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Republic vs.

Orbecido

472 SCRA 114 Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling:Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.

Te vs. Court of Appeals


Facts: Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988 in civil rites. They did not live together after the marriage, and later on, Choa gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989 -May 20, 1990, Te contracted a second marriafe with Julieta Santilla -Choa filed an affidavit on June 1990, and filed a charge of bigamy with the RTC on August 1990 -July 20, 1990, Te filed in RTC an action for annulment of their marriage, alleging that Choa concealed her pregnancy to another man at the time of their marriage, and she was psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations -Nov 8, 1990, Choa also filed with the PRC (professional regulation commission) for the revocation of the engineering licenses of Santella and Te, on grounds of acting immorally by living together and marrying, despite the fact that petitioner was still married to her, as well as act of falsification, by stating in Tes marriage contract that he is still single. -Te accused RTC for showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of this case. He claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and Choa was not presented, and the signatures were not properly identified, as well as the fact that the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented as well -Te filed a case in CA alleging grave abuse of discrertion on part of RTC for: o showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of this case o violating requirements of due process by denying petitioners demurrer to evidence even before the filing of such o disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by SC o ruling that in a criminal case, only prima facie evidence is sufficient for conviction of accused -CA upheld the RTCs decision, on grounds that Te failed to show any concrete evidence that the RTC prejudged the case. Issue: Did the RTC and CA gravely abused discretion and committed an error in law in not holding the demurrer to evidence?

Held: SC held that there was no abuse in discretion on part of the judge of RTC, for they were not deprived of fair and impartial trial. The denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the criminal proceedings are in accordance with the law and jurisprudence. SC also states that RTC based its denial of demurrer on two grounds: first, Choa and her counsel established a prima facie case for bigamy against petitioner, and second, petitioners allegation of demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. SC also clarifies that by denying of demurrer of petitioner of demurrer doesnt mean that he is pronounced as liable for the case. Tes petition is denied for lack of merit

Nial vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marri age with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008 FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sw orn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement. HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear vi olation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage i s void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Reinel De Castro vs Annabelle De Castro

on November 11, 2010 Void ab initio marriages Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, the mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a govern ment dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City . In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obliga tion to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

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