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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AUDREY ZIBELMAN Chair PATRICIA L. ACAMPORA GARRY A. BROWN GREGG C. SAYRE DIANE X. BURMAN Commissioners PETER McGOWAN General Counsel KATHLEEN H. BURGESS Secretary
November 7, 2013 Via Electronic Mail Cheryl I. Sacco, Esq. Coughlin & Gerhart LLP PO Box 2039. Binghamton, New York 13902 RE: Request for a copy of the PSC report regarding the July 23, 2012 Lightning Strike at the Compressor Station located in the Town of Windsor.
Dear Ms. Sacco: This is our final response to your request received October 4, 2013 asking for the record(s) described above. Enclosed you will find the requested records consisting of a 23-page PDF report. I hereby certify, pursuant to Public Officers Law 89(3) that, insofar as you reasonably described the records, no other records responsive to your request could be found after diligent search of records maintained by the Department. We trust this material is responsive to your request. To the extent this response denies you access to any records, you may seek a review of this decision pursuant to POL 89(4)(a) by filing a written appeal within 30 days of the date of this letter with Kathleen H. Burgess, Secretary to the Commission, at the above address. Sincerely,
NYS Dept. Of Public Service Office of Electric, Gas & Water Division Safety Section Incident Investigation Report
Williams Midstream Pipeline Pipeline System: Williams Midstream Compressor Station: Location: Patterson Road, Town of Windsor, NY Material Released: Report Date (Final): Natural gas August 15, 2012 / 9:30AM Staff Arrival Time & Date: Operator: Williams Midstream July 23, 2012
Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage Material Failure Equipment Failure Incorrect Operation Other Accident/Incident Resulted in (check all that apply): Rupture Leak X Fire Comments:
Fire occurred when gas discharging from the main vent stack of the compressor station during routine compressor maintenance was ignited by lightening. The flame was confined to the vent plume from the stack. No injuries to people (on or off site) or damage to facilities occurred. Number of Persons: Approx. 20 Area: Approx. 0.5 mile radius
Explosion X Evacuation
The Williams compressor station building, a large singular building housing four reciprocal compressors (with capacity to hold several more units) is remotely located on the top of a hill, off of Patterson Road in the Town of Windsor, NY. At the time of the incident on 7/23/2012, three of the compressors were in service and a fourth had been shut down while undergoing manufacturers (Caterpillar) recommended periodic maintenance (spark plugs, valve calibrations, etc.). As part of the restart procedure, the natural gas that was still within the fourth compressor had to be purged prior to the restarting. At the time this purge was taking place, a violent lightning storm was occurring in the region. Lightning struck on (or near) the stations main vent stack during the purging of the unit and ignited the venting gas. Williams personnel saw a large orange glow from the flame, realizing there was a fire but unaware of its precise nature. They immediately engaged the emergency shutdown system (ESD) to deprive the fire of further fuel, thereby venting all of the stations gas into the stack, increasing the flame height. All of the fire was confined to the venting gas plume. No damage occurred to any structures or to the environment, and there were no injuries. The ignited gas plume resulted in notice from local citizens, who called 911. As a precaution, the responding emergency authorities evacuated approximately 20 citizens along Patterson Road and Dunbar Road. The evacuation lasted approximately one hour. Williams personnel fully informed the responding authorities of what had occurred, walked them through the compressor site and arranged for further gas emergency training with them. Staff s investigation concluded that vent stack and the ESD functioned as designed and the operator responded in a prudent manner, in accordance with their Emergency Plan.
Lead Investigator Contributing Staff Contributing Staff Local Supervisor Regional Supervisor Section Chief Reviewed By Counsel Name Kristan Harsh Steven Blaney Brett Mahan Kevin Speicher Steven Kramer Title Utility Specialist-Safety I Utility Engineer III (Safety) Utility Engineer II (Safety) Chief, Safety Section Assistant Counsel Signature Approved in DMM3 Approved in DMM3 Approved in DMM3 Approved in DMM3 Reviewed in DMM Date 9/20/2012 10/3/2013 5/17/2013 5/31/2013 10/2/2013
(Acquire Map)
Type of Area (Rural, City): Rural. Longitude: -75.71627 The event occurred at 17:30 hrs
(1)
Time of Failure:
Time Detected: 17:30 (5:30 PM) Time Located: 17:30 (5:30 PM) Five (5) operator personnel (2 Williams personnel, 3 contractor personnel) witnessed the event at the How Located: compressor station. They were inside the building performing maintenance on one of the compressors. NRC Report #: (Attach Report) Time Reported to NRC: Reported by:
N/A
N/A
N/A
__ Gas Gathering Pipeline Configuration (Regulator Station, Pump Station, Pipeline, etc.): Large compressor station complex, with multiple sizes of incoming and outgoing, buried and above ground, steel piping and appurtenances.
Operator/Owner Information
Owner: Williams Midstream Address: 51 Warren Street, Tunkhannock, PA 18657 Operator: Williams Midstream Address: (same)
Company Official: Dave Thompson (Regional Operations Supervisor) Phone No.: 570-965-9001 Fax No.: 570-965-3119 Drug Program Contact & Phone: Alcohol Program Contact & Phone:
Company Official: (same) Phone No. 570-965-9001 Fax No. 570-965-3119 X N/A
Damages
Product/Gas Loss or Spill Amount Recovered Estimated Amount $
(3)
0.00
$0.00
__ Yes __ Yes
__ No __ No
Number: Number:
_X N/A
Public: Public: Public: Public:
_X N/A
Drug/Alcohol Testing
_X__ N/A
Were all employees that could have contributed to the incident, post-accident tested within the 2 hour time frame for alcohol or the 32 hour time frame for all other drugs? ___Yes ___No Job Function Test Date & Time Location Results Pos Neg Type of Drug
System Description
Describe the Operator's System: The interstate pipeline, originates in the Forest Lake Township in Northern Pennsylvania, approximately 20 miles south of the New York/Pennsylvania border. It crosses into New York and continues to the Dunbar Compressor Station and continues to a tap on the Millennium Pipeline. The pipeline was originally known as the Laser Pipeline and was built in 2011 by the original owner, Laser Northeast Gathering, LLC. The pipeline transports natural gas onto the Millennium Pipeline from production wells located in Pennsylvania. Williams Midstream became its new owner in early 2012. The former Laser Pipeline (now-called WMW Pipeline, also referred to at Williams as The New York Mainline) includes approximately 9.8 miles of 16-inch, 0.312inch and .0375-inch wall X-65 welded steel pipe with fusion bond epoxy coating in New York. In addition, the New York assets include the Dunbar Compressor Station (also constructed in 2011) located approximately 0.6 mile off of Patterson Road in the Town of Windsor, approximately 0.5 miles from the WMW Pipelines connection to the Millennium Pipeline. As of August 2012, the compressor building houses 4 reciprocal compressors.
__X_ N/A
(1) (1)
Laboratory Analysis:
___ Yes
___ No Page 4 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
__X_ N/A
_X_ N/A
(1)
Model: Size:
Pipe Data
Material: Diameter (O.D.): SMYS: Longitudinal Seam: Pipe Specifications (API 5L, ASTM A53, etc.): Wall Thickness/SDR: Installation Date: Manufacturer: Type of Coating:
_X__ N/A
Joining
Type: NDT Method: Procedure: Inspected: ___ Yes ___No
_X__N/A
_X_ N/A
Direction from Failure Site Upstream Downstream
Page 5 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
N/A
API Gravity: Flow Rate: Distance to Failure Site: Low Pressure Set Point:
_X__ N/A
Flow Rate: Distance to Failure Site: 0 feet Low Pressure Set Point:
Fo N
Operating Pressure
Max. Allowable Operating Pressure: Actual Operating Pressure: Comment: (The event was not pressure related.) Relief Valve Set Point: Capacity Adequate? ___ Yes ___ No Determination of MAOP:
_X__ N/A
_X__ N/A
___ No
X N/A
Type of Backfill (Size and Description): Type of Water (Salt, Brackish): Water Analysis
(6)
___ Yes
___ No
Cathodic Protection
P/S (Surface): Soil Resistivity: Method of Protection: Did the Operator have knowledge of Corrosion before the Incident? ___ Yes ___ No How Discovered? (Close Interval Survey, Instrumented Pig, Annual Survey, Rectifier Readings, ECDA, etc): pH: P/S (Interface): Date of Installation:
X N/A
5 Obtain event logs and pressure recording charts 6 Attach copy of water analysis report Page 6 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
___ N/A
N/A
(1)
Description of Corrosion: The operator reported that there were no corrosion concerns found during post-event inspection of the facilities. Description of Failure Surface (Gouges, Arc Burns, Wrinkle Bends, Cracks, Stress Cracks, Chevrons, Fracture Mode, Point of Origin): There was no asset failure involved in this incident. The event was caused by natural forces (lightning) that resulted in the station ESD being initiated by attending operator personnel and the ESD functioning as designed. Post-incident inspection of the vent stack by the operator found no damage or corrosion.
Above Ground:
X Yes
___ No N/A
(1) (1)
Buried:
___ Yes
X No N/A
(1) (1)
Depth of Cover:
_X__ N/A
___ No ___ No
___ No
(7)
___ No
___ No
Did the Operator have knowledge of Corrosion before the Incident? ___ Yes How Discovered? (Instrumented Pig, Coupon Testing, ICDA, etc.):
Natural Forces
__ N/A
Description (Earthquake, Tornado, Flooding, Erosion): Weather Event: A lightning strike during a storm occurred on, or very near, the main vent stack at the Dunbar Compressor Station while natural gas was being purged through the vent stack from Unit 2 Compressor during routine maintenance on July 23, 2012. The personnel, seeing a distinctive orange glow (associated with fire), engaged the station ESD, resulting in more gas from the station piping and other compressors being exhausted through the same stack and adding to the flame.
7 Attach copy of gas and/or liquid analysis report 8 Attach copy of internal inspection survey report Page 7 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
X N/A
Telephone No.:
Called One Call System? ___ Yes One Call Report # (9) Time: Time:
___ No
One Call Name: Notice Date: Response Date: Details of Response: Was Location Marked According to Procedures? Pipeline Marking Type: ___ Yes
___ No
(1)
Location:
(1)
State Law Damage Prevention Program Followed? ___ Yes Notice Required: ___Yes ___No
___ No
Did a deficiency in the Public Awareness Program contribute to the accident? ___Yes ___ No
Failure Isolation
Squeeze Off/Stopple Location and Method: (There was no failure or damage.)
_X_ N/A
(1)
Valve Closed - Upstream: Time: Valve Closed - Downstream: Time: Pipeline Shutdown Method: __ Manual
Odorization
Method of Determination: Was Odorizer Working Prior to the Incident? __ Yes __ No Concentration of Odorant
(10)
X
:
N/A
N/A
Weather Conditions
Temperature: Approximately 73 degrees F. Climate (Snow, Rain): Rain Was Incident preceded by a rapid weather change? X Yes
__ N/A
Wind (Direction & Speed): Approximately 10 MPH, southeasterly. Humidity: Dew point was approximately 66 degrees F. __ No
Weather Conditions Prior to Incident (Cloud Cover, Ceiling Heights, Snow, Rain, Fog): Overcast conditions with rain with accompanying lightning and varying wind speeds, including gusts.
_X_ N/A
(1)
_X_ N/A
(1)
Location (Nearest Rivers, Body of Water, Marshlands, Wildlife Refuge, City Water Supplies that could be or were affected by the medium loss): OPA Contingency Plan Available? __ Yes __ No Followed? __ Yes __ No
__ N/A
___ N/A
X Yes
__ No
Comments: pdf file-type Google Earth based views of Dunbar Compressor Station site acquired from the operator, with relative pipeline location drawn.
11 Plot on site description page 12 Obtain copies of maps and records Page 9 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
_X_ N/A
Pressure (psig) Duration (hrs) % SMYS
Reqd (13)Assessment Deadline Date Installation Next Next Most Recent N/A
Test Date
Test Medium
X N/A
Indicated Anomaly If yes, describe below __ Yes __ Yes __ Yes __ Yes __ No __ No __ No __ No
Reqd (13) Assessment Deadline Date Initial Next Next Most Recent
Assessment Date
Describe any previously indicated anomalies at the failed pipe, and any subsequent pipe inspections (anomaly digs) and remedial actions.
_X_ N/A
If there was such a known pre-failure condition, had the operator established and adhered to a required (13) evaluation and remediation schedule? Describe below or on attachment. __ Yes __ No __ N/A Prior to the failure, had the operator performed the required (13) actions to address the threats that are now known to be related to the cause of this failure? __ Yes __ No __ N/A List below or on an attachment such operator-identified threats, and operator actions taken prior to the accident. Describe any previously indicated anomalies at the failed pipe, and any subsequent pipe inspections (anomaly digs) and remedial actions.
__X_ N/A
13 As required of Pipeline Integrity Management regulations in 16 NYCRR Part 255 and 49CFR Parts 192 and 195 14 MFL, TFI, UT, Combination, Geometry, etc. 15 ECDA, ICDA, SCCDA, other technology, etc. Page 10 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
_X__ N/A
Did a Safety Related Condition Exist Prior to Failure? Unaccounted For Gas:
___ Yes
___ No
Reported?
___ Yes
___ No
Operator/Contractor Error
Name: Title: Training (Type of Training, Background): Was the person Operator Qualified as applicable to a precursor abnormal operating condition? ___Yes Was qualified individual suspended from performing covered task ___ Yes Type of Error (Inadvertent Operation of a Valve): Procedures that are required: Actions that were taken: Pre-Job Meeting (Construction, Maintenance, Blow Down, Purging, Isolation): Prevention of Accidental Ignition (Tag & Lock Out, Hot Weld Permit): Procedures conducted for Accidental Ignition: Was a Company Inspector on the Job? ___ Yes ___ No ___ No ___ No ___ N/A ___ No Job Function: Years of Experience:
_X__ N/A
___ N/A
Additional Actions (Contributing factors may include number of hours at work prior to failure or time of day work being conducted): Training Procedures: Operation Procedures: Controller Activities: Years Experience Hours on Duty Prior to Failure
Name
Title
Shift
Page 11 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
_X__ N/A
Type of Alarm: Company Response Procedures for Abnormal Operations: Over/Short Line Balance Procedures: Frequency of Over/Short Line Balance: Additional Actions:
___N/A
Make notes regarding the emergency and Failure Investigation Procedures (Pressure reduction, Reinforced Squeeze Off, Clean Up, Use of Evacuators, Line Purging, closing Additional Valves, Double Block and Bleed, Continue Operating downstream Pumps): 1) The operators Safety Officer Kate Kamp did an internal post-event debriefing of involved individuals, and later, a review of safety policy with its local personnel regarding purging procedures at the compressor station: If lightning appears to be possible in the visual inspection of weather at the time of planned purging, purging will be postponed. An example of this stand-down policy being implemented occurred since the original event and was exercised on the night of 8/14/2012 during other type of routine maintenance. The purging was postponed to the morning of 8/15/2012 due to possible electrical storm activity forecasted on 8/14. 2) Williams conducted a training session for local first responders to increase their knowledge of the Williams system. The session was held on October 1, 2012 and included a tour of the facility, a review of the July 23, 2012 incident and an afteraction review with first responders and Williams personnel. The agencies that attended were: West Windsor Fire Department, Windsor Fire Department, Coleville Fire Department, Broome County Hazmat, Broome County Fire Investigation, Broome County Emergency Management Agency
Page 12 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Camera Type:
Digital. Page 13 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
Approx. 1.35 Miles Patterson Rd Approx. 0.8 Miles Millennium Pipeline Williams Pipeline
Dunbar Station
Photo #1: Overhead view: Basic location reference. This photo was taken during the 2011 construction phase of the compressor station.
Page 14 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
Photo #2 (0764): Facing N/NE; interior of compressor station. Unit #2 Compressor is second unit from the extreme right (at approximately the center of the photo, between the first two sets of traversing ceiling light banks from the right).
Page 15 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
Photo #3 (0774): Facing W: Rear of compressor station showing the main ESD vent/silencer stack (the singular fat stack) through which all venting gas is exhausted. Unit #2 Compressor is (represented by) the second fan from the left.
Page 16 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
Brett Chellis
607 778-1208
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Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
Phone Number:
5:30 PM 5:31 PM
8:45 PM (approx) NYS-DPS Syracuse Region supervisor Brett Mahan was notified by his supervisor of the compressor station event. 9:00 PM 9:07 PM 9:20 PM Brett Mahan notified NYS-DPS Binghamton area NYS-DPS inspector Kris Harsh of the event and requested Harsh to verify the event particulars by contacting appropriate Williams supervision. Kris Harsh called Curtis Stevens, who (at that time) was the operators lead contact person Harsh knew of. Stevens, who was on scene, relayed the unfolding of events (accurate to what is presented in this timeline). Kris Harsh reported the results of the Stevens interview to Brett Mahan.
8/15/2012: 9:30 AM Kris Harsh went to the Williams field office at 86 Patterson Road, Town of Windsor, which is about 0.60 mile from the Williams Dunbar Compressor Station. An interview with Williams personnel Tony Decesaris and Dave Thompson, took place regarding the incident. The contents of this incident report form was the meeting agenda. The visit also included a look at the compressor station and its associated property.
Page 19 of 23
Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
9:07PM
7/23/2012
Curtis Stevens
Brett Mahan Anthony Decesaris Dave Thompson West Windsor Fire Chief Jerry Launt
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Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
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Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
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Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).
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Incident Investigation Report (Rev. 3/30/2011 through Amdt. 192-113 & 195-93).