Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-23638 October 12, 1967

DIONISIO ERN!NDE", EUSE#IO RE$ES %&' LUIS! RE$ES, petitioners, vs. ISM!EL! DIM!GI#!, respondent. ---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967

M!RI!NO RE$ES, CES!R RE$ES, LEONOR RE$ES %&' P!CIENCI! RE$ES, petitioners, vs. ISM!EL! DIM!GI#!, respondent. Jose D. Villena for petitioners. Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent. RE$ES, (.#.L., Actg. C.J.: The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a revie of the decision of the Court of Appeals !in CA-". R. No. #$%%$-R& affir'in( that of the Court of )irst *nstance of Bulacan, in +pecial Proceedin( No. ,#$ of said Court, ad'ittin( to probate the alle(ed last ill and testa'ent of the deceased, and overrulin( the opposition to the probate. *t appears fro' the record that on -anuary $., $.//, *s'aela 0i'a(iba, no respondent, sub'itted to the Court of )irst *nstance a petition for the probate of the purported ill of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, e1ecuted on 2ctober %%, $.#3, and anne1ed to the petition. The ill instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition as set for hearin(, and in due ti'e, 0ionisio )ernande4, Eusebio Reyes and 5uisa Reyes and one 'onth later, Mariano, Cesar, 5eonor and Paciencia, all surna'ed Reyes, all clai'in( to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate as6ed. "rounds advanced for the opposition ere for(ery, vices of consent of the testatri1, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the ill by t o deeds of conveyance of the 'a7or portion of the estate 'ade by the testatri1 in favor of the proponent in $.8# and $.88, but hich conveyances ere finally set aside by this +upre'e Court in a decision pro'ul(ated on Au(ust #, $./8, in cases ".R. Nos. 5-/9$, and 5-/9%3 !unpublished&. After trial on the for'ulated issues, the Court of )irst *nstance, by decision of -une %3, $./,, found that the ill as (enuine and properly e1ecuted: but deferred resolution on the ;uestions of estoppel and revocation <until such ti'e hen e shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the ill or hen the ;uestion of ad7udication of the properties is opportunely presented.< 2ppositors )ernande4 and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and=or ne trial, insistin( that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved: hereupon, on -uly %>, $./., the Court overruled the clai' that proponent as in estoppel to as6 for the probate of the ill, but <reservin( unto the parties the ri(ht to raise the issue of i'plied revocation at the opportune ti'e.<

2n -anuary $$, $.93, the Court of )irst *nstance appointed Ricardo Cru4 as ad'inistrator for the sole purpose of sub'ittin( an inventory of the estate, and this as done on )ebruary ., $.93. 2n )ebruary %>, $.9%, after receivin( further evidence on the issue hether the e1ecution by the testatri1 of deeds of sale of the lar(er portion of her estate in favor of the testa'entary heir, 'ade in $.8# and $.88, subse;uent to the e1ecution of her $.#3 testa'ent, had revo6ed the latter under Article ./>!%& of the $./3 Civil Code !Art. ,9. of the Civil Code of $,,.&, the trial Court resolved a(ainst the oppositors and held the ill of the late Benedicta de los Reyes <unaffected and unrevo6ed by the deeds of sale.< ?hereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate Court held that the decree of -une %3, $./,, ad'ittin( the ill to probate, had beco'e final for lac6 of opportune appeal: that the sa'e as appealable independently of the issue of i'plied revocation: that contrary to the clai' of oppositors-appellants, there had been no le(al revocation by the e1ecution of the $.8# and $.88 deeds of sale, because the latter had been 'ade in favor of the le(atee herself, and affir'ed the decision of the Court of )irst *nstance. 2ppositors then appealed to this Court. *n this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three 'ain issues@ !a& hether or not the decree of the Court of )irst *nstance allo in( the ill to probate had beco'e final for lac6 of appeal: !b& hether or not the order of the Court of ori(in dated -uly %>, $./., overrulin( the estoppel invo6ed by oppositors-appellants had li6e ise beco'e final: and !c& hether or not the $.#3 ill of Benedicta de los Reyes had been i'pliedly revo6ed by her e1ecution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March %9, $.8# and April #, $.88. As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allo in( the ill to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition. ?e a(ree ith the Court of Appeals that the appellantAs stand is untenable. *t is ele'entary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all ;uestions concernin( capacity of the testator and the proper e1ecution and itnessin( of his last ill and testa'ent, irrespective of hether its provisions are valid and enforceable or other ise. !MontaBano vs. +uesa, $8 Phil. 9>9: Mercado vs. +antos, 99 Phil. %$/: Trillana vs. Crisosto'o, ,. Phil. >$3&. As such, the probate order is final and appealable: and it is so reco(ni4ed by e1press provisions of +ection $ of Rule $3., that specifically prescribes that <any interested person 'ay appeal in special proceedin(s fro' an order or 7ud('ent . . . here such order or 7ud('ent@ !a& allo s or disallo s a ill.< Appellants ar(ue that they ere entitled to a ait the trial CourtAs resolution on the other (rounds of their opposition before ta6in( an appeal, as other ise there ould be a 'ultiplicity of recourses to the hi(her Courts. This contention is ithout ei(ht, since Rule $3., section $, e1pressly enu'erates si1 different instances hen appeal 'ay be ta6en in special proceedin(s. There bein( no controversy that the probate decree of the Court belo as not appealed on ti'e, the sa'e had beco'e final and conclusive. Cence, the appellate courts 'ay no lon(er revo6e said decree nor revie the evidence upon hich it is 'ade to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lod(ed a(ainst the decree as correctly dis'issed. The alle(ed revocation i'plied fro' the e1ecution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testa'entary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate fro' the ;uestion of hether the testa'ent as duly e1ecuted. )or one, if the ill is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all ;uestions of revocation beco'e superfluous in la , there is no such ill and hence there ould be nothin( to

revo6e. Then, a(ain, the revocation invo6ed by the oppositors-appellants is not an e1press one, but 'erely i'plied fro' subse;uent acts of the testatri1 alle(edly evidencin( an abandon'ent of the ori(inal intention to be;ueath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation ould not affect the ill itself, but 'erely the particular devise or le(acy. 2nly the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revo6ed testa'ent !Trillana vs. Crisosto'o, supra.&. As to the issue of estoppel, e have already ruled in "uevara vs. "uevara, ., Phil. %8., that the presentation and probate of a ill are re;uire'ents of public policy, bein( pri'arily desi(ned to protect the testatorAs, e1pressed ishes, hich are entitled to respect as a conse;uence of the decedentAs o nership and ri(ht of disposition ithin le(al li'its. Evidence of it is the duty i'posed on a custodian of a ill to deliver the sa'e to the Court, and the fine and i'prison'ent prescribed for its violation !Revised Rule >/&. *t ould be a non sequitur to allo public policy to be evaded on the prete1t of estoppel. ?hether or not the order overrulin( the alle(ation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently un'eritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled. The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on para(raph % of Article ./> of the Civil Code of $./3 !Art. ,9. of the Code of $,,.&, hich recites@ Art. ./>. The le(acy or devise shall be ithout effect@ !$& . . . . !%& *f the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thin( be;ueathed or any part thereof, it bein( understood that in the latter case the le(acy or devise shall be ithout effect only ith respect to the part thus alienated. *f after the alienation the thin( should a(ain belon( to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the le(acy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reac;uisition shall have been effected by virtue of the e1ercise of the ri(ht of repurchase: 111 111 111

*t is ell to note that, unli6e in the )rench and *talian Codes, the basis of the ;uoted provision is a presu'ed chan(e of intention on the part of the testator. As pointed out by Manresa in his Co''entaries on Article ,9. of the Civil Code !Dol. 9, >th Ed., p. >8#& E Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. +i este, despues de le(ar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lu(ar a la presuncion de ;ue ha ca'biado de voluntad, y no ;uiere ;ue el le(ado se cu'pla. Mas para ;ue pueda presu'irse esa voluntad, es necesario ;ue 'edien actos del testador ;ue la indi;uen. +i la perdida del derecho sobre la cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del testador, el le(ado podra;uedar sin efecto, 'as no en virtud del nu'ero % del articulo ,9., ;ue e1i(e sie'pre actos voluntarios de ena7enacion por parte del 'is'o testador. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the e1istence of any such chan(e or departure fro' the ori(inal intent of the testatri1, e1pressed in her $.#3 testa'ent, is rendered doubtful by the circu'stance that the subse;uent alienations in $.8# and $.88 ere e1ecuted in favor of the le(atee herself, appellee 0i'a(iba. *n fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annullin( these conveyances !affir'ed in that point by this +upre'e Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dima iba, 5-/9$, and 5-/9%3, pro'ul(ated on -uly #$, $./8&, <no consideration hatever as paid by respondent 0i'a(iba< on account of the transfers, thereby renderin( it even 'ore doubtful hether in conveyin( the property to her le(atee, the testatri1 'erely intended to co'ply in advance

ith hat she had ordained in her testa'ent, rather than an alteration or departure therefro'. $ Revocation bein( an e1ception, e believe, ith the Courts belo , that in the circu'stances of the particular case, Article ./> of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar. Not only that, but even if it ere applicable, the annul'ent of the conveyances ould not necessarily result in the revocation of the le(acies, if e bear in 'ind that the findin(s 'ade in the decision decreein( the annul'ent of the subse;uent $.8# and $.88 deeds of sale ere also that it as the 'oral influence, ori(inatin( fro' their confidential relationship, hich as the only cause for the e1ecution of E1hs. A and B !the $.8# and $.88 conveyances&. !0ecision, 5-/9$, and 5-/9%3&. *f the annul'ent as due to undue influence, as the ;uoted passa(e i'plies, then the transferor as not e1pressin( her o n free ill and intent in 'a6in( the conveyances. Cence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the ori(inal le(acy. True it is that the le(al provision ;uoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property <even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract< does not revive the le(acy: but as pointed out by +caevola !Codi(o Civil, Dol. FD, 8th Ed., pp. #%8-#%/& the <nullity of the contract< can not be ta6en in an absolute sense.% Certainly, it could not be 'aintained, for e1a'ple, that if a testatorAs subse;uent alienation ere avoided because the testator as 'entally deran(ed at the ti'e, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the sa'e thin( could be said if the alienation !posterior to the ill& ere avoided on account of physical or 'ental duress. Get, an alienation throu(h undue influence in no ay differs fro' one 'ade throu(h violence or inti'idation. *n either case, the transferor is not e1pressin( his real intent, # and it can not be held that there as in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior be;uest. *n vie of the fore(oin( considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affir'ed. Costs a(ainst appellants Reyes and )ernande4. +o ordered. Di!on" Ma#alintal" Zaldivar" $an%&e!" Castro" An eles and 'ernando" JJ." concur. Con%ep%ion" C.J. and Ben !on" J.(." J." are on leave, too6 no part.

oot&ote)
$

+caevola !Codi(o Civil, Dol. FD, 8th Ed., p. #>,& aptly re'ar6s@

<Cuando el testador, a sabiendas de la disposicion contenida en su ulti'a voluntad, ena7ena al le(atario la cosa le(ada, si bien esta sale del poder de a;uel, va a parar al del le(atario, acto ;ue no puede interpretarse co'o 'udan4a del a voluntad, puesto ;ue trans'its la cosa a la persona a la ;ue deseaba favoreer con ella. Por esta circunstancia y por la de no revocar el le(ado, 'as bien parece ;ue persiste en su intencion de beneficiar al le(atario, ya ;ue no con la propia cosa, con el derecho ;ue le concede el art. ,>,. +i al donar el testador al futuro le(atario la cosa ;ue le de7aba en el testa'ento, indica solo una reali4acion anticipada de la ulti'a voluntad, el venderia sin dero(ar la disposicion delle(ado parece indicae ta'bien ;ue no ha habido idea 'odificadora de la intencion, sino ;ue porsi(ue en la de favorecer al instituido, y ya ;ue no es posible conse(uirlo con la cosa 'is'a,se i'pone el

verificarlo en la 'anera deter'inada por el articulo, o sea 'ediante la entre(a del precio.< <0ecia'os anterior'ente ;ue necesitaba al(una e1plicacion la frase del nu'. %3.o del art. ,9., <aun;ue sea por la nulidad del contrato,< para no apartarla de sus verdaderos y prudentes li'ites. 5iteral'ente entendida, autori4aria el ;ue fuese revocado un le(ado por ena7enacion ;ue hubiese reali4ado el testador con vicio en el consenti'iento. 0ice con ra4on el7urisconsulto frances 0e'ante, <;uese lle(aria a consecuencias contrariasa los principios 'as ele'entales del 0erecho y de la ra4on si, e1a(erandodicha doctrina, se diese efecto revocatorio a una ena7enacion nulapor vicio de consenti'iento.< Co'o una voluntad i'potente para transferirla propiedad podria tener la fuer4a de revocar un le(adoH +i la ena7enacionlleva el vicio de violencia o de error, sera posible artibuir al(un efectoa acto se'e7anteH Es lo(ico deducir entonces ;ue el testador se arrepintio, co'o dicen las partidas del otor(a'ento de la 'andaH< !+caevola, op. cit.&
% #

Cf. Torres vs. 5ope4, 8, Phil. >>%: Coso vs. 0e4a, 8% Phil