Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Eastern Shipping
Lines
[GR L-34382, 20 July 1983];
Home Insurance vs. Nedlloyd Lijnen [GR L-34383]
Facts: [GR L-34382] On or about 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf
of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board
the SS Eastern Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of Black Hot Rolled
Copper Wire Rods. The said VESSEL is owned and operated by Eastern
Shipping Lines. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading O-MA-9, with
arrival notice to Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of the Philippines
at Manila. The shipment was insured with the Home Insurance Company
against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06 under its Insurance Policy AS73633. The coils discharged from the VESSEL numbered 2,361, of which 53
were in bad order. What the Phelps Dodge ultimately received at its
warehouse was the same number of 2,361 coils, with 73 coils loose and partly
cut, and 28 coils entangled, partly cut, and which had to be considered as
scrap. Upon weighing at Phelps Dodge's warehouse, the 2,361 coils were
found to weight 263,940.85 kilos as against its invoiced weight of 264,534.00
kilos or a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kilos, or 1,209,56 lbs., according to the
claims presented by the Phelps Dodge against Home Insurance, the Eastern
Shipping, and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. For the loss/damage suffered by
the cargo, Home Insurance paid the Phelps Dodge under its insurance policy
the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home Insurance became
subrogated to the rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance
made demands for payment against the Eastern Shipping and the Angel Jose
Transportation for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to
pay the same."
[GR L-34383] On or about 22 December 1966, the Hansa Transport Kontor
shipped from Bremen, Germany, 30 packages of Service Parts of Farm
Equipment and Implements on board the VESSEL, SS 'NEDER RIJN' owned
by N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, and represented in the Philippines by its local agent,
the Columbian Philippines, Inc.. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading
No. 22 for transportation to, and delivery at, Manila, in favor of International
Harvester Macleod, Inc. The shipment was insured with Home Insurance
company under its Cargo Policy AS-73735 'with average terms' for
P98,567.79. The packages discharged from the VESSEL numbered 29, of
which seven packages were found to be in bad order. What International
Harvester ultimately received at its warehouse was the same number of 29
packages with 9 packages in bad order. Out of these 9 packages, 1 package
was accepted by International Harvester in good order due to the negligible
complaint and setting up 3 counterclaims for the recovery of the value of her
demolished kitchenette in leased land, and for the improvements, and
damages.
3. The court dismissed the complaint based on the motion of Ziga contending
that the cause of action had already been moot and academic by the expiration
of the leased contract.
4.Melitons counterclaim s were also dismissed for non-payment of docket
fees. The trial court said that it had not acquired jurisdiction because of the
non-payment of the docket fees.
5. Spouses Lydia Meliton and Virgilio Meliton filed a complaint against Ziga for
recovery of the same amounts involved and alleged in their counterclaims in
the previous case and assigned to Branch 27 of the same trial court.
6.Ziga filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by a prior judgment in the previous case. But the court
denied her motion to dismiss on the ground that the dismissal of the Meliton's
counterclaims in the previous case is not an adjudication on the merits
because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims for failure
of Meliton to pay the docket fees, and for this reason, the said dismissal does
not constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint. She also filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was subsequently denied.
7. Aggrieved, Ziga filed a petition for certiorari filed a petition for certiorari with
the SC. Then, the higher court, in its resolution, referred the case to the Court
of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9,
paragraph 1, of B.P. Blg. 129.
8. The CA found that Melitons counterclaim The Melitons' counterclaim
against the Ziga is a compulsory counterclaim, it having arisen out of or being
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence subject matter of
Zigas complaint. The failure of the Melitons to seek a reconsideration of the
dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an appeal rendered the dismissal
final; and such dismissal barred the prosecution of their counterclaim by
another action.
9. The Melitons challenged the judgment of the CA and praying for its
annulment.
ISSUES:
1. WON the counterclaims of the petitioners are compulsory in nature.
YES. The counterclaims of the petitioners are compulsory in nature.
Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court enumerates the requisites
compulsory counterclaim, to wit;(a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
It has been postulated that while a number of criteria have been advanced for
the determination of whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the
one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relationship between the
claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, e.i., where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they involve many of the
same factual and/or legal issues.
In the case at bar, all the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim are present.
The counterclaims are logically related to the complaint. Private respondent
Zigas complaint was for rescission of the contract of lease due to petitioner
Lydia Meliton's breach of her obligations under the said contract. On the other
hand, petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of
the improvements. Both the claims of petitioners and private respondent arose
from the same contract of lease. To state it differently, They are offshoots of
the same basic controversy between the parties, e.i., the right of either to the
possession of the property.
2. WON the petitioners are barred from asserting their counterclaims
having failed to seek reconsideration or to take an appeal from the order
of dismissal of the same. NO. The petitioners are not barred from asserting
claims in a separate suit.
While it is true, as stated in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, that a
counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, cannot be applied to
the case at bar.
Firstly, where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a separate
suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis
pendentia and/or dismissed on the ground of res judicata, depending on the
stage or status of the other suit. The action in the case at bar cannot be
dismissed either on the ground of litis pendentia since there is no other
pending action between the same parties and for the same cause, nor on the
ground of res judicata. Also, the dismissal of the counterclaims of the
petitioners because of failure to pay docket fees does not constitute does not
constitute res judicata, there having been no consideration and adjudication of
the case on the merits.
Secondly, a reading of the order of dismissal will show that the trial court, in
dismissing the complaint of private respondent, did not intend to prejudice the
claims of petitioners by barring the subsequent judicial enforcement thereof.
The failure of petitioners to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from
the order of dismissal of the counterclaim should not prejudice their right to file
their claims in a separate action because they were thereby made to
understand and believe that their counterclaims were merely permissive and
could be the subject of a separate and independent action. Had the trial court
correctly specified that petitioners' counterclaims were compulsory, petitioners
could have objected to the dismissal sought by private respondent on the
ground that said counterclaims could not remain pending for independent
adjudication
counterclaim
requires
December 14,
1994: Private
respondent Asian High
Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner Digital Microwave Corp.
for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC: Denied the motion, as well as petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then initiated a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Court of Appeals: Dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Revised
Circular No.28-91, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
o Requires the petition filed before the Court of Appeals to be accompanied
by a sworn certification against forum shopping, signed by petitioner himself.
o
Petitioner's certification was signed by counsel; the petition was, thus,
dismissed.
MR to CA: submitted a sworn certification against forum shopping duly
signed by one of its senior officers. The motion was, however, denied, with the
PETITIONER CONTENTION
Petitioner contends that in the case of a corporation as petitioner, the
certification against forum shopping may be signed by a natural person
authorized to do so and with knowledge of the required facts. The authorized
person may be anyone authorized by the corporation, not necessarily an
officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the counsel of record has the
authority
to execute the certification
on behalf of the
corporation, particularly considering that under the Rules of Court, counsel's
authority to represent his client is presumed. No written power of attorney is
required for counsel to appear for his client.
This requirement is now found in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The
requirement
for
a
sworn
certification against forum shopping was extended by Administrative Circular N
o. 04-94 to complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings filed
in all courts or agencies other than the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
The Court disagrees with petitioner that a corporation cannot possibly hope to
comply with the requirement laid down by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because
it is a juridical entity and not a natural person. If this were so, then it would
have
been
impossible
for
a
corporation
to
do
anything at all. Needless to say, this is the
reason why
corporations have directors and officers, to represent it in its transactions with
others. The same is true for the certification against forum shopping. It could
easily have been made by a duly authorized director or officer of the
corporation.
In the recent case of Spouses Valentin Ortiz and Camilla Milan Ortiz vs.Court
of Appeals, et al., 299 SCRA 708, 711-712 (1998), the Court ruled that
"Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
involving strict observance as provided for in Circular No. 2891. The
attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court's
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice."
In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the
certification against forum shopping signed by one of its officers. Neither has it
shown any compelling reason for us to disregard strict compliance with the
rules. As the Court further stated in Spouses Ortiz , "Utter disregard of the
rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction."
in, enforcing the principal contract within the period during which he could
otherwise have enforced it, and precludes the surety from paying the debt.
Facts:
Filtex applied to SIHI for domestic letters of credit to finance the purchase of
raw materials for its textile business. SIHI accepted. Villanueva executed a
comprehensive surety agreement, where he guaranteed, jointly and severally
with Filtex, the payment at maturity to SIHI of all the indebtedness of Filtex. To
ensure payment of the sight drafts, Filtex issued to SIHI several trust covering
the merchandise sold. Under the trust receipts, Filtex agreed to hold the
merchandise in trust for SIHI, with liberty to sell the same for SIHIs account but
without authority to make any other disposition of the said goods. Because of
Filtexs failure to pay its outstanding obligation despite demand, SIHI filed a
Complaint praying that the petitioners be ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
theprincipal amount.
Filtex: trust receipts and surety agreement dont reflect true intention of parties;
obligation was fully paid; no cause of action
Villanueva: same special and affirmative defenses and added that the
comprehensive surety agreement is null and void
The petitioners, however, failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents upon which the
Complaint was based
RTC: Filtex and Villanueva jointly and severally liable to SIHI
On appeal to CA, Filtex and Villanueva argued that they have fully paid
their indebtedness to SIHI and asserting that the letters of credit, sight drafts,
trustr eceipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which the
Complaint is based are inadmissible in evidence supposedly because of nonpayment of documentary stamp taxes as required by the Internal Revenue
Code.
In addition, Villanueva asserted that the comprehensive surety agreement
which he executed is null and void, inadmissible in evidence and contains
material alterations. Thus, he claimed that he should not be held solidarily
liable with Filtex.
CA: Upheld RTC. Petitioners had in effect, admitted the genuineness and due
execution of said documents because of their failure to have their answers
placed under oath, the complaint being based on actionable documents in line
with Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The CA also ruled that there
remained an unpaid balance for which Filtex and Villanueva are solidarily
liable. (MR denied)
Issues:
WON the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive
issue the domestic letters of credit. SIHIs consent to the surety is also
understood from the fact that it demanded payment from both Filtex and
Villanueva. The extension of time granted to Filtex to pay its obligation did not
release Villanueva from his liability. The neglect of the creditor to sue the
principal at the time the debt falls due does not discharge the surety, even if
such delay continues until the principal becomes insolvent. The raison detre
for the rule is that there is nothing to prevent the creditor from proceeding
against the principal at any time. At any rate, if the surety is dissatisfied with
the degree of activity displayed by the creditor in the pursuit of his principal, he
may pay the debt himself and become subrogated to all the rights and
remedies of the creditor. It may not be amiss to add that leniency shown to a
debtor in default, by delay permitted by the creditor without change in the time
when the debt might be demanded, does not constitute an extension of the
time of payment, which would release the surety.
In order to constitute an extension discharging the surety, it should appear that
the extension as for a definite period, pursuant to an enforceable agreement
between the principal and the creditor, and that it was made without the
consent of the surety or with a reservation of rights with respect to him. The
contract must be one which precludes the creditor from, or at least hinders him
in, enforcing the principal contract within the period during which he could
otherwise have enforced it, and precludes the surety from paying the debt.
Dispositive: Petition denied, CA decision affirmed