How Conceptually Guided are Kantian Intuitions? 1 Jessica J. Williams 1.

Introduction In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant draws a distinction between intuitions, which are singular representations that pertain to objects immediately, and concepts, which are general representations that are used to determine the objects of intuition by serving as the predicates of judgments. The receptive faculty of sensibility is responsible for intuitions, insofar as it is affected by objects, while concepts spring from the spontaneous faculty of understanding. Kant writes, bjects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions! but they are thought through the understanding, and from it arise concepts" #$%&'())*+. Kant famously notes in the Introduction that sensibility and understanding are the two stems of human cognition" #$%,'(+&* and in the Transcendental -ogic he writes that, these two faculties or capacities cannot e.change their functions" #(/,'$,%* although cognition re0uires their co1operation. The distinction that Kant draws between the faculties of sensibility and understanding and the representations associated with them, intuitions and concepts, has been a point of interest to several contemporary philosophers engaged in the debate over the possibility of nonconceptual mental content. John 2c3owell has argued forcefully against the possibility of nonconceptual content on Kantian grounds. While 2c3owell ac4nowledges that, for Kant, e.perience is the result of the co1operation of sensibility and understanding, he claims that intuitions already have conceptual content, and moreover, that receptivity does not ma4e an even notionally separable contribution to the co1operation" #%&&5, &*. 6onversely, -ucy $llais and 7obert 8anna have both offered nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant and have turned to his description of intuition in the Transcendental $esthetic as the model for at least certain forms

of nonconceptual content as found in the contemporary literature. In this paper, I will argue that the interpretations offered by 2c3owell, 8anna, and $llais are problematic insofar as they either overloo4 or misconstrue crucial aspects of Kant9s account of cognition, including the role of the imagination in the synthesis of intuitions and its relationship to the understanding, and the distinction between the categories and empirical concepts. In addition, I will argue that proper attention to these aspects provides a more nuanced answer to the 0uestion of what we should learn from Kant regarding the role of concepts in structuring representational content. n the one hand, I

thin4 that best interpretation of Kant is as a conceptualist because, on his account, any intuition must be synthesi:ed by the imagination in accordance with the categories, and hence the understanding, in order for the content to become available. This does not, however, mean that empirical concepts have been or must be applied to the content of intuitions in order for them to have representational character. 2. Varieties of Nonconceptualism ;ince the publication of <areth =vans9 Varieties of Reference, the interest in nonconceptual content has grown considerably and now includes a range of philosophers #and psychologists* with varying projects and motivations. The result is that there is no consensus regarding the definition or scope of nonconceptual content and no standard account of the nature of concepts. <iven the broad contours of the present debate, not all of the issues that are presently discussed can be relevantly engaged with Kant scholarship. The main 0uestion that interests me in this paper is whether a mental state can represent the world, i.e., have intentional content, without the application of concepts to either structure the representation or specify the content. There are a number of motivations for adopting some version of nonconceptualism. ne

of the most compelling motivations comes from the consideration of infant and non1human animal cognition. 2ost of us will grant that infants and non1human animals, especially higher mammals, not only have sensations, but actually represent the world. 8owever, unless we are wor4ing with a minimalist account of concepts, it is difficult to attribute the possession of concepts to infants and non1human animals. $ second, e0ually compelling, reason comes from the following feature of perception> perceptual e.perience seems to present a 0ualitative fineness of grain that cannot be captured by our concepts?that is, we can perceptually discriminate aspects of e.perience even without corresponding concepts. 2oreover, perceptual e.perience can present contradictory and parado.ical contents, for instance in cases of optical illusions, that concepts cannot, given the constraint of rational consistency. $t least one commonly accepted view among nonconceptualists is that how one perceptually represents the world need not be constrained by the set of concepts one possesses! however, beyond this point, a number of distinctions are drawn. The first distinction is between the global and local lifting of the conceptualist constraint. ) ne can reject conceptual content itself and argue that all content is nonconceptual #global lifting* 5, or one can ta4e it that concepts are re0uired to lin4 e.periential inta4e to beliefs and judgments, but are not re0uired for perceptual e.perience to have representational content. In other words, not all representations are constrained by concepts or conceptual capacities #local lifting*. We can rule out global nonconceptualist readings of Kant from the start. @o matter how we interpret the representational content of intuitions for Kant, it is undeniable that he thin4s that intuitions have to be conceptuali:ed at some point if they are to factor in our e.perience of an objective world. This leaves us with the various branches of nonconceptualism that involve a local lifting of the conceptual constraint.

ne branch of the #local* debate is focused on the role of nonconceptual content in subpersonal states. Within this branch, the concern is usually about the content of the early stages of perceptual, especially visual, e.perience or with the subpersonal processing of information, where this processing is e.plained in terms of physical systems operating under causal laws,. Those interested in the first domain, e.g., the content of early stages of perceptual e.perience, have relied on an interpretation of spatial and temporal orientation that is nonconceptual. Aor the purposes of this paper, I thin4 we can ta4e the issue of the conceptual independence of spatial and temporal representation at the early stages of perceptual e.perience to be a subset of the larger 0uestion of such independence in perception in general. Aurthermore, many of the 0uestions that arise in relation to subpersonal states are a matter of empirical investigation or of cognitive psychology, and in some sense fall outside the scope of Kant9s project. $nother distinction that has been drawn within the nonconceptualist debate is between Bstate9 and Bcontent9 nonconceptualismC> Bstate9 nonconceptualists hold that a subject can be in a certain perceptual state #including having intentional representations of perceptually given particulars* without the possession of the concepts re0uired for the correct specification of the content, while Bcontent9 nonconceptualists hold that the content of perception itself is different in nature and structure from the concepts employed in the propositional attitudes specifying the content. To relate this distinction bac4 to Kant, one might want to maintain the view that a human or non1human animal can have immediate intuitions of particulars without the possession or application of concepts. r, one might want to go even further and claim that the content of intuitions is fundamentally different from the content of beliefs and judgments./ The last distinction within the nonconceptualist debate that is worth mentioning concerns

the autonomy of nonconceptual content. The 0uestion here is whether one can have nonconceptual content without possessing any concepts at all, i.e., autonomously. If one affirms this possibility, then one has subscribed to the $utonomy Thesis> an animal #human or non1human* can represent the world without the possession of any concepts or conceptual capacitiesD. The 0uestion of autonomy in Kant is thus the 0uestion of whether intuitions have representational character independently of the application of any concepts. (efore going any further, we first need to understand how Kant defines intuitions. Kant writes, The capacity #receptivity* to ac0uire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. bjects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions" #$%&'())*. Through intuition, we are immediately presented with objects, and when this presentation depends on sensation, as it does in perception, then we have empirical intuitions #()5'$+E*. In a trivial sense, intuitions are nonconceptual, precisely because they are defined in opposition to concepts and are treated as a distinct element in cognition #$,E'(/5*. I say this is trivial" because despite being defined in opposition to concepts, Kant nevertheless claims, intuitions without concepts are blind" #(/,'$,%*. If by blind," Kant means that they lac4 intentional content, then it will not matter if they are nonconceptual, because they will not be able to do the wor4 that contemporary nonconceptualists want them to do. 3.Mc owell!s Conceptualist "eadin# of Kant In both Mind and World #%&&5* and Having the World in View #+EE&*, 2c3owell claims that the proper interpretation of the relationship between sensibility and understanding in Kant is one that recogni:es that intuitions already involve conceptual capacities and hence already have conceptual content. 2c3owell repeatedly emphasi:es that conceptual capacities are not e.ercised on nonconceptual deliverances of sensibility," instead, they are

already operative in the deliverances of sensibility themselves" #%&&5, )&*. In other words, intuitions are conceptual shapings of sensory consciousness" #+EE&, )5*. In Mind and World, 2c3owell uses his interpretation of Kant to combat both the coherentist view that our representations are not rationally constrained by an e.ternal world #although they might be causally constrained* and the 2yth of the <iven. $ccording to 2c3owell, this interpretation avoids coherentism because although the understanding is involved in shaping sensory consciousness, such consciousness is nevertheless passive and receptive. We are saddled" with the content of sensory consciousness. $nd while the understanding is a faculty of spontaneity, this does not mean that it can shape sensory consciousness in any way that it wants. Aor 2c3owell, one needs conceptual capacities in order for the content of intuitions to become available, but the content is not something one has put together oneself, as when one decides what to say about something" #%&&5, %E*. $lthough conceptual capacities must be drawn on within sensory consciousness in order for content to become available for a subject, this process ta4es places before one has any choice in the matter" #ibid.*. $lthough 2c3owell does not deny that e.periencing the world re0uires activity, his point is that what one e.periences is largely not under one9s control. In other words, although the understanding is a spontaneous faculty, this does not mean that all instances where conceptual capacities are actuali:ed indicate spontaneity! they must in principle, however, be instances where one could ta4e active control in order for these capacities to count as conceptual capacities at all. Aor 2c3owell, the fact that e.perience is largely a passive actuali:ation of conceptual capacities is enough to avoid the worry that our beliefs and judgments are not constrained by the world they purport to be about. It is precisely this latter worry that has tempted philosophers into thin4ing that if our beliefs and judgments are to be warranted, our concepts must be formed in response to

impingements on sensibility by the e.ternal world, where what is given to us from the causal impact of the world is independent of our conceptual capacities. (ecause what is supposedly given to us is independent of our conceptual capacities, it can serve as the e.ternal constraint of our judgments. The problem with this, as 2c3owell sees it, is that the nonconceptual content that is given" cannot serve to justify our judgments, because justification ta4es place within what Wilfrid ;ellars has termed the space of reasons," insofar as justification depends on rational relations. In other words, in order for judgments to be warranted they must be supported by reasons, which may come in the form of implication or probabilification. (ut nonconceptual content is precisely outside the conceptual space of reasons. =.perience can serve as the warrant for our judgments on 2c3owell9s account only because the content of e.perience is already conceptual. $s 2c3owell puts it, a bare presence cannot be the ground for anything" #%&&5, %&*. Intuitions are precisely not bare presences! on 2c3owell9s reading they are e.periential states that present things as being thus1and1so. We can then go on to ma4e judgments about our intuitions, for instance, when we affirm or deny that things are as they appear to us in intuition, but this is not to add conceptual content to something that was first nonconceptual. 2c3owell writes, $ judgment of e.perience does not introduce a new 4ind of content, but simply endorses the conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed by the e.perience on which it is grounded" #%&&5, 5D*. Intuitions have the right 4ind of content to justify judgments, vi: . conceptuali:ed content, but 2c3owell also thin4s that since e.perience is passive, we have the e.ternal constraint needed to avoid coherentism without falling prey to the 2yth of the <iven. ne initial problem with this account from the perspective of a nonconceptualist is that one of the obvious differences between sensory e.perience and concepts is that e.perience

involves a richness of detail that is not possessed by concepts. 2c3owell is aware of this objection and cites <areth =van9s formulation of the problem> 3o we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminateF" #=vans, %&D+, ++&! 2c3owell, %&&5, ,C*. While =vans uses the e.ample of colors, the point clearly e.tends to other features of perceptual e.perience. 2c3owell responds to this line of objection by proposing that demonstrative concepts can capture all of the detail that we are capable of perceptually discriminating. Aor 2c3owell, in the case of color, if one has the concept of a shade of color, then one can go on to conceptually discriminate what is perceptually presented by saying or thin4ing, that shade" #2c3owell, %&&5, ,/*. 8owever, in order for a demonstrative concept to count as a concept at all, it must be able to persist longer than the perceptual e.perience itself, even if only for a short time. This is because concepts are used to compare, sort, and contrast and they cannot serve this function unless they have some degree of persistence. 2c3owell accounts for this by conceiving of demonstrative concepts as recognitional capacities with conceptual content that can be made e.plicit with the help of a sample, something that is guaranteed to be available at the time of the e.perience with which the capacity sets in" #%&&5, ,/*. $lthough the capacity re0uires e.perience to be actuali:ed, it is nevertheless an enduring capacity which re0uires no more than possession of a shade together with the subject9s standing powers of discrimination" #%&&5, ,& fn. %C*. (y resorting to these demonstrative concepts, 2c3owell thin4s that he can salvage the richness of perceptual e.perience without giving up on the claim that the content of e.perience is conceptual. In Having the World in View, 2c3owell maintains his interpretation of Kantian intuitions as already involving conceptual content. 2oreover, he defends this interpretation against Wilfred ;ellars9 claim in Science and Metaph sics that in addition to intuitions that

involve the understanding, we should also interpret Kant as positing intuitions that result from sheer receptivity" and are in no way conceptual, even if Kant did not ma4e this distinction #+EE&, +,*. $ccording to ;ellars, Kant9s account of cognition re0uires that we posit nonconceptual episodes of sensation as guiding those intuitions that already involve conceptual capacities. @onconceptual intuitions serve a transcendental" role because while we need them to ground our conceptuali:ed #or proto1conceptuali:ed* intuitions, they do not actually factor in our e.perience! instead, they merely serve an e.planatory function. Aurthermore, for ;ellars, we must posit nonconceptual sensations as guiding our conceptuali:ations if we are to avoid idealism. 2c3owell agrees with ;ellars9 characteri:ation of those intuitions that already involve the understanding as representations of individual objects as this1suches, but he rejects the idea that we need to posit nonconceptual states as grounding them, transcendentally or otherwise. In his argument against ;ellars, 2c3owell is more e.plicit about the role of conceptual capacities in shaping sensory consciousness than he was in Mind and World. Aollowing ;ellars, 2c3owell thin4s that perceptual e.perience contains claims! for instance, in an ostensible seeing of a red cube #which, if it is also a seeing, counts as an intuition*, one has the visual impression that there is a red cube in front of one. Aor 2c3owell, intuitions contain claims because they e.hibit the same logical togetherness" of content that is found in judgments. 2c3owell places a great deal of emphasis on Kant9s statement in the 2etaphysical 3eduction that The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a !udgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition" #6G7, $/&'(%E51,! +EE&, )E*. In order to judge that there is a red cube in front of one, one must conceive of red" and cube" with the right 4ind of togetherness and in a single act. This is because redness and cubeness must already show up

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as combined in an intuition if that intuition is going to justify the corresponding judgment. In other words, the content of intuitions is already structured compositionally. In both cases, one must actuali:e conceptual capacities, i.e. the concepts red" and cube," among others. The actuali:ation of such conceptual capacities is the function that unifies both intuitions and judgments, and ensures that they have the same content. Aor ;ellars, an intuition that represents an object as a this1such involves the understanding, but he does not thin4 this means that one must already possess or necessarily apply the concept that would correspond to such," e.g., cube." 2c3owell, on the other hand, implies that this process already re0uires the actuali:ation of specific concepts in perception itself #+EE&, )E*. The difference 2c3owell draws between the role of concepts in intuition and the role of concepts in propositional attitudes is the following> in an intuition, conceptual capacities are involuntarily drawn into operation and necessitated by the presence to sensory consciousness of objects, whereas in beliefs and judgments, there is a free responsible e.ercise of the conceptual capacities" #+EE&, )E*. 2c3owell rejects ;ellars9 idea that we need non1conceptual manifolds of sheer receptivity because, %* as he argued in Mind and World, it is difficult to see how something outside the conceptual sphere can serve as a justification for anything that goes on inside of it and +* we simply do not need any e.tra justification. 2c3owell thin4s that it is enough that conceptual capacities are operative in receptivity rather than on some e.tra1conceptual given to avoid the threat of frictionless spinning in a void." There are a couple of 4ey reminders before moving on. The first is that 2c3owell is interested in utili:ing Kant9s account of cognition to combat both coherentism and the 2yth of the <iven! his interpretation of Kant is motivated more by present philosophical problems than a close te.tual reading of Kant. The second point is that 2c3owell9s reconstruction of

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Kant9s account of intuition as already involving conceptual capacities clearly rules out Bcontent9 nonconceptualism! 2c3owell goes to great lengths to argue that the content of perceptual e.perience must be the same 4ind of content that figures in beliefs and judgments. 2oreover, this reconstruction of Kant9s account rules out even non1autonomous cases of nonconceptual content. Aor 2c3owell, representational content is only available to a subject whose conceptual capacities are actuali:ed in sensory consciousness. $. %llais and Hanna& '(e Nonconceptualist Interpretation of Kant While 2c3owell has argued for a strong conceptualist interpretation of Kant, 7obert 8anna and -ucy $llais have both offered interpretations of Kant in which nonconceptual content does play a role in Kant9s account of cognition. 8owever, there are notable differences in the degree of nonconceptualism that $llais and 8anna attribute to Kant. $llais, for instance, is most interested in arguing that intuition does ma4e at least a notionally separable contribution to cognition, but her overall interpretation is best described as autonomous Bstate9 nonconceptualism. ;he argues that, on Kant9s account, an individual can be in a perceptual state with representational content without the application of concepts or the possession of conceptual capacities, but she does not thin4 that the content of intuitions is different in structure from that of concepts. While it is true, on her interpretation, that the application of concepts can further determine the content of intuitions, the synthetic character of intuition #that which is responsible for its structure and intentionality on her account* does not re0uire the application of concepts or conceptual capacities #$llais +EE&> 5E/*. 8anna, on the other hand, goes beyond Bstate9 nonconceptualism in maintaining the view that, for Kant, the content of intuitions is cognitively and semantically independent of concepts" #8anna +EE,> +,/*. 3espite these differences, 8anna and $llais share the view that, according to Kant, intuition does not depend on any concepts for the representation of particular objects

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#although both admit that concepts are re0uired for the representation of an object qua object*. I would li4e to focus on the argument common to both $llais and 8anna that is central to the interpretation of Kant as a nonconceptualist of either the Bstate9 or Bcontent9 variety. $llais and 8anna point to Kant9s discussion of the forms of intuition in the Transcendental $esthetic to support the argument that intuitions have representational content apart from the application of concepts. In the Transcendental $esthetic, Kant defines intuition as the immediate representation of an object #$%&'())* & and he provides only two conditions for the representational character of intuition, vi", the a priori representations of space and time, which are the pure forms of sensible intuition"#$++'()C*. If it is the case #as 8anna and $llais both assert* that the nonconceptual, intuitive representations of space and time are all that is re0uired to uni0uely locate and represent distinct particulars, then it follows that one can have intentional representations of perceptually given particulars without the application of any concepts #$llais +EE&> )&&! 8anna +EE,> +,)*. 8ence, Kant provides an account of intuitions as having representational content apart from the application of concepts. 8owever, to maintain the above argument in light of Kant9s further elaboration of intuition, found in the 2etaphysical and Transcendental 3eductions, one must account for the following> %* Kant9s introduction of the synthetic activity of the imagination and its role in shaping intuition and +* Kant9s apparent argument in the Transcendental 3eduction that the categories, along with the unity of apperception, are necessary for individuating objects in perception. In the 2etaphysical 3eduction, Kant indicates that beyond the forms of space and time, intuitions re0uire synthesis, the action of putting together and combining manifold

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representations into a comprehensible unity. Kant writes, synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content"! this synthetic activity is the effect of the imagination, a blind though indispensable function of the soul" #$/D*. Kant9s introduction of the imagination as the source of this structuring activity complicates his neat division of cognition into sensibility and understanding and gives rise to serious interpretative 0uestions regarding the status of the imagination. If the synthesis of imagination is re0uired for intuition to have a certain content #which I understand to mean the intentional representation of a distinct particular*, then any nonconceptual interpretation of Kant will depend on treating the imagination as either a part of sensibility, or at least separable from the understanding in terms of its synthetic activity in certain cases.%E 8anna ta4es the former approach, incorporating the imagination into the faculty of sensibility. 8anna cites Kant9s claim that the imagination belongs to sensibility" #(%,%*%% and 8anna then defines the imagination as an immediate, sense1related, singular, and nonconceptual cognitive capacity that can represent either e.isting or non1e.isting objects" #8anna +EE,> +CC*. $llais, on the other hand, assumes that the synthetic activity of the imagination, though usually governed by the understanding, can ta4e place apart from conceptual guidance. ;he grants that for cognition of an objective world?grasping the world as objective and #empirically* mind1independent?to be possible, intuition must be synthesi:ed in ways that are governed by concepts" #$llais +EE&> 5E/*, but she does not thin4 that the synthesis re0uired for the mere presentation of particulars re0uires conceptual guidance, precisely because she believes the intuitive representations of space and time are enough to account for this. In order to be presented with uni0ue particulars, however, the spatio1temporal manifold will still have to be unified in some way, so $llais9 claim here seems to be that synthesis can provide unity without the categories or the transcendental unity

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of apperception. $s we shall see, it is difficult to ma4e sense of what 4ind of unity this would be, and it would potentially re0uire positing two different 4inds of spatio1temporal e.perience in Kant, for which there is no te.tual support. $ more serious threat to the above argument can be found in the later sections of the Transcendental 3eduction. In H+C, Kant argues that space and time are not only forms of sensible intuition, but are themselves intuitions that re0uire a synthetic unity insofar as they contain a manifold. Kant also ma4es it clear that what is a condition for space and time as intuitions is also a condition for whatever appears as determined in space and time. This condition is the synthetic unity of space and time in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories" #(%C%*. Kant then concludes with the following statement> 6onse0uently, all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since e.perience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of e.perience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of e.perience. #(%C%* If synthesis is re0uired for perception itself, then 0uite a bit hinges on what guides synthetic activity. If, as Kant writes, synthesis stands under the categories," then it does not seem that intuition can have representational content apart from the categories. In order to reconcile their nonconceptual readings of Kant with the later sections of the Transcendental 3eduction, $llais and 8anna have both used the following two strategies. Airst, they have employed Kant9s distinction between space and time as forms of intuition and space and time as formal intuitions to claim that the argument of H+C only applies to space and time as formal intuitions.%+ ;econdly, they have both relied on the assumption that what Kant says in the Transcendental 3eduction concerns the conditions for ma4ing objectively valid judgments, not the conditions for mere perception #$llais +EE&> 5E+! 8anna +EE,> +,/*. In regards to the first strategy, $llais has focused on the form'formal distinction of

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space. ;he writes that as a form of intuition, space enables us to be presented with empirical particulars as uni0uely located in an oriented and egocentrically1centered, three1dimensional framewor4"%) while space as a formal intuition is the representation of a unified objective space as the study of geometry" #$llais +EE&> 5E5*. It is only the latter that re0uires that space be unified in accordance with the categories and under the transcendental unity of apperception. -i4ewise, 8anna thin4s that space and time qua formal intuitions re0uire the objective unity of consciousness #categories plus apperception*, whereas space and time qua forms of intuition only re0uire a subjective unity of consciousness #8anna +EE,> +//*. Gart of the motivation behind maintaining this division is that it upholds the initial distinction Kant draws between sensibility and understanding and fits with Kant9s argument in the #esthetic for the nonconceptual status of the forms of intuition. In regards to the second strategy, 8anna and $llais have narrowly focused on an early passage in the Transcendental 3eduction to support their reading of the 3eduction as concerning objectively valid judgments and not mere perception. In fact, the following passage, to which both refer at various stages in their respective arguments, can be seen as providing the strongest support to a nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant> I Jbjects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding . . . .appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understandingK.Aor appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unityK. $ppearances would nevertheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means re0uires the functions of thin4ing. #$D&'(%++1$&E'(%+)* Aor $llais, the role of intuitions is to provide us with particular and immediate representations of objects in perception. 6oncepts, as essentially general, cannot provide us with particular objects. The content of intuitions, while different from the content of concepts insofar as it is always singular and immediate, nevertheless shares with concepts a similar

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structure. The process of synthesis that is responsible for the structure of content is re0uired for both intuitional content and conceptual content, and the similarity of structure between intuitions and concepts allows for the former to serve as reasons for belief. While $llais holds that cognition re0uires conceptually guided synthesis, intuitions, in providing us with immediate representations in sensory consciousness #to borrow 2c3owell9s phrase*, re0uires only synthesis per se #$llais +EE&> )&/*. 8anna goes further than $llais in claiming that, an intuition refers to its object even if no other cognitive faculty apart from sensibility is involved" #8anna +EE,> +,D*. If one wants to ma4e an objectively valid judgment, then intuitions must be combined with concepts #8anna +EE,> +,/*. @evertheless, both human and non1human animals can have intuitions of objects apart from any concepts or conceptual capacities so long as they have the capacities for spatial and temporal representation" which 8anna ta4es to be non1conceptual cognitive capacities #8anna +EE,> +/E*. 8anna9s insistence that intuitions have content that is referentially meaningful apart from the involvement any other cognitive faculties seems to fly in the face of Kant9s argument in the Transcendental 3eduction that the unity of intuition which provides the representation of an object re0uires the categories #(%55'(%55fn*. $s mentioned above, 8anna supports such a position by maintaining that the argument of the 3eduction only applies to objectively valid judgments. In the ne.t section, I will show why this interpretation is misguided. ). %n Intermediary "eadin# of Kant The conflicting interpretations of 2c3owell on the one hand and $llais and 8anna on the other show that Kant9s account of cognition can be used to support both conceptualist and nonconceptualist positions. Gart of the reason for these conflicting interpretations is that Kant is not always precise with his own terminology and what he claims in one section of the first Critique may be further elaborated, perhaps even contradicted, by what he claims in later

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sections or in other wor4s%5. In terms of the specific debate over whether Kant allows for nonconceptual content, a central 0uestion concerns how one should reconcile the Transcendental $esthetic with Kant9s further claims in the Transcendental 3eduction regarding the forms of space and time and the role of synthesis in intuition. The nonconceptualist interpretations offered by 8anna and $llais clearly rely on treating the $esthetic as a self1standing section, and more importantly, on assuming that sensibility can provide intuitions without aid from the determining capacities of the understanding. While I thin4 that Kant9s account of cognition can supply the inspiration for both conceptualist and nonconceptualist positions, I will argue that despite the interpretative challenges, the best way to read Kant is as a conceptualist. In order for objects to appear to us in intuition, the content of intuition must already be structured by the imagination in accordance with the categories. This is not, however, to claim that we can fully specify the content of intuitions in terms of empirical concepts, as 2c3owell9s position implies. What Kant offers is a minimal conceptualism> intuitions must be structured in basic ways in order to display the unity re0uisite for representational content. (efore moving on, I would li4e to point out that one interpretative challenge has to do with Kant9s usage of the term object." $lthough Kant claims in the $esthetic that sensibility gives us objects," if the understanding, or more precisely the imagination, has not determined what is given, then we only have a manifold of appearance. Intuitions that are related to objects through sensation are empirical, and Kant writes, the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance" #()5'$+E*. Kant fre0uently uses appearance" in contrast to things1in1themselves," but here the relevant contrast is between appearance, as an undetermined manifold, and Kant9s definition of an object in the 3eduction, as that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" #(%)/*. I thin4 we should also

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distinguish between object" as the representation of a unified particular, and an object" of e.perience, that is, an object that is empirically real and is recogni:ed as displaying at least some features that must be ac4nowledged by all judging subjects %,. The synthetic activity of the imagination is responsible for the transition from appearance #as above construed* to unified particular #which we can further connect to other representations via judgments made possible by the categories*. Kant claims that even prior to e.plicit conceptuali:ation, all intuition re0uires synthesis, which is an effect of the imagination" #$/D*. 8e describes synthesis as the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" #$//'(%E)* and goes on to write, synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content" #$/D*. If I am right, then by content" we should understand the representation of a distinct particular, located spatio1 temporally, to which both attention and thought can be directed. In an important way, the entire debate over whether Kantian intuitions are conceptual or nonconceptual hinges on how we understand the synthetic activity of the imagination. If synthesis is guided by the understanding, then it counts as a conceptual capacity, and 2c3owell is correct in claiming that the deliverances of sensibility already depend on the e.ercise of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness. If, on the other hand, synthesis does not depend on the understanding #or at least not always*, as $llais and 8anna have claimed, then intuitions would seem to be able to present us with concrete particulars to which we can be directed apart from any conceptual activity. In the Transcendental 3eduction, Kant connects the imagination with both sensibility and understanding. 8e writes> @ow since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding

%D

intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to sensibility! but insofar as its synthesis is still an e.ercise of spontaneityK the imagination is to this e.tent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibilit #(%,+, italics added*. While it is true that Kant initially subsumes imagination under sensibility, his point here is that the imagination depends on the material that is given to sensibility and thus has a receptive component. @evertheless, because the imagination determines what is given to it, it is more a4in to the active faculty of understanding. 2oreover, the way in which the imagination determines the manifold transcendentally fundamentally depends on the unity of apperception and the categories. Insofar as it is both active and dependent on the understanding, the imagination is a conceptual capacity. ne could object, as $llais does, that although Kant here lin4s the imagination to the understanding, this is not to say that synthesis per se must be guided by the categories or the unity of apperception. Let, there is strong te.tual evidence against this objection. To begin, Kant9s account appears to rule out the possibility that synthesis per se could provide an intuition of a concrete particular apart from conceptual guidance. In the Transcendental $esthetic, Kant establishes space and time as the forms of intuition, with space as the form of outer sense and time as the form of inner sense, but in the 3eduction, he argues that these forms are not enough to provide the intuition of distinct particulars. In regards to space as the form of outer sense, Kant writes that in order to cogni:e something in space I must synthetically bring about a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousnessKand thereby is an object #a determinate space* first cogni:ed" #(%)D*. Kant ma4es the same point in regards to inner sense. 8e writes, inner senseKcontains the mere form of intuition, but without

%&

combination of the manifold in it, and thus does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination" which Kant parenthetically e.plains as the synthetic influence of the understanding on inner sense" #(%,5, italics added*. In order to support their nonconceptualist interpretations, both $llais and 8anna relied on the distinction Kant draws between space and time as forms of intuition and as formal intuitions. Let, Kant states that as mere forms of intuition, space and time contain a manifold, but cannot provide any determinate intuitions. The point here is essential for the success of the Transcendental 3eduction. ne of the major goals of the 3eduction is to show how the categories, which are not derived from e.perience, nevertheless apply to e.perience in a way that grounds the objective validity of our judgments. Gart of the e.planation #and justification* of this application of the categories is that they ma4e e.perience itself possible. Arom the Transcendental $esthetic, we 4now that anything that we can sensibly e.perience is subject to the forms of space and time. What we learn in the 3eduction is that the forms of space and time, as intuitions, must themselves be synthesi:ed by the figurative imagination #(%C%*. 2oreover, this synthesis must be in accordance with the categories #(%5)* because only the categories can prescribe the unity necessary for an intuition to be determinate. In H +C, Kant writes, 6onse0uently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since e.perience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of e.perience" #(%C%*. This passage indicates that we need the categories not only for ma4ing objectively valid judgments about the world #as 8anna and $llais claim*, but for perception itself, which Kant e0uates with the synthetic unity of apprehension" #(%C+*. We should, however, clarify what it means for this synthesis to

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stand under the categories." What synthesis provides is unity! in order to have a representation of a spatiotemporal particular #which clearly involves seeing it as something and as distinct from other things, even if I do not yet 4now what it is*, one must combine and order the material of sensation into an image of which one is conscious. $t the very least, this process re0uires the imagination to combine preceding perceptions with succeeding ones #which re0uires the unity of apperception*, otherwise we could not be presented with an object, but would have mere heaps of unconnected sensations. Kant writes that this reproduction of perceptions must thus have a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others" #$%+%*. Aor Kant, this is the merely empirical and subjective association of representations. 8owever, he thin4s that this 4ind of association is only possible given the transcendental function of the imagination in ordering intuitions according to the categories. If we turn to Kant9s e.ample of the empirical intuition of a house, we can better understand the relation of empirical association to transcendental synthesis. In the empirical intuition of a house, in order to see the house as a unified object, even if I do not 4now what it is, I must have associated the various representations of its parts in such a way that I see them as comprising a single object, which is the intentional content of my representation. In order to do this, though, I must have ordered the spatial relations of those parts. I am able to locate the house in space as a unified object because I have utili:ed the category of 0uantity, the category of the homogenous in an intuition in general" #(%C+*. $lthough many of the associations I ma4e among representations will be empirical #and contingent*, the point is that I can only do that if there are some necessary rules for putting representations together into unified particulars in the first place. This also e.plains the 0uote from the 2etaphysical 3eduction that plays a central role in 2c3owell9s interpretation> The same function that

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gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which e.pressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding" #(%E,*. It should be noted, however, that when Kant claims that the categories ma4e perception itself possible, what he means is empirical intuition, which involves not only appearance, but also the empirical consciousness of appearance as such #(%CE*. $ppearance itself does not re0uire the categories, or any functions of thin4ing for that matter, precisely because we are receptive to the sensible influence of the e.ternal world. (ut this receptivity is not enough to account for the synthesi:ed content of our representations and consciousness of them! for that we need the categories. While I am in agreement with 2c3owell that for Kant, intuition does re0uire the actuali:ation of conceptual capacities to provide intentional representations, 2c3owell overloo4s the distinction between the categories and empirical concepts. Kant provides no indication that the representational content of intuitions re0uires the application of empirical concepts. In the Transcendental 3eduction, Kant aims to show how the categories ma4e e.perience in general possible, or, in other words, Kant e.hibits the possibility of the categories, as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general" #(%,&, italics added*. =mpirical concepts, as rules for combining singular intuitions together under a common mar4, are derived from e.perience. The Transcendental 3eduction relies on the impossibility of intuitions not being structured by the categories, at least as far as their form is concerned! it does not, however, rely on the impossibility of the content of intuitions out1stripping the set of empirical concepts possessed by the subject. Kant9s account rules out the $utonomy Thesis, but allows for a nonconceptualist position that maintains that the representational content of intuitions does not depend on the application of empirical concepts. In the $%sche

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&ogic, Kant offers an e.ample where someone has an intuition without possessing the corresponding concept. 8e writes, If a savage sees a house from a distance, for e.ample, with whose use he is not ac0uainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is ac0uainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. (ut as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time #$&, H,*. $lthough Kant describes the savage" as having a mere intuition," I thin4 the best interpretation of this passage in light of Kant9s argument in the Transcendental 3eduction is that the intuition has been shaped by categorically1guided synthesis, providing the object content, but this content has not been further determined by the empirical concept of a house. It should be noted that even apart from the application of an empirical concept, the unity of the content of the intuition is the same. (ecause the categories function as rules for the synthesis of intuition, they guarantee a certain basic unity of the content of intuition. The application of additional concepts does not change the content of the representation from being nonconceptual to conceptual content, even if the content itself is further refined by the application of additional concepts. It should also be noted that when 2c3owell describes the role of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness using the e.ample of the red cube, he implies that one already has the concepts of red" and cube." #+EE&, )E*. While this may be the case, Kant9s account gives no indication that one must possess the empirical concepts needed to specify the content of an intuition in order for that content to already contain what would be described by someone else in terms of specific concepts, such as red" and cube." In fact, 2c3owell9s own discussion of demonstrative concepts is li4ely a more accurate depiction of how perceptual e.perience can have conceptual content even if a subject lac4s specific concepts. ne could even argue that what gets demonstrative concepts off the ground

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is that all intuitions are already synthesi:ed in accordance with the categories. In other words, we can point to something as a this" or that" because we already have a sense that it is a unified whole with features that can be recogni:able in other situations and belong to other objects. *. Conclusion If we turn to Kant9s account of cognition to understand the role of conceptual capacities in shaping representational content, what we learn is that, for Kant at least, any intuition must be synthesi:ed by the imagination in accordance with the categories in order for it to have content that is directed at or is about objects, even if we do not yet 4now what those objects are. In other words, the formation of representational images re0uires rule1 governed synthesis. Kant9s account supports conceptualism, but only up to a point. @onconceptualists can still turn to Kant to support at least the basic position that the content of representations, while not autonomous from conceptual capacities, can still outstrip the empirical concepts that a subject possesses. This does not, however, support the nonconceptualist positions of either $llais or 8anna that rely on separating the forms of space and time from the formal intuitions of space and time. Kant argues that space and time, as mere forms of intuition, contain only an indeterminate manifold. n the other hand, the mere denial of the claim that content cannot be independent of the categories, while admitting that it can still be independent of empirical concepts, is probably not enough conceptualism for 2c3owell. That is to say, it will not secure the 4ind of content which will be able to function in the space of reasons" in the way that motivated 2c3owell9s conceptualism in the first place. ne advantage to adopting this 4ind of intermediary position is that it may be helpful for clarifying 0uestions concerning the formation of empirical concepts. While I cannot

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e.plore this idea in detail, it seems that one way of approaching the 0uestion of how we generate empirical concepts in response to perceptual e.perience is by understanding how we synthesi:e empirically given material in a rule1governed way. If our intentional representations of the material given to us through perceptual e.perience were not already structured in a way that was amenable to further conceptuali:ation, it is difficult to see how empirical concepts could get off the ground. 8owever, this also points to a remaining challenge that Kant9s account poses for the contemporary debate. There is a deep problem with Kant9s reliance on the imagination as the intermediary between sensibility and understanding. n the one hand, we need the imagination to be tied to sensibility, so that we do not lose contact with the e.ternal world. n the other hand, the imagination is lin4ed to the understanding, and Kant refers to it as an effect of the understanding" #(%,+*. If the imagination is treated as a conceptual capacity, then we run up against the threat of idealism. We want our representations to be constrained not just by our concepts, but also by the e.ternal world. 8ow do we 4now that the imagination, in synthesi:ing intuitions, is actually faithful to the world, i.e., that it is not arbitrarily synthesi:ingF 2c3owell, in appropriating Kant, brushes off the threat of idealism! he thin4s that it is enough that conceptual capacities are operative in sensibility, rather than on sensibility. I agree that pointing to some bare e.tra1 conceptual given will not answer the 0uestion of how our representations are e.ternally guided, but a change in preposition is not enough to banish idealism. %C In applying Kant to the contemporary debate, we need to carefully address the problems that his account may leave us with, especially the threat of idealism. This tas4 I leave to another paper.

Jessica J. Williams ;tanford Mniversity

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I am grateful to 7ebecca Ku4la, 7ichard 2anning, Jeffrey Tluma4, =ric Winsberg, and those present at the 2arch +E%% meeting of the ;outhern 3ivision of the @orth $merican Kant ;ociety in @ew rleans for critical comments on earlier versions of this paper. + 7eferences to the Critique of Pure Reason are given parenthetically in the te.t, following the standard practice of B$9 and B(9 referring to the first and second editions of the te.t. ) (ermNde:, #+EE)a*. 5 ;talna4er is a notable proponent of a global lifting of the conceptual constraint. While 2c3owell has argued that conceptual content goes all the way down, ;talna4er #%&&D* argues that nonconceptual content goes all the way up" and should be thought of in terms of information1bearing states. , (ermNde:, #+EE)b*. C . 7.<. 8ec4 #+EEE*. / ne problem with the state'content distinction is that it is difficult to maintain state nonconceptualism without appealing to the content of the perceptual states involved. $s (ermude: notes #+EE)a*, the state nonconceptualist relies on the distinction between concept dependent and concept independent states! however, in order to e.plain why some states #e.g., propositional states* are concept dependent, while others, such as perceptual states, are not, one will need to ma4e a claim about the differing content of those states. D Geacoc4e #%&&+* initially rejected this thesis, arguing that the content at sta4e in many nonconceptualist positions is spatial content, but in order for a creature to have representations with spatial content, it must at least have a primitive first1person concept. & Aor clearer evidence of Kant9s definition of intuitions as immediate representations of objects, see the Prolegemena to #n 'uture Metaph sics #+EE5> +D%*, as 0uoted by -. $llais #+EE&> )D&fn*. %E ;ee 8annah <insborg #+EED*. $ccording to <insborg, any nonconceptualist reading of Kant will re0uire interpreting the synthetic activity of the imagination as, at the very least, distinct from the understanding. ;he 0uic4ly goes on to show, however, that the understanding is re0uired for perceptual synthesis. That said, <insborg does offer a less demanding conception" of the understanding9s role in synthesis in terms of consciousness of normativity" #/%*. I find this approach appealing but also potentially problematic. 2a4ing sense of her suggestion of this consciousness of normativity" would re0uire a separate paper. %% I find 8anna9s reference to this passage pu::ling. While Kant does claim that the imagination belongs to sensibility," he goes on, in the same sentence, to state that insofar as synthesis depends on the unity of apperception and the categories, the imagination is an effect of the understanding on sensibility" #(%,%*. $t no point does 8anna ac4nowledge this statement or address the problems it poses for his interpretation. %+ Kant writes, the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation." #(%CEn* %) It is not e.actly clear how $llais is defining particulars, although she does indicate that, as she is using it, the reference of this term is broader and less specific than Bphysical object99 #$llais +EE&> )D5fn*. %5 Aor e.ample, Kant9s distinction between judgments of e.perience and judgments of perception in the Prolegomena #+&D1+&&* is of obvious relevance to this debate. Kant here claims that judgments of perception, re0uire no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perception in a thin4ing subject." This would seem to lend support to a nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant, however, there are interpretations of this passage that are in line with a conceptualist reading of Kant. ;ee (Oatrice -onguenesse9s discussion of this distinction in (ant and the Capacit to $udge #%&&D> %C,* for an e.ample of the latter. %, -eaving aside the transcendental object, I thin4 we can distinguish between three senses of object"> bject% refers to the manifold which is given" in an empirical intuition prior to determination. f course, it is my contention that we have no consciousness of what is given prior to conceptual determination, rather, it is a way of tal4ing about the content of empirical intuitions apart from conceptual activities. bject + refers to the representation of a unified particular! in other words, it is the product of figurative synthesis. bject ) refers to the object of e.perience that is both objectively valid and objectively real. I ta4e it that objective

validity indicates that a given representation refers to an object, where objective reality indicates that a given representation refers to an object for which there is also an empirical intuition. %C There are good reasons for 0uestioning whether 2c3owell9s position can overcome the threat of idealism. ;ee, e.g., 7ichard 2anning #+EEC*. "eferences $llais, -. #+EE&*, Kant, @on1conceptual 6ontent and the 7epresentation of ;pace," )uropean $ournal of Philosoph , 5/> )DD15%). (ermNde:, J. #+EE)a*, @onconceptual mental content". In =. Palta #=d.*, ;tanford =ncyclopedia of Ghilosophy. M7-Qhttp>''www.plato.stanford.edu'archives' spr+EE)'entries'content1nonconceptual (ermNde:, J. #+EE)b*, @onconceptual 6ontent> Arom Gerceptual =.perience to ;ubpersonal 6omputational ;tates". In L. <unther #=d.*, )ssa s on *onconceptual Content #pp.%D51+%C*. 6ambridge> 2IT Gress. =vans, <. #%&D+*, Varieties of Reference. .ford> 6larendon' .ford Mniversity Gress. <insborg, 8. #+EED*, Was Kant a @onconceptualistF" Philosophical Studies, %)/> C,1//. <riffith. $. #+E%E*, Gerception and the 6ategories> $ 6onceptualist 7eading of Kant9s Critique of Pure Reason," )uropean $ournal of Philosoph , %D #+*. 8anna, 7. #+EE,*, Kant and @onconceptual 6ontent," )uropean $ournal of Philosoph , %)> +5D1&E. 8ec4, 7. <., #+EEE*, @onconceptual 6ontent and the ;pace of 7easons," Philosophical Review, %E&> 5D)1,+). Kant, I. #%&&/*, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. G. <uyer and $. Wood. 6ambridge> 6ambridge Mniversity Gress. Kant, I. #%&&+*, JRsche -ogic," in +mmanuel (ant, &ectures on &ogic, trans. J.2. Loung. 6ambridge> 6ambridge Mniversity Gress, ,%&1C5E. Kant, I. #+EE5*, Prolegomena to #n 'uture Metaphs ics, ed. and trans. <. 8atfield. 6ambridge> 6ambridge Mniversity Gress. -onguenesse, (. #%&&D* (ant and the Capacit to $udge, trans. 6harles T. Wolfe. Grinceton> Grinceton Mniversity Gress. 2anning, 7. #+EEC*, The @ecessity of 7eceptivity> =.ploring a Mnified $ccount of Kantian ;ensibility and Mnderstanding," in 7. Ku4la #=d.* #esthetics and Cognition in (ant-s Critical Philosoph #pp. C%1 D5*, 6ambridge> 6ambridge Mniversity Gress. 2c3owell, J. #%&&5*, 2ind and World. 6ambridge> 8arvard Mniversity Gress. 2c3owell, J. #+EE&*, Having the World in View, )ssa s on (ant. Hegel. and Sellars . 6ambridge> 8arvard Mniversity Gress. Geacoc4e, 6. #%&&+*, # Stud of Concepts. 6ambridge> 2IT Gress. ;talna4er, 7. #%&&D*, What 2ight @onconceptual 6ontent (eF" In =. Sillanueva #=d.*, 6oncepts #pp.))&1),+*, $stascadero, 6$> 7idgeview Gress.