SCA (Melo) 2014 Digests

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (MELO)
TABLE OF CONTENTS RULE 62 - INTERPLEADER RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF RULE 64 REVIEW OF COMELEC/COA JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS RULE 65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS CERTIORARI: PROHIBITION: MANDAMUS: RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO RULE 67 EXPROPRIATION RULE 68 FORECLOSURE RULE 69 PARTITION RULE 70 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER RULE 71 CONTEMPT RULE 62 - INTERPLEADER 1 4 12 14 14 28 35 45 48 57 62 66 78 1.
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OCAMPO V. TIRONA, G.R. NO. 147382, 6 APRIL 2005
Facts: Leonora Tirona was a lessee of the land that Leonardo Ocampo owned. But, the former invoked her right of first refusal and, in relation thereto, temporarily stopped paying her monthly rentals when the subject land was declared under area for priority development. Ocampo then demanded Tirona to pay his rentals in arrears, but the latter refused to pay. This led Ocampo to file a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona in the MTC. Tirona countered that Ocampo did not own the subject land and that he was entitled to exercise his right of first refusal pursuant in case of the sale of the land, under PD Nos. 1517, 1893, and 1968. MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Ocampo. CA, however, set aside these decisions. Hence, this petition. Pertinently, Tirona claimed for the first time before RTC that she had been paying her rentals to a certain Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, who had allegedly inherited the said land. In light of the deeds of conveyance and waiver executed by Mendiolas brother, Tirona could not legally acquire the said land. Mendiola is Tironas lessor, and is the only person who can file an ejectment suit against Tirona. Issue: Whether Ocampo had a right to file an ejectment suit against Tirona Held: YES. All the elements for an unlawful detainer suit are present in the instant case. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. Petition granted. 2. WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB V. WON, 70 SCRA 165 (1976)
Facts: Defendants separately claim to be the lawful owners of membership fee certificates issued by the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club. Defendant Lee Won claims its ownership stemming from a decision rendered in an earlier civil case. Meanwhile, defendant Bienvenido Tan claims the certificates from assignment made by Swan, Culbertson, and Fritz in his favor. In sum therefore, the plaintiff club prays that the CFI order the defendants to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims. In separate motions, however, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of res judicata, failure to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. Consequently, the trial court ruled against the club. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the club was diligent in invoking the remedy of interpleader
COMPILED FROM 2011 KAW, MAWIS & SULIT DIGESTS + 2014A DIGESTS (RULE 65)

Held: NO. Undoubtedly, the subject matter in the instant case is proper for an interpleader suit. It must be noted, however, that a stakeholder should use reasonable diligencethat is, by filing the interpleader suit within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so because, once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant, he becomes liable to the latter. In the instant case, the club was not so diligent because it had been aware of the defendants conflicting claims long before its filing of the interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation, the earlier civil case, and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is not therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader. To permit the club to bring Lee to court after the latters successful esta blishment of his rights in the earlier civil case would increase the suits, instead of diminishing them as is the goal of filing an interpleader suit. Petition denied 3. RAMOS V. RAMOS, 399 SCRA 43(2003)
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ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property. As such, the complaint was brought against the deceased registered co-owners, as represented by their respective estates. Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as the heirs of one of the co-owners. They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or administrator. Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made parties. Petition denied. 4. BELTRAN V. PEOPLES HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORP., 29 SCRA 145 (1969)
Facts: Plaintiffs leased their respective housing units at Project 4 from defendant PHHC. The latter ensured the former that they would be entitled to purchase their units after five years of continuous occupancy. Eventually, PHHC announced to its tenants that Project 4s administration, management, and ownership would be transferred to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). It also (1) asked the tenants to signify their conformity in still buying the said units at the selling price so indicated and (2) instructed the Project Housing Manager to accept as installments on the selling price the payments made by the tenants. Pursuant to the PHHC-GSIS Agreement, PHHC delivered installment payments to the GSIS. But while PHHC turned over its properties in GSISs favor, the former refused to recognize the agreements and undertakings previously entered with the latter. Meanwhile, GSIS asserted its legal rights, which the Government Corporate Counsel and Department of Justice upheld. These being said, plaintiffs claimed to have been inconvenienced enough to not know anymore to whom they should pay their amortizations. They then filed the corresponding interpleader suit before the trial court. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit. It furthered that GSIS had agreed that the subject payments be made to PHHC. There then is no dispute as to whom the residents should pay. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint Held: YES. An action for interpleader requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in- interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration, and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. Trial courts order affirmed. 5. MESINA V. IAC, 145 SCRA 497 (1986)
Facts: Petitioners father, aunt, and uncles co-owned a parcel of land. By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the co- owners in the aunts favor, her daughter (petitioners cousin) sold to the respondents the said land. Because of the conflict amongst the heirs of the co-owners, respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims. The RTC upheld the sale, insofar as the aunts share was concerned. It ruled that the cousin had no authority to sell the other co-owners shares since the SPA was executed in her mothers favor only. The CA modified the RTCs ruling. It held that, while the cousin did not hold the requisite SPA, the sale she had conducted was nevertheless valid because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters sub-agent. Consequently, petitioners filed a motion to set aside the CAs decision. According to them, they had not been served a copy of the summons, as well as impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC. CA, however, denied this motion. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether petitioners should have been impleaded in the instant case Held: NO. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. The complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in question. Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the
Facts: Private respondent Jose Go purchased from the Associated Bank a cashiers check, which he accidentally left on top of the bank managers desk. The bank manager then entrusted the said check to a certain Albert Uy, who, at that time, had a certain Alexander Lim as his visitor. Uy, however, had to answer a phone call from somewhere. When he got back, Lim had already gone. When Go inquired about his check, Uy couldnt find the same anymore. Go then accomplished the

corresponding stop payment order, while Uy reported the loss to the police station. The police records show that Associated Bank has received the lost check for clearing. While it had dishonored the check pursuant to the stop payment order, it received from an Atty. Navarro a demand letter on the subject check in favor of his client. Navarro refused to name his client. Unsure of what to do, the bank filed an action for interpleader naming Go and one John Doe, Navarros client, as respondents. It then amended its complaint, substituting petitioner Mesina for John Doe. Mesina allegedly obtained a check from a transaction with Lim. In the interpleader case, the trial court ruled in favor of the bank. It eventually ordered the bank to replace the check in Gos favor. IAC dismissed Mesinas petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether there exists conflicting claims in the instant case as to necessitate the remedy of interpleader Held: YES. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by the bank because Mesina and Go were both laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking payment thereon and Go as the purchaser or owner. Mesinas allegation that bank had effectively relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for interpleader was belied by the willingness of the bank to issue a certificate of time deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's check in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever wig be found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the parties' respective rights and titles thereto. IACs orders affirmed. 6. VDA DE CAMILO V. ARCAMO 3 PHIL 146 Issue: Whether plaintiffs claim should be upheld
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Held: NO. The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective claim was separate and distinct from the other. Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her property which was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true that Kee and Ong did not have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist. Appealed decision affirmed. 7. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORP V. TANJUATCO, 27 SCRA 401 (1969)
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement where the latter would construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park. Plaintiff inquired from defendants suppliers the necessary materials. C oncrete Aggregates, Inc. a supplier, made a claim on a certain amount allegedly owed by defendant. With defendants consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him. But in view of defendants subsequent failure to settle his issue with the supplier, plaintiff instituted an action for interpleader against the defendant and the supplier, before CFI. Defendant moved to have the case dismissed on the ground that CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the amount involved being less than P10,000. Consequently, the lower court dismissed the case. Plaintiff now claims that the subject matter is not the amount in dispute, but the right to compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect to one liability."
Facts: Petitioner Camilo had been in peaceful, open, and adverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land. Private respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the apartments of the commercial building erected on the said land. The commercial buildings burned down. Kee and private respondent Adelia Ong then built and occupied a building of their own. The same encroached, however, on areas of the land previously occupied by the petitioners. Camilo then filed the corresponding complaint for forcible entry against the respondents before the Justice of the Peace. The respondents claimed that the land they occupied was leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas. Pending the trial of these cases, respondents filed an action for interpleader against the petitioners. They alleged that the filing of the three cases of forcible entry had conflicting interests, since the petitioners claimed to be entitled to the possession of the lot in question and they (Kee and Ong) could not determine without hazard to themselves who of defendants was entitled to the possession. The Justice gave due course to the interpleader suit. The CFI, however, ruled that the Justice did not have jurisdiction over this suit. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the Justice had jurisdiction to take cognizance over the instant interpleader case
Held: NO. Plaintiff relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts. Appealed order affirmed. 8. Facts: RCBC V. METRO CONTAINER CORP., G.R. NO. 127913, 13 SEPT. 2001

Ley Construction Corp. (Leycon) obtained a loan from petitioner RCBC, secured by a real estate mortgage. Leycon failed to settle its obligations, prompting RCBC to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against it. Leycon filed an action for nullification of extrajudicial foreclosure sale and damages against RCBC before RTC. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its ownership over the property because of Leycons failure to redeem it within 12 months. Because of this, RCBC demanded rental payments from respondent Metro Container Corporation (Metrocan), which was leasing the property from Leycon. Metrocan then filed an action for interpleader against RCBC and Leycon. This was to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. The trial court dismissed the case insofar as Metrocan and Leycon were concerned. The MeTC ordered Metrocan to pay Leycon whatever rentals may be due to the latter. Both parties appealed to the CA. Insofar as RCBC is concerned, its motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the filing of the action for interpleader was proper, even when the MeTC resolved to have Leycon pay its rentals to Metrocan Held: NO. An action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. The MeTCs resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned. Petition denied. RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF 1.
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ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC. V. REPUBLIC, 190 SCRA 782 (1990)
Facts: RA No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, maintain and operate 10 radio broadcasting stations all over the country. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to provide adequate public service which enabled the government to reach the population on important public issues, and assist the government in programs relating to public information and education. Section 10 of RA 3001 provides that petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the public interest so requires." PD 576-A was eventually passed, providing that no person or corporation may own, operate, or manage more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city; nor more than five AM and FM radio stations; nor more than five television channels in the entire country, and no radio or television station shall be utilized by any single-interest group to disseminate information or otherwise influence the public or the government to serve or support the ends of such group. It must divest itself of the excess stations or channels. Any excess station shall be sold through the Board of Communications. A person or corporation shall make such divestiture within one year from the discovery of the offense. Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner under RA 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked effective December 31, 1981. Thus, petitioner is left with only three radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City. Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. Issue: Whether there exists a controversy between ABC and the government by virtue of the law Held: NO. The SC ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the SC even if only questions of law are involved. Such an action should be brought before the RTC and not before the SC. Further, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be nullified. ABC does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under PD. 576- A. ABC does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said PD. There is, likewise, no DIRECT allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to PD 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein ABC has asserted its rights. All that ABC seeks is the nullification of PD 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under RA 3001. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants. The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. Petitioner did not allege that it challenged the constitutionality of the decree at any time since it took effect on December 31, 1981. It does not appear that petitioner's compliance was made under protest. In view of its acquiescence with Presidential Decree No. 576-A, the petitioner is now estopped from challenging the same under the principle of estoppel that "one who sleeps on his rights shall not be heard to complain." The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest. Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast license which is about to be denied under Presidential Decree No.

576-A. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of an application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of the restrictions imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is premature. Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise. Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and cannot be secured through a writ of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It cannot correct an act that is a fait accompli. 2. SALVACION V CENTRAL BANK, 278 SCRA 27 (1997)
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Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214. The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like the accused. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by the accused for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. 3. TOLENTINO V. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY 90 PHIL 83 (1951)
Facts: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, a minor, to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Bartelli detained and raped Salvacion. After policemen and people living nearby rescued Salvacion, Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli a Dollar Check, a COCOBANK Bank Book, a Dollar Account China Banking Corp., Philippine Money (P234.00) cash, door keys, and a teddy used in seducing the complainant. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1M. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? (2) May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Held: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. SC ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil
Facts: Defendants Ferguson and Hausamann, Swiss accountants, applied for the renewal of Fleming & Williamson, an accounting firms old trade name that had been sold to various parties, as their trade name. Relating to this, plaintiff Tolentino, a certified public accountant, questions the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 342, otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy Law. This law authorizes accountants to practice their profession under a trade name. According to Tolentino, it is unconstitutional because it is class legislation. By its very terms, it excludes persons engaged in other professions from adopting, acquiring, or using a trade name in connection with the practice of such professions. Meanwhile, the defendants counter that neither is there class legislation nor violation of the equal protection of laws by the assailed law. They further that Tolentino has no right or interest adversely affected by this law and may use a trade name or firm name in the practice of his profession as accountant. Issue: Whether Tolentino has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of the Philippine Accountancy Law Held: NO. An action for declaratory relief may be entertained, provided the following are present: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy, (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse, (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

In the instant case, Tolentinos main objection centers on the exclusive character of the law, which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions, who are not parties to the case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff has no actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants that gives him the right to seek declaratory relief. Appealed decision affirmed. 4. PACU V. SEC. OF EDUC., 97 PHIL 806 (1955)
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fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain" and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. This only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school. Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedings not to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. There has been no undue delegation of legislative power. In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it. Another grievance of petitionersprobably the most significantis the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74. Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right the right to open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaper both constitutional privilegeshave been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere feeand not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance. Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off- hand be said that the latter must yield to the formerconflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced. However, no justiciable controversy has been presented. The court is not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
Facts: The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: i. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; ii. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and iii. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned. Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. This is because in March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the local educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations. Issue: Whether there is a justiciable controversy Held: NO. It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the legislature has not

Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the National Board of Education created by RA No. 1124. This petition for prohibition will be denied. 5. CUTARAN V. DENR, 350 SCRA 697 (2001)
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rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well- defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. The petitioners allegation that certain documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice it to say that by the petitioners own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of Carantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at some future time. If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners possession thereof even without prior approval by the DENR of the claim of the heirs of Carantes, the case is simply one for forcible entry. 6. CALTEX V. PALOMAR, 18 SCRA 247
Facts: The Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order No. 31 entitled, Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region. The special task force created was authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims within the said area, and after due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim) in accordance with existing laws. Eventually, the Secretary of the DENR issued Speci al Order no. 25 entitled, Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide and Department Administrative Order no. 02, containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25. On the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. Three years after, the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the assailed administrative issuances the Heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an application for certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the petitioners. Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners. Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the improvements they introduced within the area they actually occupy and if not f or the petitioners timely resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would have been totally evicted therefrom. Hence, this petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing the assailed administrative issuances and from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said administrative issuances are void for lack of legal basis. Issue: Whether there is a justiciable controversy Held: NO. There is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground. The alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners asserted right to possess the land by reason of the implementation of the questioned administrative issuances. A justiciable controversy has been defined as a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a
Facts: Caltex conceived a promotional scheme Caltex Hooded Pump Contest calculated to drum up patronage for its products, calling for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid. Neither a purchase of Caltex products is required. Entry forms were available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can was provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst the mediator publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, in view of sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. In its letter to the Postmaster General, Caltex justified its position that it did not violate the anti- lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General Enrico Palomar opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law and, thus, inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein Held: NO. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. For, construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to

the substance, in order to unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent or prohibit. Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise, on the other hand, is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Further, consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the gift enterprise therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. In the present case, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance. 7. MIRANDO V. WELLINGTON TY, 81 SCRA 506 Whether the complaint has a sufficient cause of action
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Held: In the absence of proof of defect in the acquisition by Carmen Planas of, or proof of infirmity in her title to, the lots occupied by petitioners-appellants, the validity of the contract of sale executed between the administrator of her estate and the respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc cannot be questioned. The fact that the applications of the petitioners-appellants to buy these parcels of land from the national government, thru the Board of Liquidators, had not been given due course by the latter no doubt shows that, the national government reserved these lots for its own use with no intention to subdivide them into convenient-sized lots to be awarded to bona fide occupants. That petitioners-appellants paid nominal fees for the use of the lots is of little consequence, in the absence of positive proof that the fees were in consideration of any claim of priority rights. In fact, unrebutted testimony was presented appellants were considered squatters, not as bona fide occupants by the Board of Liquidators to the effect that petitioners occupants thereon. Their use and occupation of the land was merely tolerated by the national government, and could not have vested in them any claim, right, or adverse interest in such government property. Under the Rules of Court, declaratory relief is an action which any person interested under a deed will, contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. Petitioners-appellants brought this action with a claim that they were deprived of their preferential right to buy the disputed lots by virtue of a contract of sale involving said lots executed between the administrator of the estate of the late Carmen Planas and respondent Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. But it is evident from the records that from the date of their relocation to the disputed lots in 1950 to the date of the filing of this petition for declaratory relief, at no time did the petitioners-appellants acquire any interest whatsoever in the parcels of land subject of the aforementioned contract of sale. They enjoyed no rights which were violated, or at the least, affected by the exchange of properties between the national government and the late Carmen Planas, and eventually, by the above contract of sale between the administrator of the estate of Carmen Planas and the respondent- appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justifiable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. All these requisite facts are not present; the complaint must, therefore, fail for lack of sufficient cause of action. 8. DELUMEN V. REP., 94 PHIL 287
Facts: Shortly after the liberation of Manila from the Japanese Imperial Army, petitioners occupied and lived in the premises of Arellano University at Legarda St., Manila, from 1945 to 1950. To solve the problem posed by the squatters to public health and sanitation in general and to meet the needs of the University for its premises in particular, the Manila City Mayor secured the approval of the Quezon City Mayor to relocate the squatters in the latters city. These lots were formerly owned by a Japanese man named Arata Tuitsue. Because he was an enemy alien, the Phil. Alien Property Custodian and later its successor, the Phil. Board of Liquidators, took possession of these lots. During their occupancy of the lots in question, petitioners constructed their respective houses thereon and were charged nominal rentals by the respondent Phil. Board of Liquidators. They also filed their respective applications with the Board through the Office of the President for the sale of the lots to them. Sometime in 1953 the Phil. Board of Liquidators with the approval of the President of the Philippines, bartered the two parcels of land in dispute with another piece of land owned by the late Carmen Planas. On Dec. 8, 1964, the administrator of the estate of the late Carmen Planas sold the lots in question to private respondents, Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. The case was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds of Q.C. in the name of private respondents. Soon thereafter, the private respondents made demands upon the petitioners to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises. Petitioners refused, claiming that they had preferential rights to the property. Private respondents reacted by filing an ejectment proceeding in the City Court of Q.C. Hence, petitioners-appellants filed a petition entitled Declaratory Relief for Cancellation of Title and/or Reconveyance with Preliminary Injunction, claiming inter alia, (a) that they are the bona fide occupants of the lots in question, having, constructed thereon their respective resident substantial houses and (b) that through the fraud and misrepresentation of the respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros, Inc., in collusion with the Phil. Board of Liquidators, they were deprived of their preferential right to purchase said lots from the latter. The petition below sought the cancellation of the title of Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc., the reconveyance of the disputed lots in their favor and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against further proceedings in the ejectment case filed by respondent- appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. against the petitioners- appellants. Issue:
Facts: Antonio, Juan and Julito Delumen filed a petition alleging that they are legitimate children of Pacencia Pua, a Filipino woman, and Mariano Delumen who was declared a Filipino citizen and praying said court to determine whether they are Filipino citizens and to declare their corresponding rights and duties. It is further alleged that the petitioners have continuously resided in the Philippines since their birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos, had exercised the right to vote in the general elections. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an answer alleging that the petition states no cause of action, there being no adverse party against whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controversy. CFI declared the appellees to be Filipinos by birth and blood. From this decision the Solicitor General has appealed. Issue: Whether the petition states a cause of action Held: In the Tolentino case, it was held that a petition for declaratory relief must be predicated on the following

requisites: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. While the Solicitor General contends that the justiciable controversy is one involving " an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue," and that in the present case "no specific person was mentioned in the petition as having or claiming an adverse interest in the matter and with whom the appellees have an actual controversy," the appellees argue that, by virtue of the answer filed by the Solicitor General opposing the petition for declaratory relief, a justiciable controversy thereby arose. The appellant's contention is tenable, since there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleged status of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in any instance been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority. Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered themselves and were considered by their friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the elections of 1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions their citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say, as appellees do, that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicitor General of an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of action must be made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, without the aid of the answer. The answer herein alleges that the petition states no cause of action. In essence, the appellees merely wanted to remove all doubts in their minds as to their citizenship, but an action for declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstract or theoretical question, or decide claims which are uncertain or hypothetical. And the fact that the appellees' desires are thwarted by their "own doubts, or by fears of others does not confer a cause of action." 9. LIM V. REPUBLIC 37 S 783 Appealed decision reversed. 10. DE LA LLANA V. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525
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Facts: The subject of controversy in this case is the question submitted to the people in the December 1977 referendum. It reads, Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution? Alleging that the question and the holding of a referendum indirectly amend Amendment No. 3, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition or declaratory relief.
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Issue: Whether the holding of a referendum and the question so submitted indirectly amend Amendment No. 3, the act of which is unconstitutional Held: NO. If the people vote "yes," Amendment No. 3 will merely be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote "no," the incumbent President, heeding "the will" of the people, will - as he has categorically announced - resign; in such situation, he will be merely exercising the prerogative, inherent in all public officials, to resign. In either case the Constitution, as it now reads, will remain unaltered. Amendment No. 3: The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution. The call for the referendum is explicitly authorized by Amendment No. 7 of the Constitution which in part provides that "Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest." If, pursuant to this grant of power, the President decides, as he has decided, to consult with the people and submit himself to a vote of confidence in a referendum because he deems it important to do so, he cannot be constitutionally faulted. Petition dismissed. Barredo separate opinion: There is no violation of the procedure for constitutional amendment, particularly when it is considered that the motivation is precisely to ascertain with more definiteness the true will of the people on the specific question on whether President Marcos should be the prime minister of the Batasang Pambansa. Teehankee dissent: Such referendums which concededly are "purely consultative" and cannot abrogate nor amend the Constitution are not provided for nor authorized by the 1973 Constitution and that "the referendum power of the people" as it is known in law and usage" is a negative power through which appeal may be taken directly to the people from an affirmative action taken by their representatives." I held therein that "prescinding from the question of whether it is subject to judicial review and determination, the termination of martial law is not a matter of choice for the people (who much less than the courts can have 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards' nor 'the complete picture of the emergency' to make the determination) but a matter of the President's constitutional duty to determine and declare the
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Facts: Petitioner Felisa Lim is a former Philippine citizen who has acquired her Chinese citizenship by marrying a Chinese. In this case, she intends to reacquire her Philippine citizenship and to renounce all allegiance and fidelity to China. Despite the Philippine governments (Republic) opposition, the lower court declared that Lim may be so repatriated. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, now raises that the lower court has erred in declaring Lim a repatriated citizen since, among other things, she has not duly established either the nationality of her alleged father or her alleged relation with him. Issue: Whether it was proper for Lim to be repatriated as a Philippine citizen Held: NO. The procedure for the repatriation of a female citizen of the Philippines, who has lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien, is as simple as it can possibly be. All that is required of her, upon termination of her marital status, is for her to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register said oath in the proper civil registry. It is also apparent that Lims objective is to settle her political status prior to marriage. As a consequence, her petition is, in effect, one for a declaratory relief, which, the Court has repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natural persons. Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action that may lie only when any person, interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights affected by statute or ordinance, demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration. Also, there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.
Amendment No. 3: The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.

termination of martial law when the necessity therefor has ceased. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration." Munoz Palma dissent: The necessity for holding the referendum is to my mind a justiciable question and can be inquired into by the Court as it involves the use of public funds, a power granted under the Constitution to the legislative branch of the Government, it is true, but one that is subject to certain limitations so that the matter of whether the power has been transgressed or abused or whether the appropriation of public funds for the purpose indicated is within the authority granted by the law or the Constitution is within the competence of the Court to inquire into and resolve. Santos concurring opinion: The forthcoming referendum is a milestone in the nations continuing search for a truly free and democratic mechanism to ascertain the peoples will on vital issues that concern them. 11. OLLADA V. CENTRAL BANK 5 SCRA 297
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Petitioners allege that: o Mr. Juan Echiverri, as President of the Ilocos Norte Federation of Facomas, failed miserably to protect the virginia tobacco producers in failing to register their objections against the said importations. o That the Barter Permit was issued in violation of the laws o That the certificates issued by the ACCFA and/or the BIR were false because we have surplusage of indigenous production of Virginia type leaf tobacco in the Philippines, Respondents filed their joint answer denying all the material allegations of the petition. As special defenses, they claim o that the petition states no cause of action against o that the petition is improper because there is no justiciable controversy and there is no violation of law. ISSUE W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper? HELD 1. NOT PROPER a. Sec. 2 of Rule 66, reads as follows: i. SEC. 2. A contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof. b. If an action for declaratory relief were to be allowed in this case, after a breach of the statute, the decision of the court in the action for declaratory relief would prejudge the action for violation of the barter law. i. It will violate the rule on multiplicity of suits. c. If the case at bar were allowed for a declaratory relief, another action would still lie against the importer respondent for violation of the barter law. i. So, instead of one case only, two cases will be allowed, one being the present action for declaratory relief and a subsequent one for the confiscation of the importations as a consequence of the breach of the barter law. d. Whereas the case at bar was purported to bring about a simple declaration of the rights of the parties to the action, the judgment goes further than said declaration and decrees that the importation by the respondent corporation violates the law, and further directs that legal importation be confiscated under the provisions the law. i. This confiscation directed by the court lies clearly beyond the scope and nature of an action for declaratory relief, as the judgment of confiscation goes beyond the issues expressly raised, and to that extent it is null and void. e. The proper remedy under the circumstances was an action for injunction As of this date, the permit had expired two years before, and all the shipments under the permit had already been delivered to the consignee and used in the manufacture of tobacco. f. The issues have become moot and academic and the court can do no other than declare the action to be so and of no practical use or value. 13. EDADES V EDADES 99 PHIL 675
Facts: Respondent Central Banks Import-Export Department required its certified public accountants (CPAs) to submit to an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations with its office. Petitioner Ollada, one of respondents CPAs whose previous accreditation has been nullified, assails this accreditation requirement on the ground that it is (1) an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (2) in excess of respondents powers, and (3) unconstitutional in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of ones trade. He then filed a petition for declaratory relief in behalf of numerous other CPAs before CFI Manila. Respondent counters that it has the responsibility of administering the Monetary Banking System of the Republic. It is thus authorized to prepare and issue, through its Monetary Board, rules and regulations to make effective the discharge of such responsibility. Also, its purpose in requiring the accreditation is not to regulate the practice of accountancy in the Philippines, but only the manner in which certified public accountants should transact business with respondent. CFI dismissed the complaint; hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the case was properly dismissed Held: YES. The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute, or right has been breached or violated. In the present case, such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by Ollada, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injuryall these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. The rule is that an action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding. Appealed decision affirmed. 12. SARMIENTO V. CAPAPAS GR L-15509, 31 MARCH 1962
FACTS: Virginia Type Leaf Tobacco were imported by the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation (PTFRC) under a Barter Permit Petitioners initially filed an injunction against the Collector and Commissioner of Customs to prohibit them from releasing the importations but the petitioners filed a motion to be permitted to file new petition for declaratory relief instead.
FACTS Plaintiff brought this action before CFI of Pangasinan seeking a declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged father and the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades. In his complaint, he alleges o That he is an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades o that as such illegitimate child he is entitled to share in the inheritance of his father under the law; o that as the legitimate children of his father will deny, as in fact they have denied his right to inherit, and such denial may ripen into a costly litigation, he brought the present action for the determination of his hereditary rights.
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ISSUE W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper? HELD 1. As for the judgment on his hereditary rights, an action for declaratory relief is not proper. But as to the recognition of his status as an illegitimate child, an action for declaratory relief is proper. a. Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance in order to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder. Moreover, the action should be predicated on the following conditions: i. there must be a justiciable controversy; ii. the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; iii. the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; iv. the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination. b. The present case (hereditary rights issue) does not come within the purview of the law authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is involved. c. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of inheritance against the Defendants as basis of the relief have not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father Emigdio Edades has not yet died. i. The law is clear that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent ii. Up to that moment, the right to succession is merely speculative But as to the complainants prayer wherein he asks that he be recognize as an illegitimate child with right to inherit. 2. It is true that there is no express provision in the new Civil Code which prescribe the step that may be taken to establish such status 3. But this silence notwithstanding, we declare that a similar action may be brought under similar circumstances considering that an illegitimate child other than natural is now given successional rights and there is need to establish his status before such rights can be asserted and enforced. 4. We hold that the present action may be maintained in the light of the view herein expressed. 5. DEGALA V. REYES 87 PHIL 649 iii.
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the rights of persons not parties to the action." The non-joinder of necessary parties would deprive the declaration of that final and pacifying function it is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue And the absence of a defendant with such adverse interest is a jurisdictional defect, and no declaratory judgment can be rendered" But the Roman Catholic Church, or its legal representative was not included as party defendant in the present case. 6. BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION V. CITY COUNCIL (121 SCRA 368)
iv. v.
Facts: In this petition for declaratory relief, what is involved is the validity of Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of Baguio City o it was an ordinance considering all squatters who are duly registered as bona fide occupants of their respective lots The petition for declaratory relief prays for a judgment declaring the Ordinance as invalid and illegal ab initio. The petition was dismissed on several grounds: o those who come within the protection of the ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and it has been held that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect; and o the court is clothed with discretion to refuse to make any declaration where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances, e.g. where the declaration would be of no practical help in ending the controversy or would not stabilize the disputed legal relation Hence, the instant appeal ISSUE W/N the non-inclusion of the squatters as party defendants is a jurisdictional defect? HELD The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the CFI of Baguio. i. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which says that the non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. ii. Said section merely states that "All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action." iii. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that "the Court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances." iv. the reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the Identical issue. v. In the case at bar, although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question. vi. Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would be binding upon the squatters. vii. A different situation obtains in the case of Degala v. Reyes i. The Degala case involves the validity of the trust created in the will of the testator. ii. In the said case, the Roman Catholic Church which was a necessary party, being the one which would be most vitally affected by the
Facts: CFI of Ilocos ordered the probating of a will executed by the late Placida Mina o The provisions in the will left certain properties of the testatrix for the maintenance and repair of the churches During the pendency of the appeal from such order, Santiago Degala, alleging that he is one of the legal heirs of said Placida Mina, filed a petition praying that the provisions of said will be declared null and void because there is no cestui que named therein, under Rule 66 on Declaratory judgment. The only persons who were made party defendants in the petition for declaratory judgment are Cecilia Reyes, petitioner for the probate of the will Valentin Umipig, special administrator of the estate of the deceased Leona Leones and Cipriana Alcantara named as trustees under the will. ISSUE W/N the Romantic Catholic Church should be made parties to the case? HELD 1. YES, they should be made parties to the case. i. The Roman Catholic Church or its legal representative the Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia, has interest in defending the validity of the trust created in the will and its interest would be affected by the declaration of nullity of the trust. ii. Section 3, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court provides that "when declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice
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declaration of the nullity of the will was not brought in as party. The Court therefore, refused to make any declaratory judgment on ground of jurisdictional defect, for there can be no final judgment that could be rendered and the Roman Catholic not being bound by such judgment might raise the Identical issue, making therefore the declaration a mere exercise in futility. h. This is not true in the instant case. i. A declaration on the nullity of the ordinance, would give the squatters no right which they are entitled to protect. ii. The party most interested to sustain and defend the legality of the Ordinance is the body that passed it, the City Council, and together with the City Mayor, is already a party in these proceedings. library iii. RULE 64 REVIEW OF COMELEC/COA JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS 1. ARATUC V. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
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Facts: Petitioners, independent candidates for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa, sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent Regional Board of Canvassers. Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended. But after the supervening panel headed by the Commissioner of Elections presented its report, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. Despite the petitioners protests, the Court allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued the guidelines to be observed therein. The Board then culminated its canvassing and released the results thereof. Petitioners then brought this resolution to the Comelec. The latter, however declared a final result that petitioners still had to assail. The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the following specifications: 1. In not pursuing further the examination of the registration and voting records from other voting centers after it found proof of massive substitute voting in all of the said records; 2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of voters and voting records could not be recovered by the Commission in spite of its repeated efforts to retrieve said records; 3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a very high percentage of voting and in not considering that high percentage of voting, coupled with massive substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing of election returns; 4. In denying petitioners petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from voting centers whose records are not available for examination to determine whether there had been voting in said voting centers; 5. In not identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and especially those that were found to be empty while they were shipped to Manila pursuant to Comelecs directive in accordance with the Courts guidelines; 6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of examination of the voting and registration records show that some of the voters thumbprints in CE Form 5 did not correspond with theirs as shown in CE Form 1; 7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the voting centers, municipal treasurers, and other election officials in the voting centers where irregularities had been committed and not giving credence to the affidavits of watchers of petitioners; and 8. In not including among those questioned before the Board by petitioners those included among the returns questioned by them. Meanwhile, the Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions invoked the Courts certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate autho rity of review. Issue: Whether the petitions should be given due course Held: NO. A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness. Under the existing constitutional and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over
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orders, rulings, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Petition dismissed. 2. AMBIL, JR. V. COMELEC, 344 SCRA 358 official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial NAMFREL quick count.
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Comelec, through the Solicitor General, now contends that: 1. The petition is moot and academic, the elections having been held and done with. 2. ABS-CBN failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to its present petition. Issue: Whether Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the restraining order enjoining ABS-CBN or any other group from conducting the exit polls Held: YES. The petition is not totally moot. The cases implications on the peoples freedom of expression transcend the past election. To set aside the resolution of the instant issue would only postpone the task that could well crop up again in future elections. Also, the failure to exhaust all administrative remedies should also be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice (1) when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, (2) when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or (3) when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. Petition granted. 4. REPOL V. COMELEC - 428 SCRA 321 [2004]
Facts: Petitioner Ambil and private respondent Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor of the Eastern Samar province. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ambil as the duly elected governor. Ramirez filed with the Comelec an election protest, challenging the results in some precints. The case was assigned to Comelec First Division. Commissioner Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution of the case, but later on retired from service. Ambil and Ramirez received a copy of the proposed resolution, which ruled in favor of the latter. Comelec First Division later said, however, that this resolution was a useless scrap of paper that should be ignored by the parties involved. Comelec First Division issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case. Ambil, however, filed a motion to cancel the promulgation, challenging the Guiani resolution. Acting on this motion, Comelec First Division postponed the promulgation until the matter would be resolved. Without waiting for the promulgation, Ambil filed the instant petition seeking to annul the promulgation of the Guiani resolution. It then prayed that Comelec First Division deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate its decision thereon. Meanwhile, Ramirez claims that the Guiani resolution is no longer valid in light of his retirement; thus, Comelec First Divisions should elevate the protest case to Comelec en banc until resolved with finality. Issue: Whether Comelec First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution, acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Held: NO. Ambils petition was prematurely filed. A decision, ruling, or order of a Comelec division must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before it may be brought to the SC on certiorari. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions2 to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to Comelec en banc, whose decision is reviewable by certiorari before the SC. The Kho ruling likewise does not apply in the instant case. In Kho, the SC held that Comelec had committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it. The aggrieved partys remedy then is not to refer the controversy to Comelec en banc, but to elevate it to the SC on certiorari. Unlike in the instant case, the Comelec division in Kho admitted respondents answer with counter- protest after the period to file the same had expired. Insofar as the Guiani resolution was concerned, the SC held it to be void because, among other reasons, it had not yet been promulgated; thus, it had not yet attained finality. It should have been signed first by a majority of the members of the division and duly promulgated. Petition denied. 3. ABS-CBN V. COMELEC (360 PHIL 780[2000])G.R. NO. 133486. JANUARY 28, 2000
Facts: Repol and private respondent Ceracas were candidates for the position of Municipal Mayor of Pangasinan. Ceracas was proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Repol filed an election protest before the RTC. Claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the elections of certain precints, Repol prayed for the revision of the ballots in the same. The RTC judge dismissed the complaint but, upon certiorari, the Comelec First Division reversed the order and reinstated Repols election protest. Meanwhile, the Comelec en banc affirmed in toto the Comelec First Divisions decision. This time around, the trial court declared Ceracas proclamation void and held that Repol was the duly elected mayor. Pursuant to this, Repol filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the same. Meanwhile, Ceracas (1) appealed the trial courts judgment in Comelec and (2) filed before the trial court an omnibus motion to reconsider, set aside, and quash the writ of execution. But during the pendency of these actions, Ceracas filed with the Comelec a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order, assailing the issuance of the said writ. In its assailed order, the Comelec First Division held that the parties maintain the status quo ante. Therefore, effective immediately, Repol was ordered to cease and desist from assuming his duties as the municipal mayor, until further orders from the Comelec. Hence, this petition. Repol now argues that the Comelec First Division has acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the status quo ante order, which has indefinitely suspended and effectively nullified the trial courts writ of execution. Issue: Whether Comelec is empowered under any law to issue a status quo ante in effect overturning the effective enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the trial court Held:
Facts: Comelec en banc issued a resolution prohibiting petitioner ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys, the results of which to be immediately broadcasted. According to Comelec, the results might conflict with the
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NO. Any motion to reconsider a decision or ruling of a division shall be resolved by the Comelec en banc, except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. In the instant case, since the Comelec First Division issued an interlocutory order, the same Comelec First Division should resolve Repols motion for reconsideration of the order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the Comelec en banc nor to elevate the issue to the SC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The present case is not one of the cases specifically provided under the Comelec Rules of Procedure in which the Comelec may sit en banc. Neither is this case one where a division is not authorized to act nor a case where the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the issue to the Comelec en banc. Thus, the Comelec en bancis not even the proper forum where Repol may bring the assailed interlocutory Order for resolution. The circumstances of the instant case justify, however, the propriety of assailing the order through certiorari. This issue is not mooted even if the next elections are just a few weeks away. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In the instant case, the Comelec First Divisions status quo ante order, which actually took the form of a temporary restraining order as prescribed by the Comelec rules and regulations, violated the rule that the said order only had a lifespan of 20 days. Also, the granting of the writ of execution pending appeal was well within the trial courts discretionary power. Petition granted. RULE 65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS CERTIORARI: 1. TUAZON V. REGISTER OF DEEDS, 157 SCRA 613 (1988)
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FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. With funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hardearned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots. It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. Notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles. ISSUE: W/N a SCA of Certiorari under rule 65 is proper in this case? HELD: Yes. The extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full
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payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings. 2. MERALCO SECURITIES V. CBAA FACTS: In this special civil action of certiorari, Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation assails the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) dated May 6, 1976, holding that Meralco Securities' oil pipeline is subject to realty tax. The record reveals that pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The portion passing through Laguna is about thirty kilometers long. In order to repair, replace, remove or transfer segments of the pipeline, the pipes have to be cold-cut by means of a rotary hard-metal pipe-cutter after digging or excavating them out of the ground where they are buried. In points where the pipeline traversed rivers or creeks, the pipes were laid beneath the bed thereof. Hence, the pipes are permanently attached to the land. However, Meralco Securities notes that segments of the pipeline can be moved from one place to another as shown in the permit issued by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications which permit provides that the government reserves the right to require the removal or transfer of the pipes by and at the concessionaire's expense should they be affected by any road repair or improvement. Pursuant to the Assessment Law, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations containing the assessed values of portions of the pipeline. Meralco Securities appealed the assessments to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Laguna. That board in its decision of June 18, 1975 upheld the assessments Meralco Securities brought the case to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. The Board ruled that the pipeline was subject to realty tax. A copy of that decision was served on Meralco Securities' counsel on August 27, 1976. Section 36 of the Real Property Tax Code, provides that the Board's decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision by the appellant. Under Rule III of the amended rules of procedure of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, a party may ask for the reconsideration of the Board's decision within fifteen days after receipt. On September 7, 1976 (the eleventh day), Meralco Securities filed its motion for reconsideration.
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Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata and Secretary Roo (Secretary Abad Santos abstained) denied the motion in a resolution dated December 2, 1976, a copy of which was received by appellant's counsel on May 24, 1977. On June 6, 1977, Meralco Securities filed the instant petition for certiorari. The Solicitor General contends that certiorari is not proper in this case because the Board acted within its jurisdiction and did not gravely abuse its discretion and Meralco Securities was not denied due process of law. Meralco Securities explains that because the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and because no judicial review of the Board's decision is provided for in the Real Property Tax Code, Meralco Securities' recourse is to file a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari was proper HELD: We hold that certiorari was properly availed of in this case. It is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to be elevated for review and correction in matters of law. The rule is that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. The review is a part of the system of checks and balances which is a limitation on the separation of powers and which forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review of the decision of an official or administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion or in case the administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious. 3. ANGARA V. FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION DOCTRINE The supervisory power of the CA/courts to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing that there is reason for the Court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. FACTS Sen. Angara (petitioner) had installed fences over 4 parcels of land in Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu, Batangas in August 1995. When Fedman Development Corporation (Fedman) found out they protested and claimed that the land was titled in their name. A relocation survey confirmed that Fedman owned the land, but despite this and further demand Angara refused to vacate property and surrender possession thereof. In the RTC Angara maintained he was the owner, or if was not originally the owner he had acquired it through acquisitive prescription. Another ground relocation survey was ordered during the pre-trial in 1996 to be conducted jointly by the parties. However, in 2000 the Court moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Angara & Fedman filed separate motions for the court to render judgment based on the pleadings. The court sided refused to render judgment and sided with Fedman that no joint ground relocation was conducted and the commissioners report had no merit.
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On petition for certiorari before the CA, the appellate Court affirmed and held that the record of the case show that only orders for and no actual relocation survey was conducted, and that it was not necessary to implead alleged owners of adjacent lands as necessary parties. MR denied. Petition for review on certiorari with the SC to have the orders of the RTC declared rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because (a) there was no plausible and substantial explanation for the RTC to completely ignore the commissioners report or to render judgment based on it; (b) RTC refused to implead the surrounding property owners in former Hacienda Balaytigue in accordance with Sec. 7 & 2, Rule 3, RoC. (c) to direct that the proper government agency should determine the issue on overlapping or incorrect boundaries. SC denied. This is the present MR. ISSUE (1) (2) (3)
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based on the commissioners report. The Rules of Court clearly provides that the trial court is not bound by the findings of the commissioners or precluded from disregarding the same. It may adopt, modify, reject the report or recommit it with instructions, or require the parties to present further evidence. (3) NO. Petitioner did not identify the property owners allegedly affected or will be affected by the suit. The RTC cannot simply order a blanket inclusion of property owners in the entire Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu, Batangas as parties-defendants in the case. It is the petitioners responsibility to state the names of all the persons whom he claims will be affected by the suit or any judgment therein. Neither has Angara shown the existence of the property owners injury or interest in the outcome of the suit. More importantly, the joinder of adjoining property owners is not warranted since the RTC did not adopt the surveys and reports of the individual commissioners. The RTC chose not to give credence to the observation of one surveyor that the parties affected are all indispensable parties because the report of the surveyors is not in compliance with its order to make a joint survey. 4. INTESTATE ESTATE OF CARMEN DE LUNA (DECEASED), CATALINA MORALES GONZALES, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ESPERANZA DE LUNA GONZALES AZUPARDO & ISIDORO DE LUNA GONZALES. FACTS This is a petition to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 19, 1985.
Whether the remedy of petition for certiorari before the CA was properly taken. Whether the RTC acted with GADLEJ in not considering the Commissioners Report. Whether the RTC acted with GADLEJ in not impleading the adjoining property owners.
Jose de Luna Gonzales and former Judge Ramon Icasiano were appointed co-administrators of the estate of Carmen de Luna in a special proceedings case. Judge Icasiano died so Gonzales performed his duties as sole administrator of the estate. Gonzales through counsel filed a motion for allowances and payment of administrator's commission. The trial court issued an order requiring the administrator to define the fees he was demanding but 10 days thereafter, Gonzales died. His heirs filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion for allowances and payment of administrator's commission or fees asking the amount of P100,000.00. The same was amount was amended to P500,000.00. Both amounts were opposed to by the heirs of De Luna. The administratrix, Catalina (wife of deceased administrator), filed the inventory where the total of the real and personal property of the estate was listed at P10,751,189.97. The trial court issued an order granting the compensation asked for by the late administrator amounting to P500,000. Another order was issued authorizing the administratrix to withdraw from bank deposits and mortgage properties. The heirs of De Luna appealed. However, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the administrator. Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the CA modified the decision reducing the amount to P4,312.50. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the administratrix. ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by reducing the administrators commission from P500,000 to P4,312.50. HELD: Yes. The last inventory of the late Jose de Luna Gonzales showed a gross estate in the amount of P890,865.25, and since such value has increased by way of increments, dividends and interests earned, and the additional fishponds, farm lands and coconut lands which said administrator discovered and brought to the estate. The inventory of the present administratrix shows that the real and personal estate of the deceased Carmen de Luna amounts to P10,751,189.97. The heirs oppose such claim for being unreasonable and unconscionable, among other reasons. Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 85 an administrator is entitled by way of compensation to the following: (a) P4.00 per day "for the time actually and necessarily employed" by him as such administrator, or
HELD Petition denied. (1) NO. Certiorari was not the proper procedural remedy. Petition before the CA is a SCA for certiorari under Rule 65, it is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasijudicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Not every error in proceeding, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is abuse of discretion. The assailed orders of the RTC are but resolutions on incidental matters which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings in short they are mere interlocutory orders which leaves the petitioners with other remedies. The normal remedy for an interlocutory is to proceed with the case and not to resort to Rule 65, and should he lose in trial his remedy then is to appeal his case. The exception is where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. No special circumstances exist in this case. A petition for certiorari is intended to correct defects of jurisdiction solely, and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the RTCs findings or conclusion. Any error therein amounts only to an error of judgment correctible by appeal, and is not a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. A court with jurisdiction over the case, when questioned on its acts, or allegedly incorrect findings would be considered to have committed an error of law and not an abuse of discretion. The supervisory power of the CA/courts to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing that there is reason for the Court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. (2) NO. Petitioner failed to demonstrate his claim that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioners prayer for rendition of judgment
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(b) a "commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and was finally disposed of by him," according to the schedule therein provided. The CA arrived at the amount of P4,313.50 by applying the schedule provided in computing for commissions. The respondents also contend that the estimates of the real properties reflected in the inventory were highly exaggerated to jack-up the asking price and excluded from the computation of the fee of the administrator the total value of the stocks and cash deposits of the administrator. Consequently, it placed the value of the estate at P1,500,000.00 more or less. However, the applicable provision is the proviso which states: "in any special case, where the estate is large and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed." A wide latitude, leeway or discretion is therefore given to the trial court to grant a greater sum. And the determination of whether the administration and liquidation of an estate have been attended with greater difficulty and have required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator rests on the sound discretion of the court which took cognizance of the estate. There appears to be no sound justification why the appellate court should interfere with the exercise of the trial court's discretion, absent a showing that the trial court committed any abuse of discretion in granting a greater remuneration to the petitioner. The trial court's order is based on substantial evidence and the applicable rule. The records of the case is replete with evidence to prove that the late administrator Jose de Luna Gonzales had taken good care of the estate and performed his duties without any complaint from any of the heirs. With regard to the inventory, the respondents did not even present any evidence to counter or disprove the valuations made so their claim that the estimated P10 million value of the properties was exaggerated is without basis and purely conjectural. With the well settled rule that the findings of the trial court are given great respect, we therefore sustain the finding that the value of the estate is worth P10 million as found by the trial court. Considering the size of the estate and extent of the care given by the administrator, the amount asked for is not unreasonable and should therefore be allowed. 5. LALICAN V. VERGARA FACTS An information for violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Reform Code was filed against petitioners. Petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The lower court issued an Order quashing the information. On a motion for reconsideration by respondent, the lower court issued an order setting aside the quashal order of the previous judge.The motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied, hence this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE Whether a petition for Certiorari is proper/there was grave abuse of discretion (NO/NONE) HELD (The Court discussed that lumber is not excluded, as it may fall under other forest products.) The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of
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positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. 6. GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SYSTEMS, INC. V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 171 SCRA 579 (1989) FACTS: Private respondent, Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr., was a retained counsel for petitioner company, an arrastre and stevedoring operator since 1976. As retained counsel, he was given a monthly fee of P 1,000.00, representation allowance of P 500.00 and 100 liters per month as gasoline allowance. On 1984 private respondent asked for an increase in retainership fee. Instead of giving the same, petitioner discarded the previous arrangement and proposed that private respondent specify, instead, the legal fee for every legal case to be handled by him, effective 1 June 1984. In three pending cases handled by private respondent for petitioner before the lower Courts, private respondent filed Manifestations/Motions for the payment of attorney's fees based on quantum meruit. The same were granted by the respective Trial Courts. Challenging the aforesaid Orders, petitioner resorted to Petitions for Certiorari, not appeals, before the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which decided against petitioner in a consolidated Decision the dispositive portion of which reads: In the main, therefore, what petitioner should have done was to appeal on time the questioned orders. This, it failed to do, and at the very least if these petitions had only been interposed seasonably they could have considered the appeals. Then, even if we were for the moment to ignore the fatal procedural error of petitioner of not appealing, and were we to treat the petitions for certiorari as such, still no comfort and relief could be extended to petitioner, because grave abuses of discretion on the part of respondent judges had not been shown to exist. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, this recourse. ISSUE: W/N a SCA for certiorari under rule 65 is proper in this case? HELD: No. Certiorari is not proper in this case. Contrary to petitioner's submission, certiorari will neither lie. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a Court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.
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As pointed out in Tolentino vs. Escalona, having failed to interpose a timely appeal from the impugned Orders, petitioners may not avail of the Writ of certiorari to offset the adverse effects of their omission. And even if certiorari were the proper remedy, petitioner has failed to show that the Orders complained of are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, meaning such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Abuse of discretion alone is not sufficient. Rather, it must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. That the Courts below were lawfully vested with jurisdiction to hear and act on the Motions to fix attomey's fees is beyond question. Any alleged mistakes committed in the exercise thereof would be errors of judgment not reviewable by a special civil action of Certiorari. While petitioner claims that the Orders were issued ex-parte, its filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, which was orally argued and subsequently supported by a memorandum and documents, had cured that defect. The broader interests of justice, as petitioner claims, do not justify a contrary conclusion in the face of procedural lapses vis-a-vis valid and lawful Orders. 7. ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK V. CAMPOS G.R. No. L-38280 March 21, 1975 Facts: Spouses Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed suit against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (St. Peter), Araceli Wijangco del Rosario, National Investment and Development Corporation (or NIDC), Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (or Banco Filipino for short), the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Sheriff of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-15001). In their amended complaint, the spouses prayed that they be declared the rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate, that the Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceased predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire in 1933; that the certificates of title over said lot in the name of the Memorial Park, and that in the name of Wijangco del Rosario, and all the certificates of title from which these certificates were derived be declared null and void; that the mortgages over said, lot constituted in favor of Banco Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and void; and that the Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages. The amended complaint likewise sought issuance of preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver. The lower court ordered appointment of a receiver, but upon filing of a bond by the Memorial Park, the receivership was lifted. After trial, the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The Memorial Park and Banco Filipino, on June 23, 1973, filed their joint motion for reconsideration of the decision. On June 30, 1973, they filed a joint motion for new trial. On July 9, 1973, the Memorial Park filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration with prayer for new trial. Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. On January 10, 1974, the plaintiffs moved for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and restoration of receivership. On February 5, 1974, the trial court denied new trial. On February 21, 1974, Banco Filipino and the Memorial Park filed their notice of appeal from the decision of May 2, 1973, and filed their cash bond. Within the reglementary period they filed their joint record on appeal. On February 28, 1974, the Memorial Park filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (L-38280) against the trial judge and the plaintiff spouses, seeking annulment of the court's order denying new trial, on the ground that the same was issued in grave abuse of discretion. Issues: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the joint appeal of the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino in its order of July 8, 1974. YES. Whether or not the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied in its order of February 5, 1974 the motion for new trial of the Memorial Park. YES.
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Courts Ruling: Petition granted. The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will not be adequate. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial, having disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the newly discovered evidence. Rationale: It must be noted that the petitioner in L-38280 is only St. Peter Memorial Park. Banco Filipino is not a party in that first proceeding before this Court. Thus, whatever may be the effect of the filing of a petition for certiorari, on the pending appeal, cannot affect the appeal of Banco Filipino. And the respondent Judge clearly committed a clear error and a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the appeal of Banco Filipino due to the filing by the Memorial Park of its petition in L- 38280. Moreover, as will now be explained, the dismissal of the appeal violated the restraining order issued by this Court. The general rule is that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. However, we have granted the writ in cases where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of. The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will not be adequate. As many memorial lot buyers are affected, and the very integrity of the torrens system is at stake, public interest is involved. This rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities. 8. VALENCIA V. CA, 184 SCRA 561 (1990) FACTS: On July 6, 1984, petitioner filed in RTC Bulacan for the rescission of a lease contract over a 24 h. fishpond in Bulacan, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondents. Private respondents filed an answer with a counterclaim for damages. During the pendency of the case, the lease contract expired and the defendants peacefully surrendered the fishpond to plaintiff. Consequently the court a quo declared that the plaintiff's prayer for rescission of contract had become moot and academic and the only remaining issue was the matter of damages. The trial court awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to each defendant and further ordered plaintiff to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner claims that defendant Bagtas acknowledged in writing his receipt of said decision on January 3, 1989. However, petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 10, 1989, and filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 1989. 4 On the same day, respondent judge issued an order that said notice of appeal be "given due course" and directing that the records of the case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals. 5 On January 17, 1989, private respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal, alleging that: 2. Under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court a writ of execution may be issued to enforce a judgment before the expiration of the period to appeal upon showing good reasons. 3. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 39 and the jurisprudence on the matter, defendant is now moving that a writ of execution be issued pending appeal to enforce judgment of this Honorable Court and for this purpose hereby offers to post a bond in such amount that this Honorable Court may deem adequate to answer for all damages that the plaintiff may suffer by reason of the execution prayed for. 6 The respondent judge issued an order 7 granting the motion for execution pending appeal, the defendants having filed a bond in the amount of P330,000.00, and granted a period up to April 27,
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1989 within which the plaintiff may "file a counterbond to stay the implementation of the Writ of Execution to be issued." Petitioner's MR was denied by the trial court on the ground that "an offer of a bond for immediate execution of judgment is a good ground for execution pending appeal" and "execution pending appeal 9 may be granted as long as movant files a good and sufficient surety." A writ of execution pending 10 appeal was issued by the trial court. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA on the ff. grounds: 1. THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, UPON THE PERFECTION OF THE APPEAL FROM THE DECISION RENDERED ON NOVEMBER 29, 1988 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 7554-M, A COPY HAVING BEEN RECEIVED BY BUNYE AND BAGTAS ON JANUARY 3, 1989, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BULACAN BRANCH XV (15) LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND NO LONGER HAD ANY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN BUNYE'S AND BAGTAS' MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, LET ALONE TO ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION. THAT MERE FILING OF A BOND DOES NOT SUFFICE ABSENT OF A SHOWING OF SUPERIOR CIRCUMSTANCES DEMANDING URGENCY WHICH WILL OUTWEIGH THE INJURY OR DAMAGES SHOULD THE LOSING PARTY SECURE A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT, AND RULING THAT A TRIAL COURT EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT ORDERS ADVANCE OF EXECUTION OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. INSTEAD, RESPONDENT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE IMPLEMENTED HIS ORDER GIVING DUE COURSE TO VALENCIA'S APPEAL AND DIRECTING THE RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE FORWARDED TO THIS COURT. respondent Court of Appeals dismissed said petition and refused to reconsider such dismissal, hence the appeal to the SC. The SC issued a TRO against respondents.
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party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari. Thus, we held therein, and we so reiterate for purposes of the case at bar, that certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution. That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against him. The filing of such bond does not entitle 21 him to the suspension of execution as a matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so circumstances to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other remedial options at hand. Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposes that the case presents a presumptively valid occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no good reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party could unjustly compel the losing party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple expedient of filing a motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ of execution pending appeal although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule 39. This could not have been the intendment of the rule, hence we give our imprimatur to the propriety of petitioner's action for certiorari in respondent court. 9. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a Petition for certiorari in relation to Rule 45. Respondents Rural Power Corporation, Eusebio E. Ferrer, Lourdes Sison, and Eduardo Ferrer (hereinafter referred to as Rural Power) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA) in the sum of P985,000.00 for the purpose of improving the former's services to the public. On the same date, Rural Power was required to execute two other real estate mortgages to secure two other loans whose amounts were never released. Among the conditions of the mortgage were that the amount to be released to Rural Power would be utilized for the "purposes therein specified subject to availability of funds", and "that the respondents shall adhere strictly with the program of work and specifications attached to the deed." Due to alleged violations of the above-stated conditions, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the Sheriff set the sale of the properties involved for public auction. Rural Power initiated a civil case for Injunction, release of a sum of money, cancellation of mortgages, and damages. Respondent judhge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction stopping the auction sale and subsequently decided in favor of Rural Power after trial on the merits. Petitioner NEA filed a Record on Appeal, which as disapproved by respondent judge for non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court referring to the form and contents of the record on appeal. Petitioner filed an Amended Record on Appeal supplying the deficiencies with the prayer that "all oral and documentary evidence presented in the instant case be elevated together with all the records to the Court of Appeals". Again, respondent Judge disapproved the Amended Record on Appeal for alleged non-compliance with Section 6 of Rule 41. Petitioner corporation did not file a Motion for Reconsideration but subsequently filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before respondent Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that failure of the petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration was fatal to its cause. ISSUE:
2.
3.
ISSUE: (1) W/N Trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the execution of consequential & exemplary damages, attorneys fees? Yes. (2) W/N Certiorari is the proper remedy? Yes. HELD: Yes. 1) Conformably with Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order that there may be a discretionary issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) There must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The good reason must be stated in a special order. 15 In the case at bar, the ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the immediate execution, as stated in its order of March 20, 1989, is the filing of a bond by private respondents. The rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering execution pending appeal The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 17 However, the existence of good reasons is principally what confers such discretionary power. Absent any such good reason, the special order of execution must be struck down for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. 2) Anent issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an order for execution pending appeal, we have ruled in Jaca et al. vs. Davao Lumber Company, et al. 20 that: . . . Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorarimay only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the (ordinary) course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
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WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner's omission to move for reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus was fatal to the petition. HELD: Yes. First of all, the orders of the respondent judge disapproving petitioner's original and amended Record on Appeal were both vague because they did not specify the requirements not complied with nor the errors or additions that had to be corrected or added. As the Appellate Court had observed "it is possible that the respondent (Judge) was referring to deficiencies other than that specified in (the) order of January 14, 1970". Hence, petitioner cannot be faulted if its Amended Record on Appeal did not meet the standards set by the Trial Judge as there weren't any. Secondly, whatever defects the original Record on Appeal may have contained had been cured in the Amended Record on Appeal by petitioner's prayer that all the documentary and oral evidence be elevated to the Appellate Court as expressly provided for by Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, respondent judges disapproval of the Amended Record on Appeal was arbitrary and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In the eyes of the law, the two disputed Orders were patent nullities, thus excepting the -instant case from the general rule that before certiorari or mandamus may be availed of petitioner must first file a Motion for Reconsideration. In other words, respondent Judge, in effect, deprived petitioner of its right to Appeal and other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarily course of law, hence, making petitioner's resort to the instant petition a virtual necessity. Third, petitioner is a government corporation performing governmental functions. Public interest being involved, a Motion for Read consideration need not be availed of. Fourth, petitioner averred that time was of the essence because respondents were in the process of executing the assailed judgment of the Trial Court with precipitate haste, the enforcement of which would have impaired petitioner corporation's operations and funds. This Court held that a Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government. Finally, to sustain Rural Power's stand would be to put a premium on procedural technicality, which should not be made to prevail over petitioner's substantive right to appeal. Considering the fact that the two Records on Appeal were totally unopposed by Rural Power and that giving the appeal due course would not have prejudiced its rights nor substantially affected the merits of the case, the spirit of liberality which animates the Rules rather than strict technicality would be more in keeping with the ends of justice. 10. ABRAHAM V. NLRC Facts: Petitioner Jennifer Abraham filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against the herein respondent Philippine Institute of Technical Education (PITE) and its school administrator Jaime Magnanao before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Petitioner then appealed to the NLRC which rendered a Resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The aggrieved respondents moved for reconsideration which was granted by the NLRC. Aggrieved by the adverse ruling of the NLRC, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioners petition on the ground that she failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the NLRC reconsidering its previous Resolution. Issue/s: Whether or not the filing of a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for Certiorari is MANDATORY. Held: Generally, yes but there are exceptions.
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Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless ; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The Court held that the second and fourth exceptions are clearly in point. The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board, or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. In the present case, the NLRC was already given the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself when the respondent filed its motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs initial ruling in favor of petitioner. In fact, it granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent and reversed its previous ruling and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. It would be an exercise in futility to require the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration since the very issues raised in the petition for certiorari, i.e. whether or not the petitioner was constructively dismissed by the respondent and whether or not she was entitled to her money claims, were already duly passed upon and resolved by the NLRC. Thus the NLRC had more than one opportunity to resolve the issues of the case and in fact reversed itself upon a reconsideration. It is highly improbable or unlikely under the circumstances that the Commission would reverse or set aside its resolution granting a reconsideration. 11./13. JP LATEX V. BALLONS GRANGER BALLOONS FACTS Anchoring on an isolated transaction, respondent Granger filed a complaint for rescission and damages against petitioner JP Latex Technology, Inc. The complaint alleged that the president of petitioner corporation, and respondent entered into a contract for the sale of respondent Grangers machinery consisting of four dipping lines and all associated equipment for the amount of US$1,230,000.00 and other non-cash considerations consisting of a 20% shareholding in petitioners distribution company and the distributorship of its balloons in Canada and Greece. Although respondent Granger had performed its end of the bargain, the petitioner allegedly paid only a partial sum of US$748,262.87 and reneged on its other non-cash commitments. According to respondent Granger, it made several written and verbal demands for the full payment of the purchase price to no avail. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent Granger. While the case was pending, respondent Granger moved for the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. Petitioner opposed respondent Grangers motion for execution pending appeal, which was denied. The RTC granted the plea for execution pending appeal. The writ of execution pending appeal was issued. Thereupon, sheriff Arellano successfully effected the dismantling of the machinery. Thus, petitioner filed a special civil
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action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, denying the petition for certiorari mainly on the ground that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order. Hence this petition. ISSUE WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. HELD As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2) when public interest is involved; or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. In the instant case, the issue raised is purely an issue of law. Moreover, following the fourth exception, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order allowing the immediate execution of its decision is no longer necessary in view of the fact that the RTC had already passed upon the propriety of respondents motion for execution pending appeal on two occasions. It should be noted that on the first occasion, the RTC denied respondents motion for execution pending appeal, prompting them to seek reconsideration of its denial. In the second instance, the RTC reversed itself and allowed the execution pending appeal. On these two occasions, the parties had been accorded ample avenue to squarely and exhaustively argue their positions and the RTC more than enough opportunity to study the matter and to deliberate upon the issues raised by the parties. Thus, the filing of another motion for reconsideration of the order of execution pending appeal by petitioner could not be considered a plain and adequate remedy but a mere superfluity under the circumstances of the case. 12. METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC. V. CA, GR NO. 142133, NOV. 19, 2002 Facts: After completion of an inventory count of tokens, petitioners Metro Transit Organization (MTO) and Jovencio Bantang, Jr., an MTO officer, discovered that 2,000 tokens were missing. They then conducted an investigation, which implicated private respondent Ruperto Evangelista, a cash assistant at MTOs Treasury Division, as one of the alleged perpetrators responsible for the said loss. Based on the evidence presented, which consisted of handwritten letters by Evangelista and two other persons, petitioners dismissed Evangelista for lack of trust and confidence. Evangelista filed a case of illegal dismissal against the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter and, upon appeal, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of Evangelista. Meanwhile, the CA dismissed the petitioners petition for certiorari because this special civil action would only lie if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, that remedy should have been a motion for reconsideration of the assailed NLRC decision. Hence, the instant case. Petitioners now contend that a motion for reconsideration is not necessary before resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The said special civil action with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is allegedly the only remedy available to them. They also argue that, without the extraordinary relief of injunction, the NLRC can immediately execute the questioned decision rendering the issues raised in the petition moot and academic. Besides this, the said motion for reconsideration is not necessary because the questions that will be raised in the same are those that the NLRC had already considered. Issue: Whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary before resort to the special civil action for certiorari
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Held: YES. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. This rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions: 1. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; 2. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; 3. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; 4. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; 5. Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; 6. Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; 7. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; 8. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; 9. Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; 10. Where the issue raised was one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Pertinently, certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. To dispense with this requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement. In the instant case, the petitioners did not file the necessary motion for reconsideration before resorting to the said special civil action. Except for their bare allegation that the said motion was not so necessary, petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. They failed to show that their case falls in any of the enumerated exceptions. Petition for review denied. 14. CONTI V. CA, GR NO. 134441, MAY 19, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Indalicio Conti was an Assistant Professor IV of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), under National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 33. This circular was intended to be the criteria in ranking faculty members in state universities and colleges. By virtue of NCC 68, which amended NCC 33, Conti was reclassified as Professor I after submitting the necessary documents and presenting himself for an interview. Civil Service Commission- NCR (CSC) Director II Dionisia Pingol requested Conti, however, to submit a copy of his MBA diploma or transcript of records in order to determine whether he was indeed a masteral degree holder. Conti replied that a masteral degree was not a requisite for his current position. Consequently, Benita Santos, Director IV of the CSC-NCR, formally charged Conti with dishonesty. CSC then resolved that Conti was guilty of this charge and, thus, should be dismissed from his position with all its accessory penalties. Conti then moved for a reconsideration of CSCs decision. Despite the letters Conti had sent to the CSC reminding it of the pending motion, the latter had not acted accordingly. Conti then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the SC, which referred the same to the CA. CA dismissed this petition, holding that it had been filed out of time. Contrary to the SCs administrative circular requiring that appeals from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies shall be taken to the CA by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 within 15 days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, or resolution, the instant appeal was filed almost three months past its due date.
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Hence, the instant petition. Conti now alleges that his petition before the appellate court is an original action under Rule 65 and not an appeal under Rule 43. Accordingly, his petition was not filed out of time. Meanwhile, PUP alleges that the petition at hand is one under Rule 43 since it is the proper remedy in the instant case, not one filed under Rule 65. Issue: Whether the instant petition has been filed out of time Held: NO. The old rule (prior to the promulgation of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 in June 1, 1995) was that a decision, order, or ruling from the CSC was unappealable subject to the SCs certiorari jurisdiction. A party aggrieved by the CSCs judgment should proceed to the SC alone on certiorari under Rule 65 within 30 days from the receipt of a copy thereof. By virtue of the said circular, however, an appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of quasijudicial agencies like the CSC may be taken to the CA by way of a petition for review within 15 days from notice of the assailed order or resolution. As to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 pending with SC directed against CSC, the Circular provides that they shall be treated as petitions for review and, thus, transferred to the CA for appropriate disposition. In the instant case, Contis petition could have been dismissed outright, if it werent for the presence of exceptional circumstances that justified his recourse to a special remedy. Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under these Rules is an absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This remedy has been defined as that which would equally be beneficial, speedy, and sufficient. It is not merely a remedy which, at some time in the future, will bring about a revival of the judgment complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy that will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and acts of the inferior court or tribunal. Illustrative of such plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is a motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar, while PUP contends that Contis petition for certiorari was premature, in light of the latters pending motion for reconsideration, it must be noted that CSC has continuously failed to resolve the same for a lengthy period of time. This then amounts to a denial of Contis rights to due process and speedy disposition of his caseone of the circumstances that justify recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Case remanded to the CA for further proceedings. 15. PEOPLE V. ALBANO, GR NOS. L-45376-77, JUL. 26, 1988 Facts: Private respondents Antonio Acharon and Rosalina Bernabe were the City Mayor and then City ViceMayor of Davao City, respectively, Before the CFI, they were charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As to Acharon, he allegedly denied an Emilio Evangelistas application for the renewal of his license to operate a cockpit and, instead, approved his uncles application (relative within the third civil degree). As to both Acharon and Bernabe, they allegedly used the names of their 327 employees to fraudulently procure sacks of RCA rice for sale at a price lower than the prevailing one in the open market to persons other than those employees. Before the pre-suspension hearings can be held and, pursuant to an SC resolution, the case was transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court. Trial was also postponed, in light of the petition for reinvestigation filed by Acharon in the office of the Acting District State Prosecutor. This trial court found that the informations filed against the accused were invalid ab initio and, thus, dismissed the corresponding cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari. In sum, petitioner challenges the manner in which the trial court has arrived at its conclusion that the informations filed are invalid. Issues: i.
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ii.
Whether in a pre-suspension proceeding to determine the validity of an information filed under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a court may consider matters not alleged in the information under consideration Whether a court may, without a trial proper, decide a case on the merits by making findings of fact after an assessment of the evidence on the record, taking into consideration matters of defense of the accused and, on the basis, thereof, dismiss the same
Held: Petition granted. 1. YES. While suspension of a public officer is mandatory, it is not automatic, the reason being that a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction. Also, public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in the cases. Thus, before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. The right to challenge the validity of the information, in prosecutions under the anti-graft law, is not limited to the right to challenge the completeness of sufficiency of the recitals in the information vis--vis the essential elements of the offense as defined by substantive law. Considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, the right to challenge the validity of an information entitles the accused to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings leading to the filing of the information against him. 2. NO. It must be noted, however, that the right of the accused to challenge the validity of the information does not divest the prosecution of its right to prove the guilt of the accused in a trial on the merits, nor should the pre-suspension hearing substitute the trial proper. 3. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before the trial on the merits proceeds. Nor does it prohibit the trial, and thus the suspension, of the innocent. The law permits the trial of the accused based merely on probable cause, as long as probable cause has been properly determined. And for honest lapses in its administration, the law provides for remedial measures upon which an innocent public officer is vindicated and compensated. In any event, when the contending parties in both cases agreed to submit the question of the validity of the informations on the basis of the records of the cases, among others,to determine whether accused Acharon can be mandatorily suspended, the trial court was competent to inquire only whether or not (1) accused Acharon had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the informations against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the RoC, not deemed waived in view of the previous arraignment of the accused. In the instant case, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process. 16. ESCUDERO V. DULAY, GR NO. L-60578, FEB. 23, 1988 Facts: Petitioner Araceli Escudero, wife of co-petitioner Paterno Escudero, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale under Pacto de Retro in favor of private respondents, the spouses Amistad, over a parcel of residential land. The deed stated that redemption was to be made by the vendors within three months after the
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execution of the same. The period of redemption expired without the petitioners making an offer of repurchase. Consequently, the spouses Amistad filed a petition for consolidation of title over the subject land. Araceli opposed the petition, contending that what had transpired amongst the parties was a transaction of loan and not one of sale. According to her, the transaction of equitable mortgage can be gleaned from the gross inadequacy of the purchase price and the fact that she, the alleged vendor, remained in possession of the land and continued to enjoy the fruits thereof. Notably, however, one month after the expiration of the redemption period, Araceli deposited a bank managers check, whose amount represents the redemption money, with the clerk of court of the respondent court, CFI. Consequently, the counsel for petitioners filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings before CFI, alleging that: 1. The deposit of the managers check constitutes Aracelis abandonment of her defense as alleged in her answer and that she is deemed to have admitted material allegations in the complaint; and 2. The spouses Amistad cannot consolidate their ownership over the land because, pursuant to Art. 1606 of the Civil Code, the vendor in a pacto de retro sale still has the right to repurchase the property within 31 days after the date of the final judgment in a civil case on the basis that the contract was a true sale with a right to repurchase. CFI, however, ruled against the petitioners, holding that Art. 1606 contemplates a legal controversy as to the juridical nature of the contractthat is, whether it is a pacto de retro sale or an equitable mortgage. In the instant case, there is none. As earlier said, the petitioners expressly abandoned their defense that the contract was one of equitable mortgage. Consequently, their act of depositing the managers check was one of no force and effect. CA affirmed the CFIs decision. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari. Petitioners now contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments rendered against them by the respondent courts are null and void, because they have been deprived of their day in court and divested of their property without due process of law, through the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of their previous counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the mistake of their counsel, the rule should not be applied automatically to their case, as their trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their cause of action and violated their substantive rights. Issue: Whether petitioners claims before the SC justify their filing of the special civil action for certiorari Held: YES. Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 will not be a substitute or cure the failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Where, however, the application of this rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed. In the instant case, there is good and valid evidence to support petitioners allegation that the disputed transaction is one of equitable mortgage. While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a technicality. Petition granted. 17. LEONOR V. CA, GR NO. 112597, APR. 2, 1996 Facts:
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Petitioner Virginia Leonor and private respondent Mauricio Leonor, Jr. were married. They were separate for a substantial part of their married life, with Viriginia working as a nurse in Laguna and Mauricio studying and working in Switzerland. Mauricio, however, became unfaithful and lived with a Swiss woman. Consequently, Virginia instituted a civil action in the Swiss court for separation and alimony, while Mauricio countersued for divorce. While the proceedings in the Swiss courts were ongoing, Mauricio, represented by his brother, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage in the civil registry applied for by Virginia3 before the RTC. The RTC rendered judgment, declaring that the marriage was null and void. After receiving the notice of the decision, Virginia filed the corresponding appeal. RTC dismissed her appeal, however, on the ground that she had failed to file a record on appeal within 30 days and had thus failed to perfect her appeal. Virginia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA and sought the nullification of the RTCs decisions for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the petition, saying that the remedy for the purpose of seeking the reversal of the trial courts decision was an appeal, not a special civil action. It granted the petition seeking the nullification of the decision dismissing the appeal. Hence, the instant case. Issues: 1. Whether CA erred in holding that Virginia should have appealed from the RTCs decision instead of filing a petition for certiorari 2. Whether CA erred in refusing to decide upon the merits of the case, that is, to declare whether the RTCs judgment is null and void Held: YES, to both issues. At the outset, the CA acted within its authority in simply ordering the trial court to give course to petitioners appeal without going into the merits of the case. In a certiorari proceeding involving an incident in a case, the CA has no jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the main case itself which has not been on appeal before it. In other words, the CA has already done its duty by declaring that the RTC has gravely abused its discretion or acted without jurisdiction in refusing to give due course to petitioners appeal. It must be noted, however, that the SC is not just a toothless promoter of procedural niceties, which are understood only by lawyers and jurists. It cannot shrink from its quintessential role as the fountain of speedy, adequate, and substantial justice. In the instant case, therefore, the SC resolves to make an exception to the normal procedures and to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity or nullity of the trial courts proceedings. In the instant case, therefore, the SC resolves to make an exception to the normal procedures and to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity or nullity of the trial courts proceedings. Also, it must be observed that Virginia actually filed a proper Notice of Appeal which the trial court disallowed. Hence, she had no choice but to bring her petition for certiorari in the respondent Court. To constrain her to go back to said Court, this time by ordinary appeal, would be tantamount to punishing her and delaying her cause for faults not attributable to her, but rather to the manifest error of the respondent trial judge. So, too, as will be shown shortly, the trial court's decision is really a nullity for utter want of jurisdiction. Hence it could be challenged at any time. Insofar as the SC can figure out from the RTCs decision, it (a) declared the marriage null and void and (b) ordered the local civil registrar of San Carlos City to cancel its entry in the local civil registry, the sum total of which, coincidentally (and most conveniently), would enable Mauricio to show to the Swiss courts
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that he was never married and thus, to convince said courts to reverse their order granting alimony to his abandoned wife. Such blatant abuse and misuse of court proceedings cannot be countenanced by this Court. Also, RTCs decision is void for want of jurisdiction. As the RoC provides, where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding. Petition granted. 18. DD COMMENDADOR CONSTRUCTION CORP. V. SAYO DOCTRINE The general rule is that certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The only exception is when appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained. FACTS DD Commendador Construction Corp. (Corp), from October 1977 to July 6, 1978, purchased construction materials from Sayo for the total value of P108,799.54. As payment, Corp. issued a postdated check for November 22, 1977 in the amount of P24,455 to Sayo. Check was subsequently dishonored when presented for encashment. On March 1980, Sayo filed a civil case against Corp, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, which was granted and certain construction equipment were levied by the Sheriff. Corp filed its answer alleging Sayo and Corp had an understanding that the payment is subject to releases by the government due to the Corp. and such was sufficient to answer for the debt. Sayo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Court granted Judgment on the Pleadings. The hearing was set for March 5, 1981, whereupon Corp. failed to appear. Corp. had been earlier granted a motion to reset the hearing. Judge declared the case submitted for decision. Corp.s MR was denied. Corp. then filed the present petition for certiorari with the SC. While the petition was pending Corp was adjudged liable in the civil case, as the court was serve with late notice of the petition. On appeal to the CA, Sayo attacked in his memoranda the propriety of filing the present petition when the remedy of appeal was still available. Corp. justifies its action, citing St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Campos Jr. (63 SCRA 180), which held that certiorari may be availed of although there is a remedy of appeal, if appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained. ISSUE (1) Whether judgment on the pleadings was proper. (2) Whether present petition can proceed when the main case has been decided and is now on appeal. HELD (1) YES. The pleadings have not raised any genuine issue that would require the reception of material evidence. The issue raised was refuted by Corp in its answer when it admitted to issuing the post -dated check as initial payment, an action that made payment not subject to government releases received by the Corp. Further, the motion was granted only after hearing and formal written opposition had been filed by Corp. Issue:
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(2) NO. But the court moved to settle the issue in this case to avoid long litigation. The general rule is that certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The only exception is when appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained. Compared to the St. Peter case, where certiorari was granted, Corp., here, failed to prove that the remedy of appeal falls under the exception. The Corp. had originally filed the petition not as an exception to the general rule held in the St Peter case, - that there existed extraordinary circumstances which justified it - but only in order to overturn a disfavorable interlocutory order, which is not the subject of appeal. If the questioned orders had suffered from any legal or jurisdictional infirmity, any objection that may be raised by certiorari or prohibition were foreclosed by the rendition of judgment in the main case and the appeal taken. The validity of the orders should have been questioned in connection with the appeal. 19. PASTOR, JR. V. CA, GR NO. L-56340, JUN. 24, 1983 Facts: Pastor, Sr., a Spanish subject, died. He was survived by his wife and their two illegitimate children, one of which is the petitioner Pastor, Jr., and an illegitimate child, not natural, who is private respondent Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr. with CFI. The will contained only one testamentary provision: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation of some mining claims. The probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the decedents estate. Pursuant thereto, Quemada instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate. Meanwhile, the latter filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The CA and SC affirmed this order, with the latter remanding the case to the probate court. After some time from the said remand, Quemada filed pleading after pleading, asking for the payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of the said legacy. Pastor, Jr. opposed these pleadings, claiming that the action for reconveyance was pending in another CFI. While the said reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court issued the now assailed order of execution and garnishment against Pastor, Jr. and his wife. Before the motion for reconsideration filed by Pastor, Jr. could be restored, however, he and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction. This petition was denied, however. Hence, the instant case. In sum, petitioners now contend that probate court has acted beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it has issued the assailed orders. According to them, before the provisions of the holographic will can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality. Meanwhile, Quemada challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the disputed order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.
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Whether filing of the petition for certiorari is proper to assail the validity of the order of execution and the implementing writ Held: YES. Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. It is also well-recognized that the execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. In the instant case, the order sought to be executed by the assailed order of execution allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. But, it did not. As an attempt to justify the issuance of the order of execution, the probate court in its earlier order explained that its bases for its conclusion as the question of ownership were that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he was receiving royalties from Atlas; (2) he had resided in the Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the mine prospecting business since 1937; and (3) Pastor, Jr. was only acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a Spaniard. Based on this justification, the conclusion is far-fetched. It was then error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the probate order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said probate order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute. In light of this, the ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e. the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment. But to order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced, certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution. CA decision reversed. 20. CHUA V. CA, GR NO. 150793, NOV. 19, 2004 Facts: Private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint for falsification of public documents with the City Prosecutor against petitioner Francis Chua and his wife. The latter allegedly indicated in the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeti ng of the Board of the Board of Directors of the said company that Hao was present, when she really wasnt. The City Prosecutor filed the corresponding information with the MeTC against Chua but dismissed that filed against his wife. During the trial in t he MeTC, Haos counsel appeared as private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first witness. After Haos testimony, Chua moved to exclude Haos counsel as private prosecutors on the ground that Hao had failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. MeTC granted Chuas motion, prompting Hao to move for reconsideration. Haos motion was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari in her own behalf and for the benefit of the company before the RTC. The RTC gave due course to the petition and reversed the MeTCs order. Dissatisfied, Chua filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The RTC allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion in (1) refusing to consider material facts, (2) allowing Siena Realty Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner although it was not a party to the criminal complaint, and (3) effectively
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amending the information against the accused in violation of his constitutional rights. Also, according to Chua, Hao had no authority to bring a suit in behalf of the company. It being a derivative suit, Hao has to first secure the issuance of a board resolution authorizing her to file the suit. Meanwhile, Hao claims that no such resolution is needed, especially where the directors or trustees refuse to file a suit even when the stockholders demand it. CA denied Chuas petition. Hence, the instant case. Among others, petitioner now claims that the company is not a proper party in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC since it is not a private complainant in the criminal case filed. Issue: Whether Haos recourse through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was proper, despite that Siena Realty Corporation was not so impleaded as a private complainant in the said criminal case Held: YES. When a trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special civil action for certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State and the private complainant. In a string of cases, the SC has consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest may file certiorari cases. Notably, however, in Pastor, Jr. v. CA, even a non-party may institute a petition for certiorari. In that case, petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining claims and could file a petition for certiorari, the fastest and most feasible remedy since she could not intervene in the probate of her father-in-laws estate. In the instant case, Haos recourse to the CA was proper. Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation's project and the falsified documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari because the proceedings in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation. Petition denied. 21. TANG V. CA, GR NO. 117204, FEB. 11, 2000 Facts: The court-appointed administrator, Prudencio Teodoro, of the respondent Estate of the Spouses Teodoro sought to have the two lots belonging thereto fenced. He then applied with the City Engineer for a permit to fence the said lots, who then endorsed the application to the City Legal Officer, for appropriate action. In a conference called by the City Legal Officer between Prudencio and the owners of the properties adjoining the subject lots, petitioners herein, the latter opposed the issuance of the fencing permit on the claim that the subject lots were street lots. Their fencing would mean the closure of their access to public roads. The City Legal Officer then recommended that the fencing permit be denied, which the City Engineer did accordingly. This denial prompted Prudencio to file a petition before the probate court to order the City Engineer to issue the fencing permit for the subject lots. After hearing, the probate court granted the petition. Upon noticing that the subject lots were being fenced, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA denied this petition, however, on the ground that certiorari was not the proper remedy for petitioners to annul and set aside the order of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
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Petitioners now assert that the special civil action of certiorari is the only available remedy to them because they cannot otherwise avail themselves of the remedy of appeal under Rule 42. They were not parties in the proceedings in the probate court. Issue: Whether petitioners contention should be upheld Held: NO. Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court's order or decision can question the said court's disposition viacertiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court. In a situation where the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail himself of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari. Another factor, which militates against the availability of certiorari to petitioners, is the principle that the SC will only exercise its power of judicial review if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the legal question. "Legal standing" denotes a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means material interest as distinguished from a mere incidental interest. In the present case, aside from the fact that petitioners were not parties in the proceedings before the lower court, they have not cited any acceptable or valid basis to support their legal standing to question the probate court's order. Since respondent estate is the undisputed owner of the subject private lots, the right of the administrator to have the same fenced cannot be questioned by petitioners who do not have any vested right over the subject lots. The fact that petitioners are neighboring lot owners whose access to public roads will allegedly be affected by the fencing of the subject lots, merely gives them an incidental interest over the questioned order of the probate court and cannot serve as basis to support their legal standing to elevate the order of the probate court to the Court of Appeals and before this Court. Although petitioners maintain that their legal basis for filing the special civil action of certiorari with the CA and the present petition before this Court is Section 22 of The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree, the said section is evidently inapplicable to the present case sinc e it pertains to the proscription imposed upon a subdivision owner or developer. In the present case, respondent estate is not a subdivision owner or developer but merely the owner of a neighboring lot. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the only person who can rightfully oppose the issuance of the fencing permit is the City Engineer. Petition denied. 22. RODRIGUEZ V. GADIANE 23. JEROME CASTRO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: Petitioner, Thomasita Rodriguez was the private complainant in a criminal case filed against Rolando Gadiane and Ricardo Rafols, Jr. (respondents), for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22). The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) hearing the complaint had suspended the criminal proceeding on the ground that a prejudicial question was posed in a separate civil case then pending. Petitioner then
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filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to set aside the MTC order of suspension. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition was filed by the private complainant, instead of the government prosecutor representing the People of the Philippines in criminal cases. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of conformity or signature of the government prosecutor. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review. Issue/s: Whether a private offended party in a criminal proceeding may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing an interlocutory order, without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Held: YES. A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. In a long line of cases, the Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include the State and the private offended party or complainant. As early as in the case of Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Apropos thereto is the case cited by petitioner, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, wherein it was categorically stated that the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. It was further held in De la Rosa that the complainant has such an interest in the civil aspect of the case that he may file a special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. He should do so and prosecute it in his name as such complainant. In this case, there is no doubt that petitioner maintains an interest in the litigation of the civil aspect of the case against respondents. Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. Hence, the possible conviction of respondents would concurrently provide a judgment for damages in favor of petitioner. The suspension of the criminal case which petitioner decries would necessarily cause delay in the resolution of the civil aspect of the said case which precisely is the interest and concern of petitioner. Such interest warrants protection from the courts. Significantly, under the present Rules of Court, complainants in B.P. 22 cases have to pay filing fees upon the commencement of such cases in court to protect their interest. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari emanated from the complaint for grave oral defamation filed by Albert Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro.
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On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tans son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary probation. Upon Tans request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed non-appealable conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies. Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS code violation p oint system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it. Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003. After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant headmaster. Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], thats dangerous. Ching then called Tan (si Ching may kasalanan dito eh!) and informed him that petitioner said talking to him was dangerous. Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner on August 21, 2003. The MeTC found that Chings statements in her affidavit and in open court were consistent and that she did not have any motive to fabricate a false statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will against Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that he uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and professional reputation. Thus, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in view of the animosity between the parties, it found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the RTC. It contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated the antecedents which provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory statement against Tan. The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari. Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him. ISSUE: WON errors of judgment can be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 HELD: Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or
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convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy. In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the nature of petitioners statement , that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs erroneous evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the public respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion). Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC. We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 24. TANJUAN V. PHIL. POSTAL SAVINGS BANK, GR NO. 155278, SEP. 16, 2003 Facts: Respondent Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc. (PPSBI) hired petitioner Tanjuan as Property Appraisal Specialist and Officer- in-Charge of its Credit and Supervision and Control Department. Respondent Torres, PPSBIs president and chief executive officer, issued a memorandum address ed to Tanjuan and five other employees charging them with negligence in the performance of their duties and misrepresentation in violation of the banks rules and regulations for approving certain loan applications. Tanjuan claimed that he merely reviewed and validated the findings of the Property Appraiser. Nevertheless, Torres issued an order informing Tanjuan of his preventive suspension in view of the pending administrative investigation against the latter. Tanjuan alleged that only the Ombudsman had the authority to issue such order. Eventually, Torres then reduced the period within which the suspension was to take effect. Subsequently, by virtue of a board resolution approving PPSBIs reorganization via retrenchment of employees and realignment of functions and positions for the purpose of preventing further serious losses, Torres informed all PPSBI employees that the latter were enjoined to apply for their desired plantilla positions under the new set-up until a certain period. Tanjuan did not apply for any position. Consequently, he received a notice of termination. The release of his separation pay was withheld, however, in light of the pending criminal case filed against him. Displeased with his termination, Tanjuan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against PPSBI. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Tanjuan. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters decision, finding that the private respondents evidence (presented for the first time before the NLRC) was sufficient to support their claim of business losses to justify retrenchment. CA affirmed NLRCs decision.
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Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether the SC should be bound by the NLRCs and CAs findings, even when the evidence of alleged business losses was presented for the first time on appeal before the NLRC Held: YES. It is well-settled that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. This rule applies equally to both the employee and the employer. In the interest of due process, the Labor Code directs labor officials to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or formalities. However, delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained and should adequately prove the employers allegation of the cause for termination. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the evidence of business losses was introduced before the NLRC only. The CA correctly noted, however, that respondents reserved the right to introduce the evidence to the labor arbiter, if and when required to do so. Reasons of confidentiality and the volatile nature of PPSBIs business as a banking institution prompted respondents to limit the presentation of this evidence at the outset. Indeed, it would have been foolhardy for the NLRC and the CA to reject the evidence, just because it had not been presented before the labor arbiter. Such evidence was absolutely necessary to resolve the issue of whether petitioners employment was validly terminated. The CA did not also err in disregarding the Labor Arbiters findings. Notably, the NLRC already rejected these findings, pursuant to its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters. Thereafter, its decision was properly reviewed by the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Accordingly, the CAs factual findings affirming those of the NLRC are generally binding on the SC and will not, as a rule, be reviewed on appeal. Petition denied. PROHIBITION: 1. MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC. V. CA, 263 SCRA 490(1996) concession.
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After investigation of DAVENCORs complaint, the Investigating Committee which looked into DAVENCORs complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that MLE had encroached on the concession area of DAVENCOR. MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During the pendency of the appealed case with the Minister of Natural Resources, Ma. Milagros Matuguina disposed of her shares in petitioner MIWPI, thereby ceasing to be a stockholder of the petitioner of March 16, 1986. The Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his Decision, affirming the aforesaid order of the Director of Forest Development. When the Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources became final and executory, Philip Co and DAVENCOR requested the respondent Minister on October 30, 1986 to issue immediately a writ of execution against MLE and/or MIWPI. MIWPI filed the instant complaint for prohibition, damages and injunction, with prayer for restraining order. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the next day, restraining and/or enjoining the private respondents and the Hon. Secretary of Natural Resources from enforcing, implementing and/or carrying into effect, the decision of the respondent Secretary as well as the order of execution. Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case under Presidential Decree No. 705, to which Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed an Opposition. Trial court issued an order denying private respondents Motion to Dismiss. Trial court issued an order granting the petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the private respondents and the Secretary of Natural Resources, ordering them to desist, refrain and prevent from enforcing respondent Secretarys Decision as well as the writ of execution. Trial court rendered its Decison in favor of the petitioner. Private respondents appealed the trial courts decision on May 19, 1989. Their notice of appeal was approved by the trial court. Respondent Court rendered its Decision, reversing the lower courts pronouncement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Private respondents filed their opposition to the same, the motion was denied by the respondent Court. Not content with the courts pronouncement, petitioner is now before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, alleging that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned decision and its companion resolution, denying the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE/S Was the Petitioner denied due process when it was adjudged liable with MLE for encroaching upon the timber concession of DAVENCOR in the respondent Minister's order of Execution? ii. Is the petitioner a transferee of MLE's interest, as to make it liable for the latters illegal logging operations in DAVENCORs timber concession, or more specifically, is it possible to pierce the veil of MIWPIs corporate existence, making it a mere conduit or successor of MLE? i. HELD YES, to the first issue. NO, to the second issue. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. In Lorenzo vs. Cayetano, 78 SCRA 485 [1987], this Court held that only real parties in interest in an action are bound by judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. Indeed a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. It is elementary that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court and such judgment is not available as an adjudication either against or in favor of such other person. A decision of a court will not operate to divest the rights of a person who has not and has never been a party to a litigation, either as plaintiff or as defendant. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party in the action has not yet had his day in court. The writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment which sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it
DOCTRINE Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law, and the issueof whether a party is an alter ego of another person is one of fact which should be threshed out in the administrative proceeding and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court. In prohibition, only issues affecting jurisdiction may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts. FACTS Facts: The Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber License (PTL) No. 30, covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Ms. Milagros Matuguina who was then doing business under the name of MLE, a sole proprietorship venture. A portion, covering 1,900 hectares, of the said area was located within the territorial boundary of Gov. Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and adjoined the timber concession of Davao Enterprises Corporation (DAVENCOR), the private respondent in this case. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI, for brevity) thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of MIWPI. Milagros Matuguina requested the Director for a change of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30, from a single proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI. Milagros Matuguina and petitioner MIWPI executed a Deed of Transfer transferring all of the formers rights, interests, ownership and participation in Provincial Timber License No. 30 to the latter for and in consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI. Pending approval of the request to transfer the PTL to MIWPI, DAVENCOR, through its Assistant General Manager, complained to the District Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that Milagros Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting logging operations in DAVENCORs timber
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has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the petitioner. The same was issued without giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that petitioner was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Honorable Secretarys decision against it. Petitioner was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, petitioner was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the respondent Secretary disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. In Police Commission vs. Hon Judge Lood, we held that the formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their evidence. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings. Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. In a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts. The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact, and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the execution of its order which is under scrutiny. Assuming, arguendo, that prohibition is the proper remedy for determining the propriety of piercing the separate personality of petitioner with its stockholders, the evidence presented at said trial does not warrant such action. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from that of persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder cannot be made to answer for any of its financial obligations even if he should be its president. But when the juridical personality of the corporation is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the corporation shall be considered as a mere association of persons and its responsible officers and/or stockholders shall be individually liable For the same reasons, a corporation shall be liable for the obligations of a stockholder, or a corporation and its successor-in-interest shall be considered as one and the liability of the former attach to the latter. But for the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed. In the case at bar, there is, insufficient basis for the appellate courts ruling that MIWPI is the same as Matuguina. In the first place the alleged control of plaintiff corporation was not evident in any particular corporate acts of plaintiff corporation, wherein Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises using plaintiff corporation, executed acts or powers directly involving plaintiff corporation. Neither was there any evidence of defendants, that Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises, using the facilities and resources of plaintiff corporation, involved itself in transaction using both single proprietorship and plaintiff corporation in such particular line of business undertakings. It is improper to state that the MIWPI is the privy or the successor-ininterest of MLE, as the liability for the encroachment over DAVENCORs timber concession is concerned, by reason of the transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from MLE to MIWPI.
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More importantly, even if it is deemed that there was a valid change of name and transfer of interest in the PTL No. 30, this only signifies a transfer of authority, from MLE to MIWPI, to conduct logging operations in the area covered by PTL No. 30. It does not show indubitable proof that MIWPI was a mere conduit or successor of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, as far the latters liability for the encroachment upon DAVENCORs concession is concerned. This is the only conclusion which we can discern from the language of Section 61 of P.D. 705, and the letters of the Acting Minister of Natural Resources to Milagros Matuguina/MLE and to MIWPI, on September 16, 1975. 2. AURILLO V. RABI, 392 SCRA 595 (2002)
DOCTRINE When Aurillo, after the lapse of the TRO, continued with the PI, he did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition. One cannot simply say wait for TRO to expire then do it and say since act done, prohibition no longer proper. Court said acts still subject to outcome of petition for prohibition. FACTS Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of arrested without a warrant of arrest and charged in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (possession of unlicensed firearm). Public Prosecutor Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an inquest investigation of the case and issued a resolution recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause on her findings that the material averments of the Joint Affidavit executed by the arresting police officers were hearsay due to the absence of any affidavit of the complainant Rodolfo Cabaluna; and that the knife, gun and the live ammunitions referred to in said affidavit were not found under the chair occupied by Rabi. However, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Aurillo, Jr. of Region VIII decided to assume jurisdiction over the case and to order the conduct of a new preliminary investigation thereof. He issued a Regional Memorandum Order to the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City directing him to elevate to his office the complete records of I.S. No. 95-043 within 24 hours from receipt thereof, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1275 in relation to Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice. On January 20, 1995, Aurillo issued another Memorandum Order to the City Prosecutor directing him to elevate the affidavit of Rodolfo Cabaluna as well as the subject firearm and knife to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor with the information that it had taken over the preliminary investigation of the said complaint pursuant to PD 1275 and existing rules. Assistant Regional State Prosecutor issued a subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043, not only for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2323 (gun banned) [sic], Batas Pambansa Bilang 9 (possession of deadly weapon) and Malicious Mischief. RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining and prohibiting Aurillo and all others acting for and in his behalf from taking over and conducting a new preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 until the court shall have resolved the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the other issues raised in the petition. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi. The trial court nullified the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor and the Information filed with the RTC against Rabi. The RTC declared that under Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice, the power of a regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation was confined solely to specific criminal cases and only when the Secretary of Justice directs him to do so. The trial court further held that without any order from the Secretary of Justice, Aurillo cannot motu proprio take over the preliminary investigation of a case already investigated by the city prosecutor or conduct a new one. Aurillo thereafter filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, on questions of law, against Rabi and the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE/S 1. Whether the petition filed by Rabi with the RTC was premature; 2. Whether Aurillo is empowered to motu proprio take over and conduct a preliminary investigation of I.S No. 95-043, after the inquest investigation thereof had already been terminated and approved by city prosecutor; and 3. Whether the information filed against Rabi for violation of PD 1866 may be nullified by RTC
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the issues presented by the pleadings of the parties. HELD On the first issue, the general rule is that an aggrieved party is mandated to first exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a judicial action for redress from acts of administrative bodies or offices in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions; otherwise, said action may be dismissed for prematurity. However, the principle is not without exceptions. The aggrieved party may validly resort to immediate judicial action where the (a) question raised is purely legal; (b) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (c) when there is an urgent need for judicial intervention; (d) when the disputed act is performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (e) the administrative remedy does not provide for a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and (f) when due process is disregarded. In this case, the Investigating Prosecutor terminated the inquest investigation and came out with her resolution dismissing the case as approved by the City Prosecutor. On January 11, 1995, barely a day thereafter, Aurillo decided to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. 95-043 and ordered the City Prosecutor to elevate the records of said case to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. Rabi was completely unaware of the takeover by Aurillo of the preliminary investigation of the case or the reasons therefor. Rabi learned about Aurillos action for the first time when he received the subpoena from the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor setting the preliminary investigation of the case anew. Being a resident of Tacloban City, Rabi did not have adequate time to seek redress from the Secretary of Justice whose offices is located in Manila and request that the scheduled investigation be forestalled. Time was of the essence. Inaction was not an option; it was, in fact, sheer folly. Judicial intervention was imperative. There was no need for Rabi to still wait for Aurillo to complete his preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043, find probable cause against Rabi for violation of PD 1866 and file an Information against him for said crime nor wait for the issuance by the trial court of a warrant for his arrest. If Rabi tarried, the acts sought to be assailed by him would by then have been a fait accompli to his gross prejudice, and his prayer for a writ of prohibition and for injunctive relief, an exercise in utter futility. Aurillo acted without authority and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when he took over motu proprio the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and ordered a new preliminary investigation thereof; hence, his actuations were a nullity. In this case, when Aurillo motu proprio took over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 after the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor and ordered the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case, he exercised not only administrative supervision but control over the city prosecutor in the performance of the latters quasi-judicial functions. By doing so, Aurillo nullified the resolution of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city prosecutor and deprived Rabi as the aggrieved party in I.S. 95-043 of his right to file a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the inquest prosecutor under Section 2 of Department Circular No. 7 of the Department of Justice, as amended by Department Order No. 223, and if said motion were denied to appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice. Aurillo threw a monkey wrench to the appeal process and deprived the Secretary of Justice of the authority to resolve any appeal by the losing party from the resolution of the city prosecutor in I.S. No. 95- 043. What is so palpable and condemnable is that, Aurillo decided to conduct a preliminary investigation of the crimes for malicious mischief, violation of the Omnibus Election Code and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 9 without any complaint for said cases filed directly with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. The pendency of the special civil action for prohibition before the trial court did not interrupt the investigation in I.S. No. 95-043. It goes without saying, however, that in proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition. In this case, the RTC granted the petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo bereft of authority to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by Aurillo as well as the Information thereafter filed by him. The RTC is possessed of residual power to restore the parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper. Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give complete relief not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. The Court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within
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Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is governed by the nature of the grievance proved and the situation at the time of judgment. Although the general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future act, and not to undo an act already performed, where anything remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating ground for relief are pleaded.Although prohibition is requested only as to a particular matter, the court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as much as is proper to be granted. In the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, the court has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to make such incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future, even though the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed. Hence, the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only the preliminary investigation by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043 for want of authority but also the Information approved by Aurillo and filed with the RTC 3.
VERGARA V. RUGUE, 78 SCRA 312 (1977)
DOCTRINE As a general rule, petition for prohibition is intended as a remedy for acts yet to be performed, not acts already performed. Here, the case was already decided, last ditch effort because already in execution stage. Appeals; Special Civil Action; Prohibition; The function of prohibition is to prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority.The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Same; Prohibition; The office of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct errors of judgment but to restrain usurpation and compel observance of jurisdictional limitations. The office of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions. It is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some act to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. This remedy will lie only to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure; but, if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper assumption or jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available. It may be safely asserted as a settled law, that unless the court sought to be prohibited is wanting in jurisdiction over the class of cases to which the pending case belongs or is attempting to act in excess of its jurisdiction in a case of which it rightfully has cognizance, the writ will be denied. FACTS On September 30, 1949, the Kapisanan Ang Buhay, Inc which was duly authorized by the Tuason Estate in Sta. Mesa, Manila, which has been acquired by the Republic of the Philippines, executed a contract of sale on a portion of the said estate described as Lot No. 9, Block No. 12, in favor of the plaintiff Abraham Rugue. Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff bound himself to pay and religiously and regularly paid the installments that become due and payable thereon. The size of the lot had been
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reduced from 200 square meters to only 120 square meters as a result of the widening of the street, reducing the value of the property to only P2,785.59. Of this amount, the sum of P1,407.07 was paid by plaintiff to the Kapisanan Ang Buhay, Inc and the balance of P1,378.52 was paid to the cashier of the Land Tenure Administration on October 3, 1957. Having thus completed the payments constituting the purchase price of the said lot, the Land Tenure Administration became bound to execute the corresponding document of sale to transfer the ownership of the said lot to the plaintiff. However, before the same could be done, one Alfonso Vergara intervened and claim preferential right over the said property over the plaintiff herein. An investigation was conducted by the Land Tenure Administration as a result of which the Land Tenure Administration awarded the contract in favor of the plaintiff. An appeal from the decision of the Land Tenure Administration was taken by defendant Alfonso Vergara to the Office of the President, which Office reversed the decision of the Land Tenure Administration thru former Executive Secretary Juan Pajo on June 12, 1958, and subsequently, Natalio Castillo on February 12 1960 and awarded the contract of the said property to the said defendant Alfonso Vergara, reserving, however, the right of reimbursement to the plaintiff for the payments that he had made on the said lot by virtue of the contract that was executed between him and the representative of the government. Hence, this action. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but ordering the Land Tenure Administration to refund to Abraham Rugue all the payments that he has made on the property, as well as to reimburse him for whatever improvement he has made on the property. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals, on June 20, 1967, reversed the judgment of the trial court On December 23, 1967, the records of the case were remanded by the Court of Appeals to the lower court, and on December 18, 1969, Rugue filed with the lower court a motion for execution of said decision which was granted by the trial court on January 10, 1970. Consequently, the corresponding order of execution was issued. On January 20, 1970, petitioner Vergara was served with a copy of said order of execution. On April 20, 1970, through his new counsel, Vergara filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for relief from judgment; he also filed with the lower court the corresponding motion to stay execution of judgment. In his petition for relief from judgment, Vergara alleged, among others, that he learned from his former counsel, Atty. Matias P. Gaspar, that the latter never received a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, and that on his part, he learned of said decision only when he received notice of the execution proceedings in the lower court. He, however, stated in his petition that it appears from the records of the Court of Appeals that Atty. Gaspar has not given notice of his various changes of address. He then prayed that he be relieved from the mistake of counsel. Subsequent appeals to the SC were dismissed. Petitioners view that when the Court of Appeals in effect set aside the e ffects of the decision of Executive Secretary Pajo, dated June 12, 1958, which according to him had long become final and executory, it exceeded or transcended its appellate jurisdiction. The thrust of his argument is that the Court of Appeals was precluded from reviewing the decision of Executive Secretary Pajo on the ground of res judicataa principle also applicable to judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards. ISSUE/S Whether the CA exceeded its jurisdiction and the same is a proper subject of prohibition. HELD NO, the CA acted within its jurisdiction and the same is NOT a proper subject of a petition for prohibition . We do not think that this ingenious argument is legally tenable. It ignores the circumstance that res judicata was never raised as a defense by the petitioner in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 45780, the decision of which was reversed by the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 31186-R. It should be remembered that in the Answer of petitioner Alfonso Vergara, dated January 5, 1961, to the complaint of Abraham Rugue for annulment of sale and specific performance in Civil Case No. 45780, his defense was that the resolutions of the Executive Secretary, dated June 12, 1958 and February 12, 1960, (1) reversing the decision of the Land Tenure Administration in LTA Case No. 253 dismissing the claims of Vergara and Retoma over Lot No. 9, Block No. 12 of the Tuason Estate and (2) awarding the said property to him, is based on law and equity because (a) Rugue was not a bonafide tenant as defined in LTA Administrative Order No. 2; (b) Rugue has no immediate need of the land in question as he
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acquired another house and lot at Vergara Street, Quiapo, Manila; (c) to convey to plaintiff the lot in question would be repugnant to the spirit of the Land Reform Act to distribute as many family size farms to as many landless citizens as possible; and (d) plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the agreement to sell executed between him and the Kapisanang Ang Buhay, Inc. as he failed to construct a house on said property. Nowhere in the afore-mentioned answer has Vergara ever asserted that the decisions of Executive Secretary Pajo, as affirmed by Executive Secretary Castillo, was a final adjudication of the property rights of Vergara and Rugue and, therefore, the action of Rugue was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Neither has Vergara invoked res judicata in his brief when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 31186-R, although extensive discussion was made thereon regarding the power of the Executive Secretary to reverse the decision of the Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration and the correctness and validity of the formers decision reversing that of the latter. The same conclusion is reached with regard to petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred when it honored the sale of the questioned lot in favor of Abraham Rugue. This is a matter that has to do with the merits of the case which petitioner is now precluded from relitigating in view of the principle of res judicata. Certainly, such question is not a proper subject of a petition for prohibition. The office of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions. It is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some act to be done, It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. This remedy will lie only to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure; but, if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the person and subejct-matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper assumption or jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available. It may be safely asserted as a settled law, that unless the court sought to be prohibited is wanting in jurisdiction over the class of cases to which the pending case belongs or is attempting to act in excess of its jurisdiction in a case of which it rightfully has cognizance, the writ will be denied. The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must first be demonstrated that the lower court has exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended the same or acted without any authority. 4. VERSOZA V. MARTINEZ (299 SCRA 100, 113-114[1998])
DOCTRINE Same; Same; Generally consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction.Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, where the acts are performed after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed to perform the acts sought to be restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the injunction will not lie because he has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after the beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril. It has been held that [t]he gener al rule of law is that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and before the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper.
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Same; Same; Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril.In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. If one in the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus outwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. x x x Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril. Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling the property to Pilar Martinez, Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril. FACTS Records reveal that Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 19,955 square meters located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Verzosa. Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the mortgage foreclosed. On July 21, 1988, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan set the foreclosure sale on August 17, 1988 at 10:00 A.M. To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Fe Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 16590, for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On August 22, 1988, defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 8, 1989, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson. On June 27, 1989, Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the court. On June 29, 1989, she filed her amended complaint which bears the proper verification. Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage. Whereupon, Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him to discontinue the foreclosure sale in deference to the said pending case and to the action to be taken by the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Court. On July 4, 1989, the foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold to Verzosa being the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was approved by Executive Judge Antonio Belen and issued to Verzosa. On September 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson. At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898 for certiorari. He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On June 20, 1990, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan. On July 5, 1990, or after the expiration of the redemption period of one year, the defendant Sheriff issued the Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale. Thus, O.C.T. No. 12783 in Fe Usons name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. 11087 was issued in the name of Wilfredo Verzosa. On July 12, 1990, Verzosa sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosa s T.C.T. No. 11087 was cancelled and T.C.T. No. 11107 was issued to Martinez.
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Meantime, on October 16, 1990, or after one year from the filing of Verzosas petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the said court dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the validity of respondent courts order dated September 5, 1989 admitting Fe Usons amended complaint. On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying, among others, the annulment of the latters titleT.C.T. No. 11107. On August 20, 1991, upon Usons application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second Amended Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez), respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or ownership over the land in question covered by O.C.T. No. 12783, upon posting by plaintiff Uson of a bond of P10,000.00. Defendant Martinez filed a motion for consideration which was denied on September 18, 1991. On October 30, 1991, after hearing and upon posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 by Uson, respondent Judge issued an order directing defendants Verzosa and Martinez and/or any and other persons acting under their command to desist and cease from entering, intruding and making constructions on the land covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. On November 22, 1991, respondent judge, acting on Verzosas motion for clarification of the order dated September 18, 1991, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107. HELD For as long as the instant case (Civil Case No. 16590) remains pending, no act of the defendants subsequent to the filing of this case can make TCT No. 11107 in the name of defendant Pilar Martinez, and the alleged possession of the latter of the property in question, valid and be considered the status quo. For purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand. In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa. In the same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the Amended Complaints therein alleged new causes of action. Similarly unavailing is petitioners contention that the injunctive writ was applied retroactively and, hence, violative of Ruymann and other subsequent cases. To repeat, Ruymann was wrongly applied by petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint herein, the present suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint. Finally, petitioners assert that Respondent Court violated the well-entrenched doctrine that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. As earlier noted, despite the fact that Pilar Martinez already had title to and possession of the disputed property, the CA affirmed the order of the trial court enjoining her from entering, intruding and making construction and/or performing any act of ownership or possession and any activity over the land. In the case at bar, private respondent was still the owner and was in possession of the property at the time the original Complaint was filed. The rule is that a court should not by means of preliminary injunction transfer the property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal
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title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership thereto.22 When private respondent filed the original Complaint, she had title to and possession of the property and was asserting ownership thereto. Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, where the acts are performed after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed to perform Performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after the beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril. It has been held that [t]he gen eral rule of law is that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and before the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper. In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. If one in the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus outwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. x x x Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril.25 Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling the property to Pilar Martinez, Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril. Clearly, the Respondent Court did not err in sustaining the Decision of the lower court that the status quo to be maintained was the situation when title to and possession of the property were still with Private Respondent Uson. 5. NACIONALISTA PARTY V. BAUTISTA, 85 PHIL 101 (1949) (2)
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It is claimed, in the alternative, that even if there was on that date a vacancy in the Commission on Elections, still the respondent's designation to act as such member of the Commission, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending the appointment of a permanent member, is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because membership in the Commission is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and, therefore, no designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made; because a member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office; and because the respondent as Solicitor General belongs to the executive department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in the Commission. As there was a vacancy in the membership of the Commission on Elections, the next point to determine is whether the designation of the respondent as Acting Member of the Commission on Elections, in addition to his duties as Solicitor General, pending the appointment of a permanent member to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of Commissioner Francisco Enage, is unlawful and unconstitutional. ISSUE (1) (2) HELD (1) NO. It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily. Moreover, the permanent office of the respondent may not, from the strict legal point of view, be incompatible with the temporary one to which he has been designated, tested by the nature and character of the functions he has to perform in both offices, but in a broad sense there is an incompatibility, because his duties and functions as Solicitor General require that all his time be devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that is required and expected of him. YES, while ordinarily this remedy would be found improper the court held that the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the case allowed for the resort to prohibition in the absence of any other remedy in law. Whether the temporary appointment was lawful. Whether prohibition is the proper remedy.
DOCTRINE PROHIBITION; IT WILL NOT LIE TO DETERMINE TITLE TO OFFICE.The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court (High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3d ed., p. 715; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 871). FACTS On November 9, 1949 respondent Bautista was appointed by the president to the Commission on Elections to fill in for Commissioner Engage, whose application for retirement from the office was approved on the same date. At the time, Bautista was already employed at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). When Bautista was appointed he did not cease to exercise his office at the OSG not did he make any statement that he would resign in favor of his new appointment. Bautista averred that the appointment was only in a temporary or in an acting capacity pending the appointment of a permanent member of the Commission. The respondent contends that his designation is lawful and valid, not only because the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to designate, but also because it is expressly so provided in 'Commonwealth Act No. 588; and that the offices held by him, one permanent and the other temporary, are not incompatible. It is contended that such designation is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional, because there was on 9 November 1949 no vacancy in the Commission on Elections, for the acceptance, approval, or granting of the application for retirement filed by Commissioner Francisco Enage on such date constitutes or amounts to abuse of discretion and was done in bad faith by the President and therefore null and void; and, because Commissioner Enage is entitled to leave and until after the expiration of such leave he does not cease to be a member of the Commission on Elections. The contention that the granting of the retirement application of Commissioner Enage constitutes an abuse of discretion and was made in bad faith is based upon the allegation and claim that the Commissioner "had voted to suspend the elections in Negros Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears he might vote to annul said elections."
Authorities are invoked in view of the peculiar and extraordinary circumstances obtaining in this case already referred to, to wit: that as no one is entitled to the office there is no party who in his name may institute quo warranto proceedings, and that the respondent, the only other party who may institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, would not proceed against himself. Were it not for this anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, we would adhere strictly to the time-honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto proceedings is the proper remedy. The allegations in the complaint test the validity or legality of the respondent's designation in a temporary capacity as member of the Commission on Elections pending the appointment of a permanent member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the party who claims to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule 68) or by the Solicitor General (secs. 3, 4, Rule 68). The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court (High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3d ed., p. 715; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 871). In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the respondent's designation to act temporarily as member of the Commission on Elections is unlawfful because it offends against the provisions of the Constitution creating the Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny and deprive the parties that are affected by such designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is entitled now to the office and a party who is not entitled to the office may not institute quo warranto proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General, the only other party who may institute the proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a remedy. There are cases involving a situation similar to the one under consideration wherein it was ruled that the remedy of prohibition may lie.
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6. ENRIQUEZ V. MACADAEG, 84 PHIL. 674 (1949)
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DOCTRINE APPEAL; PROHIBITION. While the court exceeds its jurisdiction in ordering the payment of said expenses, which are not administration expenses, yet as the remedy of appeal is adequate to correct said error, the extraordinary remedy of prohibition does not lie. FACTS Original petition for the writ of prohibition filed by Catalina Asinas, assisted by her husband Francisco Medina, against the Court of First Instance of Romblon and Felisa Asinas, praying, for the reasons therein given, that the respondent court be required to refrain from ordering the payment of P200 to the respondent Felisa Asinas and permitting the latter to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of Mauricio Asinas' will, and the administration of his estate; and the said respondent Felisa Asinas to refrain from performing any act with respect thereto. On August 9, 1926, an application for the probate of what purports to be the will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, a resident of the municipality of Looc of the Province of Romblon was filed in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Opposition was entered to said application by the respondent Felisa Asinas, alleging that she is an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio Asinas, and by Justo Asinas, brother of said deceased. In view of the fact that the petitioner Catalina Asinas denied Felisa Asinas' right to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of said alleged will, the court proceeded to determine whether said respondent is really an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Mauricio Asinas. After hearing the parties, and upon consideration of the evidence adduced, the respondent court, in spite of petitioner's objection, authorized Felisa Asinas to intervene in said probate proceeding as well as in the administration of the said deceased's estate, and granted her, moreover, P200 travelling expenses for herself and her witnesses, chargeable to the funds under administration. The petitioner took exception to said rulings issued by the respondent court and moved for a reconsideration, but said motion was denied by its order of November 19, 1927. ISSUE (1) Whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in authorizing the respondent Felisa Asinas to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of the alleged will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas and the administration of his estate, as well as in ordering that the expenses incurred by her appearance in court and that of her witnesses, amounting to P200, be charged to the funds under administration. Whether prohibition is the proper remedy.
DOCTRINE PLEADING AND PRACTICE; IMPROPER VENUE; MOTION TO DISMISS; COURT'S DENIAL OF MOTION; MANDAMUS is NOT PROPER REMEDY BUT PROHIBITION. When a motion to dismiss on the ground' of improper venue is erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting the error. It being a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be maintained' in his court, the remedy is prohibition. FACTS Petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss a civil action pending in his court. The civil action in question is for the recovery of a piece of real property situated in Negros Oriental, the complaint alleging that the said property had been bought by plaintiff at an execution sale but that, notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed owner of said property, subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank and refused to surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, whereupon, the latter brought suit to have himself declared owner of said property and placed in possession thereof. Before filing their answer, the defendants in that case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the action. Respondent judge puts up the defense that the act sought to be ordered involves the exercise of judicial diseretion and that petitioner has another adequate remedy, which is by appeal. Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property be commenced and tried in the province where the property lies, while paragraph 1(&) of Rule 8, provides that defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." As the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and the recovery of possession of real property situated in Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should have been granted. ISSUE (1) (2) HELD (1) YES. Whether the judge erred in dismissing the motion Whether mandamus is the proper remedy
(2) HELD (1)
NO.
(2) NO. Mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action that would not be maintained in his court a case for prohibition. While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the respondent judge or his successor from taking cognizance of this case unless it be to dismiss the same in accordance with the Rules. Without costs. So ordered. 7. ASINAS V. CFI ROMBLON, 51 PHIL 665 (1928)
A person alleging an interest in opposing the probate of a will as an acknowledged natural daughter need not conclusively prove the existence of such a civil status, or that such status has been judicially declared; it is sufficient that there be prima facie evidence to that effect. This is not only because the law does not require it, but because section 753 of the same Code provides for the determination of the persons entitled to receive the rest of the property in the said administration proceeding after the debts, funeral and administration expenses have been paid. (Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Torres vs. Javier, 34 Phil., 382; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343; Briz vs. Briz and Remigio, 43 Phil., 763.) As to the respondent's (Felisa Asinas') right to intervene in the appointment of an administrator and in the estate, that is nothing more than a logical consequence of her right to oppose the probate of the will. The respondent court did not exceed its jurisdiction in permitting the respondent Felisa Asinas, upon producing prima facie evidence of her condition as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, to oppose the probate of the said deceased's will, and to intervene in the appointment of an administrator of the property left by him. There can be no doubt that the expenses incurred by the respondent Felisa Asinas for her appearance
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and that of her witnesses, with a view to establishing her right to oppose the probate of Mauricio Asinas' will, cannot be considered as administration expenses, inasmuch as they are not necessary either for the management of the property or its protection from destruction or deterioration, or for the production of fruits. Although a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to authorize a judicial administrator of a decedent's estate to make certain expenses for the benefit of said estate, or to approve those already made, such jurisdiction is confined to expenses strictly necessary for the good management thereof. In ordering, then, that the P200 expenses incurred for the appearance of the respondent and her witnesses be paid out of, and charged to, the funds under administration, the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction.
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suffering from any academic deficiency petitioners have satisfactorily complied with the prescribed curriculum, entitling them to re-admission and enrollment as 4th year students in the College of Nursing of respondent USA. ISSUE/S (1) (2) HELD (1)
Whether the case should have been dismissed for being moot and academic. Whether mandamus may lie to compel a school to readmit students.
NO. Even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. NO. Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary duty.
(2)
NO. The order subject of certiorari is final in character and was made without giving the administrator his day in court, as such it is subject to APPEAL. As there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of justice, namely, an appeal, prohibition cannot lie.
(2)
MANDAMUS: 1. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN V. CA, 230 SCRA 761, G.R. NO. 100588 MARCH 7, 1994
FACTS Respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused re- admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II With Related Learning Experience). Petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner USA to readmit them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for actual and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them. Justified the decision not to readmit them as being in pursuance of the schools policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their beiow 80% performance rating. Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject tb existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research. Also allege that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court revered and ruled that the students be re-admitted. Whether or not petitioners, with grades ranging from 77% to 78% in Nursing 104, are deemed, within legal contemplation, to be with academic deficiency. And on this crucial issue, We cannot help but resolve in the negative. While it is true that they did not obtain a grade of at least 80% in Nursing 104, they passed and did not fail in said subject. It is irrefutable that 75% is the passing grade in respondent USA, and in all educational institutions of this country; so that petitioners grades of 77% and 78% are well above passing mark. Therefore, petitioners having been given passing grades in all their subjects and full credit for the corresponding number of units; it stands to reason, and conclude, that far from
Private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and indispensable requisites of a mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that they possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in petitioner USA. Moreover, assuming that petitioner USA has an imperative duty to enrol them, it does not appear to this Court that the duty is merely ministerial; rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion. CJ Teehankee rationalized this in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee et al: Only x x x when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for enrollment x x x. The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves as Admission Committees of he universities and institutions of higher learning and to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be swamped with petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their grades. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. 2. UY KIAO ENG V. NIXON LEE GR NO. 176831, 15 JAN 2010
FACTS Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for noncompliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of
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Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. In its February 4, 2005 Order, however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20, 2005. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76 in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006 Amended Decision, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. ISSUE/S Was issuance of mandamus by the CA proper? HELD NO. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the perfor - mance of duties in which the public has no interest.The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
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speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not (Rule 76, Section 1). 3. ANGCHANGCO, JR. V. OMBUDSMAN, 268 SCRA 301 (1997)
FACTS Petitioner Angchangco, Jr. was an RTC Sheriff IV. Pursuant to the DOLEs decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (NIASS) to pay its workers, a writ of execution was issued. Angchangco, as the assigned sheriff, garnished NIASSs daily collections from its various clients. NIASSs counsel filed the following against Angchangco in relation to the latters enforcement of the said writ: 1. Complaint for prohibition and damages before the RTC; and 2. Complaint for graft, estafa/malversation, and misconduct, before the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, certain NIASS employees filed a separate complaint against Angchangco, claiming that the latter had illegally deducted an amount from their differential pay. While the complaint for prohibition and damages before the RTC had already been resolved, the criminal cases against Angchangco were still pending. This prevented Angchangco from claiming his benefits upon his retirement. Hence, this petition for mandamus against the Ombudsman, compelling him to dismiss the unresolved cases. ISSUE Whether the instant petition should be granted HELD YES. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This remedy is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retroaction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In the instant case, dismissal is proper, considering that petitioners constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases against him are violated by the Ombudsmans inordinate delay of more than six years in resolving the said unresolved cases. Petition Granted.
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4. LAMB V. PHIPPS, 22 PHIL 456 (1921) (READ ALSO DISSENT OF J. TRENT)
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acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Meanwhile, a purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of impropriety if the act done. Finally, mandamus is not the only available remedy to Lamb. He should have exercised his right to appeal. He, however, failed to exhaust the administrative remedies, such as this right, before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Petition dismissed. Trent dissent: In determining whether the writ of mandamus should issue, the court must be governed by the nature of the duty sought to be enforced and not by the nature of office held by the respondent. This is true, and the rule, to this extent, has been modified in this jurisdiction. But political necessity and public policy demanded this modification. There is nothing growing out of the official character of Phipps which exempts him from or places him beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The duties of public officers are of two kinds: (1) those of a political or legislative character in the discharge of which their discretion is uncontrollable by mandamus and (2) those administrative, judicial, and quasi-judicial duties imposed by law. No one will claim that Phipps duties belong to the first class. His duties, under the statutes, are administrative and, to some extent, quasi-judicial only. If he is exempt from all kinds of suits in the courts and from all kinds of process issued by the courts, it must be because of some hidden or occult implications of the laws or statutes or from inherent and insuperable barriers found in the structure of the government itself, and not from the express provisions of the statutes. Can the courts control by mandamus the judgment and the discretion which Phipps has exercised when he denied the Lamb's request for a certificate of clearance upon the grounds (1) that a probable suit might be brought by one Fernandez against the Government, and (2) that the Government, in all probability, would have to pay the Lambs claims for leave, salary, and transportation? Yes. It cannot be said that every act is within the legal or official discretion of the officer performing it. Discretion, when applied to officers of the Government, means sound discretion, guided by reason. It must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And when an officers acts do not come within this rule, the courts have the power to and should intervene. Also, as a matter of fact, it is necessary for a public officer to exercise his own discretion and judgment as to whether a certain state of facts exists, even in the performance of a so-called ministerial duty. It would seem that the only difference between the discretion which he thus exercises and that conferred upon him by express law is one of degree and not of kind. In the laws the duties of every officer are outlined as completely as human skill can do it. Yet, in the nature of things, doubts often arise as to what is the correct procedure under the laws. A public officer, on taking office, must necessarily be the first to interpret the laws relating to his position. When the time arrives for him to perform any one of his duties, he must first act or refuse to act before anyone else can take jurisdiction. Some of the duties prescribed for him by the laws are so plain as to practically admit of no argument. These are generally called ministerial duties. Still, it requires the exercise of personal judgment to decide on the time, manner, and extent of performance. 5. CARBUNGCO V. AMPARO, 83 PHIL 638 (1949)
FACTS Petitioner Lamb held various governmental positions, his latest was as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony. Meanwhile, respondent Phipps was the countrys Insular Auditor at the time of this case. According to Lamb, Phipps duty as such was to issue an auditors certificate to any employee or agent of the Government who had left the service. This issuance, however, is subject to the conditions that the legal records of the office of the Auditor for the Philippine Islands show that (1) the said employees or agents accounts are balanced and (2) the said employee or agent has properly accounted for all government property and funds that have come into his possession during his employment. Phipps failed and refused to issue the certificate in Lambs favor. According to Lamb, this failure violated his rights to (1) collect the amounts due him for accrued leave, salary, and transportation from the Government and (2) leave the country on his own will since it would be a criminal offense to do so. Notably, however, three charges of malversation of public funds were filed against Lamb. While the criminal cases have been dismissed, its civil aspect remains unresolved. Because of this, Phipps claimed that no funds and clearance to leave the country would be granted, pending the said civil case. Hence, the present petition for mandamus. Lamb now claims that Phipps should grant him the said clearance since, pursuant to the law, the former has already accounted for the all the governmental property and funds that have come under his possession. Phipps counters that (1) the court has no jurisdiction to issue mandamus to the Auditor of the Philippine Islands and (2) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ISSUE Whether Phipps should be compelled to issue the certificate in Lambs favor HELD NO. Experience has taught auditors and businessmen that mere paper balances are not always reliable. The actual funds and property are not always visible in the said documents. The facts also show that Phipps has not been in delay in exercising his duty. While the law provides that an account cannot be reopened against the subject employee after three years from the time that the auditor has verified the same, in the instant case, the said period has not yet elapsed. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. In the present case, however, the mandamus is not for the purpose of compelling action only. It is presented for the purpose of requiring particular action on the part of the Auditor. There is a wide discretion between the two. And for the courts to require an auditor to allow or disallow a claim against or in favor of the Government would be to substitute the courts as the auditing officers of the Government. Such was a result not contemplated by law, which had conferred upon another department of the Government the final and exclusive jurisdiction to consider claims. Pertinently, mandamus will not lie in any matter requiring the exercise of official judgment, or resting in the sound discretion of the person to whom a duty is confided by law, either to control the exercise of that discretion or to determine the decision which shall be finally given, but only to set him in motion and compel him to exercise his function according to some discretion when he has refused or neglected to act at all. Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of
FACTS: Petitioner Carbungco filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Vicenta Foz. Carbungco claims that Foz has refused to vacate his premises because of a sublease granted to her by a Jose Santos, his former tenant. The municipal court ruled against Foz, with the latter failing to appear and answer in the same. Foz appealed her case to the CFI. Pending appeal and because Foz has failed to deposit the rental corresponding to a particular month before the court, Carbungco filed a motion for the execution of
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judgment. Respondent judge Amparo denied Carbungcos motion on the ground that a deposit had already been made. Hence, the instant petition for mandamus, praying that Amparo be compelled to issue an order of execution against Foz. ISSUE Whether the instant petition should be granted HELD YES. The procedural law provides that, in a detainer case, an amount representing the rental of the previous month must first be deposited with the court within the first ten days of the succeeding month. In the instant case, Foz was only able to so pay three days after the 10-day period had lapsed. The law and authorities are clear that the deposit to be made within the said period is mandatory. The court then is left without any discretion to extend the period of deposit prescribed by law, however short the delay. Petition for mandamus granted. 6. UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS V. CA, 166 SCRA 570 (1988)
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Lee has employed undue and improper pressure in having her grades changed. And even if Lee had succeeded in having her failing grades changed, USC still has the discretion to decide whether she can still graduate with honors. Petition granted. 7. PERALTA V. SALCEDO, 101 PHIL 452 (1957)
FACTS Petitioner Peralta was a fourth year law student of the Adamson University College of Law. A Marieta de Sesto filed an immorality charge against him before the Bureau of Private Education, claiming that they had illicit relations from which a baby boy had resulted. Despite repeated demands, Peralta refused to fulfill his promise of marrying her. Pursuant to this charge, respondent director conducted an investigation and subsequently recommended to the Secretary of Education that Peralta be expelled from Adamson University and denied admission to any other school. At the end of the school year, Peralta filed with the Bureau of Private Schools an application for graduation from the law course. He likewise requested that the said office issue him a certificate showing his having completed the required studies of lawa requisite for bar examinees. The Bureau, however, did not accede to these requests, prompting Peralta to file the present petition for mandamus. iSSUE Whether the present petition shall prosper HELD NO. The petition is clearly premature. At the time this petition has been filed, the Secretary of Education had not yet acted on the directors recommendation. Until and after the Secretary of Education has rendered a decision on Peraltas case, the courts cannot act in the matter. Well-settled is the rule that no recourse to the courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petition dismissed. What is continuing Mandamus? It is part of the new rules on the Writ of Kalikasan. It is a special rule. Meant to be implemented CONTINUELY, CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; COMMON MATTERS 1. Facts UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN V. CA
FACTS Private respondent Jennifer Lee was an Architecture student of petitioner University of San Carlos (USC) during her first school year. Having obtained incomplete and failing grades, she shifted to USCs School of Commerce, where she performed well. Lee, however, was aware that her grades with the College of Architecture would be considered in determining whether she could graduate with honors. She then requested to the Council of Deans that her grades in some of her Architecture classes be disregarded in the computation of her average. The USC President denied this request since deviating from this policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before but were not allowed to graduate with honors. Lee then graduated without any honors. Lee filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC, praying that petitioners USC and Dean Victoria Satorre be compelled confer upon her the degree, cum laude, and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors. Both the RTC and, upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of Lee. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners now allege that mandamus does not lie to compel a university to grant graduation honors to any student who, according to its rules and regulations, does not qualify to receive such. ISSUE Whether a university may be compelled grant honors to a student who does not qualify as such, according to its rules and regulations, through mandamus HELD NO. It is an accepted principle that schools are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. In the instant case, petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors so demanded. The facts of the case show that, while the USC President is out of town, Lee has had her grades changed by the university registrar. Besides not qualifying to graduate with honors as per university rules and regulations,
The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the retention policy of the school, that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing subject and in two minor subjects. As a consequence, the school refused to re-admit them. Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience). Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner USA to re-admit them. Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena,
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Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To buttress petitioner's stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research. Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to readmit them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom. The RTC ruled that mandamus will not lie to compel the respondents to enroll petitioning students because of their academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondents university falls within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause of our Constitution. The CA did not agree with the ruling of the trial court.
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imperative duty to enroll them, it does not appear to this Court that the duty is merely ministerial; rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion. This was likewise our ruling in the case of Tangonan v. Pao et al., which involves a factual setting similar to the present petition. We adopted as our own the rationalization of the trial court therein: . . . . Every school has a right to determine who are the students it should accept for enrolment. It has the right to judge the fitness of students. While petitioner questions the findings of respondent school as to her academic competence, the Court cannot find any legal jurisdiction to interfere in the exercise of judgment of the school on this matter. . . . Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its intent. 2. UY KIAO ENG V. NIXON LEE
Issue
Whether or not the students can compel the school to allow them to complete their course? No. Mandamus does not lie.
FACTS Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent. Held: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for
Held We rule that the special civil action of mandamus is not available in this instance. The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrollment. Taking into account the admission of private respondents that they have finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by events and should therefore be dismissed. However, even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. We shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The nature of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act requiredIt is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In the present case, private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and indispensable requisites of a mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that they possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in petitioner USA. Moreover, assuming that petitioner USA has an
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citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here the production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. 3. SANTIAGO V. VASQUEZ, 217 SCRA 633 (1993)
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3. Libel, by uttering scurrilous and defamotory statements against Maria Tatoy then Chief of the Certificate Section, Commission on Immigration and Deportation that the latter was a corrupt employee, a perennial trouble-maker who has filed administrative cases against all the commissioners under whom she served. A temporary restraining order was issued ordering the Sandiganbayan and the RTC to respectively cease and desist from conducting the proceedings. Petitioner avers that in filing the aforequoted criminal informations, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner contends that the criminal charges are meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. ISSUE Whether the SB and RTC should be enjoined from proceeding with the criminal cases HELD YES. It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible official is vested with discretion and is endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite investigate and adjudicatory proceedings. But if, as emphasized by respondent Ombudsman, the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation constitutes very valid grounds to charge petitioner Santiago and her co-accused before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, no compelling reason would exist for us to rule otherwise. Petitioner, claiming exception to the interdiction against a suit to enjoin criminal prosecution, avers that the instant petition seeks to prevent the strong arm of the law from being utilized in an oppressive and vindictive manner. She then postulates that as one who has consistently topped all major presidential surveys from 1990 to 1991, the filing of the informations against her will prejudice her standing in the presidential surveys. This is, contextually and for legal intents and purposes herein, a mere verisimilitude. At any rate, we definitely cannot subordinate the demands of public interest and policy to the political aspirations of herein petitioner. We have carefully gone over the records of the case and, contrary to the pretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to show that the informations in question were filed with the vindictive intention to oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate her constitutional rights. It is significant that petitioner failed to impute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public respondents. Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he "has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for the highest position in the land." This is made no more apparent than in the various memoranda approved by respondent Ombudsman establishing that the admitted facts of record are sufficient to engender a well founded belief that each of the crimes charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the requisite quantum of evidence at this posture of each of said cases. CASE NOTE
FACTS Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), was accused of: 1. Willfully, unlawfully and criminally approving the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines in violation of Executive Order No. 324; 2. Together with the Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry and a CID employee, of willfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and other valuable things from several Filipino and foreign businessmen the same being given by reason of their respective official positions for past favor and expected favor and better treatment in the future from said accused, in the discharge of their respective official functions; and
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Concurrent jurisdiction of courts does not mean you can ignore judicial hierarchy. Appellate court will not entertain complaints when it can be entertained in the appropriate court. Start with the RTC, rather than CA or SC. 4. ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK V COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 421 (1998)
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1. Whether or not respondents' appeal was timely submitted to the appellate court and should be resolved on the merits; 2. Whether the said court had jurisdiction to issue motu proprio its resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 notwithstanding the pendency of the present petition filed with this Court on March 5, 1979 HELD With regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate court in issuing the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 respectively, the petitioner argues that since it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which means that such a petition is a special civil action, the appellate court did not lose its jurisdiction to correct interlocutory orders that may have been issued erroneously. On the other hand, the respondents maintain that while under the Rules of Court, courts may amend, modify or revoke any decision or order promulgated by them, such power of authority is not absolute. They state that among the limitations thereof are when a judgment has become final and when an appeal has been interposed on time. Accordingly, while it is true that what is pending in the present case is neither a final judgment nor an appeal by certiorari, the effect thereof would be the same. Therefore, out of respect and courtesy for the higher court, the lower court should have suspended all pending proceedings in the elevated case as even without any restraining order, the lower court had lost jurisdiction to further act on the case. We agree with the respondents on this point. Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to discuss and denying the latter's motion to reconsider such, order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court. The appellate court acted with grave abuse of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 correcting its earlier erroneous orders which were already before us. On the second issue of whether or not respondents perfected their appeal on time, the petitioner argues that clearly, the respondents appeal was filed out of time since by their own admission, respondents filed their notice of appeal only on September 8, 1978, when they had only up to August 27, 1978 to file the same. We find the petitioner's contention well-taken. It should be noted that when the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issued by the NPCC dated August 18, 1978, the same was denied by the latter on August 22, 1978, Notice of the denial was received by the respondents on August 25, 1978. It is clear from the above-quoted order that as far as the respondents are concemed there was no amendment of the NPCC's previous orders which would justify the running anew of the period to appeal. The only modification found in the order did not pertain to the respondents but to the petitioner which was fined for allowing an illegal interment. The respondents cannot allege that the order of August 22, 1978 was more adverse to them since it was the petitioner which was fined. After the denial of the respondents' motion for reconsideration, they only had one day to perfect their appeal which was on August 26, 1978. Therefore, their filing of an appeal on September 8, 1978 was definitely out of time. Even assuming arguendo that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal started anew on August 25, 1978, the day when respondents received the order of August 22, 1978, still their appeal was perfected out of time since the perfection of the same should be reckoned not from the filing of the notice of appeal but from the payment of docketing fees. The respondents paid the docket fees only on October 2, 1978. Inasmuch as the respondents' appeal was perfected out of time, the appellate court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Consequently, its appealed orders before this Court and all other orders it issued with
FACTS Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation (Eternal Gardens) applied for a certificate of clearance from the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), to operate a memorial park at the former site of the Philippine Union College in Baesa, Caloocan City. The private respondents, "Residents of Baesa" opposed the application on the ground that the project would cause pollution of water resources in the area. While hearings were being conducted by the NPCC, the petitioner allowed an interment to take place in its cemetery. The private respondents filed a telegram complaint with the NPCC requesting the latter to investigate and look into the legality of the said interment. The complaint was incorporated with the original application for clearance filed by the petitioner. Upon a finding that the objections raised by the respondents were not without remedy and that the project had been approved by the Metro Manila Commission, the Regional Health Office No. 4 and the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, the NPCC issued an order granting the petitioner a certificate of clearance to operate a memorial park at Baesa, Caloocan City subject to the condition that it submit the following: (1) A design of its interment vaults duly certified by a registered structural engineer that such vaults will not crack from earthquakes with intensity No. 7 and above on the Richter Scale; and (2) A certification covering each interment vault to be used that the same has passed a rigid quality control test according to the latest concept of interment to the effect that it is structurally sound, free from the tiniest crack, and waterproof. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but NPCC denied the motion. But, it imposed a fine of P1,000.00 on the petitioner for causing an interment to take place without any prior permit from the NPCC. On September 8, 1978, the respondents filed a notice of appeal and an ex-parte urgent motion for extension of time to file appeal or petition for review with the appellate court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days to perfect the appeal. The docket fee, however, was paid only on October 2, 1978. In a resolution dated October 4, 1978, the appellate court granted the respondents' motion, subject to the conditions that the same is filed within the reglementary period and that the decision sought to be reviewed is appealable. Thereafter, the respondents filed the corresponding appeal. On November 21, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time. According to the petitioner, since the respondents received the NPCC's order on April 20, 1978, they had up to May 5, 1978 or 15 days within which to perfect their appeal, pursuant to section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. However, on May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus, assumming that the said motion interrupted the period for filing their notice of appeal, respondents had only one (1) day left within which to appeal, which was on August 26, 1978, one day after the respondents received the denial of their motion. Therefore, since the respondents filed their appeal only on October 2, 1978, the same was filed out of time being 37 days late. The respondents filed a motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the latter failed to state the time and place for hearing in violation of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court granted the respondents' motion on January 10, 1979. The petitioner moved to reconsider the court's order but the same was denied on February 8, 1979. Consequently, it filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, alleging that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its motion on the ground that said motion did not contain any notice of hearing for such notice is not required in motions or pleadings filed with the appellate court. ISSUE
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regard to the present case are null and void. Petition granted. CASE NOTE Most cited case for delay of proceedings for pending petition in higher/appellate courts will stay proceedings in lower court. Misunderstood though, because subsequent cases clarified that only the issued raised on certiorari are lost jurisdiction by the lower court. UNDER NEW RULES, the lower court must proceed and only refrain from ruling on the issue on certiorari. 3. JOY MART CONSOLIDATED CORP. V COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA 738 (1992)
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consolidated block of the LRT Carriedo station. Joy Mart made representations with the LRTA and reiterated its first option to redevelop the subject area, but to no avail. Joy Mart filed a complaint for specific performance of contract and damages for breach of contract with injunction against the LRTA and Phoenix. Joy Mart asked that LRTA be ordered to award to it, either by sale, or lease, the redevelopment of the area known as the consolidated block of the LRT Carriedo station which is part of the area subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 22, 1983, executed by Joy Mart in favor of the Government or LRTA. Joy Mart also asked the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order "commanding the respondents (LRTA and Phoenix) individually and collectively, their officers and employees, to cease and desist from the construction being had in the property adjacent to the leased premises." Trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Phoenix sought relief in the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. While their certiorari petition to review the writ of preliminary injunction was still pending with CA, the LRTA and Phoenix filed in the trial court a joint petition to dissolve the said Writ of Preliminary Injunction, offering to post a counterbond for that purpose. They alleged that the writ of preliminary injunction was causing tremendous losses to LRTA and Phoenix because they have been unable to use the commercial stalls in the consolidated block while Joy Mart could be compensated for any loss it may suffer if the injunction were lifted; They pleaded that they "are as much entitled to the protection of their rights as plaintiff, that if fair play gives the plaintiff a right to prolong the litigation, fairness also demands that defendants be relieved of the thousands of pesos in damages that they suffer for every day of delay in this case occasioned by the imposition of the injunction. Trial court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that its continuance would cause great damage to the respondents, while the petitioner's claim for damages, which was yet to be proven, can be fully compensated. Joy Mart filed a motion for reconsideration. LRTA and Phoenix opposed it. The trial court denied Joy Mart's Motion for Reconsideration. CA upon being apprised by Phoenix of the trial court's action, dismissed Phoenix's petition for certiorari for having become moot and academic. Joy Mart sought relief in the CA. The CA gave due course to the petition and required the respondents to answer within ten (10) days from notice. The Court temporarily restrained the respondents "from implementing the questioned orders of 6 July 1988 and 9 August 1988, and for private respondent Phoenix to refrain from engaging in subleasing and construction activities in the questioned premises, and from implementing the sublease contracts if already signed, or the occupancy of the commercial stalls if already constructed, until further orders from this court". Despite the temporary restraining order which it received, Phoenix continued its construction activities and allowed its tenants to occupy the finished stalls. Whereupon Joy Mart filed a motion praying the CA to declare Phoenix in contempt of court. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE Does a trial court possess jurisdiction to dissolve a writ of preliminary injunction which is pending review on certiorari in the CA? HELD NO. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the CA for determination of the propriety of its issuance, the trial court (notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court) could not interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the CA on the writ of preliminary injunction whose annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the LRTA. In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which they themselves had brought up to the CA for review, Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the question of whether the writ of preliminary injunction should be annulled or continued had been elevated to the CA for determination, the trial court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter. By seeking from the trial court an order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction, Phoenix and LRTA sought to divest the CA of its jurisdiction to review the writ. They improperly tried to moot their own petition in the CA a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate court or of disrespect for said court. The actuation of the trial court judge can be categorized as such. It is not excused by the fact that
FACTS In 1978-79, the government planned the Light Rail Transit (LRT) system to service the transportation requirements of the commuting public from Baclaran to Balintawak Monument and vice versa. Petitioner Joy Marts property was among those considered for expropriation in order for the LRT system to succeed. Joy Mart agreed to sell its property and give up its leasehold rights over the adjacent properties, provided, it would be given the first option to redevelop the entire area denominated as the consolidated block of the LRT Carriedo station encompassing Joy Mart's properties. While negotiations for the purchase of the properties were ongoing between Joy Mart and the Special Committee on Land and Property Acquisition of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), the latter entered into a contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation Inc. which had been granted the right, authority, and license to develop the areas adjacent to the LRT stations and to manage and operate the concessions to be established in Caloocan, Manila, and Pasay, with the right to sublease, assign, and transfer any of its rights and interests therein. Joy Mart conveyed its property and waived its leasehold rights on the adjacent lots in favor of the government, through the LRTA, under a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Deed provided, among other things, that "upon recommendation of the special panel created by the LRTA Committee on Land and Property Acquisition. LRTA agreed that Joy Mart, the owner of Isetann and lessee of the Presidente Hotel, should be given the first option in the redevelopment of the consolidated block, notwithstanding their compensation for the property." As partial compliance with the aforestated first option, the PGH Foundation subleased to Joy Mart the LRT Carriedo station covering the consolidated block for the purpose of constructing a multi-storey building of first class materials. Subsequently, Joy Mart submitted to LRTA its plans for the construction of the building occupying the consolidated block. However, LRTA informed Joy Mart that the proposed building should occupy only a certain portion as the rest of the areas within the consolidated block would be used by the LRT station and as set- back area or open space for the benefit of the commuting public. When Joy Mart reminded LRTA of the contract provisions over the consolidated block, the former was assured that, in the event any area in the consolidated block was to be released for redevelopment, the first option of Joy Mart would be respected and implemented. An Addendum to the Sublease Agreement was executed between Joy Mart and the PGH Foundation increasing the area to be used and occupied by Joy Mart. Aside from the increase of monthly rental and provision for an escalation clause, Joy Mart was made to pay "goodwill" in the sum of P3.0 Million. Pursuant to its understanding with, and the assurances of, LRTA, Joy Mart constructed an eight-storey building with ten levels fully air- conditioned in the subject area. Joy Mart had to borrow money for this project. The feasibility study on the viability of this project was conditioned upon Joy Mart serving the business requirements in the LRT Carriedo station and maintaining its first option to redevelop and occupy any available area therein. LRTA entered into Commercial Stalls Concession Contract with the Phoenix Omega Development and Management Corporation ("Phoenix" for brevity) awarding to it all the areas and commercial spaces within the three LRT terminals and the fifteen (15) on-line stations. In the third quarter of 1987, Joy Mart learned of the contract between LRTA and Phoenix when construction activities commenced within the
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Phoenix and LRTA were presenting evidence of losses and damages in support of their motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction, for that could as easily have been done by them in the CA which possesses the power to try cases and conduct hearing, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. The trial judge played into the hands of Phoenix and the LRTA, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting their motion to dissolve the writ of injunction. Judicial courtesy behooved the trial court to keep its hands off the writ of preliminary injunction and defer to the better judgment of the CA the determination of whether the writ should be continued or discontinued. The non-issuance of a temporary restraining order by the CA upon receipt of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 12998 simply meant that the trial court could proceed to hear and decide the main complaint of Joy Mart for specific performance of contract and damages against the LRTA and Phoenix. It did not give the lower court a license to interfere with the appellate court's disposition of the writ of preliminary injunction. By simply "noting" that the trial court's order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction had mooted the case before it, the CA displayed regrettable indifference toward the lower court's interference with the exercise of the appellate court's jurisdiction to decide and dispose of the petition for certiorari pending before it. Instead of being jealous of its jurisdiction, the Appellate Court was simply glad to be rid of the case. The CA's reasoning that the trial court did not overlap or encroach upon its (the CA's) jurisdiction because the trial court "was actually delving into a new matter the propriety of the continuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in view of developments and circumstances occurring after the issuance of the injunction", is unconvincing, for the issue of the impropriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction was inseparable from the issue of whether the writ should be maintained or not. By lifting the writ of injunction before the CA could rule on whether or not it was properly issued, the trial court in effect preempted the CA' jurisdiction and flouted its authority. The private respondents' application to the trial court for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction that was pending review in the CA was a form of forum shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The lower court's proceeding being void for lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated, and the petition to annul the writ (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping as provided in Rule No. 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, Rules of Court. 17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc. No petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. CA decision annulled and set aside. 4. GO V. JUDGE ABROGAR, 398 SCRA 166 (2003)
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the Deputy Sheriffs opinion when the former gave the go -signal to proceed with the auction sale of Go's supposed properties, as they were in fact sold. Finally, they fault respondent judge for not postponing the auction sale despite the pendency then of their motion to quash the writ of execution and their thirdparty adverse claim. Respondent judge ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of plaintiff bank to implement the decision against the "goods and chattels of the defendants" and in case of insufficiency thereof, against "the real property of the said defendants and to sell the same or so much thereof in the manner provided for by law for the satisfaction of said judgment." As a result of the enforcement of the writ, 81,566 shares in China Banking Corporation registered in the name of Looyuko were levied upon. Go moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the decision was not final and executory as to him and that the writ of execution was issued without the benefit of any hearing. Curiously, for an allegedly urgent motion to quash a standing writ of execution and to stop the auction of the properties he claimed to be his, complainant Go set the hearing thereof on 3 March 2000, a period of 14 days from the date of its filing. Not content with the motion to quash, complainants also filed a thirdparty adverse claim over half of the 81,566 shares of stock that had been calendared for public sale. On 21 February 1999 the sale on execution took place. Meanwhile, while their third-party adverse claim and motion to quash the writ of execution were pending, complainants filed a complaint for the annulment of the auction sale with damages and injunction. On 4 March 2000 complainants also filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition before the CA. As in their pending complaint for annulment, they assailed the writ of execution issued by respondent judge in favor of plaintiff International Exchange Bank, as well as the former's prior orders denying Go's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial; dismissing his notice of appeal; and authorizing the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge issued a second writ of execution directing the Deputy Sheriff to levy on the properties of complainant Jimmy Go and to sell the properties. CA denied Go's petition for lack of merit and affirming in toto the orders of respondent judge, most notably the declaration of respondent's Decision in the civil case as final and executory. The motion for reconsideration of this Decision is said to be still pending in the appellate court. In his Comment on the instant complaint, Judge Zeus C. Abrogar asserts that the 14 February 2000 writ of executionwas directed only against Looyuko who had withdrawn his notice of appeal and conveyed his acquiescence to the execution of the decision against his properties. Judge Abrogar claims that the reference of the writ to "defendants" was a mere clerical mistake, as it should have read "defendant," that was not corrected when the writ was issued. ISSUE 1. Whether the decision in the civil case is final and executor when the writ of execution was issued; and 2. Whether the principle of judicial courtesy applicable to prevent respondent from authorizing the execution of the judgment HELD As far as Judge Abrogar is concerned, the decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 was already final and executory when he authorized the execution of the judgment and issued the writ of execution. To recall the case antecedents, the appeal of complainants was already dismissed on 8 February 2000 even before the issuance of the order and the writ of execution on 14 February 2000 and the conduct of the execution sale on 21 February 2000. It must also be stressed that the CA decision affirmed the final and executory character of the judgment as well as the validity of the orders of respondent Judge now complained of. The principle of "judicial courtesy" could not have prevented respondent Judge from authorizing the execution of the judgment and issuing the writ of execution. Obviously, at the time these processes were made available, no petition was then pending in the CA. The petition in the appellate court was filed only
FACTS Complainants Jimmy Go and his lawyer of record, Atty. Gregorio Caeda, Jr. question respondent judge's order dismissing their appeal from the decision in the civil case. They allege that respondent judge did not possess the authority to do so nor rule that the judgment was ripe for execution, the same being reserved in the CA. Complainants also challenge the sale on execution of the shares of stock purportedly co-owned by complainant Go and defendant Alberto Looyuko. They assert that the judgment against Go was not yet final and executory in view of the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition assailing the dismissal of their appeal. Complainants further aver that respondent judge was so incompetent a judge that he merely relied upon
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on 4 March 2000. Moreover, the precept of "judicial courtesy" should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Sec. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. Also, jurisprudence provides that the rule of "judicial courtesy" would apply only if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. Unfortunately for complainants, this circumstance is not present in the decision of respondent judge to issue on 19 April 2000 a second writ of execution. Clearly, the ill-effects of this writ of execution, if any, would have been remedied by restitution or reparation under Sec. 5, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Evidently, too, the proceedings in the CA were not interrupted by respondent judge's action as shown by the promulgation of its decision on complainant Go's petition without any hint of interference from respondent Judge's exercise of discretion. If any party in this case has violated the rule of "judicial courtesy," it appears to be complainants. They were the ones who have apparently misapplied Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and violated the rules against forum shopping. This was so when they instituted a separate action for annulment of the auction sale with prayer for injunction before the RTC, simultaneously with their thirdparty adverse claim and motion to quash the writ of execution, and their petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the CA. All these cases and incidents sought substantially the same relief, i.e., to reverse and set aside the orders of respondent judge regarding the execution of his decision. Moreover, complainants could not have availed of the remedies under Sec. 16, Rule 39, specifically the filing of a "terceria" and an independent action to vindicate Go's claim of ownership. Certainly, they are not "strangers" or "third persons" as regards Civil Case No. 98-791 who would have been otherwise entitled to seek recourse under the rule. The mere filing of a "terceria," or an affidavit stating complainant Go's alleged title, under Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,9 or a motion to quash the writ of execution does not stay the auction sale scheduled by the sheriff. For one, as stated above, complainants are not "strangers" or "third persons" with respect to Civil Case No. 98-791 within the meaning of Sec. 16, Rule 39. Hence, they have no requisite standing to file a "terceria," much less a separate complaint to annul the execution sale which they inopportunely instituted before the RTC of Pasig City. A "stranger" or "third person" is any person other than the judgment debtor or his agent, a class of parties that indubitably excludes complainant Go. In Tillson v. CA we held that a party to the action has "no business filing a third-party claim over property involved in that action and which he himself claims to belong to him." The remedy of complainants is "to ask the court for relief against any alleged errors, excesses or irregularities of the sheriff, which the court itself could as easily and expeditiously grant." Furthermore, the grounds adduced by complainants to quash the writ of execution, i.e., that the decision has not yet attained finality; that there was no opportunity given to complainant Go to oppose the motion for execution; and that a new trial should be conducted to determine the true amount of complainant Go's liability, are matters that have already been resolved and found to be unmeritorious. They also involve allegations that are easily proved as unmistakably false by a straightforward examination of the record of the civil case, i.e., complainant Go was given several opportunities to contest the motion for execution against him. Plainly, complainant's arguments do not justify a deferment of the execution of the trial court's decision. At any rate, if the motion to quash did not produce its desired effect of putting the execution of the judgment on hold, it was complainants' own doing. Irresponsibly, they set the hearing thereof a period of 14 days from the date of its filing, and thereafter postponed their own setting to a date seven days later. Eventually, after their self-induced delay of 21 days, complainants moved for the cancellation of the scheduled hearing upon a measly one day's notice. For a supposedly pressing and imperative motion, the hearings set by complainants do not indicate a bona fide intention to correct an earnest injustice as the dates were calendared simply far apart until finally the hearing of their motion was called off unceremoniously.
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Obviously, on the basis of the foregoing case scrutiny, there is no basis to hold respondent Judge liable for "Gross Ignorance of the Law." The allegations of complainants and the proffered evidence thereof do not prove the elements of this administrative offense, i.e., that the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but more importantly must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. It may even be said confidently that respondent Judge did not deviate from established rules on the execution of judgments. CASE NOTE If there is a petition for certiorari, that petition will only stop the lower court from ruling on that particular issue. See Sec. 8, R 65.
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Rule 66 QUO WARRANTO 1. ABAYA V. ALVEAR, 82 PHIL. 103(1948)
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believe that the changing of the original circuit occupied by petitioner Abaya be eliminating therefrom the town of Angaki, was a mere temporary expedient to meet the exigencies of the administration of justice in that area, under abnormal conditions, and that his acceptance of the new post did not involve or entail abandonment of his old position. In proof of the temporary nature of the change in the circuit is the fact that when conditions returned to normal, the old circuit comprising the towns of Cervantes and Angaki was restored. And it is significant to note that when said old circuit was restored, the petitioner was likewise restored to his old post by appointments extended by two administrations, that of President Osmena and the administration of President Roxas. In those days Abaya could not very well dictate his terms of acceptance of the positions extended to him. He had to take them as they came, accepting the position of justice of the peace of Cervantes alone during the occupation and accepting a new appointment to his old circuit during the days following the liberation. He had no freedom of choice. The important thing is that he never intended to abandon his old post and all along during the Japanese occupation and even after liberation he continued in the judicial service and exercised and discharged the functions of the office of justice of the peace in the same place and area which he did before the war. His appointment by President Osmena and later by President Roxas, to his old post of justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki though not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, was unnecessary; that it did not and could not add anything to or diminish his right to the office conferred by his original appointment, but that said appointments may be regarded as a mere restitution of the office which belonged to him but which he failed to hold because of, and during the war. Alejandrino A. Alvear is ordered to deliver said office and all the records appertaining thereto to said petitioner. 2. POTOT V. BAGANO, 82 PHIL 679(1949)
DOCTRINE Abandonment of a position is not abandonment when it is done during the exigencies of war, or other exigencies. Facts: Jose Abaya was appointed to the post of justice of the peace of the towns of Cervantes, Angaki, Concepcion and San Emilio, Province of Ilocos Sur and he qualified for the position and discharged the duties thereof. In 1923, the municipalities of Concepcion and San Emilio were excluded from his territorial jurisdiction and he continued to discharge his judicial functions as justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki up to December 31, 1941, a few days before the Japanese occupation forces arrived in the town of Cervantes. On April 17, 1943, said petitioner was given an appointment as justice of the peace of Cervantes only. Pres. Jose P. Laurel extended to him another appointment as justice of the peace of the same town of Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. Abaya evidently accepted these appointments made during the Japanese occupation and continued to discharge his judicial function of the peace but only for the town of Cervantes, until the month of November, 1944 when, because of the threat of military clashes between Japanese forces on one side and the Filipino guerrillas on the other, he left his post and fled to the mountains for safety. After liberation and upon the establishment of what the parties term a military government, in Ilocos Sur, Abaya was appointed by the military governor as justice of the peace of the municipalities of Cervantes and Angaki, Ilocos Sur. Then, Mauro Versoza, acting as delegate of the Department of the Interior, designated the petitioner temporary justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki, the appointment to "terminate as soon as your successor is appointed by the central office." Upon the restoration of peace and order and upon normal functioning of the Commonwealth government, petitioner was given an ad interim appointment by President Osmea to the post of justice of the peace for the towns of Cervantes and Angaki. However, when this appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments, it was turned down. Abaya was given another appointment as justice of the peace by President Manuel Roxas for the municipalities of Cervantes and Angaki but said appointment was left without being acted upon by the Commission on Appointments. Presumably because of the failure of the Commission on Appointments to approve the appointment of the petitioner, President Manuel Roxas extended an ad interim appointment to the post of justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki in favor of the respondent Alvear who accepted said appointment and assumed office. Alvear's appointment was later confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In respondent's answer he claims that when he assumed office the petitioner was nowhere to be found because he had gone to the town of Candon, Ilocos Sur to reside. He also states that the petitioner has already asked the Secretary of Justice to have his application for retirement approved. The petitioner claims that shortly after the respondent had assumed office as justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki, he, the petitioner wrote a letter to the President of the Philippines protesting against his being deprived of his old post although, no copy of said letter could be found in the office of the Assistant Executive Secretary of Malacaan. The petitioner further claims that when he failed to receive any answer to his letter to the President, he conferred with then Vice-President Elipidio Quirino and Senator Prospero Sanidad regarding his being restored to the position for justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki. Failing to receive immediate relief, he commenced these quo warranto proceedings. Issue: Whether Jose Abaya never abandoned his office of justice of the peace of Cervantes and Angaki and that he is entitled to the same by virtue of his pre-war appointment? YES! Held: Applying the doctrine laid down in that case of Teves vs. Sindiong, because of the abnormal conditions obtaining in Ilocos Sur, particularly the towns of Cervantes and Angaki during the war, there is reason to
Facts: This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by a prewar justice of the peace whose position was filled by the appointment and confirmation of the respondent after liberation. Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Pilar, Cebu, in November, 1933. He had held that office until he ceased to act for reasons not disclosed in the record. On August 19, 1945, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of San Francisco, Poro and Tudela, Vicente de Roda, was extended to comprise the municipality of Pilar. De Roda was later succeeded by Sosmea, who was justice of the peace until 1946. From the latter date September 1, 1946, the office of justice of the peace of Pilar was vacant. It was on the last mentioned date that the respondent entered upon the performance of his duties in that office. Petitioner joined the police force of the City of Cebu as lieutenant and became the Assistant Provincial Warden. Held: That petitioner was forced to seek or accept jobs in order to live would not alter the case even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that economic necessity was a valid plea. The government was not the only source of gainful employments that could have tide him over while waiting, as he says, for reappointment to his old position. The truth is that for almost two years after liberation, before he accepted other government positions, he got position was without any permanent incumbent, he did not enter public service, and he did not raise a finger to claim his judicial post. It would seem that he lost all interest in the same until he changed his mind or found he was dismissed with costs. Petitioner's acceptance of other public offices incompatible with judicial function operates as an abandonment of the position to which he seeks reinstatement.
3.
SERAFIN V. CRUZ, 58 PHIL 611 (1933)
DOCTRINE The extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto does not lie against a duly and legally appointed chief of the municipal police who has duly qualified for and has entered upon the performance of his duties, in order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the office in question. Facts: Father Victorino Lopez filed with the provincial board administrative charges against plaintiff Serafin in his capacity as chief of police their municipality, for negligence of performance in his duties. Pursuant
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thereto, the board rendered judgment against Serafin. The municipal president then dismissed Serafin from his services and appointed defendant Cruz as permanent chief of police of the municipality. While the new provincial board granted Serafins MR and, thus, ordered his reinstatement, the latter filed the present action to expel Cruz from the office he had been holding. Issue: Whether a duly appointed and qualified chief of municipal police who has entered upon the performance of his duties as such, may be dismissed therefrom in order to reinstate another who had been dismissed from such office pursuant to a valid, legal, and conclusive decision Held: NO. Cruz has acquired a vested right in the office and cannot be removed nor dismissed therefrom except for any of the causes designated and in accordance with the proceedings established by law. The legal provision quoted above expressly states that members of the municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases of resignation, shall not be discharged from the service, except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the United States or Philippine Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty. The reinstatement of the dismissed official is not one of the causes designated by the law for the removal therefrom of one who has been permanently appointed to substitute the former. The extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto does not lie against a duly and legally appointed chief of municipal police who has duly qualified for and has entered upon the performance of his duties, in order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the office in question. Appealed judgment reversed. MELO NOTE: Look at the qualifications of respondent, if there is nothing wrong with the qualifications, the quo warranto is out the window. 4. DOCTRINE Appointment requires acceptance. Facts: The President nominated Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Eventually, he simultaneously nominated petitioner Lacson and respondent Romero to the positions of provincial fiscal of Tarlac and Negros Oriental, respectively. The Commission on Appointments also simultaneously confirmed these nominations. While Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed office in Tarlac, Romero took his oath of office, notified the Solicitor General, and proceeded to his station. Lacson objected. While Romero appeared for a criminal case, Lacson filed his objection before the judge and asked that Romeros appearance be stricken from the record. After Romero had exhibited his credentials before the court, the judge denied Lacsons petition and recognized the former as the provincial fiscal. Also, the Provincial Treasurer turned down Lacsons claim for the salaries of a provincial fiscal and instead paid Romero. Hence, the instant action for quo warranto. Issue: Whether Lacson is legally entitled to the Tarlac post; thus, Romero should be ousted from his office Held: YES. The complete appointment to a post like that of a provincial fiscal involves several steps. First is the nomination by the President. Second, for it to be valid and permanent, the Commission on LACSON V. ROMERO, 84 PHIL. 740 (1949)
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Appointments must confirm the said nomination. Finally, the appointee should accept his post by assuming it. The first two steps constitute a mere offer of a post. Acceptance then completes and gives effect the appointment, which rests solely with the appointee himself. In the instant case, Lacson has declined to accept the Tarlac post. No one can compel him to decide otherwise. He then continues as the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, unless he has been lawfully removed as such. Looking then at the pertinent laws, it can be seen that a provincial fiscal enjoys security of tenure that is, until he reaches the age of 65, unless sooner removed for cause. In the instant case, Lacson was neither charged with any violation of the law or civil service regulation nor investigated and thereafter found guilty so as to authorize removal from office. These being said, there was then no vacancy in the post to which Romero could have been legally appointed. Romeros appointment then was invalid. 5. ACOSTA V. FLOR, 5 PHIL 18 (1905) DOCTRINE For a private person to file quo warranto he must establish a right to the office, the court need not pass upon the qualifications of the respondent. Facts: Plaintiff Acosta and defendant Flor were candidates for the office of municipal president during their towns municipal elections. Although Acosta allegedly won by a majority of 100 votes, Flor still usurped the office and continued to hold the same. Not a single witness, however, confirmed Acostas allegations that led to him having won by a majority of 100 votes. Consequently, the trial court ruled in favor of Flor, imposing costs upon Acosta. Issue: Whether Acosta can maintain his action for the purpose of excluding Flor from the exercise of his office on account of illegalities committed during the elections, despite his failure to show whether he has any right to the office Held: NO. The Code of Civil Procedure at that time provides that: 1. The Attorney-General of the islands or the fiscal of any province, when directed by the Chief Executive of the Philippines, must commence any such action, provided that he has good reason to believe that the complaint can be established by proof, must commence such action. 2. A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may bring an action therefor. It then follows that no individual can bring a civil action relating to the usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action is destroyed as in the case here. Appealed order affirmed. MELO NOTE Steps to quo warranto: (1) prove your right to the office (2) prove usurpation, lack of qualifications, etc.
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6. GARCIA V. PEREZ, 99 SCRA 628 (1980)
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Such increase does not result in the diminution of the emolument or in the curtailment of the participation in the deliberations and of the vote of each of the petitioners as a member of the board. The petitioners are bringing this action as individuals and not as a group or judicial entity recognized by law as having a corporate or collective right to assert. Petition dismissed.
DOCTRINE Seniority does not give you a preference to a position. FACTS: The position of Senior Clerk in the Fiscal Management and Budget Division of the CA was vacant. Petitioner Garcia, another CA senior clerk receiving a different amount as compensation, applied for the said position. Upon the CA Clerks recommendation, the CA instead appointed respondent Perez, then a Cash and Payroll Clerk, to the vacant position. This moved Garcia to file her protest with the CSC, claiming that she was next in rank, better qualified and entitled to preferential treatment to the position. CSC indorsed the protest to CA. CA recommended the upholding of Perez appointment, which CSC did. CA furthered HELD: Garcia has no legal right, to speak of, over the position. Preference in appointment (say, by virtue of seniority) cannot be equated to entitlement to appointment; the former is not sufficient to sustain a quo warranto proceeding. 7. CRUZ V. RAMOS, 84 PHIL. 226 (1949)
Facts: Only one vacancy in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was created by virtue of a certain Balagtas appointment as Director of Prisoners. The President of the Philippines, however, appointed the three respondents, Ramos, Monleon, and Villaceran, to seats in the said board, pursuant to Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The charter was subsequently held to be unconstitutional because the Constitution authorizes the Congress to apportion legislative districts throughout the Philippines by a general law and not by piecemeal legislation. Petitioners, other board members, claim that at least any of the two respondents are illegally usurping, intruding into, and/or holding or exercising the rights and privileges and discharging the duties exclusively pertaining to them and the other members of the Municipal Board. Also, the unconstitutional appointment of at least any two the respondents increases the number of the majority to constitute quorum, thereby depriving any six members of the board to do business (with the increased number of members, the quorum becomes seven, instead of six). Meanwhile, respondents counter that petitioners have no legal capacity to institute the quo warranto proceedings as they do not claim to be entitled to occupy the office now held by the former. An action for usurpation then may be brought only by the Solicitor General or by a fiscal in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether petitioners have the legal capacity to institute the present action for usurpation of office. HELD: NO. The petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the public office alleged to be unlawfully held or exercised by the respondents. As a matter of fact, the petitioners allege that they are elected members of the board. They do not and cannot claim then that respondents have supplanted them. The mere fact that the membership of a board was increased from 10 to 12 and the quorum from six to seven does not in any way diminish the rights and prerogatives of the individual petitioners as members of the board. Such increase does not result in the dimunition of the emolument or in the curtailment of the participation in the deliberations and of the vote of each of the petitioners as a member of the board.
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Rule 67 EXPROPRIATION 1. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR, G.R. NO. 138896, 20 JUNE 2000 2.
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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. JOCSON, 206 SCRA 520 (1992)
Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC a complaint to expropriate the respondents property. MTC dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. According to it, eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. The principal cause of action is the exercise of such power, while the fact that the action involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed with the MTC or RTC. In this case, the RTC concluded that jurisdiction lies with the MTC since the propertys value was less than P20,000. Issue: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case Held: YES. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must be looked into. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. But, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction. In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. Also, expropriation proceedings involve two phases: 1. Determination of the plaintiffs authority to exercise the power of eminent domain a nd the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the court on the merits. 2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the court regarding the issue. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is dutybound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Facts: Petitioner NPC filed seven expropriation cases against respondents for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the parcels of land for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod-Tomonton Transmission Line. Respondent judge issued an order fixing the provisional values of the subject areas. He also directed NPC to deposit the amount with the PNB in escrow for the benefit of the respondents pending decision on the merits. These market values are the same values appearing in the tax declarations of the properties and notices of assessment issued by the assessor. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, however, contending that the provisional values therein were too low. They likewise asked for a re-evaluation of the provisional value of the subject property. Respondent judge then issued another order increasing the provisional values involved, directing NPC to deposit whatever differential between the amounts above fixed and those already deposited within 24 hours from the receipt of the order and holding in abeyance the issue of the writ of possession pending compliance therewith. While NPC immediately complied with the adjustments made, it filed the instant petition alleging that: 1. Respondent judge had acted in excess of jurisdiction. It asserts that the provisional values fixed are excessive and unconscionable; thus, utterly scandalous and unreasonable. 2. Pursuant to the RoC, NPC shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. 3. The issuance then of the writ of possession was an unqualified ministerial duty that respondent judge failed to perform. 4. The order setting the provisional values partakes the nature of a final disposition of the case should the respondents accept the same. Clearly, respondent judge took a shortcut, violating the procedure laid in the RoC. Issue: Whether respondent judges actions are in accord with the law Held: NO. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and is otherwise either unmindful or ignorant of the law when he: 1. Fixed the provisional values of the properties for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit NPC may derive in violation of PD 42; 2. Increased the said values without hearing; 3. Directed the respondents to manifest within 24 hours whether they were to accept and withdraw the amounts representing the values; 4. Declared the provisional values as the final values and directing the release of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to the respondents even if not all of them made the manifestation; and 5. Suspended the issuance of the writ of possession until after the amounts shall have been released to and received by respondents. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon compliance with PD 42. PD 42 requires the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the PNB in its main office or any of its branches or agencies an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. Notably, PD 42 repealed the provision in the RoC on the assessment of the property value. Under the
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RoC then, the court has the discretion to determine the provisional value. Now, under PD 42, what is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned. In any event, NPC deposited the provisional value fixed by the court. As a matter of right then, it is entitled to be placed in the possession of the property involved in the complaints at once. Also, upon having fixed the provisional values, though erroneous, and NPC having deposited the amount thereof, respondent judge lost plenary control over the order fixing the amount of the deposit. He has no power to annul, amend, or modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnation proceedings. The reason for this is that a contrary ruling would defeat the very purpose of the law which is to provide a speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceable possession of the property subject of the expropriation proceedings may be secured without the delays incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownership and value of such lands, which should not be permitted to delay the progress of the work. Petition granted. 3. VISAYAN REFINING CO. V. CAMUS, 40 PHIL. 550 (1919)
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The provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. Petition denied. 4. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF RIZAL V. CARO DE ARAULLO, 58 PHIL. 308 (1933)
Facts: Plaintiff Provincial Government of Rizal (hereinafter Rizal) sought to expropriate defendants 52 lots. The property was to be used for building an extension of Taft Avenue. Accordingly, CFI issued the order fixing the damages to be paid by Rizal for the expropriated property. Rizal appealed from this decision. As represented by the fiscal, it questions the values arrived at by the commissioners assigned by CFI in determining the amounts to be paid to defendants. Issue: Whether the amount to be paid should be based on the value of the property at the time Rizals district engineer entered upon the land and laid out the extension sought to be built in the land Held: NO. The value of the property taken by eminent domain should be fixed as of the date of the proceedings, and with reference to the loss the owner sustains, considering the property in its condition and situation at the time it has been taken and not as enhanced by the purpose for which it is taken. As the law provides, compensation should be just. For it to be exactly just, the compensation should be estimated as of the time of the taking. Appealed decision modified. 5. REPUBLIC V. VDA DE CASTELLVI, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
Facts: The Governor-General instructed respondent Paredes, then Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, to cause the condemnation proceedings on Camp Tomas Claudio for military and aviation purposes. In conformity with these instructions, condemnation proceedings were commenced, with the petitioners impleaded in the complaint as defendants because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property sought to be expropriated. Respondent judge subsequently issued an order fixing the provisional value of the subject lot and ordering that the Government be placed in possession thereof. Along with their demurrer, petitioners filed a motion to revoke the said order on the ground that the deposit made in the court had been made without authority of the law. The money in question had been taken from the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by the Philippine Legislature for the use of the Militia Commission. CFI denied petitioners motion. Hence, the instant case. Petitioners now allege that the expropriation proceedings at bar cannot be maintained by the Philippine Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain for military and aviation purposes. Issue: Whether the expropriation proceedings in the instant case cannot be maintained on the ground posited by the petitioners Held: NO. At least expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the GovernorGeneral, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that already on the statute books. Furthermore, if the Government complies with the requirements of law relative to the making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be at once given to it, just as is permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized by law to exercise the power eminent domain. Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of pain; and in the case of a forced taking of property against the will of the owner, all that can be required of the government is that should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise. The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution.
Facts: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Pampanga in a Civil Case, an expropriation proceeding. Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint for eminent domain against Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi , over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga and against Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over two parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10. Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and ToledoGozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded. The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter. Issue: Whether the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action?
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Held: The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security. Appellee Castellvi, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1)entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the registered owner(s) and with full authority to execute a contract of this nature. It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the annual contracts entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi and the Republic of the Philippines. It is undisputed, therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the terms and conditions therein stated. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy. A follow-up letter was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the property within one month from said date. On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic was placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959, On November 21, 1959, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed the case. The Republic urges that the "taking of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows: Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
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First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration"; "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment. The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud the question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air base? It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice of such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484). Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
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The Republic's claim that it had the "right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. The "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959, The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. 6. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY V. DULAY, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
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Issue: WON Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned? (WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?) Held: Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process-clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reye, this Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as further amended by P.D. Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing Authority contended that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which happened to be lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondent's property under section 92 of P.D. No. 464. On the other hand, the private respondent stressed that while there may be basis for the allegation that the respondent judge did not follow the decree, the matter is still subject to his final disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise his judicial discretion in the light of the constitutional clauses on due process and equal protection. To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled that under the conceded facts, there should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocably calls for obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that "the courts should recognizethat the mle introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subw quent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property." While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form of absolute law-making power, its members, nonetheless, remained uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President himself did not seem assured or confident with his own enactment. It was not enough to lay down the law on determination of just compensation in P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D. 1533. The provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D. 1313. inspite of its effectivity as general law and the wide publicity given to it, the questioned provision or an even stricter version had to be embodied in cases of specific expropriations by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the Tambunting Estate and P.D. 1670 expropriating the Sunog Apog area in Tondo, Manila. In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. This time, we answer in the affirmative. In overruling the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and objection to the conunissioner's report, the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier wellestablished doctrine, is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." The doctrine enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role
Facts: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the state of the property. The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. Respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises. Respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. Petitioner filed a MR of the order and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. MR denied. Petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
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as the guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for pubhc use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shag prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. 7. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. V. REPUBLIC, 143 SCRA 466 (1986)
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1955, by the President of the Philippines, the reasonable and fair market value of the rights and interests of all the defendants which win be affected by these eminent domain proceedings cannot exceed the total sum of P532,371.40. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that, insofar as it is concerned, the Republic did not need and has not occupied the areas covered by the above-mentioned mining claims and neither have improvements been made on the said areas and that the area covers ground which is rugged in terrain for which the Philippine Military Academy could have no use. By way of separate and special grounds for dismissal, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleged that the authority given by the President of the Philippines for the expropriation proceedings refers to privately owned mineral lands, mining interests, and other private interests of private individuals and entities of private individuals in certain portions of the site surveyed for and presently occupied by the Philippine Military Academy at Loakan, Baguio and that the expropriation of Benguet Consolidated, Inc.'s mineral claims is in violation of law. In the course of the proceedings, a Board of Commissioners to assess and establish the reasonable amount of compensation was formed. Board of Commissioners submitted their report recommending the payment of P43,703.37 to the ten (10) defendants as just compensation for their expropriated properties. The parties filed their objections to the Commissioners' report. The trial court rejected the Commissioners' Report. Benguet Consolidated filed a motion to clarify the decision since the dispositive portion of the decision computed the respective amounts to be paid by the Republic to the defendants without, however, including the amount to be paid to Benguet Consolidated for the expropriation of its four (4) mining claims. In other words, the petitioner was excluded from the awards made by the trial court. After Benguet Consolidated filed two other motions (motion for new trial and/or reconsideration; second motion for clarification) reiterating its objection to the decision in not providing for just compensation for their expropriated properties, the trial court issued an order fixing the "just compensation of the surface area of the four (4) claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. in the amount of P128,051.82 with interest at 6% per annum from May 6, 1950 until fully paid, plus attorney's fees in an amount equal to 5 % of the sum fixed by this Court." A motion to reopen the case praying for a new trial to allow it to present evidence as to the value of the properties filed by Benguet Consolidated was denied by the trial court. ISSUE: (1) WON in expropriation proceedings an order of condemnation may be entered by the court before a motion to dismiss is denied? (2) WON the commissioners are correct in arriving at the just compensation to be paid to petitioners? HELD: (1) The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that the petitioner's property is no longer part of the public domain. The power of eminent domain refers to the power of government to take private property for public use. If the mineral claims are public, there would be no need to expropriate them. The mineral claims of the petitioner are not being transferred to another mining company or to a public entity interested in the claims as such. The land where the mineral claims were located is needed for the Philippine Military Academy, a public use completely unrelated to mining. The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain covers all forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes rights which are attached to land. In the instant case the ruling on the motion to dismiss was deferred by the trial court in view of a possible amicable settlement. Moreover, after the trial court entered an order of condemnation over the objection of the petitioner, the court issued an order to the effect that the trial court"... makes it of record that, pending negotiations between the Government and Benguet Consolidated, Inc. said corporation has not waived its right to challenge plaintiff's right to condemn the mineral claims in question." At the hearing conducted by the Board of Commissioners, the counsel for the petitioner manifested that its motion to dismiss was still pending in court, and requested that the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the petitioner be cancelled. At this point, negotiations between the government and the petitioner were still going on.
Facts: Republic of the Philippines filed with the then Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio a complaint for expropriation against ten (10) defendants, among them Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The Republic stated that it needed the property for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine Military Academy, a training institution for officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, under the direct authority and supervision of the Department of National Defense. It also averred that it had occupied since May 6, 1950, the area covered by the mining claims of the defendants and had already installed therein permanent buildings and other valuable improvements with no less than P3,000,000.00 in the belief that the area was unoccupied portions of the public domain, and that according to the Appraisal Committee constituted under Administrative Order No. 144, dated October 10,
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In its original decision, the lower court overlooked an award of just compensation for the petitioner. This triggered off the filing of the following motions by the petitioner: (1) motion for clarification praying that an order be issued clarifying the decision insofar as the compensation to be paid to the petitioner is concerned; (2) motion for new trial and/or reconsideration on the ground that the court did not award just compensation for the properties of the petitioner; (3) motion to re-open case on the ground that the issues insofar as the petitioner is concerned have not been joined since its motion to dismiss has not been resolved; and (4) a second motion for clarification. The lower court denied the motion to reopen the case. This order was not challenged by the petitioner. Instead, it filed its abovementioned second motion for clarification. It is to be noted that in its motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, the petitioner stated: Defendant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., does not dispute the right of the government to exercise the power of eminent domain with respect to its property. However, in so doing this court failed to comply with the basic constitutional provision that said power can only be exercised upon payment of just compensation. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the proceedings of condemnation followed by the court. We cannot condone the inconsistent positions of the petitioner. It is very clear from the statements of the petitioner that it had already abandoned its earlier stand on the propriety of expropriation and that its intent shifted to the just compensation to be paid by the plaintiff for its condemned properties. The second issue centers on the amount of just compensation which should be paid by the respondent to the petitioner for the condemned properties. The conclusion of the Commissioners are the result of documentary evidence presented by the parties, testimonies of several mining experts and executives of mining companies including Mr. Ralph W. Crosby, the then vice-president of the petitioner, and ocular inspections of the mining claims involved in this case. Among those considered by the commissioners in order to determine the just compensation to be paid to the defendants were the ore reserves, base metal concentrates, and gypsums deposits of the mining claims.
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eight hearings of the Board, the defendants did not ask for a replacement. Anyway, the Court was ably represented by Engineer Bengson. The Board held a total of 64 hearings. Besides documentary evidence, and an ocular inspection of the mining claims involved made with prior notice, twelve witnesses were presented by the parties. Moreover, it is to be noted that unlike the plaintiff and other defendants, the petitioner did not file any opposition to the Commissioners' Report in the lower court. The appellate court, however, should have provided for the payment of legal interest from the time the government took over the petitioner's mining claims until payment is made by the government. 8. COSCOLLUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 77765 AUGUST 15, 1988)
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Facts: Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the CFI Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project. Trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation. CA affirmed. On motion of the petitioner, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the judgment of the appellate court. Republic filed a motion to set aside the order of May 7, 1986 as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, contending that the funds of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) are government funds and therefore, cannot be disbursed without a government appropriation. Lower court issued an order directing instead that the respondent Republic deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the name of the petitioner, the amount adjudged in favor of the latter. The respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to annul the orders. The appellate court rendered the questioned decision setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court on the ground that public or government funds are not subject to levy and execution. ISSUE: WON the decision of the appellate court is violative of petitioners right to just compensation and due process of law? He maintains that these constitutional guarantees transcend all administrative and procedural laws and jurisprudence for as between these said laws and the constitutional rights of private citizens, the latter must prevail. YES! HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. The property of the petitioner was taken by the government in 1975. The following year, respondent NIA made the required deposit of P2,097.30 with the Philippine National Bank and within the same year, the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project was finished. Since then, for more than a period of ten (10) years, the project has been of service to the farmers nearby in the province of Iloilo. It is, thus, inconceivable how this project could have been started without the necessary appropriation for just compensation. Needless to state, no government instrumentality, agency, or subdivision has any business initiating expropriation proceedings unless it has adequate funds, supported by proper appropriation acts, to pay for the property to be seized from the owner. Not only was the government able to make an initial deposit of P2,097.30 but the project was finished in only a year's time. We agree with the petitioner that before the respondent NIA undertook the construction of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project, the same was duly authorized, with the corresponding funds appropriated for the payment of expropriated land and to pay for equipment, salaries of personnel, and other expenses incidental to the project. The NIA officials responsible for the project have to do plenty of explaining as to where they misdirected the funds intended for the expropriated property. The present case must be distinguished from earlier cases where payment for property expropriated by the National Government may not be realized upon execution. As a rule, the legislature must first appropriate the additional amount to pay the award. In the present case, the Barotac Viejo Project was a package project of government. Money was allocated for an entire project. Before bulldozers and ditch diggers tore up the place and before millions of pesos were put into the development of the project, the basic responsibility of paying the owners for property seized from them should have been met. Another distinction lies in the fact that the NIA collects fees for the use of the irrigation system constructed on the petitioner's land. It does not have to await an express act of Congress to locate funds
The petitioner's mining claims were classified as non-producing unpatented claims. It was established that the area of the mineral claims belonging to the petitioner and included in the Philippine Military Reservation was 25.1082 hectares. Hence, the commissioners arrived at the total amount of P7,532.46 (25.1082 x P300.00) as just compensation to be paid to the petitioner for its mining claims. The Schedule of Assessment Value of Mineral Lands presented by the government, is a "SCHEDULE of Assessed Values of mineral lands, furnished by the Provincial Assessor of Mountain Province on June 30, 1955" issued by Onofre D. Alabanza, ex-oficio Mining Recorder of the Office of the Mining Recorder, City of Baguio, Bureau of Mines, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. These findings negate the trial court's observation that the commissioners only took into consideration the surface value of the mineral claims. In fact, the lower court affirmed the commissioners' report to the effect that the petitioner herein is only entitled to the surface value of the mineral claims. "Other claims" include the petitioner's mining claims. Thus, the trial court computed the amount to be paid to the petitioner as just compensation on the basis of the surface value of its mining claims. The appellate court based its findings on the Commissioners' Report. The petitioner now assails the approval of the commissioners' report regarding the P7,532.46 just compensation to be paid by the government for its four (4) mining claims. While it is true that a court may reject a Commissioners' Report on the ground that the amount allowed is palpably inadequate, it is to be noted that the petitioner herein has not supported its stand that the P7,532.46 just compensation for its mining claims is by any standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered just. On the other hand, the appellate court said: The integrity and impartiality of the remaining Commissioners, Engrs. Bengson and Gamboa, were not questioned by the defendants. They are experienced mining engineers and members of the bar. And the Commissioners did give value to the mineral contents of the claims. Pages 168 to 206 of the Report will show that the Board considered the ore reserves and the base metal concentrates and gypsum deposits. The Board concluded that it was not profitable to operate the claims, taking into account the cost of production, rehabilitation and depletion, depreciation and smelting and marketing expenses. Although Engineer Joaquin resigned after
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for this specific purpose. The rule in earlier precedents that the functions and public services rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects (Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, supra, at p. 625) is not applicable here. There is no showing of any public service to be disrupted if the fees collected from the farmers of Iloilo for the use of irrigation water from the disrupted property were utilized to pay for that property. We must emphasize that nowhere in any expropriation case has there been a deviation from the rule that the Government must pay for expropriated property. In the Commissioner of Public Highways case, the Court stressed that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate the necessary amount because it cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment. This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause. (Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects for rent or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems and sells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominy for the agencies to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of just compensation to the former owners. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 9. REPUBLIC V. LIM, G.R. NO. 161656. JUNE 29, 2005
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They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name. On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ...This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just". Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932. SC denied. This is the third MR. In the third MR the Republic raised the defense that the matters at litigation were already resolved in the original Valdehueza case that on ownership. ISSUE/S Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940. HELD NO. The failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete and the property remained in the ownership of Lim and his successors-in-interest. The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation . Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time. While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice,the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republics failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.
DOCTRINE While the prevailing doctrine is that the non- payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. FACTS In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948. In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-ininterest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value". On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
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As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent s predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market val ue of the two lots in question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court s mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation.10 From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. The Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio. In the present case, fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. The Republic disregarded Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondents predecessors-in-interest were given a run around by the Republics officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of respondents predecessorsin-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened. Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner. 10. VDA DE OUANO V. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 168770, FEBRUARY 09, 2011.
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(CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic, declaring the expropriation a lawful exercise of eminent domain. In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the lots no longer appealed the decision of the trial court.8 Following the finality of the judgment of condemnation, certificates of title for the covered parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic which, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958,9 were subsequently transferred to MCIAA. At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase. The demands went unheeded. Civil suits followed. G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition) On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who originally owned six of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others, successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18370, was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the court. On September 29, 1997, one Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot Nos. 761A and 762-A but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to intervene. During the pre-trial and trial, MCIAA admitted and evidence was adduced that certain lot owners were able to buy back their lots [in] the event the Lahug Airport would be abandoned or if its operat ion were transferred to the Mactan Airport due to a previous agreement or waiver in the purchase agreement. MCIAA later denied this. The RTC ruled for the successors-in-interest of the lot owners and ordered MCIAA to reconvey the lots. On appeal to the CA, the court affirmed. G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition) Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20743. Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 not having found any reversionary condition. The RTC ruled for the Ouanos and ordered reversion. On MR, the court overturned the decision. On appeal to CA, the MR was affirmed. The court stated ISSUE/S Whether the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City still has the right to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties. HELD YES.
DOCTRINE In the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. FACTS In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration
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First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex. Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airpo rt purposes.21 No less than Asterio Uy, the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airports expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their properties.22 In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit G, the transcript of the deposition23 of Anunc iacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA, recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in interest24 and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and promise of the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do not materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of Moreno. There is no reason why the ratio decidendi in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud should not be made to apply to petitioners Ouanos and respondents Inocians such that they shall be entitled to recover their or their predecessors respective properties under the same manner and arrangement as the heirs of Moreno and Tudtud. Stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established). Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important condition in the CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion of the Lahug Airport. The project the public purpose behind the forced property takingwas, in fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the lots expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction. The correct lesson of Fery is captured by what the Court said in that case, thus: the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. In light of our disposition in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. But as has been determined below, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision in Heirs of Moreno, [n]o doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could readily be justified as the manifest legal effect of consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest.
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We add, however, as in Heirs of Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equitythe landowners in this instance, in establishing the trustmust himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable.
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RULE 68 FORECLOSURE GENERAL BANKING ACT OF 2000, SEC. 47. FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE. SECTION 47. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage . In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold for the full or partial payment of his obligation shall have the right within one year after the sale of the real estate, to redeem the property by paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank or institution from the sale and custody of said property less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser at the auction sale concerned whether in a judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right to enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of the confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in accordance with law. Any petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings instituted pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all the damages which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the foreclosure proceeding. Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration. (78a) ACT NO. 3135, AS AMENDED BY ACT 4118 "Section 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." "Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. "Section 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions
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hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. "Section 9. When the property is redeemed after the purchaser has been given possession, the redeemer shall be entitled to deduct from the price of redemption any rentals that said purchaser may have collected in case the property or any part thereof was rented; if the purchaser occupied the property as his own dwelling, it being town property, or used it gainfully, it being rural property, the redeemer may deduct from the price the interest of one per centum per month provided for in section four hundred and sixty-five of the Code of Civil Procedure."
DIGESTS 1. SENO V. PESTOLANTE, 103 PHIL. 414 (1958)
Facts: Defendants Barimbao and Pestolante owed plaintiff Seno a certain amount. To secure the prompt and full payment of the same and interest thereon, they executed a deed of chattel mortgage in Senos favor. The debt was, however, only partially paid. Plaintiff brought this action with CFI, praying that the mortgage be executed in his favor. Barimbao counters that he refuses to surrender his possession of the subject property since he has purchased it from Pestolante as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by a notary public. Meanwhile, Pestolante filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the CFI had no jurisdiction over this case. Since the action is to collect a balance on the debt, it should come under the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court instead. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether CFI has jurisdiction over the instant case Held: YES. While it is true that the action is to recover the balance of the debt plus interest and, thus, falls under the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, it also involves the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage executed by Pestolante to secure payment of his obligation. When the mortgagor refuses to surrender possession of the mortgaged chattel, an action of judicial foreclosure necessarily arises, or one of replevin to secure possession as a preliminary step to the sale contemplated in Sec. 14 of Act No. 1508. Appealed order set aside. Case remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
2.
LIMPIN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 166 SCRA 87 (1988)
Facts: The spouses Aquino mortgaged their lots to private respondent Ponce. The same spouses then sold the said lots to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation (hereinafter Butuan). Petitioner Limpin obtained a money judgment against Butuan. To satisfy the said judgment, the latters lots were sold at public auction, with Limpin being the highest bidder. Limpin later sold these lots to co- petitioner Sarmiento.
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A day before levy was made on the lots to satisfy the money judgment, however, Ponce initiated judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage. Foreclosure sale then ensued, with Ponce being the highest bidder. To resolve the dispute, Ponce instituted a special civil action with IAC. The latter decided in favor of Ponce. Later on, SC denied petitioners appeal. In effect, SC affirmed IACs decision ordering the trial court to affirm the sale of the subject lots in Ponces favor, subject to the equity of redemption by Sarmiento. Instead of exercising his right of redemption, Sarmiento instituted separate actions with the same RTC, attempting to relitigate precisely the same issues that IAC and SC passed upon. For unwarrantedly delaying execution of the final and executory judgment, Sarmiento and his counsel were both found guilty of contempt. Before the decision of contempt was released and nine months after the judgment decreeing the right of redemption, Sarmiento finally attempted to exercise his unforeclosed equity of redemption. He then manifested before RTC that he would exercise his right and that the latter fix the price. RTC held that the price should be subject to an agreement between Ponce and Sarmiento. Ponce opposed this decision. According to him, Sarmientos exercise of his right ha d long elapsed. Sarmiento should have exercised his equity of redemption after default of the performance of the conditions of the mortgage, but before the Sheriffs sale of the property and judicial confirmation thereof. Sarmiento counters that the judicial confirmation of the sale of the lots could not have cut off his equity of redemption. Ponce himself has recognized in his urgent motion for the issuance of the writ of possession Sarmientos equity of redemption beyond confirmation date. Also, Sarmient o claims not to have been informed of the confirmation as he has not received a copy of the notice thereof. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether Sarmientos equity of redemption has lapsed Held: YES. Equity of redemption should first be distinguished from right of redemption. Right of Redemption Prerogative to reacquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale Equity of Redemption Right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final (See Rule 68, Sec. 2) GR: Must be exercised within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final Expect: When, even after the foreclosure sale itself has been made, no order of confirmation of the sale had been made. Otherwise, no redemption can be made anymore.
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In the instant case, however, there is no unforeclosed equity of redemption in Sarmientos favor since he has been improperly impleaded in the judicial proceeding where his and Ponces rights over the mortgaged property have been ventilated and specifically adjudicated. IACs purpose was to give Sarmiento, not the unforeclosed equity of redemption pertaining to a stranger in the foreclosure suit, but the same equity of redemption possessed by the mortgagor himself. The judgment cannot be construed as contemplating or requiring the institution of a separate suit by Ponce to compel Sarmiento to exercise his unforeclosed equity of redemption, or as granting Sarmiento the option to redeem at any time that he pleases, subject only to prescription. This would give rise to that multiplicity of proceedings which the law eschews. The judgment plainly intended that Sarmiento exercise his option to redeem, as successor of the mortgagor. Trial courts order confirming the Sheriffs sale in Ponces favor affirmed. 3. QUIMSON V. PNB, 36 SCRA 26 (1970)
Facts: Francisco Quimson mortgaged his properties with defendant PNB. Because of the formers failure to pay his loans, PNB filed the corresponding foreclosure proceedings with CFI. CFI then issued the Writ of Execution and directed the Provincial Sheriff to sell at public auction the subject properties. PNB was the highest bidder. Afterwards, the Provincial Sheriff issued a certificate of sale, which was eventually given a judicial confirmation. Petitioners, the heirs of Francisco, seek to redeem the property sold. PNB refused, however, alleging that the period of redemption, which was to be counted from the date of judicial confirmation, had already expired. Also, the property had already been sold to a certain Mendoza. Petitioners counter that the period of redemption should be counted from the date the certificate of sale and decree of confirmation of the same have been registered with the Register of Deeds. The trial court ruled in favor of PNB. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether the one-year redemption period should be counted from the date of the judicial confirmation of the sale. Held: NO. Contrary to PNBs argument, while sales on foreclosure of properties mortgaged to it partake the nature of sui generis, they need not depart from the sound principles governing registration of transactions concerning lands coming under the Land Registration Act or the Torrens system. The property in the instant case is registered land. Nevertheless, redemption from execution sales under ordinary judgments should be made within 12 months from the registration of the same. This also applies to extrajudicial foreclosure of registered lands. Lower courts decision modified. 4. RAMOS V. MANALAC AND LOPEZ, 89 PHIL. 270 (1951)
GR: Exists only in the case of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage Except: When, in a judicial foreclosure, the mortgagee is PNB or a bank or banking institution PNBs charter and the General Banking Act confer on the mortgagor, his successors-in-interest, or judgment creditor the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale within one year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
Equity of redemption is conferred by law on (1) the mortgagors successors-in-interest or (2) third persons acquiring rights over the mortgaged property subsequent, and therefore subordinate, to the mortgagees lien. If these subsequent or junior lienholders be not joined in the foreclosure action, the judgment in the mortgagors favor is ineffective as to them, of course. In that case, they retain what is known as unforeclosed equity of redemption. A separate foreclosure proceeding should be brought to require them to redeem from the first mortgage, or the party acquiring title to the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale, within 90 days, under penalty of losing that prerogative to redeem.
Facts: Petitioners executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother, Eladio, granting him the authority to encumber, mortgage, and transfer in favor of any person a certain parcel of land. Pursuant thereto, Eladio attached the said land as mortgage to guarantee a loan in favor of one Rivera. Eladio, however, failed to pay the loan. Rivera then instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The court ordered Eladio to pay the loan with the corresponding interest and, in failure thereof, that the mortgage be foreclosed within 90 days from the date the decision would become final. As Eladio failed to pay the loan, the public auction over the foreclosed land took place, with Rivera emerging as the highest bidder. Rivera sold the land to private respondent Lopez. Lopez filed a motion that she be placed in possession of the land. Upon executing the writ of possession,
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however, petitioners refused to obey the same. The latter claim that: 1. The court acted in excess of its jurisdiction since the writ, partaking the nature of an action, had been issued after more than five years already. 2. The sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal since petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The lower court threatened to punish petitioners for contempt should they still refuse to comply with the order. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether petitioners claims should be upheld Held: NO. First, petitioners arguments partake the nature of a collateral attack against a judgment that is valid and regular on its face and has become final long ago. It is well-settled that such judgment can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for that purpose. Assuming that petitioners claim was true, such was cured by the appearance of their counsel in all stages of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require the evasions of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor to overcome such presumption. The issuance of the writ of possession in the instant case is proper. As a general rule, after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. Such writ becomes a necessary remedy where, in a foreclosure suit, a third person not a party thereto intervenes and the debtor continues to possess the real property mortgaged. Petition dismissed. 5. GRIMALT V. VELASQUEZ, 36 PHIL. 936 (1917)
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the owner of the mortgaged property is in no sense a debtor of any person who voluntarily takes part in the bidding. Appealed judgment modified. 6. SY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 172 SCRA 725 (1989)
Facts: Carlos Coquinco executed in favor of private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) a real estate mortgage. For Coquincos ailure to pay the outstanding balance of his loan, SIHI extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and emerged as the sole bidder of the same in its public auction. The certificate of sale in SIHIs favor was then registered with the Registry of Deeds. SIHI then filed with RTC a collection case against Coquinco. In the meantime, petitioner Sy acquired by virtue of a deed of assignment of Coquincos right of redemption. Before the expiration of the one -year redemption period, Sy offered to redeem the foreclosed property from SIHI. SIHI rejected the offer. Sy filed an action for consignation of the amount he had offered to SIHI before RTC. This is to compel the latter to accept the payment of the same and surrender the title over the subject land. RTC dismissed Sys petition on the ground, among others, that there being no valid tender of payment, there was no valid consignation. After this dismissal, SIHI consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed property. Upon learning of this development, Sy instituted another complaint, this time for annulment and cancellation of title, with damages, against SIHI and public respondent Register of Deeds with RTC. RTC ruled against Sy, holding that he had failed to effect a valid redemption, as required by the General Banking Act. CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, the instant case. Sy now claims that, pursuant to Act No. 3135, in relation to Rule 39, Sec. 30 of the RoC, he has made a valid redemption. According to these laws, the judgment debtor or redemptioner may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within 12 months after the sale, upon paying the purchaser the (1) amount of his purchase, (2) 1% monthly interest thereon up to the time of redemption, and (3) amount of any assessments or taxes that the purchaser may have paid after purchase. Meanwhile, CA held that no valid redemption had been made, according to the General Banking Act. The amount tendered to SIHI and thereafter paid to the sheriff was insufficient, it being less than the amount due under the real estate mortgage contract with Coquinco or the latters outstanding balance, with the interests provided in the contract and the expenses incurred by SIHI by reason of the foreclosure and sale of the subject land. Issue: Whether the General Banking Act should apply in determining the amount that should have been paid by Sy as redemptioner Held: YES. Sec. 78 of the General Banking Act provides: In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the passage of this Act or under the prove the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, or the amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage and all the costs, and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less the income received from the property. This section is applicable to not only to banks and banking institutions. It also applies to financial intermediaries engaged in quasi-banking functions within the purview of this section, such as SIHI.
Facts: Plaintiff Grimalt brought an action to foreclose a mortgage on defendant Velasquez property. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, with defendant Sy Quio as the highest bidder in the corresponding sale of the land. Without notice to Velasquez, the court affirmed the sale upon Sy Quios motion. Velasquez then sought to set aside the order of the affirmance on the ground that it was void for lack of notice. The court granted Velasquez motion, but ordered him to pay Sy Quio interest upon the amount of his bid from the time it had been paid to the sheriff until its return to the bidder. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether it was erroneous for the court to order Velasquez to pay interest to Sy Quio Held: YES. Persons who bid at a foreclosure sale are assumed to know that the mere fact of being the highest bidder does not vest in him the ownership of the property. The action by which the ownership of the property is conveyed is the approval of the sale by the court. If the debtor discharges the obligation at any time before a valid is entered, confirming the sale, the right of the bidder is limited to the return of the money paid by him to cover his bid. The debtor, in paying the creditor the amount of the judgment for the purpose of discharging his property from the lien of the mortgage, infringes no right whatever of the bidder. Consequently, it is error to require the mortgagor to pay the bidder interest upon sum deposited by him. Interest is payable by virtue of a contractual undertaking, or as a result of the breach of an obligation after the obligor has been put in default. With respect to one who becomes a bidder at a foreclosure sale,
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These financial intermediaries are authorized to engage in the lending of funds or purchasing of receivables or other obligations with funds obtained from the public. CA decision affirmed. 7. TOLENTINO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 106 SCRA 513 (1981)
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Here, the Tolentinos are not indebted to BPI since their indebtedness has already been extinguished with the foreclosure and sale of the properties. What now remains is the right vested by law to redeem the properties within the prescribed period. The right of redemption is an absolute privilege, the exercise of which is entirely dependent upon the will and discretion of the redemptioners. It is not a legal obligation that the Tolentinos are required to exercise. Notably, if the redemptioners choose to exercise their right, it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat it. Redemptions should be looked upon with favor and where no injury is to follow, a liberal construction will be given. In the instant case, the ends of justice will be better served by affording the Tolentinos the opportunity to redeem the subject properties other than the homestead land. What the redemptioner should pay is the auction purchase price plus 1% monthly interest up to the time of redemption, together with the taxes or assessment paid by the purchaser after the purchase, if any. A formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, although proper, is not essential where, as in the instant case, the right to redeem is exercised thru the filing of judicial action, which as noted earlier was made simultaneously with the deposit of the redemption price with the Sheriff, within the period of redemption. The formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price within the period of redemption prescribed by law, is only essential to preserve the right of redemption for future enforcement even beyond such period of redemption. The filing of the action itself, within the period of redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. Petition modified. 8. GRAVINA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 220 SCRA 178 (1993)
Facts: Ceferino de la Cruz died, leaving private respondents, the de la Cruzes, as his heirs and a parcel of homestead land. The de la Cruzes later sold the said land to petitioner spouses Tolentino. The Tolentinos instituted two mortgages on the homestead land, one in favor of private respondent BPI and the other in favor of the Philippine Banking Corporation. The Tolentinos failed to pay their indebtedness to BPI. Consequently, the sheriff conducted a judicial foreclosure sale on the land, with BPI as the sole and highest bidder. The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale in favor of BPI was subsequently registered. Meanwhile, the de la Cruzes filed an action against the Tolentinos with CFI for the repurchase of their homestead land. The former claim that they have tried to repurchase the land extrajudicially in numerous instances, but the Tolentinos have not heeded to their request. The Tolentinos counter that: 1. Cerefino, as the original patentee, and not the de la Cruzes, has the right to repurchase the homestead land. 2. The complaint does not allege that (a) there has been a bona fide offer to repurchase or a valid tender of payment and (b) the de la Cruzes have intended to pay not only the purchase price but all other expenses of the sale, which includes the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. CFI ruled in favor of the de la Cruzes by allowing them to repurchase the homestead land. Upon payment to BPI, possession of the land was delivered to the de la Cruzes. Meanwhile, among other actions, the Tolentinos filed with CFI a complaint for the redemption of their properties, which were foreclosed by and sold to BPI. The former allege bad faith on the part of BPI in allegedly refusing to allow them to redeem their three lots, one of which was the homestead land. CFI, however, dismissed the Tolentinos complaint. CA issued a consolidated decision on the repurchase and redemption cases in favor of the de la Cruzes. In ruling on the redemption case, CA held that the Tolentinos failed to comply with the manner of the tender of payment. Consignation by crossed checks, as is done by them, does not satisfy the requirements set forth in Art. 1249 of the Civil Code governing the payment of debts in money. As required by the said provision, the payment shall be made in the currency stipulated and, if it were not possible to do so, then in the currency that is the legal tender of the Philippines. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the Tolentinos validly made their tender of payment and consignation before the City Sheriff. Held: YES. Art. 1249 provides that: The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines. The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance. This article, which deals with a mode of extinguishing an obligation, does not apply to the instant case.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Gravina mortgaged their lots to private respondent Daily Savings Loan Association (DSLA) as security for loans they had obtained. For the spouses failure to pay the loans, DSLA foreclosed the mortgage and bought the property as the highest bidder of the sale. DSLA then sold the property to private respondent Mercantile Financing Corporation (MFC). Meanwhile, MFC sold the same to private respondent spouses Tan. Spouses Tan filed an ejectment complaint against the spouses Gravina before MTC. MTC ruled in favor of the Tans. Upon appeal, RTC dismissed the case, claiming that the Tans proper remedy was an accion reivindicatoria or for recovery of property. Consequently, the Tans filed an action to recover possession with RTC. RTC granted the same. CA denied the Gravinas appeal. Hence, the instant case. The Gravinas question the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of their land since they allege not to have received notice thereof as mortgagors. Issue: Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure in the instant case is invalid if the Gavinas have not received notice of the same Held: NO. Act No. 3135 or the Mortgage Law only requires the posting of the notices of sale in three public places and the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice is not required. Petition for review on the CA decision denied for lack of merit. 9. OUANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 398 SCRA 425 (2003)
Facts: Private respondent Julieta obtained a loan from PNB with a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land as security. She failed to pay her loan, prompting PNB to file a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
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with the City Sheriff. The sheriff prepared a notice of sale setting the date of the public auction. It was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation and posted in public places of the city. The sale as scheduled, however, did not take place because the parties had agreed to postpone the same, without any further republication of the notice. The sale did not push through in accordance with the numerous instances that the parties had executed an Agreement to Postpone the Sale. Notably, in all of these postponements, neither a new notice of sale was issued nor was there any republication or reposting of the notice for the rescheduled sale. Finally, the sheriff conducted the auction sale, with PNB as the only bidder. A certificate of sale was executed in favor of the latter. It then conveyed the properties to petitioner Alfredo, Julietas brother. Julieta sent demand letters to PNB, pointing out the irregularities in the auction sale. She also filed a complaint for the nullification of the sale with RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Julieta, holding that the sale was void for lack of republication. CA affirmed this ruling. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether the rescheduled auction sale was null and void, despite the parties having originally complied with the requirements of publication and posting of the notice of sale Held: YES. Failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect. Consequently, such defect renders the sale absolutely void and no title passes. Substantial compliance with these requirements, considering that prior publication and posting of the notice of the first date have been made, does not validate the sale. Republication in the manner prescribed by Act No. 3135 is necessary for the validity of a postponed extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Also, while the waiver of ones rights is recognized by law, such is not operative and void if it would infringe on the rights of others or would be against public policy and morals. In a foreclosure sale, the purpose of notice and publication is not for the benefit of the mortgagor, but that for third persons. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135. CA decision affirmed. 10. YULIENCO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 393 SCRA 143 (2002)
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demand on the latter and (2) file a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with RTC Quezon City. The spouses refute this petition on the ground that its issuance would be improper pending the outcome of the case filed with RTC Makati. RTC Quezon City granted the writ of possession. CA affirmed this decision. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC decision granting the writ of possession. Held: NO. Act 3135 provides that jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of possession lies in the court of the province, city, or municipality where the property subject thereof is situated. Since the land sought to be possessed is located in Quezon City, the RTC therein should rightly take cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of the other courts. The pending case with RTC Makati should not be considered as a procedural obstacle. Said action for injunction, reformation, and damages does not raise an issue that constitutes a prejudicial question in relation to the present case. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may be proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale of this principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The principle of prejudicial question does not apply in the instant case because both cases are civil in nature. The issue in the case with RTC Makati is whether the promissory note and mortgage agreement executed by the parties are valid. Meanwhile, the issue in the case with RTC Quezon City is whether ACC, armed with the TCT in its name, is entitled to a writ of possession. Clearly, these two cases are can proceed separately and are independent from one another. Notably, the spouses cannot anymore exercise their right of redemption, the prescribed period having already lapsed. After consolidation of title in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. Petition denied.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Yulienco obtained a loan from private respondent Advance Capital Corporation (ACC), evidenced with a promissory note and secured by a real estate mortgage on their properties in the Benguet, Makati, and Quezon Cities. When the spouses failed to pay their debt, ACC filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the said properties with the ex-officio Sheriff of Quezon City. To forestall the said foreclosure, the spouses filed a petition for injunction, reformation, and damages with prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction against ACC with RTC Makati. The latter granted the spouses prayer, but not as to Quezon City since, according to BP 129, it cannot enforce a writ of preliminary injunction outside its territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, a public auction on the property in Quezon City was held, with ACC being its highest bidder and eventual buyer. ACC consolidated the ownership of the same and paid the necessary taxes with BIR. The spouses, however, continued to occupy the property, prompting ACC to (1) make a formal and final
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RULE 69 PARTITION 1. RUSSEL V. VESTIL, 304 SCRA 738 (1999)
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the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 2. RUGUIAN V. RUGUIAN, 9 PHIL. 527 (1908)
Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION. The complaint alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land previously owned by the spouses Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION. By virtue of this deed, respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00; thus the MCTC should exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the case instead. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether RTC has jurisdiction Held: YES. The complaint filed before the RTC is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. But, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance. While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction. The subject matter of the complaint in this case is the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Tautho and divided this property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
Facts: This was an action brought in the CFI for the partition of a certain parcel of land. It appears that the said Diego, Felipa, and Valeriana Ruguian, plaintiffs, and the said Roman Ruguian were brothers and sisters, and that Faustina and Antonio were children of two other deceased brothers, all of which brothers were the children of one Calixto Ruguian. The plaintiffs allege that they and the defendant are the heirs of Calixto Ruguian and that the said land constituted a part of the estate of Ruguian. To the petition of the plaintiffs, the defendant filed a general denial, together with a special defense, in which he alleged that he was the owner of the said land and had been in the uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of about 40 years. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court ordered a partition of the property in accordance with the prayer of the petition of the plaintiffs. From this decision the defendant appealed. Issues: 1. Whether the court erred in allowing the action brought by the plaintiffs; 2. Whether the court erred in finding that the property in question is a part of the estate of the deceased Calixto Ruguian; and 3. Whether the court erred in considering the plaintiff's claim as proven, and not the allegation on which the defendant bases his argument Held: The defendant presents no document to sustain his contention. There is a preponderance of evidence, however, showing that the defendant had been in possession of the land for a period of about thirty years. The evidence also shows that if the land was deeded at all to the defendant, it must have been deeded by Calixto Ruguian and Mariano Ruguian, Mariano being a brother of Calixto. There being no documentary evidence, however, to support the contention of the defendant that the land in question had been deeded to him, we are unable to find as a fact that the said land had actually been conveyed to him, and it appearing from the evidence that a third person, Mariano Ruguian, had an interest in the land in question, and he not being made a party to this suit, we are of the opinion, and so hold, for this reason, that a partition of the land in question cannot be granted. An action will not lie for the partition of an undivided interest in the land without the joinder of all coowners. Evidence shows that all of the parties interested in the land in question are not parties to the suit. 3. MIRANDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 71 SCRA 295 (1976)
Facts: Petitioner Vicente Miranda was appointed as administrator of the estate of deceased Hilarion Dydongco. Petitioner as such administrator filed a case against the private respondents (or their predecessors) for recovery of properties of the decedent alleged to have been fraudulently and in bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed, appropriated and converted as their own by respondents. In his complaint for recovery, petitioner alleged that prior to and at the time of his death, Dydongco, who resided in the Philippines since the beginning of the century, had well-developed and established business and commercial enterprises with substantial bank deposits and numerous parcels of land or property; that Hilarion Dydongco went to China and thereafter, became seriously ill; that, at that time, his children, Dy Chun and Dy Suat Hong (both defendants in said case R-7793) as well as Dy Sick Lee (who died subsequently and is not a defendant in case No. R-7793) and his protegees Dy Bee and Dy Seko were working as his Manager and/or employees in the aforementioned business establishments;
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that taking advantage of the absence and bad condition of the health of Hilarion Dydongco, particularly of his subsequent death, the defendants therein took over said business, including its assets, goods, merchandise, chattels, machinery, stock-in-trade, cash on hand and in banks, amounts receivable and other properties of the deceased, as well as his store its branches; that with funds belonging to the latter, the defendants therein moreover purchased several parcels of land, on one of which a 20-door apartment building was constructed, with funds of the same nature, and leased to Chinese tenants and other lessees; that the defendants therein had received and are receiving the rentals, earnings and profits derived from said business and property of the deceased; and that said defendants hold, manage and operate the aforementioned business, properties and income in trust for the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco but have not rendered any accounting thereof." Petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that said business, assets, income and other property, are in the possession and under the management and control of said defendants as mere trustees thereof, and sentencing them to turnover and deliver the same to him, as well as to render accounts and to execute the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition to paying damages and the costs." Held: CA erred in upholding respondent Judge Tantuicos decision amending that of his predecessor judge. The only remaining or residual authority of respondent judge was to enforce, consider and act on the accounting ordered in the original decision for the completion of the relief therein granted before considering private respondents' proposed appeal, suffices to dispose of the case at bar itself. Imperative considerations of public policy and of sound practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action call for considering such judgments for recovery of property with accounting as final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of the judgment. Also, no appeal would lie from the lower court's action approving or disapproving the accounting unless there was gross error, oppression, fraud or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction that would be correctible on a special writ of certiorari. Respondent appellate court's decision is set aside and instead judgment is rendered declaring null and void and setting aside respondent judge's amended decision of October 4, 1969 and reinstating the original decision of July 26, 1965. The judge now presiding the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. R- 7793 thereof (and whoever may hereafter succeed him) is ordered to proceed forthwith with the implementation of this Court's 1968 judgment in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza by making the necessary adjudication within thirty (30) days from finality of this judgment on the full, accurate and correct accounting of all fruits, interest, profits, assets and properties required of the defendants therein 'which accounting private respondents (defendants) are hereby ordered to render within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Good grounds having been set forth and found to order delivery pending appeal of the properties found in the July 26, 1965 judgment to belong to the decedent's estate, private respondents (defendants) are hereby ordered to deliver all such properties to petitioner-administrator within 30 days from finality of this judgment, regardless of any appeal they may take from the said July 26, 1965 judgment and adjudication that the lower court may make on their accounting (as allowed in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza), subject to the provisions of Rule 39, section 3 on stay of execution upon approval of a sufficient supersedeas bond. In view of the reversal herein of the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and the length of time that this dispute between the parties has been pending final determination, private respondents are herein given the option within 30 days from finality of this judgment to take an immediate appeal from the said July 26, 1965 judgment without waiting for the trial court's adjudication on the accounting therein ordered. 4. MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN V. GARCIA, 180 SCRA 576 (1989)
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Facts: The Municipality of Bian sought to expropriate the parcels of land owned by the defendants as its new site for a modern public market. It then filed the corresponding expropriation suit with the RTC. One of the defendants was private respondent Francisco. She filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the allegations in the complaint were vague and conjectural, (2) the complaint violates the constitutional limitations of law and jurisprudence on eminent domain, (3) it is oppressive, (4) it is barred prior decision and disposition on the subject matter, and (5) it states no cause of action. Respondent judge Garcia issued a writ of possession in favor of Municipality. Francisco then filed a motion for separate trial, claiming that, among other defenses, she had a vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance and Development Permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Until this clearance was revoked or the Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a rezoning of the lots in question, the latters action for expropriation would be premature. RTC granted Franciscos motion for separate trial. After the said trial, Garcia dismissed the complaint against Francisco and excluded her property from the writ of possession. Municipalitys MR, which had raised the issues now presented in this case, was denied for having filed out of time. Hence, the instant case. Issues: 1. Whether Municipalitys MR was filed out of time 2. Whether Garcias issuance of the order in the separate trial gave rise to a situation where multiple appeals had become available Held: 1. NO. Francisco contends that the MR has been filed beyond the 15-day period to be counted from the notice of the final order appealed from. Franciscos argument, however, should not be upheld. The SC notes the close analogy between actions for expropriation and partition in deciding the instant case. In the various partition cases that SC has decided, it has been held that an order of partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, such as the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination by said commissioners of just compensation, the submission of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition. Imperative considerations of public policy, sound practice, and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action require that judgments for recovery or partition of property with accounting be considered as final judgments, duly appealable. As in actions for partition, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation in actions for eminent domain is 30 days counted from the notice of order and not the ordinary 15-day period. Municipalitys motion, therefore, was timely presented. 2. YES. Where a single complaint was filed against several defendants having individual, separate interests, and a separate trial was held relative to one of said defendants after which a final order or judgment was rendered on the merits of the plaintiffs claim against that particular d efendant, it is obvious that in the event of an appeal from that separate judgment, the original record cannot and should not be sent up to the appellate tribunal. The record will have to stay with the trial court because it will still try the case as regards the other defendants. Since more than one appeal is allowed in this case, there is more reason then to apply the 30-day period within which to file a record of appeal, as in this case. This is pursuant to the Implementing Rules in relation to BP 129.
*Same facts, issues, and ruling as in the digest made under Rule 67
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Challenged order annulled and set aside. 5. QUIMPO, VS. ABAD VDA. DE BELTRAN, G.R. NO. 160956, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
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Facts: Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad was the owner of several parcels of land. She died intestate, leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild and great grandchildren, namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, all surnamed Abad. Joaquin and respondents undertook an oral partition of some of these parcels. Half of the properties was given to Joaquin and the other half to the respondents. But, no document of partition was executed, because Joaquin refused to execute a deed. Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their respective shares in one land, and installed several tenants over their share in the other. Meanwhile, Joaquin became the administrator of the remaining undivided properties and of the shares of respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, who were still minors at that time. Danilo, Marites, Anita, and Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to them, but Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused to heed respondents demand for partition of the other parcels, prompting respondents to file a complaint for judicial partition and/or recovery of possession with accounting and damages with the RTC. Joaquin denied the material allegations in the complaint, and averred, as his special and affirmative defenses, lack of cause of action and prescription. He asserted absolute ownership over some of these parcels, claiming that he had purchased these lands from Eustaquia, evidenced by deeds of sale. He, likewise, claimed continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of these lots since 1946, and alleged that Consuelos occupation of the portion of the San Jose property was by mere tolerance. During the pendency of the case, Joaquin died. Accordingly, he was substituted by his wife, Estela Tena- Quimpo and his children, namely, Jose, Adelia, Joaquin, Anita, Angelita, Amelia, Arlene, Joy and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo (the Quimpos). The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, declaring them as co-owners of all the properties left by Eustaquia. It rejected Joaquins claim of absolute ownership and declared void the purported deeds of sale executed by Eustaquia for lack of consideration and consent. The court also found that at the time of the execution of these deeds, Joaquin was not gainfully employed and had no known source of income, which shows that the deeds of sale state a false and fictitious consideration. Likewise, Eustaquia could not have possibly given her consent to the sale because she was already 91 years old at that time. The RTC also sustained the oral partition among the heirs. According to the trial court, the possession and occupation of land by respondents Consuelo and Ireneo, and Joaquins acquiescence for 23 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was actual partition of the properties. It held that Joaquin and his heirs are now estopped from claiming ownership over the lands in dispute. Issue: Whether co-ownership exists among petitioners and respondents over the subject parcels of land Held: YES. Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. Respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral partition the parcels, and the partition of the others. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches. 6. DE GUIA V. CA, 413 SCRA 114
DOCTRINE Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extrajudicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each coowner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the coownership under the conditions set by law. FACTS On 12 May 1986, ABEJO instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the 1/2 undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond (FISHPOND) situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDS total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO further averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract a nd without paying rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay damages. DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues concerning the validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to him, ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the 1/2 undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith. The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pretrial brief on 05 April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial brief on 31 July 1990. DE GUIAs pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to Compromise, offering to settle ABEJOs claim for P300,000 and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJOs choice.
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Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land covering a fishpond with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one half undivided portion owned by Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh. B), the only heir of the original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant. The contract provided that the period of lease shall be until November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and defendant failed to surrender the fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27, 1983 were made for defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in question (Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver possession and also to pay. On the other hand, defendants evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of one half of the undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. The RTC ruled for ABEJO. i. Declaring the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan (Exhs. A & 1) dated November 10, 1979, and the Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan (Exhs. C and 3) also dated November 10, 1979, as valid for all legal intents and purposes; ii. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage; and The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJOs 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIAs sublease contract expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired his fathers share in 1983. However, the tria l court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the reasonable amount but under certain conditions which ABEJO found unacceptable. Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender possession of the 1/2 undivided portion of the FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals found DE GUIAs appeal without merit and affirmed the trial courts decision. Upon DE GUIAs motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIAs failure to respect ABEJOs right over his 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of possession. Hence, the instant petition. DE GUIA. contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since the court cannot implement any decision in the latter case without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery of possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the action is part of an undivided, co- owned property. The procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement difficult if not impossible since there is still no partition of the subject property. ISSUE/S (1) Whether an action filed should have been one for partition. (2) Whether an order to pay damages in the form of rent is premature before partition. (3) Whether award of attorneys fees is proper.
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HELD (1) YES. Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co- ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law. To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the coowned property. Thus, judicial or extrajudicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND. (2) NO. The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the coowner who dwells in the house. The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the coowner to pay rent after the co- owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property. In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co- participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits. The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJOs right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his 1/2 share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others. Since ABEJO acquired his 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJOs portion beginning from that date. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property, considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to ABEJOs 1/2 undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years. ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment. (3) DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co- owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
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RULE 70 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER 1. REYES V. STA. MARIA, 91 SCRA 164 (1979)
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It appears, however, that the Hilarios have further allowed the Palileos to remain in possession of the premises on the verbal understanding that the latter are to vacate the same after two years from the date of sale. The Palileos failed to comply with this understanding despite the Hilarios demands, prompting the latter to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against the former. The Palileos raise the following defenses: 1. The purported deed of a sale was in fact a deed of mortgage. Having already paid the sum agreed upon, their corresponding obligation with regard to the said mortgage was already extinguished. They thus remained as owners of the disputed lot. 2. The MTC trying the case does not have jurisdiction over it. MTC and RTC ruled in favor of the Hilarios. CA reversed these rulings on the ground that the issue raised by the Palileos ultimately rested upon and involved the question of ownership. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether MTC has jurisdiction over the case, despite that the issue here pertains to the conflicting claims of the parties on the ownership of the land Held: YES. Inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership. But this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Therefore, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, thus, would not prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case may be. Otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is, after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged or pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in his or her answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting ownership. The settled rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it contains the allegation that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The complaint must aver facts showing that the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case, such as how defendants possession started or continued. CAs judgment reversed and set aside. 3. WILSON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS, 208 SCRA 108 (1992)
Facts: Petitioners Artemio and Hilarion Reyes were the owners of a certain residential lot. They tolerated a certain Maximo Santos, the father of respondents Hilaria and Pilar Santos, to use and occupy the said lot free of charge, under the following conditions: (1) that instead of paying rentals, the Santoses should undertake to pay the corresponding real estate taxes on the land and (2) that the latter will leave and vacate the premises anytime the Reyeses so demand. Subsequently, the Reyeses verbally notified the Santoses that they were in need of the lot; thus, the latter should vacate and leave the same. The Santoses allegedly unreasonably refused, at the same time claiming ownership of the property, and alleging further they had bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo. This prompted the Reyeses to file an action that they had termed as one to quiet title with CFI. They prayed in their complaint that (1) they be declared as the owners of the subject lot, (2) the court order the Santoses to vacate the premises and the return of the possession thereof to them and (2) the court order the Santoses to pay the Reyeses, jointly and severally, an amount representing rental or damages every month until the possession thereof is finally restored. The Santoses filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that CFI had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit. They furthered that the action filed by the Reyeses is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer. Consequently, the case falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior or municipal court. CFI dismissed the Reyeses complaint. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether CFI had jurisdiction over the instant case Held: YES. The complaint here shows on its face that the Santoses refusal to deliver possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of ownership of the same property and their counter-allegation that they had bought it from the said Aguinaldo. The Reyeses action then was clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property (possession de jure), as well as to be declared the owners thereof as against the contrary claim of the Santoses. The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria. The Reyeses action was not merely for recovery of possession de fact. Their action was clearly one for accion publiciana for recovery of possession de jure, if not one of accion reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the land. Such accion publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess (independently of title) clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI and not of the Municipal Courts. Lower courts dismissal order set aside. 2. HILARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 260 SCRA 420 (1996)
Facts: Petitioner spouses Hilario purchased from private respondent spouses Palileo a house and lot, with a right to repurchase the property within one year from the execution of the deed of sale in favor of the latter.
Facts: Petitioners Wilmon Auto Supply Corp., Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corp., and Chang Liang, Jr. leased a commercial building and bodegas standing on registered land. After the expiration of the period fixed in their lease agreements with their lessors, the latter executed a deed of absolute sale over the said properties in favor of respondent Star Group Resources and Development Inc. Among others, the deed provided that Star Group shall deal with the lessees and occupants therein without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the lessors. Pursuant thereto, Star Group filed separate actions of unlawful detainer against the petitioners with MTC. Meanwhile, the latter refused to concede, alleging that, in so selling the properties and seeking their
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ejectment therefrom, the lessorand their buyerhad violated their leasehold rights because (1) they, as lessees, were not accorded the right of preemption, (2) the buyer was not required to honor the leases, and (3) the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases upon the expiration thereof. Pursuant to their answer, some of the petitioners filed an action against their lessors and Star Group with RTC. They prayed, among others, that they be allowed to exercise their right of preemption or redemption. MTC held that some of the actions for unlawful detainer must be so tried, while the summary procedure rules were inapplicable in others. In filing their MR, petitioners prayed that the complaints so filed be dismissed on the grounds of litis pendentia (as earlier said, there was pending action with RTC) and lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the actions. This MR was denied. RTC also ruled against petitioners. It held that the unlawful detainer cases fell within the MTCs jurisdiction and that the pendency of the said case with RTC did not warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer cases, the only issue in the latter suits being physical possession or possession de facto while the issue in the former suit is basically one of ownership. Pursuant thereto, the pendency of an action involving ownership and annulment of sale does not stay the proceedings in the ejectment case. CA ruled against the petitioners. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether Star Groups unlawful detainer suits in the MTC against petitioner lessees for the reason that their leases had expired, should be abated by the actions filed in the RTC by said petitioner lessees based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of preemption on prior purchase of the leased premises Held: NO. The following should not be regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment suit: 1. Injunction suit instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the MTCs or other courts of the first level, as well as proceedings on consignation of rentals; 2. An accion publiciana does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former; 3. A writ of possession case where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the RTC; 4. An action for quieting of title to property; 5. Suits for specific performance with damages; 6. Action for reformation of instrument (e.g. from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) 7. Action for reconveyance of property or accion reivindicatoria; and 8. Suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property. The underlying reason for this enumeration is that the actions in the RTC do not involve physical or de facto possession. Also, on not a few occasions, the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding or that the issues presented in the RTC could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. This especially holds true in the case at bar. CAs decision affirmed. 4. MUNOZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 214 SCRA 216 (1992)
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Petitioners raised as two of their defenses that (1) a Loreta Garcia was already the owner of the said land and (2) MTC had no jurisdiction on the case, the latter being an accion publiciana that is exclusively cognizable by the RTC. MTC ruled in favor of Garcia on the ground that since the issue involved in the case is mere possession and the defendants did not claim ownership, unlawful detainer is the proper action for plaintiffs recovery of possession. RTC reversed MTCs decision on the ground that Garcia had failed to establish his proof of prior physical possession over the land in dispute. Meanwhile, CA reversed and set aside RTCs decision. Hence, the instant case. In reiterating their defense, petitioners contend that, based on the allegations in Garcias complaint, it is one for accion publiciana and not for unlawful detainer. Meanwhile, Garcia now alleges that, while the complaint has been captioned as unlawful detainer, his allegation that petitioners have constructed their houses on the questioned premises stealthily clearly characterizes the complaint as one for forcible entry. Issue: Whether the complaint filed by Garcia was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer Held: NO. The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are (1) who had actual possession over the piece of real property, (2) whether the possessor was ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy, or stealth, and (3) whether plaintiff asked for the restoration of his possession. In the instant case, there was no mention in Garcias complaint and position paper that he and his co owners were in prior possession of the property. There was an allegation that the property is presently tenanted, but it did not state when the tenant started to possess the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was accomplished or when Garcia learned of such entry. Garcias failure to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place was fatal because this would determine the start of the counting of the one-year period for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or reivindicatoria in the RTC. Notably, CA erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by Garcia for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises could not change the nature of the latters possession of the property and convert the formers action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. Petition granted. *This case distinguishes forcible entry from unlawful detainer. See Sara Mawis supplemental SCA Melo Reviewer for these distinctions. 5. SUMULONG V. CA, 232 SCRA 372 (1994)
Facts: Private respondent Nicolas Garcia is a co-owner of an agricultural land, which and he is co-owners have acquired by succession from their deceased father. The petitioners herein, however, constructed their houses on a portion of the lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners. Despite letters of demand asking the petitioners to remove their houses from the lot within 15 days from the receipt thereof and demands made by Garcia, petitioners refused to do so. This prompted Garcia to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners with the MTC.
Facts: Jopson Management and Development Corporation leased from petitioner Esperanza Sumulong her lot
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for the formers parking lot and warehouse for its supermarket. Later on, Jopson was beset with a strike by its laborers. Consequently, it ceased operations for about two years. Upon Sumulongs inspection of the subject lot, it was verified that Jopson had vacated the premises and tolerated the illegal entry of private respondent Inland Trailways. Accordingly, the contract of lease was automatically terminated. Sumulong, through her attorney-in-fact, took possession of the subject properties. Inland did not resist, but later on misrepresented to Sumulong that Jopson Supermarket had resumed operations under the name of Inland Supermarket. This led Sumulog to accept Inlands check payment. Upon learning of the misrepresentation, Sumulong notified Jopson of the termination of their lease contract. Inland, however, persuaded Sumulongs attorney-in-fact to grant to it the temporary use of the subject properties, pending negotiations for the lease of the premises. Sumulong relented to this plea. The new lease contract did not materialize because Inland insisted on a lower price than what Sumulong had anticipated. To fully protect her interest, Sumulong formally notified Jopson of the termination of the subsisting lease contract due to the latters abandonment of the premises. Unbeknownst to Sumulong, Inland procured a sublease agreement from Jopson, despite cancellation of the said contract. This compelled Sumulong to take over the physical possession of leased premises. But, Inland again misrepresented to Sumulong that it was ready to finalize appropriate lease contract with the latter. Sumulong then allowed Inland once more to enter premises. the the the the
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Here, Sumulong failed to substantiate her allegations with material operative facts. Also, whatever illegality may have tainted Inlands entry was removed by Sumulongs acceptance of rentals from the former after her take-over, even if such was through the formers misrepresentation. Nevertheless, the complaint should not have been dismissed merely for its failure to state a cause of action for forcible entry. While Sumulong has designated it as one for forcible entry in the caption, her allegations sufficiently establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Finally, as in the instant case, possession by tolerance is lawful. But, a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Petition granted. 6. ONG V. PAREL, 355 SCRA 691 (2001)
Thereafter, however, Inland refused to execute the lease contract it had promised. It also failed to deliver the agreed monetary consideration for the temporary use of the premises or to peacefully return the same. This prompted Sumulong to file a complaint for forcible entry against Inland with MTC. In ruling in favor of Sumulong, MTC sustained the formers theory that Inland had entered the premises by stealth and strategy, and disregarded the latters defense that the proper action should have been one for unlawful detainer. RTC reversed MTCs decision. Although Sumulong had constructive possession of the subject premises, she was, nevertheless, not in prior physical and actual possession of the same. Prior physical and actual possession being an essential element of forcible entry, Sumulongs action then should fail. CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, the instant petition. Sumulong now asserts that CA has erred in holding that she has no cause of action for forcible entry against Inland. She argues that the prior possession for purposes of the instant action is not to be reckoned from the time Inland has first entered the premises, but from the time she has successfully regained actual physical possession of the lot from Inland, where the latter has failed to resist the physical take-over and reentry. Issue: Whether the complaint filed fails to state a cause of action for forcible entry Held: YES. It must be noted that Sumulong had used strategy and stealth as grounds for filing her complaint for forcible entry against Inland. Here, the acts allegedly constitutive of strategy and stealth consisted of Inlands procurement of the sublease agreement and its misrepresentation that it was ready to finalize the appropriate lease contract. Assuming these acts were true, these acts hardly constitute either strategy or stealth as a means of forcible entry. Strategy means machination or artifice, while stealth means any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Ong purchased a lot adjacent to that owned by a Visitacion Beltran, respondent Parels grandmother. The Ongs filed an action for forcible entry against Parel before MTC. The former allege that Parel, through strategy and stealth, has constructed an overhang and hollow block wall along the common boundary of the parties adjoining lot. This allegedly illegally deprived the Ongs o f possession of the said portion of their lot. Despite the latters various demands to remove the constructions so introduced, no such removal was made. Meanwhile, Parel counters that the subject wall has already existed before the Ongs lot has been sold to them. MTC ruled in favor of the Ongs. RTC dismissed the case for the Ongs failure to prove prior physical possession of the subject lot. Upon appeal, CA upheld Parels claims and added that Visitacions alleged encroachments could not be equated with strategy and stealth giving rise to forcible entry. Also, the Ongs failed to prove in their favor the issue of material possession or possession de facto. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether the Ongs complaint for forcible entry should necessarily fail Held: YES. In actions for forcible entry, the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action is filed any time within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies in such cases, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry was made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the
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plaintiff learned thereof. Also, stealth is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission. In the instant case, the Ongs failed to establish that Parel had employed strategy and stealth in encroaching on the formers property. Meanwhile, Parel sufficiently proved that the disputed structures already existed before the Ongs bought the lot. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the instant case, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. It becomes clear that this is not a proper case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is, instead, a boundary dispute. Petition denied. 7. CO TIAMCO V. DIAZ, 75 PHIL. 672 (1946) by
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2. Defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense. There has been in this case a notice to quit, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint. Even supposing, without conceding, that the complaint is deficient in that regard, the deficiency was cured by evidence. According to the RoC, when evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. The complaint filed sufficiently provides a cause of action for unlawful detainer. As in the instant case, a complaint setting forth a charge of unlawful entry and detainer in the language of the statute is sufficient. In relation thereto, in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient, for the words unlawfully withholding imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be tried and decided by justice of the peace or municipal courts who are in close contact with the masses. Simple and practical methods of procedure should be afforded these masses so that they may not fail through their ignorance in obtaining a just redress for their grievances. Judgment ordering CFI to try Co Tiamcos case after respondents have answered. 8. PENAS, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS, 233 SCRA 744 (1994)
Facts: Petitioner Co Tiamco filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents Yao Boom Sim, Yao Ka Tiam, and Sy Gui Gam. At the trial, Tiamco received offered as evidence a notice to quit alleged to have been served on respondents prior to the action. The municipal court sustained the latters objection that the fact sought to be proven thereby was not alleged in the complaint. This prompted Tiamco to file a writ of mandamus with CFI, which the latter granted. When the trial was resumed in the municipal court, the evidence was admitted. After trial, judgment was rendered against respondents. Upon appeal before CFI, respondents filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was no allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or vacate the premises served upon them prior to the action and, therefore, the municipal court had no original jurisdiction. As a consequence, CFI had no appellate jurisdiction to try and decide the case. CFI sustained the motion. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether CFIs order of dismissal was erroneous Held: YES, on the grounds that (1) it relies on the wrong construction of the RoC, (2) it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the case, and (3) the complaint filed is sufficient in itself. 1. CFI interpreted the pertinent provision of the RoC to mean that, in all actions for unlawful detainer by a landlord against a tenant, demand is jurisdictional; thus, required. It is apparent from this provision, however, that a demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, and not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiry of its term. In other words, upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the expiration of the periods prescribed by the RoC. Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit renewal thereof, as when, with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for 15 days, as provided in the old Civil Code; and the lessors acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. But a tacit renewal in such case, being a new contract, is a matter of defense which may be alleged
Facts: The late Nazario Penas executed a written lease contract with private respondent Lupo Calaycay over a lot. Upon Nazarios death, an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, petitioner Penas, Jr. Eventually, petitioner spouses Pena, Jr. notified Calaycay that they were terminating the written monthto-month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter to vacate the subject premises. The Penases, however, opted to allow Calaycay to continue occupying the leased premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease contract at an increased monthly rental. Calaycay failed to abide by this demand, but continued staying on the leased premises and eventually deposited the monthly rentals in the subject premises with PNB in trust for the Penases. Before this deposit, Calaycay, together with others, informed the Penases, among other things, that since the latters representative had refused to accept the rentals, he would deposit the same with a reput able bank and he would withhold the same intact for the Penases. There was no instance that Penases manifested any desire to withdraw the same deposit in the bank. Later on, the Penases sent another letter to Calaycay to vacate the premises and to pay back rental arrearages, which the latter failed to satisfy. The Penases filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the grounds of termination of the month-tomonth lease contract and Calaycays failure to execute a new lease agreement with increased rentals.
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MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In upholding MTCs decision, RTC held that the Penases remedy should have been accion publiciana since more than one year had elapsed from the demand uponp Calaycay to vacate. CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether MTC had jurisdiction over the instant case Held: YES. The one-year period provided for in Rule 70 of the RoC within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last letter of demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. As with the instant case, the notice of giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the RoC in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made. It should also be noted that, even if Calaycay were depositing rentals in trust for the petitioner spouses, what was being deposited where rentals at the old rate, which the latter were not bound to accept or withdraw. CA decision set aside.
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Held: It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order. Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied" -- they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness" -- in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ** (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth." The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession ** became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's owner) was its proper remedy." It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last) written demand to vacate. The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated. Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the
9.
CANIZA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 268 SCRA 640 (1997)
Facts: Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. Issue: WON an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute.
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property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event which still has to take place; in other words; prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious. In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure. 10. CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. CA, 176 SCRA 72 (1989)
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or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days or five (5) days in case of building, after demand therefor, made upon qqqm personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon. The right to bring an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer must be counted from the time the defendants failed to pay rent after the demand therefor. It is not the failure per se to pay rent as agreed in the contract, but the failure to pay the rent after a demand therefor is made, that entitles the lessor to bring an action for unlawful detainer. In other words, the demand contemplated by the above-quoted provision is not a demand to vacate, but a demand made by the landlord upon his tenant for the latter to pay the rent due if the tenant fails to comply with the said demand with the period provided, his possession becomes unlawful and the landlord may then bring the action for ejectment. The demand required and contemplated in Section 2, aforequoted, is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of lease. It partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued before resorting for judicial action so much so that when there is full compliance with the demand, there arises no necessity for court action. As to whether this demand is merely a demand to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease or also a demand to vacate, the answer can be gleaned from said Section 2. This section presupposes the existence of a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it speaks of "failure to pay rent due or comply with the conditions of the lease." The existence of said cause of action gives the lessor the right under Article 1659 of the New Civil Code to ask for the rescission of the contract of lease and indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force. Accordingly, if the option chosen is for specific performance, then the demand referred to is obviously to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease violated. However, if rescission is the option chosen, the demand must be for the lessee to pay rents or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate. Accordingly, the rule that has been followed in our jurisprudence where rescission is clearly the option taken, is that both demands to pay rent and to vacate are necessary to make a lessee a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. Thus, for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2, Rule 70, namely 15 days in case of lands and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. It is very clear that in the case at bar, no cause of action for ejectment has accrued. There was no failure yet on the part of private respondents to pay rents for three consecutive months. As the terms of the individual verbal leases which were on a month-to-month basis were not alleged and proved, the general rule on necessity of demand applies, to wit: there is default in the fulfillment of an obligation when the creditor demands payment at the maturity of the obligation or at anytime thereafter. This is explicit in Article 1169, New Civil Code which provides that "(t)hose obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation." Petitioner has not shown that its case falls on any of the following exceptions where demand is not required: (a) when the obligation or the law so declares; (b) when from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it can be inferred that time is of the essence of the contract; and (c) when demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. The demand required in Article 1169 of the Civil Code may be in any form, provided that it can be proved. The proof of this demand lies upon the creditor. Without such demand, oral or written, the effects of default do not arise. This demand is different from the demand required under Section 2, Rule 70, which is merely a jurisdictional requirement before an existing cause of action may be pursued. The facts on record fail to show proof that petitioner demanded the payment of the rentals when the obligation matured. Coupled with the fact that no collector was sent as previously done in the past, the private respondents cannot be held guilty of mora solvendi or delay in the payment of rentals. Thus, when petitioner first demanded the payment of the 3-month arrearages and private respondents lost no time in making tender and payment, which petitioner accepted, no cause of action for ejectment accrued. Hence, its demand to vacate was premature as it was an exercise of a non-existing right to rescind.
Facts: The private respondents, Ederlina Navalta, Ong Teng, Jose Liwanag, Leandro Canlas, Victoria Sudario, and Flora Nagbuya were the lessees of the premises located at No. 512 Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, originally owned by the Susana Realty. These individual verbal leases were on a month-to month basis at the following rates: Ederlina Navalta at the rate of P80.50; Ong Teng at the rate of P96.10; Jose Liwanag at the rate of P40.35; Leandro Canlas at the rate of P80.55; Victoria Sudario at the rate of P50.45 and Flora Nagbuya at the rate of P80.55. The payments of the rentals were paid by the lessees to a collector of the Susana Realty who went to the premises monthly. Sometime in March, 1984, the Susana Realty sold the leased premises to the petitioner, Cetus Development, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. From April to June, 1984, the private respondents continued to pay their monthly rentals to a collector sent by the petitioner. In the succeeding months of July, August and September 1984, the respondents failed to pay their monthly individual rentals as no collector came. Petitioner sent a letter to each of the private respondents demanding that they vacate the subject premises and to pay the back rentals for the months of July, August and September, 1984, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof. Immediately upon the receipt of the said demand letters on October 10, 1984, the private respondents paid their respective arrearages in rent which were accepted by the petitioner subject to the unilateral condition that the acceptance was without prejudice to the filing of an ejectment suit. Subsequent monthly rental payments were likewise accepted by the petitioner under the same condition. For failure of the private respondents to vacate the premises, the petitioner filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila complaints for ejectment against the manner. Respondents claimed that since the occupancy of the premises they paid their monthly rental regularly through a collector of the lessor; that their non-payment of the rentals for the months of July, August and September, 1984, was due to the failure of the petitioner (as the new owner) to send its collector; that they were at a loss as to where they should pay their rentals; that sometime later, one of the respondents called the office of the petitioner to inquire as to where they would make such payments and he was told that a collector would be sent to receive the same; that no collector was ever sent by the petitioner; and that instead they received a uniform demand letter dated October 9, 1984. MTC dismissed the 6 cases. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court.RTC dismissed the appeal. Hence, petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court was filed by the petitioner with the Court of Appeals. Said petition was dismissed. Issue: Whether there exists a cause of action when the complaints for unlawful detainer were filed considering the fact that upon demand by petitioner from private respondents for payment of their back rentals, the latter immediately tendered payment which was accepted by petitioner Held: NO. Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 2. Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. No landlord or his legal representative or assign, shall be such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent
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In contradistinction, where the right of rescission exists, payment of the arrearages in rental after the demand to pay and to vacate under Section 2, Rule 70 does not extinguish the cause of action for ejectment as the lessor is not only entitled to recover the unpaid rents but also to eject the lessee. Petitioner correctly argues that acceptance of tendered payment does not constitute a waiver of the cause of action for ejectment especially when accepted with the written condition that it was "without prejudice to the filing of an ejectment suit". Indeed, it is illogical or ridiculous not to accept the tender of payment of rentals merely to preserve the right to file an action for unlawful detainer. However, this line of argument presupposes that a cause of action for ejectment has already accrued, which is not true in the instant case. Petitioner likewise claims that its failure to send a collector to collect the rentals cannot be considered a valid defense for the reason that sending a collector is not one of the obligations of the lessor under Article 1654. While it is true that a lessor is not obligated to send a collector, it has been duly established that it has been customary for private respondents to pay the rentals through a collector. Besides Article 1257, New Civil Code provides that where no agreement has been designated for the payment of the rentals, the place of payment is at the domicile of the defendants. Hence, it could not be said that they were in default in the payment of their rentals as the delay in paying the same was not imputable to them. Rather, it was attributle to petitioner's omission or neglect to collect. Petitioner also argues that neither is its refused to accept the rentals a defense for non-payment as Article 1256 provides that "[i]f the creditor to whom the tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing due." It bears emphasis that in this case there was no unjustified refusal on the part of petitioner or non-acceptance without reason that would constitute mora accipiendi and warrant consignation. There was simply lack of demand for payment of the rentals. 11. HEIRS OF SUICO V. CA, 266 SCRA 444 (1997)
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settled that the lease of and rentals for a building include that of the lot on which it stands. The building was destroyed sometime in 1950 by typhoon Amy and the private respondents parents (the lessees) constructed a larger house of permanent materials. That the lease was principally over a portion of the lessors lot is admitted by the private respondents in paragraph 4 of the Affirmative Allegations in their Answer. Marlyn asserted: This is in connection with your refusal to accept our rental payment and your demand to increase the land rental of our residential house. Let it be recalled that we had been occupying and in possession of the land as tenants since 1949, while your mother-in- law (Lola Meliang) and beloved husband (Tiyo Maning) were still landlords. Also, please be reminded that said house was destroyed by typhoon Amy in the early 1950s and that the reconstruction of the building was undertaken by our family (with Tiyo Manings approval) at no cost to the Suico landlords. Petitioners did not deny Marlyns claim that the old house was destroyed and a new one was built by the private respondents parents. By their prayer in this petition that we annul the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the MTCC decision, the petitioners have unconditionally conceded to the finding of the MTCC that the building did not belong to their grandparents, as it was constructed by the private respondents parents. The private respondents affirmative allegation of ownership of the building was raised merely to underscore their claim that the petitioners demand for a rental increase several times (more) than the prevailing rentals was harsh, and that the petitioners were trying to oppressively evict them from the premises, disregarding the close relationship between the petitioners parents and grandparents, on one hand, and the private respondents and their parents, on the other. It may also be noted that in the Prayer in their Answer, the private respondents never asked for payment of the value of their building, but only sought that the complaint be dismissed in toto, or in the alternative, that the lease period be fixed, with moral damages of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees and litigation expenses of at least P50,000.00, in either case. The subject matter of the verbal lease agreement between the petitioners grandparents and the private respondents parents was exclusively a portion of the lot described in the Complaint in Civil Case No. R 31419, after the latter constructed the building in question following the destruction of the old house by typhoon Amy. The private respondents, moreover, did not set up in their answer to the complaint for ejectment, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the MTCC on the basis of the issue of ownership of the building. Neither did they raise this before the RTC nor the Court of Appeals. The upshot of the foregoing is that the MTCCs lack of jurisdiction on the ground aforementioned was not even contemplated by the parties. It was thus error for the Court of Appeals to annul the decisions of the MTCC and the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC owing to the allegations concerning ownership of the building. The parties to the oral lease in question -- the petitioners grandparents and the private respondents parents -- did not fix a specified period therefor. However, since the rentals were paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal, may be deemed to be on a monthly basis, expiring at the end of every month, pursuant to Article 1687, in relation to Article 1673, of the Civil Code. In such case, a demand to vacate was not even necessary for judicial action after the expiration of every one month. In the instant case, however, the petitioners likewise demanded an increase in the rent since the private respondents did not use the building exclusively for their residence or dwelling, having used it for the conduct of their air-conditioning service and repair business. Expectedly, the private respondents refused to pay the new rate of rentals. In light of the facts obtaining in this case, we find the MTCCs ruling more in accord with justice and equity. The private respondents and their parents had been in possession of the premises for 43 years when the complaint in Civil Case No. R-31419 was filed. Although the building is rather large as shown in the pictures, and described in the Tax Declaration as having a floor area of 165 square meters with a portion being used as a shop for the private respondents business, the private resp ondents were paying a relatively meager sum as rental, which started at P30.00 a month, and was at P360.00 immediately before the demand to increase to P1,200.00 was made. To the demand, the private respondents merely deposited P450.00 a month. Verily, the arrangement obviously worked in favor of the private respondents, a situation which could probably be explained by the admitted closeness of the relationship between the parties predecessors-in-interest -- the original lessors and lessees. In short, respondents were the recipients of greater benefits while petitioners were unable to have the full use and enjoyment of a substantial portion of their valuable property. The need to balance these interests, however, did not
Facts: The two (2) storey six (6) room residential building subject of the instant petition was originally owned by the late Emilia Suico, grandmother of petitioners, as shown by Tax Declaration No. 00188 (Rollo, p. 7; Exhibit B, p.51, Records). The same was being rented by private respondents from petitioners at the rate of P360.00 per month. Finding this amount to be inadequate, petitioners proposed to increase this amount to P1,200 a month. This was refused by private respondents. Private respondents proposed a lease contract for a period of at least twenty five years at a monthly rental of P600 subject to an escalation of not more than ten (10%) percent per annum. This in turn was not accepted by petitioners. The petitioners refused to receive the rentals tendered by private respondents as the latter insisted on paying the previous rate sought to be increased by petitioners. Because of private respondents failure to remit increased rentals, petitioners served on private respondents a notice to vacate the premises. The petitioners then brought the case before the barangay for conciliation. After referral of the case to the barangay, private respondents informed petitioners for the first time that they had been depositing their monthly rentals in the amount of P450.00 with a reputable bank since August 1991. Both parties failed to come to an agreement during the proceedings in the barangay court. Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against private respondents in the MTC.After joinder of issues, the MTC issued its preliminary conference order. MTC rendered its decision against the defendants. Both parties appealed this decision to the RTC ISSUE: WON the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case because the issue of ownership of the building was raised. HELD: The Court of Appeals failed to fully appreciate the subject matter of the lease and the purpose of the private respondents claim of ownership over the building. The initiatory pleadings of the parties filed with the MTCC, together with the annexes thereto, disclose that the subject of the lease between the petitioners grandparents, as lessors, and the private respondents parents, as lessees, was a portion of the land and a small house with nipa roof, bamboo floors, and amakan walls. Parenthetically, it is
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sanction an extension of the term. In any event, by these proceedings, the private respondents have effectively obtained an extension of nearly five years, i.e., from the filing of the complaint on 23 June 1992 up to the present. The value of the house is inconsequential since it was built in 1950, and the private respondents can remove it if the petitioners opt not to retain it by paying the private respondents one-half (12) of its value pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code. This Article provides as follows: ART. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished. Under this Article, the petitioners (as lessors) would become the owner of the house constructed by the private respondents parents (lessees) by reimbursing the latter one-half (12) of the value of the house, a useful improvement, as of the termination of the extended term. The petitioners are thus given the option to pay such indemnity, while the private respondents do not have a right to demand that they be paid therefor. If the former refuses to reimburse the said amount, the latters remedy is to remove the house, even though the petitioners lot may suffer damage thereby, provided, however, that such removal should not cause any more impairment upon the lot than is necessary. It necessarily follows that the RTC erred when it ruled that [a]fter the expiration of the aforementioned period, then, the property should be vacated by the defendants and the residential building, together with all its permanent improvements on the leased property shall become the property of the plaintiffs. 12. MARA, INC. V. ESTRELLA, 65 SCRA 471(1975)
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Issue: Whether Mara, Inc. is entitled to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to recover possession of the four lots during the pendency of the ejectment suit or whether the City Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dissolving the injunction Held: YES. The Civil Code provides: ART. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession: and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (446a). Mara, Inc. based its petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on the second paragraph of article 539 which was incorporated as the second paragraph of section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court dealing with forcible entry and detainer. The Code Commission noted that there had been "prolonged litigations between the owner and the usurper" and that the owner had been frequently deprived of his possession even when he had an immediate right thereto. The urgency of the remedy of injunction is underscored by the fact that the court is given only thirty days within which to decide the motion for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. It is deplorable that in this case it took the City Court more than nineteen months to decide the motion of Mara, Inc. As expressed by Justice Moreland in his flamboyant rhetoric, "it is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective. It is principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners". The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an exception to the general rule that the writ of injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take property out of the possession or control of one person and place it in the hands of another whose title has not clearly been established by law. Therefore, if the petitioner asking for an injunction is the registered owner and the oppositor is an interloper or squatter who has no possessory right to the land in litigation, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be issued pendente lite. In the instant case, the Torrens titles of Mara, Inc. to the four lots appear to be unassailable. De Leon in his answer to the complaint for ejectment merely pretended lack of knowledge of the said titles. He has not shown in his answer any indubitable right to possess the four lots in question. It results that the City Court, after finding that OCT No. 735, from which the four titles of Mara, Inc. were derived, is incontestable and after denying De Leon's motion for the reconsideration of the order granting the injunction, made a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion in dissolving the injunction and in allowing De Leon to file a counterbond. As already noted, he filed in court a check for P10,000 instead of a surety bond. He did not apprise Mara, Inc. of that fact. 13. BALAGTAS REALTY CORP. V. ROMILLO, JR., 114 SCRA 28 (1982)
Facts: Mara, Inc. filed in the City Court of Quezon City a complaint for forcible entry against Jose de Leon. It alleged that on or about April 5, 1973 De Leon through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth occupied Lots 7, 9, 11 and 13, located at G. Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision, Barrio Santol, Quezon City with a total area of four thousand square meters, registered in the name of Mara, Inc. as shown in Transfer Certificates of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Mara, Inc. further alleged that it had prior possession of the four lots. On May 8, 1973 or four days after the filing of the complaint, Mara, Inc. asked the City Court to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the purpose of restoring to it the possession of the said lots.De Leon opposed the motion on the grounds that Mara, Inc. was never in possession of the lots; that its titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was allegedly void, and that the said lots were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 56 which was being reconstituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX and which is in the name of the spouses Blas Fajardo and Pantaleona Santiago. Judge Justiniano C. Estrella in his order deferred the resolution of the said motion until the trial of the case because of the jurisdictional issue raised by De Leon. In his order of Judge Estrella denied De Leon's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. However, he later reaffirmed his prior order to hold in abeyance the resolution of plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. After Judge Estrella's attention was called to the SC's decision in 3 cases, which upheld the validity and incontestability of TCT No. 735, to which the titles of Mara, Inc. to the four lots in question could be traced, he granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on condition that Mara, Inc. should file a bond in the sum of P10,000. De Leon moved for the reconsideration of that order. He alleged that the preliminary mandatory injunction would cause irreparable injury to him because it would result in the demolition of his improvements. He contended that OCT No. 56 was not nullified by SC the said 3 cases. Judge Estrella denied the motion. Mara, Inc. filed on December 6, 1974 its bond for P10,000. Judge Estrella issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. De Leon filed a motion for the dissolution of the injunction. He manifested that he was willing to file a counterbond in the same amount. Mara, Inc. opposed the motion. Judge Estrella granted the motion for the dissolution of the injunction provided that De Leon filed "a surety bond in the sum of P10,000 to answer for all damages which the plaintiff may suffer". Hence, this petition.
Facts: Petitioner Balagtas Realty Corp. filed separate identical complaints for illegal detainer against private respondents for the latters refusal and failure to vacate their respective premises and to pay their rentals in arrears with the City Court. The City Court ruled in favor of Balagtas. Pursuant thereto, Balagtas filed separate identical motions for immediate execution of the said judgment. To stay the immediate execution, private respondents posted their respective supersedeas bonds. The City Court approved the said bonds and stayed the immediate execution of the judgment. The cases were elevated to CFI. Here, Balagtas filed again separate identical motions for immediate
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ejectment execution against the private respondents on the ground that the latter had failed to deposit to CFI their monthly rentals for a certain period. Respondent judge Romillo, Jr. denied Balagtas motions. Hence, the instant case. Issue: Whether Balagtas is entitled to immediate execution of the decision Held: YES. According to the RoC, judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be executed immediately in order to prevent further damages to him arising from continued loss of possession. But, the defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas bond and (b) by paying promptly from time to time either to the plaintiff or depositing with CFI the adjudged reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property. This rule is mandatory, the exception being when the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. What is at issue in the instant case is the propriety of the amount of the monthly deposits made. While Balagtas based the amount it claimed on the City Courts dispositive portion, private respondents based the same on a letter-contract sustained and upheld by the City Court as the new lease contract governing the relations between the parties. The amount provided in the dispositive portion must be upheld. Anything said in the body of the opinion is merely an obiter. Also, private respondents are in estoppel from claiming another amount because their bonds posted with and approved by the lower court is on the basis of the amount provided in the dispositive portion. Judgment setting aside respondent judges order. 14. CHUA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 286 SCRA 437 (1998)
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Held: Late Filing of the Supersedeas Bond: The applicable rule in this case is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question.11 To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal.12 The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative.13 Hence, if the defendant- appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. In the present case, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, a day after their receipt of the MTCs decision. On March 16, 1993, or five days later, the MTC transmitted the records of the case to the RTC. On March 29, 1993, the private respondents filed a motion for the immediate execution of the decision. As noted earlier, petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that they were co- owners of the property. On June 10, 1993, the RTC denied the motion for execution and directed petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. On the authority of the RTC order, petitioners filed a cash bond, which was later substituted with a surety bond. The bond was filed out of time. The motion for execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the MTCs decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the aforecited rule.Petitioners contend that the delay should be excused because the MTC, without fixing the amount of the bond, transmitted the records of the case to the RTC even before the perfection of the appeal,14 i.e., the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.15 Hence, they did not know whether to file a bond with the RTC or with the MTC. Neither were they certain of the amount of the bond. How the Amount of Supersedeas Bond Is Determined Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo and De Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the judgment: x x x. Under the provisions of Section 8 of the Rule, a justice of the peace or a municipal court may require the defendant to file a bond for an amount which would cover the stipulated rentals, as found by the judgment of the Court, or the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, at the rate determined by the judgment, damages and costs down to the time of the final judgment in the action. The reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, the possession of which is sought to be recovered, is that fixed by the Court in the judgment, because the rental stipulated in the contract of lease that has expired or terminated may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation
Facts: Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City rendered judgment for petitioners [private respondents herein] with respect to four lots located in Galicano St., Batangas City, ordering the ejectment of private respondents [petitioners herein] and ordering them to pay monthly rentals of P50,000 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to petitioners and the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. It appears further that a copy of the decision was received by private respondents counsel on March 10, 1993; that on March 11, 1993 he filed a notice of appeal; and that on March 16, 1993, the MTC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the RTC. Petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that although private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make [sic] a deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8. Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co- owners of the lots from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution of the decision would render their appeal moot and academic. They later filed a supplement to their opposition, claiming that while they were after all willing to file a supersedeas bond, but that they had been kept busy attending to their businesses and thus unable to secure a bond. Trial court denied petitioners motion for execution on the ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal, prevented private respondents from filing a supersedeas bond on time. RTC issued another order giving petitioners an extension of five days within which to file a supersedeas bond. After initially admitting a cash bond of P550,000, the RTC granted petitioners motion for the substitution of the cash bond with a surety bond. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the said three orders. Issues: i. ii.
Whether it is proper to apply the general rule as stated in Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and not the law on exceptions to said rule Whether after the expiration of the period for perfecting said appeal, the RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal. This encompasses several questions regarding the nature of a supersedeas bond: What is the amount of the bond? Who, if any, determines the amount? Where and at what point in the litigation should the bond be filed? We shall deal with each of these questions.
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of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. But the bond together with the appeal is only to prevent the immediate execution of a judgment rendered against the defendant in forcible entry and detainer cases. Such execution must be prevented further by paying to the plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance, during the pendency of the appeal, the stipulated rental due from time to time under the contract, as found by the judgment of the Court, or, in the absence of a contract, the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, at the rate determined by the judgment. (Underscoring supplied). Under Section 8 of Rule 70, the supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages and costs which accrued before the decision was rendered, as determined by the MTC in the said decision.17 The bond does not answer for amounts accruing during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic deposits to be made by the defendant.18 In the present case, the MTC clearly stated in its March 5, 1993 decision that petitioners should pay rentals of P50,000 a month from April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots. The amount comprising the supersedeas bond and the periodic deposits, therefore, is evident and computable from the MTCs decision. Where Is the Supersedeas Bond Filed? There is no need for either the MTC or the RTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond, the same being manifest in the face of the MTCs decision. Moreover, petitioner failed to file the bond on time not because they did not know where to file it, but because they believed that they should not do so. Hence, their opposition to the motion for execution was based on their alleged co-ownership of the property. It was only before the Court of Appeals that they claimed confusion on where the bond should be filed. The Court of Appeals discarded petitioners argument in this wise: Their claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond is being made only now. Indeed, in opposing petitioners motion for execution they based their opposition not on this ground but on the claim that since they were claiming to be co-owners of the lots in question, their claim would be rendered moot and academic if execution were ordered pending appeal. It is, therefore, not true that they were prevented from filing a supersedeas bond because the MTC transmitted the records of the case to the RTC before the expiration of private respondents period of appeal. We do not find in this case any supervening circumstance material change in the situation of the parties, which would render inequitable the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal. We agree with the disquisition of Respondent Court on this point: It is also argued that this case falls under the exception to the rule making Rule 70, sec. 8 mandatory because of supervening events which bring about a material change in the situation of the parties and make the execution pending appeal inequitable or because there is no urgency for the execution under the circumstances. The case in which this exception was applied was that of Laurel v. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 (1969). The present case is, however, a far cry from that case. In Laurel v. Abalos there was probability that the plaintiff in the ejectment case would lose the property and therefore, his right to eject the defendant became doubtful because, while the appeal of the defendant was pending, another court declared the plaintiffs title to be null and void at the instance of plaintiffs predecessor- in-interest. In the present case, no such probability exists. What is there is only an allegation by private respondents ejectment suit, that they are co-owners of the lots in question. What is noteworthy in this case is that the titles to the lots are in the names of petitioners and, except for the claim of ownership put up as a defense by the defendants, there is otherwise no action questioning the validity of petitioners titles. Indeed no heirs of Chua Hai has ever claimed ownership of the lots in question. There is, therefore, no basis for private respondents contention that because of a supervening event -- of which there is none -- there is no compelling necessity for ordering execution of the decision in the ejectment case based on private respondents failure to file a supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals within the time provided by law. The allegation of Petitioner Marciano Chua that he, as a co-owner of the subject property, has filed an action for partition does not constitute a compelling reason to further delay the execution of the judgment. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material possession or possession de facto of the property under litigation, not on the issue of ownership. Section 725 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is
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clear on this: SEC. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. -- The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession. The pendency of the action for partition, where ownership is one of the principal issues, does not preclude the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit. Such action for partition is entirely independent of the ejectment suit.26 On the other hand, the issue of ownership is considered in an ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining who between the contending parties has the better right to possession.27 Moreover, it should be stressed that we are not being called upon here to decide which of the parties has a better right of possession, let alone, a better title to the property. The only issue in this case is whether or not a writ of execution should be issued pending appeal of the ejectment suit. In any event, it is erroneous to characterize the partition suit as a compelling reason to stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. On the contrary, the fact that the titles to the disputed lots are in the name of Private Respondent Mariano C. Moreno, and not in the name of petitioners or their father Chua Hai, justifies the transfer of possession of the said property to the private respondents, at least during the appeal. The question of irreparable injury to petitioners, on the other hand, cannot be discussed at this forum, for this Court is not a trier of facts.28 In any case, this question of irreparable injury is, at best, speculative and conjectural, and deserves no further disquisition. The bond should be filed before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during the period of appeal. 15. DE LAUREANO V. ADIL, 72 SCRA 148 (1976)
Facts: Josefina S. de Laureano in this special civil action of certiorari assails the interlocutory orders of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, denying her motions for execution and for a preliminary mandatory injunction in an ejectment suit which was decided in her favor by the city court of Iloilo City and which was appealed by the lessee, Ong Cu.Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots 996 and 1004-B with a total area of 3,107 square meters located at the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City. The lots were leased to Ong Cu for fifteen year period which allegedly expired on August 31, 1974. In view of Ong Cu's failure to vacate the lots and remove his improvements thereon. Mrs. Laureano filed against him an ejectment suit in October, 1974 in the city court of Iloilo City. After trial, the city court rendered a judgment ordering Ong Cu to vacate the lots, to restore their possession to Mrs. Laureano, to remove his buildings and other improvements thereon and to pay P12,428 monthly as compensation for the use and occupation of the lots from September 1, 1974 up to the time he vacates them. Ong Cu appealed to the CFI. Instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on the findings of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu asked the city court ex parte to approve his supersedeas bond in the sum of P22,000 and to fix the rental value of the two lots at P1,200 a month. The city court granted that ex parte motion in its order of October 8, 1975. Thereafter, the record was elevated to the Court of First Instance. The case was assigned to the sala of respondent Judge. On November 4 Mrs. Laureano received a notice from the clerk of court that Ong Cu's appeal had been docketed. She filed a motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore her to the possession of the said lots. Invoking article 1674 of the Civil Code and section 9, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, she alleged that Ong Cu's appeal was frivolous and dilatory. She also asked for immediate execution of the city court's judgment on the ground that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he had failed to deposit the sum of P12,428 monthly as reasonable value of the use and occupation of the lots adjudged by the city court. Ong Cu opposed the two motions. The lower court upheld the city court's order fixing the supersedeas bond and the amount to be deposited by Ong Cu. After the lower court's attention was called to its failure to resolve Mrs. Laureano's other motion for a mandatory injunction, it ruled in its order of February 12, 1976 that the writ could not be granted because it had already sanctioned Ong Cu's supersedeas bond, the purpose of which was to stay execution pending appeal. The lower court reasoned out that it would be absurd to stay execution and at the same time restore possession to the plaintiff by granting the mandatory injunction. It regarded Ong Cu as a possessor in good faith entitled to reimbursement of his necessary and useful expenses.
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Issue: Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Mrs. Laureano's motions for execution and a mandatory injunction. Yes Held: The motion for execution. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. Haw to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. All moneys so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the provincial or city treasury, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its merits. xxx xxx xxx As explicitly provided in section 8, the judgment of tile inferior court in plaintiff's favor in an ejectment case is immediately executory. Thus, where the city court on the day it rendered the judgment ordered the execution thereof and the defendant did not perfect his appeal and did not post a supersedeas bond, it was held that certiorari would not lie to set aside the execution. Section 8 of Rule 70 is an exception to the general rule as to the execution of the judgment of an inferior court which is found in section 18, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court (Pascua vs. Nable, 71 Phil. 186). The inferior court's judgment is immediately executory in order to prevent further damages to the plaintiff should the defendant continue to deprive him of the possession of the premises in litigation (Yu Tiong Tay vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. '597, 601). The defendant may stay execution by (a) perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas bond and (b) paying from time to time either to the plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal the rentals or the reasonable value Of the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the inferior in its judgment (Sison vs. Hon. Bayona, 109 Phil. 567, 561; Vda. de Palanca vs. Chua Keng Kian, L-26430, March 11, 1969, 27 SCRA 356). The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises is that fixed by the inferior court in its judgment because the rental stipulated in the lease contract that had expired might no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises by the reason of the change or rise in value (Aylon vs. Jugo, 78 Phil. 816). The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed judgment. Hence, the bond is not n if the defendant deposits in court the amount of back rentals as fixed in the judgment. In other words, the supersedeas bond answers only for rentals was in the judgment and not for those that may accrue during the pendency of the appeal which are guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be made by the defendant. (Sison vs. Hon. Bayona, supra). The appeal bond answers for the costs (Sanchez vs. Zosa, L-27043, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 171, 174; Contreras vs. Dinglasan 79 Phil. 42).
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The damages contemplated in section 8 of Rule 70 refer to the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property which is generally measured by its fair rental value. It cannot refer to other damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the property. Consequently attorney's fees cannot be considered as damages (Castueras vs. Bayona, 106 Phil. 340). In the instant case, the city court found that Ong Cu's lease expired on August 31, 1974 and that the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots is four pesos a square meter or P12,428 monthly. To stay execution, Ong Cu should have filed, and the city court should have required, a supersedeas bond in the total amount of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots for the period from September 1, 1974 to September, 1975, or for thirteen months, at the rate fixed in the city court's judgment which is P12,428. The supersedeas bond should be in the total sum of P161,564.00. And the amount to be deposited monthly beginning October, 1975 is that same amount of P12,428. The deposit should be made on or before the tenth day of the succeeding month. The city court erred in issuing ex parte an order granting Ong Cu's motion fixing the supersedeas bond at P22,000 and the monthly deposit at P1,200 which was the rental stipulated in the lease contract that had already expired. The city court should not have allowed Ong Cu to dictate the amount of the supersedeas bond and the amount of the monthly payments to be deposited in court. The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the two lots was already fixed in its judgment. That value is the value to be deposited in court. Ong Cu's motion that it be fixed at P1,200 was uncalled for and was in contravention of the mandatory provisions of section 8 of Rule 70. Also contrary to the peremptory provisions of section 8 was Ong Cu's act of fixing his supersedas bond at P22,000 instead of at the amount equivalent to the total compensation or rentals Is that had accumulated up to the rendition of the city court's judgment. That is the amount of the supersedeas bond unalterably fixed in section 8. The lower court theorized that the city court's order of October 8, 1975 approving Ong Cu's supersedeas bond in the sum of P22,000 and provisionally fixing the monthly rental deposited at P1,200 was a valid amendment of the city court's decision of September 23. That theory is untenable. It distorts the meaning of an amendment. Ong Cu did not move. that the decision be amended. The order according to its letter and tenor can in no sense be interpreted as amendment of the city court's decision. It makes no reference to the decision. At the time the order was issued, Ong Cu had already riled his notice of appeal. He did not rile a new notice of appeal by indicating therein that he was appealing from the city court's ,decision as supposedly amended by its order of October 8. He could not have done so because the October 8 order in its face does not purport to amend the decision. It results that Ong Cu's supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he did not deposit the compensation for the use and occupation of the two lots which wits fixed in the city court judgment. His supersedeas bond and his deposits were not sufficient to stay execution. If this were a case where the defendant did not file any supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, then Mrs. Laureano would be entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the city court's judgment both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises (De Pages and Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Hon. Canonoy, 116 Phil. 898, 901; Paulino, Sr. vs. Hon. Surtida, 109 Phil. 621, 626). In such a case ' the execution is mandatory. The only exceptions are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or execusable negligence which prevented the defendant from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make the execution inequitable (Cunanan vs. Rodas, 78 Phil. 800; Laurel vs. Abalos, L-26098, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 281). This is a case where there was a supersedeas bond and where monthly de sits were made but the bond
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and the deposit were inadequate or were not in conformity with the city court's judgment. Ong Cu committed a mistake because he followed the erroneous order of the city court which fixed the supersedeas bond and the monthly deposit in contravention of its own decision and, consequently, in violation of section 8 of Rule 70. Because of that mistake, immediate execution under Rule 70 would not be warranted (See Yu Phil. Khim vs. Amparo, 86 Phil. 441, 445, Bantug vs. Montinola, 73 Phil. 13, 20; Kraut vs. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 986; Tagulimot vs. Makalintal, 85 Phil. 40; De la Cruz vs. Burgos, L28095, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 977). The Court of First Instance has discretion to order the execution of a new supersedeas bond to replace a defective one (Zamora vs. Dinglasan and Hilario, 77 Phil. 46, 53). Ong Cu should be given a thirty-day period from notice within which to file a new supersedeas bond in the sum of P161,564 and to deposit the value of the use and occupation of the two lots at the rate of P12,428 beginning October, 1975 less the amounts already deposited by him. Execution should issue if he fails to file a new supersedeas bond and to make up for the deficiency in his monthly deposits. Motion for mandatory injunction. The Civil Code provides: ART. 1674. In ejectment cases where an appeal is taken the remedy granted in article 539, second paragraph, shall also apply, if the higher court is satisfied that the lessee's appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the lessor's appeal is prima facie meritorious. The period of ten days referred to in said article shall be counted from the time the appeal is perfected. (n) Article 1674 is reproduced in section 9 of Rule 70. Article 539 of the Civil Code in its second paragraph grants to the possessor, who was deprived of the possession of his real property through forcible entry, the right to secure from an inferior court in the action for forcible entry a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. Article 1674 gives to the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case originating in the inferior court and appealed to the Court of First Instance the remedy which article 539 gives to the plaintiff in a forcible entry case. It is designed to eliminate the injustice of the old rule which allowed the lessee to continue in possession during an appeal even if the owner or plaintiff has an immediate right to the premises in litigation (pp. 98,143, Report of Code Commission). Article 1674 is in consonance with the summary character of an ejectment suit which is an expeditious means for recovering possession of real property (Deveza vs. Montecillo, L-23942, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 822; Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471) but the effectiveness of which was often frustrated by defendant's dilatory tactics which were tolerated by inferior courts (Vda. de Palanca vs. Chua Keng Kian L-26430, March 11, 1969, 27 SCRA 3.56, 365-6). The decisive issue is whether the pleadings, the city court's decision and Ong Cu's contentions show that his appeal is manifestly frivolous and dilatory. There is no question that Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of the two lots and that they were leased to Ong Cu for a fifteen year period counted from September 1, 1959 and expiring on August 31, 1974. Ong Cu in his answer to the ejectment complaint unmistakably admitted that the lease expired on that date. He alleged that there were negotiations for his purchase of the two lots. His defenses were that the ejectment action was premature because he was still considering Mrs. Laureano's proposal to sell the lots; that the removal of his buildings and iniprovements allegedly worth P1,800,000 would prejudice him and entail considerable expenses; that there is difficulty in looking for another site during the short period granted to him by Mrs. Laureano; that he is willing to buy the lots at a reasonable price, and that the price fixed by Mrs. Laureano is excessive. Those defenses cannot defeat the ejectment suit. The expiration of lease and Mrs. Laureano's refusal to renew it made Ong Cu a deforciant or an unlawful with holder of the possession of the lots. He has become a possessor in bad faith. The rule is that if after the termination of the lease contract the lessee prolongs his occupation of the premises, there is unlawful detainer and article 1674 applies. For the purpose of that article, it is enough that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and that the defendant is in temporary occupation thereof whether under a lease contract or on mere tolerance or under a temporary permit. (De la Cruz vs. Bocar,
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99 Phil. 491). The lower court assumed that Ong Cu in constructing his building on the leased lots is a possessor in good faith entitled to reimbursement of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him and with a right of retention, as contemplated in articles 546 and 547 of the Civil Code. That assumption is erroneous. As a lessee, who constructed a building on the leased land, Ong Cu cannot be characterized as a builder in good faith. Under article 448 of the Civil Code the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith may appropriate the building after payment of the indemnity provided in articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. It results that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in not granting the writ of mandatory injunction. Its questioned orders were predicated on erroneous assumptions.
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RULE 71 CONTEMPT 1. HALILI V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. 136 SCRA 112 (1982)
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from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. The instant petition, which is the reconveyance of the disputed real property, does not fall under any of the issues cognizable by the NLRC. The judgment having become final and executor, neither NLRC nor SC will have any authority to look into the validity of the disposal by PTGWO of the property so acquired by it during the proceedings. NLRC, as virtual owner of the property, would not need authority from NLRC or SC to sell the same to MMPCI. Petition dismissed. 2. ANG V. CASTRO, 136 SCRA 453, (1985)
Facts: Respondent Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union 5. (PTGWO) filed a complaint against petitioner Fortunato Halili for unpaid overtime pay, with the now-defunct CIR. Halili died and the cases were settled amicably. PTGWO and the administratix of the estate of Halili then reached an agreement where: i. PTGWO shall withdraw and dismiss with prejudice the case it has filed against the deceased; ii. The estate shall cause to be delivered to PTGWO a deed of transfer covering a parcel of land and a negotiable check; and iii. PTGWO shall sign this MOA with Release and Quitclaim, holding free from liabilities the heirs and the estate of the deceased. Pursuant thereto, PTGWO, through its legal counsel, Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), requesting that authority be granted to sell and dispose of the property. MOLE granted the same. Thereafter, Pineda filed a motion with SC, requesting authority to sell the property. SC, however, merely noted the motion in its resolution. Relying on the earlier authority given to him by MOLE, Pineda subsequently filed another motion with the former, this time praying that PTGWO be authorized to sell the lot to co-respondent Manila Memorial Park Cemetery (MMPCI). This motion was granted. The corresponding sale of the lot was subsequently consummated. Significantly, however, SC set aside the orders issued by MOLE in a later resolution. On this basis, PTGWO filed a complaint with NLRC seeking to compel the buyer, MMPCI, to reconvey the lot it bought from Pineda on the ground of the latters lack of authority in selling the same. The Chief of the Legal and Enforcement Division of the NLRC, tasked to act on the complaint, refused to take cognizance of the case for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case Held: NO. The Labor Code provides that, except as otherwise provided, the labor arbiters shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide, within 30 calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair Labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. Also, cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising
DOCTRINE Use of disrespectful language against a judge in a pleading constitutes indirect contempt. The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful or contemptous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions, petitioners conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and, if found guilty, he may appear pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. FACTS Alberto Ang, assisted by the Office of the President of Legal Affairs, filed in 1983 an administrative case against Judge Castro of QC RTC ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-35466 and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case. After receiving notice of the admin case, Judge Castro required Ang to appear in his court and explain why Ang should not be cited in contempt for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and towards him. Ang failed to appear and Judge Castro cited him in contempt of court, and sentenced him to serve 5 days in prison. Ang appealed the order, which was denied. Judge Castro then filed a criminal case for libel with the Fiscals Oc ISSUE (1) Whether Ang is guilty of contempt of court? (2) Whether the grant of prohibition was proper? HELD (1) YES AND NO. Ang is not guilty of direct contempt, but he is guilty of indirect contempt of court. The alleged malicious imputations were not uttered in the presence or so near respondent Judge Jose P. Castro as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by petitioner against him. Section 3, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, provide: SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a
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person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: x xx x xx xxx (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; x xx x xx xxx (d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions, petitioners conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and, if found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. (2) YES. Anent the ancillary action for prohibition, We find the same meritorious, considering that the basis of the libel case (Criminal Case No. Q-31587) filed against petitioner before the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City was a communication addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court which was coursed through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, complaining against respondent judges ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, disregard for the Supreme Court administrative order, grave misconduct, rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of duty. It is manifest that as held in the case of Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, a communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which without the privilege would be libelous and actionable; x x x that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case. Records show that the libel case had already been instituted in court when the restraining order was issued by Us. Nonetheless, considering the privileged character of petitioners communication to the Chief Justice barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the injunction against respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City, from proceeding with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-31587, be made permanent pursuant to the restraining order and established doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the law as an instrument of arbitrary and oppressive prosecution. 3. IN RE: KELLY, 35 PHIL. 944 (1916)
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me are many but man, Don Vicente, is not made of rock but of mud; and it appears that some of the men who have been so arrogantly misusing imaginary judicial powers are made of a very poor quality of this substance. Keep up the fight and tell the people, the Filipino people, for whom I am laboring, that at liberty or in prison, I shall never discontinue until the innocence of General Noriel and his companions is vindicated and the infamous system that murdered Dr. Jose Rizal and murdered General Noriel and his companions is completely eliminated from the Philippine Islands. "Do not hesitate to condemn the individuals whom I accused for criminal careless neglect of duty and then, cowardly shielding themselves behind contempt proceedings, imprisoned me in Bilibid. Truth cannot be dishonored; right cannot be imprisoned. Them may temporarily restrain counsel; but his great cause, firmly established in the heart of the people American and Filipino will move on with a steady substantial unerring step and all those in ignorance will gradually see the right, change and march with us; and the criminals espousing wrong, will go down before the host of right, like frail leaves before the autumn wind. "The people do not really understand the great wrong committed by. Taking this decision in my case as a basis, if you should criticize or espouse the crime, or charge him with it, the same judge could mount the bench and imprison you for six months without the right of appeal; or if you should happen to see an individual on the street committing a crime; having charged him with it if he be a citizen like you or me you might be saved; but, if he should happen to be a judge according to this decision he could imprison you without the right to appeal. "Of course, nothing of this kind is the law. It is no more contempt of court to criticize the acts of a judge or charge with a crime the janitor of the court. Nevertheless, as long as this infamous law remains in the statute books and . . . the liberty of no man is safe and this law should be immediately repealed. One day in jail, victim of the arrogance of an individual, is too long for a freeman to suffer. "As soon as the Supreme Court of the United States sees this case, they will reverse it; and when the Senate sees it, even without the Noriel case, they will remove the judges responsible for it; for their actions in my case is really worse and more atrocious than their actions in the Noriel case. For in the Noriel case, they were only careless, but in my case, they were both arbitrary and arrogant and knowingly and maliciously perpetrated a wrong for the purpose of terrorizing the people and intimidating the press. They may have frightened some faint hearts, but their actions have only spurred me on to a tenfold greater activity in order to rid the country of them; and I shall never cease my labor until . . . and I say this with the positive assurance to you that under no conceivable condition would I accept, even if offered, a position on said bench made vacant by any of the men against whom I am, and shall continue to labor. "Hand in hand with the vindication of Noriel and companions, is the elimination of these men and their ideas, and in the end, both shall be accomplished and we will have no more judicial arrogance, but begin in these Islands the system hinted at in the book: "The Trained Judiciary." Issue: Whether Kelly should be punished for contempt of the court in respect of a publication of a certain letter or communication published? YES! Held: The power to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, or enforce the observance of order,are powers which cannot be dispensed with in the courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a part of the law of the land. Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in the presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollary to this provision, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution. The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is essential to the observance of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision
Facts: Court charged Amzi B. Kelly for contempt of this court and was held guilty. He amend a motion in the Supreme Court for a rehearing of the said proceeding for contempt and of the order of the court finding the said Amzi B. Kelly guilty of contempt. While said proceeding was pending, Amzi B. Kelly wrote, composed, and caused to be published in a weekly newspaper regularly published once each week in the city of Manila, P. I., and circulated in the said city of Manila and in the Philippine Islands. That said letter was intended to obstruct or interfere with and tends directly to obstruct and interfere with and impede the administration of justice in the proceeding for contempt. that said Amzi B. Kelly, by the publication of said letter intended and said publication tends directly to affect and influence the action of the court in the said pending matter. "Mr. VICENTE SOTTO, "Editor of "The Independent." "SIR: I was very much amused at your cartoon displaying me as attacking a rock wall. The men against
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of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Amzi B. Kelly did, by said publication, thereby willfully, maliciously, and deliberately intend and attempt to bring the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and the members thereof into contempt and ridicule and to lower the dignity, standing, and prestige of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and to hinder and delay the due administration of justice in the Philippine Islands; and considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly, by his answer and oral argument given in reply to said order to show cause, admitted in open court the authorship of said publication; and considering that said publication was intended to obstruct and interfere with, and tends directly to obstruct and interfere with and impede the administration of justice in said pending proceedings in the Supreme Court, and said motion made therein; and considering that the said Amzi B. Kelly, by means of said publication intended the action of the Supreme Court in the said pending proceedings, and to bring the Supreme Court into contempt and to destroy its usefulness in the Philippine Islands, and the confidence of the people therein, and to hinder and prevent the due administration of justice; it is hereby ordered and decreed. 4. IN RE: LOZANO AND QUEVEDO, 54 PHIL. 801, 805 (1930)
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for the adoption of such a rule is readily explainable and consists in the practice of litigants and others making vindictive and malicious charges against lawyers and Judges of First Instance, which are ruinous to the reputations of the respondent lawyers and judges. It was accordingly thought best to keep such matters secret for the good of the administration of justice until the final outcome of the proceedings could be ascertained. Issue: The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt, the editor and the reporter of a newspaper, for publishing and inaccurate account of the investigation of a Judge of First Instance notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind closed doors, and notwithstanding a resolution of this court which makes such proceedings confidential in nature. Held: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court. That this power extends to administrative proceedings as well as to suits at law cannot be doubted. It is as necessary to maintain respect for the courts, indeed to safeguard their very existence, in administrative cases concerning the removal and suspension of judges as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. The rule is well established that the newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera. The English courts are more stringent in prohibiting the publication of their proceedings than are the American courts. Thus where the petitioner and her solicitor published a copy of the transcript of the official shorthand notes in a case of a very delicate and private character in contravention of an order directing that the cause be heard in camera, the presiding judge in England found the petitioner and her solicitor in contempt of court but accepted their excuses and apologies. A decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa inclines to general or special rule the publication of testimony pending an investigation has been prohibited, a willful violation of such rule might amount to a contempt, especially if the rule itself declared the act to be a contempt. But in a California divorce case, although the trial court ordered that no public report of the testimony should be made, and thereafter punished the editor of a newspaper for publishing a report of the trial, on the certiorari the Supreme Court of California annulled the proceedings of the court under review. As explanatory of this judgment, it should be said that a fair and true report of the testimony was published and that the result was influenced by the phraseology of the California law. To conclude our review of the pertinent decisions, "Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press." What is the best for the maintenance of the Judiciary in the Philippines should be the criterion. In contrast to other jurisdictions, we need not be overly sensitive because of the sting of newspaper articles, for there are no juries to be kept free from outside influence. Here also we are not restrained by regulatory law. The only law, and that the judge made, which is at all applicable to the situation, is the resolution adopted by this court. That the respondents were ignorant of this resolution is no excuse, for the very article published by them indicates that the hearing was held behind closed doors and that the information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and from comments in social circles. Then in writing up the investigation, it came about that the testimony was mutilated and that the report reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible disadvantage. The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under to Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizen must be preserved in all of its completenes. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means of diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts. The parties plead ignorance in extenuation of their offense. We accept as certain this defense. It is made known also that other newspapers, particularly in the metropolis, have
Facts: The complaint of an attorney against a Judge of First Instance was by resolution of this court referred to the Attorney-General for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor-General was designated to conduct the investigation of the charges, and pursuant to said designation, proceeded to the municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz, to take the testimony of certain witnesses. The investigation was conducted secretly, as is customary in cases of this character. El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited by Severino Lozano, printed an account of the investigation written by Anastacio Quevedo, said to be an employee in the office of the Judge under investigation. The opening portion of this article, as translated from Spanish to English, reads: NOTES FROM CAPIZ - INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGE GARDUO: It appears that it was some three months ago that the investigation was begun in the office of the SolicitorGeneral in Manila, and that, therefore, the proceedings taken here were but its continuation. The hearing was held behind closed doors, notwithstanding my desire to attend the same in order to take notes and send them, for publication, to the newspaper El Pueblo, which I represent as correspondent. However, behind the screen which shut the door of the investigation room, something could be heard of what transpired within, and to this circumstance, together with the comments offered gratis et amore in social circles, are due the present notes of the hearing. The remaining portion of the article purports to give an account of the evidence of the different witnesses. Regarding this account, the complainant attorney alleges that the facts therein contained are "false, malicious, and untrue" and that "said report took sides with the respondent judge . . . and expressed an opinion as to the merits of the same, with the object undoubtedly, to influence the action of the investigator and the public in general and to obstruct, embarrass or impede the course of the present investigation." In the same connection, the Attorney-General states that the newspaper report "does not contain a fair and true account of the facts disclosed at the investigation, . . . creating a wrong impression in the mind of the public and tending to influence improperly the action of this court in the said pending matter." Under the circumstances, the observations of the Attorney-General must necessarily be accepted as true. At the time of publication of the aforementioned article, there was in force a resolution of this court dated January 27, 1922, which provided "That all proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the suspension or removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in nature until the final disposition of the matter." In so far as this resolution relates to the suspension or removal of Judges of First Instance, it finds support in section 173 of the Administrative Code, authorizing the Supreme Court to conduct inquiries into the conduct of Judges of First Instance "and to adopt such rules of procedure in that regard as it may deem proper." The reason
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been guilty of similar acts. That likewise is undoubtedly true, but does not purge the respondents of their contempt. All facts considered, we desire on the one hand to proceed on the corrective and not true retaliatory idea of punishment, while on the other giving due notice that practices of which the respondents are guilty must stop. 5. PEOPLE V. GODOY, 243 SCRA 64 (1995)
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exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than a bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such, outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence. Prescinding from the foregoing adjudgment, the Court observes that there are two primary issues presented in this incident which deserve a more extended disquisition, firstly, because of their importance and frequent involvement in contempt proceedings filed in the courts, and, secondly, by reason of the fact that there are numerous and variant pronouncements on the subject of contempt which need to be clarified. The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform. Due perhaps to this two fold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal. However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting criminal contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite indistinct. The confusion in attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts is due to the fact that there are contempts in which both elements appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it is also possible that the same act may constitute both a civil and criminal contempt. A. As to the Nature of the Offense A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court. It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the courts authorit y and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal contempt involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the court; private parties have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the court, and the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings look only to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt proceedings, the contemnor must
Facts: This case is about citing for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review. The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder reproduced, with the alleged contemptuous statements italicized for ready identification as the particulars equivalent to the innuendo in a libel charge: Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na lamang sila sa magiging resulta ng review ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa. Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa kanyang mga coteachers sa Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding "balita" ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa. Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan. Issue: Whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature?(NO); WON there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements or publications? (NO) which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal? Held: Involved here is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken out of context. If the statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with contextual care, there would have been no reason for this contempt proceeding. On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair criticism. Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so
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be in a position to purge himself. C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation of a court order in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the order. It has been held, however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of new process. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere bet ween the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden. On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well settled, it can be safely concluded that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt. Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of Contempt Proceedings ? The Philippine Doctrine- In the Philippine setting, as we have noted, there are conflicting views on this issue which have to be analyzed and, if possible, reconciled. On that exordial indication, we have digressed into these aspects of the law on contempt and seized upon this incident in the criminal cases at bar in order to essay a rapprochement of such views into what we may call the Philippine doctrine.
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It appears, therefore, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court, the general rule that there can be no contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. From the shift in judicial approach in Brillantes to the position announced in Almacen, it can inevitably be concluded that the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libelous, depending on the purpose and effects thereof. In other words, one may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case has ended, where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court. We do not hesitate to hereby give our imprimatur to the aforequoted opinion which, we fully believe, conforms to basic dogmatic teachings on judicial and professional conduct requiring respect for and the giving of due deference to the judicial system and its members ethical standards which this Court has, time and again, been trying to inculcate in the minds of every member of the Bar and the public in general. Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings where the Alleged Contumely is Committed Against a Lower Court while the Case is Pending in the Appellate or Higher Court In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt. The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.: 1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty. 2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of fact. 3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable by the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may have made the order. However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. 4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been
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transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the most common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances. 6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act. 7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court. 8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered. 9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. 10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. 11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done. 12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried before the court actually contemned. The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same. 6. ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
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criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused; and (2) Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases were all null and void. Court issued a Resolution, which read: G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases The parties later filed their respective pleadings. Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690707. In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court. In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987: G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED. Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case. The Solicitor General filed a Comment on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply thereto. On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt directed at
A Motion to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements. Facts: Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) Resolution of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of
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respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:" Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial." What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview. Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free." Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him. Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan. Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan. While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said. In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities. While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said. He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates. Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied) Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." Court rendered its Decision (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read: (1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and (2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
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1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' " 2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and 3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)." Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes which he claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof. Held: We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power. It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding. It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
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or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues. It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent. A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
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Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war. Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations: (a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;" (b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge; (c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;" (d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation running riot;" (e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and (f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original) Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at
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respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons. Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent. The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out. Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government. Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (MELO)

OCAMPO V. TIRONA, G.R. NO. 147382, 6 APRIL 2005

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VERGARA V. RUGUE, 78 SCRA 312 (1977)

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(2) HELD (1)

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SERAFIN V. CRUZ, 58 PHIL 611 (1933)

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DIGESTS 1. SENO V. PESTOLANTE, 103 PHIL. 414 (1958)

LIMPIN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 166 SCRA 87 (1988)