Joson v.

Executive Secretary

Facts:
On Sept. 17, 1996, some SB members of Nueva Ecija filed with the Office of the
President a letter-complaint charging Edno Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of
authority. They allege that in the morning of Sept. 12, 1996, they were at the session hall
of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when
Joson belligerently barged in to the hall, kicked the door and chairs and uttered
threatening words at them; and that Edno was with several men with firearms who
encircled the area. They claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a
pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija
obtain a loan of P150 M.
The President acted on the complaint by noting on the margin that the “use of
force, intimidation or armed followers” were unjustified and instructed Sec. Barbers of the
DILG to take preemptive and investigative actions. Sec. Barbers directed the petitioner to
submit an answer but Edno failed to submit even after several extensions granted by the
DILG. On April 22, 1997, Usec Sanchez, then acting Sec., issued an order declaring Edno in
default and to have waived his right to present evidence. 2 days later, Edno’s counsel
entered appearance causing Usec Sanchez to reconsider his order and gave petitioner, for
the last time, 15 days to filed his answer. But still, Edno failed to file his answer. The order
of default was thus reinstated.
Joson then filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint was not verified and
that the DILG has no jurisdiction over the case.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Sec. Barbers, Exec. Sec.Torres issued an
order, by authority of the President, placing Edno Joson under preventive suspension for
60 days pending investigation of the charges against him. Vice-Governor Tinio was
designated as Acting Governor. Edno, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and
the order of default. Edno also filed, among others, a Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation pursuant to the provisions of the LGC and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No.
23.
The petition for certiorari with the CA was later dismissed. The Motion to Conduct
Formal Investigation with the DILG was also denied. The DILG Secretary found the
affidavits of complainants’ witnesses to be “more natural, reasonable, and probable” than
those of Edno Joson. The Exec. Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
finding and recommendation of the DILG and imposed on petitioner the penalty of
suspension from office for 6 months without pay. The Supreme Court, however, issued a
TRO enjoining the implementation of said order. That notwithstanding, Tinio was installed
as Acting Governor.

Issue:
Whether the DILG Secretary had jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in 2 authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating
Authority. Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 3 of A.O. No. 23, the Disciplining Authority is the
President, whether acting by himself or through the Exec. Secretary. The Sec. of the DILG
is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating
Committee. He is not, however, the exclusive Investigating Authority for the DILG Sec.
may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments as
provided under Sec. 4, Art. X, 1987 Constitution. And the power of supervision means
“overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The
President’s power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that
laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. This power must be construed to authorize the President
to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the
good of the public service requires.
A.O. No. 23 delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not
undue delegation, contrary to petitioner’s claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. And the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on
the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Exec.Dept., the heads of
which are assistants and agents of the President. And this doctrine is corollary to the
control power of the President as provided in the Constitution.
The procedure under the LGC and A.O. No. 23, however, is that when an
administrative complaint is filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring
the respondent to submit his verified answer within 15 days from notice. And upon filing
of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority
for investigation.
In the case at bar, the Office of the President did not comply with this requirement
since it should have first required petitioner to file his answer and this, together with the
complaint, to be referred to the Investigating Authority. Be that as it may, this procedural
lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to
make a preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient
in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President
on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether the DILG Sec. erred in recommending to the Discipling Authority the
preventive suspension of petitioner during the investigation.

Held:
No. Preventive suspension is authorized under Sec. 63 of the LGC. It may be
imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when
the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Exec. Sec. Torres found that all requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had
been complied with. Petitioner’s failure to file his answer despite several opportunities
given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and
as a result of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. It was also found
that the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during
the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the evidence against him.

Issue:
Whether the Resolution finding petitioner guilty and imposing the 6-month
suspension is valid.

Held:
Yes. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process. Thus, when
petitioner failed to submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct o
formal investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural process.