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DPM
17,4 Earthquake impact mitigation in
poor urban areas
The case of Metropolitan Manila
454
Kanako Iuchi
Department of Urban and Regional Planning,
University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA, and
Ann-Margaret Esnard
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Florida Atlantic University,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, USA

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that the Philippines is often described as the melting
pot of natural disasters (typhoons, floods and torrential rains). As part of the Pacific ring of fire, the
Philippines is also prone to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In the current disaster management
scheme, the poor are likely to be put last. Conventional risk reduction mitigation methods (such as land
use and building codes) are failing. A paradigm shift is needed – one that enables poor communities to
maximize their limited resources and contribute to risk reduction.
Design/methodology/approach – Interviews and field investigations were conducted between
2001 and 2006 in three case study neighborhoods in Metro Manila to understand the risk components
that exist and the resources (or lack of) for dealing with them.
Findings – Field surveys highlighted three major risk components: liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),
illegal electrical connections, and residential buildings. Mitigation efforts need to be implemented by:
developing hybrid community organizations; minimizing direct physical damage; developing
neighborhood cooperatives through microfinance schemes; and developing an in-kind community
insurance system.
Originality/value – While this research focused on earthquake impact mitigation, the inquiry and
findings with respect to the urban poor in high risk areas, have applicability to other localities in the
developing world. Furthermore, Manila’s situation is not unique. Disaster threats, rapid substandard
urban development, growth in the number of the poor, and degradation of social capital, are
phenomena present in other parts of the developing world. In such settings, traditional mitigation
approaches are difficult to carry out effectively as well.
Keywords Case studies, Earthquakes, Philippines, Risk assessment, Poverty
Paper type Research paper

Background and introduction

The Philippines is located in a region within the Pacific Ring of fire, a zone of frequent
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Metro Manila[1], the capital of the Philippines, is

Disaster Prevention and Management
Vol. 17 No. 4, 2008
pp. 454-469
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/09653560810901700
The field work component of this research (initiated between 2001 and 2004) was funded by the
Japanese overseas development assistantships and the World Bank. Follow-up work and
research were completed at Cornell University, where Professors David Lewis and Thomas
Vietorisz of Cornell University’s Department of City and Regional Planning provided timely and
important advice and feedback. The Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and the
International Studies in Planning at Cornell University provided for travel to conduct field
surveys in Metro Manila in the summer of 2005.
faced with rapid urbanization, which has led to unequal income distributions and land Earthquake
ownership, and many households who are forced to migrate to marginal land with impact
unsafe living and work conditions. The poorer segments of the population, those most
vulnerable to a pending catastrophic earthquake event, make up at least 40 percent of mitigation
the total population in Metro Manila. Overall, they are less resilient and have less
capacity to prepare for and survive disasters. In the current disaster management
scheme, the poor are likely to be put last, because the wealthier population who 455
regularly pay taxes and have title to their land are given priority.
Manila’s situation is not unique and needs to be considered in a broader
international context. Population concentration, rapid substandard urban
development, growth in the number of the poor, and degradation of social capital,
are phenomena present in other parts of the developing world. In such settings,
traditional mitigation approaches are difficult to carry out effectively, due to factors
such as violations of laws and regulations intended to regulate safe construction, and
limited government resources. Furthermore, traditional mitigation strategies are not
sufficient in coping with major-scale earthquakes. The mitigation approach thus needs
to be modified. The poor need to be the core actors in any redefined mitigation strategy,
because while lacking power, they are the most affected by disasters. A redefined
mitigation approach requires a deeper understanding of people’s risk perception, level
of engagement in mitigation activities, risk components in the neighborhood, and
economic limitations – which will lead to an understanding of preparedness levels and
the possible impacts of immediate and long term post-disaster periods. An
understanding of organizations, institutional and personal networks, and
neighborhood actors, are also important.
Research was conducted over several years to gain a new perspective on earthquake
disaster risk reduction potential community-driven pre-disaster damage reduction
strategies in Metro Manila’s poor areas. This paper summarizes research findings and
begins with a background section on disasters and impacts on the urban poor, a
summary of Metropolitan Manila’s disaster threats, and the limitations of using
traditional/conventional approaches to mitigation and disaster management. It then
proceeds with main findings and observations based on field work and surveys
conducted between 2001 and 2006. The paper ends with recommendations and
suggestions for revised mitigation and disaster management strategies.

Natural disasters and impacts on the urban poor

The World Bank, more than a decade ago, estimated that urbanization was increasing
at a rate three times faster in low and middle income countries than in high income
countries (Clark, 2003). Rapid urbanization is often associated with a lack of
appropriate and effective land use planning and building standards, deterioration of
older, densely packed inner city areas (UNDP, 2004), as well as increased
vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Comparisons of the impacts of extreme natural
events and disasters on countries with high, medium, and low Human Development
Indicators (HDI)[2] have been made using information from the UNDP and the Center
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (Wisner, 2003). Table I clearly reveals
that countries with low HDI suffer more in terms of death toll; 86 percent of deaths
occurred in countries with low HDI, while only two percent occurred in countries with
high HDI[3].
DPM Research by the UK Department for International Development (DFID, 2005) also
17,4 shows a strong correlation between disaster and poverty – with the poor being the
most affected. The reasons can be both physical and economic:
(1) the poor are physically vulnerable because they tend to live in hazardous areas,
such as gullies or shorelines that are prone to disaster; and
456 (2) they are economically vulnerable because disasters destroy their households’
natural, physical, and social assets. In addition, injury, disability, and loss of life
resulting from disasters affects their main asset – their labor.

With decentralized local governments lacking basic resources (personnel, supplies

and funds), the wealthy have power to control the recovery process. Wisner et al.’s
(2004, p. 301) reference to the following statement by a field survey participant in
Gujarat further highlights this issue – that is, “with good political connections the
powerful castes have even managed to attract infrastructure and investment, while
the poor and the marginalized are now left as ‘abandoned hamlets’ devoid of even
basic facilities”. Overall, this creates a situation where the poor are usually left
behind, which sometimes bring their “coping strategies to breaking point, have
long term effects on livelihoods and often tip the poorest into destitution” (DFID,
2005, p. 2).

Metropolitan Manila: a disaster waiting to happen

The Philippines is often described as the melting pot of natural disasters. Located in
the tropics, it experiences major typhoons (approximately 20 per year[4]), floods and
torrential rains. As part of the “Pacific ring of fire”, the Philippines is also prone to
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Particularly, the Luzon earthquake in July 1990,
and volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in June 1991, vividly show the geographic
hazards of Luzon Island, where Metropolitan Manila is located (Figure 1). These
disasters caused estimated losses of US$ 577 million[5] and US$ 423 million[6]
respectively, figures that do not include the economic effects due to loss of lives and
industries. Casualties from these disasters added up to 4,390 people (1,283 dead, 321
missing, and 2,786 injured) and 1,057 people (850 dead, 23 missing, and 184 injured),
respectively, according to the National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC)
(2003)[7]. Although neither disaster directly damaged Metropolitan Manila, this area is
facing an increasing risk from natural disasters, one of which is a possible rupture of
the West Valley Fault (WVF) system that runs north-south in eastern part of the
metropolis.

HDI Deaths per disaster Proportion (%) Cost per disaster (US$m)

Low 1,052 86.23 79

Table I. Medium 145 11.89 209
Level of human High 23 1.89 636
development and impact
of disasters Source: Modified from Wisner (2003, p. 46) based on IFRC (2001, pp. 162, 164)
 Earthquake
impact
mitigation

457

Figure 1.
The Luzon Island and
metropolitan Manila

Disaster threats to Metro Manila

The possibility of a large scale earthquake generated from the WVF system is very
real. Scientists have determined that at least three rupturing events have occurred
within the last 1400 years along the WVF System, based on radiocarbon dates and soil
development and that the last rupture occurred during the eighteenth or nineteenth
century (Nelson et al. 1995). Use of recurrence intervals of 200 to 400 to estimate future
large earthquakes along the WV Fault have been suggested by Nelson et al. (1996).
Potential damage and casualties from a magnitude 7.2 rupture of the WV Fault
system can also be significant, based on a 2004 MMEIRS study[8] by Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The study concluded that approximately 40
percent of total buildings would be heavily, moderately or partially damaged, with
casualties of 147,100, and a death toll of 33,500 (0.3 percent of the total population).
That study also estimates significant fire damage that can result in building collapse,
casualties and deaths. Other infrastructure damage would include water pipe, electric
power transmission and distribution line cutoffs, and public service buildings,
including hospitals, schools, and office buildings of Local Government Units (LGUs[9]).
The MMEIRS study clearly predicts that Metro Manila would be in a chaotic state if a
WV Fault related earthquake occurs.
DPM Metro Manila faces urbanization growth rates that increase vulnerability of the
17,4 area, accompanied by population concentration, rapid substandard urban
development, and increasing percentage of the population living in poverty. The
population concentration of metro region has intensified since 1948, when the
region was home to eight percent of the total national population. By 2000, this
had increased to thirteen percent. During these years, the population rate increased
458 by 3-5 percent in the Metro Manila area, while nationally, the rate was less than
three 3 percent[10]. Urban land expansion beyond the periphery of the metro
region is also evident. By 1994, the city covered approximately 430 km2[11]
compared to the 110 km2 covered in 1948. The urbanized area had grown three
times larger in a half century than throughout the first five centuries of Manila’s
history[12]. According to the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor
(PCUP)[13], 3.45 million people were identified as poor in 1995, compared to 2.8
million in 1990 (Nakanishi et al., 2001).

The conventional mitigation approach: conceptual functions and failures

People in Metro Manila have a relatively high consciousness of possible disasters that
could affect them. The Luzon earthquake and the Pinatubo eruption in the early 1990s
has made it clear that such disasters can happen at any time. Additionally, daily
exposure to floods and inundations has led to the development of some preparedness
and coping strategies. Some city governments, such as Marikina City, are active in
disaster management activities, owning storage buildings to stock basic needs and
offer support during emergencies to the affected families[14]. However, just as in other
societies, Metro Manila’s capacity to cope with the impacts of catastrophic events is
unknown.
Mitigation approaches often rely on government-led regulation, advanced
technology, and public emergency response. Many of these traditional approaches,
however, tend to fail. First, regulation represented by building codes and zoning laws,
are usually promulgated by public agencies and enforced through the legal system,
with varying degrees of effectiveness (The World Bank, 1999). The conventional
wisdom is that damage can be reduced by:
(1) enforcing building codes that make newly constructed buildings resistant to
earthquakes and existing buildings more durable;
(2) implementing land use controls that direct people away from hazardous areas;
and
(3) utilizing advanced technologies such as quake-absorbing construction
materials can minimize structural vulnerability.

However, an earthquake in Kobe, Japan, in January 1995[15], destroyed the safety myth
of many Japanese, by proving that such technologies cannot withstand a disaster
whose force is significantly greater than expected. Lastly, public emergency response
is anticipated to function logistically, to initially assist people and save public assets
from further losses. The Kobe earthquake showed that the public sector could not
respond as planned, especially in the first 72 hours (The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake Memorial Research Institute, 2006).
Why conventional approaches are not effective in Metro Manila Earthquake
In the Philippines, building codes, under Presidential Decree (PD) 1096[16], specifies impact
the minimum requirements and standards of building design to protect against fire and
natural disasters (JICA, 2004). This system, however, is largely ineffective because mitigation
people ignore regulations and construct buildings without building permits. Even
permitted buildings under construction are not monitored beyond the formal approval
process. Municipal land use controls with regulations that prohibit construction on 459
river banks, public lands, and government lands, are not functioning either, as
buildings are densely constructed in these hazardous areas. Besides, it is not only the
people who do not follow rules and regulations, but also the governments. A revised
comprehensive land use plan (CLUP)[17], which included articles and sections related
to disaster mitigation, was originally ordered to be prepared for ratification, by the
seventeen local governments[18] comprising Metro Manila by the end of 2002.
However, only seven local governments had completed compiling this plan by the end
of 2003 (JICA, 2004).
Public emergency response operations in Metro Manila are expected to function as a
bottom-up procedure, primarily coordinated and supervised by LGUs and
Barangays[19], called Disaster Coordinating Committees (DCCs). When local DCCs
are overwhelmed by situations, the regional and provincial DCCs, and eventually
national government are, in theory, to give their support (JICA, 2004)[20]. However,
there is a lack of coordination between different levels of organizations. The content of
the emergency response plans often completely ignores earthquakes, whether it is
preventative or in response to the earthquake or related fires. Furthermore, as lessons
documented in earthquakes in Kobe and other regions show, these paper-based
emergency response plans do not function as expected when a large earthquake hits. It
is most likely that the initial actions to be taken by the governments will be delayed
due to the many unexpected problems that arise.
The fragmented and decentralized government structure, differences in the interests
of government leaders, and in the differences in availability of funds[21], has led to
further inequity in levels of mitigation preparedness and emergency response. The
availability of calamity funds for each LGU in the metro region represents huge gaps.
The LGU with the largest fund, the City of Manila, makes up 18.49 percent of the total,
while the LGU with smallest fund, Pateros, only makes up 0.25 percent[22].

Field research, findings and observations

Case study neighborhoods
Given the problems and limitations discussed above, a new approach is needed for
reducing the potential impacts from earthquake disasters, for understanding the
neighborhood variations, and for a more customized approach to mitigation planning
in poor neighborhoods. In response to this need, surveys were conducted in three
neighborhoods to more fully understand the risk components that exist in these and
other poor communities, as well as the resources for dealing with them, including social
capital and networks. The selection of the case study neighborhoods was based on
characteristics such as densely packed buildings, deteriorating infrastructure, and
large proportions of buildings that lack appropriate standards. The survey
methodology focused mainly on neighborhood interviews, but also included field
investigations.
DPM Risk perception and level of engagement
17,4 Interview responses suggested that people in general are aware that earthquakes cause
building damage and fire, yet are not really engaged in mitigation and preparedness
activities. On the other hand, the survey made it clear that poor neighborhood residents
do not have complete information and knowledge about the earthquake risks that they
are facing. For example, many people know that an earthquake generates building
460 damage, yet have no idea how it could affect them, both short-term and long-term.
Survey respondents in two of the three case study neighborhoods, where wooden
buildings are built close together and thus occasionally suffer from fire incidents,
responded that they have in place some response measures for fire, at the household
level. Responses of women from the three neighborhoods revealed that they are very
sensitive about the need to keep their immediate environs safe and livable, and their
willingness to devote their utmost effort at the household level to mitigate possible
risks based on their knowledge of disaster impacts. However, willingness of women is
not yet systematically coordinated to comply with disaster mitigation efforts.

Risk components
Field surveys showed that the three major risk components found in the
neighborhoods are liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), illegal electrical connections, and
residential buildings itself. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is commonly used in the
households for cooking. The shape of the LPG tanks makes them prone to rollover
during ground shaking, and because a tank’s connection to the stove is loose, there is a
high probability that the connection could break and cause gas to leak out (Figure 2).
Commonly, in very poor neighborhoods, buildings with floor space of less than 10
square meters are at least two or three stories high, constructed of wooden materials,
and built adjacent to similar buildings. Because the living arrangement in these
buildings is such that one household occupies one floor with a kitchen, there is a high
concentration of LPGs found in each neighborhood. Any gas leaks would result in
multiple explosions and fires in multiple locations.
The second element is illegal electrical connections that are prone to
short-circuiting, even under normal circumstances (Figure 3). In the event of an
earthquake, this could initiate fire which would spread through flammable building

Figure 2.
Major components that
cause fire outbreaks. LPG
tank largely used in
households
 Earthquake
impact
mitigation

461

Figure 3.
Major components that
cause fire outbreaks.
Illegal electricity
connections

materials. Such illegal connections are very common and can be found throughout the
poor communities.
The other types of risk that people face are their residential buildings. The types of
vulnerable residential buildings in impoverished neighborhoods can be classified into
two basic types: wooden and masonry. The structure of the wooden buildings in these
neighborhoods is very simple, with columns that are thin and roofs and walls that are
un-reinforced (Figure 4). Even in masonry buildings where most of the pillars are
reinforced, walls are not (Figure 5). From past earthquakes occurred in different places,
researchers found that building collapse in both wooden and masonry buildings are
caused by failure of walls and separation of walls from roofs and foundations. Thus,
unless special measures are taken to strengthen the structure of these buildings, Metro
Manila will also face large casualties from building collapse.

Daily economic constraints

Some of the poor in Metro Manila are fortunate to own houses. They often rent out
rooms to supplement their income. The price of rent varies from P 1,000 to P 5,000 per
room depending on the location and size. Others who do not have such retained capital

Figure 4.
Structure of wooden and
masonry buildings.
Wooden buildings found
in illegal settlements
DPM
17,4

462

Figure 5.
Structure of wooden and
masonry buildings.
Masonry buildings found
in illegal settlements

often face difficulties in surviving from day to day. Whenever households are in this
situation, they borrow money from 5-6[23] or Bombay[24] rather than from neighbors,
friends or relatives. Most respondents who usually borrow money from these informal
money lenders are fully aware of the high interest rate of 20 percent or more, but they
prefer to avoid any possible conflicts about money matters that may arise between
close relationships. On the other hand, there are formal cooperatives[25], which include
a service of providing loans to members.
Some residents, those who own their homes or run a business, responded that they
usually borrow from the cooperatives because the interest rate is lower by ten percent.
Yet, for most respondents, keeping up with payments of monthly membership dues is
often difficult and thus they end up borrowing from the 5-6 or the Bombay anyway.
Some residents indicated forming a cooperative as a community undertaking, based on
their understanding that such an organization could provide opportunities to generate
incomes, and also allow investment in neighborhood improvements.

Organization and networks

In case study neighborhoods, there are neighborhood associations and the
homeowners associations identified as active units for neighborhood activities.
These two groups usually have strong mutual connection with the barangays. Often,
these groups jointly extend livelihood programs or other social activities with
barangays, according to the barangay leader and leaders of the homeowners’
association. Barangay leaders[26], Purok[27] leaders, and neighborhood association
leaders are perceived as the leaders by the people in the neighborhoods, and
neighborhood residents usually follow the decisions that these leaders make to keep
the neighborhood in order. Currently, there is no uniform rule about the information
distribution networks at either barangay or LGU level.

Women as the main actors for neighborhood disaster mitigation activities

Field surveys suggest that the majority of men go out for work, while women stay
home to take care of the children and do household chores. Some women run small
home-based businesses or get side jobs that they could do from home. Many women in
such impoverished areas are willing to work, yet the fact of low educational Earthquake
attainments and work inexperience make it difficult for them to do so. impact
Daily activities of women in the neighborhood are strengths, because majority of
women are aware of changes that occur in their neighborhood. Additionally, in many mitigation
cases, they function as the hub of information in families and neighborhoods. Such
engagement of women in neighborhoods and families highlight the important
networking roles that they can play at the local level. As mentioned before, women did 463
not show significant interest in taking a leadership role in their neighborhood activities
except in the case of working jointly with other mothers to protect their children.

Recommendations for a revised approach to mitigation and disaster

management
Make community organizations hybrid
People in the impoverished areas did not know the possible risks they may face, and
additionally have large budget constraints to engage in activities that relate to reduce
such risks. Thus, participating in risk minimizing activities, such as reducing building
vulnerabilities, is often difficult. Active participation in risk minimizing activities by
the poor requires an organization that is operated independently at the neighborhood
level, but one that would fit into an information sharing and distribution framework as
proposed in Figure 6.
During the pre-disaster period, hybrid organizations would function for the well
being of poor neighborhoods; and in case of a disaster, the organization can shift to
respond to the situation immediately. The organization can oversee creation and
development of active women’s organizations and business ventures. This serves the
dual role of increasing financial stability and exposure to information and knowledge.
Although the governments and the public institutions are not capable of responding
to all the needs of the poor, they are still in essential and critical positions to provide
leadership and information to a variety of organizations and groups at different levels.
Further, they have the responsibility to provide equal opportunities and support

Figure 6.
Flow of information and
knowledge to
neighborhoods
DPM neighborhoods that are falling behind, or at least encourage actions to unify
17,4 neighborhoods as part of mitigation and disaster resiliency efforts.

Minimize direct physical damages

To minimize damages from building collapse, people in poor neighborhoods need to
understand the specific risks by type, of their residences and neighborhoods. By
464 knowing the risks and applying seismic resistance techniques they can largely
decrease risk exposure. Since men in poor neighborhoods are quite adept at building
houses, they would benefit from improving their houses in inexpensive ways, using
donations collected from construction suppliers.
The causes of fire, namely, the materials that develop fire and are flammable, need
to be minimized. Four recommendations seem pertinent in this case: build common
cooking spaces; minimize illegal electricity connections; reduce the use of flammable
materials in buildings; and promote fire extinguishing and evacuation activities.
Building communal cooking spaces is of the highest priority. Sharing a space will not
only reduce the numbers of LPG-filled tanks, but can serve to enhance social capital, by
daily gathering and sharing of information among women. This collective system will
also give opportunities to government to participate in this proactive activity.
Government could take part in subsidizing fuel for the neighborhoods – an
inexpensive mitigation approach with huge benefits toward risk reduction.

Develop neighborhood cooperatives through microfinance schemes

Development of neighborhood cooperatives is one way that the poor neighborhoods
in Metro Manila can increase and improve their financial and social capacities. The
cooperative system would be based on three main funds: revolving fund, repayment,
and disaster management related funds (See Figure 7). The revolving fund would be
used for operational expenses such as worker salaries. Repayment funds will go
back to the fund lending institutions, and the rest will be aimed to spend in
mitigation activities. For the funds pooled for mitigation purposes, two types are

Figure 7.
Funds for neighborhood
cooperatives
proposed – a vulnerability reduction fund and a calamity fund. Vulnerability Earthquake
reduction funds can widely be used for a host of programs and activities that impact
support any mitigation or other information sharing activities. Calamity funds can
be saved for purchasing seismic resistant construction materials. mitigation
Government could provide information on the “how-to”; for example, tips on
approaching micro-finance institutions and running the community business. Overall,
key issues for sustained operation of neighborhood cooperatives are transparency of 465
finance, women being key actors, and open communication with administrative bodies
and other existing organizations. The bonding that can develop through daily
networking and interaction will enable a more efficient flow of information and
increased neighborhood unity.

Develop an in-kind community insurance system

A community insurance system would focus on developing committed networks of the
poor in the neighborhoods to participate and contribute through providing the labor,
one of the most costly components during the recovery and reconstruction period. Such
collective and voluntary provision of labor can provide an opportunity for quicker and
less expensive recovery.
This system could be further extended to work between government and
communities, by aiming to exchange and utilize resources held by both parties during
the post-disaster period. Government could provide basic survival food and supplies
(such as rice), while community members contribute their labor.
This system is constructive for both poor neighborhoods and government;
especially since poor neighborhoods do not have access to private insurance options.
The system can be operated by an advance agreement made between neighborhoods
and government. This in-kind community insurance system offers other benefits as
well:
.
economic inflation that often develops in post-disaster would not affect this
insurance system because it is developed in a non-monetary form; and
.
government could operate this system with minimum input, which will be a large
incentive toward implementation.

Final thoughts
While this research focused on earthquake impact mitigation, the inquiry and findings
with respect to the urban poor in high risk areas, has applicability to other localities in
the developing world. The trend of urbanization and the vulnerability of the poor
neighborhoods in hazardous urban areas require that communities maximize their
limited resources and contribute to risk reduction.
Governments at all levels should continuously improve and strengthen their
capacities for implementing appropriate conventional practices: enforcing building
codes and land use guidelines, and improving emergency response capacities.
Application of advanced technologies to the mitigation practices may be further
investigated as part of private-public partnership schemes.
However, a paradigm shift in mitigation approaches is needed. The essential issues
in redefining disaster mitigation strategies can be summarized as follows:
DPM .
the poor are most at risk to earthquake disaster and should be main actors in the
17,4 mitigation process;
.
qualitative field work assessments are important for understanding the variety
and variability of poverty and vulnerability characteristics in urban settings;
.
mitigation plans need to be customized based on urban forms and structures,
social systems and cultures;
466 .
the role of organizations, networks and governments must be better coordinated;
.
an independent organization of some form is required in each underprivileged
neighborhood to integrate disaster mitigation activities with efforts toward
economic efficiency; and
.
women have a good sense of their neighborhood conditions and residents, and
need to be active players in mitigation activities as well as resource persons in
the organizations.

Notes
1. Metro Manila, the capital region of the Philippines, is made up of 17 local government units
(LGUs). This comprises 13 cities and 4 municipalities, and functions as the political,
economic, social, and cultural center of the country. It is one of the most populous areas in
East Asia.
2. The Human Development Indicator “quantifies available data to assess the state of human
development across the globe and provide a critical analysis of a specific theme each year. It
combines thematic policy analysis with detailed country data that focus on human
well-being, not just economic trends” (UNDP, 2004). The main indicators are: Life
expectancy at birth; Adult literacy rate; and Combined primary, secondary and tertiary
gross school enrollment. “All countries are classified into three clusters by achievement in
human development: high human development (with an HDI of 0.800 or above), medium
human development (0.500-0.799) and low human development (under 0.500)” (UNDP, 2004).
3. It is important to note, however, that the cost per disaster is low in those developing
countries, but the number of deaths per disaster is high compared to those in medium and
high HDI countries.
4. The number is calculated based on information provided by National Disaster Coordinating
Committee of the Philippines in 2003.
5. The National Disaster Coordinating Committee’s (NDCC) official figures indicate 31.176
Billion Pesos, based on the 2003 adjusted rate of 1 Philippine Peso ðPHPÞ ¼ 0:01851 US
Dollar (USD)
6. The NDCC official figures indicate 22.8502 Billion Pesos, based on the 2003 adjusted rate.
7. The NDCC is the focal inter-institutional organization for disaster management at the
national level. It is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of National Defense, and its
members generally represent national government departments and the Philippine Red
Cross (JICA, 2004).
8. Earthquake Impact Reduction Study for Metropolitan Manila, JICA, 2002-2004.
9. Local Government Units (LGUs) are the generic name used for cities and municipalities in
Metro Manila. The LGUs are responsible for basic services and regulatory functions through
Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which was enacted in 1991. LGUs are
anticipated to enhance self-reliant communities and effective government (JICA, 2004).
10. The population growth rate of the metropolitan area between 1995 and 2000 was less than Earthquake
the national growth rate. Some social scientists perceive this phenomenon not as a setback of
population agglomeration in the metropolis, but as a development of the greater metropolis, impact
with people moving just outside the administratively defined metro Manila. mitigation
11. The area of urban expansion shown was calculated using GIS. The figure is based on an
urban expansion map from MMEIRS (2004), which was originally taken from the book “City
of Man” published by the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA). 467
12. The Historical records of Manila can be found going back to the early 16th century. When a
Spanish troop, dispatched by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, landed at Maynila in 1570, the region
was already developed as the center of regional trading under the influence of Islam. Maynila
is thought to have been established around 1500. The Spanish colonized Manila by force,
constructing Intramuros near Manila Bay, and established as the colonial capital city,
Manila, (Insigne y siempre leal Ciudad de Manila) in June 26, 1571 (Nakanishi et al., 2001).
13. This committee was created in 1986 by President Aquino to deal with urban poverty issues.
The first president of this committee was a representative from squatter residents
association and engaged to settle the problems on squatter clearance (Nakanishi et al., 2001).
14. Information obtained through site visit and an interview with Marikina Disaster
Management Officer, in October, 2002.
15. This earthquake is officially called “Earthquake of Southern Hyogo Prefecture, 1995”. It
occurred on January 17, 1995 with magnitude 7.3 and its aftermath saw 6,433 dead, 3
missing, 43,792 injured (as of December 26, 2002), and 219,000 buildings were heavily
damaged. (The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Research Institute, 2006).
16. Presidential Decree 1096 is the National Building Code of the Philippines.
17. Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region, March 1981. This
ordinance describes the type of zoning and procedures of implementation. Housing and Land
use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is responsible for ratifying and adjusting the land use plan
prepared by individual LGUs, while Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is
responsible for advising LGUs in developing plans.
18. The 13 cities and 4 municipalities comprising Metro Manila local governments are Kalookan,
Las Piñas, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas,
Parañaque, Pasay, Pasig, Pateros, Quezon, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela.
19. The barangays are the smallest local government unit in the Philippines, which was codified
under the 1991 Local Government Code. The word barangay is a native Filipino term for a
village, district or ward. Municipalities and cities are composed of barangays. Historically, a
barangay is a relatively small community of around 50 to 100 families. So in metro Manila,
one finds small barangays if the area was established a very long time ago, and larger
barangays if the areas are newly established.
20. In Metro Manila, two laws, PD 1566 (1978) and Local Government Code (1991), Republic Act
No. 7160, the Philippines, function as important components to the legal framework of
disaster management. The former instructs Metro Manila to create a Regional Disaster
Coordinating Committee (RDCC) and Local Disaster Coordinating Committees (LDCC), while
the latter gives local and regional governments the power to implement disaster
management provisions.
21. Normally, LGUs’ marginal viability comes from two sources, the five percent calamity fund
from local budgets, and the 800 million Pesos provided as national calamity funding in the
General Appropriation Act of 2003 (JICA, 2004).
22. Calculated based on the information provided by JICA, 2004, which originally refer to
Department of Budget and Management Regional Office, National Capital Region
DPM 23. Term describing the money lending system used by people in Metropolitan Manila. The term
is derived for the concept that borrowing 5 pesos will be increased to 6 pesos when returning,
17,4 which is a 20 percent interest rate. The term of loan is usually 1 month.
24. This is another money lending system that is usually operated by Indian investors who are
called “Bombay” (old name of India’s capital Mumbai). Bombays travel by motorcycle and
are easily recognizable throughout the region. They collect payments in small amounts. For
example, if they lend 100 pesos, they will collect 20 pesos each time, yet more than 5 times.
468 Therefore at the end, money borrowers pay back much more than they have borrowed.
People perceive the numbers of Bombay are decreasing recently.
25. Cooperatives are self help organizations with several mandates that include credits,
agriculture sector, marketing, services, etc. This organization is usually run by some
neighborhood residents; their activities are not limited to their region but extend to near
neighborhoods.
26. Barangay leaders include Barangay chairman, Kagawads and Tanods. Barangay Chairman
is the equivalent of the City Mayor as chief executive of his barangay. There are usually
seven Kagawads and they are the members of the Barangay Council. Tanods are responsible
for the Barangay security.
27. Puroks are the quasi-official administrative body that exists under Barangays. Puroks are
usually seen in the suburban areas, as this body significantly existed in rural areas of the
Philippines.

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impact
About the authors mitigation
Kanako Iuchi is a PhD student at University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. Prior to joining
UIUC, she was a master’s student in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell
University. Before embarking on graduate studies, Ms. Iuchi worked in a consulting firm for a 469
decade, gaining field experiences and insights of Japanese-funded projects overseas. Her
interests include disaster management and improving plight of the urban poor upon disaster in
developing countries. He is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: kiuchi2@uiuc.edu
Ann-Margaret Esnard is an Associate Professor and Director of the Visual Planning
Technology Lab at Florida Atlantic University. Prior to joining FAU, she was a faculty member
in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University. Dr. Esnard’s expertise
encompasses GIS/spatial analysis, vulnerability assessment, land use planning, and disaster
planning.

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