B. Who May Practice Law LEGAL PROVISIONS: RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 1.

Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar . Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twentyone years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office: I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination. Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to

the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court. No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics. Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics. Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship. Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination. Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing). Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used. The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given. Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon). Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports. Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court. Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent. Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report. Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed

regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school. The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject. Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. Section 18. Certificate. The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice. Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate. Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney: (a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines. (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law; (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; (f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed; (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal . An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to

be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client. Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds . A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant. Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall

be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses. Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect. Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. 1, Article XI, 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

13, Article VII, 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

2, Article IX (A), 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

14, Article VI (A), 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

In re Integration of the Philippine Bar

N THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. RESOLUTION

appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and

PER CURIAM: On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4 Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise

participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are: (1) Assist in the administration of justice; (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct; (3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members; (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto; (6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers; (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position; (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers; (8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces; (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country; (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules; (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to: (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; (3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation. Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional

rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report: Constitutionality of Bar Integration Judicial Pronouncements. In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. 1. Freedom of Association. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to

provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect. The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar. 2. Regulatory Fee. For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech. A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established. The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government. 4. Fair to All Lawyers. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair. To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration. In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)

avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar. Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., 42 SCRA 302 (1971)
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case. The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer. The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning. On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows: Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10% Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10% Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5% The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition. Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case. The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel ... is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence. thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ... imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorneyclient relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated: But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of

authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5 No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6 The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to nonlawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that nonlawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10 And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11 The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by nonlawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception. The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated. We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides: Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations. Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law. WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.

In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230 (1948)

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent. Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.

MONTEMAYOR, J.: The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full: Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning. These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests. The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city. The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations. The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations. The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation. In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows: In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar

examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court. From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result. Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment. Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state. This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not unanimous. In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.

In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state." In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public safety," are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it. The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety,""National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information. The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and

comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nations, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc. We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance. If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose

confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar. The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, one or two or more of them that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government. In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity. Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things. In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges

contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation. When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations. In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the

present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered. Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940)

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent, Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant. LAUREL, J.: This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him. It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent, the service were rendered free of charge. The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A. There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a

lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document cancelling the previous one. The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

In re Sycip, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated. Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: 1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: t.hqw The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1 2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3 3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: t.hqw ... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4 4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were

connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5 5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7 6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8 The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead." The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene asamicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper. On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name. Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court. The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner. It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability. Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners. B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of aprofessional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.hqw

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, t.hqw ... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied) C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 t.hqw A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12 The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession. Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood." xxx xxx xxx Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability. 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13 "The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16 D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their petitions. It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. t.hqw The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members. ... There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied). The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom. In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18 Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter. Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that

a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24 The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw ... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25 In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment. ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

In re Garcia Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902)

In the matter of the petition of J. GARCIA BOSQUE for admission to the practice of law in the Philippine Islands. Oscar Sutro, attorney for petitioner. ARELLANO, C.J.: The cession of the Philippine Archipelago having been agreed upon by the parties to the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the compulsory subjection of the subjects of the ceding power to the new sovereign followed as a logical consequence. The status of these subjects was not uniform, as in addition to the natives there were others who were merely residents but who, equally with the natives, had interests and rights inherent in the nationality of the territory. With respect to these the special agreement contained in article 9 was established, by virtue of which it was agreed to accord them the right of electing to leave the country, thus freeing themselves of subjection to the new sovereign, or to continue to reside in the territory, in which case the expiration of the term of eighteen months without their making an express declaration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter, such persons thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these Islands. The period of eighteen months began to run from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty that is to say, from April 11, 1899, and expired on the corresponding day of October, 1900. The petitioner absented himself from these Islands on May 30, 1899, and remained absent therefrom during the whole period. It was in January, 1901, that he returned to these Islands. From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it is evident that he elected to take the first of the two courses open to him under his right of option. Neither the Government nor the courts can place any other construction upon the facts above related. Having left the islands he had no occasion to make any declaration of his intention to preserve his Spanish nationality, which he carried with him on his departure. This nationality could be forfeited only by a continued residence in the ceded territory and a failure to make a declaration of intention to preserve it within the term fixed therefor. The conditions which gave rise to the presumptive change of nationality were residence and the lapse of eighteen months without express declaration to the contrary; these two conditions not being fulfilled there was no change of national status. Neither by the Government of Spain nor by that of the United States could the petitioner be regarded as a Filipino subject. By absenting himself from the territory he continued to be a Spaniard. To native-born subjects of the territory no such right of option was accorded; it was expressly refused them upon the rejection by the American Commissioners of the proposition in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded territories made by the Spanish Commissioners in Annex No. 1 to the twenty-second protocol. (Conference of December 10, 1898.) The native subject could not evade the power of the new sovereign by withdrawing from the Islands, nor while continuing to reside therein make declaration of his intention to preserve the Spanish nationality enjoyed under the former sovereign. Neither the Government of the United States nor that of Spain can consider them as other

than Filipino subjects. This is expressly stated by the Spanish Government in article 1 of its royal decree of May 11, 1901. The dates fixed by the treaty by which the sovereignty of one nation is ceded to another are of the highest importance, they being part of the contract, and are not within the control of the subjects as are those relating to their individual rights by reason of the fact that the political rights of the contracting nations themselves are the subject of the agreement. It is for this reason that the Government of Spain in the royal decree above cited has always taken the dates fixed in the treaty of Paris as the starting point, and, moreover, expressly declares therein that persons who are natives or residents of the ceded or relinquished territories can not, in their relations with the Government or authorities of such territories, lay claim to Spanish nationality preserved or recovered by virtue of said decree, except with the consent of such Government, or under treaty stipulations. (Art. 5.) The Government and courts of these Islands should not act with less circumspection in the matter, and invade the sovereign rights of Spain by giving the presumptive nationality established by Article IX of the treaty of Paris an extent not warranted by the conditions upon which it depends, to wit, residence coupled with failure to make an express declaration to the contrary. The ordinary provisions of local laws in their normal operation with regard to the effect of absence upon the retention of a residence or domicile can not therefore be relied upon, nor the presumption as to the intention of an absentee recognized by civil codes and international treaties, although the most general and almost the only proof allowed by statute as evidence of an intention to preserve a residence or domicile in a country is the maintenance of a dwelling or commercial establishment therein, upon which point, as also upon the fact that the petitioner became a member of the bar of Barcelona upon his arrival in that city, we made no decision, not regarding it as of any moment in view of the conclusions above expressed. The fact is that one is not to be regarded as having submitted to the new sovereign by the mere failure to make an express declaration, inasmuch as without a residence de facto the declaration is of no significance, having been established for the express purpose of overcoming the effect of a continued residence, an act which in itself implies subjection to the new sovereign by giving rise to the presumption of waiver of Spanish nationality and the adoption of that of the territory. The petitioner can not, therefore, be considered to have lost his Spanish nationality by reason of his residence in the territory after the 11th of October, 1900, and his failure to make declaration of his intention to preserve it within the period agreed upon by the high contracting parties to the treaty of Paris, and to have adopted the nationality of the native subjects under the presumption arising from the conditions expressed. He can only acquire it through voluntary renunciation of his present nationality by seeking to become naturalized in these Islands; but upon this matter this court can decide nothing, there having been no legislation upon the subject up to the present. The status of the petitioner with respect to the new sovereignty of the territory having been defined, it remains to determine the question raised as to whether Spanish subjects resident therein constitute an intermediate class between other foreign residents and the native of the country in whose behalf some specially favorable conditions have been stipulated. Upon this point no proposition was made, even incidentally, nor was any reference made to it in the discussions which preceded the treaty of Paris. The American Commissioners, referring to Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, simply said: "Such persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property and remove from the territory

or remain therein to continue to be Spanish subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory." (Memorandum annexed to Protocol No. 22.) "They shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and profession, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners." (Art. 9 of the treaty of Paris.) The laws applicable to other foreigners were, prior to that treaty, the Law of Foreigners for the Ultramarine Provinces of July 4, 1870, and article 27 of the Civil Code. The first of these laws in its thirty-ninth article authorized all foreigners to engage in any kind of industry in the Spanish ultramarine provinces subject to the laws prevailing therein, and to practice any profession for which the laws did not require a diploma of proficiency granted by the Spanish authorities. No one can doubt that the legal profession is one of those for the practice of which the law required a diploma of proficiency granted by the Spanish authorities. The second law cited provides that foreigners in Spain shall enjoy the rights which the civil laws accord to Spaniards, subject to the provisions of article 2 of the constitution of the State. Article 2 of the constitution of 1876 establishes the same restriction or limitation as the law of foreigners. Hence if other foreigners could not then engage in the practice of law, and by the express prohibition of the Code of Civil Procedure in force can not do so at the present time, neither can Spanish subjects do so, they being in every respect upon the same footing as other foreigners. If, then, the petitioner upon his departure from these Islands on May 30, 1899, did not take with him the nationality or the native inhabitants impressed by the treaty of Paris, which had been in force from the 11th of April of the same year; if he departed as a Spaniard and continued to be a Spaniard, by taking the first course left open by the right of option stipulated in the treaty of Paris, without being affected by the presumptive nationality of the territory arising from the fact of residence and the lapse of the time fixed; if he had not elected to adopt this nationality of the territory by express declaration within the same period; if after the expiration of that period it is expressly provided that the right of option shall no longer be available, and that the only course is naturalization, as to which subject upon equal footing with other foreign residents he can not practice the legal profession under the law either prior or subsequent to the treaty of Paris, it is evident that this court can not regard the petitioner as possessed of the qualifications alleged. The new petition presented by him for admission to the bar of these Islands must therefore be denied, and it is so ordered. Torres, Cooper, Ladd, J., did not sit in this case. Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913)

In re application of MARIO GUARIA for admission to the bar. Mario Guaria in his behalf. CARSON, J.: Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes. Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows: SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows: 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Code: Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General, assistant attorney in the office of the AttorneyGeneral, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court." The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this applicant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination, the clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without and examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in the Philippine Islands without an examination." It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised. It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited strictly to the provisions of local law touching this matter, the contentions of the applicant would have great weight . For it is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall" where such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator. In Rock Island County Supervisors vs. United States (71 U.S., 435, 446), Mr. Justice Swayne says: The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is that where power is given to public officers, in the language of the Act before us, or in equivalent language, whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered to do for a third person the law requires shall be done. The power is given, not for their benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depository to meet the demands of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held that the intent of the Legislature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and absolute duty. Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it should be given a mandatory effect. (Colby University vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673; Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092, 1093, 128 Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs. Schlesinger, 82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168; People vs. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 56 N.E., 953, 956, 184 Ill., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24 S.W., 638, 641; Leavenworth & D. M.R. Co. vs. Platte County Court, 42 Mo., 171, 174.) Applying these canons of construction to the statute under consideration, and limiting ourselves strictly to the provisions of local law touching the admission of candidates to the bar, we might, as we have said, be inclined to give the statute the mandatory effect

which applicant claims should be placed upon it. But we are of opinion that such a construction is precluded by the provisions of the Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902, which confirm and secure to this court the jurisdiction theretofore conferred upon it. Section 9 of that Act is as follows: That the Supreme Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as may be hereafter enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall hereafter be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive the compensation heretofore prescribed by the Commission until otherwise provided by Congress. The judges of the Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the Civil Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission: Provided, That the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance shall not be changed except by Act of Congress. Prior to the passage of this Act the power and jurisdiction of this court in relation to the admission of candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands had been fixed by the provisions of the Organic Act (No. 136) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and as we understand these provisions this court was vested thereby with authority, and charged with a duty to pass upon the "moral character" and the "qualifications and ability" of all candidates for admission to the bar. The pertinent provisions of these statutes are as follows: (Act No. 136.) "SEC . 2. Constitution of judiciary. The judicial power of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace, together with such special jurisdictions of municipal courts, and other special tribunals as now are or hereafter may be authorized by law. The two courts first named shall be courts of record. (Act No. 136.) "SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate. SEC. 17. Its original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs ofmandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code

of Civil Procedure, and to hear and to determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law. (Act No. 190.) "SEC. 13. Who may practice as lawyers. The following persons, if not specially declared ineligible, are entitled to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands: 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Code; 2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner herein prescribed. SEC. 14. Qualifications of applicants. Any resident of the Philippine Islands, not a subject or citizen of any foreign government, of the age of twenty-three years, of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to admission as a member of the bar of the Islands and to practice as such in all their courts. SEC. 15. Certificate of good character required. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must produce the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character, and must satisfactorily pass a proper examination upon all the codes of law and procedure in force in the Philippine Islands, and upon such other branches of legal learning as the Supreme Court by general rule shall provide. . . . SEC. 16. Place and manner of examinations. Such examinations shall be conducted at Manila, by the judges of the Supreme Court or by a committee of competent lawyers by them to be appointed, and shall be held at such times as the judges of the court shall provide by general or special rules. Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any Act of the Commission which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the Commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority. The Act of Congress was the creator of the Commission and indeed of the Government of these Islands, which is the creature of its creator. Its powers are defined, prescribed and limited by the Act which created it, and by such other lawful acts of its creator as may further define, prescribe, limit or expand these powers. It cannot lawfully transcend or infringe upon the limits thus prescribed, and any Act of the Commission repugnant to the Act of Congress which created it, or which is repugnant to any other lawful Act of its creator defining, prescribing or limiting its authority is void and invalid. The various Acts

of Congress conferring power upon the Philippine Legislature, and defining, prescribing and limiting this power, especially the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are to that Legislature in the nature of an organic act with its amendments, binding on it in like manner as is the Constitution of the United States upon Congress itself. In the great case of Marbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch, 175), the Supreme Court of the United States, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall, laid down the doctrine in this regard which has been followed by that court unhesitatingly ever since. In that case the court held that an Act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution cannot become law, and that the courts of the United States are bound to take notice if the Constitution. Applying the reasoning of that case to the question of the validity of an Act of the Philippine Commission enacted since the date of the passage of the Philippine Bill which is found to be in conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress dealing with the same subject matter, and especially with the provisions of the Philippine Bill itself, we think there can be no doubt as to the result. The Act of the Commission in so far as it is in conflict with or in any wise repugnant to the various Acts of Congress dealing with the same subject matter must be held to be void and of no effect. Paraphrasing slightly the language used in the early case of Kemper vs. Hawkins (1 Va. Cases, 20-24), it may be said that the Acts of the Congress of the United States are to the Commission, or rather to all the departments of the Philippine Government, what a law is to individuals; nay, they constitute not only a rule of action to the various branches of the Government, but it is from them that the very existence of the power of the Government flows, and it is by virtue of the Acts of Congress that the powers (or portions of the right to govern) which may have been committed to this Government are prescribed. The Act of Congress was the Commission's commission; nay, it was its creator. Section 9 of the Act of Congress, set out above, placed it beyond the power of the local Legislature to deprive this court of the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it; leaving however, to local legislative authority the right to confer additional jurisdiction, or to change the practice and method of procedure. The above-cited provisions of Act No. 190, in force at the time when the Act of Congress was enacted, conferred upon this court the power and jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar unless, in addition to certain other prescribed conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the necessary learning in the law, by passing an examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clear, therefore, that the Commission, while it was undoubtedly authorized to modify the provision requiring the holding of examinations under general rules (that being merely the prescribed mode of procedure whereby the court was required to ascertain the qualifications of the candidate), had no authority to deprive this court of its power to deny admission to any candidate who fails to satisfy it that he possesses the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar of the Philippine Islands. In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be

disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law. Black on Interpretation of Laws at page 87 says: "In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question. The construction should be in harmony with this assumption whenever possible." The same author, at pages 93 and 94, says: "Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and effect, if this can be done without extravagance. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the words of provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language employed." Without undue straining of the language used in the statute under consideration, the word "may" may be construed as either mandatory or permissive in its effect. But to construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we conclude therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of the legislator, that it should be given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that the true intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to admit to the bar without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the court is otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary qualifications. Ordinarily, and in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it may fairly be assumed that an applicant who has held one of the offices mentioned in the statute, and who, prior to his appointment, had been admitted to the practice of law in the courts of these Islands under the former sovereign or in some other jurisdiction is duly qualified for admission to the bar of these Islands. In the case In re Du Fresne (20 Phil. Rep., 488, 492), speaking of the provisions of this Act, we said: Appointments to the positions mentioned in Act No. 1597 are made either by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, and the legislator evidently conceived that the fact that such an appointment is made is a sufficient guaranty that after due inquiry the appointee has been found to be possessed of at least the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar. In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the

applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment. In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar. In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied. In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the abovecited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Rustia v. Judge of CFI of Batangas, 44 Phil. 62 (1962)

JUAN S. RUSTIA, Petitioner, vs. THE JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ, ROSA H. DE PORCUNA and her husband JUSTO M. PORCUNA and EULALIA MAGSOMBOL,Respondents. The petitioner in The respondents Porcunas Jose Mayo Librea for the other respondents. OSTRAND, J.: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner alleging that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the parties but without the intervention of the attorney for the plaintiff in the case, the herein petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It appears from the record that on July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself and on behalf of his wife, the respondent Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a written contract, retained the petitioner to represent them as their lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna was the plaintiff and one Eulalia Magsombol was the defendant. The contract fixed the petitioner's fee at P200 in advance with an additional contigent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer, the herein petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After trial, the petitioner then being plaintiffs' attorney of record, the Court of First Instance, under date of December 24, 1921, rendered judgment in favor of Justo Porcuna and Rosa H. de Porcuna ordering the defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof to pay to them the sum of P3,250. On January 14, 1922, Eulalia Magsombol filed her exception to the judgment and on the following day presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on the 21st of the same month. She thereupon gave notice of appeal and presented a bill of exceptions which was approved on February 20, 1922. On March 2, 1922, and before the transmission of the bill of exceptions to this court, the plaintiffs presented the following motion in the Court of First Instance. The plaintiffs, without any further intervention of their attorney, now appear before this Honorable Court and respectfully aver:chanrobles virtual law library That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado, they already settled this case with the herein defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library his in their own own behalf. behalf.

That the basis of the compromise is that we, the plaintiffs, finally agree that we should be paid the amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) in two installments; P300 to be paid on this same date, and the remaining five hundred pesos (P500) at the end of March, 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That we, the plaintiffs, recognize not to have any further rights in this case than to the aforesaid amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) and that this is the total amount the defendant Eulalia Magsombol should pay us, and we have no right whatever to any other amount than the aforementioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That we have not sold to any other person our rights as plaintiffs in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request the dismissal of this case without any pronouncement as to costs, and that the appeal interposed by the defendant be further dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Batangas, Batangas, P.I., March 2, 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (Sgd.) ROSA Plaintiff chanrobles virtual law library JUSTO Plaintiff . M. H. PORCUNA

PORCUNA

The defendant, through here attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having signified her assent to the motion, the Court of First Instance on the same day, March 2, dismissed the action without notice to counsel for the plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922. After an unsuccessful effort to obtain a reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial court, he filed the present petition for a writ of certiorari. By resolution dated October 24, 1922, this court denied the petition and upon motion of the petitioner we shall now briefly state our reason for such denial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The burden of the petitioner's contention is (1) that he, as attorney of record, was entitled to notice of his client's motion to dismiss the case, and (2) that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it. A moment's reflection should make it clear that neither of these propositions is tenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to

prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of the sum recovered in case of success, this does not give the attorney such an interest in the cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from compromising the suit. (4 Cyc., 990, and authorities cited in Note 6; see alsoLouque vs. Dejan, 129 La., 519; Price vs. Western Loan and Savings Co., 19 Ann. Cas., 589 and Note.) In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The petitioner's contingent interest in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of exceptions had been approved, it is very true upon such approval the lower court loses its jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was done in this case. A valid agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything covered by the agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091; Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Obed, 13 Phil., 391.) The petitioner might have protected his interests by entering an attorney's lien under section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petition for a writ of certiorari was therefore properly ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library denied. So

Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

U.S. v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912)

THE vs. GO-LENG, defendant-appellant. Pantaleon E. Del Rosario for appellant. UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

representing the United States. On the defendant's being asked whether he could afford to employ a lawyer, he replied in the affirmative, but said that he had been unable to come to an agreement with one as to the amount he should pay him for his services. This court being of the opinion that the defendant is not entitled to the appointment of counsel de oficio, and, declining to recognize the fact of his not having reached an agreement with his attorney in the matter of his fees as a proper excuse for postponing the hearing of this case, orders the reading of the complaint. The reason of the court for not postponing the hearing is set forth in another part of the record and is as follows: The bond given by the defendant in this case was first forfeited; later, the forfeiture was canceled. Another date was set for the hearing, at least two days in advance. The court sees no reason whatever for postponing this case, and still less for showing any consideration to the defendant because he is not represented by counsel, since he does not belong to the class of poor people who are entitled to the appointment of counsel de oficio. If he can not come to an agreement with Mr. Sotto as to the amount of the latter's fees for defending him, the court is not called upon to take the matter into consideration as a ground for postponement and other similar delays. By order of the court the complaint was duly read to the defendant: the latter

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee. MAPA, J.: The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of a violation of Act No. 1761 , wherein he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, a fine of P300, and, in default of such payment, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for each 12 pesetas and a half he fails to pay, not to exceed one-third of the time of the principal penalty, and to payment of the costs. It is a fact which we find to be sufficiently proven that on the date mentioned in the complaint, an internal-revenue agent went to the defendant's house and found in various places therein two little cans and a small horn jar, all containing opium; another small tin with about 50 grams of opium ashes; scales for weighing opium; a pan for cooking the said drug, and two small lamps such as are used in smoking opium. This fact effectively sustains the finding in the judgment appealed from as to the defendant's guilt. Counsel for the defense alleges that the trial court obliged the defendant to stand trial without the assistance of an attorney, and refused to allow his request for time to procure such counsel for his defense; this, he alleges, is an error that affects the essential rights of the defendant. The facts in no manner support this allegation. Nowhere in the record does it appear that any postponement was requested by the defendant for securing counsel. That part of the record in which reference is made to this point reads as follows:

acknowledged notification thereof and replied by pleading not guilty. Neither on that occasion, nor before, nor afterwards, nor, in short, at any time during the progress of the trial, did the defendant request the postponement or suspension of the same or raise any objection or protest of any sort against the continuance of the trial. Far from so doing, the record shows that during the presentation of the evidence he crossed-examined the witness, notwithstanding that he was advised by the court of his right not to testify unless he desired to do so of his own free will and consent. These being the facts, the assignment of error contained in the brief filed by the

The above-mentioned case was called for rehearing on this date, September 29, 1910, there being present the defendant, not represented by counsel, and the fiscal

defendant's counsel is absolutely devoid of foundation. Accused persons are undoubtedly entitled to appoint an attorney to defend them at trial, or to have one

appointed de oficio, should they ask for one and not possess the necessary means to employ an attorney of their own. But it devolves exclusively upon them to avail themselves of this right. It is one which they are perfectly entitled to waive and they may defend themselves in person. The law expressly authorizes them, as it could not but do, to defend themselves in person, without the assistance of counsel. (Sec. 15, General Orders, No. 58. It is understood, of course, that they waive their right to be assisted by counsel when they not only do not appoint or request one, but voluntarily submit to trial, and especially when they actually exercise therein the right of defense by crossexamining the witnesses for the prosecution and by introducing evidence in their own behalf, as was done in the present case. It is evident that the defendant herein preferred to defend himself personally in the Court of First Instance and, therefore, he can not be heard to complain that he was not assisted by any attorney in the proceedings there had. When an accused person in a criminal case chooses to defend himself in person, none of his rights are infringed by the fact that the action was prosecuted without the intervention of an attorney in his behalf. In such a case the attendance of the latter is no wise necessary for the legality and perfect propriety of the proceedings. In consideration of the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that a fine of P300 is a sufficient penalty for the crime committed by the accused. The judgment appealed from is therefore modified in the sense that the defendant is sentenced only to pay the fine of P300, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for each P2.50 which he may fail to pay, and the costs in this instance. Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Lichauco v. Alejandrino, 21 Phil. 58 (1911)

G.R. No. 6513 FAUSTINO LICHAUCO, in his own name and in behalf of his coheirs, Eugenia, Clara, Luisa, vs. ANA ALEJANDRINO and her husband W. WEINMANN, defendant-appellees. Ramon Salinas, for appellants. Crisanto, Zacarias, Galo and Timotea Lichauso, plaintiffs-appellants,

was the father of the defendant, Ana Alejandrino, and Cornelia Laochangco as the mother of the plaintiffs. Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco are both dead. From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiffs appealed. From an examination of the record, the following facts seem to be true: First. That on the 30th of July, 1886, the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from the said Cornelia Laochangco the sum of P6,000 Mex., under certain conditions mentioned in the said contract. (See Exhibit A.) Second. That on the 15th of August, 1895, the said Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco liquidated the amount due under the said contract, Exhibit A, and it was found on the date that there was still due under the said contract the sum of P4,115.75. On the same day (August 15, 1895) the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from Cornelia Laochangco the additional sum of P234.25, making a total amount due of 4,350 pesos Mex. (Exhibit B.) Third. That on the 15th of December, 1906, all of the children of the said Mariano Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, entered into a contract, by the terms of which they obligated themselves to pay to the plaintiffs the balance due from their father, Mariano Alejandrino. (See Exhibit D.) Fifth. That on the 23d of April, 1898, the amount due on the said contract of July 30, 1886, was again liquidated and it was found that there was remaining due and unpaid on the said contract, the sum of P4,465. (See Exhibit C.) Under the provisions of Exhibit D (the contract which was entered into by all of the heirs of Mariano Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino), they obligated themselves to pay their proportional amount of the indebtedness of their father, together with 12 per cent interest. The plaintiffs claim that the amount due on the contract of July

No appearance for appellees. JOHNSON, J.: On the 16th of July, 1908, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants, in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent from the said 16th of July, 1908. To this complaint the defendants demurred, which demurrer was, on the 23d of November, 1908, sustained by the Hon. Julio Llorente, judge. On the same day (the 23d of November, 1908) the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the defendants. The complaint was accompanied by Exhibit A, B, C, and D. Later the defendants presented a demurrer which was overruled. On the 2d of July, 1909, the defendants presented a general and special answer, in which they prayed to be relieved from all liability under the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Hon. Julio Llorente, judge, on the 10th of February, 1901, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for the sum of P610.22 Philippine currency, with interest at 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908, with the provision that if the defendants failed to pay the said amount, the plaintiffs were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth part of the land mortgaged under and by virtue of a contract between Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco, dated the 30th of July, 1886. (See Exhibit A.) Mariano Alejandrino

30, 1886, at the time of the commencement of the present action (the 15th of July, 1908), together with the interest amounted to the sum of P9,946.50, and that the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, was liable for one-sixth part of said sum, or the sum of P1,657.75. The defendant, Ana Alejandrino, was not a party to the contract represented by Exhibit D. she did not agree to pay 12 per cent interest on the amount remaining due on the 23rd of April, 1898, of the debt between her father and the plaintiffs herein. There is no proof in the record that any demand was ever made upon her for the payment of her aliquot part of the balance found to be due on the 23rd of April, 1898, either judicially or extrajudicially. She was, therefore, not liable to pay interest or her aliquot part of the said amount. The lower court correctly held, however, that she was liable for the payment of one-sixth part of said amount by virtue of her having accepted her proportional part of the property involved and covered by the original contract between her father and the mother of the plaintiffs, bearing date of July 30, 1886, or for the sum of 744.16 pesos Mex., which, reduced to conant, amounted to P610.22, the amount for which the lower court rendered judgment, with 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908. While we have not discussed the assignments of error in detail, we believe that we have answered each of them in effect. We have discussed the question upon their merits as they are presented in the record. There is a question of parties, however, which has not been presented, which we can not overlook. It will be noted that Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in representation of his co-heirs. So far as the record shows, the co-heirs have no knowledge of the pendency of the action. Faustino Lichauco shows no authority for representing his co-heirs except the mere allegation in the title of his complaint. He speaks of himself as the plaintiff. The attorney signs himself as attorney for the plaintiff ? not for the plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents himself and his co-heirs, and the attorney-at-law, who signs the complaint, represents as he alleges "the plaintiff." There is nothing in the record which shows that the co-heirs are not capable of representing

themselves. There is nothing in the record which shows that they ever gave their consent to the commencement of the present action. It may be assumed that they did, but this not sufficient. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that in Courts of First Instance a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a duly authorized member of the bar. (Sec. 34, Act No. 190.) In the present case the co-heirs are neither in court personally nor by the a duly authorized member of the bar. Therefore they are not in court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present case, with reference to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way be binding upon them. (Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Vicente Guasch, No. 5313).[[1]] The present case seems to have been tried in the lower court upon the theory that all of the interested parties were present, and for that reason we have discussed the case upon its merits, believing that the parties would deem further litigation unnecessary, once being informed of the views of this court upon the facts presented. This assumption, however, is based upon the ground that even though the co-heirs had been represented in the trial of the cause, in accordance with law, no other or different evidence would have been adduced. Therefore, following the decision of this court in the case of Lichauco vs. Limjuco (19 Phil. Rep., 12), the judgment of the lower court is hereby set aside, unless the coheirs of Faustino Lichauco, within a period of ten days from notification of this decision, shall appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of the Province or Pampanga, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and in writing indicate their full conformance with the proceedings had in the present cause. In which case, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga is hereby directed to enter a judgment confirming the judgment heretofore rendered by said court on the 10th day of February, 1910. Mapa, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Hydro Resources Contractors Pagalilauan, 172 SCRA 399

Corp.

v.

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent, G.E. Aragones & Associates for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondents. Cirilo A. Bravo for private respondent.

acting as such, as long as he is performing acts constituting practice of law, can never be considered an employee. His relationship with those to whom he renders services, as such lawyer, can never be governed by the labor laws. For a lawyer to so argue is not only demeaning to himself (sic), but also his profession and to his brothers in the profession." Thus, the petitioner argues that the labor arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over the instant case. The contention is without merit. A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. At the same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and other professionals. This Court is not without a guide in deciding whether or not an employer-employee relation exists between the contending parties or whether or not the private respondent was hired on a retainer basis. As stated in the case of Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co., (G.R. No. 80680, January 26, 1989): This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor. Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his appointment paper (Exhibit "A"). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance. Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties well. (Exhibit "B"). Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation. The above-mentioned facts show that the petitioner paid Aban's wages, exercised its power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the labor arbiter's decision ordering herein petitioner, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation to reinstate Rogelio A. Abanto his former position without loss of seniority rights, to pay him 12 months backwages in the amount of P18,000.00 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,800.00. On October 24, 1978, petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well. On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition. The only issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not there was an employeremployee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban. The petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the public respondents considering the alleged absence of an employer-employee relationship. The petitioner contends that its relationship with Aban is that of a client with his lawyer. It is its position that "(a) lawyer as long as he is

Moreover, estoppel lies against the petitioner. It may no longer question the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and NLRC . The petitioner presented documents (Exhibits "2" to "19") before the Labor Arbiter to prove that Aban was a managerial employee. Now, it is disclaiming that Aban was ever its employee. The proper procedure was for the petitioner to prove its allegations that Aban drank heavily, violated company policies, spent company funds and properties for personal ends, and otherwise led the employer to lose trust and confidence in him. The real issue was due process, not the specious argument raised in this petition. The new theory presented before this Court is a last-ditch effort by the petitioner to cover up for the unwarranted dismissal of its employee. This Court frowns upon such delaying tactics. The findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter being supported by substantial evidence are binding on this Court. (See Industrial limber Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 83616, January 20, 1989). Considering that the private respondent was illegally dismissed from his employment in 1980, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former or similar position without loss of seniority rights, if it is still feasible, to backwages without qualification or deduction for three years, (D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan 159 SCRA 107 (1988); Flores v. Nuestro, G.R. No. 66890, April 15, 1988), and to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00. Should reinstatement prove no longer feasible, the petitioner will pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. (City Trust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87; Santos v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 166; Metro Drug v. NLRC, et al., 143 SCRA 132; Luzon Brokerage v. Luzon Labor Union, 7 SCRA 116). The amount of such separation pay as may be provided by law or the collective bargaining agreement is to be computed based on the period from 24 October 1978 (date of first employment) to 4 October 1983 (three years after date of illegal dismissal). [Manila Midtown Commercial Corporation v. Nuwhrain 159 SCRA 212 (1988)]. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petitioner is ordered to reinstate the private respondent to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Ramos v. Rada, 65 SCRA 179 (1975)

RENE vs. MOISES R. RADA, respondent. P. RAMOS, complainant,

CASTRO, J.: Moises R. Rada a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, is charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows: Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government:.... From the respondent Rada's letters of explanation and their annexes, dated December 16, 1973 and June 27, 1974, respectively, and the letter and its annexes, dated August 12, 1974, filed by the complainant Rene P. Ramos, by way of rejoinder to Rada's explanation, undisputed fundamental facts emerge that justify us in dispensing with a full-blown investigation of this administrative case. The respondent Rada receives a monthly salary of P267.75. On December 15, 1972 he was extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation, thru its president, Jimmy Tang, as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation. Rada accepted the appointment and discharged his duties as administrator. The administrative complaint against Rada was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973. He requested permission to accept the appointment on October 27, 1973. It is not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties of the position of administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger; nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours. Indubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting government employees from engaging directly in a private business, vocation or profession or being connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private business connection has not resulted in any prejudice to the Government service. Thus, his violation of the rule the lack of prior permission is a technical one, and he should be meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty, which is reprimand.

The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such being his situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award a premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without foreseeable detriment to the Government service. His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, who is hereby authorized to grant or revoke such permission, under such terms and conditions as will safeguard the best interests of the service, in general, and the court, in particular. ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Moises R. Rada is adjudged guilty of a technical violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, for which he is hereby reprimanded. He may however apply, if he so desires, for permission to resume his business connection with the corporation, in the manner above indicated. Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Flores v. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746 (1918)

BERNABE FLORES, Protestant-Appellant, v. JOSE ZURBITO ET AL., protestees. JOSE ZURBITO, Appellee. SYLLABUS 1. ELECTION CONTESTS; NOTICE; APPEARANCE. While the law provides that election contests shall be instituted "upon motion with notice," it does not contain any provision as to the method of giving notice. While the procedure indicated by section 396 of Act No. 190 may be followed in giving notice, such procedure is not mandatory. While service of a copy of the protest and notice of the same is important and necessary, it may be waived by the protestee. If the protestee voluntarily appears, by a general appearance, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person, and an objection thereafter made upon the ground that no notice was received will not avail him. It is then too late. He has given the court jurisdiction over his person. 2. ID.; ID.; ID. A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. An appearance may be made by filing a formal motion, or plea, or answer. When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. DECISION JOHNSON, J. : This is an appeal from an order dismissing an election protest. The only question presented is: Whether or not the protestees had been given legal notice of the protest presented by the protestant and appellant? If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the cause remanded with direction to the lower court to reinstate the same and to proceed to a determination of the protest upon its merits. Upon the other hand, if said question is answered in the negative, then the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed. This is the second time the parties hereto have been before this court in relation of the said election protest. 1 In their first appeal the present appellant alleged that the lower court deprived him of the right to be heard by dismissing his protest upon the ground that the same had been signed by his attorney instead of by himself personally. This court, upon a consideration of the question presented in that appeal, following a decision

theretofore rendered in the case of De Castro v. Salas and Santiago (34 Phil. Rep.; 818), revoked the order of dismissal and ordered that the record be returned to the lower court with direction that said action be reinstated and that the lower court proceed to hear said protest upon its merits. The cause was remanded to the lower court in accordance with said order. It was reinstated, a time was set for trial and witnesses were subpoenaed. At the time fixed for the trial Jose Zurbito presented a motion for dismissal of the protest upon the ground that all of the candidates who had been voted for, for the office of governor, had not been given notice of said protest. Upon a consideration of that motion the lower court found that the said candidates had not been given legal notice of said protest and dismissed the same with costs against the protestant. From that order the protestant appealed to this court. The appellant contends that the notice required by law had been given and that his protest should have been heard upon its merits. The facts pertinent to the question presented by the appellant are undenied and are as follows: That an election was held in the Province of Sorsogon on the 6th day of June, 1916, for the office of governor of said province; that at said election Bernabe Flores, Jose Zurbito, Antonio Rocha, and Rosendo Gabionsa were candidates for the office of governor; that at the close of said election the votes were canvassed and Jose Zurbito was proclaimed duly elected by the provincial board of canvasses on the 8th day of July, 1916; that the said Bernabe Flores on the 19th day of July, 1916, presented a protest in the Court of First Instance against said election, alleging that many frauds had been committed and prayed for a recanvass of the votes and an investigation of said frauds; that notice of said protest was given to Jose Zurbito, Antonio Rocha, and Rosendo Gabionsa by sending to each of them a copy of the same by registered mail (see pp. 93, 94 and 127 of record) which was received by each of them; that in addition to said notice by registered mail a copy of the protest was delivered to the appellee Jose Zurbito and received by him personally (Exhibit C, p. 95); that Antonio Rocha and Rosendo Gabionsa failed to appear and answer or defend said protest in any manner whatsoever at any time during the pendency of the action in the court below; that a copy of said protest was delivered to Jose Zurbito and received by him personally on the 27th day of July, 1916, (Exhibit C, p. 95); that on the 25th day of July, 1916, the said Jose Zurbito appeared in court and presented a motion in said protest relating to the custody of the ballot boxes during the pendency of said protest (p.25), which motion was granted by the court on the same day (p. 26); that on the 27th day of July, 1916, Jose Zurbito again appeared in court, and without making any pretension whatever that he had not appeared in said court for the purpose of defending the protest, presented another motion praying that the same be dismissed for the reason that it was signed by the attorney for the protestant and not by the protestant himself (p. 30); that on the 7th day of August, 1916, after hearing the respective parties, Fernando Salas, judge granted said motion and dismissed said protest with costs against the protestant; that form that order the protestant appealed to the Supreme Court and obtained a reversal of the same by a decision of the Supreme Court of the 27th day of December, 1916, (p. 107); that the cause was remanded to the lower court with direction that the protest be reinstated and that the court proceed to hear the same upon its merits; that at the time set for the trial after the reinstatement of the cause Jose Zurbito again appeared and presented another motion praying that the protest be dismissed because proper notice had not been given to the protestee, which motion was granted on the 16th day of March, 1917, and the present appeal was perfected from that order. While the law provides that the mode of procedure, in election contest, shall be "upon motion with notice" (Sec. 27, Act No. 1582; sec. 2, Act No. 2170; sec. 578, Act No. 2657;

sec. 481, Act No. 2711) it does not contain any provision as to the method of giving notice. And while it has been held, in order to more conveniently prove the fact that notice had been given, that the provisions of Act No. 190 (section 396) should be followed, it has never been held that the notice of the protest must be given in accordance with the provisions of said Act (No. 190). (Campos v. Wislizenus and Aldanese, 35 Phil. Rep., 373.) While service of a copy of the protest and notice of the same is important and necessary, the receipt of the protest and the notice may be waived by the protestee. If he voluntarily appears, by a general appearance, without specifically and explicitly objecting to the lack of notice, etc., he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person, and an objection thereafter made upon the ground that no notice was received will not avail him. It is then made too late. He has given the court jurisdiction over his person. A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. (Handy v. Insurance Co., 37 Ohio St., 366; Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St., 171; New Jersey v. New York, 6 Peters [U.S. ], 323; Livingston v. Gibbons, 4 Johnsons Chancery [N. Y. ], 94; Fitzgerald etc. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S., 98.) The taking of any proceedings on the part of the defendant, other than a special appearance or a motion of plea objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, is equivalent to a general appearance and is a submission of the defendants person to the jurisdiction of the court. (New Jersey v. New York, 6 Peters [U. S. ], 323; Texas etc. Co. v. Saunders, 151 U. S., 105.) An appearance in court, either in person or by counsel, for any purpose other than to expressly object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, waives want of process and service of notice. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person. (Henderson v. Carbondale etc. Co., 140 U. S., 25; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters [U. S. ], 657.) A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter. Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St., 171.) In the present case, Jose Zurbito appeared in court on three different occasions; first, to make a motion relating to the custody of the ballot boxes during the pendency of the action; second, to make a motion to dismiss the protest upon the ground that the same had not been signed by the protestant personally, and third, to dismiss the protest upon the ground that he had not been duly notified of the same. Each of the first and second appearances were sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over his person and authority to decide the questions presented. With reference to his third appearance the record shows by Exhibit C that he had actually

received notice of the protest together [with] a copy of the protest filed in court. His appearance without objecting to the jurisdiction of the court waived all objections to the form and manner of service of notice. (Provident etc. Association v. Ford, 114 U. S., 635, 639.) Considering, therefore, (a) that all of the candidates received actual notice of the protest as well as a copy of the protest, and (b) that the Jose Zurbito not only received actual notice of the protest together with a copy of the same, but actually appeared in court and thereby gave the court jurisdiction over his person, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment dismissing the protest be revoked and that the cause be remanded to the court whence it came with direction that said protest be reinstated for the purpose of deciding the issues presented by the same upon their merits. And without any finding as to costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm, Avencea, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

U. S. v. Ney, 8 Phil. (1907)

THE UNITED vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants. TRACEY, J.: This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt. In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was entered accordingly. In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque,jurisconsulto espaol C.W. Ney, abogado americano." Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque C.W. Ney, abogado." On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding. The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law. Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice STATES, plaintiff,

any signature of names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by nonqualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice. It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding. Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt? Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows: 1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge; 2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions. Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for acts so defined. (Ex parteRobinson, 86 U.S., 505.) As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State. (In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.

Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the bar. The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, J., does not concur in the result. and Willard, JJ., concur.