Socrates and Hedonism: "Protagoras" 351b-358d Author(s): Donald J. Zeyl Reviewed work(s): Source: Phronesis, Vol. 25, No.

3 (1980), pp. 250-269 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182098 . Accessed: 01/11/2011 13:55
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Socrates and Hedonism: Protagoras 351b-358d.

DONALD J. ZEYL

An ancientquarrelpersistsamong studentsof Plato'sProtagoras between those who claim that Socrateshimselfholds the hedonisticthesison which he bases his argumentagainstakrasia(I shall call them 6prohedonists"), and those who deny the claim ("'antihedonists").1 Few will deny that the matterat issue is basic to the interpretation of Plato'searlydialoguesand hence to the reconstruction of the philosophyof Socrates,and until it is resolved,Socrates'place in the historyof moral thoughtwill remainunclear. The challenges which either camp must meet are well known and considerable.If Socratesdoes sincerelyaccepthedonismin the Protagoras, how is his hedonism here to be reconciled with his claims about the supremeimportanceof virtueand the perfectionof the soul, and in particular with his attackon hedonismin the Gorgias?2 If, on the other hand, Socratesdoes not seriouslyrepresent himselfas a hedonistin the argument, why does he use hedonismas a premisein an argument whoseconclusion to take he surely takes seriously,and why does he allow his interlocutors him as believingthatpremisein all seriousness? If a newcase is to be made on eitherside of the issue it mustbe made on the basisof a close readingof the text, on a plausible account of Socrates'aims and strategyin the argument,and on a consideration of objectionsto both sides. In this paper I shall presentsuch a case. I shall arguefor the antihedonist interpretation by showingthatit is consistentwith a natural,unconstrained readingof the text; that it is accountedfor by a plausiblereadingof Socrates'aims and methods in arguing against akrasia; that major objections to it can be account satisfactorily answered;and thatmajorobjectionsto a prohedonist cannot be satisfactorily answered.If I am successfulin each aspectof the case, the ancientquarrelcan, I believe,be broughtto an end.
I

I shall begin by examiningclosely those passageswithinPrt.351b-358din which the hedonistic thesis is introducedor reassertedand which have been, or could be, taken to support a prohedonist account. In the examination I shall limit my attention strictly to the issue of pro- or 250

antihedonism. I readily sacrifice elegance in favor of accuracy in the translations: (a) 351b3-e7:
I said, "that(I) some men live well and others badly?"He "Do you say, Protagras," assented. "Then does it seem to you that (2) a man would live well if he lived in distressand suffering?"He demurred."(3) What if he should live a pleasant life to the end? Doesn't it seem to you that he would have lived well like that?""It does," he said. "Therefore(&pa) (4) living pleasantlyis good, and unpleasantlybad." "(5) As long as he lived in the enjoyment of praiseworthythings (TotS xaXots)," he said. Surelynot you too call (6) some pleasantthingsbad and painful "What,Protagoras? things good, as the many do? I mean, (7) aren't they good in that respect in which they are pleasant,disregardinganythingelse that may come from them?And again, aren't painful things bad to the extent to which they are painful?""I don't know, Socrates,"he said, "whetherI should answerso unqualifiedlyas you ask, that (8) all pleasant things are good and all painful things bad; it seems to me safer, not only with respectto my presentanswer,but also all the rest of my life, to answerthat (6') some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not bad, though some are, and thirdly,some (sc. pleasuresand pains) are neutral,neithergood nor bad.""(9) Don't you call 'pleasant',"I said, "the thingswhich partakeof pleasureor which produce pleasure?""Indeed I do," he said. "Then this is what I mean, (7) whether things aren'tgood to the extent that they are pleasant; I'm askingwhetherpleasureitself is not good." "As you frequentlysay, Socrates,"he said, "let's examine it, and if our examination appears reasonable,and pleasant and good should turn out to be the same, we shall be in agreement;if not, we shall dispute it then."

I representthe numberedsentences and phrases by the following statements: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Some men live well, othersbadly. A man lives badly if he lives in distressand suffering. A man lives well if he lives a pleasantlife to the end. Livingpleasantlyis good; living unpleasantlyis bad. Living pleasantlyis good only if one lives in the enjoymentof praiseworthythings. 6. Some pleasantthingsare bad; some painful thingsare good. 7. Pleasantthingsare good in the respectin which / to the extentto which they are pleasant;painfulthingsare bad in the respectin which / to the extent to which they are painful. 8. All pleasantthings are good; all painful thingsare bad. 9. All thingswhich partakeof or producepleasureare pleasant. agreesthat The discussionin this passage proceedsas follows: Protagoras 1, 2 and 3 express his views. Socratesinfers 4 from 2 and 3. Protagoras
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denies 4 in its unqualifiedform;he will acceptit only if it is qualifiedas in 5. Socrateslinks5 to 6, a view whichhe attributes to the many.He proposes 7 as the view which Protagoras ought to acceptinsteadof 5, and represents it as contradicting 6. 8 is Protagoras' versionof 7, and 9 is an analytictruth. 6' and 7' are merelyrepetitionsof 6 and 7. The discussion begins with Socrates securing Protagoras'answers to threequestions,and inferringa conclusionfromthoseanswers. We need to determineboth the significanceof the questions and the conclusion and the extent to which they can be taken as indicativeof Socrates' own view. In assenting to 1, Protagorasmakes it clear that he is prepared to evaluatelives as good or bad. "Livingwell"(eV' Civ) is a standard synonym for "doing well" or "faringwell" (?VisTp&'TTELV)and "being happy" (EVi8aL[LoveLv).3 He thus has some criterionor criteriaby which he judges lives as good or happy, and his answersto 2 and 3 revealwhat these are. In his answerto 2 he statesthat living a (predominantly) painfullife is sufficient for not living well, and living a (predominantly) pleasantlife is sufficient
for living well.4 These answers and their implications bear close attention.

If being a pleasantlife is a sufficientconditionfor being a good life, it will follow thata predominance of pleasurein any life, no matterhowslight thepredominance, suffices to qualify that life as a good one, and similarly with a painful life. Although this view does not at first disallow the possibilitythat factorsother than pleasureand pain may contributeto the goodness or badnessof a life, such factors,no matterhow abundantlythey are presentin a life, do not avail againstpleasureand pain to makeeven a marginallypleasantlife bad, or a marginally painfullife good. Since such factorscannot contributeto the goodnessor badnessof a life commensurablywith pleasureand pain,it is doubtfulthat2 and 3 are intendedto allow for them. Further,the conjunctionof 2 and 3, with the addition of the reasonableassumptionthat a life predominateseither in pleasure or in pain,will entail that being a pleasantlife is the only sufficientconditionfor being a good life, and being a painfullife the only sufficientconditionfor being a bad life, and it will further follow that living (predominantly) pleasantlyis both a necessaryand a sufficientconditionfor living well. In his answersto 2 and 3 Protagorasthus shows that he is committed to a hedonistic eudaemonistictheory: living pleasantlydefines or constitutes living well or happily.5 In 4 Socrates infers from Protagoras'answers a thesis about the of living pleasantlyto what is good, and of livingunpleasantly relationship to what is bad. 4 mustthen be understoodin a suitablesense so thatit does indeed follow from2 and 3. Livingpleasantlyhas indeedbeen shownto be 252

good, and living painfully bad, but to be so in a strong sense: they are, a necessaryand sufficientgood, and a necessary respectively, and sufficient evil.6If a theoryaboutwhatis good in this strongsense is a theoryaboutthe defining conditionsof living well or being happy, then the theoryimplied in 2-4 is nothing shortof evaluativehedonism. Socrateshas reason,therefore,to take Protagoras' answersto 2 and 3 as committingthe sophistto hedonism,and he does so explicitlyin 4. Is there any suggestionthat 2-4 expressSocrates'own view?Some commentators, relying on the fact that Socratescustomarilyexpresseshis own views as questionsto which he invites the interlocutor's assent,claim that 1-3 may be taken as expressionsof his own view, whetherhe advocatesit sincerely or ironically.7 Butthis will not workhere:Socrates' questionsdo not simply have the form, "p?",but the form, "doyou think (say) that p?" Socrates wants to elicit Protagoras'views, rather than to express his own (cf. "XEyeLt," b3; "8oxrisot," b4; So~v . . . coO boxe," b6,7), and his questions provide no evidence for his own views on the matter.They are simply diagnostic.8 As we shallsee in the next section,Socrateshassome interestin obtaining Protagoras' views about the relationbetween pleasureand the good. Protagorasrejects4 as a statementexpressiveof his view, at least in its unqualifiedform: it is not living pleasantlysimpliciter (cf. 'a&Xws, c7) that constitutes living well, for if it were (one might imagine him thinking), someonewho lived as a catamite(cf. Grg.494e) would live well. Shrinking back from this, Protagoras emends Socrates'conclusionin 4 to readthat it is living in the enjoymentof XaX& only that constitutesliving well. The qualificationamounts to a surrenderof the view that pleasureas such is sufficient for living well, and his subsequentadmissionthat some pains are good9 suggests that he gives up the view that it is necessaryas well. Only praiseworthy pleasure(the pleasurederivedfromexperiences or activitieswhich are xaXa) counts in determiningthe goodnessof a life. He is thus admittinga standardof value otherthanpleasure,and one by which pleasuresthemselvesare approvedas good or disapprovedas bad, so that only praiseworthy pleasuresare good, i.e. make a contributionto a good life. Disgracefulpleasuresare presumablybad. If so, then his view is that pleasureis as such neithergood nor bad: only praiseworthy pleasuresare good, only disgraceful pleasures are bad, and pleasures neither praiseworthynor disgracefulare neithergood nor bad (cf. d4-7). SocratesassociatesProtagoras' view with a view which he attributesto the many,10 viz., that some pleasuresare bad and some pains are good. On the interpretation of 5 just given, this associationis justified to the extent 253

that 5 does indeed entail the firstconjunctof 6. By accepting6 as a whole (see n. 9) he acceptsa view whichis whollyincompatible with4. 5 and 6 are not statementswhich, in Socrates'view, Protagoras ought to accept. He recommends,ratherinsistently, 7 instead. 7 must then be read in a way which will make evident its incompatibilitywith 6. Now in 5 Protagoras maintainedthat a life is a good one to the extent that it consistsof praiseworthy pleasuresand not merelyto the extentthat it consistsof pleasureas such. It is the importof 7 to affirmwhatwas denied in 5. So 7 insiststhat it is merelyquapleasantthat anything(includinga life) is good, and thusthat the restriction on 4 importedby 5 is improper." Why does Socratesurge 7 against Protagoras' professionof 5 and the general view of the relation between pleasant and good which that professionimplies?It is universallyassumed,certainlyby prohedonists,12 but also by antihedonists,whether they take Socrates to be asserting hedonism ironically in 7'3 or not asserting it at all,14 that Socrates represents7 as his own view. This assumptionis never argued,and it is open to challenge.To understandSocrates'use of 7 we need to recallthe earlier steps in the argument.In securing Protagoras' assent to 2 and 3 Socrateshad reasonto take the sophistas committedto hedonism,and he explicitly did so in 4. But Protagorasshrank from accepting hedonism outrightby proposing5, and thushe will not standby the implicationof his earlieranswers.So now Socrateshas reasonto object to Protagoras' proposal of 5 and the non-hedonistic view of the relationof pleasantand good which it entails as stated in 6, not becausehe thinksthat 5 and 6 are false, but becausethey are inconsistentwith the sophist'searlieranswers.Protagorasis vacillatingbetweentwo views about that relation,a hedonisticone to which his actual evaluationscommit him, and a non-hedonisticone which alone his scruplesallow him to acceptexplicitly.In urging 7 upon him Socratesis pressing his interlocutorto be consistent:if Protagoras' "real"positionis revealedby his answersto 2 and 3, then his disavowalof 4 is a fainthearted concessionto the unpopularityof hedonismas a theory. Socrates'associationof 5 with the apparentnon-hedonismof the many plays on the sophist's contempt for the masses on whose approval his reputationand livelihoodnevertheless depend.15 The attempt to make Protagorasconsistent helps to explain, then, Socrates'sponsorhipof 7. But it does not explain it completely.Consiscould have been tencycould equallywell have been achievedif Protagoras allowed to retractor modify his answersto 2 and 3 to make them compatible with 5, and this line would probably have been more welcome to Protagoras.Socratesmay have reasons to take advantageof Protagoras' 254

(probablyunguarded)answersto 2 and 3, i.e., reasonsto extractan explicit commitment to hedonism from Protagoras(as I shall argue in the next section), and if so, then his attempt to make Protagorasa consistent hedonist ratherthan a consistentnon-hedonistwill be explainedin a way which does not requirehis own endorsementof 7.16 (b) 353e5-354al:
"Then isn't it evident to you, gentlemen, as Protagorasand I are saying, that these things are bad for no other reason than that they terminatein pains and depriveone of other pleasures?"

I have italicized the crucial clause in the sentence. At first glance, and outside of its context, it seems ambiguous. It could indicate (a) that Socratesand Protagoras themselvesclaim thatimmediatelypleasantthings are bad because they result in greaterpains. In this case Socratesis unambiguouslydeclaringthat he and Protagoras are hedonists.On the other hand, it could indicate (b) that Socrates and Protagorasclaim that it is evidentto the manythat these thingsare bad, etc. Thereare quite decisivereasonsin favorof(b). Against(a) is the fact that on its reading Socrateswould be identifyingnot only himself, but Protagorasas a hedonist,when the sophisthas previouslyresistedthe imputation of hedonism to him. Even if Socratesshould be rightin diagnosingProtagoras' "real" position as hedonistic, this context is inappropriatefor revealingthat diagnosis.In favorof (b) is the fact that it fits well in its own immediatecontext. In the precedinglines (d6-e4) Socratesand Protagoras have been discussing between themselves what the many would say in responseto a question that mightbe put to them; that is, they predicthow the many would answerthatquestion.In the sentenceunderdiscussionthe many are being asked that question directly,and the predictionis being tested.What "Protagoras and I are saying"was said at d6-el.'7
(c) 356b3-cl:
"If you weigh pleasant things against pleasant things you should always take the greaterand the more; ... you should do that action in which (pains are exceeded by pleasures) . . ."

The injunctiongiven here'8is Socrates'responseto an objection(356a5-7) to the precedingargumentwhich showed that the positionof the many on akrasiais absurd.19 Socratesdisallows the plea that one pleasuremay be preferredto anothersimply because it is nearerin time. He is thus strictly enforcing the hedonistic principle, which his opponents have accepted,
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that the only factor which makes one pleasure preferableto another is differencein quantity(355d6-e2;356al-5). The injunctionhas force only for those who accept the hedonistic principle on which the preceding argument against akrasia depended, and so provides no independent evidencein favorof prohedonism. (d) 357a5-7:
"Since the salvation of our lives has turned out to consist in the right choice of pleasureand pain . . ."

One might think that Socratescommits himself to the truthof the statementcontainedin thisclause,especiallyin the lightof his contrastbetween this accountof "the salvationof our lives"and the two clearlycounterfactual accounts mentioned earlier (356c8-e4; e5-357a5). An antihedonist as well for accountwould requirethe presentinstanceto be counterfactual Socrates.But Socratesis here merelyrecallingthe applicationof the result of the akrasia argumentfor choice and action (356a8-c3;cf (c) above), which has force only againstthose who accept the premisesof that argument. As before, Socrates is not including himself among those against whom the argumenthas force, though equally he takes no pains to dissociatehimself fromit.20 (e) 357d3-7:
"For you too have agreed that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasuresand pains go wrong throughlack of knowledge, - and these are goods and evils, - and not merely of knowledge, but of that which earlier we agreed was knowledge of measurement."

the The hyphenatedclause, though not given in oratioobliqua,represents view of the many and need not be taken as representingSocrates'own
view.

(f) 358al-b6:
"Thiswould be our answerto the many. And I ask you, Hippiasand Prodicus,along with Protagoras(let the argumentbe shared by you), whether I seem to you to be speaking truly or falsely." It seemed quite emphaticallyto all that what had been said was true. "You agree, then (&pa),"I said, "that the pleasant is good and the painful bad." . . . Prodicussmiled and gave his assent,and so did the others. "'What about this, then, gentlemen," I said, "aren't all actions that aim at painless and pleasant living praiseworthy(xacaX)?And the praiseworthyaccomplishmentgood and beneficial?"They all thoughtso.

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In the sequel to the argumentwith the manywhichbeginswith thispassage Hippias and Prodicus are drawn into the discussion. They are asked whose silence implies consent) whether they, too, (as well as Protagoras, accept as true "what(Socrates)has been saying".The two sophistsexpress their emphatic approval of Socrates' argument. They immediately acknowledgethatin acceptingthatargumentthey acceptthe thesisbasicto it, that the pleasantis (the) good21and the painful (the) bad. Thus they take Socratesas not only having representedthe positionof the many correctly but also as sharing their hedonism.22Like Protagorasearlier (351e), Hippiasand Prodicusare prohedonists. It does not follow, however,that they are right.Socrates' questionis best interpreted as a diagnostic one: do Hippias and Prodicus think that Socrateshas offered a sound argument(cf. Boxav',iv)?Their affirmative answerdoes not imply that Socratesthinksthat his argumentis sound; he may thinkthatit is merelyvalid. And Socrateshas good reason,as we shall see, not to discouragetheir readingof his own position. By not challenging Socrates'inference (as Protagorashad challenged anotherinferenceto the same conclusion,351b7-cl) the two sophistsand also Protagoras, must presumably who does not repeathis formerprotest,23 accept the hedonisticcriterionfor praiseworthy actions.Contraryto that protest(5 above), that To xaXovis the measurewhich distinguishesgood pleasuresfrombad ones, pleasureas such is now acceptedas a measureof what is xaXov.The hedonisticcriterion,coupled with the admissionthat what is praiseworthy is good and beneficial,is used later in the argument (at 359e5-360a5)to argue for the unity of courage and wisdom. Not only the many but also the sophistshave overtly acceptedhedonism,and their acceptance of it can be used by Socrates to support positions which he thinksthey are wrong to deny. The examinationof the precedingtextshas yielded the followingresults: (1) In none of them are we requiredby a natural,unconstrained readingof the text to interpretSocrates'use of the hedonistic thesis as implying his own endorsementof that thesis; and (2) Socratesdoes not explicitly dissociatehimselffromhedonism,and allowshis interlocutors to thinkthathe does hold it. It will now be our task to interpretSocrates'strategyin a way that makessense of these results. II Any interpretation of Socrates'dialecticalposturein this part of the Protagoras must relate that posture to Socrates'motives and tactics in the
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dialogue as a whole. Fifty years ago Grube arguedconvincingly,p. 203, that "the Protagorasis an attack upon the sophists as representedby Protagoras,the greatest of them," and Vlastos, 1956, pp. xxiv-xxvi and Sullivan,pp. 11-18have given an accountof his methodsin carryingout the attack. Recently Klosko has argued forcefully,p. 126, "that the discussion in the Protagorasis meant to be readas a(n) ... eristicdebate."If these readingsof the dialogueas a whole arecorrect,as I thinkthey are,the presumptionis strong that they apply to the passageunder study in this paper.Socrateswill be less concernedto defend positions(whichall agree are recognisably his own) with arguments which represent his ownreasons for holding these positions, than to attack the contradictories of those positionsas these are maintainedby his opponents,and to do so by using the most effective means his offensive purpose and the conventions of eristicdebate will allow. The passage of the Protagorasfrom 351 to 358 bridges two attempts, unsuccessfuland successfulrespectively,to arguefor the unityof courage and wisdom.The passagecontainsan argumentfor a thesiswhich is used as a premisein the second attemptand accountsfor its success.This is the psychologicalclaim that "no one who knowsor believes that other things are betterthan those he is doing and are possibleto do subsequentlydoes them when he could do the better"(358b7-c1).24 and the other Protagoras sophistsmust, then, be persuadedto acceptthis "Socraticparadox"if the final argumentis to succeed.But by what arguments can they be persuaded? Professor Vlastos has proposed an argument which supports the paradox,and whose premisesconsist of well known Socraticdoctrines.25 The argumentis as follows: (SI) (S2) (S3) (S4) If one knowsthat X is betterthan Y, one will want X more than Y. If one wantsX more than Y, one will choose X ratherthan Y All men desirewelfare. Anythingelse they desireonly as a meansto welfare.

(S3) and (S4) represent well known Socratictenets,and theirconjunction, accordingto Vlastos,entails (Si).26 The conjunctionof (SI) with (52) (an apparentlyuncontroversialstatement of the connection between desire and choice) entails the paradox:if one knows that X is betterthan Y one will choose X ratherthan y.27 Since Socrateshas the resourcesto constructwhat he would regardas a sound argumentfor the paradox,one may well wonderwhy he resortsto another which he (as antihedonistswill claim) regardsas unsound, es258

pecially if the premise which he rejects is at first also denied by his interlocutor. Socrates takes some pains to get Protagoras to admit the premise, and though he is justified (as I have argued) in attributing it to the sophist, he must think that it is worth the pains. Clearly Socrates thinks that the argument based on hedonism has greater cogency for Protagoras and the other sophists than the argument from (SJ)-(S4). And so it has. Anyone who doubts or denies the Socratic paradox will regard the argument from (SJ)-(S4) with suspicion because it rules out the possibility of akrasia, and anyone who believes that akrasia does occur will have reason to doubt one or more premises in that argument. He will certainly reject (SI), and hence at least one of (S3) and (S4). (S4) is the likelier candidate for rejection.28The doubter will maintain that the occurrence of akrasia proves the existence of welfare-independent desires, and that the denial of akrasia on the basis of the non-existence of welfare-independent desires merely begs the question against him. He may press his case by claiming, against (SI), that even though one knows that X is better than Y, one may still want Y more than X because, for instance, (one knows or believes that) Y is more pleasant than X. He thus claims, against (S4), that one's desire for pleasure is a welfare-independent desire. There is only one way for Socrates to dismantle this defense, and that is by showing that the defender of akrasia is not entitled to his claim that one's desire for pleasure is a welfare- or good-independent desire. If that claim can be dismantled independently, (S4) and (SI) will not be challengeable, for then a conflict between a desire for X qua good and for Y qua pleasant is not possible. If to desire Y for its pleasure is just to desire it for its good (cf. 354c3-5), then it cannot even be claimed that X is the better, but Y the more pleasant alternative. This, I believe, is the advantage the argument from hedonism has over the argument from (S1)-(S4) against a hedonistic opponent. And, I believe, against such an opponent only.29 Conceivably Socrates might try to convert a non-hedonistic defender of akrasia to hedonism first, in order to exercise this advantage. Whether he would actually do so, even given the license allowed by eristic conventions, may be doubted. In any case he is not doing it in the Protagoras. He does not argue for hedonism against Protagoras' protest, nor against the many. He has, as we saw, good reason to believe that they are hedonists already, whatever their professions. If an argument from hedonism has greater cogency against a hedonistic opponent than some alternative argument, Socrates will have a good reason (a) to determine whether his interlocutor is a hedonist prior to launching such an argument, and (b) to press his interlocutor, should he be 259

found to use hedonisticcriteriaof evaluationbut to be too confusedor too timid to acceptthe theoryimpliedby his evaluations,to acceptthattheory. Moreover,he will have good reason(c) to suppresshis own disavowalof that theory. For if he openly questionedor rejectedhedonism,he would lose the strategicadvantageof his position:the locus of debatewouldshift away from the issue under discussion, that of supplying a scaffold to Worse,he would supportthe thesis of the unity of courageand wisdom.30 be encouragingdoubt in hedonism,and thus underminehis own denial of
akrasia.31

That argument makes use of hedonism by taking advantageof the and of "painful" (or "pleasure") of "good"for "pleasant" substitutability many that sometimes of the thesis for "bad",32 and in this way shows the one does what one knows to be bad overall,because one is overcomeby pleasure,to be absurd:how can one possiblycreditthe explanationgiven, when that the agentdid whathe did becausehe wantedpleasure/goodness one of the givens in the descriptionof the act is the stipulationthat the agent knew that he would get less pleasure/goodnessfrom that act than from some alternative equally open to him? That is like explaining job by his desirefor wealthand at the someone'schoice of a less lucrative same time insist that the individualknew at the time he made his choice is whichof thejobs was the morelucrativeone. The "logicof explanation" vitiated if the explanationoffered to make an action intelligibleconflicts
with the description of the action it is supposed to explain.33

Does the great logical advantagewhich Socratesgains from the use of hedonism in arguing against akrasia imply that Socrates accepts hedonism? It certainly need not. First, to get this logical advantage, Socratesdoes not need hedonismas such, but a premisewhichwill insure are of the (a) that the goods of both the chosen and the rejectedalternative same kind, and (b) that it is by a good of that kind thatthe agentis said to of "good"will be defeated.It is indeedhardto see whatotheridentification satisfy (a) and (b) so neatly, and so Socrateshas good reasonto use the hedonistic premise where he can. This, however, does not mean that Socrateshimselfacceptshedonism.If I can defend a view of mine by either of two arguments, only one of which I acceptas sound but whosepremises may be hard to defend, while I regardthe other as valid, dependingon premises some of which I do not accept, and I realize that the latter argumentwould have greatercogency againstsomeone who does accept thesepremisesthanthe former,I mayhaveexcellentreasonto use the latter argument to defend my view. This, I believe, is exactly the position of
Socrates in the Protagoras.

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III It is time now to consider and evaluate some majorobjectionsto antihedonism and to raiseand presssome objectionsto prohedonism. (1) It is sometimes flatly assertedthat prohedonismis requiredby a naturalreadingof the text, and that antihedonistsdo violence to the plain sense of the text. Thus Grote finds hedonism "directly stated" by Socrates,34 a view that is echoed by Hackforthand Dodds,35the latter characterizing antihedonistargumentsas "more ingenious than honest." The motivesof antihedonists arealso suspect:"Thecommentators resortto this (sc. antihedonist)hypothesis,partlybecausethe doctrineis one which
(sic) they disapprove
..

." (Grote); "It is only because hedonism is a

naughty view that there are reservationsabout saying that Socrates maintainsit in the Protagoras" (Crombie,p. 240). "Scholars who resentthe suggestionthat Plato ever changed his mind have tried to paper over this crackin the 'unity'of his thought. . ." (Dodds). These allegationshave by themselvesno probativeforcewhatever. (2) A more substantialobjection is derived from the observationthat hedonismis not a positionto which eitherProtagoras or the manyclaim to adhere;that position,it is claimed,is "forced"(Hackforth,p. 41) on them by Socrates,and if hedonismis not the positionof Socrates'opponents,a defense of antihedonism which interprets Socrates' argument as ad hominem collapses. Why else should Socrates try to persuade them to accept hedonism,unless he thoughtthat that view was true?36 The objection is answeredif it can be shown,as I have triedto show, that Protagoras and the many are,despite theirdisclaimers, hedonists,and thusopponents againstwhom Socrates'hedonisticargumentagainstakrasia will be effective. (3) It is frequentlypointedout thatSocratescontinuesto makeprofitable use of the hedonisticpremiseafter the argument with the manyis complete. Partlyon the strengthof this premisehe arguesfor the unityof courageand wisdom,a thesiswhich he surelyaccepts.To recommendthat argumentas sound would be uncharacteristically 'insincere" (Hackforth,p. 42), and would show him, implausibly,to be "arguingwith consciousdishonesty" (Taylor,p. 209; cf. Gulley, p. 112).An appealto Socrates' sincerityto limit the viability of antihedonismwas made by Vlastos in 1956(p. xl, n. 50; retracted in 1969),who stated that "it is most unlikelythat Socrateswould deliberatelyoffer a false propositionas a premisefor establishinghis great proposition(that knowledge is virtue) .. . It would have encouragedthe
listener to believe a falsehood . . ." (his italics). It may be pointed out in

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response,however,that Socratesdeliberatelysecuresthe sophists'conscious assent to the hedonisticpremiseafter the argumentwith the many is over (358al-6; cf. I (f) above), and is thus careful to solicit explicitly a license to carryover his use of that premise.Whetherthat concealmentis morally justifiedor whetherit makeshim liable to the chargeof insincerity or dishonestywill depend on what we take to be permissiblewithin his strategy.We shouldbe carefulnot to reduceSocraticironyto a moralfault, nor fail to appreciatethe eristiccharacterof the discussionin the Protagoras.37

(4) Irwinhas argued(p. 106) that hedonismis indispensableto a nonquestion-beggingargument against akrasia. A principle of "hedonistic hedonismis needed, whichcombinesethicaland psychological prudence" he argues,to give backingto the Socraticdoctrinethat no one will choose what he knowsor believesto be the lesserof the availablegoods (cf. his 3., p. 105). Whetherthat Socraticdoctrineis assumedin the argumentmay well be doubted, but even if it is, the suitabilityof the identificationof goodnesswithpleasureto give backingto thatdoctrineand its usefulnessin this argument is contingent on the fact that the opponent has already accepteda principleof hedonisticprudence.If the opponenthad accepted would have some other identificationof the good, then that identification servedto give backingto the Socraticdoctrine.That doctrineconstitutesa one knowsor believesto be the claimaboutwhatever generalpsychological good, and the principleof hedonisticprudenceis one case of thatclaim. It is becausethe manyalreadyacceptthe principlethatthey mustalso accept the doctrine;but it does not follow that Socratesmustacceptthe principle because he accepts the doctrine. It is only because the (theory-independent)explanationgiven of akrasiaby the many is the agent'sbeing overcome by pleasurethat Socrateshas an interestin mountinghis argument on a principleof hedonisticprudence,as I have explainedabove; it does not follow that Socrateshimselfacceptsthatprinciple. I have thus far arguedthat an antihedonisticreadingof the Protagoras passage is fully plausible, and free from the objections that have been raised against it. Prohedonistsmay claim, however,that their readingis equally supportedby the text (a claim which I have not contested)and which,in theirview,wouldbe explainedby Socrates'aims in the argument to give a sound, non-question-begging argumentagainstakrasia.To argue we need to examine of antihedonismto prohedonism for the preferability in the light of the implicationof readingthe Protagoras prohedonistically the evidenceof other dialogues. readProThere are two relatedproblemsto which a prohedonistically 262

tagoras gives rise. The first is the questionof the consistencyof the Protagoras with other dialogues; the second is the question about the philo-

sophicalpositionof the historicalSocratesor at least about Plato'sbeliefs about that position, or the position Plato took on the relationof pleasure and goodnessat the time he wrotethe Protagoras. On the firstof these, all prohedonistshave acknowledgedthat there is a problemof consistency, though some have minimized it.38The verbal similaritiesbetween the thesissupposedlyendorsedin the Protagoras and the thesisattackedin the and so most prohedonists have given Gorgias are considerable, however,39 other accountsof the discrepancy.Few are as radicalas Grote, who dismissesattemptsto addressthis problem:"Wehave no rightto requirethat (the dialogues)shall be consistentwith each otherin doctrine" (p. 316).But he neverdoes althoughPlatodoes changehis mind,sometimesdrastically, so withoutsuggestingreasonsfor the change,and we have no such reasons in the presentcase. In the Gorgias (which I assume to be later than the Protagoras but still essentially"Socratic") hedonismis representedas the total antithesisof the Socraticconcept of the happy life; Socratesis not represented as havingsecondthoughts,as movingfroman old positionto a new one, but as implacablyopposed to a positionwhichhe regards as most for happiness. destructive The positionof the Apology and the Crito (both of which I assumeto be earlierthan the Protagoras) is of a piece with the Gorgias, and equally at variance with a prohedonisticProtagoras. The appeals to the supreme importanceof virtueand the perfectionof the soul seem inconsistentwith the view thatpleasureis the good. We mighttryto harmonizetheseappeals with that view by claiming that virtue and the perfectionof the soul are necessaryand infallibly sufficient means to pleasure, and in that sense supremely important, and such an attempt has been seriously made recentlyby Irwin.I can only say here that I do not thinkthat the attemptis nor do other attempts seem promising.4'There is an irresuccessful,40 concilable incompatibilitybetween the claim that virtue and the care of one's soul is supremelyimportant,and the claim that pleasureis the only ultimategood. If the "Socrates" of the Protagoras is representedby Plato as a serious advocateof hedonism,then (a) (Platobelieved that)the historicalSocrates did (at one time)hold thatview, or (b) Platodid himself(at one time)hold that view. It is unlikely that Plato would seriouslyascribeto his dramatic "Socrates" anywherein the dialoguesa view withwhichneitherhe himself nor,so far as he would know,his masterwas in sympathy.Thus some have suggestedthatthe historicalSocrateswas indeed a hedonist.42 If this is true, 263

however,then neitherthe Apology and the Crito on the one hand, nor the Gorgias on the other depict (what Plato believed was) the historical Socrates,or else (Plato believed that)Socrateschangedhis view. As to the former, surely the Apology and the Crito are intended to portray the As historicalSocrates,and we mustnot beg thatquestionwith the Gorgias. view?By to the latter,how arewe supposedto chartthischangein Socrates' the dramaticdates of the dialoguesor by their sequencein composition? Further, the absence of any extra-Platonictestimonia for a hedonistic Socrateshas persuadedone prohedonistcommentatorthat the historical Socratesdid not espousehedonism.43 flirtation. Alternatively,the hedonism is Plato'sown, and a temporary to attempt it is Plato's thinks that (p. 42) who This is the view of Hackforth make sense of the Socraticequationof virtue and knowledge,an attempt There is, however, which he rejectedwhen he came to write the Gorgias. equallyno evidenceoutsideof the dialoguesfor thisview as therewas none us to postulate for a hedonisticSocrates(cf. Gulley, p. 113),and it requires the changes of view to him: if he wrote Apology and equally unchartable Crito first, then he was probablynot a hedonist to begin with (assuming of Plato'sown that these dialogues are both Socraticand representative when he wrotetheProtagorashe view at the time).At some time thereafter, was a hedonist,and at some time afterthatwhen he wrotethe Phaedo and the Republic (leavingaside the chronologicalrelationof the Gorgias to the Protagoras) he rejectedhedonism.The most thatcan be said for a Platonic interestin hedonismat the time the Protagoras was writtenis that it might have been a "thoughtexperiment",not somethingwhich Plato seriously believed, and perhaps this is all that Hackforthmeant. But even this is unlikely if Plato makes "Socrates"the serious spokesmanonly for views seriouslyheld by the masteror by himself. I conclude, then, that the weight of evidence is heavily in favorof the antihedonistcase: it is thoroughlycompatiblewith the text of the Protaaims; goras; it is intelligiblein the light of a plausibleaccountof Socrates' more creates account whereas a it prohedonist and it can meetobjectionsto
problems than it solves.44 The Centerfor Hellenic Studies The University of Rhode Island

1 An antihedonistinterpretation is at least as old as MarsilioFicino (1433-1499)quoted (with disapproval)by Grote, p. 314, n. 1. (All workscited are listed in the Bibliography

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below.) Prohedonistsmay differ about whether the historicalSocratesshould or should not be credited with hedonism, and antihedonists about whether Socrates adopts hedonism insincerelyor ironically,or not at all. 2 Claims about virtue and the soul are found at Apology28b; 29b-30b; 31b; 32a-e; 36c; Crito47e-48a; 48b-49a. The attackon hedonism is at Gorgias492d-500d. 3 Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1095al8-20: "For both ordinary and sophisticatedpeople understandliving well and faringwell to be the same thing as being happy."Cf. also Rep. 354a. 4 Assuming that no life is purely pleasant or purely painful. Living pleasantly and painfullyare thus mattersof degree, as areliving well and living badly.This will allow for a commensurabilitybetween degrees of living well and living pleasantly which will be importantfor interpretingsome later statementsin the argument.See n. II below. 5 I thus think that 2 and 3 are more immediatelyhedonisticthan Taylor(p. 164)suggests. At first sight goods other than pleasureand evils other than pain are not ruled out, but if they are intended to have some weight in determining whether a life of exactly equal pleasureand pain (a mere theoreticalpossibility,surely)is good or bad, and can affect the degree of the goodness or badness of a life beyond its degree of pleasure and pain, then surely a largequantityof such evils could suffice to make a slightlypleasantlife bad, and a large quantityof goods a slightlypainful life good. But 2 and 3 do not allow this; hence it is likelierthat they do not envisage goods other than pleasureand evils other than pain. 6 That is, a good whose attainment constitutesliving well or being happy, and an evil whose incurrence constitutes living badly. The Euthydemusdefines happiness as the possession of good(s), 278e; and the Meno identifies such possession as the object of desire, 77b-78b. 4 should thus be read as stating, not merely that living pleasantly is a good thing and living unpleasantlya bad thing, but that they are that good and that evil whose possession is constitutiveof happinessor misery,as requiredby the interpretation of 2 and 3 given above. I On this basis Crombie (p. 240) settles for a prohedonistreadingof the Protagoras,and Sullivan adopts the view that Socrates is consciously and deliberately assuming the hedonisticposition, but is doing so ironically(pp. 21-2). 8 The diagnostic readingof these questions is confirmed at 352a2-6. Using the image of the medical examiner, Socrates interprets the discussion at 351b-e as an attempt to determine"how (Protagoras)stand(s)with regardto the pleasant and the good" (a7). 9 That some pains are good is stated in 6, a proposition which Socrates links with 5. Protagorasdoes explicitly say "that some pains are not bad" (at 6) presumablythereby accepting6. 10 This view is explicitlyassignedto the many later(at 353cff.) where Socratesshows that though it appears to be a denial of hedonism it can yet be construedas consistent with hedonism, and it is only on such a constructionthat the many are allowed to maintainthe view, given their hedonistic criteria of evaluations. Here, however, Socrates presses Protagorasto deny it, without allowing him to consider its hedonisticconstruction. 11 Thus 7 cannot be used to defend antihedonismby claimingthat it allows pleasureto be a good, one of a pluralityof goods, as Vlastos does (1969, pp. 76-8 and n. 24). In context, the purpose of 7 is not to state that pleasant things are good qua pleasant whereas other things may be good qua something else as well, but that all pleasantthings,whetherthey are praiseworthyor not, are good merely qua pleasant, and not qua pleasant in some specific way. Goods other than pleasure and evils other than pain have already been

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eliminated from considerationin the discussion(cf. nn. 5 and 6 above). The use of xn'O" . . . xorrnTOro (c4) and xamW'oov . .. (xarr TooGo'Tov to be supplied before xax6, c6) suggests both a qualitative and a quantitativecorrelationbetween being pleasant and being good: things are good in the veryrespectin which they are pleasant,and to the very degreeto which they are pleasant.Since other goods and evils do not play any partin the argument, 7 can be taken in a strongsense: things are good only in the respectin which, and to the degree to which, they are pleasant;bad only in the respectin which,and to the degree to which, they are painful. A more explicit way of asserting the identity of goodness and pleasure could hardly be found, and Protagorasis not confused (pace Vlastos, ibid.)in taking 7 to be a statementof that identity,at e4-6. 12 See e.g., Taylor, p. 166,sub 351c2-3 and 351c4. 13 See Sullivan, p. 21 subfin. 14 See Vlastos, ibid.;Cf. n. I I above. 15 Protagoras' contempt for the many has been in evidence since 317a; cf. 352e3,4,and 353a7,8. His hesitation to dissociate himself from the views of the many (a hesitation explicable by what we know of his epistemology)is clear at 333c; cf. 359c. 16 The introductory clause at c4, "kyQ y&pXiyw"cannot here be read as introducinga statement expressing the speaker'sview, for it introducesa direct question and not an indirectstatement,as that readingwould require. 17Taylor (p. 176) misses this backwardreferenceof the clause. He finds (b) "less attractive" than (a) but also thinks that "on either reading the sentence presentsthe difficulty that it asserts a unanimity between Socrates and Protagoraswhich is not justified by anythingsaid previously."He does not say why he thinksthis is true for (b). "8Thegerundivesexpress moral or prudentialnecesity, not psychologicalnecessity.See Taylor, pp. 189-190;Dyson, p. 33. 19 For my account of the natureof the absurdityand its location in the text, see Zeyl. 20 In case one is tempted to think that Socratesdoes include himself,as shown by his use of 'p.ivin ". . . Niq&vetv.. .", it should be pointed out that this dative is possessiveand modifies aT-rqpia To0 Iov, as it clearly does at 356e5. 21 It is not clear whetherEfV,L here indicatespredicationor identity. Identitystatements about the good sometimes lack the article, as, e.g., at Philebus 11b4. The absence of the articlemay be explained by the monistictendencyof Greekeudaimonism:if somethingis proposed as good in the sense that it provides the standard whereby other things are judged good, then given that tendency,it is the only such good or the good. This exclusive use of the predicatewas alreadyin evidence, I believe, at 35 Ic I (= 4 above). In any case, in the present passage the sophists'assent is taken as an acceptanceof hedonism,for the assent is recalled at 360a3 as implying acceptanceof the view that if anythingis praiseworthyand good, it is pleasant. 22 This answersa question raisedby Taylor,p. 201 sub 358a1-5. 23 The protestoccurredat 351c1,2. Taylor (pp. 201-2) rightlyconcludes that Protagoras must have changedhis mind duringthe precedingargument,at the pointwhere the many were supposed to be persuaded that they accept no other standardof goodness than pleasure. But Protagorasneed not have believed that Socrateswas trying to prove the hedonistic thesis; he may simply have realized that he had no altemative standardof goodness to propose,whetheron the many'sbehalf or on his own. 24 The inclusion of belief in the statementof the paradox,when the precedingargument concerned only the "powerof knowledge"is puzzling. For my accountof the puzzle see Zeyl.

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25

Vlastos, 1969, pp. 83-4. Vlastos makes the Protagorasargumentdepend on the argument from (S1)-(S4). For my criticism,see n. 33 below. 26 Two auxiliary premises are needed to get the entailment: (I) If X and Y are both means to one's welfare (= contributeto one's welfare) and one knows that X contributes more to one's welfare than Y, one will want X more than Y; and (2) X is better than Y if and only if X contributes more to one's welfare than Y. These auxiliary premises may easily be granted Socrates, given the logical structureof his eudaemonism: if welfare is the only thing desired for itself (S3) then the degree of one's desire for anything else is commensuratewith the extent of the contributionone believes the thing to make to one's welfare; and one's criterion for judging one thing to be better than another is just the difference in the extent of their contributions. 27 As Irwin has noticed, p. 308, n. 13.2, the argument from (SJ)-(S4) is related to the argumentat Meno 77b-78b. I am indebted to Irwinfor an appreciationof the inadequacy of such an argument in the presentcontext. 28 (S3) is never doubted by a Socratic interlocutor,and Socratesthinks that it would be silly to doubt it, Euthydemus 278e3-6; cf. Meno 78a4,5. It expresses the central thesis of Greek eudaemonism. 29 Given the explanation, "because the agent is overcome by pleasure",the argumentis not effective againsta non-hedonisticopponent who merelyrecognizespleasureto be one good among others (contraVlastos, 1969,pp. 86-7). The only way a non-hedonistcould explain the agent's defeat by pleasureas defeat by a good would be to say that this good differed qualitatively from that of the rejected option as well as quantitatively. But Socratesexpressly disallows any criterionother than quantity to determine the "worthiness" of the goods in question (355d6-e2; 356a1-5), and this a non-hedonistwould not accept. 30 Note that Socrates does not take Protagoras up on his offer to "examine"the issue of the identity of pleasureand the good (35 1e3-7), and with good reason.If Socratesis not a hedonist then to argue for the identity explicitly would be to compromise his nonhedonism, and to argue against it would underminehis own argumentagainstakrasia. 31 Protagoras'acceptance of the "power of knowledge" (352c8-d3) is hardly consistent with his own non-cognitiveview of virtue (his notion of "teaching"is quite unsocratic:it appearsto be little more than social conditioning;cf. 322d-326e),expressedmost recently at 351b 1,2. He is persuadedby Socrates'rhetoricaltourdeforce on behalf of the power of knowledge,which is not so much Socrates'own impassioneddoxology to knowledgeas a deliberate rhetorical(!) device aimed at securing Protagoras'assent to a position with which he ought to disagree. Note that in accepting it Protagorasappeals, not to the relation of that thesis to his other beliefs, but to his personal position and interests.In ought to accept, Socrates making"the many"bear the burdenof views which Protagoras creates an "alter tu" for Protagoras.This is an ingenious dialectical maneuver whose advantagesshould be obvious. 32 The legitimacy of the substitutionshas been questioned by Taylor, pp. 180-181.For a criticismof Taylor, see Zeyl. 33 For a development and defense of this view of the absurdityagainst other accounts, see Zeyl. I must mention here Vlastos'account (1969), for his view of the absurdityleads him to construe the argument in the Prt. as dependent on the argumentfrom (SI)-(S4). The absurdity,on his view, is that the many's explanation of akrasia characterizesthe agent as choosing knowinglygreaterevils as the price for lessergoods. I believe that this is

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wrong (see also Taylor, p. 185, Irwin, p. 308, n. 12), for if the many's explanation of akrasia is on analysis found to be a knowingchoice of greaterevils, it is hardto see how it is on analysissupposed to be ignorance,as the argumentrequires.Even if Vlastosis right, however, it is not at all clear that the argument from (S1)-(S4) could be persuasive without begging the question. 34 Grote, p. 314. Cf. ibid.,"Throughout all the Platoniccompositions,there is nowhereto be found any trainof argumentmore direct,more serious,and more elaborate,than that by which Sokrateshere proves the identityof the good with pleasure,or pain with evil (p. 351 to end)." 35 Hackforth, p. 41: "Socrates originally propounds the doctrine and propounds it seriously . . ."; Dodds, p. 21, n. 3: "The dialogue contains no hint that the assumptionis made merely for the sake of argument. .. 36 This argumenthas been widely used by prohedonists: see Grote, pp. 314-5; Hackforth, p. 41; Dodds, p. 21, n. 3; Irwin,p. 309, n. 13. 37 Prohedonistsregularly underratethe irony of the passage; cf. nn. 34 and 35 above. Although I do not accept the view that Socrates is explicitly representinghimself as a hedonist, but only ironically(Sullivan'sview), the irony in the passage is inescapable to one not already partialto a prohedonistview. Socraticirony(if not sarcasm)is seldom so blunt as it is at 357e, where Socrateschides the many for failing to purchase(!) a sophistic (!) education. "This is more than an ironical aside in an otherwise straightforward at all"(O' Brien,p. exposition: it is rathera clue that Socratesis not being straightforward 138). 38 So Taylor, p. 170,arguesfor distinguishing the thesishe takesSocratesto be endorsing in the Protagorasfrom that which he attacksin the Gorgias.And Crombiewrites,p. 248, ". . . Even if at the (probablyearly) date at which he wrote the GorgiasPlato had thought that it was in one sense true to say that all pleasantthings are good, it would have suited his purpose better to stressthe sense in which this is false." 39 The similaritiesare noted by Adam and Adam, p. 000. 40 Irwin, p. 93. Irwin's position has been criticized by Vlastos in the Times Literary Feb. 22, 1978,and in subsequentcorrespondence. Supplement, 41 The temptation to credit Socrateswith a rarefiedhedonism, such that only the pleasure experiencedin virtuousaction,etc. ispleasurein an acceptablesense must be resisted, since it finds no supportin the Protagorasand seems to be rejectedby Socrates'objection to Protagoras' qualification that only pleasure at praiseworthy things counts in allow determiningthe goodness of a life (35 lc 1,2;cf. I (a) above). Nor will the Protagoras a pluralityof ultimategoods (pleasureand virtue) if Socratesbelieves with the many that there is no other standardof goodness than pleasure(353c9-354e2). 42 Adam and Adam, p. xxxii; Taylor, p. 210. 43 Gulley, p. II 13f. 44 Research on this subject was begun during a seminar sponsored by the National Endowmentfor the Humanitiesin the summerof 1978,and the paperwas writtenduring the tenureof a JuniorFellowship at the Center for Hellenic Studies.I wish to thank both institutionsfor theirsupport.I am especiallygratefulto ProfessorGregoryVlastosfor his criticismand encouragement.

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