Changing the Cotton

Landscape in Pakistan

Dr. Neil Forrester

October 2008

Ali Tareen Farms, Pakistan

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Copyright © 2009 Ali Tareen Farms

Permission is granted for copying and distribution after due acknowledgement.
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Preface

The importance of improving cotton production for cotton growers, the textile industry and other
members of the cotton value chain in Pakistan can hardly be overstated. Considering its role in
the national economy, it is surprising how little the public and the private sector in Pakistan has
invested in cotton research and development (R&D) during the last few decades. The public
sector’s large infrastructure of research institutes and agricultural universities suffers from the
endemic problems of lack of resources and poor management. It has been unable to keep pace
with the latest discoveries in production and crop management. Consequently, Pakistan’s per
acre yield continues to remain below the world average. It grows cotton on 3.2 million hectares,
yet the total production has fluctuated around a meager 12 million (170 kg) bales during the last
decade, leaving a shortfall of 2-3 million in domestic consumption every year. This places a
heavy burden on cotton growers and the textile industry – the two most important members in
the value chain – to come forward and fill this gap in cotton R&D.

This research is one small contribution towards this objective. Dr. Neil Forrester is a leading
international expert on cotton production, who has kept himself abreast of the latest
developments in cotton biotechnology and other innovations. His familiarity with Pakistani cotton
landscape enabled him to produce a valuable report within the short time period of two weeks.
This research serves two important functions. First, it helps cotton farmers to better understand
the disease and pest complex they face each year. Second, it constitutes the starting point for
further in-depth research on the constraints identified in this report.

Hopefully, other progressive growers and the textile industry will take this work from here and
invest in rigorous and scientific investigation of the problems that have so far condemned
Pakistan farmers to a below average performance.

Jahangir Khan Tareen

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Table of Contents

Page
Acronyms viii
Introduction 1
Major constraints on Cotton Production in Pakistan 1
Cotton leaf curl virus 6
Mealybugs 10
Lack of a professional seed industry 15
Weeds 20
High input costs and water scarcity 23
Bollworms 24
Research 29
Future Pipeline Technologies 29
Insecticide Resistance Management 30
Sources for Germplasm and Public Sector Technologies 35
Summary of Recommendations 36

Appendix A: Terms of Reference

37
Appendix B: Stakeholders Engaged for this Study 40
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Acronyms

AARI Ayub Agricultural Research Institute

APTMA All Pakistan Textile Mills Association
CABI Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux International
CAMB Centre for Applied Molecular Biology
CCRI Central Cotton Research Institute
CLCV Cotton Leaf Curl Virus
CRDC Cotton Research and Development Company
CRI Cotton Research Institute
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
HRAC Herbicide Resistance Action Committee
ICAC International Cotton Advisory Committee
IP Intellectual Property
MINFAL Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
NIAB Nuclear Institute of Agricultural Biology
NIBGE National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering
PARB Punjab Agricultural Research Board
PARC Pakistan Agricultural Research Council
WUE Water Use Efficiency
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1. Introduction

This report is based on the research conducted in Pakistan during October 2008 to review the
current production constraints and problems in the Pakistan cotton industry and to recommend
possible solutions. All aspects and stakeholders of the Pakistan cotton industry were covered
including a range of both provincial and federal government officials, private seed companies,
multinational businesses, research and breeding facilities, textile and ginning industry
representatives and cotton growers. Site visits to cotton fields and research institutes were
undertaken in Lahore, Multan, Lodhran, Vehari, Karachi, Islamabad and Faisalabad. The terms
of reference for this study are attached as Appendix A. The list of persons interviewed is
attached as Appendix B.

The main body of this report will cover the key problems affecting the Pakistan cotton industry
and will suggest ways for the Pakistan cotton industry to overcome them to become a vibrant,
forward looking, productive and globally competitive industry. The specific technical issues
covered are: 1) resistance management of Bt cotton; 2) sources for available transgenic
technologies; 3) suitability of Chinese Bt cottons; 4) sources of public-good biotechnology; 5)
sources of cotton germplasm; 6) control of CLCV and mealybug; and 7) possible new research
and development (R&D) structures. These will be addressed at the end of this report.

A detailed presentation of the findings from this research was given in Lahore to a broad cross
section of participants. This meeting was organized and hosted by the All Pakistan Textile Mills
Association (APTMA) whose support and encouragement for this review is acknowledged. A
final summary presentation was also given to the federal Finance Minister and the federal
Minister for MINFAL (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock) in Islamabad.

2. Major Constraints on Cotton Production in Pakistan

The principal problem of the Pakistan cotton industry is a shortfall in production of cotton lint
versus consumption. Production is variable from year to year at 12 million bales (170 kg) or less
while consumption is at 15 million bales. This leaves a shortfall of around 3 million bales of
cotton lint which has to be imported each year to satisfy the demand of the Pakistan spinning
industry. The cost of these raw cotton imports and the oil and meal forgone if the cotton could
have been grown in Pakistan, is around US $ 0.8-1.0 billion per year.
 Millions of Bales (170 kgs)
Yield (kgs/ha) Area (,000 ha)

0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0

0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
1980
1980 1981
1981 1982
1982 1983
1983 1984
1984 1985
1985 1986

Data Source: ICAC Cotton Statistics

Data Source: ICAC Cotton Statistics

1986 1987
1987 1988
1988 1989
1989
Production

1990
1990 1991
1991 1992
1992 1993
Mill use

Area
1993 1994
1994 1995
1995 1996
1996
Imports
Pakistan Emerging as Importer

Yield
1997
1997 1998
1998 1999
1999 2000
Exports

2000 2001
Area & Yield of Cotton in Pakistan for the past 28 years

2001 2002
2002 2003
2003 2004
2004 2005
2005 2006
2006 2007
2007
2
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The figure above represents the area of cotton grown in Pakistan over the last 3 decades and
the average yield. Over this time, the area has increased steadily from just over 2 million
hectares to just over 3 million hectares but yield has stagnated. Every time the yield has
threatened to increase (e.g. the early nineties and 2004), some disaster has befallen the
industry (e.g. CLCV, mealybugs, etc). The increase in production in Pakistan over time has
been driven by increased area planted, not so much by any increase in productivity. The
industry is in a 25 year time warp.

The current average cotton yield in Pakistan is 18 maunds (1 maund = 37.32 kg) of seed cotton
per acre which would produce 11.7 million (170 kg) bales on 3.2 million hectares. In order to
meet current mill demand, the yield would need to increase by 30% to 23.4 maunds average
which would produce 15.2 million bales. This is an extra 3.5 million bales of cotton production
which would put an extra US$ 0.9-1.1 billion per year into the pockets of Pakistan cotton
farmers, not overseas cotton farmers.

Now pushing the concept of potential yield increases a little further, what if yield can be
increased 67% to 30 maunds average which would produce 19.5 million bales. This is an extra
7.8 million bales of cotton production which would give Pakistani cotton farmers an extra US$ 2-
2.5 billion per year. The extra production over current mill demand would go to either export of
excess lint or increased mill demand, probably a combination of both. Assuming that all could
be value added in the local textile industry, the increased textile production would be worth an
extra US$ 3 billion per year, over and above the extra US$ 2-2.5b/yr for the lint mentioned
above.

These are certainly impressive numbers but are they realistically achievable? I believe so.
Firstly, this is already the set target for the Cotton Vision 2015 Project (20m bales by 2015) and
secondly, the Indian cotton industry has already achieved this level of improvement.
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India Emerging as Exporter

Production Mill use Exports

35.0

30.0
Millions of bales (170 kgs)

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Data Source: ICAC Cotton Statistics

Bt introduction

The figure above demonstrates the profound changes in the Indian cotton industry since the
introduction of Bt cotton. Prior to the introduction of Bt cotton in India in 2003, India had the
world’s lowest average yield (302 kg lint/ha in 2002) and was importing cotton lint to meet mill
demand. Within 5 years, average yield had increased 88% to 567 kg lint/ha 1 and India is now
the world’s second biggest cotton exporter. So the potential 67% yield increase mentioned for
Pakistan is not unrealistic.

However, India’s yield constraints were different to Pakistan’s. Number one problem was
Bollworm control which was addressed immediately by the introduction of Bt cotton. Other
problems were (and still are) erratic monsoon rains (to be addressed by the introduction of
future drought tolerant cotton?), weeds, particularly in the northern irrigated crop (to be
addressed by the introduction of herbicide tolerant cottons) and CLCV (Cotton Leaf Curl Virus)
but only in the north (0.5m out of a total of 9m ha).

1
ICAC Cotton Statistics.
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Pakistan has a different set of problems. Number one problem is CLCV which first arose in the
early nineties and which was solved by the breeding of CLCV resistant varieties. However, this
early success was short lived with the development of a recombinant mutant strain of the virus
(called Burewala strain after the village where it was first discovered) which overcame all
previously resistant varieties and even to date, there are no known cotton varieties resistant to
this new strain despite extensive testing of global germplasm collections. Until this problem is
solved, any benefits to be potentially gained from solving the other problems (including the
introduction of Bt cotton) will not be fully realized. The second major problem for the Pakistan
cotton industry is the lack of a professional seed industry resulting in poor quality seed (poor
germination and lack of genetic purity) to the farmer. Investing in new transgenic technologies
will not produce results if these cannot be delivered to farmers in a consistently high quality
seed, which in turn cannot be achieved without a professional seed industry. The third major
problem for the Pakistan cotton industry has been mealybugs. These have arisen as a key pest
in just a matter of a couple of seasons and there is no clear understanding why this is so or
what will happen to their pest status in the future. The fourth major problem for the Pakistan
cotton industry is the high input cost (principally diesel and fertilizer) which is a common
problem for farmers around the globe. The fifth major problem for the Pakistan cotton industry is
lack of water, although it is unclear whether the problem is scarcity of water or its distribution.
Weeds are also a major problem for Pakistan cotton farmers although they are hardly
mentioned by most people, presumably because it is just accepted that weeds are a problem
about which little can be done. Last but not least, bollworms and armyworms have been a
consistent problem for Pakistan cotton farmers with some years being much worse than others.
The solution to bollworms is relatively simple (the introduction of transgenic Bt cottons) but as
stated previously and which cannot be emphasized enough, the full potential of Bt cotton will not
be realized until all the other problems are solved as well.

There are no clear data on the economic impact of these various problems mentioned above
but I will attempt below to estimate the cost of these problems to the Pakistan cotton growers.

Problem Estimated yield losses (170 kg bales lint)

CLCV 2-3 m
No professional seed industry 2-3 m
Mealybugs 1m
Water 1m
Weeds 2m
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The total yield losses are somewhere in the range of 8-10 million bales. On top of that, improved
crop management techniques could add an extra 2-3 million bales, making a grand total of an
extra 10-13 million bales per year, if all of Pakistan’s cotton production problems could be
solved. This figure is double the current production and would be worth an extra US$ 2.7-
4.1b/year in extra lint, oil and meal yield. The extra lint production over the current mill
requirement could be met either by exports or increased mill use or both (as was the case with
India) with the value adding figure if it all went to increased textile production being another US$
4.7-6.7b/year. These figures would represent a very significant improvement in Pakistan’s
national economic position if the Pakistan cotton industry can be turned around and revitalised.
In addition, there is a developing decline in US cotton production due to the competition from
biofuel crops and the US cotton production may end up moving off shore as has the US cotton
processing industry. If this happens, it will open up a great opportunity for other cotton
producing countries to meet this potential shortfall in the US cotton exports and Pakistan should
ensure that it can be one of those countries along with India, Africa, Brazil and the cotton
growing countries of the CIS.

Now to deal with the major cotton problems in detail.

2.1 Cotton Leaf Curl Virus

This problem has been in Pakistan for a very long time, probably as long as cotton has been
grown in the region. The local cotton species Gossypium arboreum has developed a natural
resistance to CLCV but the introduced commercial cotton species Gossypium hirsutum is mostly
naturally susceptible to CLCV as it evolved elsewhere. The introduction of the smooth leaf
highly virus susceptible S12 variety in the late 80s, saw an increase in spraying for jassids
initially, then for bollworms induced by the jassid sprays which in turn induced a whitefly
problem.

Whitefly vector of
CLCV
Left – adults & nymphs
(scales)
Right – adults & eggs
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As whitefly is the vector for CLCV and there was a large area of the highly CLCV susceptible
S12 variety being grown, the conditions were ripe for the first CLCV epizootic. This severely
affected Pakistan cotton production in the early 90s and the problem was eventually solved by
the breeding of conventional CLCV resistant varieties by a number of local Pakistan breeding
institutes. However, later research indicated that there were only three sources of CLCV
resistance discovered (LRA 5166, CP 15/2 and Cedex) and that the first two were actually the
same, so effectively there were only two sources. As the CLCV problem declined in severity, the
industry ended up growing a mixture of CLCV resistant and tolerant varieties which allowed a
residual CLCV population to flourish. Additionally, this allowed the virus to recombine and
mutate to a different form, and in this case unfortunately, to a more virulent form called the
Burewala strain. This new mutant strain overcame all previously known sources of conventional
host plant resistance and is still spreading gradually from its original source at Burewala near
Vehari throughout the Pakistani Punjab and even into the Indian Punjab. Pakistani cotton
breeders have been assiduously screening germplasm from around the world to try to identify a
source (or hopefully sources) of resistance to this new CLCV strain but have so far been
unsuccessful, despite screening over 12,000 lines at the Vehari Cotton Research Station near
the virus epicentre.

The solution to the CLCV problem must come from research and as the CLCV problem is
restricted to Pakistan and the Indian Punjab, this will have to rely largely on a local regional
solution. Clearly help will also be required from external virus research institutes such as the US
Danforth Institute but most of the effort will have to come from local research institutes to solve
a local problem. The eventual solution will come from either conventional breeding, mutation
breeding such as carried out at the Nuclear Institute of Agricultural Biology (NIAB), interspecific
crosses from resistant but commercially distant wild cottons (such as carried out at the Central
Cotton Research Institute (CCRI) and the Ayub Agricultural Research Institute (AARI)) or
transgenic (genetically modified) approaches such as carried out at the National Institute of
Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (NIBGE). All these 4 approaches should be funded as a
priority and when a solution is eventually found, a country wide cotton crop management
strategy should be concurrently implemented to ensure the maximum durability of the new
solution e.g. quit growing CLCV susceptible varieties as quickly as possible to reduce the virus
inoculum level and thus reduce the potential for virus recombination and mutation, as happened
previously.
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CLCV susceptible variety in the Indian Punjab

However, it could be some time before a successful solution is found and in the meantime there
should be a concerted extension campaign to mitigate the economic impact of CLCV. This
should be planned on two fronts; one to reduce the whitefly vector population and another to
reduce the CLCV inoculum level. In regards to the latter, CLCV can only exist in a live host so
all cotton plant sticks should be removed immediately after harvesting is finished and in
particular, all cotton crops abandoned due to severe CLCV should be uprooted as soon as
possible. Whitefly populations on weeds and crops should be managed early season with soft,
non-disruptive chemicals (e.g. mineral oils, buprofezin and pyriproxyfen) and all hard spray
options should be delayed as long as possible. Early season sunflowers are excellent whitefly
nurseries and should be avoided at all costs in cotton areas.
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CLCV damage –
Multan district Aug
2006

Some growers have tried to avoid the CLCV problem by planting earlier and earlier, some even
as early as February or March. They then treat this crop as a high input 300 day crop and aim to
maximize yield from the cotton crop as a rotation with wheat is no longer possible. Many larger
farmers have tried this approach with some success but in the long term, I can foresee lots of
problems if this trend is continued. The most important problem being encountered is the
problem of Bronze Wilt (also called Sudden Wilt or Reddening in Pakistan) which is a
physiological disorder caused by trying to fill bolls during the hottest part of the season. The
optimum temperatures for cotton are 35 degrees Centigrade during the day and 26 degrees
Centigrade at night. February/March planted cotton will be fully loaded up with fruit and at the
boll-fill stage when the extremely hot May/June temperatures come (45 degrees during the day
and 35 degrees during the night being not uncommon). This is a physiological impossibility for
the cotton plant which then goes a red/bronze colour, wilts and sheds it fruit. It can recover later
and grow a good second crop during milder conditions. This is a bigger problem in the hotter
areas of the Punjab with the northern Punjab crops faring better (and thus yielding better)
because of the milder temperatures in the north. However, the growing of 300 day cotton is not
a sustainable proposition. It uses a lot of extra inputs (especially fertilizer and number of
irrigations) and requires pest control (especially whitefly control) for a long period, creating a
pesticide resistance risk and fosters CLCV inoculum buildup for a large part of the season. Also,
the level of Bt cotton efficacy would be questionable during the latter half of the crop as Bt
efficacy usually begins to decline after 100 days or so. All in all, I see very early planting
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(Feb/March) of part of their cotton crop to avoid CLCV, as continuing to be a popular option for
some growers (particularly in the milder parts of the Punjab). But, I stress, this should not be
promoted as a solution to the CLCV problem. It should be considered only as a short term risk
spreading strategy until a longer term CLCV solution is found. Mid to late May plantings are
probably the best compromise to minimize CLCV risk and to avoid boll filling in adversely hot
weather.

2.2 Mealybugs

Mealybugs are generally considered as a curiosity on cotton and rarely need controlling. Thus
the mealybug explosion in Pakistan cotton from 2005 to 2007 came as a surprise to everyone in
the industry. It seemed to come from nowhere, peaked in 2007 and there is some evidence that
the problem may be now declining in importance. There are a couple of different theories as to
why this happened.

The first is that this is an introduced virulent new pest species but if this is the case, then it is
very hard to explain how it could have become a pest across the whole Pakistan cotton belt
almost simultaneously. Its damage would have been traceable over time from its point of
introduction but there is no evidence of this. Mealybug females can only disperse by crawling or
being moved on infested plants or produce (only the males can fly), so dispersal of mealybugs
across the Pakistan cotton belt would have been a very slow process and this does not fit with
the massive population explosion observed over just a two year period.

Close up of mealybugs Mealybugs can prematurely kill cotton plants

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What is more probable is that the mealybug was already spread throughout the Pakistan cotton
belt but that it was at such low levels that it was hardly ever noticed, and then some sort of
event triggered the population explosion. In regards to the first part of this theory, a recently
published paper 2 suggests that the mealybug was first introduced into Karachi in 1974 and then
spread slowly north. By 1988, it was recorded throughout the cotton growing areas of the Sindh
province. It then continued to spread slowly and gradually north into the Punjab province where
it was recorded in 11 cotton growing districts in 2005. The original 1974 identification was the
Hibiscus mealybug Phenacoccus (= Maconellicoccus) hirsutum which has not recently been
found in Pakistan. The cotton mealybug is similar to but different to Hibiscus mealybug and is
considered a new species Maconellicoccus sp. nov. Yousuf et al. (2007) probably very rightly
conclude that the original 1974 identification was incorrect and that the new introduction all
along was the cotton mealybug, not the Hibiscus mealybug. If this is correct, it explains the
broad distribution of the cotton mealybug throughout the Pakistan cotton belt (albeit at low
numbers) but not the trigger that set off the mealybug population explosion.

There are a couple of theories on the putative trigger which could have set off the mealybug
population explosion. If the mealybug had been present previously throughout the cotton belt for
many years, then something clearly different must have happened prior to the start of the
population explosion in 2005. Some people suggest an environmental trigger such as high
temperatures or high humidity which would favour the mealybug, while another theory is that the
population explosion was induced by intensive spraying for other pests which disrupted the
natural balance between the mealybug and its natural enemies (various parasites and
predators), perhaps even more likely, a combination of both factors. There needs to be research
on these potential triggers to sort out what happened just prior to 2005. If these factors can be
identified, then steps can be taken to predict future mealybug outbreaks to either avoid them if
possible or at least mitigate their economic impact.

In this regard, the following data was obtained to help with identifying potential mealybug
population explosion triggers, specifically: 1) broad-scale spraying of armyworms, etc. with hard
insecticides in 2003; and 2) unusually warm and humid weather from 2005 to 2007. A third
possible trigger (the wide scale early spring spraying campaign against whitefly in 2003) was
discounted as a possible trigger as the soft insecticide buprofezin was largely used in that
campaign but if any broad spectrum insecticides were used in that campaign, then this could
have also contributed to the mealybug outbreak..

2
Yousuf et al. 2007, Pakistan Entomologist Vol 29(1):49-50
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The following table presents data on the average daily maximum and minimum temperatures (in
ºC) and relative humidity and total rainfall for spring to autumn (Feb-Oct) for the years 2000 to
2007 at Multan CCRI. Numbers in bold in the table below are the years where the season
average is above the 2000-2007 long term average.

Spring to 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Av.
Autumn 2000-
(Feb-Oct) 2007

Av. daily max 34.8 34.3 34.5 33.5 34.3 32.6 34.4 33.5 33.9
temp ºC
Av. daily min 22.3 22.2 22.4 21.9 22.5 21.9 23.2 22.4 22.3
temp ºC
Av. Daily 8 am 67.0 69.5 68.1 68.4 68.9 71.6 72.1 74.3 70.4
relative humidity

Av. Daily 5 pm 43.3 47.3 39.0 47.2 48.6 52.0 53.1 56.8 48.7
relative humidity

Total rainfall 57.6 240.3 60.9 179.6 102.6 151.9 76.3 165.3 128.6
(mm)

Source: Dr. Naveed, CCRI Multan, Pakistan.

The following table presents date on the average number of insecticide sprays applied on cotton in
Pakistan in the years 2000 to 2007.

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

4.8 5.7 4.8 7.0 5.7 5.3 5.6 5.4
Source: Directorate of Pest Warning and Quality Control of Pesticides, Multan, Punjab.
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Mealybugs
attended by ants
and on brinjal (egg
plant)

The 2003 cotton season was marked by heavy mid-late season rains and an expansive
armyworm outbreak in cotton which was controlled with indiscriminate use of insecticides,
particularly when supplies ran out and growers had to resort to broad spectrum insecticides
such as the organophosphates. In fact the 2003 season had the heaviest spray pressure in the
last eight years. The theory is that this broad-scale spraying in 2003 killed the mealybug natural
enemies which had been holding the mealybug populations in check previously. This would then
have allowed the mealybug populations to increase unchecked in the following years, maybe
assisted by favourable weather conditions. In fact, the weather data for the 2005-2007 outbreak
period indicates very favourable humid weather (see table above) for the mealybug but no clear
temperature trigger.

If this theory is correct, then ultimately, the natural enemies would be able to build back up and
once again assert their control over the mealybug population. In fact, the reduced mealybug
problem in 2008 may be the start of the redressing of the natural balance of things. There
appears to be some evidence for this from data for late season mealybug collections taken from
cotton in October 2008. These were made by independent research entomologist Dr. David
Chamberlain, Crop Protection & Research Consultant, JDW Sugar Mills, Rahim Yar Khan,
Pakistan who made two collections of mealybugs off cotton from the lower Punjab (Lodhran and
Rahim Yar Khan) and recorded very high levels of parasitism by an encyrtid 3 wasp (94.2 and

3
* Parasitoid specimens collected by CABI South Asia from Maconellicoccus sp. attacking cotton in Tando Jam in
August 2008 and sent to the Natural History Museum UK were identified as Aenasius sp. nov. nr. longiscapus
Compere (Hymenoptera: Encyrtidae) – see http://www.cabi.org/default.aspx?site=170&page=1303. Although
the specimens collected from Maconellicoccus sp. attacking the cotton at Lodhran and Rahim Yar Khan in 2008 were
not officially identified, it is likely they are the same species.
 14

96.1%, respectively). High levels of parasitism (up to 70%) were also reported by entomologists
in the Sindh late season in 2008. Dr. Chamberlain followed up these late 2008 season
collections with further collections from the lower Punjab in the following season (mid and late
season mealybug collections at two sites and from another two sites where mealybugs
appeared only late in the season). Once again very high levels of parasitism were recorded (88-
94%) in late season populations where the parasites had time to establish with lower levels (30-
35%) where infestations were only recent (see Dr. Chamberlain’s data in the Table below).

Number of parasites emerging (days after

collection)
Number of
%
Date Location mealybugs
parasitism
sampled 9 12 15 18 21 24 Total

Lodhran 86 - 8 12 31 30 - 81 94.2
2008 Oct
Rahim Yar Khan 103 - 10 28 40 21 - 99 96.1

Iqbal Bagh 76 - 6 12 18 9 - 45 59.2

9th
July
Rang Pur 97 - 9 19 24 7 - 59 60.8

Iqbal Bagh 84 - 13 23 29 14 - 79 94.0

2009
Rang Pur 65 - 9 19 17 12 - 57 87.7
12th
Sept
Kot Sardar Khan 102 - 5 15 7 4 - 31 30.4

Roti Shareef 75 - 4 7 10 5 - 26 34.7

Data source: Kindly supplied by Dr. David Chamberlain (pers. comm.)

Dr Chamberlain’s observations on the abundance of the encyrtid parasite Aenasius sp. certainly
fit with field observations of declining mealybug infestations starting in 2008 with a continuing
decline into 2009. Given continuing high levels of parasitism, one should be confident to
anticipate that the mealybug populations will be reduced to very low levels and assuming that
they are not triggered off again, should now be able to held in check by their natural enemies.
 15

In this regard, the current introduction of the mealybug destroying ladybird Cryptolaemus
montrouzieri by CABI can only help in assisting to keep the mealybug populations in check.

What is the long term solution to the mealybug menace? Pakistan entomologists need to do
some basic research on the ecology of the mealybug and its natural enemies to determine what
the trigger for the mealybug population explosion was in 2005-2007. If and when this trigger is
identified and it can be attributed to be caused by human activities, then all management efforts
should be made to ensure that this trigger is never again activated.

2.3 Lack of a professional seed industry

Pakistani cotton growers have been plagued with this problem for many years. The result is that
the planting seed they have been supplied with often has poor germination and is mostly lacking
in genetic purity because of breeding shortcuts, haste to market and seed contamination, often
at the gin. Growers often end up trying to manage a mixture of varieties in the one field so that
any one crop management decision may not necessarily be the best one for all the varieties in
the field. For example in the picture below, there is a pure seed production block in the
background, rogued for off types. In the foreground, is a commercial field of the same variety
with clearly a range of different types and maturities in the same field, including even desi cotton
(Gossypium arboreum) off types.

Pure seed
production block

Same variety, commercial

seed, separated by road

Desi cotton
contaminants
 16

This has been an on-going problem for the conventional seed market and will become even
more important for the developing transgenic cotton seed market. Quality assurance is critical
for transgenic seed production otherwise you can end up with mixed and/or segregating seed
which gives rise to a number of problems, such as: 1) Bt resistance risk – bollworm larvae can
crawl between Bt and non-Bt plants to recover from Bt poisoning; and 2) yield loss from the non-
Bt plants in the field which are unprotected from bollworm attack. In fact, research from the US
has shown that for every 1% loss in Bt purity, the farmer loses 0.5 - 0.9% yield, depending on
the pest pressure. 4 For example, if Bt purity is only at 90%, then growers would suffer a 5%
yield loss under low bollworm pressure, up to 9% under high bollworm pressure. These potential
yield losses are significant enough in their own right, let alone the risk to the future efficacy of Bt
cotton.

There are other consequences of the lack of a professional seed industry, such as the following:

1) Growers held to ransom by the uncontrolled seed mafia

2) Unauthorised introduction of Bt cotton
3) New varieties are sometimes released prematurely just to exploit the novelty marketing factor
without adding significantly to the range of grower choice

The smooth leaf variety in

the centre of this jassid
screening trial indicates
the potential severity of
jassid damage

4) The foreign germplasm introduced as the unauthorized Bt donor is not necessarily adapted to
the local environmental or pest and disease conditions. For example, most potential Bt donor
varieties from the US, China and Australia are smooth leaf and therefore susceptible to jassid
attack. They are also usually very susceptible to CLCV and not generally heat tolerant. This
means that the Bt backcrossing introgression programme needs to be conducted with

4
Agi, A.L., Mahaffey, J.S., Bradley Jr., J.R. & Van Duyn, J.W. (2001) Journal of Cotton Science 5: 74-80
 17

scrupulous attention to detail with sufficient enough backcross generations (maybe even up to
BC6) to breed out the unwanted traits. If not, then these unwanted traits such as jassid and
CLCV tolerance will segregate in the subsequent commercial crops and will be observed to
varying degrees in growers’ fields, adding to the growers’ yield loss problems. This is already
happening in commercial planting seed of unauthorized Bt with many growers observing more
jassid and CLCV damage than they would normally expect in such a variety.

The extent of the problem of lack of genetic purity in commercial crops is difficult to quantify but
a survey of commercial cotton crops by the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) in
the 2007 season gives an idea of the degree of the problem.

Sindh Punjab

% of crop as Bt cotton 80% 50%

Planting seed source Gins private

% off types noted 10-20% 10-20%
% fake Bt 10% 5%
% mixed Bt or segregating 15% 4%

The problem seems worse in the Sindh, maybe because it started first with Bt cotton or maybe
because the seed was sourced from potentially contaminated seed from gins. Nevertheless,
these figures paint an alarming picture which can only become worse over time if nothing is
done to improve the Pakistani cottonseed industry.

Why then is there no professional cottonseed industry in Pakistan, as there is in, say, India?
Government policy over the years has pushed for a public breeding and seed supply system but
this has clearly not delivered. There are no incentives for the private seed sector investment and
no Intellectual Property (IP) protection for the development of new germplasm. The draft Plant
Breeders Rights Act must be enacted as soon as possible and once in place, must be enforced.
Patent protection laws are already in place for the protection of new technologies and traits but
they must be regarded and enforced if necessary. These protections will benefit both local
public and private and multinational seed sector and technology companies and will most
definitely encourage the development of a professional seed industry in Pakistan.

A viable private seed sector must be encouraged and supported in Pakistan. In addition to the
IP protection measures mentioned above, the following actions are strongly recommended:
 18

1) Pass the Seed Act 1976 amendment to include the private sector.

2) Ensure all private seed sector companies have open access to any public germplasm
releases, on the same commercial royalty terms. Public seed companies, such as the Punjab
Seed Corporation, should be treated no differently.

3) Ensure that public sector and private sector variety approvals are treated equally and that
the approval process is not influenced by the parties with vested interests.

India took a different path to professionalise its cottonseed industry. It made a conscious effort
about 30-40 years ago to develop hybrid cotton which took a while to develop but which now
accounts for about 70% of the Indian cottonseed market. Heterosis or hybrid vigour in cotton so
far has been much less than that experienced in other crops such as corn, sorghum and
sunflowers (say around 5% at most versus 20% or so for these other crops), so hybrid cotton
was adopted more for higher quality seed (better germination and genetic purity) than for hybrid
vigour. The adoption of hybrid cotton in India then allowed a private seed sector to develop as
growers had to now buy fresh seed each year (de facto IP protection if you like). The growers
were also happy as they were now being supplied with genetically pure, high quality planting
seed with good germination and seedling vigour. The growers were prepared to pay more for
the more expensive hybrid cotton seed as it delivered growers a greater economic benefit and
seed companies were prepared to invest in plant breeding and seed processing improvements
as they were assured of a return on their investments. So the Indian cottonseed industry has
flourished and India has been able to enjoy the benefits of a professional cottonseed industry
with ready access to the full range of currently available transgenic technologies for cotton and
no doubt continuing access to the pipeline of future transgenic technologies in cotton. So what
about the possibility of developing a hybrid cotton industry in Pakistan?

Hybrid cotton production is a very labour intensive process with most commercial production
requiring hand emasculation in the afternoon and hand pollination the following morning. Hand
emasculation is the most demanding task and does require a level of dexterity and children are
preferred for this task. So this has led to the problem of the use of child labour in hybrid cotton
production systems in India and China. While this may be considered less of a problem for local
seed companies, it is a very significant issue for multinational seed companies who are at an
economic disadvantage as they do not support this practice. This would also be a problem for
Pakistan, in addition to the problem of having no experience base in the practice of hybrid
cottonseed production. In comparison, India has 30-40 years of experience, and a specialized
 19

hybrid cottonseed industry is already in place with dedicated hybrid cottonseed producing
districts and villages with professional “organizers”.

Hybrid
cottonseed
production in
China

There are two other conventional hybrid production systems used but these do have their own
set of problems and are not that widely used. These are: 1) Genetic Male Sterility is used but
you have to rogue out the 50% fertile plants in the seed production fields and the yield drag from
heat stress is around 3-5%. It is a complex two gene recessive system and requires a longer
backcrossing programme; and 2) Cytoplasmic Male Sterility is rarely used because of the
unacceptable 8-10% yield loss due to heat sensitivity.

In addition to the lack of any history of hybrid cottonseed production infrastructure and
experience in Pakistan, there are a number of other major technical and logistical difficulties.
These are discussed below briefly.

Technical problems

1) Lack of suitable seed production areas – it is generally too hot in the central Pakistan cotton
belt for successful hybrid cottonseed production. Seed production will either have to be in the
milder northern Punjab or southern Sindh to avoid excessive heat during the seed production
period. However, in the more industrialized north there will be competition for labour and in the
south, it may be too wet for reliable production of high quality seed.

2) Lack of compensatory ability in low planting density hybrids – because of the higher cost of
hybrid seed, it is planted at a much lower planting rate than that used for varieties. Hybrid cotton
is planted at around 1 kg per acre in the Indian Punjab and varieties are planted at around 5-8
kg per acre in Pakistan. So debilitating problems like CLCV and jassids (which severely affect
the growth and productivity of infected/infested plants), become much more important problems
as the same percentage infection at low planting rates will cause significantly more production
losses because of the reduced compensatory ability. For example in the two photos below, we
 20

can clearly see the reduced biomass production capability in the substantial bare areas
surrounding the badly affected plants.

Left – CLCV in
Pakistan. Note
hybrid in front
– variety at
back.

Right – Jassid
damage in
India

Logistical problems

It will be very hard to quickly ramp up the hybrid production capability in Pakistan from a zero
base to a level that can effectively meet the hybrid seed demands for a 3.2m hectare cotton
industry in Pakistan. While not an impossible task, it could take up to 10 years or so to develop
a viable hybrid cottonseed production industry in Pakistan using currently available systems. For
example, if you have say 200 seed production farms or villages at 20 acres each, this will give
you 4,000 acres of seed production capability. Given current production capabilities, this should
produce enough planting seed for 100,000 hectares at a variety competitive planting rate of 2 kg
hybrid seed per hectare and this would meet only 3% of the country’s needs. The estimated
labour requirement to do this would be 300 workers per 20 acre farm or seed production village
per day from August to mid September. In addition, the production cost of this seed would be
high at around 500 PR per kg of black seed compared to around 30 PR/kg black for varietal
seed.

2.4 Weeds

Weeds are a major yield constraint in Pakistan cotton production but surprisingly are hardly
mentioned by anyone as a problem. Perhaps people are fatalistic about weeds and just accept
that they cannot do much about them and take the yield losses. But herbicide tolerant cottons
will offer growers a new weed control tool.

There are a number of herbicide tolerant technologies currently available in cotton from multiple
technology suppliers and some which will become available in the near term. In fact, the first
cotton biotech product to be commercialised was BXN cotton from Calgene in 1995 (technology
 21

went to Bayer and now withdrawn). This was an herbicide tolerant cotton resistant to
bromoxynil, a photosystems II photosynthesis inhibitor (HRAC [Herbicide Resistance Action
Committee] mode of action class C3). This was followed in 1997 by Monsanto’s Roundup
Ready cotton resistant to glyphosate, an aromatic amino acid inhibitor at EPSP synthase
(HRAC mode of action class G).

This first version of glyphosate tolerant cotton had full vegetative (that is pre-squaring) tolerance
but only limited reproductive (that is squaring, flowering, boll development and maturation)
tolerance to glyphosate resulting in glyphosate use in this initial technology being restricted to 2
over-the-top sprays before the 4 true leaf stage followed by up to another 2 possible post-
directed sprays to the base of the plant until row closure. Full vegetative and reproductive
tolerance to glyphosate was not achieved until the release of Monsanto’s improved 2-gene
Roundup Ready Flex technology in 2006 which allowed growers much greater flexibility in
glyphosate spray applications (up to 3 over-the-top sprays to 16 nodes and one post-directed
spray from 16-22 nodes plus 1 end-of-season spray if required).

The only other herbicide tolerant biotech trait commercialised so far is Bayer’s Liberty Link
cotton back in 2004, which is resistant to glufosinate, a glutamine synthesis inhibitor (HRAC
mode of action class H). So far this technology has not been out-licensed in cotton but cross-
licensing agreements have been announced in other crops and just recently in cotton.

Weed control is compounded by the CLCV problem

Monsanto has also announced that it is developing a second herbicide tolerance trait to stack
with Roundup Ready Flex. This new cotton technology will confer resistance to dicamba, a
synthetic auxin growth regulator (HRAC mode of action class O). This should certainly help
 22

address the developing concerns over the increasing number of glyphosate resistant weeds
which will be further exacerbated by the wider and more liberal application window afforded by
the introduction of Roundup Ready Flex cotton in 2006. However, there may be volatility and
drift issues with dicamba herbicide which will have to be closely watched and managed if
required.

Bayer is proposing a 2-gene stacked Glytol / Liberty Link herbicide tolerant technology. Glytol
will be Bayer’s own glyphosate resistance technology which will be stacked with their current
Liberty Link (glufosinate resistant) technology.

Dow has also announced the development of its own 2-gene stacked DHT herbicide tolerant
technology. DHT stands for Dow Agrosciences Herbicide Tolerance Trait and is based on
resistance to 2 separate herbicide classes: the synthetic auxin growth regulators (HRAC mode
of action class O) and the aryloxy phenoxy propionate or “fop” herbicides (HRAC mode of action
class A). Once again, this should help to manage potential herbicide resistance problems but
the auxinic herbicides do present potential volatility and drift management issues.

Syngenta is also developing its own glyphosate tolerant cotton technology (Touchdown
Tolerance).

Dupont has also recently announced the development of its new OPTIMUM GAT herbicide
tolerance technology for cotton and other field crops. OPTIMUM is an umbrella brand name and
GAT stands for Glyphosate ALS Tolerant which is based on resistance to 2 separate herbicide
classes: glyphosate and the acetolactate synthase (ALS) inhibitor herbicides such as the
sulfonylureas and imidazolinones (HRAC mode of action class B). The OPTIMUM technology is
based on DuPont’s proprietary “gene shuffling” technique to optimise expression/activity of
candidate transgenes. Once again, this will certainly help in the management of potential
herbicide resistance problems.

However, it should also be noted that in Pakistan, weeds serve an important function for the
local villagers who harvest them for forage for their household livestock. This source of historical
“free fodder” should be recognized and alternatives devised if and when herbicide tolerant
technologies are adopted, so that underprivileged villagers are not disadvantaged.

The recommendation for herbicide tolerant technologies in Pakistan is to go straight to

Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Flex glyphosate tolerant cotton and to stack it with double gene
Bollgard 2 or triple gene Bollgard 3 (to be discussed later). There is no point in delaying as all
 23

these technologies are available here and now for introgression into local germplasm. Other
potential technology providers should also be consulted.

HRAC Herbicide Tolerance Classes in Cotton

A = fops & dims DuPont

B = su’s & imi’s
C = BXN
G = glyphosate
B
H = glufosinate DuPont
O = auxins

G Bayer
MON
DuPont
Bayer
C3
SYT
MON
O
DOW
DOW MON Bayer

A
DOW
MON / Bayer 3-way stack H
G+O+H Bayer

2.5 High input costs and water scarcity

Like most farmers around the world, Pakistan cotton farmers are being hit by rising input costs,
particularly diesel and fertilizer costs. The cost of pumping water is being exacerbated by the
disruption of electricity supplies with extra demands on diesel to maintain pumping capacity.
While these issues are extremely important to growers, they are beyond the remit of this review
and will not be discussed further here.
 24

In regards to the claim of water scarcity, some people suggest it is not a matter of the shortage
of water but more an inefficient management of its supply and distribution. I suspect this is
probably the case from what I have seen and read but again, this is not part of the remit of this
review and will not be discussed further here except to say there should be more research on
WUE (Water Use Efficiency) in cotton in Pakistan. Consider the following figures: 5

WUE in Australia - 227 kg lint produced per megalitre of water used

WUE in Egypt - 136 kg lint produced per megalitre of water used

WUE in Pakistan - 50 kg lint produced per megalitre of water used

There is certainly lots of room for improvement in WUE in Pakistan.

2.6 Bollworms

Bollworms and armyworms have been a consistent but variable constraint on cotton production
in Pakistan requiring in most years 4 to 5 sprays. Up until the last couple of years, these have
been controlled with varying levels of success by conventional synthetic insecticides. With the
wide scale introduction of unauthorized MON 531 cotton (effectively Bollgard 1 cotton), the pest
status of the majority of these pests in cotton has declined.

There are a number of insecticide tolerant technologies currently available in cotton from
multiple technology suppliers and some which will become available in the near term.

Currently available insect tolerance cotton technologies are:

1) Monsanto’s (MON 531) Bollgard 1 – introduced in the US and Australia in 1996, contains Cry
1Ac protein from Bacillus thuringiensis. It is effective on a range of lepidopteran (chewing
caterpillar) pests, including all the main ones in cotton (American bollworm, spiny and spotted
bollworms and pink bollworm) but is only marginally effective on Spodoptera armyworm. It has
high efficacy for around 100 days after planting, thereafter efficacy gradually declines; so some
supplementary spraying may still be required, depending on pest pressure. MON 531 was
brought into Pakistan unofficially and backcrossed into local germplasm. It has been adopted
widely across the whole of the Pakistan cotton belt and would account now for around 80% of
the cotton plantings in Sindh province and around 60% in the Punjab. MON 531 has not yet
been approved by the Pakistan regulatory authorities so it currently has unauthorized regulatory
status, although there are now efforts to rectify this situation. Monsanto never applied for a
patent on MON 531 in Pakistan so it is legal to use Bollgard 1 technology in Pakistan. The

5
Irrigation of Cotton – The ICAC Recorder Vol 21(4) Dec 2003 pp. 4-9
 25

situation on exports of textile products made from lint from unpatented Bollgard 1 cotton grown
in Pakistan into countries where MON 531 has patent protection, has been examined in detail
by the Government of Punjab Task Force on Promotion of Bt Cotton in Punjab (June 2008 –
Findings & Recommendations). Their conclusion is that the case law studies so far indicate that
MON 531 protection in North America and the EU (where it is patented), does not extend to
import of products made from cotton plants containing Bt genes. Their conclusion on this is
quote: “It is now crystal clear that in the absence of patent protection on MON 531, plant
breeders and molecular biologists have a legitimate right (without jeopardizing Pakistan’s
commercial interests in export markets) to use MON 531 for improvement of cotton and other
crops in Pakistan.”

2) Monsanto’s (MON 15985) Bollgard 2 – introduced in the US and Australia in 2002, contains
Cry 1Ac and Cry 2Ab proteins from Bacillus thuringiensis. This certainly improved efficacy
longevity and the range of pests controlled (now much more effective on Spodoptera
armyworms), as well as greatly enhancing the potential durability of the technology from a
Resistance Management perspective. Monsanto has broadly out-licensed this technology which
is also patented in Pakistan.

3) Dow’s WideStrike® – introduced in the US in 2004, contains Cry 1Ac and Cry 1F proteins
from Bacillus thuringiensis. WideStrike® has not yet been commercialized outside the US but
Dow has done some cross-licensing deals with Monsanto. Efficacy on New World Heliothis
virescens has been excellent but it is unclear yet how well it will work on Old World bollworms.

4) Chinese Bt – introduced in China in 1997 by Biocentury from research out of the CAAS
(Chinese Academy of Sciences). Two technologies were introduced: a single gene product (a
‘fused’ Cry 1Ac/Cry 1Ab gene from Bacillus thuringiensis) and a 2-gene stacked product also
containing CpTi (a trypsin inhibitor from cowpea). It is unclear if the 2-gene product is still being
sold but there are claims that the single Cry 1Ac/1Ab-fusion gene technology accounts for
around 80% of Bt cotton sales in China. However, Monsanto’s Bollgard 1 technology was also
commercialised at the same time as the CAAS technology so it is almost impossible to
accurately determine the surviving technology mix in China’s current varieties. Biocentury has
also just received permission to commercialise its Cry 1Ac/Cry 1Ab-fusion technology in Indian
cotton hybrids and is actively pursuing other markets and licensees. There have been mixed
reports on efficacy of the Chinese Bts.
 26

5) Indian Bt – introduced in India in 2007 by the local Indian seed company JK Agrigenetics.
This is single gene insect tolerant cotton utilising a modified Cry 1Ac protein from Bacillus
thuringiensis developed by the Indian Institute of Technology at Kharagpur. Efficacy is unknown.

Following is a list of insect tolerance cotton technologies that are likely to be available in the
market in the near term.

1) Monsanto’s Bollgard 3 – Monsanto has recently announced a proposed 2014 global release
date for its new Bollgard 3 product (subject to a favorable regulatory approval process). It will be
a breeding stack of the current Bollgard 2 with the Vip 3A gene to be licensed in from Syngenta.
This should improve the potential durability of the technology from a Resistance Management
perspective and may also enhance the efficacy and range against some lepidopteran pests.

2) Monsanto’s Lygus bug (sucking insect) tolerance - Monsanto has also announced its work to
develop Lygus bug tolerance which, if successful, will be the first transgenic technology to work
on non-lepidopteran sucking insects. However, highly mobile insects such as the heteropteran
mirids which have damaging adult as well as juvenile stages, will present a real challenge for
insecticidal transgenes which have to be ingested first to work.

3) Bayer’s TwinLink® - Bayer is also developing its own Twin Link 2-gene insect control
technology based on Cry 1Ab and Cry 2Ae from Bacillus thuringiensis. This will be stacked with
the proposed 2-gene stacked Glytol / Liberty Link herbicide tolerant technology.

4) Syngenta’s VipCot® - Syngenta is also close to commercialisation of its 2-gene stacked

VipCot insect control technology based on Cry 1Ab and Vip 3A from Bacillus thuringiensis. The
Cry 1Ab endotoxin protein is very similar to the Cry 1Ab and Cry 1Ac proteins used by all the
other companies but the Vip 3a exotoxin has a unique mode of action and will be a very useful
component for future resistance management programmes for insecticidal transgenic cottons.
However, the recent acquisition of Syngenta’s VipCot commercialisation partner Delta and Pine
Land Company leaves some uncertainty as to the commercial future of this technology.

5) CAMB Bt – CAMB (Centre for Applied Molecular Biology in Lahore) has isolated its own local
versions of Cry 1Ab and Cry 2A from Bacillus thuringiensis and has been granted a patent in
Pakistan in 2005 (Patent # 138279). Commercial agreements have been made with at least one
local company for use of this technology in cotton (both single and double gene variants) and
biosafety studies are proceeding. Backcrossing into elite local cultivars has also started.

There are also a number of other companies/institutes developing various insecticidal

transgenic cottons based on Cry proteins derived from Bacillus thuringiensis, including the
 27

Central Institute for Cotton Research in India (for Gossypium arboreum as well as G. hirsutum)
and NIBGE in Pakistan. An Australian company Hexima is also developing insecticidal
transgenic cotton based on 2-gene stacked proteinase inhibitors from ornamental tobacco and
potatoes.

Insecticidal Proteins in Cotton

MON
ck Bayer
-w a y sta DuPont
T3 ip 3A
/ SY b+V
MON y 2A
+ Cr Cry 2Ab/e
r y 1Ac
C
MON
Bayer
VIP 3A Cry 1Ab/c DuPont
MON
SYT Bayer
SYT
DuPont DOW
DOW
DOW
PIs NBRI
Chinese Bt Cry 1F
Meta SYT
Hexima Metahelix helix Metahelix
JK Agrigenetics
Cry 1C ICGEB
CICR
NIBGE NBRI
China
CAMB

CpTi Cry 1E
China NBRI

Bollworms in Pakistan are currently considered under control in Pakistan due to the wide scale
adoption of unauthorized MON 531 Bt cotton but as stated previously in the section on the
organization of the Pakistan cottonseed industry, this could be soon at risk. A lack of proper
Quality Assurance procedures during seed production and backcrossing during the Bt gene
introgression process, has resulted in widespread significant plantings of “de facto seed mixes”.
 28

These are a considerable threat to the continued viability of Bt cotton and these problems
should be rectified as soon as possible if Pakistan is to continue benefiting from the bollworm
control afforded by Bt cotton.

The key factors affecting the development of resistance to Bt cotton will be addressed later but it
is clear that Pakistan should be planning now for the introduction of pyramided or stacked gene
products for bollworm control. It is much more difficult for insects to develop resistance to two or
more combined toxins than it is for them to develop resistance to the same toxins presented
individually and sequentially.

This then brings the first of a number of recommendations concerning the adoption of insect
tolerant cottons for the Pakistan cotton industry:-

1) It is strongly recommended that Pakistan introduce Bollgard 2 or 3 (and other stacked

insecticidal transgenes) as soon as possible and that this should be done through a professional
cottonseed industry. Do not delay because of the current high resistance risk to segregating and
mixed single gene Bollgard 1. Stack this with Roundup Ready Flex.

2) Negotiate with Monsanto for either a one-off fee or a per kg based technology fee. Details of
both these pricing models have been communicated separately. The subsidy could be gradually
phased out after, say, 5-10 years. Pricing should be based on parity for the same product sold
in the Indian Punjab. Explore alternative funding sources e.g. US aid funds.

3) Negotiate also with other potential technology providers.

4) As part of the Tech Fee, ask for training in introgression breeding and genetic purity Quality
Assurance. Ideally, a Centre of Excellence for this should be set up in Pakistan.

5) Independently check to verify the efficacy of all potential Bt cottons against a standard
reference technology (e.g. Bollgard 1 for single gene Bts and Bollgard 2 for double gene Bts).
This should be done in side by side replicated field tests, artificially infested if need be.

6) Ask for information on primers for all new Bt technologies to be lodged in all regulatory
applications (Commercial-in-Confidence if required) so that potential future disputes on genetic
integrity of commercial products can be effectively investigated.

7) As a matter of urgency, set up a Bt Resistance Monitoring facility in Pakistan so that any

changes in bollworm susceptibility to Bt toxins can be closely tracked.

8) Improve and develop local Bio-Safety Evaluation capacity so that the relevant Pakistan
authorities are capable of following the world’s best practice in the evaluation of new GM
 29

regulatory applications. This should involve training in such places as the US/Canada and/or
Australia as well as contact with such organizations as the International Society for Bio-Safety
Research (http://www.isbr.info/) and the International Life Sciences Institute
(http://www.ilsi.org/AboutILSI/IFBIC/). Attendance at relevant conferences should also be
encouraged.

3. Research

Research is essential to underpin a large number of the objectives suggested here in this report.
Unfortunately, the current research system is failing the growers, not for want of talent from
many of the researchers but a failure of the system to allow researchers the freedom to operate
their research programmes effectively. The bureaucracy beats them. The system has to be
changed if Pakistan is to resolve the problems identified in this report.

The competitive funding model being suggested by Dr. Mubarak Ali of the Punjab Agricultural
Research Board (PARB) is a refreshing novel approach to the funding model for agricultural
research in Pakistan and I strongly recommend that it should be implemented as soon as
possible.

I can also see a need to set up a new Cotton Research & Development Corporation sponsored
specialist cotton research facility. This should be set up anew so that it can be unencumbered
by previous organizational structures. Funding for this could come from the current industry
surcharges and taxes. For example, APTMA currently pays US$ 28m per year in surcharges
and cesses to support cotton research in Pakistan while the ginners currently pay another US
$5m per year in cesses.

4. Future Pipeline Technologies

Pakistan needs to enter the mainstream science and technology arena with strong IP laws and
enforcement. This will allow Pakistan prompt access to future technologies and breakthroughs.
Otherwise, Pakistan will be left behind scrambling for outdated technologies or left to fend for
itself.

There are a number of new transgenic technologies being worked on around the world of
relevance to cotton, in addition to those insect and herbicide tolerant technologies mentioned
previously. Most are output traits but there are also some new input traits for disease and
nematode control. Some of the more important ones are:
 30

• Drought tolerance from Monsanto (getting closer to commercial release) and other
companies
• Disease tolerance, especially Fusarium and Verticillium tolerance in Australia and CLCV
tolerance in India and Pakistan
• Nematode tolerance in the US
• Yield enhancement (including improved photosynthetic ability)
• Improved nutrient use efficiency
• Tolerance to high temperatures
• Chilling tolerance
• Salt tolerance
• Water logging tolerance
• Improved oil quality (e.g. healthier high oleic cottonseed oils)
• Improved fibre quality (length, strength etc)
• Fabric quality (e.g. Bayer’s work on flame retardance, improved chemical reactivity and anti-
wrinkle)
• Coloured cotton (so far unsuccessful)
• Novel insect control products (e.g. Dow’s work on toxins from Photorhabdus and
Xenorhabdus symbionts from entomopathogenic nematodes) and toxins from spiders,
scorpions, ant lions, parasitic wasps, etc., and lectins, cyclotides, monoterpenes,
peroxidases, etc.

There are also a range of new biotechnologies to facilitate cotton breeding. Recent discoveries
in cotton genomics have facilitated new biotechnology tools to help cotton breeders breed better
cottons. New Marker-Aided Selection tools will help breeders select for rare traits of economic
value or those left behind during the domestication of crops. Biotechnology breakthroughs will
allow much of this previously tedious work to be conducted more efficiently by moving testing
from the field to the lab. Gene chip microarrays will also allow the identification of large numbers
(+ 10,000) of short sequences of DNA or RNA at one time which will allow the simultaneous
tracking of many genes for complex traits such as fibre quality and stress tolerance.

5. Insecticide Resistance Management

I have already addressed the issue of preferentially using Bt genes in pyramided stacks rather
than deploying them individually and sequentially. A number of researchers have modeled the
 31

various factors which can affect the rate of anticipated resistance development to Bt toxins in
transgenic plants. In the following figure, Dr. Rick Roush 6 has modeled the impact of either
using two genes stacked together from the start such as in Bollgard 2 (pyramid line in the figure)
or using one of them alone first, such as in Bollgard 1, and then introducing the second after
resistance has developed to the first gene (sequence line in the figure). The starting resistance
gene allele frequency which is normally used is 10-4 (I in 10,000). There are normally 4-5
generations of American bollworm per year and of these about 2-3 would be subject to selection
pressure each year, so the number of generations for 50% of the population to develop
resistance (on the vertical axis in the figure, note this is a log scale) should be divided by 2-3 to
work out the anticipated viability of a technology in years. So pyramided gene technologies
would be anticipated to last 150 to 250 years and single genes used sequentially 6-9 years.
Clearly, it is highly advantageous to progress to pyramided (Cry 1Ac + Cry 2Ab) Bollgard 2
before using up the efficacy of Cry 1Ac alone in Bollgard 1 and the triple gene stack Bollgard 3
would be even better.

The role of refuges is also important to discuss. In Australia and the US, separate conventional
refuge crops were mandated to be used to allow production of Bt susceptible moths to allow
dilution of any resistant moths selected in the transgenic Bt crops. The size of these compulsory
refuge crops varied from 5-10% (if they were left unsprayed) of the total planted Bt cotton area
in the US and Australia, respectively. A similar requirement was mandated in India but adoption
of these conventional unsprayed refuge areas will always be problematic in small scale

6
Roush, R. T. 1997. Managing Resistance to Transgenic Crops. pp. 271-294, in Advances in Insect Control: The Role of
Transgenic Plants, N. Carozzi and M. Koziel, eds. Taylor and Francis (London)
 32

agriculture such as practised in India, China and elsewhere. In these cases, it is argued that
whatever natural refuges are available will dilute any resistant moths. This may or may not be
the case as the refuges have to be: 1) sufficient in moth production capacity to dilute resistant
moths from any Bt crops; 2) close enough to the Bt crops to ensure cross mating; and 3)
producing moths at the same time as the Bt crops, also to ensure cross mating. These
conditions may not necessarily be met in all cases, so resistance risk will be generally greater in
these scenarios. The resistance risk will be greatly enhanced if these countries then deploy the
same Bt toxins as found in Bt cotton (such as Cry 1Ab/c), in these other deemed refuge crops
which would then not be diluting resistance but simply adding to it. This could be happening
soon in many developing countries with plans to incorporate Cry 1Ab/c Bt toxin into current
bollworm conventional refuge crops such as corn, chick peas, sorghum etc.

The efficacy of the various Bt technologies is also an important factor in designing or evaluating
the requirement for refuge size. Efficacy is defined as the ability for a Bt cotton plant to kill
heterozygous larvae in the field. Heterozygous bollworm larvae carry only one of the two
potential resistance alleles and are the commonest individuals found in the early stages of
resistance development. These are the individuals that are targeted for mating with susceptible
refuge moths so that resistance alleles can be kept heterozygous (that is single) rather than
homozygous (that is carrying two copies and thus being more resistant and usually harder to
control). The following figure shows Roush’s model for the varying estimated kill levels of
Bollgard 1 and Bollgard 2 compared to a relative poor performing Bt technology. In this case, we
are looking for the necessary refuge sizes for each of these Bt technologies to keep resistance
under control for say 20 generations, (equals 7-10 years). This is where the thin horizontal line
at 20 generations in the figure below, meets the three vertical red lines representing the varying
levels of field efficacy.
 33

High Dose & Refuges

1
0

Poor expressing Bt BG1 BG2

This model shows that for the poor expressing, lower efficacy sub-standard Bt that 20%
unsprayed refuges would be required but only 10% and 2% refuges would be required for
Bollgard 1 and Bollgard 2, respectively. To get 40 generations (14-20 years) of resistance
management, you would need to increase the Bollgard 1 and Bollgard 2 refuges, to 20% and
5%, respectively while the poor expressing Bt technology would blow out to over 50% estimated
(see figure below).
 34

High Dose & Refuges

1
0

Poor expressing Bt BG1 BG2

The models above clearly indicate the importance of high dose (which equals high efficacy) in
managing resistance. This is why checking for efficacy in the range of various commercially
available Bt products is so critical. You should always choose the most efficacious products and
reject the poorer performing products which are a greater resistance risk requiring much larger
refuges. This is all the more important where structured refuges are not possible and where
natural refuges are all that are available. In these situations, the higher efficacy products will
require less natural refuge than the lower efficacy products for the same level of resistance
management. This is why the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently removed the
5% structured refuge requirement for Bollgard 2 in most of the US cotton belt but still maintained
the 5% refuge for Bollgard 1. They argued that the natural refuges were satisfactory for the
more efficacious Bollgard 2 product in most cases.
 35

6. Sources for Germplasm and Public Sector Technologies

The cotton breeders in Pakistan have already good connections with many of the publically
available cotton germplasm resources. In fact, many of these have already been exploited in
trying to identify new sources of CLCV resistance, e.g. the CIRAD cotton germplasm collection,
principally from Africa and Central and South America.

There has also been a recent initiative from Dr. Rafiq Chaudhry at the International Cotton
Advisory Committee (ICAC) to organize a “North-South” germplasm exchange between paired
“sister Cotton Research Institutes” from the northern and southern hemispheres. This is an
excellent idea to facilitate germplasm exchange between public research institutes. However,
there is still a large amount of cotton germplasm in the hands of private institutions and the best
way to get access to this germplasm resource is to encourage and support a viable private seed
sector in Pakistan, as outlined previously.

In regards to access to public-good biotech products and processes, there are really only a few
viable alternatives, other than the public sector universities in the developed countries of
Canada, US, Australia and Europe. Even in these institutions, there is now a push to
commercialise their biotech research efforts, closing off many public-good opportunities. The
main institutions worth approaching on this are:-

CAMBIA in Australia (http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html)

ICGEB in Italy (http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/about-the-centre.html)

BRDC in USA (http://www.biordc.com/technolo/a4.htm)

CIMBAA in USA (http://cimbaa.org/)

Crawford Fund in Australia (http://www.crawfordfund.org/about/governors.htm)

IFPRI in USA (http://www.ifpri.org/themes/themes_menu.asp)

Syngenta Foundation
(http://www.syngentafoundation.org/syngenta_foundation_plant_genetic_resources.htm)

The Rockefeller Foundation (http://www.rockfound.org/)

 36

7. Summary of Recommendations

1) Enact the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act

2) Pass the Seed Act 1976 amendment to ensure equality to private seed sector

3) Empower the Cotton Research & Development Company (CRDC) with freedom to
operate

4) Establish Centre of Excellence for Cotton R&D as part of the CRDC

5) Commission PARB competitive funding model

6) Negotiate BG 2/3 + RR Flex licence from MON

7) Push for one off or per kg licence fee and explore alternative funding sources

8) Involve multiple technology providers (e.g. Bayer, Syngenta, Dow, Chinese Bt) to ensure
competition

9) Implement interim extension programme to mitigate the economic impact of CLCV

10) Improve Bio-Safety evaluation capacity

11) Set up a Bt Resistance Monitoring facility

 37

Appendix 1

Changing the Cotton Landscape in Pakistan

Terms of Reference

Cotton is the most important crop in Pakistan and livelihoods of millions of people (directly or
indirectly) depend upon its successful cultivation and processing. There has been considerable
improvement during the last few decades in increasing yield per unit of land and improving
agronomic properties, especially fibre quality. However, both yield and fibre quality is still below
the international standards.
Biotechnology application in agriculture has emerged as a major technical innovation that
promises to increase yields and improve quality. In Pakistan, Bt cotton was introduced through
informal sector in 2002 as a means to reduce crop damage due to bollworms and consequently
improve yields. This was a major step forward, but a number of factors have kept Bt from
realising its full potential. There exists a need for science based analysis of issues concerning
cultivation of Bt cotton and suggesting ways and means of its sustained use in the years to
come. In particular, an in-depth examination is warranted of the ways and means for Pakistan to
move from the current position of lagging far behind other agricultural economies in the
introduction of BT technology to a position at par with the rest of the world wherein it becomes
possible for the most cutting edge BT technology to be introduced in Pakistan at the same time
as it is done in the leading agricultural economies.
With this broad objective, following issues need to be probed specifically.

1) Detailed examination of the prospects of resistance development in cotton bollworms

due to large scale cultivation of informal Bt cotton in Pakistan
Bt cotton presently occupies around 90% and 60% of cotton area in Sindh and Punjab
respectively. In the absence of any regulatory oversight, the level of toxin expression in many Bt
varieties may be less than optimal. This may expedite the development of resistance in cotton
bollworm against Cry toxins. Also, there is no concept of maintaining the 20% refugia as part of
the resistance management strategy. Local experts, however, have discounted such fears on
two grounds: 1) landholdings are fragmented and many different crops are planted side by side;
and 2) double-gene products will be available in the market before resistance has developed.
How serious is the threat of resistance build up and how valid are the arguments of local experts
needs to be carefully examined. To be specific what are the chances of significant resistance
build up happening before the minimum four to five years required for the availability of ‘real’ Bt
technology, or can the current crop of Bt varieties disintegrate in that interim period?
2) Comprehensive examination of the range of biotech products available from
multinational organisations (other than Monsanto) for Pakistani cotton farmers
There is a general impression that Monsanto is the only company which has multiple products
ready for Pakistani markets. Other companies (Dow, Syngenta, Bayer, Pioneer, etc.) either do
not have marketable products or are not vigorously exploring the Pakistani market. In either
case, we need to carefully examine the range of (insect resistant in particular but also other)
 38

products on offer from alternate (i.e. non-Monsanto) sources, and how the access of Pakistani
cotton farmers to these products can be increased.
A related issue is that of Bt 121 – a variety of exotic origin that occupies around 90% of
transgenic cotton area. The variety has so far given good yield and protection against
bollworms. How (and whether) this potential can be sustained is an important concern.
3) Assessment of the suitability of Chinese biotech products for Pakistani cotton
landscape
Government of Punjab as well as many private seed companies are negotiating with the
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) (through their authorised agents like M/s
Biocentury and M/s Silver Land) for import of various Bt cotton products. The CAAS products
are available at a much lower cost as compared with Monsanto products. But before we make a
decision, the efficacy and effectiveness of CAAS products for Pakistani cotton landscape needs
to be examined critically, especially in comparison with Monsanto products.
4) Identification of international sources of public-good biotech products and processes
Many technologies are available as open source products through international organisations
(e.g. FAO) and public sector universities. What are some of the more important biotech products
and processes that we can access through the open source and use in local research and
development programmes?
5) Identification of sources for import of elite germplasm
Pakistani cotton has narrow genetic base, which constitutes a serious constraint on
development of new varieties. The genetic base needs to be widened to maintain genetic
diversity and to integrate useful traits into local cotton varieties. The linkages with international
sources of cotton germplasm are weak and need to be strengthened.
6) Identification of ways and means to meet the challenges of CLCV and mealybug, and
to improve fibre qualities of cotton
Bollworms are an important threat to cotton production in Pakistan. But other issues, like CLCV
and mealybug are equally important. Recently, these have become more serious issues in the
face of relative protection from bollworms through cultivation of Bt varieties. Finding practical
solutions to these threats is a challenge for Pakistani agriculture. So far our research system
has not been successful in identifying cotton germplasm that is tolerant to CLCV and resistant to
mealybug. Until such germplasm is identified, can the chemical products available with different
Chinese companies provide an effective control? As for the mealybug, we need to examine
current strategies and see how these can be improved. Also, we need to explore technological
and cultural ways and means to improve fibre qualities of our cotton.
7) Developing a framework for making CRDC a dynamic and forward looking R&D
company that can lead the change in cotton landscape
The Government of Punjab has recently created a Cotton Research and Development
Company (CRDC) as an autonomous corporate entity to oversee cotton R&D in the public
sector. This is a step in the right direction, but the company struggles to find answers to
questions as important as stewardship, stakeholder engagement, private sector investment, and
asset management. To help CRDC, we need to deliberate on these (and other) issues and
develop a comprehensive framework for its working in the long run. The framework should
suggest measures to transform CRDC into a private-sector led, dynamic and progressive R&D
organisation that follows a research agenda in sync with the needs of farmers. It should also be
able to reach out to the farmer and bridge the gap between research and extension.
 39

These issues will be examined by Dr. Neil Forrester during his visit to Pakistan in October 2008.
Trained as an entomologist, Dr. Forrester has vast experience of resistance management for
synthetic insecticides and Bt cotton. He has worked with various public and private sector
research organisations (including Deltapine International) and has also served at the Board of
Cotton Research and Development Corporation, Australia.
Dr. Forrester will be assisted by Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Rana in carrying out this assignment.
Mr. Rana has studied law, economics and sociology, and is presently a PhD candidate at The
University of Melbourne. He is working on the political economy of agricultural biotechnology
and is particularly interested in the policy making process concerning Bt cotton in Pakistan. As
his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Rana will assist Dr. Forrester in data collection, analysis and
report writing.
The two-member team will engage with a range of stakeholders including government officials
(Punjab, Sindh and Federal Governments), public sector research institutions, (national and
international) seed companies, ginners, textile industry and farmers. (An indicative list is
attached). It will also examine the available literature and prepare a comprehensive report. Both
team members will retain their freedom to publish elsewhere.

Deliverables
• A detailed report covering the issues mentioned above
• A presentation to the Chief Minister, Punjab on the findings and recommendations
• A seminar presentation to be attended by the stakeholders listed above
 40

Appendix B

Stakeholders Engaged for this Study

Government officials
1. Mr. Zia ur Rehman, Secretary Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL),
Islamabad
2. Mr. Shahid Hussan Raja, Additional Secretary , MINFAL, Islamabad
3. Dr. Qadir Bux Baluch, Agriculture Development Commissioner, MINFAL, Islamabad
4. Dr. Muhammad Aslam Gill, Cotton Commissioner, MINFAL, Islamabad
5. Dr. M E Tusneem, Member (Agriculture) Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad
6. Mr. Nazar Hussain Mehar, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi
7. Mr. Sabhago Khan Jatoi, Secretary Agriculture, Government of Sindh, Karachi
8. Dr. Ibad Badar Siddique, Vice Chairman, Pakistan Central Cotton Committee (PCCC),
Karachi
9. Mr. Javed Iqbal Awan, Secretary Agriculture, Government of Punjab
10. Dr. Mubarak Ali, Chairman, Punjab Agricultural Research Board, Lahore
11. Dr. Noor ul Islam, CEO (designate) CRDC, Lahore
12. Dr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Secretary CRDC, Lahore
Private seed companies
13. Mr. Hasan Raza Gardezi, CEO Neelum Seeds, Multan
14. Mr. Shahzad A. Malik, CEO Guard Seeds, Lahore
15. Mr. GM Avesi, Technical Manager, Guard Seeds, Lahore
16. Mr. Attiq Cheema, General Manager Auriga Seeds, Lahore
17. Dr. Zahoor Ahmad, Ali Akbar Seeds, Multan
18. Ch. Muhammad Hanif, Ali Akbar Seeds, Multan
Multinational organisations
19. Mr. Aamir Mahmood Mirza, Country Lead, Monsanto Pakistan
20. Mr. Muhammad Asim, Technology Development Lead, Monsanto Pakistan
21. Mr. Arshad Saeed Hussain, General Manager, Syngenta Pakistan
22. Mr. S A Wahab Mehdi, Managing Director, Bayer CropSciences, Pakistan
23. Mr. Muhammad Afzal, Head Market Development, Bayer CropSciences, Pakistan
24. Mr. Munir ud Din Khan, Advisor Crop Development, FMC
25. Mr. Sarwar Rahi, Technical Manager, FMC
Molecular biologists, entomologists and plant breeders
26. Dr. David Chamberlain, Consultant Ali Tareen Farms, RY Khan
27. Dr. Kausar Abdullah Malik, former Member (Agriculture) Planning Commission of
Pakistan, Lahore
28. Dr. Aklhaq Hussain, Director General, Federal Seed Certification and Registration
Department, FSC&RD, Islamabad
29. Dr. Yusuf Zafar, Project Director, Nuclear Institute of Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology (NIGAB), Islamabad
30. Dr. Ejaz Pervez, Director General Pest Warning and Quality Control, Lahore
31. Dr. Ghulam Mustafa, Director Entomology, ARI, Faisalabad
32. Dr. Rao Iftikhar, Dean, AU, Faisalabad
 41

33. Dr. Sheikh Riaz ud Din, Director, Centre of Excellence in Molecular Biology (CEMB),
Lahore
34. Dr. Tayyub Hussnain, Professor, CEMB, Lahore
35. Dr. Idrees Ahmad Nasir, Associate Professor, CEMB, Lahore
36. Dr. Zafar M. Khalid, Director, National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic
Engineering (NIBGE), Faisalabad
37. Dr. Shahid Mansoor, Head Plant Biotechnology Division, NIBGE, Faisalabad
38. Dr. Ehsan ul Haq, Director NIAB, Faisalabad
39. Muhammad Arshad, CCRI, Multan
40. Dr. Iqbal Bandesha, Associate Professor, Islamia University, Bahawalpur
41. Dr. Mahboob Ali, Scientist Emeritus, ex-Director Central Cotton Research Institute,
Multan
42. Ch Waheed Sultan, former Director Cotton, Lahore
Farmers
43. Mr. Asim Nisar Bajwa, Manager Ali Tareen Farms, Lodhran
44. Ms. Rabia Sultana, Lahore
45. Mr. Athar Khakwani
46. Mr. Sajid Mehdi, Vehari
47. Ch Arshad, Khanpur
48. Mr. Ijaz Rao, Bahawalpur
The Textile Industry
49. Mr. Iqbal Ibrahim, Chairman All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA), Karachi
50. Mr. Akbar Sheikh, Chairman, APTMA Lahore
51. Mr. Tariq Mahmood, Chairman Cotton Committee, APTMA