Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice Author(s): Ken Booth Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs

(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 527-545 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621950 . Accessed: 13/06/2012 20:27
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in anarchy: Security utopian realism in theory andpractice

KEN

BOOTH

in a system where Realism-the view thatwar is inescapable sovereign states to one another's compete forpowerand advantage detriment-still dominates aboutinternational relations. Ken Bootharguesthat, thinking as world politics continue to surprise us, a worldview in whichwar is seenas a rational policychoice is unacceptable. It is toosoon in history to conclude thattheinternational system is in whathas beencalled necessarily a 'war system'. As states become lessimportant a the'new medievalism', he arguesfor towards decentralizing powerevenfurther He quotesOscar and a global community global civilsociety ofcommunities. Wilde: 'A map oftheworldthatdoesnotinclude Utopia is notevenworth glancing at.' An inaugurallectureis supposed to mark a beginning.This is not easy in the humanities, sincewhen it comes to studying people thereis littlenew underthe a reinauguralratherthan a beginning.I will argue sun. Consequently,I offer a case for restoring the role and reputationof 'utopianism' in the theoryand practiceof international politics.' In the I940s, the study of international politics was knocked offits then Patriotmissilecalled E. H. Carr. Carr ran utopian trajectory by an intellectual theDepartmentof International Politicsat Aberystwyth fromthemid-I930s to the mid-I940s, and in that time wrote what is stillregardedas the definitive written critiqueof utopian thinkingon the subject. Brian Porterhas recently that The twenty years'crisis, 1919-39, publishedin I939, 'sounded the deathknell 2 This is a widelyheld view, of utopianismas a respectable intellectual tradition. or progressive but when did truthor understanding change have anythingto is not self-evidently do with being respectable?Respectability an intellectual
virtue.

David Davies had founded the Department of InternationalPolitics at in I9I9, and in so doing he became the midwifefor the subject Aberystwyth
This is an edited version of an inaugural lecture given at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth,on 20 March I99I. Studies I5: I, Jan. I989, Brian Porter, 'David Davies: a hunterafterpeace', Review of International p. 32. Later comments on Davies are based on this article.
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67, 3 (I99I) International Affairs

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Ken Booth everywhere. The UniversityCollege of Wales is rightly proud of having been the home of the first department of itskind. Davies's initiative was inspiredby a spirit of liberalhumanitarianism and had been provoked by thehorrors of the of international Great War.3 With the studyand strengthening organizations and international law, he hoped that the world would never again have to undergo what had been witnessedbetween I9I4 and I9I8. The world, and perhapseven more hurtfully forDavies, his Department,did not conform to his utopian hopes. In the I930s, instead of international cooperation,'power politics' became dominant,and theiracademic offshoot came to be called 'realism'. This was all an understandablereaction to the events of the time, and intellectuallyCarr's writing was decisive. Davies became very unhappy about the shiftfrom utopianismto realism,and later wrote, 'I wish to God I had never initiatedthis proposal' (establishing the Woodrow Wilson Chair). Realism took over the study of international politics almost entirelyfrom thispoint,and it stilllargelysetsthe agenda. It stresses the tragicand conflictual side of relationsbetween states,and sees foreignpolicy in termsof the pursuit of thenationalinterest, definedas power. One of the mostfamiliar in sentences the whole subjectis thatof Hans J. Morgenthau: 'International politics,like all politics,is a strugglefor power.4 But despiteits insights and pre-eminence, realismhas deep problemsas the lens throughwhich students and practitioners look at world politics.I hope to the balance in favourof utopianism, so thatby the end do something to restore of thesepages David Davies will be able to restsomewhatmore easily (though it is not his particular brand of utopianism that I will advocate). As it Davies has had a good yearso far:one of his central happensthemuch criticized In the interwaryears Davies was a strong ideas has recently come to fruition. supporterof an international police forcebased on air power. A global posse as has recently been seen in huntingdown the bad guys with hi-techlethality, the Gulf, is exactly what he was advocating; and for 6o yearshis ideas were itsstudents. scorned.International politicscan always be reliedupon to surprise I International politics can also be relied upon to provide its studentswith a subject absolutelylike no other. It standsuniquely at the nexus of the great issuesof peace and war, 'theoriesof the good life' and 'theoriesof survival ','
An account of the origins and growth of the Department is given by Ieuan John, Moorhead Wright in Brian Porter, ed., The and John Garnett,'International politics at AberystwythI9I9-I969', politics1919-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, I972), pp. Aberystwyth papers: international
86-I02.

forpower and peace (3rd edn, New York: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politicsamongnations: thestruggle Knopf, I965; firstpublished I948), p. 28. Martin Wight's distinctionwas: political theoryis concerned with the good life,internationaltheory with survival. See Martin Wight, 'Why is there no internationaltheory?', in H. Butterfieldand M. politics(London: Allen & Unwin, of international essaysin thetheory Wight, Diplomaticinvestigations:
I966), p. i8.

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in anarchy Security and 'ethics of conviction',6 and political theoryand 'ethics of responsibility' straddleshistory,contemporary governmentalpractice. The subject-matter affairs and the future. The subject conjuresup many images. For some the image is of diplomats is that hurrying out of carsinto conference halls,but forme the most persistent rubbleof Hiroshima.The destruction of thatcityby a singlebomb of thelifeless about thegames nations symbolizeswhat can happen when traditional thinking play is kittedout with modern militarytechnology.Hiroshima I945 can be seen as the culminationof a 300-year span of historydominated by sovereign withrealist states outlooks,Machiavellianethicsand a Clausewitzianphilosophy of war. The image of Hiroshima,or the photographpublishedin The Observer on 3 March I99I of a dead Iraqi solider,body intactbut burntto charcoal,is a fitting forour study.These images shouldbe thestarting-point, starting-point the heightof human irrationality and the triumph not because theyrepresent the heightof rationality and of evil, but because theycan be said to represent thetriumph of good. When thisis thebottomline,it is difficult not to conclude thatthe theoryand practiceof international of politicshave become symptoms the disease of which they should be the cure.7 The 'disease', to use the word loosely, has been the inabilityof the human in such a way thatbasic needs are universally to organize its affairs collectivity War has always been seen as met,injusticeis reduced,and power is harnessed. the centralproblem in international politics,but thereare also silentdestroyers of lives. In the mid-ig8os, for example, the British complained when our average incomes rose by only 5 per cent,or /?400 a year. Countlessmillionsin the Third World have to live, or die, on an annual income farless than that.8 At the root of such problems,accordingto mainstream international theory, is thoughtto be the structure of the statessystem.It is usually described,in a technicalsense,as 'anarchical', thatis, 'without government'.This means that above thelevel of states thereis no supremelaw-makeror law-enforcer to keep order, as a governmentis supposed to do within states. But this anarchy between statesdoes not necessarily everyday produce chaos,the non-technical, meaning of 'anarchy'. Statesforma primitivesociety,with rules,norms and values (such as international This elementof law, diplomacy and sovereignty). societyusuallycushionsstatesfromeach other(like the rules,normsand values in a typicalWesternfamily, which is another'anarchical' relationship). Hidemi societyto an egg-box, which Suganami and JohnVincentlikenedinternational against each mostly preventsthe contentsfrom knocking too destructively other.9So we have anarchybetween states,but also society.This led Hedley
the modern discourse of realism', pp. 23-53 in Smith, Realist thought from Weberto Kissinger(Baton Rouge LA: Louisiana State University Press, I986). This is an application to internationalpolitics, conceived in the traditionalway, of the remark made by Herbert Feigel of the Vienna Circle about philosophy as traditionallypractised. 8 Peter Donaldson, Worldsapart: the development gap and what it means(Harmondsworth: Pelican, I986); see especially part one, 'Worlds drifting apart'. 9 R. J. Vincent, Human rights and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I986),
pp.

6 An introductionto Weber's importantdistinctionis given by Michael Joseph Smith, 'Max Weber and

I23-5.

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Ken Booth Bull, famously, to describethe interstate systemby an insightful oxymoron as 'the anarchicalsociety'.10 By the I98os, the academic studyof international politicshad itself become an anarchical society.Students had to decide betweenthoseprofessors forwhom thestatewas thecore of thesubject,and thoseforwhom it was at theperiphery. They had to understand neo-Hobbesians,forwhom international lifeis 'nasty, Y and neo-Kantians,who believe brutish and (only if you are powerful)long', there is an emergent world community. They had to struggle with postmodernistsand positivists, and strategists, peace researchers and quantifiers historians, functionalists (old and new), and on and on. The programmes of the annual conferencesof the British InternationalStudies Association and the International StudiesAssociationtellit all: theylistpieces of a mosaic searching a for pattern. But thebasic outlinesof the studyof international politicsremainestablished by the outlook of political realism.12 This, without doubt, is related to the that realism has always given to war, a preoccupationthat surely centrality needs no justification. War and the threatof war shape lives across the world in all mannerof directand indirect ways-more or less,dependingupon where one was lucky or unlucky enough to be born. Michael Walzer expressedthe universal pervasivenessof war by neatly paraphrasingTrotsky's aphorism about the dialectic. 'You may not be interested in war', Walzer wrote, 'but war is interestedin you.'13 Somerset Maugham once expressed the same thought.Asked about his views on nuclearweapons, he said: 'Nuclear weapons are not in my line; unfortunately I'm in theirs.' An important feature of realism'sintellectual attraction has always been that it offereda plausible explanation of war and power politics in general, and seemed to generatestrategies for coping with the problem of survival amid interstate anarchy. Carr's The twenty years' crisiswas a milestone in realist thought.14 It is without doubt a brilliant work. But it is also flawed,has been and has had an unhelpful misunderstood, influence on the developmentof the subject. The twenty is flawed because the text shows Carr to have been years'crisis confusedas to where he stood in relationto utopianismand realism.What is now rememberedis his logical dissectionof utopianismand the message that In a well-known sectionhe wrote: 'utopia' and 'reality' are irreconcilable. is thecomplexity, Here,then, thefascination andthetragedy ofallpolitical life. Politics are madeup of two elements-utopia and reality-belonging to two different planes whichcan nevermeet.15
Hedley Bull, The anarchical society:a studyof order in worldpolitics(London: Macmillan, I977). " This is a variation on a theme of Phil Williams's, following ThomasHobbes. 12 See K. J. Holsti, The dividing discipline:hegemony and diversity in international theory (Boston MA: Allen & Unwin, I987), passim. 13 MichaelWalzer, Just andunjust wars(Harmondsworth: Pelican,I980), p. 29. 1 E. H. Carr, The twenty years'crisis,1919-1939: an introduction to thestudyof international relations (London:Macmillan, I966; first published I939). 15 Carr, The twenty years' crisis, p. 93.
10

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Security in anarchy antithesis' This is a persistent theme. Elsewherehe talksabout 'a fundamental a 'fatal dualism' between power and morality, and betweenutopia and reality, the 'mutually incompatible' elements of utopia and reality,morality and power.'6 Yet in other places Carr is more guarded, talking about the 'apparently opposite poles' of utopian feelingsof rightand realistconceptions of utopia and reality,the 'coordination' of force,the need for a 'combination' of power and morality,the importance of basing or 'uneasy compromise' thoughton 'elements'of bothutopia and reality,and he describespoliticsand law as a 'meeting place' for ethics and power.'7 His changing language and reflect confusion about how to describethe relationship significant uncertainty rather in Carr's own mind. This appearsto me to be an intellectual thana moral dilemma; it is ambiguityratherthan 'anguish'. The ambiguityin Carr's language pointsto the conclusionthathis book has His readers, have pounced upon realists, been misunderstood. overwhelmingly his his attackon utopianismbut generallyhave failedto note his uncertainty, criticism of realismand his positivecommentsabout utopianism.For example, Carr definedpolitical science as 'the sciencenot only of what is, but of what ought to be '.18 Later,he described'sound politicalthoughtand sound political with finding a place forboth utopianismand realism.19 He life' as synonymous criticized 'pure realism' or 'consistent realism' for failing to provide the 'essential ingredientsof all effectivepolitical thinking'.2O He argued that international order could not be based on power alone, and that it was an 'unreal kind of realism' which ignored the elementof moralityin any world order. Finally,the very last page of the book containsan appeal to the idea an expression of the of spreading community beyond national frontiers, view of broadeningour of international desirability policy, and the suggestion forit.2"This side of Carr is thatpeople mightrespondto an appeal to sacrifice normallyignored by realists.It was inconvenientthat one of realism'schief gurus had some decidedlyutopian leanings. The misunderstood Carr-Carr the single-minded criticof utopians rather than Carr the potentialutopian realist-also exerteda balefulinfluence on the statusof Kant in the studyof international politics. Carr's attack on what he called the 'infantile'utopianism22 of the I920S and I930S was so devastating that kiss of death. As a resultone of the the 'utopian' label became a professional ImmanuelKant, who made important world's greatest arguments philosophers, about international between 'republicanism' governmentand the relationship and peace, became a virtualnon-personin the discipline, or at besta strawman 'revolutionist'tradition, to use MartinWight's termfor fora non-respectable the Kantian approach. It is unlikelythatKant would have been offered a job as
16 17 18 20

22

Carr, The twenty years' crisis, pp. II, 236 and 9. Carr, The twenty years'crisis, pp. 223, I3, 97, 220, 93 and I72. Emphasis added. p. 5. Carr, The twenty years' crisis, 9 Carr, The twenty years'crisis, p. Io. Carr, The twenty years'crisis, p. 89. The 'essential ingredients' were 'a finitegoal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgement and a ground for action'. It is hoped that all these ingredientsare found 21 Carr, The twenty in the approach to be elaborated in these pages. years'crisis, p. 239. Carr, The twenty years' crisis, p. 5.

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Ken Booth

Later, Carr acknowledged that he had exaggerated the role of power.23 he was not alone among realism'sfoundingfiguresof the I940S Significantly, in latermoving away fromwhat had become the basic tenetsof the approach (though,like Carr, most are stillremembered forwhat theysaid first, not last). of the subjectof power politics,laterwarned of Hans Morgenthau,the father the cosmic dangers of realism and advocated world government.24 George became relaxed about the Soviet threat Kennan, the creatorof containment, came and decidelyanti-nuclear.25 Bernard Brodie, the inventorof deterrence, to see the historical obsolescenceof war and argued thatwar is a moral arena.26 Carr William T. R. Fox, thecoinerof theterm'superpower', asked (in thefirst memoriallecture)who were the 'real realists'thesedays,and he made it clear thathe did not mean those he called the 'doctrinal realists'who had come to dominate the subject.27 In both theoryand practice,realismhas never been as simple as it seems. In the I960s, forexample,therewas an interesting splitbetweensome of thegrand old men of realismand the middle-agedsuccessorgeneration theyhad trained. Morgenthau,Kennan, Niebuhr and Brodie all opposed the war in Vietnam; Kissingerand his generationof realists largelysupportedit.28This episode, like others,exposes the myththatrealismis a clear guide to action in termsof the national interestexpressed as power. Realist explanations of international politicsdo not work as guidebooks for action in all circumstances, any more thanvolumes on the philosophyof ethics.The practicality of 'realism' is more in the titlethan in the text. Thus although realismexplained some elementsof politicsamong nations, of thesubject by the I970S it had become clearto a growingnumberof students thatit did not accountforall thecomplexities of politicson a global scale.29 This was when I began to move away, and my positionnow is thatof an ex-, antiand post-realist. It is ex-realist in the sensethatthatis where I come from; few in the sense that I disagree with those important elsewhere. It is anti-realist founding figures like Niebuhr who belonged to a tradition of Christian and who therefore saw a fallenhuman natureat the root of war and pessimism
23

between the I940S and I970S.

a university teacherof international politicsin the main centresof the subject

students trained in thesubject between theI940S and I970S couldhave started

24

25 26

27 28 29

In the preface to the second edition, dated I5 Nov. I945. Carr, The twenty years'crisis, pp. vii-viii. p. 244, gives a list of the main works by and about Smith, Realist thought from Weberto Kissinger, Morgenthau. For a personal account of Morgenthau's volte-face on power politics, see Francis A. Boyle, Worldpoliticsand international law (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, I985), pp. 70-4. relations in theatomicage See, for example, George F. Kennan, The nucleardelusion: Soviet-American (London: Hamish Hamilton, I984). See Ken Booth, 'Bernard Brodie: the absolute strategist',in John Baylis and John Garnett,eds., The makers of nuclearstrategy (London: Pinter, I99i). W. T. R. Fox, 'E. H. Carr and political realism: vision and revision', Review of International Studies
II: I (I985), pp. i-i6.
23I-2;

See Smith, Realist thought from Weberto Kissinger, pp.

pp. I27-8, I57-8, I85-8, 2I3-I6.

and on the views of individuals,

See, for example, the contributorsto Margot Light and A. R. Groom, eds., International relations: a handbook of current theory (London: Pinter, I985), passim.

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Security in anarchy otherinternational problems.30 This mighthave represented sound Christianity, but it was weak anthropology.The study of aboriginal societiesshows that non-violentsocial relationsare possible; it shows thatwar is not in our genes, or in what some would call our souls, but in our culture,and culturescan be changed.3" (For this reason the preservationof aboriginal peoples can be regardedas the moral equivalentin civilizationaltermsof the ecological need to preservethe rainforest. if one is saved, thereis a good chance Conveniently, of saving the other.) in the sensethatI recognizetheinsights Finally,my positionis post-realist of to go beyond KennethWaltz's versionof realism,but thinkthatit is necessary it. Waltz's 'neo-realism'32 explainswar and otherinternational phenomenanot in termsof a fallenhuman nature,like some of the foundingfigures, but in termsof theanarchicalstructure of thestates system. This determining structure is said to impose a 'self-help' logic on states.From thisperspective, wars occur because thereis nothingto stop them when a statebelieves it must defendor further a 'vital interest' by force.Brecht,in Mother Courage, put theneo-realist in attitudeto war a nutshell: 'War is like love, it always findsa way.'

It But is thereonly one logic to anarchy?It was questioningthelogic of anarchy, which grew out of my studyof ethnocentrism in the mid-197os,33 thatled me 3 Like similarlabels, thisraises to an approach which I call 'utopian realism'. at least as many questions as it settles, but what appeals is the way it provocativelycouples the two 'planes' that Carr had said could never meet. Others,in theirown ways, have pursuedthe same goal of tryingto reconcile of both the 'utopia 'and ' reality', 'power' and 'morality', and the interests in international and theuniversal.Of specialimportance particular politicshave been the writingsof John Herz, who has been struggling for nearly 50 years with versions of his 'realist liberalism'. In the I980s, manifestations of the

30 A useful introductionto and bibliography of Niebuhr's works, and criticismsof them, is given by Smith, Realist thoughtfrom Weberto Kissinger, pp. 99-I33, 242-4. Smith describes Niebuhr as 'without
31

32

33 34

question the most profound thinkerof the modern realistschool'. See inter alia David Fabbro, 'Peaceful societies: an introduction',Journalof Peace Research, Vol. I5 (I978), pp. 67-83; R. D. Givens and M. A. Nettleship,Discussionson war and humanaggression (The Hague: Mouton, I975); A. Montague, The nature of humanaggression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976) and Learningnon-aggression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, I978); and M. A. Nettleship, R. D. Givens and A. Nettleship, War, its causesand correlates (The Hague: Mouton, I975). The book that brought his developing ideas togetherwas Kenneth N. Waltz, Theoryof international politics(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, I979). The origins were evident in his classic Man, thestate and war (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, I959). An importantsurvey of neo-realism is Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealismand its critics (New York: Columbia University Press, I986). Ken Booth, Strategy and ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, I979). Ken Booth, 'Steps towards stable peace in Europe: a theory and practice of coexistence', paper presentedto 5Ist Pugwash Symposium (2I-4 Apr. I988, Bochum, Germany), InternationalPolitics Research Papers No. 4 (Dept of InternationalPolitics, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth). A later version was published in International Affairs 66: I, Jan. I990, pp. I7-45.

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Ken Booth realism' and Radmila challengewere RichardAshley'snotionof' emancipatory Nakarada's 'responsible utopianism'. In the field of sociology, Anthony Giddens has also been drawn to the phrase 'utopian realism'.35 Utopian realism as I am using it here is more an attitudeof mind than a 'theory' with powers of explanationand prediction.But it is based upon both normative (' utopian') and empirical ('realistic') theories. The normative elementis made up of a universalappeal, based on reason, to various world orderprinciples thoughtto represent the appropriate standpoint foracademics. The empiricalelementseeksto make the world of politicsmore intelligible by a fuller seekingto go beyond realismto a setof ideas which offer understanding of theforcesshaping'Who getswhat,when and how', to use Harold Lasswell's phrase.A utopian realistapproach will lead to a distinctive practiceof politics, and such a practicegrows,in a way Carr would have approved,from'reality' (as is evidentfromthe 'alternativesecurity'ideas which evolved in the early I980s in response to the predicamentsof the Second Cold War).36 Stanley whose humaneand sophisticated over theyearsare a model Hoffmann, writings forstudents of thesubject,has describedsuch an approachas 'uplifting politics', as distinct from 'applied ethics'.37 The brief explanation of the theory and practice of utopian realism that follows can only sketchthe main outlines; many philosophicaland practical questionsmust remain open for further discussion. a counter-attack mustbe organizedon behalfof' utopian' thinking. An First, obvious place to begin is by pointingout thatsome of theattacks on utopianism over the yearshave been ill founded.Much generalcriticism, forexample, has simply been tautologous. If 'utopia' is understood in an absolute sense as a it is not ' realistic 'good but unachievablesociety ', thenby definition ', thatis, practical,politics.But realismhas oftenbeen blinkeredabout what actuallyis 'practical', as in its definitionof politics as 'the art of the possible'. Being unambitiousabout defining what is 'practical' or 'possible' can be dramatically unrealistic,since, as was mentioned earlier, internationalpolitics is full of What readerof a centuryago at the high tide of imperialism would surprises. have expected the end of colonialism within an (admittedlylong) lifetime? What second-yearstudentsitting here two yearsago would have expected the Finals? collapse of Soviet power in EasternEurope beforesitting Anotherimportant and generallyoverlooked questionconcernsthe motives of those criticswho use 'utopian' as a negativelabel. In a sense,thisamounts
The development of Herz's ideas can be traced in his Politicalrealismand politicalidealism(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 195I), International politicsin theatomicage (New York: Columbia University Press, I959), The nation-state and thecrisisof worldpolitics(New York: David McKay, I976) and 'Political realism revisited', International See also StudiesQuarterly 25: 2, June I98I, pp. I82-97. Richard Ashley, 'Political realism and human interests',International StudiesQuarterly 25: 2, June I98I, in Mary pp. 204-36; Radmila Nakarada, 'The democratic potential of the new detente', pp. 39I-408 Kaldor, Gerald Holden and Richard Falk, eds., The new detente (London: Verso, I989); and Anthony & Society,2 Nov. I990. Giddens, 'Modernity and utopia', pp. 20-2 in New Statesman See, for example, Ken Booth, ed., New thinking aboutstrategy and international security (London: Harper

36

Collins,1991), passim.

Stanley Hoffmann,Duties beyond borders: on the limits and possibilities of ethicalinternational politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UniversityPress, I98I), p. 2.

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Security in anarchy to an attemptby one group to controlthinking by the controlof language.3" thattie women to washingThis is similarto thelinguistic politicsof patriarchy machines. Girl babies are not born with a washing-powdergene; women's by Hotpoint. The souls do not come with a five-year warrantymanufactured answer to the question 'Who does the washing?', like that to the question 'What is war?', is primarily cultural.In the linguisticpoliticsof international politics,utopianismhas been ghettoizedby negativelabelling.It has been made in orderto reinforce the claim thatthereis no alternative to the non-respectable who do thisprobablydo not recognize statusquo. For the most partthe critics of the statusquo is at the level of the what they are doing; theirnaturalizing It is also a sign subconscious,and it is a sign of realism'slack of self-awareness. of its conservatism. Leonard Woolf, 20 yearsbeforeCarr's Twenty years crisis, any new idea or argued thatthe designation 'utopian' was a device to discredit proposal.3 The sensein which I and othersin thefieldsof politicaltheoryand sociology want to use the term 'utopia' these days is neitherpejorativenor absolute. It into the idea thatthe world does not have to look like the one we crystallizes with: Utopian thinking is 'the GreatRefusal',and it can be justified are familiar on a number of different grounds.40 can be used as the basis for In the first place, academically,utopian thinking a criticalre-evaluationof what is believed to exist, what is believed to be and philosophicallycontestable. 'reality'. What 'is' is politically,semantically body What, forexample, is the 'reality' of an egg? Is it an oval reproductive or a potential or one's next breakfast? Should it be regardedas a thing-in-itself chicken?Realism assumestoo big a distinction between the subjectand object, factand value, is and ought, image and reality. Second, in the practiceof politics,utopian thinkingsetsgoals and can be a catalyst to action. Destinations are an integral part of politics, as will be is a significant discussedbelow. Finally,since utopian thinking part of human culture,as Carr himselfrecognized,it has a role in generaleducation in what William Morris called 'the education of desire': in this case, the desirefor a since it is betterway of being and living.4"This is a perfectly proper activity, not only human 'reason' thatrequires'educating', as so much of what passes for 'thought' is the reasoningof the 'emotions'42 If the meaning of utopia is freed from the definitional trap of having to and the analysesof utopianscan appear immediately possible,utopian thinking
38

39

40

41
42

1916-1935 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, I988), David Forgacs, ed., A Gramscireader:selected writings pp. I95, 301-II, 323-62, 422-4. Quoted by Peter Wilson, 'Leonard Woolf and internationalgovernment as a path to peace', paper presentedto the British InternationalStudies Association conference,Newcastle, Dec. I990, p. 8. Ruth Levitas, The concept of utopia (New York: Philip Allan, I990), p. ix. I have greatlybenefited from this book, and also from Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor, The politicsof utopia: a studyin and practice theory (London: Hutchinson, i982). Levitas, The concept of utopia,ch. 6, 'The education of desire: the rediscoveryof William Morris'. Recent theoriesin cognitive psychology show the importance of the emotions in the management of goals and actions; they allow us to understandthat emotions are not particularly'irrational'. See No. I678, I9 Aug. I989, pp. 33-6. Keith Oakley, 'The importance of being emotional', New Scientist,

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Ken Booth in educatingpeople about international politics perform an invaluablefunction and politics in general. This conception of political education immediately Michael Oakeshott's,whose inaugurallectureon the subject40 years confronts of theconservative approach ago became one of theintellectual building-blocks which was so congenial to realism: and In politicalactivity [he said in a much quoted passage]men sail a boundless is neither harbour forshelter nor floorforanchorage, bottomless neither sea; there The enterprise on an even destination. is to keep afloat starting place nor appointed keel.43 Oscar Wilde once used a similaranalogy, but showed a deeper understanding of the mainsprings of social life.He wrote that'A map of the world thatdoes not include Utopia is not even worth glancingat.'44Nobody sailsjust to keep Noah was probably the only sailor who set out withouta harbouror afloat.45 A desiredphysicalgoal is implicit had a destination. anchorage,but he certainly in sailing, though all sailors know that on a given voyage they might not actuallyreach the destination theyoriginallyplanned. They also know thatif of a nexttime.Of courseit is essential theysurvivethereis always thepossibility to keep afloat,and so thereis a need for 'theoriesof survival', but thereis also and thus 'theories of the good life'. a need for destinations, the world politicalcommunitywould floataimlessly Without a destination, and realistswould plot an aimless log. This would be a study of seamanship withoutnavigation.To set politicalsail in such circumstances would mean that neverthesubject.At this groupswould merelybe theobject of historical forces, such an at the end of the twentiethcentury, particularcrossroadsof history, The human collectivity is more thanever in need approachwould be irrational. of conscious cultural development. If world politics simply continue to be driven by the major forcesof the last I50 years-the apparentlyunstoppable juggernauts of industrialization, capitalism,growth, and population expansion-the outcome in the second halfof the next centurycould be very bleak indeed. When thinking about the future, a usefuldistinction can be made between 'end-point utopias' and ' process utopias .46 Most utopian thinkinglooks as world government, towardsa future when history virtually blueprint, Usuch comes to a stop. But such end-pointutopias are only attainable,if at all, over time-scale.It is not profitable to spend much time contemplating a verydistant structures which, if theyare ever built,will be in conditionsradicallydifferent fromtoday. It is futileto tryto over-manage the long-termfuture. Processutopias,on the otherhand, are benignand reformist stepscalculated to make a better world somewhat more probable for futuregenerations.
4

44
45

46

Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in politics(London: Methuen, I962), p. I27. The inaugural lecture, 'Political education', was delivered at the London School of Economics, 6 Mar. I95I. Quoted in Levitas, The concept of utopia,p. 5. This line of questioning the famous metaphor follows Bernard Crick's obituary of Oakeshott, 'Ideal scourge of the idealists', The Guardian22 Dec. I990. The distinctionis Joseph Nye's; see his 'The long-term futureof deterrence', pp. 245-7 in Roman (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, I987). Kolkowicz, ed., The logicof nuclearterror

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Security in anarchy Trying to reduce the risk of war each year, improving human rightsand spreadingeconomicjustice are examplesof such policies.Generalizedimages of a preferred futureworld can be offered, but the details can only be settled when the future problemsand prospectsare clearer.Processutopianismis thus practical utopianism.It is not a 'revolutionary'agenda in which theendjustifies the means,but rather an approach to politicsin which in a real sensethe means are the ends. So, if we look afterthe processes,the structures should look after themselves;and as Camus said in the early I950s, the means one uses today shapes the ends one mightperhapsreach tomorrow.47 The adjective 'utopian' in 'utopian realism' is therefore more practicalthan is usually implied. In parallel with this,the 'realism' elementis more realistic in I984 as having dominated the than the 'doctrinal' approach Fox identified In the subject. Doctrinal realismfailsto make world politicsfullyintelligible. Waltzian version,for example, it makes interstate relationsa 'domain of its own, and leaves out a great deal of what is most pertinent to explain events and trends. The state-centred perspectivenotably provided no handle for the fascinating evolution of Europe in the I98os fromthe birth understanding of Solidarity to the coming to power in much of Eastern Europe of civil society.48During this period much of the European agenda on political, economic, defence and environmental issues was set by popular social movements,not governments.In addition, the globalization of so much of politicallyrelevantlife demands a different frameworkfor understanding.49 Consequently, making the political world intelligiblethese days requires a global and eclectic approach, and the borrowing of insightsfrom a range of perspectives-the world society school, international political economy, Failure to comparativepoliticsand criticaltheory-as well as otherdisciplines. featureof the realist make more of otherapproaches has been a characteristic is treatedas a hegemony. For realism,the studyof international politicsitself domain of its own. as was Not only is realismincreasingly unrealistic;it lacks self-awareness, valid thantheutopianismit derides. earlier.It is lessepistemologically suggested of Waltz as standard-bearer for This is broughtout in RichardAshley'scriticism as the statist and a ideology value-system masquerading supposedlyobjective self-interest Put bluntly, realismis ethnocentric relations.50 laws of international writ large. But is utopianismno more thanoptimismwritlarge,as has been implied by Inis Claude and Ian Clark ?51I thinknot. Utopians-who thinkthatthe world
4 48 49 50
5

borders, p. I97. Hoffmann,Duties beyond The problem was not confined to academics, of course. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, 'Eastern Europe: 46: 2, Mar. I990, pp. I7-2I. the story the media missed', Bulletinof AtomicScientists world focus ofpoliticalactionin themodern Evan Luard, The globalizationofpolitics: thechanged (Basingstoke: Macmillan, I990). Richard K. Ashley, 'The poverty of neorealism', p. 258 in Keohane, ed., Neo-realismand its critics. As between realism and idealism, Inis Claude argued that the crucial question was 'optimism': see his of states In his excellent The hierarchy 'comment' on Herz, 'Political realism revisited', pp. I98-200. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I989), Ian Clark identifiesKant with 'the traditionof optimism' and Rousseau with 'the traditionof despair', chs. 3 and 4.

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Ken Booth could and should be changed-are oftenthe most pessimistic about thenuclear and ecological long-termfuture.Realists,by contrast-who pride themselves on understandingthe gloomy path of human history-are optimistic in believingthatnucleardeterrence can continue,withoutbreakingdown, forthe rest of history.Philosophically, optimism is identifiedwith Leibniz, who thoughtthis 'the best of all possible worlds'. But that beliefhappens to be a characteristic assumption of political realism. Clearly, using optimism and pessimism as a basis for distinguishingbetween utopians and realists is confusing. Time-framemightbe a more helpfulguide in clarifying the difference. For utopians, today's problems are not the main ones; whereas for realists, problem-solving means attending to the agendas of policy-makers. As a result, those academics who seek the ears of princesnecessarily have theirhorizons foreshortened. Giving a privilegedpositionto the shortterm,however, easily leads to what has been called the'boiled frogsyndrome'.When frogs are placed in a pan of waterwhich is gentlyheated,theydo not detectthegradualincrease in temperatureuntil their very existence is threatened.52 The analogy is obvious-realist Nero fiddlingwhile weapons of mass destruction proliferate and the rain forest burns. of utopian thinkingis that it is a matterof personal One serious criticism one value system and preference, pitchedagainstanother.This is a fundamental from difficult issue,but it is possible to argue fora universalethicalstandpoint a rationalpoint of view. The argumentis based on the beliefthatethicsare an and the generallyaccepted view that value-free'social science' is invention53 The idea of a universalrationalethicalstandpoint was clarified impossible.54 by notion of a 'veil of and controversial JohnRawls with his thought-provoking In The ignorance' (based upon theidea, implicitin Kant, of 'justice as fairness'). first theory publishedin I97I, Rawls askedhis readersto supposea 'veil ofjustice, of ignorance' drawn acrosssocial reality.55 They are theninvitedto imagine a of theirpositionin it. societyin which theywould be willing to live regardless about justice, since it is only the roll of This is a logical place to startthinking the cosmic genetic dice that determineswhetheras individualswe are born healthyand among the prosperousor among the wretchedof the wretched. From behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, the global statusquo becomes a severely chastening prospect. After this, an ethical test that appeals to who would not emergein supportof universalist values relatingto rationality, economic justice and environmental non-violence,human rights, protection? who cannot conceive of choice, would not Who, except for those fatalists ? espouse liberty, equality and fraternity (not to mentionsorority)
Robert Ornstein and Paul Ehrlich, New world,new mind(London: Methuen, I989), p. 74. sa See, for example, J. L. Mackie, Ethics: inventing and wrong(Harmondsworth: Penguin, I977). right intothe pronounced, for example, by David Easton in The politicalsystem:an enquiry 54 As magisterially stateofpoliticalscience(New York: Knopf, I964), p. 225. ofjustice (London: Oxford University Press, I972), pp. I7-22, I36-42. 5 John Rawls, A theory borders, pp. 2-5) is weakened in Hoffmann's criticismof Rawls (in Hoffmann,Duties beyond Hoffmann's own termsif it is accepted that one of the major 'political realities' is that human beings are more 'fundamental and primordial' than states.
52

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Security in anarchy Viewed in thislight,utopian thinking cannot be exclusionist;it must speak for the community of humankind. This is particularlyappropriate for academics,who by virtueof theircallingshould adopt a holisticperspective on world politics.Afterall, 'universus',fromwhich theword 'university'comes, means 'whole'. Consequently, a nationalistuniversityis a contradictionin terms.Grey is the colour of truth, not red, white and blue. The statessystem is obviously an important for thoughtand action. But part of the framework what thisimpliesforthosewho studymilitary strategy, forexample,is thatthe guidingprincipleshould not be to increasethe power of one's own statein the contentionof nations. Rather, the study and writing of academics is most appropriately guided by the idea of seeing theirown states,in Hedley Bull's brilliantphrase,as 'local agents of the world common good'.56 III in anarchy?What are the end-points, the What does all thissay about security and therelevantprocessesfroma utopian realist guidingprinciples perspective? To begin with, the key concept in thinking about security in thisapproach is 'emancipation9. Emancipation should be given precedence in security realistthemesof power and order. The trouble thinkingover the traditional with giving a privileged position to power and order is that they are at somebody else's expense,which means thattheyare potentially unstable.The absolute power and thereforesecurity of one state implies the absolute impotence and thereforeinsecurityof all others. Likewise, absolute order impliesno change; and where thereis no allowance forchange thereis unlikely True security to be justice,and without justice thereis thepotentialforconflict. can only be achieved by people and groups if theydo not depriveothersof it. that stop them Emancipation means freeingpeople from those constraints carryingout what freelythey would choose to do, of which war, poverty, oppressionand poor educationare a few. Securityand emancipationare in fact two sides of the same coin. It is emancipation,not power and order,in both theory and practice, that leads to stable security. Liberal democracies, committedto a level of social justice and relativelyprosperous-though still with a long way to go before achieving full emancipation-do not seem inclinedto fighteach other. Implicitin theidea of emancipationis theKantianidea thatpeople should be treated as ends and not means (which automaticallyrules out 'totalitarian in terms).States,by contrast, should be treatedas utopias' as a contradiction nature meansand not ends. Statesare unreliable, illogicaland too variedin their
56

57

University of Waterloo, I983, H. Bull, 'Order and justice in internationalrelations', Hagey Lectures, and theory and I4; quoted by Andrew Linklater,Beyondrealismand marxism:critical pp. II-I2 international relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, I990), p. 20. This and related mattersare also well I5: 2, discussed in Linklater,'The problem of community in internationalrelations', Alternatives Spring I990, pp. I35-53. Studies I7: 4, This is elaborated in Ken Booth, 'Security and emancipation', Review of International

Oct. I991.

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Ken Booth to be thoughtof as theprimary referents fora satisfactory theoryof security on a world scale. People should be the primaryreferent, not states.As Bull put it, is morefundamental andprimordial Worldorder thaninternational order becausethe ... butindividual ultimate units ofthegreat society ofall mankind arenotstates human and indestructible in whichgroupings whicharepermanent in a sense of them beings, of thisor thatsortare not.58 The focuson individualsis not as radical as it mightsound. Bull himself went on to point out thatthroughthe promotion of human rightsand the transfer of resources, in theUN are committedto more thanthepreservation even states of the egg-box.59 If emancipationis the guiding principlefor security, the key concepts for anarchy are 'community' and the awful Euroword 'subsidiarity'. In community building, we are concerned with breaking down distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, 'us' and 'them', and creating positive relationships based not only on reciprocalobligationsand mutual self-interest but also on a senseof loyaltyand moral obligation(Gemeinschaft).60 (Gesellschaft) In subsidiarity, we have the idea that decisions will be taken at the lowest appropriatelevel. With these two guiding principlesin mind, the 'anarchy' or absence of government in the states system becomes less of a problem than the 'statism'-the concentration of all power and loyalty on the state-that has much of the twentieth typified century.To achieve securityin anarchy,it is necessaryto go beyond Bull's 'anarchical society' of statesto an anarchical global 'community of communities'. Anarchy thus becomes the framework for thinkingabout the solutionto global problems, not the essence of the problem to be overcome.61 This would be a much messierpoliticalworld than the statessystem,but it should offer betterprospectsfor the emancipationof be more secure. individualsand groups, and it should therefore ultimately of the I920S and I940s, thisone does Unlike many of the utopian arguments not seek to deal with the problem of sovereignstatesby centralizing power in the ultimate sovereign state: a world government.No central government deservesmuch trust.Some governments failto maintainorder; many succeed only by being oppressive. Even relatively decent governments are not of all theircitizens.The idea mindfulof the interests and diversity necessarily of centralizing all power on a world scale is a fearful prospect,and not likely to work. A multiculturalworld with a bundle of both local and global problemslogically requiresa multifaceted approach. Richard Falk (who, like Kant, has invariably been defined out of the internationalrelations field by realists)has been conspicuous over the last
58 60 61

society, p. 87. p. 22. 5 Bull, The anarchical Bull, The anarchical society, Ferdinand Tonnies, 'Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft', pp. 7-I2 in Colin Bell and Howard Newby, (London: Frank Cass, I974). eds., The sociology of community This argument owes much to Barry Buzan's idea of 'mature anarchy' in People, statesandfear (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, I983) and 'Is internationalsecuritypossible?', pp. 3I-55 in Booth, New aboutstrategy security. thinking and international

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Security in anarchy yearsby arguingthatmodernstatesare too large to satisfy human needs and too small to cope with the requirementsof guidance for an increasingly interdependent planet.62 The logical conclusionof thisargumentis thatpower It is desirable to take it away from statesto more local should be diffused. of some human needs (to cater for cultural communitiesfor the satisfaction diversity, for example), while wider problems, such as economic and environmentalissues, could be dealt with more effectively by designated regional or global functional organizations. of power above and below thestatelevel would The resultof sucha diffusion be a dense global mesh of norms,rules,decision-making structures, complex non-territorial as well as territorial economic interdependence, communities, and overlappingidentity patterns. States in such a world would wither,but not disappear. Even permeable states boundaries,as in theEuropean Community,have theiruses. In particular, for the controlof armaments, will continueto be necessaryas frameworks as war is in historical decline as an long as the threatof war exists.But interstate of politics,as the costsgo up and the benefits instrument go down. The war in the Gulf, devastatingas the militaryvictory was, does not contradictthis conclusion. On the cost side, what should be borne in mind is the enormous effort mobilized and expended by the United Statesand its 37 allies in orderto defeata statewith a GDP about I20 times less than the United States and a population less than California. This effortshould also be compared, in with the relatively effortless 'successes' of Britainagainst historical perspective, Iraq in the past, 30 and 70 years ago. On the benefitside, it is too soon to calculatethe balance; but the immediatesignssuggestthatvictoryand success are not synonymous. The historical trends suggest that 'defence' will remain an important functionfor states, but that the institutionof war will decline in utility. dilemma-the way one state'ssearchfor Consequently,the traditional security of those it securitythrough militarypower tends to increase the insecurity relations.States threatens-will become a less pressingfeatureof international will decreasinglybe collectivitieswhose primaryobligation is to deter and violence. More important will be their function as agenciesfor conductexternal internalorder and the control of armaments. A dense global mesh of communities, as just described, is sometimes conceived of as a new medievalism. Medieval Europe was characterized by decentralizedpolitical authorityand a tangle of 'overlapping feudal jurisMedieval Europe suzerainties'.63 dictions,plural allegiancesand asymmetrical provides an illustrative model, but thereare reasons for thinkingthat a new medievalismwould not be as violent or disorderly, given thatthe instruments of violence would not be as decentralizedand thatattitudes towards,and the
20
62

63

worlds(New York: Free Press, I975), The end of world See, inter alia, Richard A. Falk, A studyoffuture order(New York: Holmes & Meier, I985), and The promiseof worldorder(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, I987). Studies J. L. Holzgrefe, 'The origins of modern internationalrelations theory', Review of International I5: i (I989), pp. II-26.

54I

Ken Booth costs of, violence have changed. The textbook states system with which novel. The Westphalian international theory deals is not eternal;it is historically of independent system sovereignstateshas only been in existenceforabout 350 years,and thereis no reasonto suppose thatit will dominateworld politicsfor the restof time. Indeed, historical change in the international systemis already apparent. As more and more of the actionsthatsustainworld politicscease to involve we are living in whatJamesN. Rosenau has called a 'post-international states, States are less able to performtheir '.64 Sovereigntyis disintegrating. politics traditional functions. Global factors increasingly impingeon all decisionsmade are becomingmore complex,as people assert by governments. Identity patterns The traditional local loyaltiesbut want to sharein global values and lifestyles. distinction between 'foreign' and 'domestic' policy is less tenable than ever. And thereis growing awarenessthatwe are sharinga common world history. As a result,it is opportune to reverseMorgenthau's famous sentence,quoted version should read: 'The struggle for earlier. The late-twentieth-century power, like all politics,is world politics.'

IV
The international systemwhich is now developing, rememberingthe earlier Suganami-Vincent metaphor, is of an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty;but alongside it a global communityomeletteis cooking. If this trendis thoughtdesirable,the problem becomes the practicalpolitical one of how to get there from here. Can world society make an omelette without breakingeggs? A few words about practiceare appropriate,since I identify with those, from Aristotleto Althusser,who have argued that we do not philosophizesimplyin order to pass the time. Space permitsme to give only a flavourof the praxis of emancipationand since what is appropriateobviously depends upon the community-building, individuals and groups. For a nuclear situation and power of different superpower,for example, a process-utopianpolicy would be to move from doctrines involving nuclear pre-emption, launch-on-warning,decapitation strikes and 'prevailing', towards doctrines where retaliation is a last not a first levels step,is gradual ratherthan massive,and is based on minimumdeterrent rather thanwar-fighting levels of capability.A sounderpolicy stillwould be to rejectthe ayatollahsof nuclearismaltogetherand, even if it ultimately proves To do otherwiseis to impossible,to seek the goal of global denuclearization.65 perpetuate a belief that there is ultimatelyno stronger basis for human coexistencethengenocidal fear.Over a long period, such minimalist thinking may be a recipe for disaster. Between statesin a spiral of suspicion, common securitypolicies seeking
64

James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in worldpolitics: a theory of changeand continuity (New York: Harvester This is argued in Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Beyond nuclearism' in Regina Cowen Karp, without ed., Security nuclearweapons(Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, I99I).

Wheatsheaf, I990),

ch. i. especially

65

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Security in anarchy to defensivemilitary greatermutual transparency and a shiftfrom offensive postures can bring reassurance and change attitudes. Such thinking has characterizedGorbachev's strategysince I985, and helped to revolutionize threatperceptionsand political relationsacross Europe. For both Gorbachev and 'alternative security' proponents in the West, 'new thinking' about of derivedfromthe 'reality' of thebreakdownof detenteand the start security the new Cold War. In this respectas in others,the new utopianismis more realisticthan that criticized by Carr when he complained about the way attempted to make practice conform to 'intellectuals' characteristically theory.66 between particularstateswill be such that Sometimes the clash of interests containmentwill be necessary. Such a posture should be firm, but noncall provocative, and leave open the door for detente.What game theorists 'tit-for-tatstrategies' can cope with defections and build up long-term The benefits of a relaxationof tensionshould not be snubbed cooperation.67 The acorns of detentecan sometimesyield mistrust. because of the underlying impressiveoaks, as with the CSCE processand the growth of civil societyin EasternEurope. and Occasionally,when an aggressiveregimeseemsbeyond both deterrence to face up to the prospectof war. In such cases it may be necessary reassurance, violence must be the last resort,in factand not only in rhetoric.It should be limited to what is necessaryto achieve clearly articulatedaims; it should be in the targets proportionalto the challenge; and it should be discriminating selected. The Gulf War left somethingto be desired on all these counts. If victory is achieved, the appropriate response, as Churchill said, is 'magnanimity '.68 It is to be hoped thattheWhite House has learnedeven more from and its failed postwar relationswith Vietnam than it learned about fighting fromits failedwar againstit; but thereis reason to information-management doubt that thisis so. between nations, Sometimesthereis a real chance for community-building foes like France and Germany.What studentat the time as between historical of Carr's inauguralin I936, the year the Rhineland was remilitarized, would have predictedthatby the time theywere middle-aged,war between France and Germany would have become unthinkable? Such an outcome was acceleratedby threewars between the two in 70 yearsand then the outbreak of the Cold War, but thereis more to the Franco-Germanrelationship than that. The French and German people have become a moralcommunity,not This comingtogether ofhitherto intractable simplya self-interested partnership. enemies was the result of the actions of visionaries like Monnet and Schuman-' bureaucrats',in Carr's scheme of things,who should have been of Adenauer and de Gaulle, committedto empiricism69-thesymbolicgestures
66 67 68

Carr, The twenty years'crisis, p. I4. See Robert Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation (New York: Basic Books, I984). Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: I, thegathering storm (London: Cassell, I964), 69 Carr, The twenty frontispiece, 'The moral of the work'. years'crisis, pp. I3-I9.

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Ken Booth of high-level contacts, growing economic interthe institutionalization at all levels. Compare this'security social interaction dependenceand intensive thatcontinues,to take community' of predictablepeace with the relationship just one example, between Greece and Turkey. Here there is little and instead of historybooks that attempt to eliminate institutionalization, chauvinismthereis only the singingof old patrioticsongs.70 Between Greece activists are needed and Turkey,or in theArab-Israelidispute,utopian-inspired to createthenecessary Statesmanship psychologicaland politicalbreakthroughs. as demonstratedby a Sadat or a Brandt is required. Till then, significant disaster. community-building probably awaits a further But today there The broad approachesjust suggestedare for governments. is significant scope foraction forindividuals actingthroughglobal civil society. live in what might become easier,we increasingly As global communications international be called a post-foreign policy world, one in which significant In this regard there are do not depend on foreign ministries. transactions or economic numerousorganizations concernedwith promotinghuman rights for environmental which are 'local agentsof welfare,and working protection, the world common good'. Some actionscan be takenon an individualbasisin To adapt a feminist a capacityof consumers or parents. slogan,theinternational is personaland the personalis international.7" Many looming problemswhich will affect everybodywill obviously be exacerbatedby severeoverpopulation. Carrjokingly said in his inauguralthatadvice on birthcontrolwas not a matter for a professor of internationalpolitics ;72 today it increasinglyis. The is now very personalindeed. international Security in anarchy is possible. The traditionallywarring countries of some proof. The questionwhat kind of proof raisesthe WesternEurope offer interesting problem of confirmingevidence in the philosophy of science. Realism proposes that war is inevitablein an anarchicalinternational system; each war thatoccurs,in theGulfor elsewhere, to confirm the idea. But appears considerthe case of the99-footman.73The hypothesis is, 'All men are less than IOO feettall.' So each sighting of a man less than IOO feetsurelyconfirms the Then someone meetsa 99-footman. Strictly speaking,thisconfirms hypothesis. the hypothesis, but in a stronger it, because thereis now way it disconfirms good reason to believe that men can grow to IOO feet.The West European which grew in thehistorical cockpitof realismand in the security community, home of the textbook statessystem, is the international politicsversionof the 99-footman. It gives good reason to believe thatpredictablepeace is possible in an interdependent world of liberal-democratic states.
70 See Peter Mangold, National security and international relations (London: Routledge, I990),

71 72

ch. 5, 'Breaking out'. The concept of 'security community' was developed by Karl W. Deutsch et al., Politicalcommunity and theNorthAtlanticarea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, I957). This formulationresulted from a lecture by Margot Light, 'Women in internationalrelations', 25 Feb. I99I, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. E. H. Carr, 'Public opinion as a safeguard of peace', International Affairs I5: 6, Nov.-Dec. I936,
pp. 846-62.

Martin Gardner, review of William Poundstone, Labyrinths of reason: paradox,puzzles and thefrailty of p. 27, in New YorkReview of Books, i6 Mar. I989. knowledge,

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in anarchy Security V Nothing in thisargumentis based on the idea thathumansare perfectible. The same struggles can be expected to be repeatedin our heads between the pirate and the bank-clerkin all of us. But the approach to international politics describedhereis based on thebeliefthatpoliticsare open-ended,and are rooted in ethics,and thatinstitutions can grow wiser and can positivelyshape human behaviour. Viewed in this light, some of the 'conventional convictions' of mainstream international theoryare opened up to different While emphases.74 acceptingthatpoliticswill, in a sense,always be 'power politics', it does not into 'might is right'. While anarchy follow thatpower politicsmust translate will persist, fora solution to the problemsof the it could also be the framework human collectivity, rather thanbeing seenas thecruxof theproblem. While selfinterest will continueto guide individualsand groups,self-interest need not be And finally,while we will continue for the synonymouswith selfishness. foreseeablefutureto live in a systemof states,it is too soon in historyto conclude that the international a 'war system'. systemis necessarily BernardBrodie used to have sleeplessnightswhen he thoughtabout world was in the situation.75 Studentsof politicsbecause he believed thatthe rigidity international politics,not to mention the world communityin general,will neverreallyknow to what extentthisis trueuntilwe confront therigidity that is in our own minds. It is the failureto do so which gives me sleeplessnights.
74

75

These conclusions (and indeed the lecture as a whole) owe a great deal to the influenceof Barry Buzan, People, statesandfear; Hoffmann,Duties beyond borders; and Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim, eds., The war system:an interdisciplinary approach(Boulder, CO: Westview, I980). Booth, 'Bernard Brodie'.

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