Professional Documents
Culture Documents
OLD SOLDIERS
Dedicated to History, the Preservation and Play of Out Of Print Wargames, and to the Support of the Small Wargame Companies Last Issue
Dec 2013
Website www.oldsoldiersmagazine.com
Variants, Strategy, Tactics, Series Replays, Scenarios, Military Book Reviews and Annotations, and Historical Articles
Game Articles:
Columbia Games Synopsis of their Borodino Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History Be Sure To Check Out page 68 for Legion Wargames Latest Game Picket Duty Sure to be an instant classic like B-17 and B-29
History Articles
Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony, The Sikh War Sourcebook, 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805, Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War, Battles of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743
Vol. 7 No. 3
Old Soldiers
FROM THE DESK OF THE EDITOR
questions like, why? Why the cockroaches scrambled beneath the spotlight of the press and found all that missing paperwork and signed it all. Amazing what things can get done when you look really stupid in front of a camera. So, now the museum is back in the rightful hands of the people who created and saved the birthplace home of Ernie Pyle from the very beginning. We now face a daunting task. For nearly 15 years the Indiana DNR has neglected any and all small and large maintenance items, which caused them to grow to be BIG problems, which were not disclosed to the Friends of Ernie Pyle, or we would have back then raised funds for the necessary repairs. We have now found out that the state neglected maintenance on the site and no one about it. So much for good management and honesty in government.
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My calendar tells me its been 2 years since the last issue of the magazine has seen publication. A great deal has gone on since then. My mothers broken back has healed. Shes fighting peripheral artery disease now. My 90 year old father is still alive and kicking. He has even fixed the museums parade jeep a few times. The Ernie Pyle Museum is now re-named, The Ernie Pyle WWII Museum and is back in the hands of the private non profit that created the museum to begin with and helped subsidize the states running of the facility. Unlike so many other facilities, where the state subsidizes their running, in the case of the Ernie Pyle Historic Site (as it was named while it was in the hands of the Indiana DNR) the state actually took private not for profit money to maintain the site because the Indiana DNR couldnt afford to do it, or wouldnt as the case may actually have been. But, once the New York Times showed up in Governor Daniels office miracle of miracles occurred, what the Indiana DNR claimed would take 6 months (and then they lost the paper work they claimed) actually took Governor Daniels two hours to cough up and sign giving the museum back to the Friends of Ernie Pyle, the original not for profit that built the museum from the very beginning in 1975 and had paid for or organized the funds for every major repair or upgrade of the museums facilities. Bless his heart, it only took Mitch Daniels 2 hours to get done what his Indiana DNR couldnt do in 8 months ... that is once the New York Times showed up asking
The museum faces some daunting tasks. 1. Quonset Hut Roofs Leak (both of them). 2. Birthplace Home Roof needs replaced (it doesnt yet leak, but its over 20 years old). 3. Planking on the side of the Birthplace home has dry rot and much needs replacing. 4. The Birthplace Home needs painting. 5. The Audio Visual System (which shows 3 documentaries and plays 3 audio recordings) is breaking down bit by bit. One Audio Player has entirely failed. One Audio speaker system has failed. A DVD player is failing. The entire system is 15 years old. 6. The Basement Leaks 7. We need to develop a teaching curriculum to take to schools (the DNR ceased doing that 10 years ago.) (Continued on Page 88)
www.erniepyle.org
Index
Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony The Sikh War Sourcebook 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805 Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War Columbia Games Synopsis of their Borodino Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History Battles of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743
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The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony In The Conduct Of The Seven Years War An Annotated Bibliography
By Robert Fulton especially Hanover. It was only after Pitt and Newcastle rebuilt their war ministry, energized the war effort, and devised a global strategy that Britain rose off the ropes and went on to score tremendous victory after victory. This strategy was not always clearly defined or effectively prosecuted; yet Pitts steadfastness with respect to strategy and the leadership of both Admiral Edward Hawke and General Jeffrey Amherst allowed the British to triumph militarily against the French in what soon became a global conflict. The British were, however, always conflicted about a ground war in Europe. This was no longer the age of Marlborough. They consistently preferred to send money rather than troops to aide both Ferdinand and Frederick. It was only the adamant attitude of George II concerning Hanover that required the British to keep some token military forces in the western German principalities for as long as they did. While the French had a few good generals, leadership was inconsistent and many of the generals were reluctant to risk their armies in major battles. Thus it was British money, the superb generalship of Ferdinand, and French disorganization that allowed Ferdinand to retake Hanover and keep Fredericks western territories safe from French deprivations. However, by 1761 George II was dead and George III had different ideas about Hanover. In addition, throughout the war the
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Introduction: The bibliography listed below represents a wide-ranging set of both popular and academic historians of the Seven Years War period. These books all feature, in a direct way, a focus on Britains goals, strategies, motivations, and challenges with respect to that war. The exception to this is Franz Szabos The Seven Years Way in Europe, 1756-1763; nevertheless, this is a valuable addition to this bibliography because which represents an interesting and well-argued (in this readers opinion) thesis that Frederick was, to put it mildly, a real loser with respect to military prowess and that Prussia merely survived the war because of squabbling enemies but more importantly due to Britains financing. It may have been George Washingtons bumbling around in the backwoods in 1754 that got the French and British to face off in North America, but it was Fredericks aggressive stance towards his rapidly coalescing European enemies that kicked the war into high gear. Frederick constantly gambled his army in battle, and more often lost than won. Indeed, the war went very badly for the British, Prussians, and Hanoverians during the first two years, from 1756 to 1758. British were themselves on the brink of total defeat in 1757 and early 1758, with losses in North America, the Mediterranean, and
French focused on European rather than colonial operations, thus allowing the British a fairly free hand in dealing with French Canada and the Caribbean as well as India. Spanish entry in 1761 came too late and was disastrous for the Bourbons. In the end peace was agreed because of the change in government in England and the death of the Empress Elizabeth in Russia. George IIIs lukewarm support for his fathers war and Tsar Pauls betrayal of the Austrians finally forced an exhausted Prussian, a frustrated Austria, a bankrupt France, and a victorious Britain to the negotiating table. Despite the overwhelming nature of Britains victories, she gave back to France and Spain much of what she had fought hard to gain. Pitt was apoplectic at these concessions, but being out of government at George IIIs initiative, there was little he could do except fume and vent. Thus while Britain kept Canada and much of its Indian subcontinent gains, she gave back most of the Caribbean island conquests, Havana (Cuba), the Philippines, and French colonies in Africa. India and Canada were the trump cards. Canada served in the opposite role. The French did not desire its return as it was an economic drain. The removal of the French created a vacuum in North America; the British colonists needed an enemy to
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causes and its outcomes. Presented as an integral part of a series of events in building the British Empire, we see the war as part of an intentional strategy. If the author errs at all, it is in not providing more of the context around the age-old conflict between England and France and how that conflict spread to their respective colonial empires. Many contemporary private or public accounts are used to effectively weave together knowledge and facts into a readable narrative. His notes are particularly helpful in coloring in the details such as politics and loyalties. Each chapter offers the reader extensive notes and annotations which in many cases are minicommentaries about the authors sources; these notes address the quality and the biases of the sources. His source work covers a wide array of valuable documentation, including diaries. Crucible of War is epic and is a pleasant and comfortable read for both the scholar and the casual historian. The story line builds towards British victory at the end of the war, with the anti-climax of mismanagement of the peace in the final chapters. In addition the author provides the context for the next war, the American War of Independence. In doing so, he gives us a crucial piece of the puzzle we need to understand the loss of the American colonies in the aftermath of the war and thus the importance of this seminal conflict to us as well as to Europe.
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(Continued) McLynn, Frank. 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World. New York: Grove Press, 2004. 422 pages. The author sets out to paint a portrait of the titanic struggle between Britain and France and that reached it zenith during this war by examining the critical events of one year, 1759. This he does quite diligently and academically. The previous wars of the 17th and 18th centuries between these two powers are seen as setting the stage for this final conflicts. In 1759 Britain became master of the world, and William Pitt the elder was the driving force behind the victory. The convergence of the characters and events related to each of the defining victories in 1759 is the main focus of the book. Principle players in the drama, such as of Bonnie Prince Charlie (the Stuart Pretender), receive detailed descriptive treatment. His main arguments for the victory of the British support his painting of convergence of factors and circumstances; he convinces through his research that Britains strategy was focused, that Frances efforts were feeble and disorganized, and that British determination overcame adversity and French fortunes. The research is thorough and evident. His bibliography is extensive, and he uses a number of published and unpublished primary sources, as well as secondary material. References
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book, and his scholarship shows in a number of ways. He was able to gather a vast array of material and compile it effectively. The authors intent is to provide us with a full and detailed account of the significant events, characters and impacts of the war. Each chapter contains numerous footnotes, as well as notes at the end of the chapter that serve as extended descriptions he was not able to work into the text itself. For example, on page 417 and 418 at the end of the chapter on General James Wolfe, the author provides details regarding Wolfes correspondence and other materials used as source work. He also tells us of a story, which grew in the telling, of Wolfes last interview with Pitt. Facts and his sources are cross-checked, and these include items such as the number of those killed in the massacre at Fort Edward, or, the Acadian deportations. There is extensive appendix material that includes quotes from correspondence, excerpts from official government reports and other documents, and explanations of how and why his source material is useful and appropriate. Many of his sources are French; he was able to gain access to many private collections from England, France, Canada and the United States. His footnotes, extended end-of-chapter notes and his Appendix material serve as his bibliography. While Parkman sometimes seems to be a bit biased in favor of the English, he is always very
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(Continued) careful with his facts. His bias in no way detracts from the excellence of the work. On the contrary, he seems to be generally aware of this bias and makes every effort to explain controversial events from both sides of the matter. His careful and painstaking research shine through in this book and the works value to the historian is consequently enormous. It remains an essential work for all Seven Years War scholars. Middleton, Richard. The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and Conduct of the Seven Years' War 1757-1762. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1985]. 268 pages. The title refers to the celebrations which took place all over England upon receiving news of Wolfe's victory at Quebec in October 1759. This book takes the old arguments about Pitt and his master strategy for the war and qualifies these traditional accounts of the Seven Years' War. While Pitts energy, dedication to victory, enthusiasm, and coordination were crucial, he did not have operational control over the forces arrayed on multiple fronts, nor could he dictate actions on the ground. In addition, he was part of the government formed by Newcastle and had to work within constitutional and political constraints. Not only could Pitt not,
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chapter is a survey within a survey, providing us with the background material from the early colonization of America and the first colonial wars to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The authors footnotes are detailed, and his bibliography fairly extensive. Much of his material comes from contemporary sources, although he relies much on past scholars such as Parkman and Henry Gipson. One of the nice features of the book is that the author provides a personalities list to help us keep track of minor players, such as James De Lancey, Lt. Governor of New York. The maps are well-drawn and plentiful and are at times topographic in style. All in all, his research is solid, if a bit lacking in French source work. The book serves as an abridged version of Parkmans Montcalm and Wolfe which he quotes from and references extensively. Thus, while it does not add significantly to our knowledge of the war and its impact, it does present a picture of the comprehensiveness of the war and the principle drivers behind Britains conduct of the war. Furneaux, Rupert. The Seven Years War. London: Granada Publishing, Ltd, 1973. 208 pages. This book represents the first in a series of books, edited by Ludovic Kennedy, entitled The British Army at War. As such, it is the authors intent to present the war from Britains point of view specifically limiting coverage to British political and military
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(Continued) actions. Other items of significant are mentioned only in passing and only where they relate to the topic at hand. This narrowness of focus does not detract from the value of the book. The author seeks to take the reader through the series of defeats and victories that the British army suffered or gained during the war to provide a comprehensive view of wartime British strategy and diplomacy. Each of the major battles of the war is enumerated, along with the events leading up to the battle and the aftermath or significance. The reader should not, however, expect to see these significant events described in minute detail. Each chapter is more of a sketch to give the reader a sense of importance; prelude, action and aftermath are the format he employs. Pitt and the politics of Parliament are covered in light of Pitts lust for power and his desire to see Britain annihilate the French empire and colonial trade. On page 45 the author states that He [Pitt] never doubted his ability to carry his war to a successful conclusion. This sums up Pitts vision and focus. The author does a good job of describing the workings of Pitts inner circle of colleagues, his attention to detail, and how he ran the war cabinet during his time in office. Mr. Furneauxs bibliography is selected, but contains a number of excellent
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find one with which he is satisfied. Only a few chapters are devoted to the Seven Years War; however they are effective at putting the war and its associated politics into a strategic framework. The end of the chapter is disappointing, as it is devoted to second guessing and pulling down improperly deified British heroes of the war. He expresses incredulity at Montcalms attack on Wolfe at Quebec, and attributes the decision to the fact that perhaps the most overlooked determining factor in history has been stupidity (page 151). Hindsight is wonderful but generals need to make critical decisions where the difference between victory and defeat may hinge upon the ability to size up a situation and make a decision. Sometimes its the wrong one and has nothing to do with stupidity. The author does do a good job placing the conflicts between England and France in light of the ongoing struggle for economic and trade supremacy. The notes at the end of each chapter serve as his bibliography, and they offer a wide sample of both contemporary and modern source work on the topic. The maps are first class but are too few to truly follow the action (which is not his intent anyway). Finally, there is an added chapter in the back of the book entitled For Further Reading that serves as an excellent list of references for scholars. This is certainly one of the redeeming features of this book.
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(Continued) Leckie, Robert. A Few Acres of Snow: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999. 388 pages. While we find some desirable qualities to this extended invective against usurpers and corrupt colonial officials, for the most part Mr. Leckie is intent on convincing his readers that France lost its colonial empire because of the rampant corruption that existed within the colony in 1759. While the story is at times gripping and smooth-flowing, he glosses over or ignores evidence contrary to his opinion. The author also interrupts the story with pointless sidebars and tangents and sometimes whole chapters of detractions, the purpose of which are never made clear to the reader. There are other difficulties as well. Extraneous material aside, he allows much subjective judgment to enter his narrative. For example, in chapter twelve the author begins a lengthy digression on the usurper William III. Next, the bibliography is quite sparse and is called selected. No contemporary sources are cited or noted; only modern source work is listed. Because of this the reader cant tell how extensively he researched the topic. There are no footnotes anywhere in the book; the sources for some of his quotes are not even cited. It is unclear at many points where he gets his facts and arguments. As the
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won because of the military skill and steadfast strategic pursuit of victory by Frederick II of Prussia. In establishing his arguments, the author is able to defend his thesis that it was British money, a disorganized and contentious enemy alliance, and fortunes of war that saved Prussia and Frederick from total defeat. Fredericks inconsistent leadership and rash operational and tactical battlefield decisions cost him and his nation dearly. He lost battles more often than won them and little credit has historically been given to the more effective leadership of figures such as Fredericks brother Prince Henry. Szabos work is a balanced and deep narrative using a wide variety of source materials. He deals effectively with political, economic, military, and diplomatic history and in doing so have provided both scholars and interested history buffs with a fastpaced and exciting read. Macksey, Piers. The Coward of Minden: The Affair of Lord George Sackville. New York: St. Martins Press, 1979. 279 pages. As Mr. Macksey explains in the books introduction, Historians have not judged Lord George Sackville with charity. Lord George Sackville was drummed out of the British army for his cowardly conduct at the Battle of Minden, which pitted Prince Ferdinand of Brunswicks Hanoverian-English army against a French army commanded by Marshall Contades. The author
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(Continued) sets out on a search for historical facts to amend that record, painted in innuendo and colored by tradition, and he does it with skill. In order to provide the reader with a full understanding of the situation, Mr. Macksey takes us on campaign Prince Ferdinand and the army. He describes the character traits and foibles of the main characters and creates a realistic picture of the challenge of managing this polyglot army. The author reconstructs the day of the battle using diaries, official records and correspondence. He shows us that Prince Ferdinand issued confusing and contradictory orders that could have led to the delay in bring the British cavalry forward. Finally, the trial of Lord George is covered in its entirety, with a focus on the significant and relevant facts and contradictions of testimony. Mr. Macksey also provides us with a different view of Mr. Pitt than most. The Great Commoner is portrayed as a man of limitless ambition and ruthlessness who, while seeking global hegemony for Britain, was willing to sacrifice anyone to achieve that goal. Prince Ferdinand was essential to victory in Hanover against the French, as there is no one else capable of defeating them. It becomes evident that Mr. Pitt and the cabinet have little or no interest in seeing Lord Sackville exonerated, and they have every reason to see him hung for treason.
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By interweaves political and military developments with popular literature, songs, white papers and pamphleteering, the author shows us how England at mid-century was a hotbed of political divisiveness. Many publications of the time including open letters were underwritten or sponsored by those seeking to influence opinion or to manipulate the public, politicians, or both. Coffee houses played a central role in communicating and disseminating information among commoners. Authors used ballads and plays convey political messages and foment action. There are twenty fine samples of the type of graphic images (mostly caricatures) used by pamphleteers and by political cartoonists. The author explores the authenticity, authorship and purpose behind many popular caricatures, ballads and poems written during the war. In weaving each chapters tale, Mr. Cardwell supplies both verbal and artistic examples of different types of literature, and does so competently. The ability of public opinion to impact political discourse, and visa versa, was demonstrated in numerous ways during the Seven Years War. This work makes those notions clear to us. Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford. England in the Seven Years War, 1759-63. 2 Volumes, 2nd edition. London: Greenhill Books, 1992. 416 pages. Sir Julian was primarily a naval historian, and sets out to
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(Continued) convince the reader that the British navy was the reason and method behind the greatness of the British Empire and the victories of the eighteenth century. The original edition appeared early in the 20th century. This new edition features an excellent introduction by Christopher Duffy, a widely acknowledged expert on eighteenth-century military affairs. Mr. Duffy has actually added a supplemental bibliography that should entice the scholar. He corrects and appends some of Corbetts original source work and conclusions. He also updates the scholarship and puts the information into perspective. The maps are all in the front of the book and thus easy to find when needing to reference them. They are well-drawn and readable. The footnotes serve as a bibliography, and there are explanations provided for certain footnotes that will enlighten the reader as to the type of source, the content, dates or importance. The author in his zeal for all things naval, sometimes give short shrift to significant political considerations, such as the importance placed by George II on the defense of Hanover. He seems to believe that the defense of Hanover was an issue of sea lanes and shipping: there lay bound up in [Hanover] that old paramount question of naval positions in the North Sea (I, 23). In fact, the issue was quite complex and related to the legitimacy of the Hanoverian
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so interconnected that neither can be fully understood in isolation but also that traditional interpretations of the war are largely inaccurate. His work also reveals how the French navy, supposedly utterly crushed, could have figured so prominently in the War of American Independence only fifteen years later. A comprehensive work integrating diplomatic, naval, military, and political history, The French Navy and the Seven Years War thoroughly explores the French perspective on the Seven Years War. It also studies British diplomacy and war strategy as well as the roles played by the American colonies, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Portugal. As this history unfolds, it becomes clear that French policy was more consistent, logical, and successful than has previously been acknowledged, and that King Louis XVs conduct of the war profoundly affected the outcome of Americas subsequent Revolutionary War. Other Sources: Fowler, Jr., William M. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009. 368 pages. Marston, Daniel. The Seven Years' War. Volume 2 of Essential Histories. Taylor & Francis, 2001. 95 pages. There are many books that have been written on the colonial American French and Indian War (just do a Google Books or Amazon search if you want to test
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(Continued) me here) and some are well-written. Most deal with the war as prelude to US independence and the removal of the French threat to the colonies. One of the sources I recommend for examining events after the war in this context is: Calloway, Colin G. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. Pivotal Moments in American History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 240 pages. Well-written, wellresearched, and a riveting read. [Robert Fulton is a doctoral candidate in history at Northwestern University. He is preparing for a trip in the spring to France to complete his thesis on the subject of the French and Indian War.: editor] [1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805 Completed From Page 25] Garrison of Bhurtpore: 50,000 Troops (Regular and Irregular Infantry) A large number of guns (cannon) Covering Force: Amir Khan/Holkar Scindhian Horse (approx. 12,000)
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The Sikh War Sourcebook
By: Andrew Preziosi To Be Published by: The Virtual Armchair General (TVAG)
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In January of 2004, Khyber Pass Games published the First Sikh War Order of Battle, which included the first detailed regimental orders of battle for both sides during the four battles fought between the Anglo-Indian and Sikh armies in 1845-1846. The booklet included a concise account of the 1st Sikh War, political background that led up to the war, and a comprehensive article on the Sikh artillery. While it enjoyed a minor success, the ideal was to expand it to include the 2nd Sikh War. Fortunately, several key books and other resources previously unavailable came on line, and a copy of the hitherto impossible to find Khalsa Durbar Records (KDR) was located and provided by Gentleman Scholar, Dennis McKinney. With the KDR, it was possible to track the rise of the Khalsa from a band of seminomadic feudal horse to the formidable army that fought so courageously against the AngloIndian Army, and almost ended the British Raj in two separate razor close battles. Now, a highly detailed account of the rise of the Khalsa, the Sikh Brotherhood of Arms, has been compiled, in which every infantry battalion, cavalry regiment and artillery battery, along with the colorful Ghorchurras, can be tracked and identified in all battles they engaged in. And while written for the Sikh/Sub-Continent History buffs, the entire work is
also war games friendly in its details and adaptability. Even though the growth of the Khalsa, tracked across fifty years, is the heart of this work, there is a wealth of information that has either been forgotten or overlooked by virtually every author of the war since 1850. For example, the AngloIndian victory at Aliwal, the Battle without a mistake, was actually preceded by a near disastrous action at Buddewal, in which a Sikh general, dismissed as incompetent, almost wiped out Sir Harry Smith and his stripped down 1st Division before they could even fight their much touted battle. And that poor planning and execution on the part of British staff officers prevented troops from arriving at the front in a timely manner at the start of both wars. Many other widely held preconceptions of the conduct of the war will be challenged by information lost in the in cracks of history by decidedly pro-Raj writers for more than and a century and a half. Among the almost forgotten resources appearing in the Sikh Wars Source Book is Sir Colin Campbells privately published pamphlet in defense of his actions at Chillianwalla, published in 1851. An rare item generously provided by Dr. Robert Pye by way of a copy made from a rare original in the UK, it was hand transcribed to correct errors, and its information has not seen the light of dayor the eyes of most historiansfor over 160 years.
One such unique contribution is an analysis of the same Second Sikh War Battle of Chillianwallah, but this time by Major Agha Khan, PAVO 11th Cavalry Regiment (rtd). Finally, a view of this crucial action from the other side of the hill, one of the two razors edge battles on which the British Raj was staked. The Majors detailed account and analysis of this almost legendary contest is accompanied by maps of his own devising, detailing the maneuvers and opportunities taken and lost by the combatants that made this one, too close to call. In keeping with the theme of the work, to cast light on all aspects of the wars, the seemingly disjointed combats of Ramnuggar and Suddulapore are now combined into what they actually werea campaign of its own, and the amazing story of Fort Jubbur is a vital link in this narrative. Never 'eard of Fort Jubbur before? Very few people have, but imagine being Gough, Cureton or Campbell and having one of your brigadiers send this brief message: "By the by, did you know that there's a rather substantial fort, almost fortress, about ten miles off your flank from which 2,000 trained Jagirdari troops have been riding out daily to raid grazing livestock and beasts of burden from us, plundering sutlers attempting to join the tail,
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and the reasons behind such decisions. Finally, there will be a large number of illustrations of all manner of items, personalities, maps, etc, from contemporary sources (newspapers, journals, professional publications, etc), modern contributions, and more. Many of these have either not been seen since the original events, or have be contributed from unseen, private sources. The current Table of Contents follows below as the simplest way of providing a good sense of most of what the published work will include. Among these are contributions from a number of other modern researchers who have collaborated with the Author by accessing even more lost sources, all helping shed more light on military and other aspects of the subject. Introduction & Acknowledgements, 2nd Edition Khalsa to Catastrophe: Chaos as Statecraft, by Chris Ferree A Concise History of the First Sikh War, 1845-46 The Lion of the Punjab I, Ranjit The Road to War Far from Blind, But Hard of Hearing Organization of the Armies Opening Moves The Battle of Mudki
Ferozeshah: An Empire Trembles Buddewal, The Secret Defeat Aliwal: The Battle without a Mistake Sobraon: The Final Victory Postscript (including Analysis and Commentary) Sikh Treachery (Sidebar) The Interim Years: 1846-1848 Kangra Kot and the Jullundur Campaign The Kashmir Campaign Taming the Northwest Frontier Blindness Sets In Treachery and Trenches: The Multan Campaign, 1848 A Murder of Residents The Fatal Pause A Lieutenant in the Middle Dancing in the Dust The Lieutenant Becomes a Field Marshal Late, But Not Better Than Never Treachery Final Siege and Assault Fraying at the Edges A chapter bridging the events that occurred during and after the Mooltan Revolt to the actual start of the 2nd Sikh War. Ranging from the Northwest Frontier, to the Jullundur Doab, and into the very heartland of the Sikh nation, both major and minor events are covered to complete the picture.
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Twenty Orders of Battle Notes on British Orders of Battle Problems with Sikh Sources The Northwest Frontier, 1837-1848 Twenty Orders of Battle Mooltan Campaign Orders of Battle: Twelve Orders of Battle 2nd Sikh War Orders of Battle: Eleven Orders of Battle Daily March and Event LogsFor Each major formation. Route March Rates and Waypoints Artillery Weights and Measures Calculations for Provisioning a March Column The Lions Teeth: The Artillery of the Khalsa, contributed by Neil Carleton The Regiments and Weapons of the Opposing Forces--by Dennis McKinney A complete listing of the regiments that were involved in the war, including details of their weaponry for both sides. Glossary, Abbreviations and Spellings of Sikh Names Sidebars: (Various short articles, including these.) The Honorable East India Company (HEIC) Weather, Terrain You, Sirrah, were Drunk!
The General Health and Well Beingor Lack Thereofof Certain Senior Officers The Curious Commands of Colin Campbell The Use of Skirmishers in Combat Flashman and the Mountain of Light The Bengal Artillery
Bibliography The final page count of the Source Book is impossible as yet to determine, but this will be no pamphlet or digest size work. It will include more information under one cover than might be found in hundreds of individual volumes, even if readily available, as so many are not. Hopefully, the editing and layout will be completed in a matter of months as every part is checked and rechecked for accuracy and completeness, and more material may yet be added to help round out the work so that when truly ready for print, it will be the single most thorough resource on this subject in published history. Tentatively, that event will be in the Autumn of 2013or as close to that date as possible! Those with questions, ideas, or interests relevant to this project are welcome to contact the Author at PreziosiA@aol.com, or the Publisher at TVAG@att.net.
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1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805
By: Andrew Preziosi
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Introduction A truce had been called, negotiations were underway with the one holdout and peace seemed at hand, but that illusion was shattered in July1804 when a major detachment of Gerard Lord Lakes vaunted army was swarmed under by the very man being negotiated with. Once more, the Army of India took the field to avenge this loss and in another series of brilliant maneuvers, the enemy was once more brought to battle and defeated, while another impregnable fortress was stormed and captured in short order. The enemy was on the run and had nowhere to go but the assumed safety of a mud-walled fortress commanded by an erstwhile ally. When General Lake and his dirty shirts arrived before this barrier, everyone was confident that it too would soon fall to their efforts; after all nothing had stood before them yet and everyone knew that victory here meant peace. The Edge of Empire It would take volumes to attempt to describe the political situation that England faced in India at the turn of the 19th Century and that is far outside the scope of this article, but it can be boiled down to a few simple truths. As late as 1796, England and its agent on the subcontinent, The Honorable East India Company (HEIC), honestly did not covet anything
more than a financial empire. True, their small factory posts had expanded exponentially in less than forty years into vast land holdings and they never turned a good deal down when it came to acquiring wealth, whether it be in a small but lucrative grain contract or gaining control of a huge tract of land through default of payment, but the idea of acquiring a land Empire just wasnt (quite) there. It is also true that while the HEIC used its three presidential armies and its own small navy in order to engage in two rather abortive wars (1st Mahratta and 1st Mysore) during the time frame of the American War of Independence; England and the HEIC generally used every trick in the book to keep potential enemies off balance on the field of commerce rather than trying to engage them in battle. In their collective minds, they had enough benefits and problems with their current holdings to even think of venturing further into the interior and facing the unknown. By the 1790s that attitude began to change for two major reasons. The first was the French Revolution and its attendant wars. While initially confined to continental boundaries, various French governments soon did all they could to try and stir up trouble for England outside of Europe and during the next twenty years, the threat to India became the favorite cats paw to be employed. Amazingly enough, for all of their political acumen, England and the HEIC never quite understood that Frances threat to India was just that; despite small
French efforts and expeditions that never really succeeded, England always believed India to be vulnerable to French advances and spent a great deal of money and effort to insure their holdings on the subcontinent were secure. From 1790 through 1792, the HEIC was caught up in a second war with Mysore and its eccentric ruler, Tippoo Sultan. While not the general his father, the late Hyder Ali, had been, Tippoo was good enough to keep the Anglo-Indian armies of the three presidencies bouncing around until the then Governor General and Commander in Chief, Charles Lord Cornwallis finally took command and control in 1791 and forced Tippoo to sue for peace within a year. These two events now set the stage for the second reason that turned England from the worlds most powerful merchant to a country now looking to build an Empire and that reason was in the shape of a single man; Richard Wellesely, 1st Earl of Mornington. In 1797, Prime Minister William Pitt appointed Wellesley as Governor General of India to replace Cornwallis and pretty much gave him free reign to do as he wished, as long as the British hold on India was strengthened. Wellesleys opinion was that England had lost its most lucrative colony when America won its war of Independence and he was determined to see India fill the void as its richest holding, especially with money so desperately needed to fight France.
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them down. The Road to the Next War The Mahratta Empire was actually a very loosely knit confederacy that stretched across Northern and Central India, bordering each of presidencies and was usually considered no more than a dull headache for the HEIC. They had been a major power in the time of Clive, but were decisively defeated at the battle of Panipat in 1761 and pretty much faded into the background for the next twenty years. During that time an obscure Gwalior Chieftain, Mahadji Scindhia began a slow but steady crawl to the top of the heap and by the late 1770s was both the kingmaker and de facto ruler of the confederacy. The period just after the 1st Mahratta War was a time of great change, for that was when Mahadji met an obscure soldier of fortune from Savoy, Benoit de Boigne. Though their relationship got off to a rocky start, Scindia was impressed by the skills, intelligence and bravery of de Boigne, but upon discovering that de Boigne was also a man of honor who could not be bought or swayed, they cemented a friendship and partnership that would last a lifetime. In short order de Boigne agreed to form a small, European lead and trained, native infantry brigade, with its own artillery battery, forged in de Boignes private foundry that had been established for him by Mahadji at Agra.
In five short years, with de Boignes assistance, Scindhia solidified his position as kingmaker and the real power within the Mahratta Empire. Taking on all comers, including recalcitrant Mahratta rajahs, Jats, Rajputs and even the forces of the decaying Moghul Empire, Scindhia entered Delhi in 1788 and became the defender and Vice Regent of the Emperor Shah Alam II, basically the same exact titles and positions he occupied within the Mahratta Confederacy. The Mahratta Empire was now at the height of its strength and influence, stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Bay of Bengal, from as far south as the border of Mysore to the edge of the Northwest Frontier and Mahadji Scindhia was the most powerful man on the subcontinent. But Mahadji was also threatened by jealous Mahratta princes and chieftains, so while engaging in a consummate game of politics and intrigue, he asked de Boigne to increase his European trained forces from one small brigade to three large ones, complete with artillery, cavalry, engineers and a siege train. At the same time, other Mahratta rulers began to recruit European officers to train their own private armies, all of which were ostensibly under the Peswha at Poona (and thus Mahadji), but it soon became common for one kingdom to fight its neighbor for a piece of land, a fortress or the hand of a woman. Mahadji allowed these conflicts to take place, as they
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provinces from within. Civil war now pretty much broke out between the individual states and their allies, but these alliances could (and would) change on an almost monthly basis. The European officered and trained brigades of the satellite kingdoms now became the nucleus of marauding armies who no longer engaged in limited warfare, but employed wholesale slaughter and terror in order to defeat their enemies. While the brigades maintained their discipline, in exchange for a piece of the action, the Mahrattas were returning to form by unleashing their most dreaded secret weapon, the Pindarees, against their foe. The Pindarees were journeymen freebooters and brigands who had always been part of the Mahratta power structure. After the battle of Panipat and under Mahadji, their power had been kept in check, but now it was allowed to bloom once more. Coupled with traditional armed bands and mobs raised by various chieftains and rulers, the Pindarees swept forth and were allowed to do as they pleased, as long as they shared their loot with whatever Rajah or Nizam who sent them forth. Nothing was out of bounds; looting, raping and pillaging now became commonplace throughout non-HEIC controlled territory. Towns and villages would be held hostage, parents would be trussed up and then forced to watch as babies and grandmothers were raped and killed in front of them, daughters of marrying age mutilated and then allowed to live, while sons or grandfathers had
bags of glowing embers placed over their face, hanged upside down and then beaten to die simultaneously of asphyxiation and being burned to death, just so they would divulge where the family treasure (if any) was secreted. If there was a silver lining to such barbarity though, it usually only took a few examples of such treatment for word to spread and those targeted next were usually only too happy to have what little wealth and food they had ready and waiting for the taking by the Pindarees, who were equally happy to take such easy pickings and quickly move on to the next target. For now though, the Pindarees were just one element of the Mahratta scourge, as stated before, civil war had broken out between the various princes and large scale battles soon became the norm. It was at Poonah however that the final threshold was crossed, for it was here that two of the rival armies, complete with their European brigades, engaged in one of the largest battles fought to date, in order to determine just who would be the next Peshwa of the Confederacy. What was truly amazing though is that the battle took place right under the very nose of the British commissioner and his small Madras infantry escort brigade, who literally had a grandstand view of the entire battle unfolding before them! This battle and its subsequent results convinced the Governor General to prepare for war; fortunately he had a fine weapon within his
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quickly retired, thereby completely destroying the morale of their troops. Reinforcements from the Deccan, under a first-rate native general fared much better and fought quite well at the decisive battle of Laswaree, but in the end, they too were completely trounced. Coupled with Arthur Wellesleys rather hard fought, but equally successful campaign in the Deccan, the war seemed to be over almost as soon as it started. The Mahrattas were a proud people and still commanded large forces and much respect, so peace negotiations were rather lengthy, but proceeded steadily. Wisely, Lake kept his army in being, while reinforcements from Bombay were placed on their northern border, because one man, Deswant Rao Holkar, could not be brought to terms. At first it seemed like the usual Mahratta stall, but as weeks stretched into months it was decided to put more than diplomatic and financial pressure on Holkar. A Colonel Murray (who was to be Wellesleys deus ex machina during the Peninsular War) was ordered north from the Bombay territories with a small force of HM and native troops, while Lake was to send a small division to the borders of Hindustan in order to cooperate. This seemingly intelligent move was anything but. Murray was somewhat cowed by Holkar, supplies were intermittent and his cavalry was almost non-existent. Due to death and promotions, Lake was restricted in his choice of leaders and resolved to send his division out under the command of
Brigadier Monson of the 76th Highlanders. Monson was a great tactician and the bravest man in the British army, he proved as much during the storming of the then impregnable Aligarh fortress in September, but he was also as dumb as a brick when it came to higher concepts. Monson was given a reinforced veteran native infantry brigade, a battery of artillery and a very large irregular cavalry force; the consensus being that these two forces would soon bring Holkar back to the bargaining table. Monson and Murray were within twenty miles of each other when Holkar turned the tables. A massive weather front had moved in and after a quick feint towards Murray, Holkar attacked Monson. The first victim was the Irregular Cavalry, under command of a newly promoted lieutenant, which was attacked by almost 20,000 of Holkars cavalry and then completely routed when one of the hitherto allied bands turned on the young officer. Monson himself was next when he was caught with his back against a river during a torrential rainstorm. Extricating most of his troops in relatively good order; he lost the bulk of his artillery, transport and supplies. After that, it was just a matter of time; attacked and harassed several times a day, in hostile territory whose people refused to assist, his once proud division began to disintegrate until Monson himself gave the order for his starving troops to scatter and flee as best they could. While a good solid portion
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week later, had it not been for a few astute pickets. With Fraser following on, Lake wisely decided to march on Delhi and arrived in the vicinity not a moment too soon, because Holkar had detached one of his sons with almost 20,000 men to capture the Moghul capital. Fortunately, the year before, Lake had left two of the finest Bengal Army officers available in command of the city and had been able to send them some reinforcements during the interim. Nonetheless Lt. Colonels Ochterlony and Burn had only 2.5 battalions of Bengal regulars and some ex-Scindhian service battalions of mixed quality to hold the fort and city, along with artillery and a fairly large force of Irregular cavalry, including the escort regiment from last year, which was now commanded by a young Eurasian James Skinner. For almost ten days, this scratch force repulsed every attempt made against Delhi until the final day, when during the middle of a full, formal assault, the enemy army just left the field of battle; Lord Lake was near. While Lake continued his pursuit, Fraser had been marching steadily in support and in midNovember the entire army got lucky. Though not a complete success, Lake once more surprised Holkar at Furruckabad and sent him packing, completely dispersing his force and capturing his baggage. Fraser, woefully outnumbered and outgunned, met Holkars regular army near the fortress of Deeg and completely vanquished his foe, though losing his life in so doing. Almost 90 of
the 160 cannon fielded by the enemy at Deeg were captured, including some of the guns captured from Monson in August, while the remnants of Holkars brigades now either disappeared in a poof or entered Deeg. Holkar went from the power in Hindustan to a veritable beggar in the space of a week and the war would have ended right there and then, had it not been for the formerly loyal Rajah of Bhurtpore, who despite being rewarded for his stance during the first phase of the war by the HEIC, had been in communication with Holkar before and during Monsons retreat and then sent his cavalry and artillery to assist Holkars forces at Deeg. Declaring treachery, the Government and Lord Lake were now forced to reduce the Rajahs holdings. Deeg was immediately covered by Lakes column, while Frasers wing (now under Monson), reinforcements and the siege train moved to join. By December 13th, Deeg was under siege, a breach was created ten days later and on Christmas Eve, the town and fortress were stormed and taken with relatively few casualties, while the Mahratta and Jat troops fled to the nearby fortress on Bhurtpore; the last citadel to be conquered before final British victory could be declared. Bhurtpore: The First Assault By January 1st, 1805, Lakes Army was en route for Bhurtpore, with a cavalry screen
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75th and 76th Highlanders), two Bengal native infantry battalions, a small battery of four 6-pndr cannon (which never joined) and the Forlorn Hope of thirteen men lead by a young Sergeant John Shipp. The Left Column was commanded by Major Walter Hawkes, 1st/2nd BNI and consisted of two companies of HM 75th, Hawkes own battalion and an artillery section of two 6-pndrs. The Right Column was under command of Lt. Colonel Robert Rayne, 1st BEIR and consisted two more companies of HM 75th, 1st Bengal European Infantry Regiment and another artillery section. Maitland was to go for the breach, Rayne to a small gateway on the right, while Hawkes was to clear a small forward enemy battery and then assault through another bastion. The columns were to make short, sharp work of their objectives and follow so close to the retreating enemy that they would be amongst their foe as they fled from the walls. Once the breach was taken and secured, a larger column would follow to insure victory. The assault began at 8PM and from the beginning things went wrong. Firing had ceased on the breach just after sunset (almost four hours earlier), allowing the defenders time to both repair it and establish new defenses. The moon was in its 2nd quarter and assisted by firebrand lighting along the walls and from the outlying positions, it was never much darker than the original sunset had been, allowing the enemy to know exactly what was going on below at all times. Worst of all, while
Hawkes column did secure its initial objective, the Main and Left columns became entangled due to the fact that they both moved out simultaneously across the same broken terrain. Hawkes took the enemy battery but could not get close to the walls and moved to support Maitland. After untangling from Maitland, Rayne moved to his assault position but was stymied by not only the ditch, but a huge drain-field which he could not cross, also forcing him to move to support Maitland. Maitland reached the breach, but thwarted by the ditch and enemy gunfire, could get few troops across. What was worse, the ladder bearers, for all of the columns, instead of being veteran native infantry (who would normally get a bonus and, if killed or wounded, a small pension for their families) were civilian pioneers who, not being offered any inducements, dropped their wooden charges when they came under fire and fled. Shipp and his Forlorn Hope came close to the breach, a small party of the 22nd Foot actually reached and climbed that obstacle to just below the lip, but despite the efforts of Maitland, who was killed trying to get troops into the city, the assault, literally taking place under bright lights, failed and had to be called back. The army lost almost five hundred men and since many of the wounded could either not be found or carried back while under fire, they were murdered in a most gruesome manner by the garrison later that evening.
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European troops, two native infantry battalions, a battery of four 6-pndrs and a picked corps of European troops and regular native infantry to carry the custom made ladder-bridges and scaling ladders. Lt. Colonel Simpson with the Right Column, consisting of two Bengal infantry battalions, was to cover Macraes flank and then proceed to another nearby gateway and force entrance, thereby allowing a larger force to follow. At 3PM on the 21st, the assault went forward. At almost the same moment, a huge mass of enemy cavalry appeared on the plain forcing Lake to take the bulk of the cavalry and galloper guns to confront this threat. The assault proceeded smoothly until reaching the ditch in front of the breach. To the amazement of everyone, the garrison had managed to widen and redirect the ditch during the night and it was now impossible to cross with the ladder bridges, mainly because proposed float barrels had been replaced with bladders that could burst and no hooks had been added to the ends in order to make larger bridges. This time casualties numbered close to six-hundred men, mainly because of the fire brought to bear on the milling crowd in front of the breach while awaiting events. With no other option, Macrae ordered a withdrawal, while out on the plain; Lake easily repulsed Meer Khan, who had been reported en route earlier with a strong force of allied cavalry to assist Holkar and the Raja.
Third and Fourth Assaults Just prior to this assault and for the following month, reinforcement and supply columns arrived and departed regularly, while the siege itself progressed. At the same time, MG Smith was detached once more with the bulk of the cavalry to pursue Meer Khan and his mounted host in order to at least keep him away from Bhurtpore, if unable to bring him to battle. The details of the 3rd attempt are a bit too complicated for this article, but it can be boiled down quickly to the fact that the night before the storm and even that morning, the enemy sortied from the town and destroyed all of the scaling equipment and forward trenches, which had traditionally been vacated by the troops prior to any attempt. They also repaired the breach, set up inner and outer defenses and made great show of digging a mine. Nonetheless, the storming parties went forward and this time made progress, including having a small party take a section of the wall. The column commander called for reinforcements, but the European troops, headed by the 76th Foot, which had been nicknamed the Heroes of Hindoostan for their service throughout the entire war, balked at going forward, fearing a mine would be exploded under them at the moment of victory. Again, retreat was ordered and this time the army suffered almost 1,000 casualties.
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active and well supplied with ammunition of all sorts to be swept from the walls and for the final time the assault was called off, with another 1,000 casualties, including Templeton, who had been killed. Endgame That was it, supplies were dangerously low, ammunition almost completely expended and with over three thousand casualties, the siege was over. But Lake refused to submit, his lines of communication were still open and supplies were en route, so he decided to blockade Bhurtpore and amazingly, within days, negotiations were underway. During this period Lake did another night march and came upon Holkar at dawn, his cavalry went in and this time the transport and supplies of the Pindarees, the Rajah and Meer Khan were captured and the entire force dispersed. Hearing this, the Rajah signed the surrender papers on April 10th, 1805 and two days later his son was received by Lake as hostage barring final ratification. Holkar himself was finally run to ground several months later while taking refuge with the Sikhs, who were just now creating a kingdom under Ranjit Singh. By years end, the war was over and the army marched back to its cantonments. Final Thoughts There were several reasons Bhurtpore never fell to the Dirty Shirts, many of which are
evidenced in the assaults themselves, but most students of the siege agree that Bhurtpore did not fall for three main reasons. The Mud Wall: Most of Lakes troops and officers initially scoffed at this obstacle, but others, including the Bengal Artillery, knew just what they were facing. Bhurtpores walls were very thick and very old, you couldnt blast holes through them, all you could do was crumble them very slowly, allowing the garrison to strengthen and even rebuild it from the inside, with little risk to themselves. The Bengal Pioneers: Were indeed the pioneers of the Bengal Sappers and Miners who would be covered with glory during the next fifty years, but they were not yet that famed corps and much had to be learned, both by their young (and relatively inexperienced) officers and men; Bhurtpore was their very first harsh headmaster. Lord Lake had a reputation second to none before Bhurtpore and there were even rumors that he might very well be returned to England to command an army in the field once again, but that was not to be. Constant, swift success had lead to such expectations and the biggest mistake made in front of Bhurtpore was the failure of General Lake in not blockading the fortress, taking a big breath and then implementing a proper and formal siege, headed by experienced senior officers of the Bengal Artillery, instead of
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of Delhi Preziosi, Andrew, The Preziosi Order of Battle Collection, 2nd Mahratta War Stubbs, History of the Bengal Artillery, Volume 1 Thorn, Captain, Memoir of the Late War in India Wellesley, Marquess of Dispatches and Notes Relative to the Late Transactions in the Mahratta Empire
1st Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 3rd Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George Ball, 1st/8th BNI HM 75th Foot Regiment (joined Dec. 31st) 1st Battalion/8th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/22nd Bengal Native Infantry Regiment The Reserve of Infantry (Brigade): Lt. Colonel Patrick Don, 2nd/8th BNI HM 22nd Foot Regiment (Flank Companies) 1st Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment (Ad Hoc) Cavalry Division: Brigadier (Colonel & Lt. Colonel) Robert Macan, 29th LD Lt. Colonel John Sullivan Wood, HM 8th LD (superseded Macan on Jan 8th, due to new regulations) 1st Brigade: Major (Brevet Lt Colonel) John Ormsby Vandeleur, HM 8th LD HM 8th Light Dragoon Regiment 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment
Order of Battle, British Army of India, 2nd Phase of the War, Bhurtpore Campaign, December 28th, 1804 April 10th, 1805 Commander in Chief, Army of India: General Sir Gerard Lake, HMs Forces Infantry (Division): Major General William Dowdeswell, HM 86th Foot (joined Dec. 31st) 1st Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Colonel and Lt. Colonel) The Hon. William Monson, HM 76th HM 76th Foot Regiment 1st Battalion/2nd Bengal (Grenadiers) Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George S. Brown, 1st/4th BNI 1st Bengal European Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/15th Bengal
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800 gun Lascars: 492 Gun Lascars 137 Irregular Golandauz 174 Ex-Scindiahs Golandauz Details: (initial) The (1st Bengal) Experimental Horse Artillery Troop 1st Company, 1st Battalion, BA (detail) 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, BA 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, BA 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, BA Subsequently joined: 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, BA 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BA Equipment: Horse Artillery Troop (4 x 6-pndrs, 2 x 5.5 Howitzers) Cavalry Gallopers (14 x 6pndrs) Battalion Guns (22 x 6pndrs) Field Pieces (in Park or Battery): 7 x 12-pndrs 8 x 6-pndrs 6 x 5.5 Howitzers 2 x 4.2/5 Howitzers Siege Equipment: 6 x 18-pndrs 4 x 5.5 Mortars 4 x 8 Mortars Siege Materiel, Engineer Supplies and Ordnance Store Depot: Allahabad Engineer and Pioneer Corps: (forerunner, Bengal Sapper and Miner) (Three Engineer Officers and Three Pioneer [Infantry] Officers,
initially) Lt. Colonel Alexander Kydd, BE Three companies of Pioneers Strengths: (8,800 men, total) British (European) Infantry (1,000) British Cavalry (800) Native Infantry (4,400) Native Cavalry (1,600) Bengal Artillery (1,000) Subsequent Reinforcements (& Detachments): Bhurtpore Campaign January 18th, 1805: (1,600) Major General John Smith, HMs Service 3 x Bengal Native Battalions (exAgra garrison) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 14th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment ? Battalion/? Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 100 European convalescents 6 x 6-pndr Battalion guns Pathan (ex-Scindhian) Cavalry (500)-Ismail Beg Major General Smiths Pursuit Column: February 8, 1805 (vs. Amir Khan) March 23rd The Cavalry Division: (1,800) HM 8th, 27th and 29th Light Dragoon Regiments 1st, 3rd and 6th BNC Regiments The Experimental Troop of BHA Skinners Irregular Horse (500) joined Feb. 11th
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Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War, 2nd Phase
Order of Battle, British Army of India, 2nd Phase of the War, Bhurtpore Campaign, December 28th, 1804 - April 10th, 1805 [Editors Note: This OOB is provided as an example of the scholarship that is to be found in the Sikh Wars Source Book advertised prior to the Siege of Bhurtpore article. I have Andrew Praziosis earlier work, The Sudan Source Book, which covers the wars against the Mad Mhadi of Sudan in the late 1800s. That book was a joy to read and contained important information that provides crucial data for the wargame enthusiast. I am sure the scholarship in Andrews Sikh War Source Book will undoubtedly be of equal usefulness and accuracy.] Commander in Chief, Army of India: General Sir Gerard Lake, HMs Forces Military Secretary: Major (Brevet Lt. Colonel) George Augustus Frederick Lake, HM 29th Foot Aides-de-Camp: Major (Brevet Lt. Colonel) George Augustus Frederick Lake, HM 29th Foot Major William Nicholson, HM 72nd Captain (Brevet Major) James Menzies, HM 22nd Foot (KIA) Captain John M Johnson Captain Alexander Morrison, 21st BNI Personal Physician: (Surgeon) Dr. Robert Leny, Esq.
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Commander in Chiefs Bodyguard: One troop, 3rd BLC-Lieutenant Thomas Martin (see below, however) Army Staff: Acting Adjutant General, Kings Troops: Major William Nicholson, HM 72nd Acting Quartermaster General, Kings Troops: Major (Brevet Lt. Colonel) George Augustus Frederick Lake, HM 29th Foot Adjutant General, HEIC Troops: Lt. Colonel John Gerard, BNI Deputy Quartermaster General, HEIC Troops: Major Thomas Salkeld, 1st BNI (W) Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, HEIC Troops: Captain John Covell, HM 76th (W) Political Department: Mr. Graeme Mercer, Governor Generals Agent Lt. Colonel John Malcolm (returned near the end) Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalf, AGGO
Versus: The Army of Scindhia: Jeswant Rao Holkar Raja Ranjit Singh of Bhurtpore [Completed on Page 10]
VOL. 7 NO. 4
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HM 76th Foot Regiment 1st Battalion/2nd Bengal (Grenadiers) Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George S. Brown, 1st/4th BNI Major of Brigade: Lieutenant John Vaughan, BNI Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant John Greenstreet, 15th BNI 1st Bengal European Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment-Captain Walsh/Welsh 2nd Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 3rd Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George Ball, 1st/8th BNI Major of Brigade: Captain Wanaee (no such name, or variation of, listed under Dodwell) Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant John Ker, 8th BNI (D) HM 75th Foot Regiment (joined Dec. 31st)-Lt. Colonel the Hon. James Maitland 1st Battalion/8th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/22nd Bengal Native Infantry Regiment The Reserve of Infantry (Brigade): Lt. Colonel Patrick Don, 2nd/8th BNI
Major of Brigade: Captain Robert Stephenson, 12th BNI Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant Norman Shairp, 12th BNI HM 22nd Foot Regiment (Flank Companies) 1st Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment (Ad Hoc) Cavalry Division: Brigadier (Colonel & Lt. Colonel) Robert Macan, 29th LD Lt. Colonel John Sullivan Wood, HM 8th LD (superseded Macan on Jan 8th, due to new regulations) Aide-de-Camp: Major of Brigade: Captain Thomas Martin, 3rd BLC (replaced Macan) Chief of Horse Artillery: Captain-Lieutenant Clements Brown, BA 1st Brigade: Major (Brevet Lt Colonel) John Ormsby Vandeleur, HM 8th LD Major of Brigade: Captain George Bolton, HM 8th LD Brigade Quartermaster: Captain Charles Augustus Mary de Peyron, 3rd BLC
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Army Troops: Army Artillery: Brevet Lt. Colonel (Major) John Horsford, BA Second in Command: (subsequent reinforcement) Major Alexander Hind (6th Company, 1st Battalion, BA) Brigade Major, Quartermaster and Adjutant: Lieutenant Marmaduke Williamson Brown, BA Supernumerary Officers: (subsequent reinforcements) Captain Gervaise Pennington, BA (W) (Acting Commissary of Ordnance, Agra) (W) Lieutenant Warren Hastings Leslie Frith, BA Mr. Conductor James Whale, BA (W) Manned by (initially): Fifteen Officers One (Brevet) Lt Colonel Four Captains Seven Lieutenants (Subalterns) 184 European gunners 800 gun Lascars: 492 Gun Lascars 137 Irregular Golandauz 174 Ex-Scindiahs Golandauz Details: (initial) The Experimental Troop of Horse Artillery: Captain-Lieutenant Clements Brown Lieutenant Henry Stark Lieutenant James Young 1st Company, 1st Battalion, BA (detail) Lieutenant George Swiney (W) 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, BA
Captain George Raban Lieutenant Rayner Gowing (KIA) 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, BA Captain John Nelly (GW) Lieutenant George Pollock 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, BA Lieutenant Samuel Sinclair Hay Lieutenant George Percival (KIA) Subsequently joined: 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, BA Captain-Lieutenant Edward William Butler* Lieutenant John D. Smith 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BA Captain Andrew Dunn Equipment: Horse Artillery Troop (4 x 6pndrs, 2 x 5.5 Howitzers) Cavalry Gallopers (14 x 6-pndrs) Battalion Guns (22 x 6-pndrs) Field Pieces (in Park or Battery): 7 x 12-pndrs 8 x 6-pndrs 6 x 5.5 Howitzers 2 x 4.2/5 Howitzers Siege Equipment: 6 x 18-pndrs 4 x 5.5 Mortars 4 x 8 Mortars Siege Materiel, Engineer Supplies and Ordnance Store Depot: Allahabad Engineer and Pioneer Corps: (fore-runner, Bengal Sapper and Miner) (Three Engineer Officers and Three Pioneer [Infantry] Officers, initially) Lt. Colonel Alexander Kydd, BE Brevet Captain (Lieutenant) Thomas Wood, BNI Brevet Captain (Lieutenant) Thomas Robertson
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Artillery: One Bombay Artillery Company 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BACaptain Andrew Dunn (only officer present) 2 x 12-pndrs 12 x 6-pndrs 2 x Field Howitzers 700 Europeans 2,400 Native Infantry and Cavalry Reinforcement and Supply Column: Lt. Colonel George Holmes, Bombay Infantry 2nd Battalion/ 1st Bombay Infantry Regiment (detached from Jones) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bombay Infantry Regiment April 1st, 1805: HM 27th LD renamed HM 24th HM 29th LD renamed HM 25th Staff Officers not accounted for: Brigade Major: Captain John Wallace, 15th BNI (KIA, 1st Assault) (This may have been Dowdeswells Divisional [Wing] Brigade Major, but I cannot be certain) Brigade Major: Lieutenant James Durant. BNI (W, 4th Assault) (Wallaces Replacement?) Versus: The Army of Scindhia: Jeswant Rao Holkar Raja Ranjit Singh of Bhurtpore [Continued on Page 58]
Strengths: (8,800 men, total) British (European) Infantry (1,000) British Cavalry (800) Native Infantry (4,400) Native Cavalry (1,600) Bengal Artillery (1,000) Subsequent Reinforcements (& Detachments): Bhurtpore Campaign January 18th, 1805: (1,600) Major General John Smith, HMs Service 3 x Bengal Native Battalions (exAgra garrison) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 14th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment ? Battalion/? Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 100 European convalescents 6 x 6-pndr Battalion guns
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Borodino was fought between the Army of Imperial Russia and Napoleons Grand Arme on September 7, 1812. The battle ended with a French victory, but strategic defeat. Losses were terrible on both sides, but the Russians could replace theirs. One week after the battle Napoleon occupied an undefended Moscow, hoping to impose a peace, but after four weeks was forced to retreat home with calamitous results. The historical battle involved wave after wave of frontal attacks by both sides, focusing on the Russian redoubts. However, the game shows all the options available to Napoleon and Kutuzov, including some not attempted historically. The French player has several possible lines of attack and the Russian player must try to anticipate and counter them all. The tactical interaction of Napoleonic infantry, cavalry and artillery is also emphasized, including cavalry charges and squares. This makes for exciting and
tense gaming. Movement and combat are resolved within areas. The game plays using the fast-paced MoveMove-Battle sequence seen in Shiloh. Players activate leaders to command divisions of the same corps. Game time is 3-4 hours. COVER ART La Moskowa by Mark Churms The scene depicts the French 1st Carabiniers charging at Borodino. Borodino Battle History On September 5, 1812, the French Grande Arme under the command of Emperor Napoleon I, advancing along the main highway from Smolensk, approached the village of Borodino where the Russians under Gen. Mikhail Kutuzov had resolved to make a stand to save their ancient capital of Moscow from the invader. Three months before in late June, the French and their allies gathered from all across Europe had crossed the
Niemen River with about 450,000 men, and over 225,000 more in reserve and covering the flanks. Though the Russians under Tsar Alexander I could also call on about 500,000 active troops throughout their vast empire, only about 200,000 were at the front facing the invader, and so the Russians began to fall back as Napoleon pursued closely, hoping to defeat them in detail. The two main Russian armies, the 1st under Gen. Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd under Prince Bagration, finally joined at Smolensk in August, where they fought for the city but were forced to abandon it to Napoleons superior forces, after each side suffered heavy losses. Following this defeat, the Tsar appointed the elderly veteran Kutuzov to lead the two combined armies. By this time, heavy attrition, battle losses and detachments of corps to cover long flanks and supply lines had reduced Napoleons Grande Arme to only about 135,000 men and 587 guns. At last the Russians, who had about 120,000 regulars
and Cossacks and at least 624 guns, along with some 30,000 militia from Moscow and Smolensk, could fight an evenly matched battle. The Russians chose a position with their right flank covered by the Kolocha River, and improved their left flank to the south of the Kolocha with several redoubts, while further south their position was covered by marshy woods around the village of Utitsa. The stage was set for what Napoleon afterward called the "most terrible" of all his battles, immortalized by Leo Tolstoy in "War and Peace." After a preliminary engagement for control of the Shevardino redoubt on the Russians' far left on September 5, and a delay on September 6 while the rest of the French army arrived and moved into position, the main battle was fought on September 7, the single bloodiest day of fighting in the Napoleonic Wars. Borodino cost the French about 28,000-30,000 and the Russians between 44,000-50,000 casualties, and
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Borodino - The largest of the villages scattered across the several miles of fields and woodland where the armies met, Borodino was a cluster of wooden houses around the 1701 two-level brick Church of the Nativity (the only surviving structure that witnessed the battle), lying at the center of the Russian army's front on the western side of the bridge where the New Smolensk Post Highway crossed the Kolocha River. The first action on September 7 was a quick assault by the French IV Corps to drive out the garrison of Russian Guard Jagers and the Russian artillery observers in the two onion-domed steeples of the church. The French held the village for the rest of the battle though they were unable to force a crossing of the Kolocha River at the bridge, which the Russians then burned. Semyonovskoye - The small village of Semyonovskoye (the correct Russian pronunciation, though often also spelled Semenovskoye) lay at the center of the Russian left wing positions, and was the scene of very heavy fighting in the late morning and afternoon as the French sought to maneuver around the Great Redoubt after capturing the Fleches. The village had been partly demolished by the Russians before the battle on September 7 to allow for unobstructed artillery fire, but the foundations of the houses provided cover for troops, as did a small redoubt the Russians had built nearby (considered part of the village on the map).
The Main Roads - The main roads running from west to east through the battlefield were critical to lines of supply and retreat. The central New Smolensk Post Highway crossed the Kolocha River by a bridge at Borodino, continuing through Gorki where Kutuzov had his battle command post on the hill providing a good view of the Russian positions (the main Russian administrative headquarters lay further down the road at Tatarinovo). The southern Old Smolensk Road ran through the village of Utitsa and the woods and swamps surrounding it. Separated by the Kolocha River on the west side of the field, the two roads run closely together where they exit the field in the east, joining together off the map edge just before the large town of Mozhaisk. The third main road, entering the map to the north at Gryaz, continues southeast across the Kolocha River and then turns east just above the New Smolensk Post Highway, becoming the Old Ruzskaya Road. The French army approached the Borodino battlefield in three columns, with Napoleon and the bulk of the French army entering the field along the New Smolensk Post Highway. The Polish V Corps used the Old Smolensk Road, entering at the village of Yelnya and flanking the Russian position at the Shevardino Redoubt, and Eugene's IV Corps entered to the north along the road from Gryaz, covering Napoleons left flank against any possible advance by
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The smaller Shevardino redoubt, a pentagon almost fully enclosed, was the focus of the preliminary fighting on September 5 between the French I and V Corps and cavalry, and the Russian VIII Corps, and Napoleon had his command post there on September 7. Another group of three Russian redoubts protecting the Russian far right along the west side of the Moskva River, the Maslovo Redoubts or Fleches, at right angles to each other and open only on the inside, were not fought over. There were a number of smaller Russian redoubts or artillery positions scattered across the battlefield, most of which are not depicted on the map as they would not have had a significant effect on the fighting at the scale of this game. One of these smaller redoubts is depicted, however, on the main road before Gorki, along the east bank of the Kolocha and near Semyonovskoye, as it was substantial enough to hold nearly a full artillery battery and guarded Kutuzov's HQ position, had the French crossed the Kolocha River from Borodino. The Kolocha River - The Kolocha, a tributary of the larger and impassable Moskva, enters the battlefield from the west as a relatively minor waterway with low banks and can readily be crossed in summer and early fall, much as the other streams on the battlefield. However, as it passes Borodino and turns northeast, it enters a ravine with steep banks and becomes more of an obstacle; at Borodino, the Kolocha is about 3-6 feet deep and 6-10 feet wide,
but the ravine about 12 feet deep. Two bridges crossed the Kolocha River near Borodino, including one on the main New Smolensk Post Highway leading to Gorki (treated together for game purposes), and a mill dam near Borodino could also be used to cross. Kutuzov and his staff anticipated a major French assault across the Kolocha and positioned the Russian II, IV, and VI Corps as well as the Cossacks along or near the river in the north to prevent it, but Napoleon never tried to force the river north of Borodino after the failure of the French IV Corps to cross at Borodino on the early morning of Sept. 7, and eventually most of these Russian forces were shifted southward to reinforce the tottering Russian 2nd Army. The Russians burned the main Borodino bridge, while the French used other bridges that they built to the west of Borodino to aid their attack over the river toward the Great Redoubt (represented by the French Bridge in the game). Platov's Cossacks and Uvarov's I Cavalry Corps, with little
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as Poniatowski or Junot in 1812, who could also command corps. One corps (IV) was led by a unique leader, Eugene, who was not only a General of Division but also the Viceroy of Italy and Napoleons stepson. The Russian army of 1812 followed Peter the Great's Table of Ranks, under which the highest rank of Field Marshal was a rarely accorded honor which no active officer held at the time of Borodino, though Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly were later to earn this rank. At the time of Borodino, the highest-ranking commanders below the Tsar were Generals of Infantry, or of Cavalry, who could command armies or corps. Lieutenant Generals, who also commanded corps, were next in rank. It is difficult to compare the ranks of French and Russian general officers exactly. French Marshals regularly held commands comparable to Russian Lieutenant Generals, or Generals of Infantry or Cavalry. The French Commanders Napoleon I - In 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French and King of Italy, was master of Europe from Spain to Poland, and the greatest captain of his era. He had risen from minor Corsican aristocracy to lead France to victory in campaigns throughout Europe, and had defeated the Russians several times before in Austria and Poland. But his legendary abilities were not at their best in his 1812 campaign in Russia; he underestimated the immense logistical difficulties
and the Russian determination to resist; and was in ill health at Borodino. The disastrous winter retreat from Moscow shattered the widespread belief in Napoleons invincibility, leading to final defeat and exile to St. Helena where he died in 1821. Joachim Murat - Napoleons brother-in-law, Marshal Murat was France's greatest cavalry leader and the most flamboyant of the Emperor's commanders. An innkeeper's son, Murat rose to King of Naples by 1808, and led Napoleons Cavalry Reserve during the invasion of Russia. Murat was well known to the Russians, and some Cossacks even asked him to switch sides and become their Hetman! But his end was humiliating; after double-crossing both Napoleon and then the Allies, he was captured in Italy and executed by firing squad on Oct. 13, 1815. Adolphe-Edouard-CasimirJoseph Mortier - One of the two commanders of Napoleons Imperial Guard infantry in Russia, Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso, was known as a capable soldier and man of honor. Napoleon called him "the big mortar with a short range." Mortier's Guard infantry was given no chance to fight at Borodino, but as Governor of Moscow he tried to blow up the Kremlin. After Napoleons fall Mortier regained favor with the Bourbons and became ambassador to Russia, but was killed by a terrorist's "infernal machine" in 1835.
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Eugene de Beauharnais Napoleons stepson by his divorced Empress Josephine, Prince Eugene proved to be one of the most capable of the many relatives that Napoleon elevated to high positions. He became a General of Division and then Viceroy of Napoleons Kingdom of Italy in 1805. Eugene commanded a large part of the Italian army in his IV Corps in 1812, and led the final successful third assault on the Great Redoubt at Borodino after a critical twohour delay. Eugene did not rejoin Napoleon in 1815 and retired to Munich until his early but natural death. Josef Anton Poniatowski - The Poles loyally and enthusiastically committed their entire army to the Russian campaign. Prince Poniatowski, nephew of the last King of Poland, a Polish liberal and nationalist, and one of the reputed lovers of Napoleons sister Pauline, led the all-Polish V Corps as General of Division, and commander in chief of the Polish army. At Borodino, he commanded his corps well on the French right, despite heavy losses, taking the Russian position at Utitsa from the Russian III Corps, and later brought the few survivors of his army out of Russia with most of their guns. Poniatowski was finally made a Marshal in 1813, just before he was killed at the Battle of Leipzig. Jean-Andoche Junot - Last and least of the French corps commanders at Borodino, General of Division Junot, Duke of
Abrantes, was put in command of the Westphalian VIII Corps in 1812 after Napoleons untalented brother King Jerome quit. Junot had never been promoted to Marshal, as his invasion of Portugal in 1807 had been defeated by Wellington, and the Westphalians were held in low regard by Napoleon, who left them to dispose of the corpses and wounded after Borodino while the rest of the army pushed on to Moscow. Napoleon faulted Junot for "gross blunders" in allowing the Russians to retreat at Smolensk, and though at Borodino he provided useful aid to Poniatowski's Poles on the French right, he was never given another important combat command after Russia and went mad, dying in 1813 by jumping out of a window. The Russian Commanders Mikhail Ilarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov - Fat and wily, old General of Infantry Prince Kutuzov, from an illustrious noble family, had over fifty years of military service to his credit by the time of the battle of Borodino. He successfully ended a war with Turkey in 1812, just in time for his Army of the Danube to join in the fight against Napoleon. Tsar Alexander I appointed Kutuzov to supreme command in August 1812 after the loss of Smolensk, as a result of the popular outcry for a "real Russian" general who would fight, despite Kutuzov's earlier defeat by Napoleon at Austerlitz. Some officers saw
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Kutuzov's death, and led the Russian army into Germany and France in 1813-15, winning promotion to Field Marshal and Prince, though after his death in 1818 his reputation was overshadowed by Kutuzov's. Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration Fiery, brave and impetuous, Prince Bagration (pronounced "bah-grahtee-ON") was descended from the Georgian royal family, and rose to General of Infantry in the Tsar's service, achieving a remarkable record of combat. During the 1812 campaign, he commanded the Russian 2nd Army, but only narrowly escaped being isolated and destroyed by Napoleon due to his reluctance to retreat, and urged fighting the French at Smolensk. Bagration's intrigues against Barclay, his temperamental opposite, helped to bring about Kutuzov's appointment. At Borodino, Bagration led his army courageously on the Russian left defending Semyonovskoye and the Fleches, bearing the brunt of Napoleons assaults and losing nearly half his men, but obstinately defending his positions until Barclay could send him critical reinforcements. Bagration's army was disheartened when he was mortally wounded in late morning leading a counterattack; he had never been wounded in battle before and was believed invulnerable. He died on Sept. 24, 1812, only after being satisfied that the Russians would not negotiate with Napoleon despite the loss of Moscow.
Matvei Ivanovich Platov - After suffering disgrace, imprisonment and exile under the half-mad Tsar Paul, Platov was restored to favor by Alexander I, who made him General of Cavalry and Ataman of the Don Cossacks. In 1812, with an extraordinary 46 years of service in the Don Cossack Host, he commanded the Cossack corps, and guarded the Russian right flank at Borodino. Platov suggested and led a massive cavalry flanking attack with his Cossacks, accompanied by Uvarov's I Cavalry Corps. This forced the French assault on the Great Redoubt to be delayed, but failed to achieve decisive results, so that Kutuzov denied Platov the honors given to other Russian generals. Platov was said to be drunk at Borodino, but was among the last to retreat from the field. Platov successfully harassed the French army retreating from Moscow and in the campaigns of 1813-14, was made a Count, and retired to his Cossack homeland where he died in 1818. Karl Fedorovich Baggovut (or Karl Gustav von Baggehufwudt) - A soldier from the Baltic provinces who served under the Russified version of his Norwegian noble family name, Lt. Gen. Baggovut commanded the II Corps initially on the Russian far right at Borodino. He marched to reinforce Tuchkov on the far left flank, and helped to contain the French assaults along the Old Smolensk Road, earning high honor. When killed by a
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in 1857, the last of the Borodino army and corps commanders. Nikolai Ivanovich Lavrov - The noble Lt. Gen. Lavrov normally commanded the Guards infantry division, but also assumed leadership of the V Guards Corps at Borodino, as his superior, Grand Duke Constantine, was absent at St. Petersburg after one of his quarrels with Barclay. Lavrov turned out to be one of the less effective corps commanders at Borodino, once nearly paralyzed under heavy French artillery fire and unable to mount his horse, though his Guard never wavered. He became seriously ill after the end of the campaign, dying in September 1813. Dmitri Sergeyevich Dokhturov General of Infantry Dokhturov, of noble birth and one of the most experienced of the Russian corps commanders, led the VI Corps in the Russian center at Borodino. Dokhturov had won honor for his defense of Smolensk, and took over command of the 2nd Army at Borodino after Bagration was mortally wounded, for which he earned high recognition. He favored defending Moscow against Napoleon, and served in all the major battles of the 1812 campaign as well as in the liberation of Germany and the invasion of France, but then retired due to ill health and died in 1816. Nikolai Nikolayevich Rayevski From a well-connected noble family, Rayevski suffered dismissal by Tsar Paul but was restored to favor and made
Lieutenant General by Alexander I. Rayevski had distinguished himself in 1812 at Smolensk, and against Davout's I Corps, before becoming a hero at Borodino, where he bravely defended the Great Redoubt with his VII Corps, repulsing two French assaults though losing half of his men. His conduct won the admiration of Kutuzov, and the Russians only lost the position to a third overwhelming attack in the afternoon after Rayevski's troops had been relieved by VI Corps. Rayevski supported Kutuzov's decision to abandon Moscow after Borodino, and in 1813-15 he continued to fight against Napoleon, winning promotion to General of Cavalry and participating in the capture of Paris. Rayevski's family later suffered disgrace when two sons and other relatives were implicated in the Decembrist uprising against the new Tsar Nicholas I, though Rayevski was not involved and survived until 1829. Mikhail Mikhailovich Borozdin - Lt. Gen. Borozdin, a member of an ancient noble family, was put in command of the Russian VIII Corps in the 1812 campaign, even though unlike all the other Russian army and corps commanders he lacked any experience fighting Napoleon. At Borodino the most severe of Napoleons blows fell on this least prepared of the Russian leaders; VIII Corps was [Continued on Page 63]
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Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History
By: Carl Willner
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Columbias Borodino: Napoleon in Russia, 1812 game, published in the 200th anniversary year of Napoleons invasion of Russia, has now joined the ranks of many earlier wargaming recreations of this famous battle. This treatment of Borodino, part of Columbias Great Battles of History series, is distinguished by a high degree of faithfulness to history. The game map, drawn from multiple 19th and 20th century Russian, English and French sources as well as personal exploration of the battlefield by this designer, reveals terrain and the Russian names in greater detail than most other games on Borodino, including some features that have not appeared on any previous game maps of the battle. In addition, the order of battle,
while presenting the armies on a division and corps scale, goes deeply into the latest research and historical sources on the Russian and French armies at Borodino. At the same time, Columbias game retains the relative simplicity of rules mechanics and the fog of war approach that have distinguished its earlier releases, while capturing the flavor of Napoleonic combat with squares, artillery bombardments, the famous redoubts at Borodino, and combined arms tactics. As a result, this great battle extending over two days can be recreated in a few hours of play. Many gamers have shown interest in the history of the campaign and battle, and how it relates to the Borodino 1812 game. This article provides a behind the scenes look from the perspective
of one of the designers. The map features, OB and game rules of Borodino 1812 were repeatedly compared to the actual battle history in the design process, to ensure that it was possible to recreate the historical actions of the commanders and that they made sense in game terms, while still allowing the players full scope to explore alternative strategies, some considered by the historical commanders but rejected. Setting the Stage: Napoleons Invasion of Russia When Napoleon commenced his invasion of Russia on June 2324, 1812 he had amassed the single largest army ever seen in Europe to that time along the Niemen River. 450,000 French
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48,000 men. This front line force of 225,600 241,000 was outnumbered at the outset two to one by the forces of Napoleons Grande Arme that initially crossed the border, as much of the Russian army was still on other fronts at the start of the campaign. The Army of the Danube/Moldavia, recently commanded by Gen. Kutuzov and replaced by Admiral Chichagov, faced Turkey with 50,000 -54,500 men, while the Finland Corps, with 28,500 30,000 men, held this province captured from Sweden in 1809. The Crimea had a garrison of 19,500 men, and in the Caucasus the Georgian Corps deployed another 24-34,000, while behind the Russian lines in the center were 84,000 more men in the I and II Reserve Corps. Most of these 206,000 222,000 men would eventually join the Russian forces facing Napoleon, apart from those in the Caucasus, but the ones from other fronts would have to march great distances to do so and could not be used in the struggle against Napoleon for the first few months. The French and Russian Armies: 1812 (Russian strength is total army at the outset of the campaign; French strength counts forces available for the Russian campaign in Poland and Germany, but not on other fronts like Spain)
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Formations Infantry Corps Cavalry Corps Infantry Divisions Cavalry Divisions Infantry Regiments Cavalry Regiments
Russians 15 6 (including 1 Cossack) 51 19 170 (not counting militia) 66 + 83 Cossack, irregular into the Russian heartland. Napoleon was forced to detach three entire corps from the Grande Arme, the II, IV and VII, to cover the ever-lengthening flanks, and leave other detachments behind from the remaining corps as garrisons. The Russians, too, had to detach the strong I Corps (Lt. Gen. Wittgenstein) with 1st Cavalry Division from their 1st Army to cover the approaches to St. Petersburg, as the rest of 1st Army fell back toward Moscow. At last the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies combined at Smolensk and sought to give battle for the city in mid-August. Though Napoleons advantage in the strength of the main armies had narrowed from the initial 2-1 to just 1.5-1, the 120,000 Russians were still heavily outnumbered by Napoleons remaining 180,000 and they were forced to abandon the city after significant losses by both sides. Following this defeat, the Tsar appointed the elderly Kutuzov, fresh from his successful conclusion of a peace with Turkey, to overall command of the combined 1st and 2nd Armies, though he kept both of the original army commanders in charge of their armies as well, creating an overly complex command
Napoleon struck into Russia with the objective of bringing on a battle near the border, and dividing the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, seeking to isolate and destroy the smaller 2nd Army first. But those two Russian armies, following the strategy urged by Barclay in light of Napoleons numerical advantage in the center, fell back and refused to give battle. The more aggressive Bagration retreated reluctantly and only narrowly escaped the trap set for him, with Davouts I Corps at one point getting ahead of the Russian 2nd Army in its advance. Napoleon blamed Jeromes slowness for Bagrations escape, and in a huff the King quit and returned to Westphalia. Napoleons opening advantage in concentration now began to work against him, as the territory through which the Grande Arme was passing could not support its enormous numbers, and severe attrition afflicted the French and their allies during the opening months of the campaign. Also, as Napoleon advanced deeper into Russia, the broad front of the advance north of the Pripyet Marshes increasingly narrowed, resembling a rapier thrust deep
structure. Kutuzov determined to fight again to try to save Moscow, and the place he chose was Borodino. Attrition, battle losses at Smolensk and detachments had still further reduced Napoleons Grande Arme to 135,117 men, with the corps remaining Guard, I, III, IV, V, VIII (now commanded by Gen. Division Junot), and the four in the Cavalry Reserve down to an average of about 45% of the troops with which they had crossed the Russian border in June. Napoleon, realizing that a major battle was about to take place, halted his army at Gzhatsk on Sept. 2 and 3, and the muster there gives us an accurate total of the strength of each of the corps of the French army just before the battle, with about 123,000 present and another 12,000 due to return within 5 days, in time for the battle. Though it is not certain if all these detachments arrived, the largest of them, including most of IV Cavalry Corps (though one brigade was absent) and a division of II Cavalry Corps, are indeed known to have returned in time. And with some additional troops of the Young Guard not counted in those totals that likely reached the battle, and men attached to Napoleons AHQ, the total of 135,000 fairly represents what Napoleon had for Borodino. Though the Russians had not suffered as heavily as Napoleon, the 180-193,000 that the two Russian armies had at the start had now been reduced to only a little over 100,000, plus
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army in numbers relying on French troops alone. He had called on his allies throughout Europe to fill out the ranks of the Grande Arme. Against Russia also marched Poles, Italians, Germans from Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Westphalia and an array of minor states, Austrians, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Swiss, Illyrians, Dalmatians and Croats. Nothing like this had been seen in Europe before, since Xerxes marched all the peoples of the Persian Empire against Greece. HQs (Leaders): One significant advantage that the French enjoyed was their leaders overall superiority in military experience and talent. For many years, the French had been fighting and usually winning battles all across Europe. They drew their commanders not just from a narrow noble class but, thanks to the French Revolution, from a broader pool of talent in all of French society. Most of the French commanders, apart from the aristocratic Davout, came from relatively humble origins, unlike the leaders of the Ancien Regime armies they faced. The very presence of Napoleon exerted a demoralizing influence on his opponents, with his nearly unbroken record of success where he commanded in person, even if at Borodino he was not at his best. And other French corps commanders present at Borodino were likewise respected and feared by their foes. Davout,
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The French and allied infantry was principally divided into line and light infantry regiments, and at Borodino there were a total of 65 infantry regiments, including 42 line and 6 light regiments in the regular infantry. The Guard divisions had a number of unique regimental designations of their own, and the 17 Guards regiments at Borodino included 3 grenadiers, 2 chasseurs, 2 tirailleurs, 3 voltigeurs, and 2 fusiliers, as well as 3 Polish Legion of the Vistula and 2 Italian Guard regiments. Various types of regiments were combined in the divisions, and the number of battalions in them could also vary, from as few as two to as many as five in Davouts powerful divisions. A few regiments were even represented by just one of their battalions. For the most part the light infantry remains combined with its parent divisions in the game. However, recognizing that the French often deployed screens of light voltigeurs to cover areas unprotected by other forces or to provide extra support for the regulars, there are three 1-step voltigeur units in the game, better able to engage and retreat quickly than regular infantry. The voltigeurs, like their Russian Jaeger counterparts, are doublecounted in the game along with the light infantry in their parent divisions, since the voltigeur screens could be formed from any infantry divisions as needed.
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including some Italian and German guard cavalry regiments mixed with the regulars, a total of 84. As with the infantry, a few regiments had only one of their squadrons present. There are 23 steps of French cavalry in the game, which at 1200 men per step represents 27,600 men, about one step less than the actual total of 29,219 reported on Sept. 2. The difference mainly reflects the handling of IV Cavalry Corps, the weakest of the four in cavalrymen. It was estimated to have 3200 cavalry for Sept. 2, but some sources indicate only had about 2600 present for Borodino, giving it 2 rather than 3 steps. This also better fits the overall Reserve Cavalry strength (with 15,780 cavalry and 1905 artillerymen on Sept. 2, a total of 13 steps of cavalry, 11 of which are accounted for in I, II and III Cavalry Corps). Here, and also with the III Corps cavalry, the French cavalry has been rounded down in close cases to reflect the worse condition of their mounts by this point in the campaign compared with the Russians. The remaining men in the army were in the artillery and train, totaling 15,391.
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The following table shows the strengths of the French and allied corps at the outset of the Russian campaign, and the strength that each of the ones that fought at Borodino had available there as of Sept. 2 for the battle. The French corps that fought at Borodino, beginning with a total of 298,873 men and 682 guns, was reduced to a total of 135,117 men and 587 guns by the time of the battle, 45.2% of their starting manpower and 86.1% of their artillery. Corps Men June 1812 47,283 72,051 37,139 39,342 45,798 36,311 25,134 17,194 17,935 33,567 32,497 50,700 est. 34,148 12,077 10,436 9,676 7,964 Guns June 1812 112 150 92 86 116 70 55 50 34 80 84 60 60 30 30 30 24 Men Sept. 1812 Guns Sept. 1812 109 147 % starting strength men/guns 39%/97% 56%/98%
6 guns were in a horse battery supporting the corps cavalry divisions of I and III Corps.
The infantry, cavalry, and artillery/train manpower in each of the French corps at Borodino, based on the Sept. 2 muster (with arrival of detachments), were as follows: (see 2nd table below) Of the corps present at Borodino, the Guard, IV and V Corps, and III Cavalry Corps had the largest share of their forces missing at the time of the battle. Guard: The Hessian Guard Regiment had been left at Vilna and the Guard Flankers Regiment of the Middle Guard at Smolensk, 6 of the 12 battalions of the Polish Vistula Legion were detached, and of the Young Guard, at least a full brigade of three regiments was still en route from Smolensk, with no more than one brigade present at Borodino. That brigade, which would only be a 1 step unit by itself in game terms, has been combined with the Middle Guard Division. I Corps: One regiment of the 4th Division, 33rd Light, had been left behind in Minsk and Smolensk, so that this division is weaker than the others in the corps. A few infantry battalions of regiments from minor German states were also left behind in garrisons, so that some German regiments attached to this corps are represented at Borodino by single battalions. The corps cavalry division of I Corps, which would only be a 1 step
Guard I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI Austrian I Cavalry II Cavalry III Cavalry IV Cavalry
18,849 40,392 Not present 13,186 25,021 10,328 Not present Not present 9,656 Not present Not present Not present Not present 5,159 5,343 3,583 3,600
30
54%/88%
25 29 10 24
Corps Guard I III IV (inc. VI corps cav.) V VIII I Cavalry II Cavalry III Cavalry IV Cavalry
Cavalry 4,000 1,206 1,908 3,492 1,638 1,195 4,474 4,660 3,446 3,200
Artillery/Train 3,287 3,161 1,536 2,776 1,794 1,021 685 683 137 400
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The Russian Army The Russian Army of 1812 was a considerably more homogenous force than the Grande Arme, with all of its regular soldiers subjects of the Tsar and principally ethnic Russians, Ukrainians or Byelorussians, though there were some more exotic nationalities thrown into the mix from the borderlands of the Russian Empire. At the level of the officer corps, though, there was a significant contingent of foreigners, especially Germans, in the service of the Tsar, having left their own conquered homelands. Among these the most famous name is Clausewitz, at the time serving on the staff of the Russian I Cavalry Corps, giving him an opportunity to participate in the battle of Borodino. Many other highranking officers with nonRussian ancestry, including Barclay (Scottish), Baggovut (Norwegian) and Bagration (a Georgian prince), actually came from lands under the rule of the Tsar but could still seem foreign; the Baltic provinces from which Barclay hailed were still culturally distinct, with their German-speaking nobility. HQs (Leaders):
The Russian officer corps, drawn very heavily from the nobility, had a narrower pool of talent than the French, and was also often seen as less professional, notably by the Germans who came to Russia as advisers to the Tsar. Though the
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battalion for Bagrations AHQ. Infantry: Of the 51 infantry divisions in the Russian Army in 1812, 30 were formed from the Guard and regular regiments of the army, and can be considered front-line formations in every sense. These were the Guard, 1st Grenadier, 2nd Grenadier, 3rd through 27th, 1st Combined Grenadier, and 2nd Combined Grenadier divisions. The Combined Grenadiers divisions were unique formations, without regiments of their own and taking their battalions from elite Grenadier companies of the other regular divisions; all of the other divisions at Borodino, apart from the Guards, contributed usually two and at least one battalion to the Combined Grenadiers. The Guard and four Grenadier divisions were all elite units, even though the Grenadiers were considered part of the regular army, and all were present for Borodino, along with the 3rd 4th, 7th, 11th 12th, 17th, 23rd 24th, and 26th 27th Divisions, with the other regular divisions in the other armies and corps elsewhere. The remaining 21 infantry divisions, 28th through 48th, were formed from reserve troops depot battalions of regular regiments and garrisons and were not usually as strong as the front-line formations. None of them were used at Borodino, though some saw action on secondary fronts. The Russian infantry corps typically had two infantry divisions each, though
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equipment of these recently raised troops (many had just pikes), only about half of them, around 15,000, performed in a combat role at Borodino, with the rest in various noncombatant roles, helping to build redoubts, carry away wounded, etc. Those that fought were initially held in reserve along the Old Smolensk Road behind III Corps on Sept. 7th, but eventually were used to aid in the defense of the Utitskii Kurgan. There are 9 steps of Russian militia infantry in the game, at 1600 men per step a total of 14,400, which reasonably corresponds to the half of the militia that actually were available to fight. Cavalry: The Russian army had fewer cavalry divisions than the French, largely because the masses of Cossacks were not formed into divisions. The 19 cavalry divisions included the Guard cavalry, 1st and 2nd Cuirassiers, and the 1st 8th Divisions formed from regular cavalry regiments, as well as the 9th 16th Divisions consisting of reserve squadrons. Unlike the French army, with multiple cavalry divisions in each cavalry corps, the Russians normally had just one cavalry division in each corps at Borodino, I Cavalry Corps had most of the Guards cavalry division with the rest in 1st Cuirassiers, and II, III and IV Cavalry respectively had the 2nd 4th Divisions, each consisting of several regiments. But each
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At least 5600 and likely between 6000-7000 of these were with Platovs Cossack Corps (the 1 and 2 Cossacks units, with a combined total of 14 regiments), and 3016 with 2nd Army (the 3 Cossacks unit, with 8 regiments), while there were two more regiments of about 400 men each as AHQ escorts, one each with 1st and 2nd Army. Each of the three Cossack units in the game represents somewhat over 3000 men rounded up to 3 steps. The Cossack force has often been underestimated, in part because there is no contemporaneous separate total for all the Cossacks at Borodino in the Russian records -- parts of them are grouped with advanced guards or other detachments. The remaining 16,000 men in the regular army are accounted for by the artillery and train, including HQ staff and escorts, pioneers and pontooniers. These men, together with the 75,200 infantry, 18,000 cavalry and 10,800 Cossacks in the steps represented in the game, bring the total for the Russian army other than the militia to 120,000, no more than 1400 above the actual overall strength of about 118,600 for the Russians (due to rounding off). With the combatant part of the militia, the Russians are about even in numbers with the French. Though there is no single tally of manpower for the Russian forces at the time of Borodino, a good estimate of the actual Russian strength can be derived from the records of 1st Army and partial ones for 2nd Army
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3439
15,370
II Corps
11,452
25 (inc. 11 reg. inf. returned to III Corps, 6 Comb. Gren. to V Corps, 8 jaegers to VI Corps) 24
III Corps
6,791
IV Corps
10,468
V Guards Corps
17,260
12 (+11 added from Advanced Guard, + 1 sent to AHQ) 21 (inc. one Comb. Gren., other Comb. Gren. sent to AHQ) 22 (+6 Comb. Gren. added from Advanced Guard) 16 (+8 added from Advanced Guard) 120 (+2 at AHQ = 122)
VI Corps
8,465
Total
75,542 (with about 2000 of these returned to 2nd Army from the Advanced Guard)
The totals in this Sept. 5 tally do not count AHQ staffs, escort troops detached from corps (2 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry regiments with 4 squadrons each, and a Cossack regiment of 5 squadrons, added to the chart), and attached pioneer and pontoonier companies in 1st Army and Kutuzovs AHQs, accounting for some 3500 more men. Nor does this tally reflect the substantial reorganization that took place just before the battle (as shown in the parentheticals in the table). All
of the attached cavalry were removed from the infantry corps and added to the cavalry corps, except the 20 squadrons of cavalry attached to the Guard in 1st Cuirassier Division, adding 33 squadrons to the cavalry corps. In addition, a large part of the corps artillery was taken away and aggregated in army reserves, and there was also some shifting of guns between 1st and 2nd Armies, with the 1st Army reserve getting the bulk of the horse artillery. The Advanced Guard, which had been covering the armys retreat along the New Smolensk Post Highway, was also recombined with its parent corps just before the battle after its task was complete. This force appears to have included (1) all of the 72 squadrons of Cossacks with Platov in 1st Army, (2) 26 squadrons of Cossacks returned to 2nd Army before the battle (out of 31 that had been borrowed from 2nd Army for the Advanced Guard, 5 of which stayed with 1st Army), (3) 11 battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division in III Corps (the 12th battalion was detached as an AHQ escort), (4) the four Jaeger regiments of VI Corps with 8 battalions, and (5) 6 battalions of Combined Grenadiers from the 1st Combined Grenadiers Division. The artillery strength of 1st Army was given as 432 guns, including 144 position guns (12 batteries), 212 light guns (18 batteries, one below full strength with 8 guns), and 76 horse guns (7 batteries, including the two in the Guard with only 8 guns each).
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VII Corps VIII Corps total - 27th Division - 2nd Grenadier Div. - 2nd Comb.Gren. Div. - Artillery 2nd Cuirassier Div. IV Cavalry
12,500 est., inc. artillery 17,410, inc. artillery 6112 (excl. artillery) 5136 (excl. artillery) 4912 (excl. artillery) 1250 est. (1058 on 9/7, in 6 batteries) 2800 est. 4300 est., inc. artillery
12 12 11
Cossacks
Total
40,026 (40,426)
59
20 32 (inc. 8 added from VII Corps before battle) 40 (includes 14 +26 others returned from 1st Army Advanced Guard, +5 at AHQ) 92 (97)
The two armies together, with HQ escorts, fielded 181 infantry battalions of regulars and Guards, 164 cavalry squadrons of regulars and Guards, and 122 Cossack sotnias (squadron equivalents), with 53 batteries of artillery (+1 in reserve at Mozhaisk, not counted). The combined strength of the two armies apart from militia was about 118,600, including about 75,300 infantry, 17,500 cavalry (not counting artillery attached to the infantry and cavalry), 9,800 Cossack and other irregular cavalry (other than those in the artillery and HQs), 10,000 in the army-level artillery reserves and train, HQ staff and escorts, and 6000 artillery and train still with the corps. The final organization of the two armies at the time of the battle is shown in the OB tables at the end, matching the individual units in the game to the names of the regiments, and numbers of battalions or squadrons and artillery batteries, included in them. The Role of Artillery at Borodino Players of Borodino 1812 have recognized the power of the artillery of the two armies in the game and that is as it should be. Napoleon called Borodino the most terrible of all his battles, and September 7 saw the largest casualties of any single day in the Napoleonic Wars. It was largely the predominance of artillery at Borodino that caused
These totals include (in parentheticals) the AHQ escort in 2nd Army of one Cossack regiment of 5 squadrons (though not the militia battalion attached to AHQ). However, they do not reflect the AHQ staff, pioneers and pontooniers, which probably added another 1100 men to the total. The 2nd Army had the remainder of the 624 guns before the battle, including 5 position batteries (60 guns), 5 light batteries (60 guns), and 6 horse batteries (72 guns), a total of 192, with 2 heavy, 3 light and 1 horse batteries in VIII Corps. By comparison, in late August 2nd Army was known to have had 54 position guns (4.5 batteries), 72 light guns (6 batteries), and 48 horse guns (4 batteries). With the reorganization before the battle some of these guns were shifted around between the two armies, and 2nd Army ended up with only 186 guns and considerably fewer horse batteries.
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usually with the heavier guns in corps reserves while the lighter foot and horse batteries were attached to the infantry divisions, with a battery each of foot and horse guns with each division. A French foot battery would typically have 6 cannon (either heavy 12 pounders or the lighter 6 pounders) and 2 howitzers, and a French horse battery 4 cannon (6 pounders) and 2 howitzers. Some of the French allies followed the French organization, while others differed in battery strengths. And just as the French corps varied considerably in size, so did their artillery contingents, all the way from the 147 guns Davout controlled in I Corps to the mere 30 Junot had in VIII Corps. In the game, however, all of this artillery is massed at the corps level, following the Napoleonic principle of massing of guns into grand batteries, to allow its full effect to be felt in battle. Indeed, Napoleon regularly made coordinated use of the guns of multiple corps to get the most powerful artillery effect for example, in his bombardment of the Fleches redoubts, he employed guns from the Guard, I Corps and III Corps. Given that almost all of the corps had mixed types of guns, the artillery units are also classified in the game according to the predominant types of guns in them, even though other types are also included. Heavy artillery units always contain some 12 pounders, generally 50% or more, but usually have some lighter guns too. These
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Had the Russians stuck with this structure for the battle, each Russian infantry corps would have had 3 steps of artillery in support in the game, much as the Guard does. But just before the battle, the Russians decided on a major reorganization of their artillery, massing a large part of the guns at the army level to create artillery reserves directly under the command of Barclay and Bagration. Horse guns (except in the Guard) only remained at the corps level in support of cavalry units, with many going into the 1st Army reserve, and each of the infantry corps gave up in theory twothirds of their foot batteries as well to the army reserves, even though some of them were reinforced again as battle neared or appear to have retained more of their guns in practice. This decision weakened the artillery of all of the corps apart from the Guard, leaving them in game terms with only one step of artillery (III, VII Corps) or at most two (II, IV, VI, VIII Corps). In return, Bagration ended up with 4 steps of artillery in game terms under his direct control, 3 light and 1 heavy (half the guns in his army, out of 8 steps, or 9 after adding III Corps), and Barclay similarly ended up with 7 steps of artillery in game terms under his control (3 light, 1 heavy and 3 horse), which, added to the 3 steps of Guard artillery that were in reserve with the entire Guard corps at the start, meant that more than half of the artillery of 1st Army was in reserve (10 out of 18 steps, counting Tuchkovs III Corps with 1st Army at the start).
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strategies, and better show the strategies of the commanders and what underlay them. There are three principal roads running from east to west across the battlefield, which do not differ from the much more extensive network of minor roads for movement purposes, but do affect supply (they would have been more useful for baggage trains). The main New Smolensk Post Highway is in the center, coming from Smolensk and heading toward the town of Mozhaisk and on to Moscow (with two supply points for both sides in the game at either end). To the south, the Old Smolensk Road enters at Yelnya to the west, and exits to the east nearly in parallel and just below the New Smolensk Post Highway, heading toward Mozhaisk and Moscow. Finally, the third main road enters at Gryaz to the north, and then heads west and southward, nearly joining with the New Smolensk Post Highway at one point where it becomes the Old Ruzskaya Road, and continuing east to cross the Moskva river, heading on toward the town of Ruza and then Moscow. This road is often overlooked in descriptions of the battle, but research has shown that it was important for the advance of the parallel column of Eugenes IV Corps to the north of Napoleons main force. Each of these other two main roads has one supply point for either side at each end. The Kolocha River, a tributary of the Moskva, runs from the west across the
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Davout proposed a major flanking effort to the south, on or below the Old Smolensk Road, with both the I Corps and the Polish V Corps, which would have had to negotiate some difficult terrain but held out the prospect of cutting the Russians off from two of their main supply roads leading to the town of Mozhaisk, and trapping them against the Moskva. But Napoleon rejected this alternative, which would have put part of his army well out of reach of support from the rest. The Emperor chose instead to concentrate his main effort against the Russian 2nd Army on the center-left, first clearing the Shevardino Redoubt to link up his army, and then driving with the main remaining force of I Corps, III Corps, part of IV Corps, and the Cavalry Reserve against the Fleches and the Great Redoubt. He aimed to crush 2nd Army before Kutuzov realized what Napoleon was about, and could reinforce 2nd Army by redeploying the corps of 1st Army. VIII Corps, initially planned as a reserve for III Corps in the center, was eventually shifted southward to reinforce the Poles, while the Guard formed the ultimate reserve, to be used, apart from its artillery, only if essential. With this decision to make a frontal assault, relying on the artillery, cavalry and tactical skill of the French commanders to prevail, the stage was set for one of the bloodiest of Napoleons battles.
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The Armies at Borodino Compared Formations Infantry Corps Cavalry Corps Infantry Divisions Cavalry Divisions Infantry Regiments Cavalry Regiments Infantry Battalions Cavalry Squadrons Artillery Batteries Total Guns French and Allies 6 4 18 17 65 84 214 (out of 556 whole army) 312 (out of 480 whole army) 75 587 Russians 7 5 (including 1 Cossack) 15 + 3 militia 6 76 + 8 militia 34 + 24 Cossack, irregular 181 + 43 militia 164 + 122 Cossack, irregular 53 (including 2 Cossack) 624
French and Russian Steps and Firepower in Borodino 1812 Unit Types French Steps Infantry 61 Cavalry 23 Artillery 24 HQs (Leaders) 17 Total 125 French Firepower 59 (inc. 9 mil.) 137 24 (inc. 9 Coss.) 60 26 60 23 41 132 298 Russian Steps Russian Firepower 125 48 64 38 275
While the total number of French steps in the game, at 125, is slightly less than the Russian total of 132, the French have the edge in firepower (steps x fire ratings of units), though the overall difference is less than 10%. This French firepower edge is due to the Russians having a large share of their steps, 18 overall, in irregular militia infantry and Cossack cavalry units with fire ratings of only 1, while all the French non-HQ units have at least 2 as regulars. The two armies are nearly equal in number of elite unit steps rated 3s or 4s (Guards, grenadiers and heavy cavalry, though not non-Guards heavy artillery), at 27 for the French and 28 for the Russians, and here firepower is comparable as well, at 89 for the French and 86 for the Russians. The Russian and French artillery are also close in steps and firepower, and indeed this is one area where the Russians even have the firepower edge, taking all gun types into account. With the advantage of the defense and terrain obstacles, this slight French edge in firepower would be readily offset, were it not for the ability of the French to bring considerably more of their firepower into action each turn for the same expenditure of supplies.
The French advantage comes from concentration of their corps and superior leadership, allowing more troops to be commanded by fewer leaders. If the French and Russians both use four supply points to activate their four strongest corps Guard, I, IV and Cavalry Reserve plus voltigeurs for the French, and V Guard, VIII, 2nd Army Cavalry, and either II or VI plus militia and Jaegers for the Russians the French are able to bring 74% of their steps and 76% of their firepower into action, while the Russians can only bring 47% of their steps and 49% of their firepower into action. The difference between being able to deploy three-quarters of the French strength, and slightly under half of the Russian strength, for the same amount of supply, is what makes the strong offensive possible that the French need to win. But both armies can throw their entire strength into action if necessary during a turn, by draining their reserves of supplies in the game, so a powerful Russian counterattack at a critical juncture is still possible, and the French can never be entirely secure. If the Russian bear seems rather slow and sleepy much of the time, he can be formidable if roused.
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Kutuzovs resulting unwillingness to bring his army fully into action. Kutuzov consciously preferred to give the initiative to Napoleon and react to what the Emperor did, having bitter experience with the danger of attacking Napoleon from Austerlitz. And in the game, this conservative approach to the battle leaves the Russians more supplies to build up their 1st Army CHQs for the main battle to come. At the outset, all of the Russian army is deployed on the map, with set locations for HQs but some limited flexibility for individual units. The Russian rearguard of Platovs Cossacks, the 3rd Division (Konovnitsyn), and screening jaegers, which had also been aided by I Cavalry Corps (Uvarov), has just rejoined the main army and taken up positions. Napoleons Grande Arme is approaching from the west in three parallel columns. The northern flanking column, coming through Gryaz, consists of Eugenes IV Corps, with some screening voltigeurs. The southern flanking column, coming through Yelnya on the Old Smolensk Road, consists of Poniatowskis V Corps, again with some voltigeurs. And the main central column, on the New Smolensk Post Highway, has at the outset Napoleons AHQ, Murat with the I and II Cavalry Corps and half of his horse artillery, and the remaining voltigeurs. Davouts I Corps and the Guard are approaching behind on the New Smolensk Post Highway, and enter at the
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a reserve supporting the other divisions of the corps (with Davouts command radius of 3 it is possible to keep these widely separated divisions under common control, even before the 1st and 3rd Divisions come under Eugenes direct control for Sept. 7). But the other two strong divisions, 1st (Morand) and 2nd (Friant), plan to force a river crossing, while the weaker 4th (Dessaix) remains in reserve behind them and does not get involved in the fighting. Polish cavalry encounters the Cossacks near Yelnya, but the Cossacks fall back, covering Utitsa. 4 pm On the French side, Davout, Murat, Poniatowski, Eugene and Mortier are all active, though after moving forward to join Napoleon Mortier does little, while the Russians activate Golitsyn, Borozdin and Bagration, bringing the AHQ forward to aid in the battle. The French 5th Division moves into Fomkino, while the French cavalry moves to its flank, taking the area on the southern bank of the Kolocha below Valuyevo. There is some skirmishing between Eugenes forces and Russian Cossacks, jaegers and artillery defending the area of Borodino, but this appears to be more of a demonstration on the part of the French to draw the Russians attention here. The French are driven back from an attack toward Borodino by strong Russian forces including Uvarovs I Cavalry Corps (1CC), jaegers and horse artillery, even though they do succeed in
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at Alexsinki. The Poles push back screening Russian jaegers in the south, linking up with the main Grande Arme. 5 pm turn: Doronino Area
French (attacking): 5th Infantry Division (6) (coming from Fomkino area), I Corps Light Artillery (3) (coming from Fomkino area), Polish 16th Infantry Division (2) (coming from Kudinovo Swamp area), Voltigeur B2 (1) (coming from Malvinka Swamp area). Russian (defending): 4CC Cavalry Corps (3), Jager B2 (1).
Result: Russians retreat (they are conducting a delaying action here and do not attempt to put up a strong fight against the much more powerful French attackers, minimizing losses), with the French and Poles finally linking up
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6 pm turn: Shevardino Redoubt Area
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27th Infantry, 2nd Grenadier, and French 5th Infantry Divisions, and French 2CC Cavalry Corps, but prolonged resistance aided by the double defense benefit of the redoubt allows Russian heavy artillery to be pulled back without loss (historically the Russians lost only 3 of their guns in the redoubt), and the Russian 2nd Grenadier and French 5th Infantry Divisions each recover a step from supply Continued From Page 28
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7 pm turn: Shevardino Village & Redoubt Area
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French (defending): 5th Infantry Division (6, but reduced to 4 by artillery bombardment), 2CC Cavalry Corps (3), Horse Artillery 1 (2), reinforced by I Corps Light Artillery (3) Result: Russian counterattack repulsed, Russians retreat but with step losses on both sides to Russian 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions, and French 5th Infantry Division Shevardino Village Area French (attacking): 1st Infantry Division (4), 2nd Infantry Division (5) Russians (defending): 4 CC Cavalry Corps (3), VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (because the Russians had the initiative this turn, their heavy artillery in the Shevardino village area was able to bombard and their 2nd Combined Grenadier Division to
move from the Shevardino village area before the French moved in to attack, but the French were able to take advantage of the weakening of the Russian position in Shevardino village to attack in response) Result: Russians retreat by 2nd round, with step losses to Russian 4CC Cavalry Corps and French 2nd Infantry Division; the Russians cannot use the Shevardino village area to retreat from the battle in the Shevardino redoubt as a result of the French attack but can still retreat their forces in that battle into the other area they attacked from SE of the redoubt
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in position on both sides of the river to build the French Bridge, and be able to deploy their incoming Sept. 6 reinforcements), and to account for the damage on certain units that they have not been able to repair even with the end-game Sept. 5 and doubled Sept. 6 supply before the Sept. 7 battle begins. This will be less important at the end of Sept. 7 as there is no continuation of the battle; all that matters then are the losses both sides have suffered and the point count. Note that neither side has suffered any unit losses on Sept. 5, since the Russians have for the most part just conducted a delaying action and the French have also avoided an all-out commitment of their available strength in the north, so the only points are for redoubt control; if this were played as the standalone Sept. 5 scenario, the Russians would win with 4 points for 4 redoubts held to 2 French points for the Shevardino redoubt. 8 pm The fighting dies down for the evening as darkness begins to fall. The Russians activate Bagration, Borozdin, Golitsyn, and Barclay (to pull back Uvarovs I Cavalry Corps and the supporting horse artillery, leaving just the jaegers in Borodino) while the French activate Napoleon, Davout, Mortier, Murat, Poniatowski, and Eugene. The Russians, recognizing that it is no longer possible to retake the Shevardino redoubt, take advantage of the
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beginning the next stage of the battle. The absence of kills of Russian units means that the French have missed a chance to weaken the Russians seriously before the main battle. Napoleon is said to have been astonished that no Russian prisoners were taken on the 5th, a foretaste of the sturdy resistance he would face two days later. Between Sept. 5 and 7, there is a quiet day on Sept. 6 while Napoleon was waiting for the rest of his army to assemble, and the Russians were reorganizing and preparing for the main battle. If the French control the areas on the map on both ends of the French Bridge (actually a group of several small bridges the French built here), as they did historically, this bridge is now considered built and aids in maneuver across the Kolocha ravine during the Sept. 7 battle. The French should aim to be in a position at the end of Sept. 5 to build it if possible. Napoleon historically received Neys III Corps and Junots Westphalian VIII Corps, coming in behind the rest of the army on the New Smolensk Post Highway. These troops are deployed in the game in range of their CHQs, which must in turn be deployed within command range of Napoleon, so where the French player locates Napoleon at the end of Sept. 5 critically affects his deployment for Sept. 7. Historically, Napoleon shifted the location of his HQ and the Guard from Valuyevo, where he had been during the fighting on Sept. 5, to the captured
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September 7: The Main Battle Turn by Turn 6 am On the French side, Napoleon, Eugene, Davout, and Poniatowski are all active, while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Borozdin, as well as Bagration to maneuver the 2nd Armys reserve artillery. The Russians are still waiting to see the direction of the French attack and conserving their supplies. Napoleon orders the use of over 100 guns for the bombardment of the Fleches, drawn from I and III Corps and the Guard. The French begin to fire on the Fleches with their massed batteries in front of Shevardino, but most of their artillery has to be moved forward as it was originally positioned out of range of the Fleches during the night. In game terms, only one of the French artillery units can initially fire directly across the Kamenka stream in front of the Fleches, while the other artillery needs to cross the start line and deploy into the wooded areas to the north and south of the Fleches before it can fire, delaying the onset of the full bombardment for a turn. Eugenes IV Corps advances to attack the village of Borodino, and Delzons 13th Division, already across the Voina near Bezzubovo, moves south and drives out the Russian Guard Jaeger regiment (the Jaeger B3 in the game), which loses half its strength and is effectively eliminated. The Russians could reasonably have expected this unit to be able to
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6 AM Sept 7: Borodino Village
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Borodino
(Continued From Page 63) Lieutenant General by 1800, and won distinction leading cavalry charges against the French at the battle of Eylau. Though Golitsyn retired from the army in 1809 after being replaced in his corps command by Barclay during the Finnish war, he returned to fight in 1812, at first leading the 2nd Cuirassier Division and then being promoted to command all the cavalry of 2nd Army at Borodino on the left flank of the army. Golitsyn continued to lead cavalry effectively in the campaigns in Germany and France in 1813-14, fighting at Kulm and Leipzig, and winning promotion to full General of Cavalry in 1814. After the war, he served as military governor of Moscow from 1820, leading the rebuilding of the city, until he became ill and gave up his position in 1841. Ironically, Golitsyn died in 1844 in Paris, where he had gone to recuperate, and was buried with great honors in Moscow. [Borodino Finished]
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7 AM Turn: Les Fleches Area
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8 AM Turn: Utitsa Village Area
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Division (N.M. Borozdin), 1st Combined Grenadiers Division (Kantakuzin), and corps artillery, toward the battle in the center, and Dukas 2nd Cuirassiers Division also moves up from the 2nd Army cavalry reserve to a position southeast of the Fleches. The French prepare to resume their assault on the Fleches; Ney takes the leading role around the Fleches after Davout is wounded though Davout continues to head his I Corps, and Ledrus 10th Division and the 25th Wurttemberg Division of Neys III Corps (the 10/25 French infantry division in the game), as well as Razouts 11th Division, advance to the north and center of the Fleches to join the battle, taking the place of Davouts shot-up troops in the line. At the same time, some of Murats cavalry, including the I and III Corps cavalry divisions (the combined III Corps cavalry division in the game) and the I Cavalry Corps (Nansouty) and II
Cavalry Corps (Montbrun), moves into position to the center and south of the Fleches to enter the fighting as well. Bagration takes personal command of the Russian forces defending the Fleches. 8 AM Turn: Utitsa Village Area French (attacking): Polish 16th Infantry Division (2) (from woods area on Old Smolensk road to west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), Polish 18th Infantry Division (2) (from woods area to south of Old Smolensk Road west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), and Polish V Corps Cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) (from clear area to south of Utitsa village) ; supported by preliminary bombardment by Polish V Corps Light Artillery (2) from woods area on Old Smolensk Road to west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), Polish 18th Infantry
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9 AM Turn: Les Fleches Area
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Ney, Junot and Murat all active, while the Russians activate Baggovut (to continue his southward march), Bagration, and Tuchkov (falling back to take up position on the Utitskii Kurgan). Poniatowski pauses to reorganize his Polish forces, realizing the Russian position is difficult to take unsupported. The French divisions of Morand (1st ), Gerard (3rd ) and Broussier (14th ) in IV Corps have finished crossing the Kolocha River using the French Bridge and deploy for attack against the Great Redoubt into the woods, while French artillery starts to bombard the redoubt. Broussiers division, in the lead, launches an attack toward the Great Redoubt through the woods but this is merely a reconnaissance in force, quickly broken off. The French at last launch a successful combined arms assault on the Fleches, Murat personally leading his I and II Cavalry Corps supported by the I and III Corps
cavalry divisions into battle, while the 10th/ 25th Divisions and 11th Division of Neys corps provides the needed infantry spine for the fight, countering Russian attempts to form squares in defense. This powerful French attack overruns all the redoubts of the Fleches and effectively destroy the 2nd Combined Grenadiers and 27th Divisions and supporting artillery, only 2nd Grenadiers escaping for the moment. Razouts 11th Division of III Corps probes toward Semyonovskoye unsuccessfully (again, like Broussiers move, this is not a full attack, which would not be possible in the game before control of the Fleches, but more of a move into position through the Fleches area, where it is participating on the flank of the battle). 9 AM: Les Fleches Area French (attacking): 10th/25th Infantry Division (4) from
By the time of the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945, the US Navy devised a plan to help ward off the expected kamikaze attacks during the battle for the island. In order to provide an early warning system for impending kamikaze attacks, the US Navy established 16 radar picket stations around the island Picket Duty is a solitaire game where you - as the captain of a Fletcher Class destroyer - fend off kamikaze attacks while performing picket duty off Okinawa. The game covers the time period from late March 1945 to late June 1945. Your goal is simple - survive. The game comes with a basic game, advanced game, six historical scenarios, two hypothetical scenarios, a mini-campaign and a full campaign. Optional rules are also included. Each game turn is divided into three phases, each depicting an eight hour period. Key crew members are depicted with certain functions, as well as damage control teams. 35 types of Japanese planes are depicted on whopping 1.2" square counters. http://www.legionwargames.com/
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Division (2), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2), 3rd Infantry Division (2); supported by bombardment from VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) (in Great Redoubt), II Army Light Artillery (3) (in Semyonovskoye village area, firing from the upslope position) French (defending): 10th/25th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 11th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (3); reinforced by III Corps Cavalry Division (2) (commanded by Murat) (the I CC Cavalry Corps which had been in Les Fleches for the previous French attack has regrouped back to the Utitskii Forest to protect the flank) Result: a disastrous repulse for the Russians, with 2nd Grenadier Division and the Bagration AHQ eliminated, though 2nd Cuirassier Division and the 3rd Infantry Division are able to retreat; the Russians had hoped that the weakened state of the French troops after taking the Fleches coupled with the preliminary bombardment would give them a chance to expel the French from the redoubts, but a stout French defense with reinforcements, even without getting the double defense for the redoubts (only the Russians enjoy this benefit), turned the tables. The French do suffer some further step losses in their infantry (1 each, leaving Ney's infantry divisions too weak to do much for the rest of the battle),
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Barclay comes under French artillery fire during this desperate struggle, after which the fighting around the Great Redoubt falls off until mid-afternoon. The final Russian reserve, the Guards Division (Lavrov) along with 1st Combined Grendiers (Kantakuzin), moves up from reserve to a position behind Semyonovskoye on the Heights. And at this critical moment Platovs Cossack Corps, joined by Uvarovs I Cavalry Corps and some horse artillery, crosses the Kolocha River around Novoye Selo and Maloye Selo, beginning a sweeping counterattack against the French left flank. The Russians see an opportunity for decisively affecting the battle, with hardly any French units remaining north of the Kolocha, only a portion of IV Corps, and the French supplies and lines of communication exposed. In the south, Poniatowski maneuvers to the south of the Utitskii Kurgan, preparing to launch an attack on the hill from both the front and southern flank. 11 AM: Great Redoubt Area Russians (attacking): 24th Infantry Division (3) (from Goruzka Valley area), and 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3) and 12th Infantry Division (2) (both from Semyonovskaya village area); supported by strong bombardment from VI Corps Heavy Artillery (2)(in area to east of Borodino across Kolocha river bridge), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) (in Semyonovskoye village area), and I Army Light
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bombardment of Guard Heavy Artillery (2) from Les Fleches and Guard Light Artillery (3) from Utitskii Forest, both firing into Semyonovskoye village area. Russians (defending): In Semyonovskoye village area 3rd Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by preliminary bombardment), 1st Combined Grenadier Division (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), II Army Light Artillery (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), reinforced by the Guards Infantry Division (6) (the unpinned VII Corps Heavy Artillery unit, which was in this area at the start, has moved to the Great Redoubt, making way for a Russian reinforcement to come in). In area south of Semyonovskoye east of Semyonovskii stream - 4th Infantry Division (3), 4 CC Cavalry Corps (3), II Army Cavalry Horse Artillery (1) Result - an unlikely French victory in the Semyonovskoye village area, with the Guards Division, 1st Combined Grenadier Division and II Army Light Artillery all retreating after they take step losses, while the 3rd Infantry is eliminated, though the French cavalry and infantry both suffer step losses as well and are unable to push ahead again for some time; the French attack south of the Semyonovskoye area, unsupported by artillery, is more
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Result: Russian victory, with the French IV Corps cavalry routed and effectively eliminated; the French, expecting to face mere Cossacks and choosing to put up a defense, were taken aback by the presence of the powerful Russian 1CC Cavalry Corps as well, and though the village initially afforded some protection, the French cavalry, outnumbered 31, were overrun, leaving Napoleon's left flank open to the Russian cavalry. 1 pm The French activate Murat and Napoleon, while the Russians activate Barclay, Platov. and Osterman-Tolstoi. In the north, Platovs Cossacks cross the Voina stream, attacking across the dam (ford) at Bezzubovo and swinging far to the west through the woods toward Valuyevo and the French baggage trains on the New Smolensk Post Highway. In game terms, a Cossack breakthrough here could deprive the French army of a major part of its supply and cripple the attack no wonder Napoleon was worried! Meanwhile, Uvarov moves along the bank of the Voina, covering the French position at Borodino to the south. However, the French deal with the attack of this strong Russian cavalry force by forming Delzons 13th Division, supported on the flank by the Italian Guard, into infantry squares, inside which Eugene takes shelter. The French infantry are prepared to meet the Russians who lack infantry support or
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2 PM The Russians activate Platov, Barclay, Rayevski, Dokhturov, Kutuzov and Lavrov, reordering their lines in the center, while the French activate Junot (who by this point has been nearly forgotten his men were actually ordered to stack arms in the Utitskii Forest), Napoleon, Davout and Ney. Junots Westphalian VIII Corps finally links up with Poniatowskis V Corps, its 23rd Division (Tharreau) facing off against the Russian 4th Division which has moved down from the center, while the Westphalian 24th Division (von Ochs) guards the northern flank of the corps (these two Westphalian divisions are combined in the game and fight as a single unit). The crisis past in the north, some fighting resumes around Semyonovskoye between Davout with his battered I Corps and Ney with his III Corps against the Russian center, but to little effect. The Russian cavalry makes its final attacks on the French in the north and then starts to fall back, unable to break the French squares. However, the cavalry counterattack has brought the Russians critical time in the center, where Russian artillery is bombarding the immobile French cavalry around the Great Redoubt and Semyonovskoye. 2 PM: Valuyevo Village Area Russians (attacking): 1 Cossacks (3) and 2 Cossacks (3) (from wooded area north of Valuyevo) French (defending): Middle Guard (4)
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thrown back from the redoubt, while Grouchys cavalry is not fully present and stays in reserve. The Great Redoubt is now defended by artillery and the Russian 24th Division of VI Corps, supported on the flank by the 11th Division of the Russian IV Corps and the III Corps Cavalry, along with the 7th Division (Kaptsevich) of VI Corps on the right flank, backed up by the II Cavalry Corps, the 23rd Division of the Russian IV Corps guarding the left, and the battered 12th and 26th Divisions (effectively just one division remaining) of VII Corps in the rear. Once again, only four of these units can actually defend the redoubt area in game terms, including the 24th Division and likely the 11th Division, the III Cavalry Corps, and the artillery
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strong artillery support proves enough this time to overcome even the double defense benefit of the Great Redoubt, and with the Semyonovskaya Heights under French control as well, this time the Russians are not able to mount an effective counterattack.
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strong to risk the Russian Guards, who pull back. 4 PM: Utitskii Kurgan Area French (Poles and Westphalians) (attacking): Polish 16th Division (2) (from the Sadovskoye Swamp area, having pushed the Russian militia back out again), V Corps Light Artillery (2) (from area west of Kurgan on Old Smolensk Road), 23rd/24th Westphalian Infantry Division (4) (from Utitskii Forest north of Kurgan); supported by bombardment from VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) on Old Smolensk Road west of Kurgan. Poniatowski (2, reduced to 1 by activating) is in the Old Smolensk road area east of the Kurgan commanding his troops, with his cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) to the south of the road covering the flank against the Russian Cossacks, and Junot (1, reduced to 0 by activating) is in the Utitskii Forest area northwest of Poniatowski, while his cavalry (1) remains in the eastern Utitskii forest area, with these other troops not being committed to the battle. Russians (defending): 17th Infantry Division (2, reduced from earlier fighting), II Corps Heavy Artillery (2), reinforced by one militia unit (Smolensk, at 3, from the Old Smolensk Road area east of the Kurgan). Other Russian troops are nearby covering the flanks, including Cossacks 3 at Miyshina, Russian Moscow militia in the woods to
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along the Old Smolensk Road. The French launch no further melee attacks, but instead begin an artillery duel in the center, pounding the Russian Guard drawn up to hold off the French cavalry. Kutuzov agrees to pull his army back about a mile, planning to align it with the Russian reserve artillery across the central plateau, along a front running from Gorki to Psarevo. Kutuzov does not yet realize the full extent of the Russian losses and overestimates the French ones, believing that he can counterattack the next day after replenishing overnight. 7 pm The French activate Napoleon, while the Russians activate Kutuzov, Baggovut, Barclay, Lavrov, OstermanTolstoy, Dokhturov, and Golitsyn to conduct their planned withdrawal. The artillery duel between the French and Russians continues sporadically, and the Russian Guards Division suffers heavy losses, as the Russians complete their withdrawal into the new position. Both armies seek to rest and replenish their heavily damaged forces. 8 pm - The Russians activate Kutuzov, Barclay and Dokhturov to complete their planned withdrawal, while the French do not choose to activate leaders this time, seeing the battle as won and with the Russians mostly out of range. The battle dies down as darkness approaches, and the armies continue to rest and resupply. Kutuzov, finally realizing how badly the Russian
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and likely another in the fighting on the southern flank. Some other Russian divisions, likely including one from VII Corps, one from IV Corps, and one from III Corps, may be considered shattered as well. However, no Russian cavalry corps or divisions were badly damaged enough to be considered shattered, and some of them came off with relatively little damage. The Russians lost about 40 guns, enough to account for the two artillery units from VII and VIII Corps, but not severe damage to the artillery. From the available data, it appears that on the Russian side, I Cavalry Corps lost only about 4-5% of its strength, about 101129 men, reflecting its failure to press the attack against the French at Borodino. On the other hand, II and III Cavalry Corps, which fought harder in the center, lost about 16% of their combined strength, 1184 men. IV Cavalry Corps also was not badly hit, with 324-325 men lost, 9%. Of the Russian cavalry formations, the cuirassier divisions were the most heavily engaged and suffered the most losses, 592 for the 1st Cuirassier, 25%, and 630-31 for the 2nd Cuirassier, 27%. Infantry losses were much more severe. Of the two corps that fought in the south, II Corps lost 3718-3764, 36%, while III Corps lost 32373294, 40-41%. The forces in the center from 1st Army had comparably heavy losses. IV Corps lost 3739-3763, or 39-40% and VI Corps lost 3616-
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French divisions were shattered after the battle, since no complete records remain of individual infantry division losses in the Grande Arme after Borodino. But the corps-level losses are known, and from this it is evident that Davouts I Corps and the Polish V Corps suffered the most heavily, as well as Murats cavalry. It is likely that one or two of Davouts divisions were effectively shattered (likely Dessaixs 4th and Morands 1st ), as well as one of Murats cavalry corps (Montbruns II Cavalry, Nansoutys I Cavalry and Latour-Maubourgs IV Cavalry all suffered heavy damage, and of these IV Cavalry was the weakest to begin with in cavalry, so the most likely loss from the final cavalry struggles) and one of the Polish divisions (16th or 18th ). Ornanos IV Corps cavalry may also have been shattered by the initial impact of Uvarovs and Platovs cavalry at Bezzubovo, for when it appears later at Moscow it is a shadow of its former power. But on the French side, it is clear that no artillery units were lost; the French artillery strength at Moscow was nearly equal to what they had at Borodino, and it appears that only 8 French guns were lost at Borodino. , French Corps At Borodino Moscow Moscow Oct. 18 end of Sept. Guard 18,849, 109 guns 18,706 22,480, 112 guns I Corps 40,392, 147 guns 24,818 28,949, 144 guns III Corps 13,186, 75 guns 6,243 10,498, 71 guns IV Corps 25,021, 88 guns 27,326 25,624, 92 guns V Corps 10,328, 50 guns 6,923 5,712, 49 guns VIII Corps 9,656, 30 guns 5,000 est. 5,691, 34 guns Reserve Cav. 17,685, 88 guns 11,759 9,000, 67 guns Corps (with about 4,000 of the cavalry dismounted) While Napoleon had 135,117 men and 587 guns available for Borodino, at the end of September in Moscow he had 100,775 and 571 guns, and at the time he left Moscow, with reinforcements that had caught up and return of lightly wounded troops to the ranks, his strength had actually grown to 107,954 men, with 569 guns. The Guard, not committed to combat at Borodino apart from the artillery, suffered insignificant losses, and was actually stronger on leaving Moscow than it had been at Borodino due to the arrival of reinforcements including the rest of the Young Guard. However, I Corps had massive losses of at least 11,500 and more likely close to 15,000 men. III Corps lost between 2,600 and 4,900 men. For IV Corps, these figures appear to show no losses, but that is because of the addition of the 6000 men of Pinos 15th Division to IV Corps after the battle; taking that into account, IV Corps losses appear more like 2,700 men. Polish V Corps losses were about 3,400. Westphalian VIII Corps suffered losses of about 4,000 by the time it left Moscow, and while this probably includes some post-battle attrition,
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could eventually draw on many reserves to replace their losses, it would still take time to rebuild from the heavy losses of Borodino, amounting to about a third of the army. In a dramatic debate at Fili, the Russian commanders divided on whether to fight another battle to defend Moscow, and Kutuzov finally had to take the momentous decision to abandon Russias ancient capital. On the French side, though losses had only amounted to somewhat under a quarter of the army, and the Guard remained intact, replacements were a more serious problem. Napoleons resources were not yet exhausted. On the evening after the battle on Sept. 7s, Pinos Italian 15th Division rejoined Eugenes IV Corps. The remainder of the Young Guard also caught up with Napoleon by Moscow, and other troops filtered in there, so that the Guard and IV Corps actually found themselves stronger after their stay in Moscow than they had been just before Borodino. But Tsar Alexander would not negotiate with Napoleon, for he still had an army in the field, and Napoleons position in Moscow, at the far end of the long rapier thrust into Russia, was becoming more tenuous every day. The vulnerability of the French was now apparent, even at the high water mark of the Grande Armees advance; raiding Cossacks could easily cut Napoleons lines of communication back to France, and the reviving strength of
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Mortier CHQ corps staff Old Guard Infantry 1st, 2nd, 3rd Grenadiers, 1st, 2nd Foot Chasseurs Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 10 bns. Middle Guard Infantry 1st Voltigeurs, 1st Tirailleurs, Fusiliers-Chasseurs, FusiliersGrenadiers Rgts. (2 bns. ea.), combined with 1 brigade of Young Guard, 4th, 5th Voltigeurs, 4th Tirailleurs Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 14 bns. (Legion of the) Vistula Infantry 1st, 2nd, 3rd Vistula Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 6 bns. Guard Heavy Artillery 6 foot batteries (49 guns) Guard Light Artillery 4 foot (30 guns), 4 horse batteries (24 guns), 6 regimental guns Guard Cavalry Horse Grenadiers, Horse Chasseurs, Empress Dragoons Rgts. (5 sq. ea.), 1st Polish Lancers, 2nd Dutch Lancers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Gendarmes delite (2 sq.), Mamelukes (1 sq.) = 26 sq. I Corps Davout CHQ corps staff 1st Infantry 13th Light, 17th, 30th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.) (+ 1 bn. of 2nd Baden Rgt. detached to AHQ) = 15 bns 2nd Infantry 15th Light, 33rd Line, 48th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea), Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 17 bns. 3rd Infantry 7th Light, 12th, 21st Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.), and 127th Line Rgt. (2 bns.) (in reserve, guarding I Corps parks), 1st Mecklenburg Bn. from 8th Rhine
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(Continued) Chasseurs Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 12th Polish Lancers Rgt. (4 sq.), 13th Polish Hussars Rgt. (4 sq.) = 17 sq. V Corps Light Artillery 5 foot batteries (32 guns), 1 horse battery (6 guns), 12 regimental guns VIII Corps Junot CHQ corps staff 23rd / 24th Infantry from 23rd Division 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th Westphalian Line Rgts. (2 bns. ea., 3 bns. in 7th ), 2 Westphalian Light bns.; from 24th Division 1 guard grenadier, 1 guard jaeger, 1 jaeger-carabinier, 1 light bns., all Westphalian = 15 bns. VIII Corps Cavalry 1st, 2nd Westphalian Hussars Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Westphalian Guard ChevauLeger Rgt. (4 sq.) = 12 sq. VIII Corps Heavy Artillery 2 foot batteries (16 guns), 1 horse battery (6 guns), 8 regimental guns (Reserve) Cavalry Corps Murat CHQ corps staff I Cavalry Corps (1CC) in 1st Heavy Cavalry Division - 2nd, 3rd, 9th, Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 1st Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 5th Heavy Cavalry Division - 6th, 11th, 12th Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 5th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (1 sq.); in 1st Light Cavalry Division - 7th, 8th Hussars Rgts., 9th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt., 16th Chasseurs Rgt., 6th, 8th Polish Lancers Rgts., 2nd Combined Prussian Hussar Rgt. (4 sq. ea.) = 55 sq.
IV Corps Eugene CHQ corps staff Italian Guard Infantry Guard Inf., Guard Conscript Rgts. (2 bns. ea.), Royal Velites (2 bns.) = 6 bns. 13th Infantry 8th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 84th, 92nd, 106th Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 1st Provisional Croat Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns. 14th Infantry 18th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 9th, 35th, 53rd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns IV Corps Cavalry (including VI Corps Cavalry) Guard Dragoons (Italian) Rgt. (2 sq.), Queens Dragoons (Italian) Rgt. (4 sq.), Guards of Honor (1 sq.), 2nd, 3rd Italian Chasseurs Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 9th, 19th Chasseurs Rgts. (3 sq ea.), 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Bavarian ChevauLeger Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 37 sq. IV Corps Heavy Artillery 6 foot batteries (44 guns) IV Corps Horse Artillery 2 foot batteries (12 guns), 4 horse batteries (24 guns), 8 regimental guns V Corps Poniatowski CHQ corps staff 16th Infantry 3rd, 15th, 16th Polish Line Rgts. (3 bns. ea.) = 9 bns. 18th Infantry 2nd, 8th, 12th Polish Line Rgts. (3 bns. ea.) = 9 bns. V Corps Cavalry 1st Polish Chasseurs Rgt. (1 sq. present, others at Smolensk), 4th, 5th Polish
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Voltigeurs (Detachments) 1xB3, 2xB2 represent light infantry drawn from infantry divisions as needed, not separate regiments The Russian Order of Battle at Borodino (Composition of Game Units) Kutuzov AHQ corps staff, escort - 1 bn. Selenginsk Rgt. from III Corps, 1 bn. Combined Grenadiers from IV Corps, Ingermanland, Kargopol Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) from II Cavalry Corps = 2 bns., 8 sq. (the available information does not clearly identify which of the 1st Army AHQ escorts were with the Kutuzov AHQ and which were with the Barclay AHQs, which operated near to each other; the assignment of most of the escorts to Kutuzov, while giving the Cossack escort to Barclay, parallels the Cossack escort of Bagrations AHQ) I Army Barclay AHQ army staff, escort - 2nd Bug Cossacks Rgt. (5 sq.) I Army Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries (24 guns) I Army Light Artillery 7 light batteries (84 guns) I Army Horse Artillery 7 horse batteries (including ones attached to cavalry corps) (84 guns) I Cavalry Corps (1CC) Life Guard Dragoon, Life Guard Uhlan, Life Guard Hussar Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Life Guard Cossack Rgt. (3 sq), Black Sea Guard Cossack sotnia (1 sq.), Yelizavetgrad Hussar Rgt. (8 sq.), Nezhinsk Dragoon Rgt. (4 sq.) = 28 sq. II Cavalry Corps (2CC) Moscow
Dragoon, Pskov Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Izumsk Hussar, Polish Uhlan Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 24 sq. III Cavalry Corps (3CC) Kurland, Orenburg, Irkutsk, Siberia Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Mariupol, Sumsk Hussar Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 32 sq. II Corps Baggovut CHQ corps staff 4th Infantry Tobolsk, Volhynia, Kremenchug, Minsk Rgts., 4th, 34th Jaeger Rgts (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 17th Infantry Ryazan, Brest, Belozersk, Willmanstrand Rgts., 30th, 48th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. II Corps Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries (48 guns) III Corps (with I Army Sept. 5, with II Army Sept. 7) Tuchkov CHQ corps staff 1st Grenadier Infantry Life Grenadier, Arakcheyev Grenadier, Pavlovsk Grenadier, Yekatarinoslav Grenadier, St. Petersburg Grenadier, Taurida Grenadier Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 3rd Infantry Murom, Revel, Chernigov Rgts. (2 bns. ea), Selenginsk Rgt. (1 bn., with 1 detached to AHQ; regiment attached from IV Corps), 20th, 21st Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 11 bns. (may have also received back its 2 bns. of Combined Grenadiers from 1st Combined Grenadier Division as attachments for the battle on Sept. 7, but for game purposes
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1st Teptyarsk Cossack Rgt. (5 sq.), and 1st Bashkir Rgt. (5 sq.) = 37 sq. Cossack 2 Cavalry 5 Don Cossack Rgts., inc. Ilovaisky V, Grekov XVIII, Denisov VII, Zhirov, Kharitonov VII (5 sq. ea.), Perekop Horse Tatar, Simferopol Horse Tatar Rgts. (5 sq. ea.) = 35 sq. Cossack Horse Artillery 2 horse batteries (24 guns) II Army Bagration AHQ corps staff, 3rd Bug Cossack Rgt. (5 sq.), 1 Smolensk militia bn. II Army Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries (24 guns) II Army Light Artillery 4 2/3 light batteries (56 guns) VII Corps Rayevski CHQ corps staff 12th Infantry Narva, Smolensk, New Ingermanland, Alexopol Rgts., 6th, 41st Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 26th Infantry Nizhni Novgorod, Orel, Ladoga, Poltava Rgts. 5th, 42nd Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. VII Corps Heavy Artillery- 1 position battery, 1 light battery (24 guns) VIII Corps Borozdin CHQ corps staff 2nd Grenadier Infantry Kiev Grenadier, Moscow Grenadier, Astrakhan Grenadier, Fanagoria Grenadier, Siberia Grenadier, Little Russia Grenadier Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 27th Infantry Odessa, Tarnopol, Vilna, Simbirsk Rgts., 49th, 50th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 2nd Combined Grenadier Infantry 11 Combined Grenadier bns. from 2nd Grenadier, 7th, 12th, 24th, 27th (2 each.) and 26th (1 bn.) Divisions; at least 7 bns. in one brigade remained with division during battle, while 4
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Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History From the Desk of the Editor [Continued From Page 2]
And importantly we seek to hire a full time curator at approximately $50K a year and benefits, understanding that curators make significantly more. We will also likely develop a newsletter too and I will likely write for or publish that. Our short term needs can be covered by approximately $150,000 in repairs. Long Term we need to build an endowment that will fund the museum in perpetuity. Interest rates being what they are, we believe annual maintenance and salaries will run us about $130,000, thus with interest at about 1.5% our target for an endowment is $15 Million. With that we hope to build a new building and create a military history library to rival the Pritsker in Chicago. The historians we have spoken to and who have visited the museum have all commented on how nice it is to be able to park on a street where the traffic is about 1 car every 10 minutes, where people say Howdy when they walk past you on the street, and where you can sit down at Dannys Bar and Grill, Peebles Pizza, or the R&R Restaurant for a home town meal and never have to fear being mugged, which in Chicago these days is a definite risk. In fact one historian from Chicago said hed rather drive 3 hours to Dana to study in a military library than drive downtown in Chicago to the Pritsker. And there are plenty of Bed and Breakfasts in the area. But, for now, thats a pipe dream, but a dream we do hope to attain. ALL of these things require money, most especially the upkeep and repairs to the existing facilities. We are in desperate need of $150,000. One of the things I never realized
may have been deployed forward in another brigade with VI Corps in I Army, but the division remains united for game purposes VIII Corps Heavy Artillery - 4.5 position batteries, 1/3 light battery (58 guns) Cavalry Corps (not a formal corps like others, but aggregates the II Army cavalry, which was all under the authority of Golitsyn as the armys cavalry commander) Golitsyn CHQ corps staff 2nd Cuirassier Cavalry Yekaterinoslavl, Military Order, Glukhov, Little Russia, Novgorod Cuirassier Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 20 sq. IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) Kharkov, Chernigov, Kiev, Novorossiisk Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Akhtyrsk, Lithuanian Hussar Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 32 sq. Corps Horse Artillery 2 horse batteries (24 guns) Cossack 3 Cavalry 8 Don Cossack Rgts,. inc. Bykhalov 1, Grekov XXI, Ilovaisky X, Ilovaisky XI, Karpov II, Kommisarov I, Melnikov IV, Sysoyov III (5 sq. ea.) = 40 sq. Opolcheniye (Militia) Moscow 1 Infantry includes 1t, 2nd Moscow militia divisions, total 4 rgts., 16 bns. Moscow 2 Infantry - includes 3rd Moscow militia division, total 4 rgts., 16 bns. Smolensk Infantry includes 11 districts (battalion equivalents) Jaegers (Detachments) 1xB3, 2xB2 represent light infantry drawn from infantry divisions as needed, not separate regiments.
about a not for profit 501(c)3 organization is that we cannot be shy about asking people for money. I grew up in the country and we would never have conceived of asking anyone for help that way. BUT, those personal feelings must be subjugated to the needs of the museum. SO, I AM ASKING: PLEASE PLEASE IF THERE ARE SUBSCRIBERS WHO CAN AFFORD THAT KIND OF A DONATION, NOT ONLY WILL IT BE APPRECIATED, BUT THE ENTIRE BOARD AND THE TOWN OF DANA WOULD BE ECSTATIC !!! You would be helping to save a national and indeed world treasure. Contact me via my e-mail: tdcgsl@yahoo.com or at the museums website www.erniepyle.org 1-765-665-3633 The Ernie Pyle WWII Museum is a tax deductible 501(c)3 Not For Profit And, yes Paypal Donations can be made at the website above www.erniepyle.org Now, about Old Soldiers. This will be the last issue of Old Soldiers, closing out Volume 7. In the end there just wasnt enough concrete material submitted to keep the magazine alive. I will write for Jon Comptons new magazine CounterFacts. Jon is the ex editor of Fire and Movement, for whom I once wrote. I will continue to make counters for anyone who asks. And I believe White Dog Games also seeks to build their own news letter and I will likely write and edit that.
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Battles of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743
Wilmanstrand and Korpostrm Written by Ian Weir. Maps by Paul Dangel
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The following is compiled from material used in the authors recently published double wargame on the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-43 (A Lesser Wrath & Somar Skrla, by Red Sash Games).
Most readers are no doubt aware that in the 17th and 18th Centuries Sweden ranked as one of the Great Powers, and that her primary rival, Russia, achieved the same status during that time. Russia cemented her rise by challenging Sweden to a duel for supremacy in what is called the Great Northern War (1700-1721). Two decades later, the Swedes sought a rematch. The War of the Hats, sometimes the Hats War, or again the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-43, is not well remembered outside of Sweden and Finland, but it is nonetheless instructive. By 1741, the Swedes were clinging desperately to the last vestiges of their imperial power. Swedens defeat had been shattering. In 1720 the State was near bankruptcy, the economy ruined, and the armed forces in tatters. The root of all these evils was a lack of ready money. When Sweden had been at her maximum territorial extent, she controlled numerous commercial hubs in Germany, and even more importantly, she controlled the grain fields of Livonia. This rich farmland was worked by
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soldiers and gentlemen, the inference being that the Hats were the Patriot party and their opponents, the Nightcaps or Caps (Mssorna), at best a group of sleepy dodderers. The Hats originated in the salon-culture of the 1720s. Salons, officers clubs, and the like, were not native to Sweden, but French imports. A great many Swedish officers had seen service with the French Army and picked up French habits. Apropos, one of the most influential of these officers clubs was the little generalitet, which served as a forum for discussion of the latest military thinking and as a hatchery for up-andcoming young officers. One of the leading lights of the club was General Carl Emil Lewenhaupt. Lewenhaupt was a veteran of the Great Northern War, respected for his forward thinking and clear judgment on matters military. He had held, and would again hold on outbreak of war with Russia, the office of Lantmarskalk Speaker of the Upper House. The Lantmarskalk was a key member of the Secret Committee. That is, after the demise of Arved Horn, Lewenhaupt was the closest thing to a prime minister Sweden possessed. He was also the man chosen to lead the Swedish Army in Finland against the Russians. There was a dark side to the clubs. Through them, French agents were able to influence Swedish foreign policy. Many ordinary Swedes saw France as their best friend in Europe; the Francophile clubs believed
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removed from power. On the second occasion the French themselves had a change of heart, seeing more to be gained by acting as Mediator in the conflict (they earned lucrative trading privileges in Syria). This left the Swedes in confusion. About all they accomplished was to tip the Russians off with some halfhearted troop movements. The Russians redeployed 80,000 men to the Baltic theatre in the closing months of the war. Severely bruised at the time, by 1741 these units would be in peak condition. After this false start and in the general exhaustion produced by the Russo-Turkish war another conflict might have been avoided for some time to come, but for two very important deaths in 1740: that of Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor, and that of the Russian Empress, Anna Ivanova. Charles death can be attributed to the RussoTurkish war. The Empire was involved as an ally of Russia and the catastrophic defeat suffered by Austria on the Danube they lost Belgrade to the Turks broke the emperors health. Because his successor was a woman, the famous Maria Theresa, a new war broke out in Europe, the War of the Austrian Succession. Prussia began her hundred-year-long drive to take Austrias place as leader of Germany. For France, likewise at odds with Austria, it became essential to prevent Russian interference on behalf of the Habsburgs. Having switched off the Swedes two years before, the French now tried to switch them on again.
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aside and the Swedish strike force would enter the northern capital and assist Elisabeth to the throne, directing the coup in a manner favourable to Sweden. In gratitude, the princess would grant territorial concessions; even the Russian government had long admitted some locations were up for discussion. Since the Swedes and French paid for her coup, perhaps she would pay for the war? But, if the worst came to the worst, one Swede was worth ten Russians any day. Unfortunately, Sweden fought her war in isolation. The Ottomans were not interested in helping. Though technically victorious over the Empire they had not done so well against the Russians, and needed a long period of peace to recover. And this was to be denied them, since, even before their war ended, they found themselves embroiled with the Persians. France became stuck in a German quagmire and had no will or means to aid Sweden after the first shots were fired. Initially, the Swedes could care less. The Hats had come to power on an antiRussian platform. More support for a war had been gained in 1740 with the Sinclair affair, the brutal murder of a Swedish diplomatic courier (he was also a member of parliament) by Russian agents. Tit-for-tat trade sanctions were imposed, and merchant ships were harassed on both sides. But, there were difficulties. The Swedish military was underfunded and undermanned.
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Both sides employed regiments of foot as administrative units and battalions as the basic combat unit. Organizations higher than the regiment were ad hoc, with brigades being the primary operational unit. Several brigades might be grouped as a corps, and a couple of corps would form an army, but such arrangements depended on how the campaign unfolded. In Finland, with only a single main road, there was no point in having multiple corps. The bulk of the forces marched as one army, and a small one at that, while detached brigades combining a mix of infantry and cavalry covered the primitive side roads. In battle, both sides infantry battalions fought in four ranks and used combat by fire only at very close range or not at all. However, there the similarities ended. Russian regiments had, with a few exceptions, a permanent twobattalion structure, backed by a third dept battalion used to organize replacements. Battalions had four fusilier companies and a grenadier company, which was usually, like the grenadiers of other armies, split off and combined with other grenadier companies to form elite assault formations. Swedish regiments had no permanent battalion structure. Instead, their foundation was the company. Recruitment was based on a cantonal system similar to Prussias, so that the company personnel would all come from
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possible. It appears that retreats, as one of the four phases of war, were not practiced at all, either for the battlefield or operationally. The tactics of the pure offensive would let the Swedes down. At Wilmanstrand their counterattack would be flanked, bringing destruction; in the campaign as a whole, the necessity to conduct a series of fallback defensive operations would bring a collapse in morale. Cavalry regiments on both sides had roughly the same organization (the Swedish cavalry did have a fixed structure): regiments of four squadron, each of two troops. The Swedes still outclassed their opponents. Unfortunately, Finland possessed almost no terrain suitable for shock action, and few districts where adequate fodder was available, so the horse were not accorded priority of transport when preparing for the campaign. Only one locally raised dragoon regiment would participate in the battle at Wilmanstrand. The Swedish dragoons, most of whom were Finnish, even in those units not cantoned in Finland, had a high reputation. Modeled on the Russians, they had greater lan and often engaged in mounted charges. But for some reason, probably the fact that the men had only just mustered, the regiments performance at Wilmanstrand was abysmal. The Russians had only a handful of experimental cuirassier regiments, on the Saxon model, whose training was minimal and whose mounts were weak; they
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single battery, the since the train proper had been sent back in anticipation of a withdrawal. Swedish light pieces were 4pounders, while the Russians had 3-pounders; the latter employed a large number of small coehorn mortars as well. Field artillery on both sides came in 8- and 12pounder weight, though naturally guns of any calibre and of uncertain ancestry would be used in a pinch.
The Leaders
Intuitively, one would expect the Swedish Army to be commanded by a brilliant, aggressive individual, matching his wits against a somewhat slow, if stolid Russian with limited imagination. In fact, the advantages were all on the Russian side. Overall command of the Swedish forces in Finland was given to Count Carl Emil Lewenhaupt (1691-1743). This choice was universally applauded at the time. Though some modern sources describe him as both inexperienced and incompetent, Lewenhaupts reputation was actually pretty solid, and he was extremely popular with the Swedish people at least, those who mattered. He was a veteran of the Great Northern War and respected as a good tactician. Most importantly, he would be, by the time war broke out, Lantmarskalk Speaker of the House of Nobles and Marshal of the Diet which ought to give him the necessary powers to ensure smooth war.
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hawkish of all the Swedish commanders. If there are rumours that Lewenhaupt lied to promote the war, the evidence that Buddenbrog did so is blatantly obvious. Wrangel by contrast, was apolitical, even a closet Cap. But he was brave to the point of impetuosity and happy to participate. Buddenbrog (1685-1743) was born in Livonia. His career ran as follows: Captain in the Livgardet (1711), Major of Grenadiers (1715), Major General (1721), elevated to the status of friherre (1731), Lieutenant General of Infantry (1739). Executed in 1743, as will be explained. Wrangel was born in Sweden and he joined the Army at 15. Captain in the Livgardet, Lieutenant Colonel of the Sknska stndsdragonerna. Captured at Poltava (1709). Repatriated in 1722. Colonel of the Nyland cavalry regiment (1722), of the Tavastehus Regiment (1727), Nyland.
(1691-1743) Opinion is divided on his politics. He was a Hat, and the contemporary chronicler Manstein credits him with telling fibs about the state of his armys preparedness, just so he could have a nice little war. It is also said that he had dreams of acquiring the governorship of Finland perhaps even ruling it as a breakaway state. Others portray him as lukewarm, going through the motions in what was supposed to be nothing more than a show of force in aid of a regime change. Like many German Swedes, Lewenhaupt first entered the Dutch service, at 16, becoming Captain in 1709. In 1710 he joined the Swedish service. In 1712 he fought, as a Lieutenant Colonel, at Gadebusch (the last Swedish victory of the Great Northern War). At the end of the Great Northern War he was made a Major General (1722). During the years of peace he served in
General Wrangel
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gained by destabilizing the imperial throne and establishing a pro-Swedish regime, well and good. If not, the Swedes must so press the Russians that they would beg for peace. Later in the war he would face insurmountable opposition from the Holsteiners, who by that point were worried that by making war on Carl Peters future empire they were sowing trouble for themselves. No such issues divided the Russian side. Command was given to Marshal Piotr Petrovitch Lascy (1678-1751). During the course of his life Lascy participated, by his own count, in 18 battles, 18 sieges, and 31 campaigns. In 1735 he had taken a Russian army to the Rhine. In 1736, 1737, and 1738 he had taken one to the Black Sea. In 1741 he would take one north and west, into Finland, and possibly to Sweden. But Lascy was not a Russian. His real name was Pierce Edmond de Lacy, of the House of Bruff, and he was
Baron Henrik Magnus von Buddenbrog (1685-1743) Dragoons (1729), Skaraborgs Regiment (1739) Major General (1732). In 1739 he was offered a seat on the Privy Council but declined in order to keep his Army commission. Captured at Wilmanstrand (1741) and repatriated in 1742, he returned to Sweden a hero. In 1743 he was promoted to Lieutenant General, and in 1754 to Field Marshal. Descending from these rarified heights, the bulk of the Swedish officer corps was competent enough, no better or worse than that of other armies. Many had years of service in the French Army under their belt; others were German soldiers of fortune. But there was one overriding problem that perhaps did more than anything else to ensure the ruin of Swedish hopes: the Army was riven by faction. Although the situation became dire only at years end, cracks were already appearing.
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to France; in 1719 he returned to Scotland and fought with the Spanish against King Georges men at Glenshiel. Transferring to the Spanish service at that time, he also participated in the abortive Siege of Gibraltar (1727). Due to his Protestant religion, promotion in the Spanish service came slowly. So, he went to Russia; Peter II (or rather the Regent of the day, Catherine I) gave him command of a Guards regiment. Like Lacy, Keith fought with skill in the War of the Polish Succession and the Russo-Turkish campaigns. Upon the outbreak of war with Sweden, he was a General of Infantry. He was also noted for his abilities in civil administration and was respected for a liberal humanity and sense of justice which were unusual for the period, and even more glaring in Russia. Both men were apolitical. Russian-born officers did have to concern themselves with their position at Court, and even foreign experts working on contract worried when there was a shakeup at the top, but whereas certain of such men had foolishly involved themselves with politics, Lacy and Keith just went about their duties. Their reputations were clean and their skills so recognized that they had little to fear. Lacy conducted the campaign of 1741 on behalf of the Regency. When the coup took place and he was woken in the dead of night with the news, he was asked where his loyalties lay. Without hesitation he said with the reigning empress and
General James Francis Edward Keith (1696-1758) born at Kileedy, in County Limerick, Ireland. Described by a Russian source as one of the best type of foreign generals of Peters time, who knew and loved the art of warfare, he was perhaps the greatest Russian general before the appearance of Suvorov. He took part in his first action at the age of 13, hastily commissioned as a Lieutenant and leading a band of his countrymen defending the town of Limerick against the army of William of Orange (1691). At the peace that year, Lacys father, his brother, and himself, took flight with the Wild Geese going to France to join the Irish Brigade. Lacy lost his relatives while fighting in Italy during the Nine Years War, and went over to the Austrian service. Two years later, in company with his commander, he joined the Russian Army in time to participate in much of the Great Northern War. Beginning as a Lieutenant at Narva, he
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waterlogged. If there is no lake on a given patch of ground, there will be a swamp. On firm ground, the forests are dense, cut by tracks known only to the locals. Even on the main coast road, the so-called Kings Road, the Russians would find themselves having to hack a path through for their artillery. A band of low hills runs parallel to the shores of Lake Saimaa, containing all that water and keeping the Karelian region north of Vyborg relatively dry. There are, however, a number of smallish rivers. The well known Vuoksi that connects Saimaa with Lake Ladoga was at that date more a string of lakes than a single channel. The town of Wilmanstrand, now Lappeenranta, lies on the south shore of Lake Saimaa. Though small, it was an important place: a point of departure for water transport heading north and a post on the northernmost of two east-west roads south of the lake the other being the Kings Road running along the coast. Wilmanstrand was also the terminus of a road running southeast across the border to Vyborg. The town was situated on a tongue of land jutting out into the lake. The landward side was protected by substantial earthworks, but the defences were not particularly formidable. Despite harsh taxation prior to the war there was barely enough money to pay the garrison of Finland, let alone improve the state of her defences.
The Theatre
Before the war, the border between Finland and Russia began at Hamina then Frederikshamn and closely followed the coast eastward for some distance before heading east-north-east. Vyborg (Vipuri), it should be noted, was a Russian possession. Frederikshamn was the most important of Swedens border posts, though not as well fortified as the Russians would later make it. Wilmanstrand was the middlemost border post, actually a few kilometers behind the border. Once past Wilmanstrand the border cut sharply northeast, passing some distance north of Lake Ladoga before heading directly north (along roughly modern lines). At a narrow crossing point in Lake Saimaa, well to the northeast of Wilmanstrand, was Nyslott (Savonlinna), the third and last of Swedens border posts. It controlled roads heading into the interior of Finland. Overall, the terrain was well suited for the defence. Even today movement is pretty much restricted to the roads, and in the 18th Century there were no railroads. Finland is the land of lakes. Much of the country has only recently, in geologic terms, sprung up, like a wet sponge, after the retreat of the ice age glaciers, and sponge-like, the ground is still
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Dispositions
Baltic Sea and Scandinavia While the town was sited on a knob of elevated ground, much of the surrounding terrain was low lying and swampy, or consisted of forest dotted with cleared smallholdings and hamlets. A ridge lay to the south and west, and beyond it another such ridge. These dominated the town, and the northernmost was within cannon range of the town center. The road from Vyborg ran straight into the town with the ridges to its left (as one approached the gate), while the east-west road ran along the top of the nearer ridge. It is a little town, at the distance of full four German miles [30 Km; the present border is 20 Km or so] from the frontier of Russia, situate on the side of a great lake; this covered it behind, so that there was no attacking it but in front, where it was fortified with a covered way, a dry ditch palisaded, and a staked rampart, the whole made of earth and fascines. The town, though itself situated on an eminence, has hills all round, which command it. The highest is on its proper right, where there was a windmill. The Swedes had posted a detachment there, to hinder the Wilmanstrands prewar garrison comprised 500 men of Willebrands battalion (part of the Bjrneborgs regemente; Colonel Willebrand was the town commandant). Attached to the garrison was the Karelska dragonregemente of Finnish dragoons (600 men). Perhaps 100 men from Karelska were detached and posted to the southeast, on the road from Vyborg, just on the Swedish side of the border. Discounting various march columns and regiments still assembling, General Lewenhaupts strike force was camped (due to lack of billets) in columns near the frontier, a days
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a mortar, besides a war chest of 8,000 crowns (a paltry sum according to Manstein). The population of Wilmanstrand was deported to Russia and, after being plundered, the town was razed (September 4th). 3,300 Swedish dead were counted on the battlefield (Swedish sources say 1,300 killed and wounded, and 1,000 POWs). Less than 500, mostly dragoons, escaped, turning up as far away as Nyslott. The Russians lost a major general Ukskul three staff officers, eleven combat officers, and 514 men (the Swedes say 2,400 men killed and wounded, including a lieutenant general). Manstein, no raw recruit, reports that the gunfire during the battle was intense, and lasted over four hours.
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After
Buddenbrog, meanwhile, was having a frustrating time. His troops were too disorganized, according to his own account, to march off immediately, and he was two days from Wilmanstrand. That said, the evening of the battle, fleeing dragoons not marching at regulation pace, mind you rushed his camp. The sentries fired at them in error, then fled themselves, taking with them most of the camp. Buddenbrog and his officers emerged from their quarters to find themselves alone. It took most of the following morning to sort things out. The generals immediate problems were compounded by a disaster that had overtaken the
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Towards Korpo
The focus of the naval war in 1743 was the land Archipelago, the cluster of islands at Finlands southwestern tip. Large troop movements across the Baltic could only be accomplished by convoys of
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Amphibious Operations
Meanwhile, there had been action in the lands. On May 17th, Khruschev reported the assembly of most of his forces at Hango. He was still waiting for the five Frederickshamn galleys. General Keith put aside his Governors duties and came down from bo. Khruschev had:
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Excursus
Korpo, or more properly, Korpostrm, is one of those battles which are at least a good exercise in analysis. Hard-fought, despite its slight butchers bill no ships were lost on either side it was important because it was the Swedes last attack, and it failed. The most detailed source of information for the battle is General Mansteins Memoirs. But in this instance Manstein was not an eyewitness, he was working from Keiths afteraction report. Moreover, the present author has used the English translation, which naturally eliminates any nuances contained in the original French. And, Mansteins account is minimalist, mentioning the key
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The End
After the Battle of Korpo, the Russians gradually pushed the Swedes out of the archipelago. Marshal Lacy soon arrived with his flotilla and preparations were made for descents upon the Swedish coast. Meanwhile the negotiations were proceeding apace at bo. The gunfire at Korpostrm had been clearly audible to the diplomats.
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Korpo Monument
Fredrik V died in 1751, irrelevant to the last. Princess Elisabeth guided Russia through the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, dying in 1762. Her protg, Carl Peter, duly became Peter III, but his wife, Catherine the Great, saw to it that he would soon disappear from history. Elisabeths candidate for the Swedish throne, resident in Sweden as heir-apparent, became leader of the Hats and turned vehemently anti-Russian. The party, though chastened, retained power until later in the century, when they were brought to book for corruption and gross mismanagement of the economy.