page 4 of Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty suggests that the existence of a public realm of referents is a condition of the existence

of language, and hence of sceptical doubt itself being articulated. And this goes precisely in the direction he sought. VI Apart from the vitiation of Wittgenstein's thesis threatened by OC2, there are other difficulties in OC, of which here mention one! his conflation of scepticism with idealism. t is not fatal to the OC"#based account of $nowledge, but that account needs to be shrived of it. Wittgenstein identifies scepticism with idealism in "%, 2& and '( )W*2&(+. n '(, moreover, he shows that he ta$es realism to be the thesis opposed to idealism. ,his is an error which many besides Wittgenstein ma$e. *ealism and idealism are not opposed theses- they are not competitors for the same territory, for realism is an epistemological thesis and idealism a metaphysical one. ,here is no entailment from the truth of either to the negation of the other. .oreover, the chief varieties of idealism are intended to show that, in an associated epistemological sphere, scepticism gets no grip. Consider /er$eley- it was the avowed aim of his construction of an anti#realist epistemology and )what is a different and further matter+ idealist metaphysics, to refute scepticism. dealisms form a various family of theses about the nature of reality, but it is safe to say that their characteristic common thesis is the metaphysical one that the universe is mental. ,heir chief historical opponent is materialism, the metaphysical thesis that the universe is material, that is, ultimately consists of 'material substance', a view that should not be confused with physicalism, which claims that the universe consists of what can be described by physics. )What can be described by physics is not only not coterminous with matter, but might well entail that there is no such thing as matter.+ dealism is not the same thing as anti#realism. ,his latter is an epistemological thesis which denies that the relations between thought and its ob0ects, perception and its targets, experience and the realms over which it ranges )these are different, though related, relations+ are external or contingent relations. ,here are realistic forms of idealism )see, for example, 1prigge +, and there is no reason in principle why there should not be anti#realistic forms of materialism or2even more plausibly2 physicalism. ta$e it that 3uantum theory under the Copenhagen interpretation is an anti#realist physicalism. ,he claim that the relations between thought and its ob0ects )etc.+ is internal is far from the claim that all ob0ects of thought are causally dependent upon thought )or, more generally, experience, or sentience+ for their existence. Certain forms of idealism )for example, /er$eley's+ put matters this way, and doubtless this is why some confuse idealism with anti#realism. *ather, anti#realism is at most the claim2 until more is said- as to which, there can be much variety2that no complete description of either relatum can leave out mention of the other. t is important to be clear about what this means. *ealism is the view that the relation between thought and its ob0ects is contingent or external, in the sense that description of neither relatum essentially involves reference to the other. ,his is the