FREEDOM OF RELIGION

1. NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE A. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of Sotto, the Director of Posts publicly announced that the designs of the postage for printing have been sent to the United States. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by Aglipay. Issue: Whether the stamp (containing a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937") violate the Nonestablishment clause by allegedly promoting the Catholic religion. Held: Section 13, Article VI, of the 1935 Constitution provides that no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium." The prohibition is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. Herein, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an

inscription that reads "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." Thus, while the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.

B. GARCES VS. ESTENZO FACTS: 1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " 2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day. It was ratified in a plebiscite. 3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighbouring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos 4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. 5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. 6. Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. 7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image

8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turned over the image to the council ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.

9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Their main argument was it prejudiced members of the Catholic Church because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta. <Labo dud!> )

10. Lower Court dismissed the complaints.

ISSUES

1) WON that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions? NO RATIO

In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City. Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed.

2) WON the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is

assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO Ratio The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

(Lower Courts decision affirmed)

C. IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. CA FACTS: This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board of Review For Moving Pictures and Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested with such. Issue: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has acted with grave abuse of discretion. Held: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom,the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner

D. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: The Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP), a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal2 certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions IDCP carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. IDCP formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, IDCP began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. IDCP even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent 42000-03664. On 26 October 2001, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued Executive Order (EO) 465, series of 2001, creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. On 8 May 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a result, IDCP lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. IDCP filed a petition for prohibition, praying for the declaration of nullity of EO 46 and the prohibition of the Office of the Executive Secretary and OMA from implementing the subject EO. Issue: Whether the OMA encroached upon the religious freedom of Muslim organizatinos to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Held: OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order 697 "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the nonestablishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on

the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.

2. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE A. GERONA VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FACTS:

RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rules (Department Order 8)says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge (panatang makabayan).

Petitioners children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They consider the flag to be an image in this context. Because of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.

Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. SecEd denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.

ISSUE: WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional

HELD: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional RATIONALE: The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield.

What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain that it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol of Republic of the Philippines. It is not a religious symbol. Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. The determination whether a ceremony is religious or not is left to the courts not to any religious group.

Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand during flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag during boy scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend the country.

There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education. Take it or leave it. Whuuuuuttt???

Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were members of Methodist Episcopal Church who believed that war and preparations for war are gainst God's wishes. They did not take required military service training which was requirement to graduate. Court said that they were not being drafted to attend university. University did not violate due process when it required the mil service.

Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs Witness children were expelled from school for refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupils in flag ceremony did not infringe due process. West Virginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided court.

This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the students although attendance in schools is mandatory turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories. Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollment here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to attend school.

Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society and community life he becomes a member and must give up some of his rights for the general welfare just like everybody else. The practice of religion is subject to reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the state.

Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: Sarah Prince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the Child Labor law because her hiece distributed religious pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control of parent/guardian. The right of practice religion freelydoes not include liberty to expose child to ill health. This case was decided after Barnette, supra.

SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flag salute. It was Merely enforcing a nondiscriminatory regulation applicable to members of all religions. State carried out duty to supervise educational institutions and teach civic duty.

Petitioners do not question the right of the school to conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the attempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the petioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and demoralize the greater student population.

There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an understanding that anti-war religious believers will not be made to fight but help war effort in other non-combat ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the courts.

DISPOSITION:

decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. No costs.

B. EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases are school children who are members of Jehovahs Witnesses who were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A. No. 1265 (July 11, 1955) and by DECS Department Order No. 8 (July 21, 1955) which makes the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private) for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony.

RATIO: It has been held previously in the case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a system of complete separation between church and state, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance and therefore saluting it is not a religious ceremony. The requirement of the flag ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to students and teachers regardless of their religion. While the necessity to develop such respect for the flag and respect for the country still persists until today, there is recognition that religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights (Fernando separate opinion in German vs. Barangan)

Two-fold aspect of religious profession: Freedom to believe absolute as long as confined to the realm of thought Freedom to act on ones belief subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts affecting the public welfare

Petitioners contend that while they did not participate in the flag ceremony, they did not engage in any disruptive behavior that would offend those who choose to participate but rather they just quietly stood at attention during the flag ceremony to show respect to their countrymen. Therefore, in the absence of a grave and present danger which is the

sole justification for a prior restraint on the exercise of religious freedom , according to Teehankee in his dissent in German vs. Barangan, there is no warrant to justify their expulsion. What petitioners seek is only exemption from the flag ceremony and therefore the virtues (e.g. patriotism, respect for human rights, love of country, etc.) they are supposed to imbibe from their participation in the flag ceremony, they can get in their study of the Constitution, the democaratic way of life and form of government, the history and culture of the Philippines, the life of our heroes, etc. To force a small religious group through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities which are precisely the values the court in Gerona feared will be lost by exempting some members of the Jehovahs Witnesses to participate in the flag ceremonies.

let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska)

expulsion of the members will violated their right as citizens under the Constitution to receive free education which is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education applicable to all.

in closing, the court hopes that it will not take another foreign invasion of our country for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag as what happened during WWII.

C. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS CITY OF MANILA FACTS: o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippines agency established in November of 1898 the defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be excercised in conformity with the provisions of R.A No. 409, known as the revised charter of the city of manila the plaintiffs agency has been distributing and selling bibles and gospel porionms thereof throughout the Philippines the acting city treasurer informed plaintiff that it was conducting business of general merchandise, without providing itself with the necessary mayors permit and municipal license, in violation of various ordinances, and asked the plaintiff to secure within 3 days, the corresponding license and fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 in the sum of Php 5,821 plaintiff paid the sum and acquired the license fees but at the same time filed a complaint to the courts plaintiff was able to show that they were exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal licence or atx fee before the war, nor does the American bible society in the U.S pay license fee or sales tax for the sale of the bible. however a witness for the appellees was able to prove that the American bibler society in fact does profit from the sale of the Bible.

o o

o o

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid?.YES!!! (2) whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society? Sayang pero YES invalid!

HELD: *The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that

maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.

*The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.

*The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.

*(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . .

*It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would

impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. *Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Reversed and Remanded

D. TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE FACTS RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively. Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. ISSUE Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. HELDNo. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate. SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

E. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint dated 27 July 2000, Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of 18 to 20 years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Pias City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor who stated that "there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation" and challenged Estrada to "appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper forum." Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference on 12 October 2000. Escritor moved for the inhibition of Judge Caoibes from hearing her case to avoid suspicion and bias as she previously filed an administrative complaint against him and said case was still pending in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Escritor's motion was denied. The preliminary conference proceeded with both Estrada and Escritor in attendance. Estrada confirmed that he filed the lettercomplaint for immorality against Escritor because in his frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Pias City, he learned from conversations therein that Escritor was living with a man not her husband and that she had an 18-20 year old son by this man. This prompted him to write to Judge Caoibes as he believed that employees of the judiciary should be respectable and Escritor's live-in arrangement did not command respect. Escritor, on the other hand, testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after 10 years of living together, she executed on 28 July 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." Escritor's partner, Quilapio, executed a similar pledge on the same day. Both pledges were executed in Atimonan, Quezon and signed by 3 witnesses. At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife. During her testimony, Escritor volunteered to present members of her congregation to confirm the truthfulness of their "Declarations of Pledging Faithfulness," but Judge Caoibes deemed it unnecessary and considered her identification of her signature and the signature of Quilapio sufficient authentication of the documents. Judge Caoibes endorsed the complaint to Executive Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., who, in turn, endorsed the same to Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. On 17 July 2001, the Court, upon recommendation of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, directed Escritor to comment on the charge against her. In her comment, Escritor reiterated her religious congregation's approval of her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio. Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that the case be referred to Executive Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Branch 255, Las Pias City for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, investigating judge Maceda found Escritor's factual allegations credible as they were supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. He also noted that "(b)y strict Catholic standards, the live-in relationship of respondent with her mate should fall within the definition of immoral conduct, to wit: 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community'" He pointed out, however, that "the

more relevant question is whether or not to exact from Escritor, a member of 'Jehovah's Witnesses,' the strict moral standards of the Catholic faith in determining her administrative responsibility in the case at bar." The investigating judge acknowledged that "religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator and thereby recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Escritor. After considering the Report and Recommendation of Executive Judge Maceda, the Office of the Court Administrator, through Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Lock and with the approval of Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco, concurred with the factual findings of Judge Maceda but departed from his recommendation to dismiss the complaint. DCA Lock stressed that although Escritor had become capacitated to marry by the time she joined the judiciary as her husband had died a year before, "it is due to her relationship with a married man, voluntarily carried on, that respondent may still be subject to disciplinary action." Considering the ruling of the Court in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al. that "court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice," DCA Lock found Escritor's defense of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant dismissal of the charge of immorality. Accordingly, he recommended that Escritor be found guilty of immorality and that she be penalized with suspension of 6 months and one day without pay with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely in accordance with the Civil Service Rules. Issue: Whether Escritor's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable. Held: The case being one of first impression, the claim of religious freedom is subjected to the "compelling state interest" test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. entertaining the possibility that Escritor's claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest. In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether Escritor's right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. The burden on Escritor is even greater as the price she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept but also her family which, by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands "honorable before God and men." The second step is to ascertain Escritor's sincerity in her religious belief. The accused appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after 10 years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and 10 years before she entered the

judiciary. In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient Escritor's evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case cannot still be decided using the "compelling state interest" test. The case is one of first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling state interest" test. To properly settle the issue, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor's stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at Escritor's claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the "compelling state interest" test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's compelling interest which can override respondent's religious belief and practice. Thus, the case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator.