PAF and the shortfall. Chapter Seven will outline a surveillance
model and program for implementation. Lastly, Chapter Eight details the conclusions
drawn and summarises the discussion made in earlier chapters.

Printed edition of this book available at OSS Library.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the
Government of Australia or that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. This document is approved for public release;
distribution unlimited. Portions of this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission,
provided a standard source credit is included.

PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE AIR OPERATIONS

MAJOR ARTURO JOSE G ORTICIO JR PAF

"...the present PAF air operations have been primarily geared for counterinsurgency (COIN)
warfare. There has been an imbalance of support that favored the ISO because the lethal air power of
the PAF for external defense operations (EDO) has been grossly lacking."

This paper will develop an

alternative concept in the Philippine Air
Force (PAF) Basic Doctrine as a future basis
for a PAF operational doctrine which will be
subject to validation and approval by
cognizant authorities. The discussions in
this paper will identify current PAF concepts
and capabilities, the future of air operations,
and the proposals for an operational
doctrine. This paper will not present the
detailed employment of specific weapon
system platforms for any particular conflict
or war, but will relate the present
PAF doctrine to the evolving security
situation. The assessment of the relevance
of the present PAF doctrine vis-à-vis trends
in modern warfare will enable relevant
authorities to identify old and new doctrines
which apply to the evolving national
defense.

During the discussions, we will be able to understand the essential air

force capabilities and the application of air power to a small air force such as the PAF.
Although some concepts have been formulated by large air forces, this paper will attempt
to identify only those which have relevance to the PAF. However, this paper will not go
into the specifics of air power applicable to other branches of services or even disclose
the details of operations and proposed combat disposition for operational readiness
owing to the difficulty of access to classified information. This paper is primarily based on
general information. Although some issues are based on policies, the outcome of this
paper is not a set of hard and fast rules and regulations, but rather it will propose some
alternative guiding principles for the employment of air power, which will be subject to
individual interpretation.

The research method employed in this paper was primarily document study and
research. Primary data from this paper were obtained through review of secondary data,
direct participant observation and the interview of key informants.
 The Philippine Air Force (PAF) has been
in the service to the nation for more than 50
years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the PAF was one
of the most modern air forces in Southeast
Asia.1 With its scale of professional manpower
plus the inventory of F-86D/F Sabres, F-5A/B
Freedom Fighters, F-8H Crusaders, C-47
Dakotas, C-123 Providers, C-130 Hercules, R-27
Maritime, BNI Islanders, N-22B/C Nomads, AT-
28 Trojans, SF-260 Warriors, HU-16B Albatross,
UH-1H Hueys, H-34, Ground Control Intercept
radars among others, the PAF was a potent
force capable of a non-nuclear conflict
(conventional warfare) and protracted conflict
(unconventional warfare). Despite the internal
security problems that beset the countryside,
the PAF was a conventional force that was
highly capable of addressing the external
defense requirements. The security umbrella
provided by the mere presence of the United
States Air Force (USAF) 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base in the Philippines augmented the
PAF external defence capabilities, which deterred incursions from other nations or would
be aggressors. “Creeping assertions” due to territorial claims were unlikely to occur
because of our credible air force plus the factor of US presence.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a disciplined organization was

utilized for political motives during Martial Law (1972-1981) by “bringing the military closer
to the people." The exploitation of the AFP as the main contingent responsible for the
policy implementation of Martial Law,2 coupled with the growing insurgency and
secessionist problem relegated the primordial role of the PAF as a conventional force to a
tactical support force. Although the external defense responsibility was a basic concern,
the PAF shifted to the internal defense role support of the AFP surface forces and to
support the internal development programs. Included in internal development were
programs that required the application of military technical skills to meet civilian
requirements (eg. Aerial photogrammetry, rainmaking, reforestation, air transport,
infrastructure development and others).3 Tacitly, only the USAF presence provided
external defense on a very limited basis, and despite their presence it was never for the
Philippine national interest.

The basis for the conduct of air operations conducted in the external and
internal modes were outlined in the PAF Basic Doctrine of 1978. This manual served as a
doctrinal reference for the employment of PAF resources/forces in support of the national
objectives. The provisions thereto specifically provided the roles of the PAF in home
defense and national development. To be more responsive to the changing environment,
the PAF Basic Doctrine was revised in 1981. The later version provided discussions for the
context of the PAF employment in the conventional and unconventional warfare, plus
internal security operations (ISO). Despite the amendments in the PAF Basic Doctrine, the
written doctrine was unable to provide the real response to the evolving national security

1 Yap Pak Choy, Air Power Development: The Royal Malaysian Experience, Air Power
Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p.244.
2 Carolina G. Hernandez, ‘The Military and Constitutional Change’, Public Policy, Vol. 1,
No. 1, University of the Philippines, p.42.
3 PAFM 0-1, Basic Doctrine of the Philippine Air Force, Nichols Air Base, 1981, p. 9-4.
environment. Even after Martial Law the main concentration of the PAF air to be effective;
however, they somehow remained to be practices only rather than doctrinal guidance for
the employment of air power. If ever they were written, they were done very late and never
reached the relevant authorities.4 These ISO practices continued to evolve depending on
aircrew experience, operational environment, and the current weapon system platform or
technology.

With the departure of the USAF tacit deterrence in the Philippines,

stimulants, in the form of incursions within the nation’s EEZ, tested the PAF external
defense doctrines.5 It proved that the existing doctrines failed to address the real
situation. The worrying state of equipment disrepair and obsolescence of weapon system
platforms plus the absence of appropriate technology forced the PAF to be reactive
instead of being proactive.

As a result, the present PAF air operations

have been primarily geared for
counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.6 There has
been an imbalance of support that favored the
ISO because the lethal air power of the PAF for
external defense operations (EDO) has been
grossly lacking. The planned PAF modernization
is anticipated to reverse the deficiency of air
power so it can meet both the internal and
external security needs of the PAF. Foregoing
considered, there is a need to update the PAF
Basic Doctrine so that it can be responsive and
proactive to the range of evolving security
situations. The update should still
consider the diversity of roles the of the
PAF may have to
perform, and as such, there may be a need to compromise on the degree of capability
required to maintain the suitable balance needed for a credible air force.

Chapter One will discuss the concepts involved in the pursuit of national interests
with the intent to present the current Philippine setting in the context of relevant security
and defense. Chapter Two will present the developments in modern warfare-how
technology has influenced the conduct of warfare, and how the intensity of information on
military platforms as a result of rapid innovations in technology has modified the
characteristics of warfare. Chapter Three will discuss the present PAF concepts and
doctrines on capabilities and employment. Chapter Four will attempt to discuss the
relevance of the present PAF concept and doctrines to the current Philippine setting vis-à-
vis the regional threat scenario and the requirements in modern warfare. Chapter Five will
state the conclusions of this paper.

4 It was not until 1995 that the PAF started writing manuals for employment of weapon
systems and aircraft platforms. The detailed experience of seasoned aircrew in relation to
the employment remained undocumented even when they left the PAF.
5 From 1995 onwards, there were intrusions from neighboring naval and air forces. The
policy of diplomacy did not seem to deter any further intrusions.
6 Adapted from former PAF CG Lieutenant General William K. Hotchkiss III, as quoted in
PAF Flight to the Future, Pasay City, Philippines, June 1997, p. 115.
* Printed edition of this book available at OSS Library.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of
Australia or that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of
this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is
included.

The Role of the Long-Range Patrol Aircraft

in National Security
MAJOR P. GERARD C. CUSTODIO PAF

Introduction

The Philippines’ security environment is essentially maritime and its geography

provides a substantial natural defense due to the lack of shared land boundaries with any
country and the large number of islands suitable for basing strategic defense forces. In
addition, the waters throughout the archipelago can serve as a venue for cooperation with
other countries, thereby facilitating mutual benefits in terms of economic and cultural
development. Ironically, while these large bodies of water separating the islands offer
numerous benefits, they also present numerous vulnerabilities that could be exploited by
an adversary.
One major concern is the continuing problem of
maritime jurisdiction, especially in the marginal seas,
due to the lack of agreed maritime boundaries,
conflicting claims to off-shore islands and the
overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of
neighboring states such as Indonesia, Malaysia,,
Vietnam, the Philippines, China and Taiwan.1 The
instability in the area was compounded by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
which culminated in 1982 giving countries an
additional 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
Also, neutralizing forces such as the Soviet Union and
the United States are now virtually non-existent in the
Southeast Asian Theatre, signaling a red light for the
Cold War but a green light for regional powers like
China, Japan and India to cautiously flex their
muscles.

Without any doubt the Southeast Asian region, in particular the ASEAN
countries, has become the fastest growing arms market in the world. What is true of the
ASEAN market is also generally true of the Asia-Pacific countries.

On balance, the two most important factors affecting the defense acquisitions by
the ASEAN states over the past five years or so, are external threat perceptions resulting
from the end of the Cold War, and from the perspective of the ASEAN members, an
essentially impending Maritime Cold War. The second factor relates to the internal non-

1 Edgar L. Abogado and Reynaldo Yoma, ‘Development of a Philippine Maritime

Surveillance Capability’; Issues on Regional Maritime Strategy: Papers in Australia
Maritime Affairs, No. 5, General Editor; David Stevens, Maritime Studies Program,
Department of Defence, Canberra, October 1998, p. 30.
threat dynamics of the ASEAN countries themselves.2 Take for example the Philippines
which is on the threshold of crushing the local secessionist and insurgency problems.

On 15 May 1996, China ratified the UNCLOS becoming the 87th country to adopt
the international maritime convention, which took effect in 1994. Almost simultaneously
however, on 16 May 1996 China released the coordinates of 78 base points, which form the
baselines of parts of its claimed territorial sea, which are not in accordance with the
UNCLOS guidelines. The detailed baselines included the Paracel Islands, and in effect
expanded their territorial sea from 370,000 square kilometres to about 2.6M square
kilometres.

The bloody conflict between Chinese and Vietnamese forces in the Chigua Reef
area of the Spratlys in the late 1980s and the recent Chinese maritime activities
(expounded in Chapter Two) in the Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal are examples of
the strategic interplay in the region that may give way to further confrontations.

The Philippines is not exempted from feeling the pressures of this so-called
Maritime Cold War. Upon the implementation of the UNCLOS in 1982, the Philippines’ Area
of Responsibility (AOR) increased to 652,000 square nautical miles making it the twenty-
third largest EEZ in the world. After signifying its claim over some islands in the disputed
Spratly group, it extended the Philippine AOR by another 360,850 square nautical miles,
giving the Philippines an abundance in maritime resources. An additional result, however,
was an overlapping of territorial borders leading to sovereignty disputes.

Compounded by the possibility of submarine intrusions, piracy on the high seas,

environmental protection and other local concerns, which I will be discussing in the
succeeding chapters, these problems can effectively be checked with the deployment of a
dedicated Long-Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA) platform.
The Need For A Long-Range Patrol Aircraft

The primary objective of this paper is to propose tactical procedures that can be
adopted upon procurement of a dedicated LRPA platform. To achieve my objective, the
following questions will be answered in the subsequent chapters:
 Where will be its area of operation?
 How is the LRPA going to be used?
 The question of command and control? And finally,
 What are the equipments necessary for the LRPA to be responsive in the
performance of its assigned task?

In 1982, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) procured

four RF-27-maritime aircraft to serve as the lead Long
Range Patrol Aircraft platforms assigned with the 220th
Heavy Airlift Wing, under 221st Airlift Squadron. But due
to the lack of resources, these aircraft have to perform
multi-role functions augmenting transport missions and
administrative flights. At the same time, information
acquired during surveillance and reconnaissance
missions was not properly handled since no database to
store and process gathered reports was properly
maintained. To date, three of the RF-27 maritime aircraft
have already been decommissioned leaving a void in the

2 McCaffrie, Jack and Hinge, Allan, Sea Power in the New Century: Maritime Operations in
Asia-Pacific beyond 2000, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1998. pp.50-53.
security of our territorial domain.
Another unit tasked to perform air surveillance and air reconnaissance missions is
the PAF’s 303rd Air Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with a TC-690 Aero Commander.
However, with the numerous needs of the different government agencies coupled with the
burden of maintenance/spare requirements and an ageing equipment fit, additional LRPAs
dedicated to their roles are overdue and are essential for the PAF and the security of
Philippine maritime borders.
As defined, Air Surveillance is a close or continued observation by any means, of
an area, place, airspace, lane of approach, or field of activity in order to accrue information
or take action when the situation warrants.3

It should also provide data to ensure that the Armed Forces of the Philippines
maintain a picture of the current maritime situations and trends.

Information gained from the surveillance is mainly used to support strategic

intelligence in peacetime or operational intelligence in times of conflict. Surveillance
information is processed by intelligence staff to provide accurate and timely knowledge of
a potential adversary’s capabilities and intention.4

Air Reconnaissance, as defined, is an examination or observation of an area,

territory or airspace from the air either visually or with the aid of photography or electronic
devices.5

Air Reconnaissance is the collection of information via a specific mission, usually

conducted over a limited period and directed against specific targets. It is used to secure
information regarding the terrain, the strength and disposition of enemy troops, resources
or activities, the location and layout of targets or of enemy installations and strong points,
the results of air operations or other operations, the disposition of friendly troops, the
weather, or any other information regarding the situation usually in the combat area or in
the enemy territory. As such, the success of military operations is dependent on the ability
of the military commander to determine the aforementioned data as basis for future
planning. These data are used in the intelligence assessment of capabilities and intention
of the enemy. Reconnaissance is a regular military activity undertaken openly by
undisguised military personnel and is distinguished from espionage. 6

Unfortunately, without any LRPA asset to perform these tasks territorial integrity is
compromised not to mention the revenues lost and the unchecked destruction of marine
habitats.

The Philippines is now facing a decline in fisheries production and rapid

deterioration of our marine habitat areas. This phenomenon is mainly attributed to land
and marine-based pollution, greatly affecting our economy and at the same time
decreasing breeding areas for future fish-stock.

Total economic loss from illegal activities at sea has been estimated at 4B Philippine
Pesos annually, including 600,000 metric tons of fish worth another 15B Philippine pesos,
with the remainder made up of coral destruction, income forgone for local fisherman,
illegal trade and unrealized tourism potential. It is estimated that of the original 27,000

3 PAF Air Power Manual (Draft-Interim), Office of Special Studies, Headquarters Philippine
Air Force, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City, p. 111.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. p.113.
6 Ibid.
square kilometres of coral reef area, about 70 per cent has been damaged mainly due to
dynamite fishing and pollution. Similarly, of the original 450,000 hectares of mangrove
forests have been reduced to less than 140,000 hectares.7

A noted Australian expert on the Law of the Sea, Professor Anthony Bergin8 has
identified five areas in which government must establish control in a country’s maritime
regions.

1. The management of marine resources,

2. The maintenance of territorial integrity,
3. The protection and preservation of marine environment,
4. The prevention of illegal activity, and
5. The safety of life at sea.

He further noted that in order to achieve this control, the coastal state must be
capable of three basic tasks:
1. Surveillance,
2. Monitoring, and
3. Enforcement.
Maritime surveillance, monitoring and enforcement refers to the systematic

observation and monitoring of an area in order to detect and deter violations of

specific rules. Professor Bergin continued by saying that, in order to demonstrate a

nation’s resolve and capability to exercise control over its sovereign territory, there

must be a real expectation by perpetrators that the breaking of the rules within the

nation’s maritime domain will be discovered and punished. To create such an

expectation requires a surveillance system that is perceived as being capable of both

detecting and apprehending offenders on a regular basis. If these tasks are not carried

out effectively, there will be a serious loss to the national economy, with impact felt on

trade, fisheries, loss of life, etc. It should be noted however, the cost penalty of not

having this level of deterrence is difficult to quantify.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is mandated by the constitution to be

the protector of the people and the state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the

state and the integrity of the national territory.9 It is the responsibility of the Chief of

7 Abogado Yoma, ‘Development of a Philippine Maritime Surveillance Capabilitiy’; p.33.

8 Ibid.
9 The Philippine Constitution, Article II, Section 3.
 Staff, AFP to implement the legal requirements of the national government and this is

done through delegation to the involved major service commands (Air Force, Navy,

Army). The Philippine Navy (PN) is the prime agency when it comes to patrolling and

securing the national waters and the adjacent shorelines around the Philippine

Archipelago, with the Philippine Air Force (PAF) playing a significant supporting role.

To this end, the PAF should have the equipment capable of maritime patrol for

surveillance and or reconnaissance missions. An LRPA has the speed, endurance and

technology to provide real time information to the concerned agency for immediate

action if necessary.

The reconnaissance role of the PAF is both strategic and tactical. In peacetime, the

strategic objective of the PAF is to collect data for assessment and identifying the

changes in the pattern of activity in the vast area of interest. In times of conflict,

strategic reconnaissance will focus on the forward basing activity of the enemy in

activities. Tactical reconnaissance will be required to provide information on the

enemy position, accurate targeting and bomb damage assessment. The PAF will

shoulder the main responsibility of providing the Army and the navy of vital

information while satisfying its own operational requirements.10

In order to carry out its assigned mission, the Philippine Air Force is tasked to

perform primary and collateral functions. Included in these functions are air

surveillance, air reconnaissance, aerial photography and sub-surface monitoring.11

Without a capable platform to perform all these tasks, the efficiency and effectiveness

of the Air Force will be greatly degraded, not to mention the lack of credibility and the

required capability to react to territorial security situations especially for an

archipelagic country like the Philippines.

10 PAF Air Power Manual (Draft-Interim), p. 114.

11 Philippine Air Force Basic Doctrine, Headquarters Philippine Air Force, PAFM 0-1
 On 23 February 1995, the government passed Republic Act Number 7898, which is

better known as the AFP Modernization Act, which provides the assurance of a better-

equipped AFP. However, due to the economic crunch that subsequently hit the

Philippines and the whole region, priorities had to be re-assessed and initial funding of

the budget was allocated for the Philippine Army (PA) which is actively involved in

ground operations against the secessionist and insurgent elements. The result of this

was a big delay in the funding for the proposed projects of the PN and the PAF.

Nevertheless, a modest amount of Air Force projects are starting to be realized and

the PAF recognizes the significance of not only patrolling our territorial waters but the

numerous roles an LRPA can contribute to the accomplishment of the Air Force

mission. With this in mind, the PAF has included in its purchase list, a number of

LRPAs for acquisition. In line with this, a special study group has been organized to

determine the most efficient and cost-effective platform together with the necessary

equipment fit that will be appropriate for the Philippine scenario. It is essential that the

PAF has procedures to effect the standard use of these aircraft.

Chapter Two will be defining the Maritime Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the

Philippines in reference to local decrees and internationally accepted treaties. It will

also be discussing on the boundaries to include the chart showing the overlapping

national boundaries for better understanding. These inputs are deemed necessary

because it will become the official reference on where the area of operation for the

proposed LRPA will be.

Chapter Three is a discussion on the actual employment of the LRPA, which will

include the following:

 Ø A brief definition on the various levels of doctrine and their relationships will

be incorporated to give the readers a careful understanding on the approach intended

by the paper;

Ø Elements involved in a surveillance model;

Ø Flight procedures for different mission requirements;

Ø Relevant factors that will affect airborne surveillance like:

Ø operating area size

Ø aircraft performance

Ø contact density, and

Ø aircrew limitations will be outlined.

Ø The necessity of post-flight reports;

Ø A general view on training and safety issues; and

Ø Surveillance efforts being practiced by the Philippines and neighboring

countries particularly those that are archipelagic in nature like the Philippines will be

integrated to serve as models.

Chapter Four will deal with the proposed command and control procedures for the

LRPA. Definitions with reference to the basic command and control terminologies and

principles as utilized by the military hierarchy will be included. Missions performed

jointly with either another branch of the military service or with another government

agency will be discussed to avoid the mistake of overlapping of authority once the

mission has commenced. To maintain the flow of continuity in this field of research by

the Philippine Air Force, this chapter will be greatly influenced by the book of

Lieutenant Colonel Dexter O. Huerto (Command and Control of the Philippine Maritime

Air Surveillance, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1998) who was also a fellow at

the RAAF Aerospace Centre.

 Chapter Five will discuss the characteristics of a desired Long-Range Patrol

Aircraft, although it will be referred to in generic terms since there is a separate group

in the Philippine Air force which will be deciding on the actual platform. Description of

the desired performance of the maritime aircraft and the desired equipment fit to be

installed in the said LRPA, for optimum mission accomplishment will also be

discussed.

Finally, chapter Six will summarize the conclusions drawn from the previous

chapters highlighting significant points that will be relevant in the operation of a

dedicated LRPA platform in support of national security for the Philippines.

* Printed edition of this book available at OSS Library.