G. Payne - Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923

Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923 Author(s): Stanley G. Payne Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No.
4, A Century of Conservatism (Oct., 1978), pp. 765-789 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260083 . Accessed: 04/11/2013 20:09
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Stanley G. Payne
Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923
The definition used in this article to identify the conservative position in modern Spanish politics is similar to that proposed by Robert Michels, when he observed that the term 'conservatism' does not necessarily refer to any specific values or philosophy but rather to 'a tendency to maintain the status quo regardless of what it may be.'" The status quo of modern Spain - its dominant political form has been constitutional parliamentary monarchy on the pattern of moderate nineteenth century liberalism. The goal of Spanish conservatism from 1834 through at least the first quarter of the twentieth century, was to preserve that institutional structure, with its values and its functional relationships, largely within the nineteenth-century framework. Classic modern Spanish conservatism was thus moderate or conservative liberalism, defending an established philosophy and system from the reactionary assaults of neotraditionalist Carlism on the one hand and all manner of progressives, radicals and revolutionaries on the other.
Traditional Spanish Catholic culture was slowly but steadily displaced during the course of the eighteenth century by an unstable symbiosis of moderate Enlightenment culture and reform-minded Catholicism. By the end of the century the estate interests of the Old Regime had begun slowly to yield to new proto-bourgeois commercial and agriculturalelements that preferred new forms of economic relations and political representation. In general, cultural change among the elite was more widespread than the emergence of new social and economic interests. The impact of war and invasion was necessary to accelerate the decomposition of the Old Regime and thus produce the conditions of limited revolution that introduced modern liberal politics to Spain in 1810-12.
Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol 13 (1978), 765-89
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Journal of Contemporary History
The first generation of Spanish liberals who introduced the indirect but democratic Cadiz constitution of 1812 were neither Jacobin nor notably radical. They initially represented more of a political intelligentsia than a constellation of serious new practical interests, and like many other institutional innovators they deluded themselves that they enjoyed much more support in the country than in fact could exist at that time. Only disturbed wartime conditions, including partial isolation of the more traditionalist regions, made it possible to skew political representation towards middle-class liberalism in a country mainly inhabited by Catholic traditionalists and illiterate peasants. As soon as peace returned and the monarchy and military hierarchywere re-established, the entire liberal structure was immediately swept away to general popular applause. Nonetheless, the dismal reign of Ferdinand VII (1808/1814-33) soon made it clear that if Spanish liberalism in any form was weakly developed, neither Catholic neotraditionalism nor Fernandine royalist despotism offered a functional alternative to it. Unlike their counterparts in central Europe, the royalist ultra-rightin Spain were unable to adjust their institutions to the new conditions of the nineteenth-century. They failed to represent the new social and economic interests (limited though these were), could not at all accommodate themselves to nineteenth-century culture, proved inept at diplomatic, imperial and military affairs, and failed even to administer the existing system with minimal efficiency. Thus within six years neo-absolutist monarchy foundered, and in 1820 was the first modern European regime to break down over the issue of unsuccessful colonial war and repression when the military revolted to restore the liberals of 1812. A decade of harsh experience had greatly tempered the political expectations of many of the original doceanistas ('eighteentwelvers'). They were inclined increasingly to moderate their liberal principles, realizing that on the one hand the common people were not with them, and that on the other they must beware both the institutional and ideological ultra-rightand also the extremes of radical liberalism that would weaken their position still further. During Spain's second liberal triennium (1820-23), the liberals quickly began to divide between the more moderate and pragmatic doceaHistasand the new urban exaltados, or radical liberals. Neotraditionalists came out in armed revolt in the northeast, and the short-lived regime was soon destroyed by French royalist intervention on behalf of the Holy Alliance in 1823.
Payne: Spanish Conservatism
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The second restoration of Fernandine absolutism (1823-33) was only relatively more successful than the first and the same inherent deficiencies came to the fore. When the capricious tyrant finally expired at a rather early age in 1833, his neotraditionalist younger brother, D. Carlos, was waiting and ready to succeed him in order to establish Spanish government on more firmly reactionary and neotraditionalist principles. It was this threat from the ultra-rightthat first placed conservative liberalism in direct control of Spain's destinies. Against the menace of reactionary 'Carlism' a common cause was initially formed among the old conservative liberals, the newer radicals and the more moderate or pragmatic royalists, who banded together behind the royal widow, Donna Maria Cristina, and Ferdinand's infant heiress, Isabel. The chief surviving leader of doceanismo, Jose Martinez de la Rosa, returned as Prime Minister in 1834. During the decade 1833-43 the classic conservative position in modern Spanish politics was fully defined. It rested on four fundamental principles: firm emphasis on monarchy under limited constitutional restrictions; social elitism, expressed politically through extremely restricted suffrage for parliamentary elections; in economics a poorly coordinated combination of national protectionism with staunch defence of private property; and an attempt to achieve a compromise on the religious issue by maintaining the Catholic identity of the liberal state and trying to regain the political support of the Church. By contrast, the more liberal position that shaded off into radicalism differed from the conservative stance considerably in degree and often in principle as well. Though Spanish liberals did not generally become republican until 1930, they strove to restrict the scope of the royal prerogative. Though the liberals did not adopt a democratic position on the question of suffrage until the 1860s, they always sought a wider franchise and broader social access to politics, with greater opportunity for the newly emerging economic sectors of the middle classes. In economics the liberals tended much more toward free trade, and in 1869 briefly inaugurated a short-lived free trade system for Spain, though they later beat a retreat from that issue. Finally, anti-clericalism remained a touchstone of liberal politics from beginning to end, and always provided one of the clearest dividing lines between liberal and conservative. The triangular conflict between ultra-right traditionalists, conservative liberals and radical or advanced liberals that first emerged in
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1820-23 continued with varying emphases for more than half a century, and was not completely replaced by a different configuration until after 1900. The term 'conservatism' and 'conservative' did not come into common use until about 1870, the conservative position being commonly identified throughout the long reign of Isabel II (1833-68) as 'moderate', and being commonly represented by the Moderado or Moderate party from approximately 1840 to 1865. If nineteenth century Spanish conservatism had an ideological founder, it would be Martinez de la Rosa, the dean of doceanismo. Martinez de la Rosa thought of himself, at least until the later years of his life, as a moderate liberal rather than a conservative, but the transition was rapidly accomplished when he returned as Prime Minister to start the third liberal cycle in 1834. He was the chief author of the royal statute of 1834, Spain's second modern constitution, and the founding document of the Moderates. Martinez de la Rosa had become convinced that if modern government were ever to be successful in Spain, it must be established on more restrainedand conservative principles than those of the 1812 constitution. The chief foreign influences in the drafting of the 1834 statute were the neolegitimist French semi-liberalcompromises of 1814 and 1830, and the recent legitimist constitutions of limited liberalism in the German states, which Martinez de la Rosa had visited in 1825-26. Moderate opinion faulted the 1812 constitution for three excesses: the exaggeration of 'national sovereignty' at the expense of royal prerogative, demagogical expansion of the franchise, and inflation of the powers of direct representation through the institution of unicameralism. These presumed ills were remedied in the 1834 statute by making the government responsible to the crown, not to parliament, through the creation of an appointed senate to serve as a conservative influence on opinion and legislation, and, in accompanying dispositions, to reduce ruthlessly the franchise to 18,000 electors (approximately 0.15 of 1 per cent of the population). There was not the slightest mention of any bill of rights or civil rights in general, and the government soon imposed a fairly broad censorship. Yet in 1834 Martinez de la Rosa did not consider this any form of archconservatism, but the necessary juste milieu to enable a moderate form of modern liberalism to survive.2 The Moderates in general represented a conservative alliance between moderate royalists from the 1820s and the more moderate liberals, and saw their role as that of a centrist modernizing conservative liberalism perilously navigating between Carlism on the right
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and radical progressives on the left. The extreme right was excluded from the electoral process by civil war, and the more immediate problem for political management was to limit the representation of the left. Thus in 1834 Martinez de la Rosa instituted a classic device of nineteenth-century Spanish government - the 'managed' or controlled election, manipulated from Madrid. Even so limited a body as 18,000 electors of the wealthy and educated were not to be trusted, for much of the radical intelligentsia either sprang from their ranks or was capable of making an appeal to them. Whereas the elections of 1820 and 1822 had chosen candidates from among the intelligentsia (secular or clerical) and the bureaucracy (civil or military), Martinez de la Rosa made a special effort to mobilize the major conservative business and economic interests of the upper-middle and upper classes. More than two-thirds of the candidates brought to Madrid by the nominal elections of 1834 represented the latter.3 Nonetheless, Martinez de la Rosa resigned within a year due to the intractable pressures of civil war on the one hand and the collapse of his scheme of conservative liberal government on the other. His failure marked only the beginning of forty years of frustration and failure for the Moderates, until a governing Conservative party was finally established firmly in power by Canovas del Castillo in 1875. The crisis conditions of civil war in which the Moderates first took office explain some of the reasons for their initial failure, but since they achieved only a very partial and limited success during the two decades after the Carlist war ended, the basic reasons were evidently of a more intrinsic nature. The fundamental weaknesses of the Moderates were three-fold. First, they failed to achieve leadership, internal unity or any serious degree of organization. Second, they encountered considerable difficulty in clarifying the nature of their actual political doctrines and relating them to the structure and function of practical Spanish politics. Third, they failed for decades to relate their political goals to broader economic, social and regional interests that would buttress a modern conservatism. In the wake of Martinez de la Rosa's resignation, the Moderates appeared too weak to govern, and various Progressive factions dominated Spanish affairs from 1835 to 1837. Under the Progressives, however, Spanish government was soon in danger of complete internal collapse, coupled with a genuine threat of military defeat by the Carlists. Their main achievement was to introduce a new constitution in 1837 that established a vaguely defined co-
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sovereignty of crown and parliament and greatly broadened the boundaries of censitary suffrage. Yet, with the Progressives in turn severely divided between their own radical and moderate factions, the Moderates were able to capitalize on a genuine conservative reaction among much of the enfranchised middle and upper classes. This, coupled with the abstention of the radicals, gave the Moderates an overwhelming victory in one of the fairer and broader elections of the nineteenth century. The elections of 1837 thus introduced the first full workings of the conservative/liberal politico-electoral cycle, for, no matter how limited the overall appeal of the Moderates, they could usually expect to take advantage of a normal cyclical reaction to the seemingly inevitable excesses and malfeasance of the Progressives. Nonetheless, the Carlist war, which did not end until 1840, continued to exert a strongly destabilizing effect. If the Progressives were no better organized or more coherent than the Moderates, they were quicker to perfect the intervention of pretorianism. Civil war inevitably led to hypertrophy of the military and, as civil-military relations deteriorated once more in 1838-39, the Progressives found it all the easier to induce military intervention on their side, which again drove the Moderates from power in 1839. There ensued the principal round of Progressive government in early nineteenth-century Spain, as the Progressives clung to power from 1839 to 1843 through the leadership of their pretorian caudillo, Baldomero Espartero, the most influential figure in the Spanish army. In most respects a political mediocrity, Espartero espoused a highly arbitrary and personalistic style of progressivism. In 1841 he ousted the queen-mother as regent of the Spanish state and established himself as regent for life, a kind of pseudo-parliamentaryhead of state who denied all Progressive principles in practice and thoroughly alienated most sectors of the body politic. Thus it was the total bankruptcy of pretorian progressivism that enabled modern Spanish conservatism to make its second comeback in 1843. Similar restorations would later occur in 1856 and 1875. That the return of the Moderates in 1843 achieved temporary success - at least for a decade - was due to several new developments. One was the end of the civil war, and victory over the extreme right, which increased the possibility for systemic stability on the one hand while enabling the Moderates to move further to the right in the formation of a moderate conservatism on the other. Another was the achievement of some degree of political experience, for a decade of
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facing the demands of a modern political system at least temporarily induced a degree of unity and practicality in the Moderates. Equally or more important was the changing balance of pretorian intervention, after the progressivist pronunciamientos of the 1830s. It is normally assumed that the military constitute a conservative force, and that if officers are to be involved in politics at all, they will tend to come down on the side of the more conservative. As an overall generalization, this is probably correct, but there are numerous exceptions, as manifold recent experiences in the Third World (and Portugal) testify. Given the profound degree of elite dissidence and institutional incoherence that attended the introduction of modern political systems in the Hispanic peninsula, the countries in which sections of the military first stepped in to fill the role of modernizing elite were Spain and Portugal. Beginning as early as 1815, there was a persistent tendency for certain elements of the Spanish officer corps to intervene on behalf of liberal, or more concretely Progressivist, politics. Given the weakness and ineffectiveness of civilian liberals, only portions of the military were able to force fundamental systemic changes or implement the adoption of new policies. Many officers, particularly in the 1830s but in many cases for long afterwards, were impelled to support liberal politics because of personal political conviction, middle-class social background, concepts of modern patriotism, and all manner of personal and professional interests (the latter sometimes self-seeking in the extreme). Yet at no time did the majority of the Spanish army officer corps become actively involved in politics, and most officers tended to adhere to a more conservative professional ideal, whose political implications ultimately led in a more conservative direction as well. The senior military hierarchy had originally been ultra-conservative,promoting the restoration of absolute royalism in 1814. Though a small clique of moderate royalists connived in the re-establishment of moderate liberalism in 1833-34, a sizeable proportion of the officer corps was appalled by the excesses and outright mutinies that attended part of the new Progressive politics, and Espartero as regent even managed to alienate a large number of fellow Progressivist officers. Thus by 1843, when Espartero was overthrown, the way was clear for the development of a new moderate conservative consensus in military politics, captained by the Moderates' chief answer to Espartero, Lieutenant-GeneralRam6n Ma. Narvfez. He seized control of the joint Moderate-Progressive revolt against Espartero in
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1843 and provided the leadership and the force to establish a fully Moderate government in power by the following year. A new but more conservative constitution (Spain's fourth) was completed by 1845, and it remained Spain's basic document of government for nearly a century, never being effectively superseded until the coming of the Second Republic in 1931. The constitution of 1845 was a conservative compromise between the statute of 1834 and the Progressivist constitution of 1837. It did not accept the Progressivist principle of full popular sovereignty but neither did it restore the full, almost untrammeled royal authority of 1834. Instead, sovereignty and responsibility for government were declared to rest somewhat ambiguously with both 'Crown and Cortes' (parliament), the crown having the express right to nominate ministers, withdraw royal confidence and require resignations, dissolve parliament and call new elections, and veto new legislation. The parliament remained bicameral, with an appointed senate, but suffrage conditions for the Cortes, while reduced considerably from the generous provisions of 1837, still enfranchised a larger minority than in 1834.4A modest guarantee of civil rights was also included. Though the Moderates had made some efforts since 1837 to organize themselves as an active conservative party, a coherent party organization was never achieved. The moderados largely remained a coalition of cliques and notables, and for real leadership in crisis they had more often than not to rely on the iron hand of General Narvaez. Only Narvaez had been able to manage the army and bend it to conservative interests, and only he could impose functional unity on the Moderate cliques. Narvaez considered himself a genuine liberal and a modern man of the century, but his liberalism made no concession to popular sovereignty, electoral representation or broad civil rights. He formed six governments between 1844 and 1866, though in total they lasted scarcely more than eight years. His greatest achievement was to keep Spain quiet during 1848, which expanded his reputation throughout Europe and gave momentary proof that in an age of revolution Spain had achieved stable modern conservative government. Yet Narvaez was merely necessary to, not popular among, the Moderates, for his somewhat capricious style of leadership tended to be domineering and overbearing. As soon as he had quelled opposition threats, his civilian colleagues were eager to
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be rid of each of his successive shortlived ministries. The latter's brevity was accelerated by Narvaez's own manic-depressivetemperament, which severely inhibited his capacity for persistence. The Narvaez syndrome pointed up one of the major enduring weaknesses of modern Spanish conservatism: though the conservatives were the most ardent champions of law and order, their own administrations frequently indulged in extra-legal and extraconstitutional practices. Because of the disunity, malorganization, poor leadership and limited support, elections were manipulated and parliamentary access arbitrarily controlled. Economic administration and press censorship were often subject to favouritism and discrimination. In reaction to this apparently deplorable state of affairs, there had emerged by the late 1840s the phenomenon of reformist conservatism, which would recur every generation for the next 75 years. The reformist Moderates were termed puritanos, because they stood for the 'pure' administration of the constitution of 1845, with fair elections and fuller civil rights. Though their leaders were able to form two shortlived cabinets during 1847, the puritanos were never more than a small minority of Moderates and had little influence on the bulk of their colleagues, who seemed to grow more factionridden and self-seeking with each passing year. The failure of the puritanos emphasized the limitations of Moderate principles in practice. Of their doctrinal cornerstones monarchy, limited suffrage, reconciliation of the new economic interests and also of Catholicism - only the last had been solidly established. The Spanish conservative principle of monarchist cosovereignty in government could only work with the cooperation of an attentive and responsible monarch. The lubricious and shortsighted Isabel II, who sat upon the throne after 1843, totally lacked the judgement and qualities of a constitutional ruler, even of the most conservative and limited sort. Capricious, dominated by favourites and influenced by petty court cliques, she compounded the factionalism and instability of the Moderates. Limited suffrage and controlled access could succeed in the long run only if the society were comparatively static. This was not the case, even though the rate of change was much slower than in most other parts of western Europe. The conservative concept of modern economic interests remained rural and largely preindustrial, geared to the landed interests but showing little understanding of the urban
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economy or such modern industrial foci as Catalonia. Adoption of a strong policy of domestic protectionism was the conservative proposal for a quid pro quo, but was not enough in the eyes of the new urban interests of northern Spain. Finally, the promotion of a new conservative bourgeois aristocracy by the crown may have been counterproductive. Ten new grandees and 53 lesser titles were created in the first five years after the establishment of the 1845 constitution, but the fostering of a neo-aristocratic elite of army generals, upper-middle class politicians and a few big landlords only rigidified and further isolated the new ruling class. Only in the case of religion was effective reconciliation achieved. The Moderates strove to heal the breach with the Church provoked by the liberal system, largely halting the sale of Church land and reestablishing a working relationship that was cemented by the new concordat of 1851. Henceforth, Spanish Church leaders would normally support the parliamentary conservatives, not the reactionary extreme right, down to the collapse of the monarchy in 1931. The price paid for this, however, was an increasingly clerical cast to conservative politics that later widened the split with progressivist anticlerical liberals, further accentuating the rigidity and anti-reformism of a sizable sector of Spanish conservatism. The dominant cliques of Moderates quickly became more exclusive with each passing year, until by 1851 even Narvaez had come to seem too liberal. Yet this posed the problem of finding some basis for conservative dominance more secure than the vagaries of pretorianism, and the only figure to attempt a practical answer was Antonio Bravo Murillo, Prime Minister in 1851-52. Bravo Murillo was an early-day equivalent of the Italian conservative Sidney Sonnino; like his Italian counterpart a half-century later, he wanted to 'go back to the statute', in this case meaning rigid new constitutional restrictions that in some cases would be even more severe than those of the royal statute of 1834. His effort to gain legislative approval for a neo-authoritarian and highly elitist constitutional reform in 1852 met the strong opposition of the military hierarchy, who quickly grasped that virtual neo-absolutism would exclude them from power as well, and Bravo Murillo quickly fell from office. The major theoretician of Spanish conservatism in the era of the Moderates was the Extremaduran aristocrat and essayist, Juan Donoso Cortes, whose philosophy differentiated that which was necessary in terms of current politics from the ideal order required by an harmonious Catholic society. To meet the former requirements,
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Donoso was a right-wing Moderate and co-leader of a small group usually called neocatolicos. In terms of the ultimate goals of modern politics, however, he posited a more authoritarian Catholic sociopolitical order. That is, Donoso's ultimate aims transcended any existing conservative order in the direction of a more radical modern authoritarian right. Donoso Cortes was a polymath who stringently criticized the new nineteenth century structure from the viewpoint of religion, politics, and the demands of social and economic change. He was convinced that modern liberalism, rooted in atomistic individual rationalism and materialism, would lead either to sectarian breakdown or socialism, or more likely a combination of the two. In the short run, the only mobilized forces in Spain or most other countries that could be used to cope with current problems were those of modern conservatism, i.e., the Moderates. Carlism or reactionary royal absolutism were not options because such elements had been reduced to political or regionalist sects and could not deal with modern problems. Nor did Donoso even support Bravo Murillo's semi-authoritarian constitutional project, because he judged correctly that Bravo could count on the backing of no more than a small clique. If there was no alternative to responsible moderate conservatism in the short run, however, the conservatism of the Moderates was merely the least objectionable variant of modern liberalism in general. It presided over an increasingly atomized and materialist society that would produce growing resentment and possibly even greater genuine immiseration as liberal economic forces tended toward exclusive and exploitative monopolies. Though Donoso's economics were pre-Marxian, his politics were pre-Dostoevskyian. The only alternative to the final crisis of liberalism, when materialist and anti-Christian revolution assaulted the state, as in 1848, would be right-wing dictatorship. For Donoso, however, a Cincinnattian dictatorship was a mere stopgap measure, and he found the crudely arbitraryadministrations of Narvaez morally and politically repugnant. The only permanent solution - and it would come, if ever, only after cataclysm had ensued - was a Christian social order founded on strong religious, social and political authority. Donoso never fully defined this alternative system but left only suggestions concerning particular desiderata that it should meet.5 Donoso had little direct impact on Spanish conservative thought, in part because his ultimate conclusions despaired of conservatism and pointed the way to a more radical authoritarian right. After his
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premature death, the more conservative of the Moderates thought in terms only of the status quo (punctuated with recourse to Narvaez whenever the water began to rise) or a reversion to a more reactionary semi-authoritarianconstitution, somewhat along the lines of Bravo Murillo. By 1854 conservative politics had become totally immobilist and stagnant, yet no alternative force could emerge under the terms of the constitutional allocation of power. Liberal reform was impossible, the Progressive party was thoroughly and systematically excluded from access, and the opportunity for pretorian rebellion was largely neutralized by Narvaez's reorganization of the military. In this situation the only possibility for initiating change lay with reformist conservatism. Given the impotence of the puritanos, a new form of pretorian leadership was required, and this emerged in the person of Leopoldo O'Donnell, by far the most flexible and politically creative of the Moderate generals. O'Donnell's goal was limited reform that would conciliate the reasonable sectors of the opposition, retaining the main features of the 1845 constitution but liberalizing it just enough to enable it to work. The first grasp at power by his new formation, the Liberal Union, ended in disaster, destabilizing the regime to such an extent that a Progressivist insurrection briefly swept the Progressives to power for a two-year interregnum(1854-56), before the Progressives in turn split apart and collapsed under their own weight, expedited by the military pressure of O'Donnell himself. He finally got the opportunity to put his own brand of reformist conservatism to work in 1858, and the ensuing 'long government' of Liberal Union, lasting nearly five years, was the most successful administration in nineteenth-century Spain to that date. O'Donnell proposed conciliation and tolerance, welcoming the more moderate sector of Progressives into his hybrid formation (not exactly a party) and trying to gain the support of the new economic elements to whom the Progressives appealed.6 Yet O'Donnell was unable to escape the trap that Donna Isabel and the Moderates had made of Spanish government, for the Liberal Union, like the Moderates proper, functioned as a kind of one-party system. A viable alternative of loyal opposition could not be established, due to a fatal combination of royal exclusiveness and radical intransigence. Factionalism and resentment finally broke down O'Donnell's coalition in 1863, and during the last five years of the Isabeline regime (1863-68), temporary cabinets moved steadily towards the right, relying on administration and patronage alone
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while losing support even among some of the Moderates. The conservative forces were then completely swept from power by Spain's 'glorious revolution' of 1868, producing a six-year democratic interregnum filled by the democratic monarchy of Don Amadeo of Savoy and then by the disastrous First Republic of 1873-74. The remnants of the Liberal Union, for the first time referring to themselves officially as the 'Conservatives' under the leadership of another general, Serrano, steadily lost influence, yet a now familiar cycle of Spanish politics repeated itself. New liberal forces in power became increasingly radicalized, then broke apart from their own factionalism, leaving a mood of exhaustion and disenchantment that was exploited for a movement back to the right. In 1875 the Spanish Conservative Party was restored not by a general but by Antonio Cainovas del Castillo, former lieutenant of the Liberal Union and head of the monarchist cause under the First Republic. After a military coup brought back the monarchy at the close of 1874, Canovas emerged as Prime Minister and undisputed leader of the new regime. The Bourbon monarchy was restored on the basis of the most explicitly conservative principles yet avowed in modern Spanish government, though these amounted to little more than a continuation of Moderate doctrines: monarchist authority, limitation of suffrage and access, economic protectionism and Catholic identity. The new constitution of 1876 was but a reelaboration of the document of 1845, retaining the sovereignty of crown and parliament, and once more severely restricting suffrage (though the enfranchisement of 5.1 per cent of the total population after 1876 compared favourably with the contemporary Italian figure of 2.2 per cent). Close identification with Catholicism was in some respects intensified, even though as a concession to the age the new constitution specified official toleration of other religions, the state itself remaining Catholic. The only other notable change in the new constitution was a slight broadening of civil rights. To Canovas and his colleagues, their brand of conservatism was not intrinsically illiberal, but instead represented the maximum degree of nineteenth-century liberalism consonant with stability, practicality or any true progress. The new party that Canovas organized from the vantage-point of government was named officially the 'Liberal Conservative party', in part to indicate that the new regime did not intend a return to the narrow structures of
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Isabeline conservatism. Late nineteenth century government in Spain had to be constitutional, parliamentaryand (up to a point) representative in order to attract enough support to survive.7 The Canovan Conservative party rested on the same social and regional bases as its Moderate predecessor, drawing support especially from middle and upper-class landowners and enjoying more backing from the main southern and central regions of agrarian Spain than from the more rapidly developing northern and eastern peripheral sectors. Yet there were differences as well, for the party of the 1880s and 90s did manage to encourage greater support from certain industrial and commercial sectors, and gain some following among the elite in all parts of Spain, to a broader and more representative degree than its predecessor. Yet the Canovan Conservative party also remained primarily a government party, that is, a political association organized originally from Madrid primarily for the purposes of limited and partially controlled elections and the patronage dispensed therefrom. It never developed a true organizational infrastructure, in part because for several decades there was little need for mobilized competition. Thus the revamped Conservative party of Cainovasnever entirely outgrew its traditional status as a coalition of notables, lawyers and part-time election activists oriented toward office and the spoils system.8 At that time the only south European country that had developed an organized two-party system was Portugal, though such a tandem was also beginning to emerge in Romania. In both those lands a certain analogy existed with the nature of things in Spain, for in all three countries the conservatives (called Regenerators in Portugal) were based above all on the larger landed properties and rural oligarchical interests, while the liberals were at least somewhat more oriented toward the cities and industry. Canovas recognized the weakness of the Isabeline regime in having denied legal access to the parliamentary opposition, but he was also aware that the more liberal and leftist groups had sometimes tended not merely to oppose the government but subvert the system. Introduction of the regular two-part system in Spain therefore depended not a little on the new and shortlived king, Alfonso XII (1875-85), who had the unusual merit to have learned from his mother's mistakes. During his decade on the throne, Don Alfonso proved an effective constitutional monarch, and initiated the two-party system by first summoning the Fusionist (Liberal) party leader Sagasta to power in 1881. This started the unofficial turno (alternation), by which the Conservative and Liberal
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parties alternated in power down to the overthrow of the system by Primo de Rivera. It is sometimes said that the reason why the turno worked (with decreasing efficiency) for nearly half a century was because both parties were conservative and on serious matters differed as little as Tweedledum and Tweedledee. This depends upon the point of comparison. Both the Conservative and Liberal parties of the period 1875-1923 were monarchist, elitist and defenders of the established constitutional system. Both were avid practitioners of the spoils system and of electoral manipulation and corruption. The only difference on the latter point was that if anything the Liberals were more given to corruption than the Conservatives, due to their somewhat lesser status and greater degree of ambition. On the other hand, the two major parties were indeed separated by doctrinal and programmatic differences. The Liberals were eager to extend the suffrage, broaden civil rights and reform the law codes and judicial procedures. They were less protectionist on economic issues and increasingly anticlerical, and they later differed more and more from the Conservatives on the issues of police power and civil repression. All systemic changes of the 1880s and 1890s were due to the Liberals, for the Canovite Conservatives soon lost the creative urge of the preceding decade. The Liberals pushed through a long series of legal and institutional reforms that were climaxed by the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890. These were accepted with increasing grudgingness by the Conservatives, who by the 1890s were in danger of becoming status quo immobilists scarcely distinguishable from their late Isabeline counterparts. Their growing rigidity was accentuated by the fact that foreign policy became a major issue for the first time in the 1890s, as the regime struggled to hold the last remnants of empire. The Restoration cycle of exhaustion and conformity had run its course by the 1890s, as a new generation of activists criticized the system from both radical and reformist conservative viewpoints. By the close of the century the chief target of domestic criticism was no longer dynasticism, clericalism or absolute denial of access but rather the corruption and manipulation that formed the core of a controlled and unrepresentativeelectoral system. The term caciquismo, meaning literally 'boss-rule', became the catch-phrase that denoted the evils of the entire structure, resting on manipulated elections, coercion, and later - after society became more literate and less restricted - the direct buying of votes.9 Given the tendency towards extreme
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moralistic interpretations in Spanish politics, this was rarely viewed objectively as the inevitable consequence of trying to operate a parliamentary system in an illiterate peasant society, but rather was commonly attributed to the unique iniquity of the incumbent politicians. There was in fact little difference between the Spanish and other south European parliamentarysystems at the close of the century. The reform tendency ('movement' would be too grandiose a term) that was intensified by the disaster of 1898 took the common name of Regenerationism. This was, like nearly all Spanish politics to that point, primarilya middle and upper class phenomenon, and affected the Conservatives at least as much if not more than the Liberals. The new leader of reformist conservatism was Francisco Silvela, who seceded temporarily from the main party in the early 1890s over the issue of caciquismo and honesty in government. Morality and honesty became key issues for reformist conservatism in the early twentieth century, particularlyin view of the Conservative reliance on the norms of religion and formal ethics. Hence the gap between theory and practice was seen as perhaps the major single problem. Silvela, however, proved to be more of a pious moralist than a politician, and after two years of disillusioning experience as Prime Minister retired altogether in 1903. The mantle of leader of reformist conservatism, and hence of the party, as well as the chief spokesman for regenerationismin government during the first decade of the new century, fell on Antonio Maura. Maura was the most imposing and charismatic figure that Spanish conservatism ever produced, a direct descendant of the Sephardic ghetto of Palma de Mallorca, whose style and appearance bespoke more of the zealous Hebraic prophet than the relaxed and somewhat cynical conservative politicians of the Restoration period. Maura's chief tenure as Prime Minister was 1907 to 1909, a long government (by Spanish standards) of nearly three years that constituted the main example of reformist conservatism during the entire period. Maura was not merely a political moralist but to a limited extent wanted to be a social reformer and even an economic developer. His government passed a lengthy series of reform legislation: it first legalized the right to strike (and also lockouts) in Spain, passed a modest measure regulating land rents for poor peasants and took the first steps toward a system of labour tribunals, regulation of labour contracts and a minimum wage. It established a national insurance institute and reformed the system of municipal justice. An electoral
781
reform law improved methods of registering the electorate and recording ballots, but one of Maura's main goals, a new local government law that would concede greater autonomy to cities and provinces and, he hoped, correct abuses, was blocked by vested political interests. Yet reformist conservatism was never able to live up entirely to its own ideals of free elections, for in the absence of broadly organized and spontaneous parties, Spain's two dominant political associations remained coalitions of notables and factions brought together by government for the purposes of parliamentary elections. Though some of the worst abuses of nineteenth century coercion did not reappear, Maura's government also used pressure and manipulation to enhance its parliamentary majorities. Since there was little difference between Liberals and Conservatives on this issue, much more serious was the question of civil rights and repression vis-a-vis the new generation of radicals, now oriented toward anarchosyndicalism and radical republicanism. A special Law for the Repression of Terrorismwas blocked by Liberals in 1908, but the real crisis occurred in 1909 at the time of the Tragic Week in Barcelona, a popular insurrection in protest against reserve call-ups for a brief colonial campaign in Spanish Morocco. The repression that ensued was not remarkable so long as the disorders continued, but what attracted international attention was the subsequent execution of four men (the most notorious being Francisco Ferrer)in symbolic punishment. The result was an international campaign (rather similar to that of 1975) against Maura's Catholic and 'Black' inquisitorial Spain that served as an excellent opportunity for the Liberals to threaten withdrawal from the system and demand Maura's resignation. The 'subversive' movement of 1909 - and even more Maura's response to it - marked the end of his effectiveness as a reformist conservative. His conception of constitutional government was rigidly formalistic and Rechtsstaatlich. Technical reforms were desirable to improve efficiency and promote wellbeing, but fundamental principles and functions ought never to be questioned or altered. Maura backed what he called 'true constitutionalism', but that had nothing to do, in his way of thinking, with public opinion or the 'street rattle' of newspaper media. That extra-parliamentary, extra-systemic pressure should induce the king (Alfonso XIII) to requirehis resignation before his normal mandate had expired was a shattering blow to Maura. The Conservatives had always depended on the support and authority of the crown - and would do so until the end in 1931
782
but the crown had, to Maura's way of thinking, clearly failed to meet its responsibility. Moreover, for the first time since 1875, the Liberals had failed to behave as a loyal opposition, having momentarily made common cause with the radical and revolutionary left against the Conservatives. Once in power, the new Liberal governments of 1909-12 tried to unify themselves around a banner of anticlericalism, which to Maura was positively unconstitutional. After 1909, Maura not only went into opposition against the new Liberal ministries but against the existing Spanish system and its course of moderate liberal evolution. As far as he was concerned, the constitutional turno had been destroyed by the subversive policies of the Liberals. He refused to organize a new government in cooperation with such a system, but demanded power to resume exactly where he had left off in 1909, without any concessions to the Liberals or any limitation (in effect) on his own governing authority save his personal sense of rectitude. Not surprisingly, when the Liberal parliament began to split apart in 1913, Alfonso XIII refused to grant power on these terms to Maura, who then officially resigned the leadership of the Conservative party in a frenzy of righteous indignation. During the decade 1913-23 Maura's reformist conservatism was replaced by a new orientation, 'Maurism', a kind of political sect that stood apart from the general trend of parliamentary politics in Spain. The credo of Maurism was developed more by the activists and their 'Maurist youth' associations than by the leader himself, who was never willing to face up to the contradictions in his political posture. It was more a mood, a style or an attitude than an explicit alternative philosophy. Up to his death in 1925 Maura remained theoretically loyal to the institutions of the established constitutional monarchy, but in fact the Maurists persistently criticized the young king for being weak and indulgent with subversive liberalism. They thus weakened the institutional respect for monarchy among moderate and conservative people by systematically denigrating the monarch, while denouncing the entire existing parliamentarysystem for slackness, corruption and cultural and spiritual degeneration. They proposed no institutional alternative, but stressed morality, strong leadership, law and order, and efficient administration and development rather than democratic participation or institutional change. In ethos if not in conscious doctrine Maurism as a sectmovement was veering in the direction of a new twentieth century right authoritarianism.
783
Another novelty of Maurism, compared with traditional conservatism, was that it learned to publicize and propagandize on a broad new scale. While Maura had been Prime Minister the Conservative party had not even had an official newspaper and, despite Maura's appeal to the masa neutra (cf. 'silent majority'), he had shown no interest in a serious public relations effort. This began to change after 1913, as the Maurists stepped up their propaganda greatly, and Maura himself proved quite effective on occasion in addressing large (occasionally mass) public rallies.'l Maura was succeeded as leader of the regular Conservative party by Eduardo Dato. The new chief was no opponent of his former captain. He simply responded, on Maura's own suggestion, to the crown's invitation to form a new Conservative government in October 1913 because he was convinced that the party must continue to cooperate with the constitutional system to be faithful to its own principles. Dato was extremely frail and probably tubercular, but in some ways the most enlightened and sensitive conservative since O'Donnell. He was more fully aware than Maura that the party must develop a systematic modern structure and learn to appeal to the ordinary populace if it were ever to survive in the coming age of mass politics. Dato's goal was a kind of reformist Tory democracy, in which the Conservative party, not the Liberals, would take the lead in enlightened new measures of social reform for workers and peasants. In his several cabinet posts between 1899 and 1904, and in the three governments that he briefly led between 1913 and 1921, Dato was responsible for initiating the Institute of Social Reform (1902), a full-fledged Ministry of Labour (1920), as well as a not inconsiderable list of subsidiary legislation having to do with insurance, accident compensation, working conditions and so forth." This was all too little and too late in the history of Spanish conservatism. Not, perhaps, in the development of the Spanish economy, for Spain's labour legislation was as advanced as that of any country in the world at its approximate level of industrialization in 1920, but certainly too late in the course of political dynamics, for politicization outstripped industrializationduring the entire century of Spain's parliamentary history. After 1917 political mobilization accelerated within the society as a whole and the goals to which new sectors of Spanish society aspired were set by the advanced industrialcountries, not the backward south European states with whom Spain belonged. New demands and pressuresprogressivelyoverloaded the system, and the old political groups were unable, as well as unwilling, to respond
784
adequately. Many of the new social reforms went unenforced simply because Spain lacked the trained bureaucracy to administer regulations. During the final decade of parliamentary monarchy both the two dominant parliamentaryparties failed almost completely to make the transition to twentieth-century party organization, to achieve broader mobilization or to deal effectively with the new issues. This was not altogether for want of intellectual understanding. Particularly the middle-class Liberals, but also to some extent the Conservatives, publicly analysed most of the problems and desiderata involved but proved almost helpless to realize new aims.'2 The tendency toward ossification and breakdown was typical of south European politics in the 1920s absolutely without exception, and common influences were at work in Spain. Neither of the Spanish parties was able to outgrow the nineteenth-century matrix in which it had been formed. They remained coalitions of notables and office-seekers, in the last instance always unwilling to make the concessions or pursue the changes that would have transformed them, for in that case they would have totally ceased to be what they were. The sociocultural vices of the old political class - the remarkable fixation on personality-and-status politics - were too deeply rooted to be torn out by intellectual prescriptions alone. Neither party ever made any serious effort to rally the lower classes, and the fact that the radical new worker culture was thoroughly anti-parliamentaryin ethos and practice only reinforced this aversion. When all was said and done, the established parliamentary elite had little genuine interest in reform, since in Spain as in Portugal and to some extent in Italy, the dominant electoral machines were still able to control the electoral mechanism and return their supporters to parliament even if unable any longer to coalesce in effective governing parties. Dato's reformist ideas thus had very little impact on the Conservative party. He was too frail and wanting in energy to act as a dynamic leader, and the outbreak of violent class struggle in the post-first world war years soon produced among the Conservatives a rigidly repressive law-and-order policy, even though Spain lacked a modern police force to carry out effective repression. The assassination of Dato in March 1921 by anarchosyndicalists blasting away from a motorcycle and sidecar eliminated the last genuine leader of the party, but it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that the party was already doomed by its character and the force of historical circumstances. In its remaining three years of life party leadership
785
was disputed by die-hard ultras (Bugallal) and ambitious activists (Sanchez Guerra) who intended no basic reforms but a more moderate policy in both domestic and colonial affairs. Though it was the conflict over Spanish Morocco that finally elicited military intervention to overthrow the system in 1923, the politics of Spanish conservatism had already atrophied through internal rivalry and mere ineptitude, just as in the preceding era of Isabel II. Bereft of the governmental-electoral mechanism that had held its officeholders together for nearly a century, the Conservative party soon dissolved. The seven-year dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) derived its initial inspiration from Regenerationism and pledged reform of the system. The dictator selected his chief associates from among Maurists, Carlists and minority arch-Conservatives, and ultimately the only constitutional alternative that could be conceived was a partial acceptance of the ideas of the new Catholic right and neoauthoritarians elsewhere by proposing to select part of parliament through corporate elections while increasing further the authority of the crown.'3 The result was eclectic, confusing and so uncertain that it drew little support from Primo de Rivera himself and even less from public opinion, which was not prepared for a permanent rightward authoritarian swing. Nonetheless, the ultimate implications of the dictatorship were right authoritarian, and not primarily conservative. Its failure brought down the institution of monarchy, completely ending the second major cycle of modern Spanish politics in 1931. Conservatism never found a clear role or political form during the shortlived Second Republic (1931-36) which was primarily dominated by the politics of neoliberalism and of the left. Historic elitist conservatism of the brand of Canovas or even of Maura could not be revived in a democratic new sytem of mass mobilization, and few even tried. Functional conservatism in the early 1930s, as back in the 1830s, was represented by the more moderate elements of the new liberals. In the Second Republic this meant primarilythe Radical Republicans of Alejandro Lerroux, who came to adopt a centre-right position that was more conservative than that of the Radicals in France. Such a role was too novel, contradictory and confusing, however, for a party that until 1931 had been a 'subversive' force. The Radicals prospered for only two years as a middle-of-the-road bandwagon party, but were never able to resolve the internal contradictions between their liberal and anticlerical dogmas and their inherently conservative status and function. As early as 1935 the party
786
entered a state of breakdown and collapse.14 Two real alternatives emerged under the new Republic: one was popular, mass-supported Catholic politics in the approximate style of the Austrian Christian Social party; and the other was clear-cut monarchist right authoritarianism. Neither was truly conservative in the historic sense, for both ultimately rejected parliamentary constitutionalism as destructive and conflictive. Catholic mobilization under a vehemently anticlerical regime took the form of the new rightist coalition CEDA ('Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups', a federative organization somewhat analogous in that sense to the German DNVP of 1919-20). Between 1933 and 1936 it was the largest single political party in the country, gaining a modest plurality of seats in the 1933 elections. The CEDA fully shared the ambiguity of its Austrian and German counterparts, and has received a bewildering variety of labels ranging from 'clerical fascist' to 'Christian democrat'. Neither of these polar definitions quite fits. The CEDA accepted constitutional process and parliamentary tactics, completely eschewing the rapidly escalating politics of violence in Spain, yet it refused to endorse parliamentary democracy or the republican system as ends in themselves. Perhaps the soundest judgment that can be made was that the CEDA, while functioning exclusively as a parliamentaryparty, aimed ultimately at the legal, non-violent transformation of Spanish government into a corporatist and undoubtedly somewhat more authoritarian kind of system. In this once more it bore analogy to elements of the German DNVP and the right-wing Bruning and Papen sectors of the German Zentrum. Its style and tactics were, however, primarily those of 'Eurocorporatism' (to anachronize the rhetoric of the 1970s) rather than of 'clerical fascism.'15 Such ambiguities were eschewed by the new monarchist authoritarian right, organized around the association Renovaci6n Espalnola, created by ex-Maurists and the right wing of the old Conservatives. By 1933 Renovaci6n Espanola had adopted an explicit creed of authoritarian monarchist corporatism in total rejection even of moderate middle-class parliamentary government, as the only alternative to revolution or civil war. Whereas the CEDA drew mass support from the lower middle classes and the Catholic peasantry, Renovaci6n Espanola had little electoral backing and could rely directly only on military intervention.16 The conversion of much of monarchist conservatism into a new authoritarian radical right brought conservative politics full circle in
787
two different ways. First, the conservative position had originally developed in the 1830s equidistantly between the Carlist authoritarian right and a new radical left, but by the 1930s all faith in the old conservative juste milieu had virtually disappeared, leading the remaining minority of mainline monarchists to adopt a modernized position analogous to Carlism as their only salvation from the left. Second, though the liberal system had been introduced by pretorian activism, a constant goal of conservative politics had been a regular institutional and constitutional system that need not rely on military intervention. After 1934 the leaders of Renovaci6n Espanola directly invoked pretorianism to destroy the liberal system for which the military had originally served as midwife. It seems doubtful that Spanish conservatism ever lost any golden opportunity to transform itself, for the reform measuresproposed by its leaders- while beneficial to the country - rarelywent to the heart of the problems of a nineteenth-centuryoligarchy confronted with twentieth century problems. This was not a matter of gerontocracy, for the deputies and activists of the Conservative party in the first decade of the century were comparatively young, normally in their forties. Many of them were new figures, elected to parliamentfor the first time after 1900, but they quickly settled into an establishedelitist mould. It was a question rather of functional psychology and of sociopolitical structure that incapacitated Spanish conservatives for confronting a mass democratic society by the end of the 1920s. Despite the reform efforts of the early twentieth century Regenerationists, Spanish conservatism changed comparatively little from the 1830s to the 1920s, and this ultimately spelled its doom. For most of the nineteenth century it had seemed that Spain's rate of social and economic change was so slow that the Conservative party elites might retain their status, in conjunction with the crown, with no more than secondary alterations. From beginning to end, Spanish conservatism was based on the structure of things that first brought parliamentary government to the peninsula. It predominated so long as the nineteenth century agrarian society and the old individualist/elitist culture lasted. When processes of structural change and politicization accelerated in 1917, the conservative mould had long since become a settled and almost inflexible way of life. After 1923 classic Spanish conservatism became simply irrelevant, and at no time did it constitute an alternative amid the intense conflicts which brought modern Spanish politics to a climax under the Second Republic.
788
Notes
1. Robert Michels, 'Conservatism' in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York 1931), IV, 230. My attention was first drawn to Michels' definition by an article by Lloyd Eastman in Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Change (Cambridge 1976), 191-210. 2. The main work on this period is J.T. Villarroya, El sistema politico del Estatuto Real (1834-1836) (Madrid 1968), but there is also an interesting unpublished dissertation by Carl L. Schweinfurth, A Case Study in the Failure of Moderation in Spanish Politics: Martinez de la Rosa, January 15, 1834 to June 6, 1835 (Southern Illinois University 1964). 3. There are further data in Fermin Caballero, El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto (Madrid 1837). 4. The accompanying decree of 1846 limited parliamentary suffrage to the 100,000 wealthiest and best educated adult males in Spain. 5. Donoso's main work was the long essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism (1851). He was resurrectedin the 1920s by Carl Schmitt, who tended to exaggerate Donoso's ultimate appeal to dictatorship. There is an excellent recent study by John T. Graham, Donoso Cortes: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist (Columbia, Mo, 1974). 6. The best study of O'Donnell is Nelson Duran, Leopoldo O'Donnell and the Politics of Liberal Union in Spain, 1858-1863 (University of Wisconsin Ph.D. dissertation 1974). 7. The best study of Canovas as Conservative party leader is M. Fernandez Almagro, Cdnovas, su vida y su politica (Madrid 1951). 8. Cf. Javier Tusell, Oligarquia y caciquismo en Andalucia (1890-1923) (Barcelona 1976). 9. The best empirical study of the electoral system in any part of Spain is the detailed work by Tusell cited above. In English, see R.W. Kern, Liberals, Reformers and Caciques in Restoration Spain 1875-1909 (Albuquerque 1974). 10. There is no good biography of Maura. The most useful is D. Sevilla Andres, Antonio Maura: La revoluci6n desde arriba (Barcelona 1954). The Maurist version of the conflict with the crown is presented in M. Fernandez Almagro and G. Maura Gamazo, Por que cay6 Alfonso XIII (Madrid 1948). The bibliography on post-1913 Maurism is exiguous in the extreme, but see Jose Gutierrez Rave, Yo fui un joven maurista (Madrid 1946). 11. There is a political biography by M. Garcia Venero, Eduardo Dato. Vida y sacrificio de un gobernante conservador (Vitoria 1969). 12. Cf. T.G. Trice, Spanish Liberalism in Crisis:A Study of the Liberal Party during Spain's Parliamentary Collapse 1913-1923 (University of Wisconsin Ph.D. dissertation, 1974). 13. A clear analysis of the new alternatives generated so uncertainly by the dictatorship will be found in Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment' in The Journal of ContemporaryHistory 12:1 (January 1977), 65-84. 14. Alejandro Ruiz Manj6n, El Partido Republican Radical (Madrid 1976), provides a full exposition of the contradictions and frustrations of the Radicals. 15. There is now a lengthy bibliography on the CEDA, most of it ratherpolemical.
789
The best general treatment of all the new forces of the Spanish right under the Republic is R.A.H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco's Spain (London 1970). 16. Cf. Paul Preston, 'Alfonsist Monarchism and the Spanish Civil War' in Journal of Contemporary History, 7:3-4 (July-October 1972), 89-114.
Stanley Payne Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, is the author of A History of Spain and Portugal and six other books on modern Spanish history.

G. Payne - Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923

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Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923 Author(s): Stanley G. Payne Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No.

Spanish Conservatism 1834-1923

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

Journal of Contemporary History

Payne: Spanish Conservatism

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