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Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197
www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci
Assessing safety culture in nuclear power stations$

T. Lee *, K. Harrison
Environmental Psychology and Policy Research Unit, School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JU, UK
Abstract Denitions of safety culture abound, but they variously refer to the safety-related values, attitudes, beliefs, risk perceptions and behaviours of all employees. This assembly may seem too inclusive to be meaningful, but each represents a dierent level of processing and the choice for measurement (or intervention) is more pragmatic than theoretical. The present study addresses mainly attitudes, but also reported behaviours. This is done using a 120-item questionnaire covering eight domains of safety in three nuclear power stations. Principal components analysis yields 28 factors all but four of which are correlated with one or more of nine criteria of accident history. Dierences by gender, age, shifts/days and work areas are revealed, but these are confounded by type of job and ANOVAS are applied to clarify the main sources of variation. The eects on safety culture of a number of organisational components are also explored. For example, the role of safety in team briengs, management style, work pressure versus safety, etc. It is concluded that personnel safety surveys can usefully be applied to deliver a multi-perspective, comprehensive and economical assessment of the current state of a safety culture and also to explore the dynamic inter-relationships of its `working parts'. # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Safety culture; Nuclear accidents; Nuclear employees; Nuclear power stations; Safety attitudes
1. Introduction Considerable progress has been made towards èngineering out' the physical causes of accidents in high technology plants. It is now generally acknowledged that individual human frailties and pervasive organisational defects lie behind the majority of the remaining accidents. Although many of these have been anticipated
A version of the survey, including the full questionnaire and software for computing factor scores and norms based on ve NPS's will shortly be available on CD. * Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-1334-462063; fax: +44-1334-463042. E-mail address: trl@st-andrews@ac.uk (T. Lee). 0925-7535/00/$ - see front matter # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S0925-7535(00)00007-2
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T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197
in safety rules, prescriptive procedures and management treatises, people don't always do what they are supposed to do. Some employees have negative attitudes to safety which adversely aect their behaviours. This undermines the system of multiple defences that an organisation constructs and maintains to guard against injury to its workers and damage to its property. This safety management system is essentially a social system, wholly reliant on the employees who operate it. Its success depends on three things; its scope, whether employees are knowledgeable about it and whether they are well disposed towards it, i.e., committed to making it work. The concept of `safety culture' has evolved as a way of formulating and addressing this new focus. An excellent overview and `practical guide' has recently been provided by Cooper (1998). The denition of safety culture adopted here is the one proposed by ACSNI (The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations), i.e.: The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to and the style and prociency of an organisation's health and safety management. Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by condence in the ecacy of preventive measures. (ACSNI, 1993, p. 23). All denitions that attempt to capture the essence of safety culture are bound to be inadequate because each of its many manifestations are extensive, complex and intangible. However, two critical attributes may help to ll out the picture. First, in a healthy culture, the avoidance of accident and injury by all available means is the responsibility of every person in the organisation. Second, the integration of role behaviours and the consolidation of social norms create a common set of expectations, a `way of life' that transcends individual members. A culture is much more than the sum of its parts. This way of conceptualising safety management originated in the nuclear industry, in the aftermath of Chernobyl. But it is related to the similar concept of `safety climate', which in turn evolved from òrganisational climate' (Schneider, 1975; Zohar, 1980). Some authors still prefer to use this term and others retain both `climate' and `culture', claiming they are useful for dierent purposes (Mearns et al., 1998). Byrom and Corbridge (1997, p. 3), for example, dene safety climate as ``. . .the tangible outputs of an organisation's health and safety culture as perceived . . .at a particular point in time'' and Mearns et al. (1998) as a ``snapshot in time''. This meteorological terminology is enigmatic, for two reasons. First, `climate' is normal parlance for the underlying consistencies in the weather of a region, not for a transitory state as suggested by these authors. Second, time sampling is the only practical method available for measuring human phenomena but, fortunately, cultures (unlike the weather) change very slowly. Hence, `snapshots' can provide estimates that are likely to remain valid (barring major interventions) for many months. Another perspective is that the `safety climate' is but one facet of several that interact to produce the safety culture. According to Cooper (1998), the safety culture is, ``The
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product of multiple goal-directed interactions between people (psychological), jobs (behavioural) and the organisation (situational)'' (p. 17). He explicitly acknowledges that this tripartite interaction is also represented in the ACSNI denition quoted above as well as in earlier formulations. However, Cooper reserves the term `safety climate' for the `people' aspects. This is not a `time sampling' distinction but a `content' one. The overall assessment of this tripartite safety culture complex is obviously beyond the scope of any single method. In the case of the personnel safety survey, the method described here, information is elicited about all three elements, but with diering degrees of thoroughness and without attempting to identify them separately. They interact so closely that it is doubtful if the latter could be achieved. The replies to any questions about overt behaviour or about the company safety organisation are inevitably but variously confounded with the respondents' subjective attitudes towards them. We have preferred the superordinate term `safety culture' for another reason, more pragmatic than theoretical. It is the term devised and exclusively adopted by the nuclear industry and used in the many reports on the subject produced by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). However, whatever denitions are used, the proactive stance to safety is now almost universally accepted, if not always practised. In consequence, there is an urgent demand for methods of assessment, for ways of diagnosing weaknesses; also for benchmarking the strengths of safety cultures across time and between organisations. The research reported here is in part a response to this growing need for measurement and in part an attempt to disaggregate some of the main working parts of safety cultures as a prelude to exploring their inter-relationships. It is the second main phase (Lee, 1998) of an attempt to develop a robust methodology for the assessment of safety cultures in the nuclear industry. It is recognised that a full and comprehensive assessment of a safety culture also requires the kind of data normally supplied in detail through one or other of the safety auditing systems available. This may be supplemented by a peer review procedure, following, for example, the system devised by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), IAEA, (OSART Review) or the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (see Section 8). However, these are `top-down' methods; they list the systems in place and cannot easily assess how well they are working. When information is available on the latter score it is sparse, or based on the èxpert judgement' of the managers responsible for the arrangements, who may be inclined to present a sanguine view. Grote and Ku nzler (2000) describe the use of questionnaires to supplement what they describe as the ``predominantly gut feelings'' of professional audit sta. Performance indicators are also obviously useful measures of the health of a safety culture and unlike audits and peer reviews, they do have the virtue of measuring mainly outcome as distinct from input. `Feedback of results' is an essential requirement of organisational learning. Some of these measures are based on plant performance, and for these there is an implicit assumption that a well-managed plant optimises both productivity and safety. Others are direct measures of safety performance (e.g. lost time accident rate, recordable incidents, average radiation dose to workers, etc).
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However, performance indicators are also a `top-down' approach, with management experts setting target levels. This dual purpose, i.e. measurement and motivation, usually implies a link to bonus payments and these may lead to stress, under-reporting of incidents and premature return to work among sick or injured sta. Moreover, it is not always easy to interpret the meaning of performance indicators. For example, a large number of shutdowns (`scrams') may indicate either that errors have resulted in tripping of the reactor or that its operators have reacted cautiously when in doubt. Performance indicators tend also to be long-term measures of safety culture, responding only slowly to changes in organisation (e.g. management style, `downsizing', òutsourcing', etc). Most important of all, they are gross measures of consequence and give little indication of the causes of upward or downward trending. Finally, there is as yet no clear evidence that performance indicators are valid as predictors of future performance (Wreathall et al., 1995). These comments on audits and performance indicators should not be taken to imply that they should be supplanted only that they should be supplemented by personnel safety surveys. No single method of assessment is sucient, although the balance between them should perhaps be reconsidered, especially if cost-eectiveness is in the frame (see Section 8). 1.1. Attitudes towards safety It may be argued that it is a radical step to base safety management partly on the subjective views of sta but these are the reality on which their working lives are based. It may also be claimed that non-managerial workers `do not see the total picture' but the same can be said for the management, including those conducting audits and peer reviews. To quote a text from 30 years ago, `Èxecutives must be prepared to face the real possibility that the attitudes they believe employees have may not coincide with actual employee attitudes. They must recognise that this dierence. . . is not a threat to their personal integrity'' (Blum and Naylor, 1968, p. 302). A more contemporary perspective would add that the converse also applies workers are often ignorant of the true attitudes of managers. The total socio-technical system is extremely complex and in an attitudinal approach, all members of the organisation at every level should properly be invited to respond to a standard appraisal of it. They all contribute to the safety culture by denition; some have unique knowledge. Both knowledge and attitudes can be measured with relative ease and can be used to monitor changes over time or resulting from specic interventions. Moreover, the validity of attitudes can be conrmed by comparing them with actual behaviour. Work in progress will shortly make it possible for nuclear power stations to assess their performance against a set of norms. 2. Previous research There are several precedents for the attempt to measure attitudes toward safety in large-scale organisations. They can be traced as far back as the classic Hawthorne
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studies in the l9300 s, when the attitudes of 21,216 employees of the Western Electric Company in the USA were assessed in a mass interviewing programme (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). It was strongly argued by a number of authors during the l980s that negative attitudes among workers are the precursors of ùnsafe' behaviour and their origins, in turn, in defective management attitudes and practices. (Jonson, 1982; Beck and Feldman, 1983; Purdham, 1984; Sheehy and Chapman, 1984, 1987; Griths, l985; Allen, 1986; Lee, 1998). A number of ìn house' surveys were carried out during this period and Lutness (l987) argued persuasively for an instrument developed by the Du Pont safety organisation, but provided little detail. Using mainly qualitative methods, Marcus (l988) studied 24 nuclear power stations in the USA and concluded that those plants where the attitudes of employees favoured control, responsibility and a generally proactive attitude towards safety had three times fewer èrror events' and a generally better safety record. Zohar (1980) is generally credited with publishing the rst quantitative study of attitudes that focuses specically on safety, using principal components analysis (PCA). He extracted eight factors from his 40-item questionnaire. Glennon (1982), Brown and Holmes (1986) in the USA, and Coyle et al. (1995) in Australia attempted to conrm these eight factors as an underlying basic structure, but without much success. The latter authors did, however, detect signicant dierences between an accident and a no-accident group using a somewhat revised version. This quest for what they termed `à possible architecture of safety attitudes'' was also pursued by Cox and Cox (1991), who surveyed a European-wide sample of chemical/gas manufacturing plants. A review of these and other studies in the literature leads the present authors to the conclusion that dierences in the chosen breadth and depth of coverage, in judgements over item selection and wording, together with cross-cultural and inter-industry variations render the quest for universal structure premature, at the least. Olearnik and Canter (1988) were probably the rst in the UK to use a survey (and other instruments such as ùncompleted sentences') of safety attitudes and, indeed, to seriously address the issue of validation. They report results from 16 plants of a steel company. Their data provide a better prediction of accident rates in these plants than èxpert judgements' of their relative hazardousness. This initiated an important stream of work in the chemical and later, in the power generation industries. A safety attitude questionnaire comprising a basic 16 standardised scales has been developed. Reliability coecients are quoted and correlations with accident rates are reported as `satisfactory' (Donald, 1994, 1997; Donald and Canter, 1994; Donald and Young, 1996). An oshore safety questionnaire has been developed by Flin et al. (1996) and applied, for example, to 722 workers on 11 oshore installations. The original emphasis of this work was on risk perceptions but it has broadened to include perceptions of the job and work environment, attitudes to safety and perceptions of organisational factors relevant to safety. From a total of 19 scales, 14 show signicant dierences between an accident and no-accident group (Mearns et al., 1997). In the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, Rundmo (1992) has considerably extended the early work of Marek et al. (1987), which focused on the perceived risks of òrdinary accidents', disasters and post-accident measures. In particular, he is the
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only researcher so far to have demonstrated an improvement in safety culture over a (4-year) period. He has also applied structural equation modelling in an attempt to establish the causal relationships between risk perceptions and various scales of protective measures, i.e. safety status, job stress and accidents/near misses. He concludes, ``The higher the perceived risk, the more dissatised with safety status, the more accidents and near accidents they experience'' (Rundmo, 1995, p. 1). The work by Cox and Cox (1991), referred to above, has also continued, extending into the oshore industry and to the development of a general purpose ``Safety Behavioural Toolkit''. This is based on a triangulation approach through questionnaires, interviews and behavioural observation at both the individual and organisational levels (Cox et. al., 1997). Also recently, the Health and Safety Executive in the UK has launched a do-it-yourself survey (Byrom and Corbridge, 1997) which is applicable to all industries. This instrument is described in more detail in Section 8. The main previous work in the nuclear industry was initiated by the authors in collaboration with Mr. J.A. Coote of British Nuclear Fuels and was carried out at the Sellaeld site in 1991 (Lee and Coote, 1993; Lee, 1997, 1998). Ostrom et al. (1993) have also developed a combined questionnaire/interview approach covering 13 categories of safety norms, designed for use in US nuclear stations. The aim of the research presented in the present paper was to build on these foundations to customise a procedure for UK nuclear power stations. 3. Method Three stations were selected for the study from widely separated sites in the UK and representing dierent technologies. A total of seven focus groups were held, two in each station plus an additional group conned to contractors. The groups were each composed of a cross-section of 1012 sta, including two or three managers and at least one safety rep. The discussions were recorded verbatim and subsequently analysed qualitatively. The general conclusions that emerged are summarised in a separate (unpublished) report (Lee and Sibley, 1996). The focus group material suggested a number of areas that extend the range of the study more widely than before. New items were added to a shortened (but equivalent) form of the Sellaeld questionnaire and this revised and extended draft version was returned for piloting and further discussion by members of each of the focus groups. This led to suggestions for still further items and for general renement of the proposed ones. It should be noted that a good safety survey should be generated from, as well as administered to, the entire workforce or a representative sample. The original Sellaeld questionnaire contained 172 items, but the analysis showed that this could be reduced to approximately 80 without loss of validity. This shortened form was then customised for the present study to a total of 120. It is expected that the present analysis will again make it possible to reduce the number of items for more convenient general application and without sacricing validity. The questionnaires were distributed in each of the three stations in dierent ways. Common to each was the use of the monthly team brieng session to explain the
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aims and background of the study. Respondents were supplied with sealable envelopes pre-addressed to the University of St. Andrews, giving further reinforcement to the assurance of anonymity provided in the introduction. Partly because of the dierent circumstances prevailing at each of the stations but mainly because of the dierent methods adopted for distribution, the response rates were variable, i.e. 167 (45%), 248 (46%) and 268 (74%), respectively. The total sample is 683. The variability is due to dierent methods adopted by stations for distributing the survey forms. All were explained and distributed at team briengs. However, in one case they were requested back às soon as possible'. In another, some were completed at the brieng and a deadline set for others. In the third, this was supplemented by unremitting pleas through the various communication media and a donation to charity, proportional to the response rate, was promised. Experience shows that questionnaires need to be completed as well as distributed as part of a team brieng session and this approach has been adopted in subsequent studies. The questionnaire covers eight domains relevant to safety performance (Table 1). The allocation of items to domains was a matter of judgement but it was guided by the focus group discussions. Although these were largely non-directive, the groups were reminded at intervals of the need to consider a predetermined set of issues but also to allude to any issues not included in this underlying agenda. The domains were as follows, together with the number of items included under each one. A number of items were considered relevant to more than one domain and were allocated accordingly: . . . . . . . . condence in safety (21); contractors (20); job satisfaction (23); participation (25); risk (20) safety rules (16) stress (15); and training (15)
It may be noted that the domains of permit to work and design of plant included in the Sellaeld study (Lee, 1998) were omitted. Two new domains of current interest, i.e. Stress and contractors were added. Condence in safety combines two of the domains included in the previous study. 4. Results 4.1. Factor analysis The next stage was to carry out the form of factor analysis known as principal components analysis (PCA) of each domain, followed by Varimax Rotation of the emergent factors. The three or four factors accounting for the greatest amount of variance and with the highest Eigen values (minimum 1.0) were extracted in each case.
68 Table 1 Domains and factors Domaina
Factors Condence in Condence in Condence in Condence in control measures [1-Con] anticipation/response [2-Con] reorganisation [3-Con] safety standards [4-Con]
Alphab 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.781 0.781 0.781
Condence in safety KMO=0.869 Bart.=2563.117; P=0.0000 Contractors KMO=0.852 Bart.=2074.781; P=0.0000 Job satisfaction KMO=0.890 Bart.=3779.122 P=0.0000 Participation KMO=0.874 Bart.=5094.786; P=0.0000 Risk KMO=0.796 Bart.=2987.841 P=0.0000 Safety rules KMO=0.785 Bart.=2018.144 P=0.0000 Stress KMO=0.791 Bart.=1379.175; P=0.0000 Training/selection KMO=0.830 Bart.=4443.021; P=0.0000
Company support for contractors [1-Ctr] Satisfaction with contractors' safety [2-Ctr] Respect for contractors' role [3-Ctr] Contentment with the job [1-Job] Satisfaction with job relationships [2-Job] Interest in the job [3-Job] Trust in colleagues [4-Job] Perceived empowerment [1-Par] Management's concern for safety [2-Par] General morale [3-Par] Organisational risk level [1-Ris] Personal risk taking [2-Ris] Risks of multi-skilling [3-Ris] Risk versus productivity [4-Ris] Complexity of instructions [1-Saf] Hazard identication/response [2-Saf] prociency Response to alarms [3-Saf] Emergency procedures [4-Saf] Personal stress [1-Str] Job insecurity [2-Str] Management's concern for health [3-Str] Quality of training induction [1-Tra] Eectiveness of sta selection [2-Tra] General quality of training [3-Tra]
a KMO, KaiserMeyerOlkin measure of sampling adequacy (acceptable at >0.500); BART, Bartlett's test of sphericity (acceptable at P<0.05). b Cronbach's alpha is based on the number of items in a scale and the average of their intercorrelations. When calculating regression factor scores, as in the present case, all items in the relevant domain are included in each scale though dierentially weighted for each factor (Norusis, 1994, pp. 7374). Hence, alpha is the same for all factors within a domain.
The rationale for this procedure is to identify groups of items that are closely correlated with each other and therefore demonstrably measuring the same underlying component or dimension. This is a purely empirical process and the `meaning' of a factor is indicated by the wording of the contributing items. It is usual to distil this meaning into a single label. The choice of an appropriate label is a matter of judgement. The naming process allocates greater weight to the wording of those items that are most highly `loaded' on the factor. In case of doubt about the true meaning of a given factor, it is always possible to refer to the full set of items.
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The factor loading is derived from a regression analysis and reects the extent to which an item contributes to its factor. If the loading is high, the item is more typical of the overall meaning of the factor. It is useful to think of the loading as a form of correlation between the single item and the aggregate eect of all the items. The results of factor analysis of the eight domains, together with their names and factor loadings are shown in Table 1. Reliability co-ecients, Cronbach's alphas, which are generally satisfactory are also shown. The items in a selected four of the factors are shown in Table 2 as examples. It will be noted that factors within domains are completely independent, by virtue of the varimax rotation. However, the domains themselves are inter-correlated to varying degrees. An alternative approach considered was to process the entire data set of 172 items simultaneously and then to perform a secondary factor analysis. The choice was made empirically, based on the earlier Sellaeld data-set of 5296 (Lee, 1998). Using the `total' method, the emergent factors were less easily interpreted and substantially less valid when compared with the accident data. It appears that in performing data reduction procedures on 172 items, it is expedient where possible to rst separate the (obviously) `chalk' from the (obviously) `cheese'. After all, doubtful items can be included in more than one category so that their allocation is determined empirically. 4.2. Factor scores Approximately half of the items in the questionnaire are expressed negatively and half positively. Scales were reversed as necessary so that a high score equals a positive orientation towards safety. Regression factor scores were next computed by adding an individual's score for each item in the factor, weighted by its factor coecient. Factor scores are then standardised to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Norusis, 1994). The eect is to replace, for each respondent, the 120 `raw' scores by 28 factor scores based on groups of congruent items. The resulting scales, by virtue of their standardisation, are directly comparable. The total sample was included in the factor analysis. This was on the assumption that the close similarity in type of work and in safety management systems between the three stations would have resulted in a common underlying factor structure. Applying this structure, standardised factor scores (and norms for the industry) could be generated. This allows for condential self-assessment of current status and progress over time. In the present study, both raw and standardised scores were made available to each station, but the focus was on strengths and weaknesses, not on inter-station comparisons. 4.3. Validation 4.3.1. Correlation between attitudes and accident history It was demonstrated in the Sellaeld Study (Lee, 1998) that there is a strong and positive relationship between negative expressions of attitude (or reported behaviour)
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Table 2 Examples of items included : four factors
Item No.
Item
Factor loadings 0.370 0.779 0.802 0.693 0.697 0.521
Complexity of instructions (1-Saf): safety rules domain 124 I sometimes have to turn a blind eye to the strict safety rules to get the job done on time 201 The written safety rules and safety instructions are so complicated that people do not pay much attention to them 203 Safety instructions are specied in so much detail you can't see the wood for the trees 204 NEL/MEP safety rules and instructions are not generally well known 212 It is hardly possible to keep up with changes in the written safety instructions 214 Station and plant operating instructions are often impractical because they've been written by òce-bound' engineers Personal stress (1-Str): stress domain 134 Sta reductions mean that I'm under more stress than before 136 We're just running around all the time from one job to another, not completing them properly 137 I sometimes wake early because I can't help thinking about problems at work 141 My health has been negatively aected by my work 142 My family/social life has been negatively aected by my work 144 Management don't care about my health so long as I get the job done Contentment with the job (1-Job): job satisfaction domain 101 I am sometimes made to feel that I'm not paid to think 103 I feel I am just a `number' in this organisation 104 `So-called experts' are always telling me how to do my job 112 You don't get promoted in this organisation if you're good at what you are doing now 113 `High iers' are pampered in this organisation 115 A lot of people in my place of work could contribute more if they were given the chance Organisational risk level (1-Ris): risk domain 124 I sometimes have to turn a blind eye to the strict safety rules to get the job done on time 203 Safety instructions are specied in so much detail you can't see the wood for the trees 206 The `Permit to Work' and other safety document systems are just a way of covering people's backs 208 When you really need one, it is not easy to contact a Safety Ocer 217 Too much attention is paid to nuclear safety and not enough to sta safety in my place of work 219 Sta reductions within the nuclear industry have led to a lowering of safety standards 515 People who tend to slow down a job for the sake of safety are seen as àwkward'
0.546 0.539 0.699 0.783 0.819 0.330 0.644 0.647 0.663 0.622 0.665 0.603
0.310 0.608 0.611 0.654 0.634 0.644 0.639
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and the likelihood of an accident involving personal injury while working on the site. However, for the present study, a greatly extended range of criteria of accident history was introduced, as follows: 1. involvement in a radiological incident on site with an increased dose of radiation; 2. contamination with radioactive material requiring decontamination; 3. any other radiological incident; 4. direct involvement in any dangerous non-radiological occurrence; 5. medical treatment following an injury with or without time o work 6. absence of 3 days or less as a result of an injury; 7. absence of more than 3 days as a result of an injury; 8. having sustained a major injury while working on site; and 9. number of times injured at work whilst employed in the industry. All but the last of these are dichotomous variables and the means of the factor scores of the accident and no-accident groups were compared by t-test. The results are shown in Table 3. For the (continuous) variable `Number of injuries' (9), the data were divided into ve groups, i.e. `no accidents'; `1 accident'; `25 accidents'; `610 accidents' and `10+ accidents'. Factor scores for each of these groups were compared using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVAS), together with a multiple comparison test (the Schee test) which compares each mean with every other mean while adjusting the probability levels to take account of the number of comparisons being made. The results of this analysis are shown in the last column of Table 3. The overall evidence is convincing. Most strikingly, Condence in control measures (1Con) is signicantly related to all nine criteria. Only four of the 28 scales fail to reach acceptable levels of signicance in the expected direction on one or other of the accident criteria. These are response to alarms, quality of training induction; personal risk taking, and interest in the job. The rst two of these are not unexpected, it is useful to know that responses are at an acceptable level, but they tend to be routine matters, probably insensitive to attitudinal dierences. However, it is surprising that personal risk taking is not signicantly related to accident probability in view of the strong relationship found at Sellaeld and in other studies in the literature. It is not the case with the three other attitudes in the risk domain. The same applies to interest in the job and the three other attitudes in the domain of job satisfaction. All four non-signicant scales are nonetheless retained within the analysis because they have intrinsic interest for organisational purposes, even though they bear no relation to accident rates. There is one factor where the èxpected direction' is equivocal. Generally, a good accident record is associated with belief and condence in the safety management system and, indeed, in management itself. However, condence in reorganisation (seen mainly as `downsizing') shows the opposite trend, with low accident likelihood associated with scepticism towards the virtues of reorganisation. This is shown in Table 3 in respect to <3 day accidents (P=0.024) and >3 day accidents
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Table 3 t-Values/f scores and probabilities for all factors by accident history on site versus 28 factor scores
Factor Radiological Dose 601 t 1-Con Condence in control measures 2-Con Condence in anticipation/response 3-Con Condence in reorganisation 4-Con Condence in safety standards 1-Ctr Company support contractors 2-Ctr Satisfaction with contractors safety 3-Ctr Respect for contractors role 1-Job Contentment with job 2-Job Satisfacton with job relationships 3-Job Interest in the job 4-Job Trust in colleagues 1-Par Perceived empowerment 2-Par Management's concern for safety P Decontam. 602 t P Evacuation 603 t P Non-radiological Involved 604 t P 0.000 0.002 0.544 0.606 0.460 0.008 0.444 0.008 0.796 0.862 0.111 0.294 0.000 All accidents Medical treatment 605 t P Absence for < 3 days 606 t P Absence for > 3 days 607 t P Major injury 608 t P No. of injuries 609
2.91 0.004 2.36 0.018 2.44 0.015 3.56 0.37 0.709 0.77 0.443 2.17 0.030 3.14
4.28 0.000 4.15 0.000 2.96 0.003 2.03 0.043 2.79 0.005 1.06 0.291 0.30 0.767 0.68 0.496 2.26 0.024 2.67 0.008 0.75 0.456 1.79 0.074 1.46 0.144
6.99 0.000 1.85 0.118 1.34 0.255 2.66 0.032 1.29 0.273 1.48 0.205 4.50 0.004 3.06 0.016 2.92 0.021 1.50 0.200 3.42 0.009 6.06 0.000 1.74 0.140
1.19 0.234 1.41 0.160 1.53 0.133 1.19 0.235
0.53 0.598 0.61 0.09 0.929 0.52 0.74
0.70 0.486 0.75 0.455 1.36 0.176
0.47 0.636 0.25 0.802 1.68 0.093
1.55 0.123 2.20 0.028 2.53 0.012 1.52 0.129 2.06 0.040 2.04 0.041 1.07 0.285 0.99 0.325 2.55 0.011 3.08 0.002 1.28 0.203 0.17 0.862 3.21 0.001 2.95 0.003 1.18 0.239 0.34 0.735 1.51 0.130 0.37 0.715 1.23 0.217 1.18 0.240 1.23 0.218 0.05 0.959 0.14 0.887
2.67 0.008 2.17 0.030 0.77 0.444 2.67 0.46 0.648 0.60 0.546 1.61 0.109 0.77 0.28 0.778 2.67 0.26
0.84 0.402 0.36 0.722
1.02 0.310 0.91 0.373 0.87 0.387 1.08 0.281 0.62 0.535 0.35 0.728 1.17 0.242 0.30 0.767 1.19 0.234
1.54 0.126 0.17 0.31 0.757 1.60 1.67 0.096 1.05
0.85 0.396 1.67 0.096 1.45 0.148 3.13 0.002 3.04 0.002 2.69 0.007 3.92 0.000 3.60 0.000 1.94 0.052
0.74 0.461 1.58 0.115 1.91 0.058 3.87
2.79 0.005 2.26 0.024 1.25 0.211 1.52 0.130
(continued on next page)
Table 3 (continued) Factor Radiological Dose 601 t 3-Par General morale 1-Ris Organisational risk level 2-Ris Personal risk taking 3-Ris Risks of multi-skilling 4-Ris Risk vs. productivity 1-Saf Complexity of instructions 2-Saf Hazard identicaion/ response 3-Saf Response to alarms 4-Saf Emergency procedures 1-Str Personal stress 2-Str Job insecurity 3-Str Management's concern for health 1-Tra Quality training induction 2-Tra Eectiveness sta training 3-Tra General quality of training P Decontam. 602 t P Evacuation 603 t P Non-radiological Involved 604 t P 0.994 0.030 0.161 0.533 0.072 0.147 0.670 0.268 0.167 0.039 0.936 0.324 0.949 0.476 0.759 All accidents Medical treatment 605 t P Absence for < 3 days 606 t P Absence for > 3 days 607 t P Major injury 608 t P No. of injuries 609 F p
0.13 0.898 0.88 0.386 0.28 0.779 0.01 0.94 0.353 1.86 0.063 1.27 0.204 2.18 0.49 0.622 0.65 0.518 1.17 0.245 0.19 0.851 1.00 0.316 0.17 0.865 1.40 0.62
1.66 0.097 0.35 0.724 0.09 0.926 1.99 0.047 3.79 0.000 3.33 0.001 2.08 0.038 1.09 0.278 1.00 0.316 0.67 0.504 0.03 0.977 0.52 0.603 1.07 0.285 2.71 0.007 1.92 0.055 1.08 0.280
2.82 0.024 8.03 0.000 0.69 0.596 0.94 0.441
0.63 0.527 0.18 0.859 0.61 0.541 1.80 1.14 0.162 2.29 0.023 1.83 0.067 1.45 0.27 0.786 0.99 0.321 0.26 0.797 0.43
4.86 0.000 2.49 0.013 2.14 0.032 1.47 0.142 10.38 0.000 3.28 0.001 2.52 0.012 1.46 0.146 1.43 0.153 6.04 0.000 3.63 0.000 1.49 0.136 1.62 0.106 1.57 0.117 5.00 0.001 0.50 0.739 0.73 0.573 1.55 0.186 1.43 0.222 4.16 0.003 0.23 0.923 5.73 0.000 4.34 0.002
0.20 0.842 0.38 0.703 0.97 0.334 1.11 1.50 0.134 0.34 0.735 0.66 0.507 1.38 1.11 0.267 1.84 0.066 0.22 0.826 2.06 0.77 0.441 0.20 0.839 1.47 0.142 0.08 0.08 0.935 0.84 0.401 1.12 0.262 0.99 0.80 0.422 0.12 0.902 0.03 0.976 0.06
0.34 0.736 0.52 0.605 1.34 0.182 0.76 0.450 0.25 0.806 2.77 0.006 1.86 0.063 1.07 0.285 1.15 0.252 0.84 0.400 1.64 0.102 3.18 0.002 3.91 0.000 2.37 0.018 1.94 0.053 0.09 0.927 0.53 0.597 0.59 0.555 0.67 0.503 0.76 0.446 0.13 0.898 1.47 0.141 1.56 0.120 0.65 0.516 1.84 0.066 0.55 0.582 0.17 0.866 2.13 0.033 3.45 0.001 0.58 0.559 0.11 0.915 0.14 0.889
3.41 0.001 1.72 0.085 1.51 0.130 0.71 0.29 0.775 1.00 0.319 0.70 0.483 0.31
73
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(P=0.008). This result could be seen as a disconrmation of our overall ndings or it can be argued that reorganisation is seen (including by management) as an external imposition a regrettable necessity that erodes good safety management. Scepticism would then be seen as realistic and not as disaection. It is in this way that we have chosen to interpret it but it is hoped that future research will clarify the issue. It will be seen that the two `lost time' measures of accident history; less than/more than 3 days, together with accidents requiring medical treatment and total number of injuries are the four criteria most closely associated with the various attitudes towards safety. (NB When a large number of t-tests are computed there is the possibility that one signicant dierence in 20 at the 0.05 level, i.e. 1.4 cases per column in Table 3, may be afalse positive. Similarly, at the 0.01 level, 0.28 cases and at the 0.001 level, 0.028 cases. With the exception of the radiological and the major accident criteria, these incidence levels of false positives do not seriously aect the general picture.) These validation data can be demonstrated in a more visually eective way by graphical means. As an example, Fig. 1 shows the mean scores for those who have been involved in an injury requiring medical treatment. Fig. 2 shows the equivalent for <3 day accidents. Fig. 3(a, b) show the downward trend in factor scores as `number of injuries' increases. The general trend of the data is clear from these illustrations. This is a form of external validation and positive results by this method are comparatively rare. Social psychologists constantly bemoan the lack of correspondence between attitudes and behaviour. Ideally, the external criterion should be wholly independent (e.g. company accident records) and not self-reported. However, there is no obvious reason why respondents would be motivated to falsify their accident records in an anonymous questionnaire.
Fig. 1. Attitudes by injury involving medical treatment. The data shown are the means of standard scores. Because there are small quantities of missing data, the means of each total sample plotted in this and subsequent bar charts may deviate slightly from zero. n=670; Mean (three sites)=0.
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Fig. 2. Attitude by 3-day accidents [n=671; Mean (three sites)=0].
4.3.2. The feedback loop, a possible source of confounding There is potential confounding in the possibility that negative attitudes are not the cause of accidents and injuries but their consequence. This would be counter-intuitive; we generally suppose that accidents at work are a result of social/environmental conditions and dysfunctional human behaviour, mediated through negative attitudes. Notwithstanding, it has to be recognised that an important component among the life experiences that shape attitudes is the behaviour that results from their expression. In other words, there is a feedback loop accidents can shape attitudes just as attitudes (and injuries) can shape behaviour. However, we would argue that by far the dominant direction of causality is from attitudes to accidents, although only `received wisdom' and indirect evidence can be marshalled in support of this contention. The evidence may be summarised as follows: 1. Overall, the most plausible assumption is that the experience of an accident or injury would not reduce but increase safety awareness, strengthening safetyrelated attitudes. This is a common experience, but it is supported by the àvailability' heuristic, which posits an increase in perceived risk (and hence, greater care) following an adverse event (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 2. If the counter hypothesis were valid, of the 15 attitudes that are signicantly correlated with number of injuries, 12 would show a signicant decrement caused by (or in consequence of) a single injury. [Fig. 3(a,b)]. Similarly, of the 24 attitudes that are signicantly correlated with at least one other measure of accident history, 17 would also show a decrement caused by only a single injury. It is improbable that the experience of one injury while employed at the plant, in almost all cases minor, could `cause' this preponderance of negative attitudes. The reverse is much more probable.
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Fig. 3. Attitudes by how many times injured (the data are distributed between two plots to aid visibility). n=663; Mean (three sites)=0. For denition of abbreviations see Table 1.
3. An obvious further prediction would be that a major accident would have the most serious negative eect on attitudes. This is contradicted for personal stress and general morale, both of which score positive (i.e. lower stress and higher morale) in the major-accident sub-sample. The only other attitudes correlated (negatively) with a major accident are condence in control measures and eectiveness of sta selection. 4. Attitudes such as perceived empowerment, complexity of instructions, and eectiveness of sta selection, are all signicantly (negatively) correlated with number of injuries at the >0.000 level, but would be most unlikely to have been adversely aected post hoc. Conversely, it might be expected that personal risk
77
taking would be changed towards caution following an injury, but it is not aected. The strong inference is that these attitudes predispose to accidents and are not primarily their consequence. 5. Biographical and work-related variables Although the work reported here was primarily research and development, its eventual aim is practical, i.e. to develop a robust tool for assessment purposes. One way in which this objective can be realised is by computing summary scores a single score for each respondent which aggregates (with equal weighting) the scores on each of the 28 factors. This is the Combined Factor Score (CFS). Mean scores can then be computed using CFS and these may be particularly useful for overall comparisons across stations and over time. They are similar to performance indicators but ones that are derived in strictly comparable ways for a large number of sub-units of the organisation. The more detailed alternative is the provision of a prole of all 28 scales for each of these sub-units. This is by far the best way of classifying strengths and weaknesses. These individual station proles for gender, age, days versus shifts, work in radiation-controlled area, type of job, area of work, and department were provided, in graphical form, as detailed feedback to station directors, department managers and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Committees. It is upon these proles that improvement measures can be based. It would be invidious (and impossibly bulky!) to reproduce the comparative data for each station or department here, and a few examples from the total sample must suce. It should be noted, however, that the stations share very similar organisational cultures and safety cultures; the dierences between them are very small by comparison with the dierences within them between types of job, for example. 5.1. Types of job Fig. 4 shows how four examples, the single attitudes labelled condence in control measures, Perceived empowerment, complexity of instructions and Risk versus productivity dier across 18 job types for the whole sample. 5.2. Age Recent publicity in the press has suggested that there may be some advantage in employing older workers on the grounds that they are more `safety conscious'. About half the relationships between safety factors and age conrm this hypothesis and are signicant using ANOVA. They are plotted in Fig. 5. However, there is an important divergence from this trend. The youngest age group score very positively on eight of the scales but this is followed by a relapse, with the most negative scores occurring mainly in the 3040 years age group. We may speculate that younger sta, and those with shorter length of service, begin on a relatively positive
78
Fig. 4. Attitudes by type of job.
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Fig. 5. Attitude by age. n=671; Mean (three sites)=0. Only attitudes indicating dierences (F ratios) are included. For denition of abbreviations see Table 1.
note in respect of some attitudes, but then converge to the plant norms for their job type and age group. However, although the trend towards improvement with age shown in Fig. 5 is entirely valid, the explanation for it is complicated. There is a dominant inuence from the type of job that people do and this is correlated with age. Analysis shows that the oldest sta are Managers (engineering), followed by Team Leaders, Managers (administration) and then Health and Safety sta. The youngest are Secretaries, followed by Administration sta and then by Security, Craft workers and Plant operators. Accordingly, ANOVA was carried out on the 28 scales to separate the eect of age from that of job type. The results of 28 two-way ANOVA show that although there are signicant eects of job type on 21 of the attitudes when age is held constant, none of the attitudes varies consistently with age when the eect of job type is removed. There are, however, signicant interactions on ve attitudes (Table 3), i.e. for these attitudes age has a signicant inuence for some job types only. These interactions occur in respect of job satisfaction (P<0.05), perceived empowerment (P<0.01), organisational risk level (P<0.05); satisfaction with contractor safety (P<0.01), and respect for contractors role (P<0.05). There is insucient space here to explore in detail the ways in which age aects each of the ve attitudes for the 13 jobs included in this analysis. However, there are two prominent trends that deserve attention, not least because they involve quite large numbers of sta. Craft workers show steady improvement with age, while Plant operators move in the opposite direction. It can be seen from Fig. 6 that Craft workers improve on four of the above ve attitudes and in three cases, i.e. excluding perceived empowerment, the improvement
80
is signicant at P<0.05. The opposite trend, for plant operators, is less marked and reaches signicance only in two, i.e. perceived empowerment (P<0.01) and organisational risk level (P<0.05), (Fig. 7). The changes in safety attitudes that occur with age in some occupations deserve to be examined more closely. They may be due to stresses in the job or to failed expectations, for example. Length of service, which is highly correlated with age, may be the explanation, but unfortunately this cannot be separated out in the present study. In Lee (1998) changes in some attitudes were shown to occur with both age and length of service, independently.
Fig. 6. Attitude changes with age: craft workers (n=77).
Fig. 7. Attitude changes with age: Plant operators (n=88).
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5.3. Gender Women have more positive attitudes towards safety than men and the dierences are signicant for 19 of the attitudinal variables. The mean scores for males and females are shown in Fig. 8. An exception, paradoxically, is personal risk taking which is signicantly more negative for women than for men. The best explanation that can be oered is that the dierence is due not so much to women scoring low as to men scoring high, i.e. cautiously. There appears to be a commendable aversion in the nuclear power setting for anything that implies a cavalier attitude to risk. The raw scores show a high mean of 5.21 (after reversal) on this factor on the seven-point scale. (We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility of some `social desirability' bias). Women and oce workers, who normally do not work in hazardous areas of the site, have perhaps responded with an attitude that is more a reection of everyday living. Here, sporting and leisure activities are generally thought to be enhanced by a spice of danger; mild personal risk taking is valued in our society and high risk taking is applauded if the stakes appear to justify it. In practice, public applause becomes one of the main stakes. It was noted earlier that, unexpectedly, personal risk taking is not related to accident history. This particular sex dierence is, therefore, more of academic than practical interest. 5.4. Days/shifts The attitudes of shift-workers are almost uniformly more negative than those of day-workers. This applies to 25 of the 28 factors and the dierences are signicant in 23 of these cases. Of the remaining four, one is signicant in the reverse direction; this is personal risk taking. Shift-workers have a signicantly more positive (i.e. cautious) attitude towards personal risk taking than day-workers. However, as already pointed out, this scale is not related to accident likelihood.
Fig. 8. Attitude by gender [n=649; Mean (three sites)=0].
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More detailed analysis of these data is required because it is more legitimate to compare shift-workers only with sta who do similar work. All sta with jobs that are done on a `days-only' basis were therefore removed. The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 9, where it will be seen that after the exclusion of 99 such sta, the dierences remain. Both personal stress and personal risk taking deviate in the direction opposite to the general trend, i.e. shifts are more positive than days, i.e. less prone to stress and less likely to take risks. ANOVA is still a more ecient way of testing the hypothesis, separating out not only the `main eects' of days/shifts and type of job but also the interactions between them, i.e. where days and shifts dier more in respect of certain jobs, than of others. Table 4 shows the `main eect' of days/shifts for each factor after the inuence of variation between jobs is removed. No fewer than 12 of the attitudes still show signicantly more negative attitudes (main eects) for shift-workers only. One, i.e. personal stress, shows a signicant positive main eect in favour of shift-workers, as indicated above. The case of personal stress was referred to earlier. Shift-workers, this analysis conrms, are less prone to personal stress. It can only be speculated that this is because the demands made on them are more routine and work pressure is less. The explanation for this lower level of stress does not, however, appear to lie in a generally higher morale quite the reverse. In addition, there is a signicant (P=<0.01) interaction eect for personal risk taking. The eect is mainly due to dierences between shifts and days for security sta and engineering managers, who score more positively on shifts. It is worth reviewing the particular attitudes on which shift-workers are more negative, to see if any pattern is discernible. Shift-workers express lower satisfaction with job relationships. This attitude refers to `vertical' relationships, i.e. the `them and us' divide, the `blame free' culture, teamwork practices and relationships with managers. They also score lower on trust in colleagues. They are more sceptical of management's concern for safety, together
Fig. 9. Attitudes by days/shifts (excluding days-only) [n=546; Mean (three sites)=0].
T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197 Table 4 Analysis of variance: days/shifts by type of job for all factors
Factor Condence in control measures 1-Con Condence anticipation/response 2-Con Condence in reorganisation 3-Con Condence in safety standards 4-Con Company support contractors 1-Ctr Satisfaction with contractors' safety 2-Ctr Respect for contractors' role 3-Ctr Contentment with job 1-Job Satisfaction with job relationships 2-Job Interest in the job 3-Job Trust in colleagues 4-Job Perceived empowerment 1-Par Mgemnt's concern for safety 2-Par General morale 3-Par Organisational risk level 1-Ris -56Personal risk taking 2-Ris Risks of multi-skilling 3-Ris Risk vs. productivity 4-Ris Complexity of instructions 1-Saf Hazard identication/response 2-Saf Response to alarms 3-Saf Emergency procedures 4-Saf Personal stress1-Str Job insecurity 2-Str Managemnt's concern health 3-Str Quality training induction 1-Tra Eectiveness of sta selection 2-Tra General quality of training 3-Tra
a b c d
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Mean days Mean shifts F score P 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.25 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.25 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.57 1.06 9.83 17.92 1.77 1.01 0.27 3.93 0.17 4.83 0.73 6.75 13.45 4.14 3.26 0.02 1.27 0.98 2.35 9.70 5.94 8.54 4.92 13.41 1.98 0.05 4.05 0.983 0.451 0.305 0.002 0.000 0.184 0.317 0.607 0.048 0.681 0.029 0.392 0.010 0.000 0.042 0.072 0.898 0.260 0.322 0.126 0.002 0.015 0.004 0.027 0.000 0.160 0.828 0.045
Interactiona P 0.754 0.063 0.076 0.171 0.773 0.345 0.341 0.222 0.004 0.196 0.321 0.622 0.026 0.019 0.040 0.016 0.658 0.672 0.485 0.365 0.364 0.959 0.397 0.521 0.317 0.290 0.142 0.009
*** ***
* * * *** *
***
* * * *
*** * ** * ***
**
Interactions are between days/shifts and eight job types. *, P<0.05. **, P<0.01. ***, P<0.001.
with management's concern for health; their feelings of job insecurity are greater and their general morale is lower. This grouping seems to be concerned mainly with the social-organisational aspects of the job. Another group of attitudes can be seen to relate more directly to safety management implications. For example, shift-workers have less condence in the organisational risk level which refers, for example, to the complexities of safety instructions, permits to work and the eect of sta reductions. It follows that they also have less condence in safety standards and are more concerned about response to alarms and emergency procedures. They perceive the general quality of training to be lower and they are sceptical about the company's support for contractors. It should be re-emphasised that these dierences occur in sub-groups of sta doing nominally the same job as `days-only' sta. However, they provide no basis
84
for saying that the attitudes of shift-workers are reprehensible only that they are more negative than equivalent day workers and that the eect extends to a set of social/organisational attitudes and a set of attitudes related to safety management systems. Attempts to redress the balance should concentrate on these attitudes. For eight of the 12 signicantly negative attitudes, the dierence between days and shifts does not vary a great deal by job type. However, in the remaining ve cases (Table 4) there is a signicant interaction, i.e. some job types show a greater dierence than others between days and shifts. Some of the job type sub-samples are small and so relatively few signicant dierences emerge when they are compared, although the trends are clear. We can summarise these by saying that special attention should be paid to shift Plant operators, who are consistently more negative than their day colleagues in all ve attitudes. In two of these cases, the dierences reach signicance (management's concern for safety and general quality of training). But the most notable nding is that Shift Team Leaders are more negative than day colleagues on all ve attitudes and the dierences on four of these are signicant, despite relatively small sample sizes (n=23; n=13). 6. Some organisational variables and their relationship with attitudes The present study was extended in scope beyond its Sellaeld predecessor to explore some of the organisational variables that might be predictive of safety attitudes and hence of accident rates. 6.1. Applying the safety rules We asked ``. . .We asked ``which role is most careful in applying the safety rules in your place of work?'' The responses are shown in Fig. 10. It will be seen that the strongest nomination (41%) is for `myself'. This may be regarded as an unconscious
Fig. 10. Who is most careful in applying the safety rules? (n=635).
85
(or deliberate) `self-serving' response. On the other hand, it is a feature of many people's value system, `Ìf you don't look after yourself, no-one else will''. The goal in fostering a safety culture is to ensure that similar (or more) concern is felt for the safety of others, because they are more numerous. There follows a high percentage (33%) nominating Senior Authorised Persons (SAPs) a more conventional response as it is the SAPs who are appointed to be the principal guardians of rules and procedures, those who must authorise and programme technical modications. Senior and other line managers are nominated hardly at all as those seen to be most careful in applying the rules but it is dicult, without further analysis, to be sure whether this means that they (apart from SAPs) are perceived to be less vigilant or whether everyday application is not seen to be part of their role. This leaves about 25% who consider their more immediate working colleagues, i.e. `my boss', team leader, safety reps or colleagues) to be most careful in applying the safety rules. These work-roles are trusted with the respondent's safety he does not have to rely exclusively on him/herself or on the more remote oces of management. Moreover, there is some evidence that employees in this category, i.e. those who trust òthers', as distinct from `self' or management, are less likely to have had accidents while working on the site (Table 5). Investing trust primarily in oneself does not appear, on this evidence, to be the best strategy. This minor but interesting nding lends support to the principle of safety culture. 6.2. Putting production before safety Using the same list of alternative roles, respondents were asked which role `` . . .is most likely to exert pressure to put production before safety?''. This conict is eternal and unavoidable. Management rightly argue that without production there is no employment. The opposite extreme viewpoint is that even employment is too high a price to pay for personal injury. A balance has to be struck and it is inevitable that the balance will dier according to role. The perceived relative priorities of production and safety form part of each role in the organisation. The data suggest that the main
Table 5 Role perceived as most careful re safety rules by accident historya Most careful role How often injured 0 Myself SAPs Management My boss Safety reps Colleagues Average Team Leader
a
1+ 235 49% 59 38%
Total 479 100% 156 100%
244 51% 97 62%
Chi-square = 6.133; P=<0.02.
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pressure is seen to come from above. Peer pressure is not a factor and there is none of the perceived ascendance of self over colleagues that is claimed for safety rule observance. Fig. 11 shows that safety reps and SAPs are least likely to exert production pressure even less likely than ``my colleagues'' and ``myself''. Thereafter, it is ``my boss'', ``team leader'' and `òther managers'' who are seen as the source of pressure and, most of all (at 29%) ``senior managers''. When considered in relation to senior managers' perceived low concern for safety, this is a cause for some concern. It should be re-emphasised that these are perceptions of the attitudes attaching to social roles, not objective behaviours. There is a signicant relationship between the perceived source of production pressure and accident history (Table 6). If respondents perceive the pressure to come mainly from the remoteness of senior management (29%), they have a better accident record than if they perceive it to be exerted by their team leaders (20%), their own colleagues (7%) or by SAPs (3%). There is an intermediate category of `my boss' (13%) and middle management (21%). Although senior management is commonly seen, ritually, to be ultimately responsible for exerting pressure, this inuence is
Fig. 11. Who exerts pressure to put production before safety? (n=506). Table 6 Perceived source of pressure to put production before safety by accident historya Role How often injured 0 Myself Senior management My boss Other management Average team leader Colleagues SAPs
a
1+ 68 38% 84 50% 93 61%
Total 181 100% 169 100% 153 100%
113 62% 85 50% 60 39%
Chi-square=17.415; P=<0.001.
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apparently too remote to aect accident rates. It is well known that peer pressure from colleagues is extremely powerful and it is gratifying to conrm that it is seen as rare (7%). This leaves the critical role of team leader if pressure for production comes from this source (20%) it is more likely to be associated with injury/accident. This nding on `pressure for production', like the previous one on `care in applying the safety rules', does not demonstrate a consistent relationship between the roles perceived to be exerting pressure and the 28 attitudes. 6.3. Source of safety suggestions Again using the same set of work roles, we asked about the most likely source of suggestions to improve safety. The results are shown in Fig. 12. It will be seen that the overwhelming majority are perceived to come from ``myself'', ``colleagues'' and ``safety reps''. It is encouraging that there should be mutual help and presumably trust at the peer level but the apparent lack of safety suggestions perceived to come from more senior levels deserves close attention. The main role of the SAPs is clearly to regulate and control safety but it is perhaps surprising that they are not seen in a more supportive role as the providers of constructive suggestions. They are seen in this role by only 4%, perhaps because they are the guardians of the existing rules and procedures. Again, team leaders are the ones whose designated role is to facilitate both production and safety and to be òn hand' at all times. Yet only 6% of the sample see them as the originators of safety suggestions. This is an important nding when added to the previous one on pressure for production. 6.4. Style of management Management style appears to have a strong eect on safety-related attitudes. No fewer than 16 attitudes are signicantly related to management style and these are plotted in Fig. 13.
Fig. 12. Who is most likely to suggest safety improvements? (n=634).
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Fig. 13. Attitude by style of management. 1, He/she never talks to me; 2, he/she tells me what to be done and how to do it; 3, he/she tells me what to be done and I decide how to do it; 4, he/she discisses the job with me and tells me how to do it; 5, he/she discusses the job with me and I decide how to do itn=667; Mean (three sites)=0. Only attitudes indicating signicant dierences (F ratios) are included. For denition of abbreviations see Table 1.
The categorisation of management style is shown moving broadly from `laissez faire' through àuthoritarian' to `democratic' in general accord with the literature on leadership and safety culture (ACSNI, 1993). This progression is associated with increasingly favourable attitudes towards safety on the part of `followers'. Predictably, the attitudes most closely aected include all four in the job satisfaction domain, i.e. contentment with the job, interest in the job, satisfaction with job relationships, and trust in colleagues; in the participation domain, perceived empowerment and general morale; in the condence in safety domain, all three except condence in safety standards; in the risk domain, organisational risk level is highly correlated with style of management. 6.5. Safety and team brieng There is an even closer correlation between safety attitudes and the attention given to safety in team briengs. All but four of the scales show consistent correlations with the variable, most with a high degree of signicance. The most frequent response (34%) is that safety is ``sometimes mentioned'' at the team briengs. Just under half of the total is accounted for by either ``safety takes equal priority'' (25%) or ``safety is often mentioned'' (22%). However, there is a disturbing residue. Safety is ``never'' mentioned in 7% of cases and no `team briefing' takes place at all for 12% of the total sample. Although the latter per cents are small, taken together they deserve attention. Also, the largest category, i.e. ``sometimes mentioned'' is clearly less than satisfactory given
89
the nding of a consistent relationship between the orientation of team briengs and safety-related attitudes. All but four of the scales show a signicant relationship and 15 are signicant beyond the 0.0001 level. The most conspicuous example is trust in colleagues. The general trend is clearly evident from Fig. 14 (a,b). The closer the attention given to safety in team briengs approaches ``safety is given equal priority . . .'', the more positive are the sta's attitudes towards safety. 6.6. The acceptance of safety suggestions An earlier section dealt with the alternative sources of safety suggestions; it is also helpful to consider the respondents' perceptions of what happens if he/she oers such suggestions.
Fig. 14. Team leaders' briengs on safety. 1, We do not have brieng. 2, safety is never mentioned; 3, safety is sometimes mentioned; 4, safety is often mentioned; 5, safety takes equal priority with operations. n=662; Mean (three sites)=0. for denition of abbreviations see Table 1.
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It is gratifying to learn that 50% claim to have suggested ways to improve safety which have been acted on. However, some of the alternative categories are clearly less satisfactory from the site safety point of view and together they add up to a sizeable percentage. Some suggestions have been ignored (14%) and a small percentage, surprisingly, claim they do not know how to make suggestions (8%). These together account for almost a quarter of sta. The group that has made suggestions which have not been acted on (10%) is hard to evaluate. The unknown factor here is obviously the quality of the suggestions, which may have been weak and rejection justied. But resentment may nonetheless have been born. The variable is signicantly related to 24 of the 28 scales. It can be seen from Fig. 15 (a,b) that there is an increasing trend towards positive attitudes in moving from ``suggestions ignored'' to ``don't feel the need to make suggestions'', although there is little to choose between ``suggestions not accepted'' and ``don't know how to make suggestions''. It is, however, unexpected that those who ``don't feel the need'' to make safety suggestions have very positive attitudes. It could imply a degree of complacency, incompatible with this end of the attitude spectrum. A more likely explanation is that the perceived lack of need to make safety suggestions arises from the nature of the work involved. Those opting for this response may be secretarial or administrative sta who have relatively more positive safety attitudes and who work in benign environments. 7. Discriminant function analysis Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA) is similar to a multiple regression but the dependent variable is binary. In our example it selects the betas by which each of the factors should be weighted to achieve the optimum predictive combination. The eectiveness of each of the predictors is indicated by their correlation with the function, enabling us to place them in rank order (Table 7). It should be pointed out that the predictive power of variables and their weightings depends on the choice of dependent variable. The one we have selected here, the rst of the non-radiological dependent variables, is expressed as follows, ``Have you ever had medical treatment as a result of an injury sustained while working on site even though you did not have time o work? (Yes/No)''. The results are presented as the number of cases that are correctly allocated by applying the function. The results in this case show that 66% of cases are allocated `correctly' to their respective groups. 28% of the àccident' group and 88% of the `no-accident' group. The variables are inserted stepwise into the analysis and it should be noted that the rst ve to be inserted are sucient to achieve maximum prediction and thereafter there is no further improvement. Notwithstanding, it is useful to see the ranking of the full set of variables and these are reproduced in Table 7, together with their correlations with the dependent variable. In a separate analysis, using the dependent variable ``how many times (0 or 1+). . . injured while working in this industry'', 63% of cases are correctly allocated, but the
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Fig. 15. Suggestions to improve safety. 1, Ihave suggested ways to improve safety but these have been ignored; 2, I have suggested ways to improve safety which have not been accepted; 3, I don't know how to suggest ways of improving safety; 4, I have suggested ways to improve safety which have been acted upon; 5, I don't feeel the need to make suggestions to improve safety. n=662; Mean (three sites)=0. For denition of abbreviations see Table 1.
percentage of the injury group identied is 72% compared with only 51% of the non-injury group (chi-square=70.743; df, 28; P=0.000). Similar results, but with some variation in the ordering of the `best' predictors, were obtained for the other (non-radiological) dependent variables. This procedure is helpful in three main ways. First, the attitudes that are most closely related to accident history can be given priority in any training or other safety management initiatives directed towards improvement. Secondly, when comparing performance between stations or across a time interval, a more rened assessment can be made by looking at which predictors are dierent or have changed. Third, it is conceivable that, with use of a suitable coding system to preserve anonymity, employees could in the future be warned that their prole of safety-related attitudes
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Table 7 Correlations between discriminating variables and discriminant function: dependent variable accident involving medical treatmenta Correlation with function 4-Ris 1-Con 1-Par 2-Str 1-Ris 2-Saf 3-Tra 1-Saf 1-Job 4-Job 2-Con 2-Par 3-Ctr 2-Ctr 2-Tra 3-Par 1-Ctr 2-Job 1-Str 3-Ris 2-Ris 3-Job 4-Con 3-Con 3-Str 3-Saf 4-Saf 1-Tra
a
Risk versus productivity Condence in control measures Perceived empowerment Job insecurity Organisational risk level Hazard identication/response General quality of training Complexity of instructions Contentment with the job Trust in colleagues Condence in anticipation/response Management's concern for safety Respect for contractors' role Satisfaction with contractors' safety Eectiveness of sta selection General morale Company support for contractors Satisfaction with job relationships Personal stress Risks of multi-skilling Personal risk taking Interest in the job Condence in safety standards Condence in reorganisation Management's concern for health Response to alarms Emergency procedures Quality of training induction
0.590 0.519 0.475 0.474 0.470 0.440 0.418 0.397 0.389 0.380 0.351 0.339 0.309 0.250 0.223 0.201 0.187 0.183 0.139 0.129 0.121 0.103 0.084 0.082 0.064 0.039 0.029 0.015
n=670; Chi-square = 63.31; df, 28; P=0.0002.
puts them at extra risk or implies membership of a sub-group with norms that could seriously impair the health of the safety culture. It was shown in the Sellaeld study (Lee, 1998) that the validity of the attitudinal scales could be substantially improved if the constituent items are weighted by DFA betas instead of factor loadings. However, the extra statistical sophistication serves to disaect managers who are seeking a practical tool and it was not incorporated in the present study. 8. Discussion Although the term `àttitude'' has been used for convenience in describing the factors emerging from the present analysis, it is not an accurate description in every case (see Section 1) An attitude is à relatively enduring predisposition to respond in
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certain ways (e.g. negatively or positively) in response to some aspect of a person's environment'. Apart from these motivational implications, it is composed of a whole set of beliefs (knowledge) about the object and an important emotional component. Hence, some of the measures we have used here, e.g. response to alarms, emergency procedures and induction training are more like knowledge structures or `schemas' than attitudes. They report (usefully) on normative behaviour and lack the motivational and emotional components that characterise, for example, perceived empowerment. This argument gains some support from the fact that two of those mentioned are among only three that are not signicant as predictors of accidents. The same argument applies to the elicitation of data about organisational variables, such as management style, safety suggestions and the role of safety in team briengs. There is scope for increasing the number of measures of this kind as a `subjective audit' of how the safety management system is actually working, as distinct from how comprehensive it is perceived to be. The distinction is not always clear cut and it is for this reason that the label of `personnel safety survey' is now preferred to that of `safety attitude survey' (Lee, 1998). As stated earlier, a comprehensive assessment of the total safety culture requires audit, peer review and performance indicator measures to be considered and their essential complementarity will eventually be represented in a more integrated form. Norms of attitudes and behaviour are important to safety culture as well as individual responses. This is not only because norms are, by denition, shared attitudes and behaviour but also because both are powerfully controlled by conformity to norms a process that generally acts as a condition of acceptance by social groups. Attitude change and behaviour modication also depend on this process and improvements are greatly facilitated if mediated through the inuence of the group. It is ìmplicit' or ìnformal' norms that `rule' and there is extensive evidence, going back to the Hawthorne studies, that these are dierent from formal norms. Mearns et al. (1998) have made the comment that despite the obvious relevance of norms to safety culture, researchers have not so far addressed them directly. There is a notable exception to this in Ignatov (1998). However, norms are no more than reduced variance of individual attitudes within groups, compared with the variance between groups. ANOVAS comparing the attitudes of dierent individuals or shifts, jobs or departments, as provided here, are just this. What could usefully extend such an analysis of norms is the identication of critical sub-groups, e.g. teams who do similar work but have sharply contrasting norms. More generally, minimal variance in the normative attitudes of constituent sub-groups is, by denition, an attribute of a healthy safety culture. By the same token, `roles' are the patterns of behaviour that characterise sta who occupy particular formal positions in the organisations, e.g. safety reps or team leaders. A beginning has been made in identifying these patterns of behaviour in, for example, management style and team leaders' briengs. Roles are, of course, complementary in organisations and teamwork, by denition. But again, a democratic style of leadership, for example, has a favourable eect on team members' attitudes and this role-behaviour should obviously be encouraged.
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A similar argument can be extended to `values', which gure prominently in some denitions of safety culture. A value is superordinate to an attitude; e.g. `safety' is a value which may be said to encompass, for example, condence in control measures, trust in colleagues, and hazard identication/response. One measure of a safety value is the CFS referred to earlier, but other sub-sets are clearly possible, such as the domains used in the present study. There is a major dilemma in producing a practical tool for the nuclear industry in that the pervasive engineering tradition in the industry makes it dicult to communicate about concepts and statistical methods that originate in the behavioural sciences. Closing this gap by clarifying and simplifying communication with managements without resorting to simple-minded or degraded assessment methodology, is a challenge. At least it can be said that the perceived value of such approaches is advancing rapidly in the light of the growing consensus that human shortcomings are now at the root of the majority of failures. A comprehensive account has been given of one approach to the evaluation of safety cultures, covering both its theoretical basis and practical implications. It should be pointed out that the former is more accepted than the latter. Safety attitudes are already chosen by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the most pertinent elements of a safety culture for use in their Diagnostic Evaluation Program. These are the intensive `peer reviews' carried out in selected stations that appear to have `signicant performance problems'. (Rubin, 1985). A team of about 15 experienced assessors spend 56 weeks studying all available documentary evidence on the plant's performance. This is followed by 3 weeks of direct observations on the site itself, covering equipment inspections, licensee meetings, maintenance testing, training and control room activities plus about 100 formal interviews carried out by the entire team. The collation of these data and production of the report must require several more weeks. The nal èxpert judgements' about safety attitudes have the virtue of being holistic, but the disadvantage of being subjective, even perhaps impressionistic. The total cost is not estimated by the author, but salaries must put it in the region of $250,000 plus for a single review. A less costly alternative, presumably for more routine application, has been devised by contract researchers and is under review by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Twenty organisational dimensions have been identied and dened, comprising ``. . . what is believed to be a comprehensive taxonomy. . . that relates to the safe operation of nuclear power plants'' (Haber et al., 1995, p. 711). The input data consist largely of retrospective performance documentation such as Inspection Reports, Licensee Event Reports and Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Ratings. These are supplemented by structured interviews, behavioural checklists and behavioural anchored rating scales. This systematic review procedure is an excellent model of its kind, but still dependent on èxpert judgement' by peers who may be prone to the same `blind spots' and biases as those under scrutiny. About half of the 20 organisational variables are similar to those in the present study. Others, indeed all, although undoubtedly pertinent to safety culture, must present a major challenge for valid qualitative judgement. There is room for only one example here:
95
Goal setting this refers to the extent to which plant personnel understand, accept and agree with the purpose and relevance of goals Given that cost-eectiveness is an issue, it is relevant to this discussion that an othe-shelf, do-it-yourself safety survey package, including the necessary software, has been issued by the UK HSE. It is based on their Guidance Document HS(G)65 entitled ``Successful Health and Safety Management''. An item set of 71 is reduced to 10 factors and these can be cross-tabulated to give measurements for manager, supervisor and team member. This is undoubtedly a welcome development, not least because it signies òcial' endorsement of the survey approach. HSE justify this from their experience that ``. . .organisations felt that they had made a step change in improvement when determined eorts were made to actively involve the workforce in health and safety'' (Byrom and Corbridge, 1997, p. 3). However, convenience and economy is bought at a price. For example, dierences may be expected between the safety problems and safety management systems of dierent organisations; an ideal instrument should be customised for, for example the construction, oshore oil, service, or manufacturing industries. More detailed breakdown of sub-groups would seem desirable. In addition, some organisations would wish for individual customisation, as an extension to a core set of questions, to be included in the analysis of factors. They would wish to know how the survey instrument was developed and to see data conrming its reliability and validity (Cooper, 1998). Another issue is condentiality, which needs to be taken very seriously. The administration and analysis of results by management themselves may raise unwarranted suspicions in some sections of the workforce. Other aspects of an ideal tool (which awaits development) is that it should be synchronised with an audit of the safety management system and, in order to inform subsequent action, should cover a wide (but not too detailed) range of measures. This should probably be no more than 2030 for ease of communication. The `tool' should allow for all relevant cross-breaks, e.g. by job types and levels, departments, shifts and other demographic variables. The capacity to benchmark against similar organisations and to assess the eects of interventions or improvements over time are further desirable qualities. It goes without saying that its factors should be valid, shown to have internal reliability and their relative importance to injury/accident rates known. In conclusion, the study reported here has added to the mounting evidence that these ideal attributes of a Personnel Safety Survey are achievable. It is clearly possible to derive robust but sensitive (i.e. discriminating) reliable and valid measurements from the workforce that can ultimately deliver comparisons across time and between organisations. But more important, they can be used to target the continuing eorts to evolve a strong safety culture. 9. Disclaimer The views in this report represent those of the authors, and may not represent the views of any of the UK Nuclear Industry Licensees or the Regulator, represented on
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the Industry Management Committee which sponsored this work as part of the HSE Nuclear Safety Research Programme. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge with gratitude the collaboration of the Station Directors and sta of the three power stations taking part in this study. Also, the help and support of Peter Ackroyd and Ray Hughes, who provided invaluable liaison throughout. Dr. Peter Ball and Caroline Sibley made helpful contributions to the research in the early stages. The research was sponsored by the Industry Management Committee (Human Factors Sub-Committee) of the HSE Nuclear Safety Research Programme. References
ACSNI, 1993. Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations: Human Factors Study Group Third Report: Organising for Safety. HSE Books, Sheeld. Allen, B., 1986. Attitudes to safety. The Safety Practitioner March 912 Beck, K.H., Feldman, R.H.L., 1983. Information seeking among safety and health managers. The Journal of Psychology 115, 2331. Blum, M.L., Naylor, J.C. (Eds) (1968). Industrial Psychology. London: Harper & Row. Brown, R.L., Holmes, H., 1986. The use of a factor-analytic procedure for assessing the validity of an employee safety climate model. Accident Analysis and Prevention 18 (6), 455470. Byrom, N., Corbridge, J., 1997. A tool to assess aspects of an organisation's health and safety climate. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Safety Culture in the Energy Industries, University of Aberdeen, 2224 September. Cooper, M.D., 1998. Improving Safety Culture: a Practical Guide. John Wiley, Chichester. Cox, S., Cox, T., 1991. The structure of employee attitudes to safety: a European example. Work & Stress 5 (2), 93106. Cox, S., Cheyne, A.J.T., Alexander, M., 1997. Safety culture in oshore environments: developing the safety climate measurement tool. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Safety Culture in the Energy Industries, University of Aberdeen, 2224 September Coyle, I.R., Sleeman, S.T., Adams, N., 1995. Safety Climate. Journal of Safety Research 26 (4), 247254. Donald, I., 1994. Measuring psychological factors in safety. Safety and Health Practitioner March, 2629. Donald, I., 1997. Generating positive safety performance. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Safety Culture in the Energy Industries, University of Aberdeen, 2224 September. Donald, I., Canter, D., 1994. Employee attitudes and safety in the chemical industry. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 7, 203208. Donald, I., Young, S., 1996. Managing safety: an attitudinal-based approach to improving safety in organization. Leadership & Organization Development Journal 17 (4), 1320. Flin, R., Mearns, K., Fleming, M., Gordon, R., 1996. Risk Perception and Safety in the Oshore Oil and Gas Industry (OSD Report OTH 94454) HSE Books, Sheeld. Glennon, D.E., 1982. Safety climate in organizations. Ergonomics and occupational health. In: Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Ergonomics Society of Australia and New Zealand, pp. 1731. Griths, D.K., 1985. Safety attitudes of management. Ergonomics 1, 6167. Grote, G., Ku nzler, 2000. Diagnosis of safety culture in safety management audits. Safety Science 34 (13), 131150.
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Haber, S.B., Shurberg, D.A., Jacobs, R., Homan, D., 1995. Safety culture management: the importance of organizational factors. In: Proceedings of the International Topical Meeting on Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations, Vienna, Austria, 2428 April Ignatov, M., 1998. Implicit norms as elements of the safety culture. In: Proceedings of IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on Safety Culture Self-Assessment Highlights and Good Practices, Vienna, 35 June 1998. Jonson, K.M., 1982. Diagnostic analysis of safety issues. In: Proceedings of the First National Conference on Industrial Safety, Sydney, Australia, pp. 3039. Lee, T.R., 1997. How can we monitor the safety culture and improve it where necessary? In: Proceedings of International Conference on Safety Culture in the Energy Industries, University of Aberdeen, 2224 September. Lee, T.R., 1998. Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant. Work and Stress 2, 217237. Lee, T.R., Coote, J.A., 1993. Employee Perceptions of Safety at Sellaeld. Initial results of the safety survey carried out in 1991/92. BNFL, Risley, Warrington. Lee, T.R., Sibley, C.J., 1996. A Qualitative Study of Safety Culture; in the Nuclear Industry (Unpublished). Lutness, J., 1987. Measuring up: assessing safety with climate surveys. Occupational Health and Safety 56 (2), 2026. Marcus, A.A., 1988. Implementing externally induced innovations a comparison of rule-bound and autonomous processes. Academy of Management Journal 3, 235256. Marek, J., Iversen, E., Hellesy, O.H., 1987. Risk, organization and safety on an oil platform. In: Singleton, W.T., Hovden, J. (Eds.), Risk and Decisions. Wiley, New York, pp. 123138. Mearns, K., Flin, R., Fleming, M., Gordon, R., 1997. Measuring safety climate on oshore installations. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Safety Culture in the Energy Industries, University of Aberdeen, 2224 September. Mearns, K., Flin, R., Gordon, R., O'Connor, P., 1998. The eect of culture on the safety climate of oshore installations. In: Proceedings of Society for Risk Analysis Conference, Paris, 1114 October. Norusis, M.J., 1994. SPSS Professional Statistics 6.1. SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL. Olearnik, H., Canter, D., 1988. Empirical validation of the relationship between safety attitudes and industrial accidents. In: Proceedings of British Psychological Society London Conference, 1920 September. Ostrom, L.T., Wilhelmsen, C.A., Kaplan, B.K., 1993. Assessing safety culture. Nuclear Safety 34, 163171. au Purdham, J.T., 1984. Etude Bibliographique sur les Attitudes, les Roles et leurs Eets sur la Securite Travail (a review of the literature on attitudes and roles and their eects on safety in the workplace). Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, Hamilton, Ontario. Roethlisberger, F.J. & Dickson, W.J. (1939). Management and the worker. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Rubin, S., 1995. Safety attitudes identied during diagnostic evaluations. In: Proceedings of the International Topical Meeting on Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations, Vienna, Austria, 2428 April. Rundmo, T., 1992a. Risk perception and safety on oshore petroleum platforms Part I: perception of risk. Safety Science 15, 3952. Rundmo, T., 1992b. Risk perception and safety on oshore petroleum platforms Part II: perceived risk job stress and accidents. Safety Science 15, 5368. Rundmo, T., 1995. Peceived risk, safety status, and job stress among injured and noninjured employees on oshore petroleum installations. Journal of Safety Research 26 (2), 97. Schneider, B., 1975. Organizational climates: an essay. Personnel Psychology 28, 447479. Sheehy, N.P., Chapman, A.J., 1984. Accidents and safety. In: Gale, A., Chapman, A.J. (Eds.), Psychology and Social Problems. John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 171190. Sheehy, N.P., Chapman, A.J., 1987. Industrial accidents. In Cooper, C.L., Robertson, I. (Eds.). International Review of Industrial and Organisational Psychology. John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 201207. Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1973. Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology 5, 207232. Wreathall, J., 1995. Organizational culture, behavioral norms, and safety. In: Proceedings of the International Topical Meeting on Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations, Vienna, Austria, 2428 April. Zohar, F., 1980. Safety climate in industrial organisations theoretical and applied implications. Journal of Applied Psychology 65, 96102.

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Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

Assessing safety culture in nuclear power stations$

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

68 Table 1 Domains and factors Domaina

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

Table 2 Examples of items included : four factors

Factor loadings 0.370 0.779 0.802 0.693 0.697 0.521

0.310 0.608 0.611 0.654 0.634 0.644 0.639

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

1.19 0.234 1.41 0.160 1.53 0.133 1.19 0.235

0.53 0.598 0.61 0.09 0.929 0.52 0.74

0.70 0.486 0.75 0.455 1.36 0.176

0.47 0.636 0.25 0.802 1.68 0.093

0.84 0.402 0.36 0.722

1.54 0.126 0.17 0.31 0.757 1.60 1.67 0.096 1.05

0.74 0.461 1.58 0.115 1.91 0.058 3.87

2.79 0.005 2.26 0.024 1.25 0.211 1.52 0.130

(continued on next page)

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

2.82 0.024 8.03 0.000 0.69 0.596 0.94 0.441

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

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Fig. 2. Attitude by 3-day accidents [n=671; Mean (three sites)=0].

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

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Fig. 4. Attitudes by type of job.

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

Fig. 6. Attitude changes with age: craft workers (n=77).

Fig. 7. Attitude changes with age: Plant operators (n=88).

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

Fig. 8. Attitude by gender [n=649; Mean (three sites)=0].

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

Fig. 9. Attitudes by days/shifts (excluding days-only) [n=546; Mean (three sites)=0].

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

1+ 235 49% 59 38%

Total 479 100% 156 100%

244 51% 97 62%

Chi-square = 6.133; P=<0.02.

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

1+ 68 38% 84 50% 93 61%

Total 181 100% 169 100% 153 100%

113 62% 85 50% 60 39%

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

Fig. 12. Who is most likely to suggest safety improvements? (n=634).

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

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n=670; Chi-square = 63.31; df, 28; P=0.0002.

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197

T. Lee, K. Harrison / Safety Science 34 (2000) 6197