Foreign Affairs Summer 1993, 72/3

The Clash of Civilizations?

Samuel P. Huntington I. THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be -- the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is li ely to be in the coming years. !t is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. "he great divisions among human ind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. #ation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civili$ations. "he clash of civili$ations will be the battle lines of the future. %onflict between civili$ations will be the latest phase of the evolution of conflict in the modern world. &or a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system of the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes -- emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to e'pand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. !n the process they created nation states, and beginning with the &rench (evolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. !n )*+,, as (. (. Palmer put it, -"he wars of ings were over. the ward of peoples had begun.- "his nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War !. "hen, as a result of the (ussian (evolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism#a$ism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. /uring the %old War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of ideology. "hese conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civili$ation, -Western civil wars,- as William 0ind has labeled them. "his was as true of the %old War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the %old War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its center-piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civili$ations and among non-Western civili$ations. !n the politics of civili$ations, the people and governments of non-Western civili$ations no longer remain the ob1ects of history as targets of Western colonialism but 1oin the West as movers and shapers of history. II. THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATION /uring the cold war the world was divided into the &irst, Second and "hird Worlds. "hose divisions are no longer relevant. !t is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civili$ation. What do we mean when we tal of a civili$ation2 3 civili$ation is a cultural entity. 4illages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. "he culture of a village in southern !taly may be different from that of a village in northern !taly, but both will share in a common !talian culture that distinguishes them from 5erman villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from 3rab or %hinese communities. 3rabs, %hinese and Westerners, however,

are not part of any broader cultural entity. "hey constitute civili$ations. 3 civili$ation is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. !t is defined both by common ob1ective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the sub1ective selfidentification of people. People have levels of identity6 a resident of (ome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a (oman, an !talian, a %atholic, a %hristian, a European, a Westerner. "he civili$ation to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civili$ations change. %ivili$ations may involve a large number of people, as with %hina 7-a civili$ation pretending to be a state,- as 0ucian Pye put it8, or a very small number of people, such as the 3nglophone %aribbean. 3 civili$ation may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, 0atin 3merican and 3rab civili$ations, or only one, as is the case with 9apanese civili$ation. %ivili$ations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivili$ations. Western civili$ation has two ma1or variants, European and #orth 3merican, and !slam has its 3rab, "ur ic and :alay subdivisions. %ivili$ations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. %ivili$ations are dynamic. they rise and fall. they divide and merge. 3nd, as any student of history nows, civili$ations disappear and are buried in the sands of time. Westerners tend to thin of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. "hey have been that, however, for only a few centuries. "he broader reaches of human history have been the history of civili$ations. !n 3 Study of History, 3rnold "oynbee identified ;) ma1or civili$ations. only si' of them e'ist in the contemporary world. III. !H" CIVILIZATION !ILL CLA H %ivili$ation identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight ma1or civili$ations. "hese include Western, %onfucian, 9apanese, !slamic, Hindu, Slavic-<rthodo', 0atin 3merican and possibly 3frican civili$ation. "he most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civili$ations from one another. Why will this be the case2 &irst, differences among civili$ations are not only real. they are basic. %ivili$ations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. "he people of different civili$ations have different views on the relations between 5od and man, the individual and the group, the citi$en and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, e=uality and hierarchy. "hese differences are the product of centuries. "hey will not soon disappear. "hey are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. /ifferences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. <ver the centuries, however, differences among civili$ations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. "he interactions between peoples of different civili$ations are increasings. these increasing interactions intensify civili$ation consciousness and awareness of differences between civili$ations and commonalities within civili$ations. #orth 3frican immigration to &rance generates hostility among &renchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by -good- European %atholic Poles. 3mericans react far more negatively to 9apanese investment than to larger investments from %anada and European countries. Similarly, as /onald Horowit$ has pointed out, -3n !bo may be . . . an <werri !bo or an <nitsha !bo in what was the Eastern region of #igeria. !n 0agos, he is simply an !bo. !n 0ondon, he is a #igerian. !n #ew Yor , he is an 3frican.- "he interactions among peoples of different civili$ations enhance the civili$ation-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch bac deep into history.

"hird, the processes of economic moderni$ation and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. "hey also wea en the nation state as a source of identity. !n much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled -fundamentalist.- Such movements are found in Western %hristianity, 9udaism, >uddhism and Hinduism, as well as in !slam. !n most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middleclass technicians, professionals and business persons. "he -unseculari$ation of the world,5eorge Weigel has remar ed, -is one of the dominant social factors of life in the late twentieth century.- "he revival of religion, -la revanche de /ieu,- as 5illes ?epel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civili$ations. &ourth, the growth of civili$ation-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. <n the one hand, the West is at a pea of power. 3t the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civili$ations. !ncreasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and -3siani$ation- in 9apan, the end of the #ehru legacy and the -Hindui$ation- of !ndia, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence -re-!slami$ation- of the :iddle East, and now a debate over Westerni$ation versus (ussiani$ation in >oris Yeltsin@s country. 3 West at the pea of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. !n the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at <'ford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. 3t the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. #ow, however, these relationships are being reversed. 3 de-Westerni$ation and indigeni$ation of elites is occurring in many nonWestern countries at the same time that Western, usually 3merican, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people. &ifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. !n the former Soviet Anion, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but (ussians cannot become Estonians and 3$eris cannot become 3rmenians. !n class and ideological conflicts, the ey =uestion was -Which side are you on2- and people could and did choose sides and change sides. !n conflicts between civili$ations, the =uestion is -What are you2- "hat is a given that cannot be changed. 3nd as we now, from >osnia to the %aucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that =uestion can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and e'clusively among people. 3 person can be half-&rench and half-3rab and simultaneously even a citi$en of two countries. !t is more difficult to be half-%atholic and half-:uslim. &inally, economic regionalism is increasing. "he proportions of total trade that are intraregional rose between )+BC and )+B+ from D) percent to D+ percent in Europe, ,, percent to ,* percent in East 3sia, and ,; percent to ,E percent in #orth 3merica. "he importance of regional economic blocs is li ely to continue to increase in the future. <n the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civili$ation-consciousness. <n the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civili$ation. "he European %ommunity rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western %hristianity. "he success of the #orth 3merican &ree "rade 3rea depends on the convergence now underway of :e'ican, %anadian and 3merican cultures. 9apan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East 3sia because 9apan is a society and civili$ation uni=ue to itself. However strong the trade and investment lin s 9apan may develop with other East 3sian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration li e that in Europe and #orth 3merica.

%ommon culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid e'pansion of the economic relations between the People@s (epublic of %hina and Hong ?ong, "aiwan, Singapore and the overseas %hinese communities in other 3sian countries. With the %old War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland %hina and "aiwan move closer together. !f cultural commonality is a prere=uisite for economic integration, the principal East 3sian economic bloc of the future is li ely to be centered on %hina. "his bloc is, in fact, already coming into e'istence. 3s :urray Weidenbaum has observed, F/espite the current 9apanese dominance of the region, the %hinese-based economy of 3sia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. "his strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability 7"aiwan8, outstanding entrepreneurial, mar eting and services acumen 7Hong ?ong8, a fine communications networ 7Singapore8, a tremendous pool of financial capital 7all three8, and very large endowments of land, resources and labor 7mainland %hina8. . . . &rom 5uang$hou to Singapore, from ?uala 0umpur to :anila, this influential networ -- often based on e'tensions of the traditional clans -has been described as the bac bone of the East 3sian economy.G) %ulture and religion also form the basis of the Economic %ooperation <rgani$ation, which brings together ten non-3rab :uslim countries6 !ran, Pa istan, "ur ey, 3$erbai1an, ?a$a hstan, ?yrgy$stan, "ur menistan, "ad1i istan, A$be istan and 3fghanistan. <ne impetus to the revival and e'pansion of this organi$ation, founded originally in the )+ECs by "ur ey, Pa istan and !ran, is the reali$ation by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European %ommunity. Similarly, %aricom, the %entral 3merican %ommon :ar et and :ercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader %aribbean-%entral 3merican economic entity bridging the 3nglo-0atin divide, however, have to date failed. 3s people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are li ely to see an -us- versus -them- relation e'isting between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. "he end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Anion permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. /ifferences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. 5eographical propin=uity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from >osnia to :indanao. :ost important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism to universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civili$ations. /ecreasingly able to mobili$e support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobili$e support by appealing to common religion and civili$ation identity. "he clash of civili$ations thus occurs at two levels. 3t the micro-level, ad1acent groups along the fault lines between civili$ations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. 3t the macro-level, states from different civili$ations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values. IV. THE FAULT LINE #ET!EEN CIVILIZATION "he fault lines between civili$ations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the %old War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. "he %old War began when the !ron %urtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. "he %old War ended with the end of the !ron %urtain. 3s the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western %hristianity, on the one hand, and <rthodo' %hristianity and !slam, on the other, has reemerged. "he most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western %hristianity in the year )DCC. "his line runs along what are now the boundaries between &inland and (ussia and between the >altic
1

:urray Weidenbaum, 5reater %hina6 "he #e't Economic Superpower2, St. 0ouis6 Washington Aniversity %enter for the Study of 3merican >usiness, %ontemporary !ssues, Series D*, &ebruary )++,, pp. ;-,.

states and (ussia, cuts through >elarus and A raine separating the more %atholic western A raine from <rthodo' eastern A raine, swings westward separating "ransylvania from the rest of (omania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost e'actly along the line now separating %roatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. !n the >al ans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and <ttoman empires. "he peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or %atholic. they shared the common e'periences of European history -- feudalism, the (enaissance, the (eformation, the Enlightenment, the &rench (evolution, the !ndustrial (evolution. they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east. and they may now loo forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. "he peoples to the east and south of this line are <rthodo' or :uslim. they historically belonged to the <ttoman or "sarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe. they are generally less advanced economically. they seem much less li ely to develop stable democratic political systems. "he 4elvet %urtain of culture has replaced the !ron %urtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. 3s the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference. it is also at times a line of bloody conflict. %onflict along the fault line between Western and !slamic civili$ations has been going on for ),,CC years. 3fter the founding of !slam, the 3rab and :oorish surge west and north only ended at "ours in *,;. &rom the eleventh to the thirteenth century the %rusaders attempted with temporary success to bring %hristianity and %hristian rule to the Holy 0and. &rom the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the <ttoman "ur s reversed the balance, e'tended their sway over the :iddle East and the >al ans, captured %onstantinople, and twice laid siege to 4ienna. !n the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at <ttoman power declined >ritain, &rance, and !taly established Western control over most of #orth 3frica and the :iddle East. 3fter World War !!, the West, in turn, began to retreat. the colonial empires disappeared. first 3rab nationalism and then !slamic fundamentalism manifested themselves. the West became heavily dependent on the Persian 5ulf countries for its energy. the oil-rich :uslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between 3rabs and !srael 7created by the West8. &rance fought a bloody and ruthless war in 3lgeria for most of the )+DCs. >ritish and &rench forces invaded Egypt in )+DE. 3merican forces returned to 0ebanon, attac ed 0ibya, and engaged in various military encounters with !ran. 3rab and !slamic terrorists, supported by at least three :iddle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the wea and bombed Western planes and installations and sei$ed Western hostages. "his warfare between 3rabs and the West culminated in )++C, when the Anited States sent a massive army to the Persian 5ulf to defend some 3rab countries against aggression by another. !n its aftermath #3"< planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its -southern tier."his centuries-old military interaction between the West and !slam is unli ely to decline. !t could become more virulent. "he 5ulf War left some 3rabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attac ed !srael and stood up to the West. !t also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West@s military presence in the Persian 5ulf, the West@s overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape theirown destiny. :any 3rab countries, in addition to the oil e'porters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in 3rab political systems have already occurred. "he principal beneficiaries of these openings have been !slamist movements. !n the 3rab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. "his may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between !slamic countries and the West. "hose relations are also complicated by demography. "he spectacular population growth in 3rab countries, particularly in #orth 3frica, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. "he movement within Western Europe toward minimi$ing internal boundaries has sharpened political

sensitivities with respect to this development. !n !taly, &rance and 5ermany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against 3rab and "ur ish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since )++C. <n both sides the interaction between !slam and the West is seen as a clash of civili$ations. "he West@s -ne't confrontation,- observes :. 9. 3 bar, an !ndian :uslim author, -is definitely going to come from the :uslim world. !t is in the sweep of the !slamic nations from the :eghreb to Pa istan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.- >ernard 0ewis comes to a regular conclusion6 -We are facing a need and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. "his is no less than a clash of civili$ations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our 9udeo-%hristian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide e'pansion of both.G; Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of 3rab !slamic civili$ation has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly %hristian blac peoples to the south. !n the past, this antagonism was epitomi$ed in the image of 3rab slave dealers and blac slaves. !t has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between 3rabs and blac s, the fighting in %had between 0ibyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between <rthodo' %hristians and :uslims in the Horn of 3frica, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between :uslims and %hristians in #igeria. "he moderni$ation of 3frica and the spread of %hristianity in #igeria. "he moderni$ation of 3frica and the spread of %hristianity are li ely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope 9ohn Paul !!@s speech in ?hartoum in &ebruary )++, attac ing the actions of the Sudan@s !slamist government against the %hristian minority there. <n the northern border of !slam, conflict has increasingly erupted between <rthodo' and :uslim peoples, including the carnage of >osnia and Sara1evo, the simmering violence between Serb and 3lbanian, the tenuous relation between >ulgarians and their "ur ish minority, the violence between <ssetians and !ngush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by 3rmenians and 3$eris, the tense relations between (ussians and :uslims in %entral 3sia, and the deployment of (ussian troops to protect (ussian interests in the %aucasus and %entral 3sia. (eligion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates (ussian fears about the security of their southern borders. "his concern is well captured by 3rchie (oosevelt6 F:uch of (ussian history concerns the struggle between Slavs and the "ur ish peoples on their borders, which dates bac to the foundation of the (ussian state more than a thousand years ago. !n the Slavs@ millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the ey to an understanding not only of (ussian history, but (ussian character. "o under (ussian realities today one has to have a concept of the great "ur ic ethnic group that has preoccupied (ussians through the centuries.G, "he conflict of civili$ations is deeply rooted elsewhere in 3sia. "he historic clash between :uslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only is the rivalry between Pa istan and !ndia but also in intensifying religious strife within !ndia between increasingly militant Hindu groups and !ndia@s substantial :uslim minority. "he destruction of the 3yodhya mos=ue in /ecember )++; brought to the fore the issue of whether !ndia will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. !n East 3sia, %hina has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. !t has pursued a ruthless policy toward the >uddhist people of "ibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its "ur ic-:uslim minority. With the %old War over, the underlying differences between %hina and the Anited States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. "hese differences are
2

>ernard 0ewis, -"he (oots of :uslim (age,- "he 3tlantic :onthly, vol. ;EE, September )++C, p. Eo. "ime, 9une )D, )++;, pp. ;H-;B. 3 3rchie (oosevelt, &or 0ust of ?nowing, >oston6 0ittle, >rown, i+BB, PP ,,;-,,,.

unli ely to moderate. 3 -new cold war,- /eng Iaioping reportedly asserted in )++), is under way between %hina and 3merica. "he same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between 9apan and the Anited States. Here cultural difference e'acerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least on the 3merican side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. "he basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more different. "he economic issues between the Anited States and Europe are no less serious than those between the Anited States and 9apan, but they do not have thesame political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between 3merican culture and European culture are so much less than those between 3merican civili$ation and 9apanese civili$ation. "he interactions between civili$ations vary greatly in the e'tent to which they are li ely to be characteri$ed by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the 3merican and European subcivili$ations of the West and between both of them and 9apan. <n the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomi$ed at the e'treme in -ethnic cleansing,- has not been totally random. !t has been most fre=uent and most violent between groups belonging to different civili$ations. !n Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civili$ations are once more aflame. "his is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescentshaped !slamic bloc of nations from the bulge of 3frica to central 3sia. 4iolence also occurs between :uslims, on the one hand, and <rthodo' Serbs in the >al ans, 9ews in !srael, Hindus in !ndia, >uddhists in >urma and %atholics in the Philippines. !slam has bloody borders. V. CIVILIZATION RALL"IN$ "he in-country syndrome groups or states belonging to one civili$ation that become involved in war with people from a different civili$ation naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civili$ation. 3s the post-%old War world evolves, civili$ation commonality, what H. /. S. 5reenway has termed the - in-country- syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. !t can be seen gradually emerging in the post-%old War conflicts in the Persian 5ulf, the %aucasus and >osnia. #one of these was a full-scale war between civili$ations, but each involved some elements of civili$ation rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future. &irst, in the 5ulf War one 3rab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of 3rab, Western and other states. While only a few :uslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many 3rab elites privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the 3rab publics. !slamic fundamentalist movements universally supported !ra= rather than the Western-bac ed governments of ?uwait and Saudi 3rabia. &orswearing 3rab nationalism, Saddam Hussein e'plicitly invo ed an !slamic appeal. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civili$ations. -!t is not the world against !ra=,- as Safar 3l-Hawali, dean of !slamic Studies at the Amm 3l-Jura Aniversity in :ecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. -!t is the West against !slam.- !gnoring the rivalry between !ran and !ra=, the chief !ranian religious leader, 3yatollah 3li ?hamenei, called for a holy war against the West6 -"he struggle against 3merican aggression, greed, plans and policies will be counted as a 1ahad, and anybody who is illed on that path is a martyr.--"his is a war,- ?ing Hussein of 9ordan argued, -against all 3rabs and all :uslims and not against !ra= alone."he rallying of substantial sections of 3rab elites and publics behind Saddam Hussein called those 3rab governments in the anti-!ra= coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. 3rab governments opposed or distanced themselves from subse=uent Western efforts to apply pressure on !ra=, including enforcement of a no-fly $one in the summer of )++; and the bombing of !ra= in 9anuary )++,. "he Western-Soviet-"ur ish-3rab anti-!ra= coalition of )++C had by )++, become a coalition of almost only the West and ?uwait against !ra=.

:uslims contrasted Western actions against !ra= with the West@s failure to protect >osnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on !srael for violating A.#. resolutions. "he West, they allege, was using a double standard. 3 world of clashing civili$ations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards6 people apply one standard to their in-countries and a different standard to others. Second, the in-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Anion. 3rmenian military successes in )++; and )++, stimulated "ur ey to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in 3$erbai1an. -We have a "ur ish nation feeling the same sentiments as the 3$erbai1anis,- said one "ur ish official in )++;. -We are under pressure. <ur newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are as ing us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. :aybe we should show 3rmenia that there@s a big "ur ey in the region.- President "urgut <$al agreed, remar ing that "ur ey should at least -scare the 3rmenians a little bit.- "ur ey, <$al threatened again in )++,, would -show its fangs."ur ey 3ir &orce 1ets flew reconnaissance flights along the 3rmenian border. "ur ey suspended food shipments and air flights to 3rmenia. and "ur ey and !ran announced they would not accept dismemberment of 3$erbai1an. !n the last years of its e'istence, the Soviet government supported 3$erbai1an because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Anion, however, political considerations gave way to religious ones. (ussian troops fought on the Side of the 3rmenians, and 3$erbai1an accused the -(ussian government of turning )BC degrees- toward support for %hristian 3rmenia. "hird, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy andsupport for the >osnian :uslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. (elatively little concern was e'pressed, however, over %roatian attac s on :uslims and participation in the dismemberment of >osnia-Her$egovina. !n the early stages of the Yugoslav brea up, 5ermany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other )) members of the European %ommunity to follow its lead in recogni$ing Slovenia and %roatia. 3s a result of the pope@s determination to provide strong bac ing to the two %atholic countries, the 4atican e'tended recognition even before the %ommunity did. "he Anited States followed the European lead. "hus the leading actors in Western civili$ation rallied behind its coreligionists. Subse=uently %roatia was reported to be receiving substantial =uantities of arms from %entral European and other Western countries. >oris Yeltsin@s government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the <rthodo' Serbs but not alienate (ussia from the West. (ussian conservative and nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attac ed the government for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. >y early )++, several hundred (ussians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of (ussian arms being supplied to Serbia. !slamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the >osnians. !ranian leaders urged :uslims from all countries to provide help to >osnia. in violation of the A.#. arms embargo, !ran supplied weapons and men for the >osnians. !ranian-supported 0ebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organi$e the >osnian forces. !n )++, up to H,CCC :uslims from over two do$en !slamic countries were reported to be fighting in >osnia. "he governments of Saudi 3rabia and other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the >osnians. >y the end of )++;, Saudi 3rabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the >osnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-a-vis the Serbs. !n the )+,Cs the Spanish %ivil War provo ed intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. !n the )++Cs the Yugoslav conflict is provo ing intervention from countries that are :uslim, <rthodo' and Western %hristian. "he parallel has not gone unnoticed. -"he war in >osnia-Her$egovina has become the emotional e=uivalent of the fight

against fascism in the Spanish %ivil War,- one Saudi editor observed. -"hose who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow :uslims.%onflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civili$ation. Such conflicts, however, are li ely to be less intense and less li ely to e'pand than conflicts between civili$ations. %ommon membership in a civili$ation reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. !n )++) and )++; many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between (ussia and A raine over territory, particularly %rimea, the >lac Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. !f civili$ation is what counts, however, the li elihood of violence between A rainians and (ussians should be low. "hey are two Slavic, primarily <rthodo' peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. 3s of early )++,, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between :uslims and %hristians elsewhere in the former Soviet Anion and much tension and some fighting between Western and <rthodo' %hristians in the >altic states, there has been virtually no violence between (ussians and A rainians. %ivili$ation rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. 3s the conflicts in the Persian 5ulf, the %aucasus and >osnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civili$ational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potential means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. !n the coming years, the local conflicts most li ely to escalate into ma1or wars will be those, as in >osnia and the %aucasus, along the fault lines between civili$ations. "he ne't world war, if there is one, will be a war between civili$ations. VI. THE !E T VER U THE RE T "he West is now at an e'traordinary pea of power in relation to other civili$ations. !n superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. :ilitary conflict among Western states is unthin able, and Western military power is unrivaled. 3part from 9apan, the West faces no economic challenge. !t dominates international economic institutions. 5lobal political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the Anited States, >ritain and &rance, world economic issues by a directorate of the Anited States, 5ermany and 9apan, all of which maintain e'traordinarily close relations with each other to the e'clusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. /ecisions made at the A.#. Security %ouncil or in the !nternational :onetary &und that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. "he very phrase -the world community- has become the euphemistic collective noun 7replacing -the &ree World-8 to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the Anited States and other Western powers.H "hrough the !:& and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thin s appropriate. !n any poll of non-Western peoples, the !:& undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from 1ust about everyone else, who would agree with 5eorgy 3rbatov@s characteri$ation of !:& officials as -neo->olshevi s who love e'propriating other people@s money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom.Western domination of the A.#. Security %ouncil and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by %hina, produced A.#. legitimation of the West@s use of force to drive !ra= out of ?uwait and its elimination of !ra=@s sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. !t also produced the =uite unprecedented action by the Anited States, >ritain and
4

3lmost invariably Western leaders claim they are acting on behalf of -the world community.- <ne minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the 5ulf War. !n an interview on -5ood :orning 3merica,- /ec. ;), )++C, >ritish Prime :inister 9ohn :a1or referred to the actions -the West- was ta ing against Saddam Hussein. He =uic ly corrected himself and subse=uently referred to -the world community.- He was, however, right when he erred.

&rance in getting the Security %ouncil to demand that 0ibya hand over the Pan 3m )C, bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when 0ibya refused. 3fter defeating the largest 3rab army, the West did not hesistate to throw its weight around in the 3rab world. "he West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values. "hat at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and there is a significant element of truth in their view. /ifferences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civili$ations. /ifferences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. 4. S. #aipaul has argued that Western civili$ation is the -universal civili$ation- that -fits all men.- 3t a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. 3t a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civili$ations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, e=uality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free mar ets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in !slamic, %onfucian, 9apanese, Hindu, >uddhist or <rthodo' cultures. Western efforts to propagate each ideas produce instead a reaction against -human rights imperialism- and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. "he very notion that there could be a -universal civili$ation- is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most 3sian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. !ndeed, the author of a review of )CC comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that -the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide.- D !n the political realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the Anited States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. :odern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed colonialism or imposition. "he central a'is of world politics in the future is li ely to be, in ?ishore :ahbubani@s phrase, the conflict between -the West and the (est- and the responses of non-Western civili$ations to Western power and values.E "hose responses generally ta e one or a combination of three forms. 3t one e'treme, non-Western states can, li e >urma and #orth ?orea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or -corruption- by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. "he costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it e'clusively. 3 second alternative, the e=uivalent of -band-wagoning- in international relations theory, is to attempt to 1oin the West and accept its values and institutions. "he third alternative is to attempt to -balance- the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions. in short, to moderni$e but not to Westerni$e. VII. THE TORN COUNTRIE !n the future, as people differentiate themselves by civili$ation, countries with large numbers of people of different civili$ations, such as the Soviet Anion and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civili$ation or another. "hese are town countries. "heir leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to ma e theirc ountries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. "he most obvious and prototypical torn country is "ur ey. "he late twentieth-century leaders of "ur ey have followed in the 3ttatur tradition and defined "ur ey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. "hey allied "ur ey with the West in #3"< and in the 5ulf War. they applied for
5

Harry %. "riandis, "he #ew Yor "imes, /ec. ;S, )++C, p. H), and -%ross-%ultural Studies of !ndividualism and %ollectivism,- #ebras a Symposium on :otivation, vol. ,*, )+B+, pp. H)-),,. 6 ?ishore :ahbubani, -"he West and the (est,- "he #ational !nterest, Summer )++;, pp. ,-),.

membership in the European %ommunity. 3t the same time, however, elements in "ur ish society have supported an !slamic revival and have argued that "ur ey is basically a :iddle Eastern :uslim society. !n addition, while the elite of "ur ey has defined "ur ey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept "ur ey and such. "ur ey will not become a member of the European %ommunity, and the real reason, as President <$al said, -is that we are :uslim and they are %hristian and they don@t say that.- Having re1ected :ecca, and then being re1ected by >russels, where does "ur ey loo 2 "ash ent may be the answer. "he end of the Soviet Anion gives "ur ey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived "ur ic civili$ation involving seven countries from the borders of 5reece to those of %hina. Encouraged by the West, "ur ey is ma ing strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself. /uring the past decade :e'ico has assumed a position somewhat similar to that of "ur ey. 9ust as "ur ey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to 1oin Europe, :e'ico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to the Anited States and is instead attempting to imitate the Anited States and to 1oin it in the #orth 3merican &ree "rade 3rea. :e'ican leaders are engaged in the great tas of redefining :e'ican identity and have introduced fundamental economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. !n )++) a top adviser to President %arlos Salinas de 5ortari described at length tome all the changes the Salinas government was ma ing. When he finished, ! remar ed6 -"hat@s most impressive. !t seems to me that basically you want to change :e'ico from a 0atin 3merican country into a #orth 3merican country.- He loo ed at me with surprise and e'claimed6 -E'actlyK "hat@s precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly.- 3s his remar indicates, in :e'ico as in "ur ey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country@s identity. !n "ur ey, European-oriented leaders have to ma e gestures to !slam 7<$al@s pilgrimage to :ecca8. so also :e'ico@s #orth 3merican-oriented leaders have to ma e gestures to those who hold :e'ico to be a 0atin 3merican country 7Salinas@ !bero-3merican 5uadala1ara summit8. Historically "ur ey has been the most profoundly torn country. &or the Anited States, :e'ico is the most immediate torn country. 5lobally the most important torn country is (ussia. "he =uestion of whether (ussia is part of the West or the leader of the Slavic-<rthodo' civili$ation has been a recurring one in (ussian history. "hat issue was obscured by the communist victory in (ussia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to (ussian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. "he dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westerni$ation versus (ussification. With communism discredited (ussians once again face that =uestion. President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and see ing to ma e (ussia a -normal- country and a part of the West. Yet both the (ussian elite and the (ussian public are divided on this issue. 3mong the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stan evich argues that (ussia should re1ect the -3tlanticist- course, which would lead it -to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organi$ed fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to particular emphasis on 5ermany and the Anited States as the two dominant members of the 3tlantic alliance.- While also re1ecting an e'clusively Eurasian policy, Stan evich nonetheless argues that (ussia should give priority to the protection of (ussians in other countries, emphasi$e its "ur ic and :uslim connections, and promote -an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of 3sia, of the eastern direction.- People of this persuasion critici$e Yeltsin for subordinating (ussia@s interests to those of the West, for reducing (ussian military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways in1urious to the (ussian people. !ndicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savits y, who in the )+;Cs argued that (ussia was a uni=ue Eurasian civili$ation. * :ore e'treme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge (ussia to redevelop its military strength and to establish closer ties with %hina and :uslim countries. "he
7

Sergei Stan evich, -(ussia in Search of !tself,- "he #ational !nterest, Summer )++;, pp. H*-D). /aniel Schneider, -3 (ussian :ovement (e1ects Western "ilt,- %hristian Science :onitor, &eb. D, )++,, pp. D-*.

people of (ussia areas divided as the elite. 3n opinion survey in European (ussia in the spring of )++; revealed that HC percent of the public had positive attitudes toward the West and ,E percent had negative attitudes. 3s it has been for much of its history, (ussia in the early )++Cs is truly a torn country. "o redefine its civili$ation identity, a torn country must meet three re=uirements. &irst, its political and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about the move. Second, its public has to be willing to ac=uiesce in the redefinition. "hird, the dominant groups in the recipient civili$ation have to be willing to embrace the convert. 3ll three re=uirements in large part e'ist with respect to :e'ico. "he first two in large part e'ist with respect to "ur ey. !t is not clear that any of them e'ist with respect to (ussia@s 1oining the West. "he conflict between liberal democracy and :ar'ism-0eninism was between ideologies which, despite their ma1or differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, e=uality and prosperity. 3 traditional, authoritarian, nationalist (ussia could have =uite different goals. 3 Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet :ar'ist. !t would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a (ussian traditionalist. !f, as the (ussians stop behaving li e :ar'ists, they re1ect liberal democracy and begin behaving li e (ussians but not li e Westerners, the relations between (ussia and the West could again become distant and conflictual.B 3ustralia@s future, they argue, is with the dynamic economies of East 3sia. >ut, as ! have suggested, close economic cooperation normally re=uires a common cultural base. !n addition, none of the three conditions necessary for a torn country to 1oin another civili$ation is li ely to e'ist in 3ustralia@s case. VIII. THE CONFUCIAN%I LA&IC CONNECTION "he obstacles to non-Western countries 1oining the West vary considerably. "hey are least for 0atin 3merican and East European countries. "hey are greater for the <rthodo' countries of the former Soviet Anion. "hey are still greater for :uslim, %onfucian, Hindu and >uddhist societies. 9apan has established a uni=ue position for itself as an associate member of the West6 it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. "hose countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, 1oin the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. "hey do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. "he most prominent form of this cooperation is the %onfucian-!slamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power. 3lmost without e'ception, Western countries are reducing their military power. under Yeltsin@s leadership so also is (ussia. %hina, #orth ?orea and several :iddle Eastern states, however, are significantly e'panding their military capabilities. "hey are doing this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries. <ne result is the emergence of what %harles ?rauthammer has called -Weapon States,- and the Weapon States are not Western states. 3nother result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal. /uring the %old War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the Anited States and its allies and the Soviet Anion and its allies. !n the post-%old War world the primary ob1ective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. "he West attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies. "he conflict between the West and the %onfucian-!slamic states focuses largely, although not e'clusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other
8

<wen Harries has pointed out that 3ustralia is trying 7unwisely in his view8 to become a torn country in reverse. 3lthough it has been a full member not only of the West but also of the 3>%3 military and intelligence core of the West, its current leaders are in effect proposing that it defect from the West, redefine itself as an 3sian country and cultivate dose ties with its neighbors. 3ustralia@s future, they argue, is with the dynamic economies of East 3sia. >ut, as ! have suggested, close economic cooperation normally re=uires a common cultural base. !n addition, none of the three conditions necessary for a torn country to 1oin another civili$ation is li ely to e'ist in 3ustralia@s case.

sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. "he West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of reali$ing that norm. !t also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. "he attention of the West focuses, naturally on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West. "he non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to ac=uire and to deploy whatever weapons they thin necessary for their security. "hey also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the !ndian defense minister when as ed what lesson he learned from the 5ulf War6 -/on@t fight the Anited States unless you have nuclear weapons.- #uclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential e=uali$er of superior Western conventional power. %hina, of course, already has nuclear weapons. Pa istan and !ndia have the capability to deploy them. #orth ?orea, !ran, !ra=, 0ibya and 3lgeria appear to be attempting to ac=uire them. 3top !ranian official has declared that all :uslim states should ac=uire nuclear weapons, and in )+BB the president of !ran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of -offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons.%entrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained e'pansion of %hina@s military power and its means to create military power. >uoyed by spectacular economic development, %hina is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the moderni$ation of its armed forces. !t is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states. it is developing long-range missiles. in )++; it tested a onemegaton nuclear device. !t is developing power-pro1ection capabilities, ac=uiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft carrier. !ts military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South %hina Sea are provo ing a multilateral regional arms race in East 3sia. %hina is also a ma1or e'porter of arms and weapons technology. !t has e'ported materials to 0ibya and !ra= that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. !t has helped 3lgeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. %hina has sold to !ran nuclear technology that 3merican officials believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped components of ,CC-mile-range missiles to Pa istan. #orth ?orea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and !ran. "he flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East 3sia to the :iddle East. "here is, however, some movement in the reverse direction. %hina has received Stinger missiles from Pa istan. 3 %onfucian-!slamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote ac=uisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military powers of the West. !t may or may not last. 3t present, however, it is, as /ave :c%urdy has said, -a renegades@ mutual support pact, run by the proliferators and their bac ers.- 3 new form of arms competition is thus occurring between !slamic-%onfucian states and the West. !nan old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. !n this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities. IX. I&PLICATION FOR THE !E T "his article does not argue that civili$ation identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civili$ation will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civili$ation will not conflict with and even fight each other. "his paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civili$ations are real and important. civili$ationconsciousness is increasing. conflict between civili$ations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict. international relations, historically a game played out within Western civili$ation, will increasingly be de-Westerni$ed and become a game in which non-Western civili$ations are actors and not simply ob1ects. successful political,

security and economic international institutions are more li ely to develop within civili$ations than across civili$ations. conflicts between groups in different civili$ations will be more fre=uent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civili$ation. violent conflicts between groups in different civili$ations are the most li ely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars. the paramount a'is of world politics will be the relations between -the West and the (est-. the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to ma e their countries part of the West, but in most cases face ma1or obstacles to accomplishing this. a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several !slamic-%onfucian states. "his is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civili$ations. !t is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be li e. !f these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. "hese implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. !n the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civili$ation, particularly between its European and #orth 3merican components. to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and 0atin 3merica whose cultures are close to those of the West. to promote and maintain cooperative relations with (ussia and 9apan. to prevent escalation of local inter-civili$ation conflicts into ma1or inter-civili$ation wars. to limit the e'pansion of the military strength of %onfucian and !slamic states. to moderate the reduction of counter military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest 3sia. to e'ploit differences and conflicts among %onfucian and !slamic states. to support in other civili$ations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests. to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions. !n the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civili$ation is both Western and modern. #on-Western civili$ations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. "o date only 9apan has fully succeeded in this =uest. #on-Western civili$ation will continue to attempt to ac=uire the wealth, technology, s ills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. "hey will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. "heir economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civili$ations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. "his will re=uire the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civili$ations. !t will also, however, re=uire the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civili$ations and the ways in which people in those civili$ations see their interests. !t will re=uire an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civili$ations. &or the relevant future, there will be no universal civili$ation, but instead a world of different civili$ations, each of which will have to learn to coe'ist with the others.
S3:AE0 P. HA#"!#5"<# is the Eaton Professor of the Science of 5overnment and /irector of the 9ohn :. <lin !nstitute for Strategic Studies at Harvard Aniversity. "his article is the product of the <lin !nstitute@s pro1ect on -"he %hanging Security Environment and 3merican #ational !nterests.-