Simon Kitson, 'Rehabilitation and Frustration: the experience of Marseille Police Officers after the Liberation', Journal of Contemporary

History, Vol 33,

No 4, pp 621-638

Simon Kitson is Director of Research at the University of London Institute in Paris

Journal ofContemporory History Copyright © 1998 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 33(4), 621-638.

[0022-O094( 19981 0)33:4;621-638;006651]

Simon Kitson

Rehabilitation and Frustration: The Experience of Marseille Police Officers after the Liberation

The Marseille police force, weakened and unpopular in the aftermath of the nazi occupation which had left a legacy of hatred, appalling living conditions, high crime rates, public order difficulties, concerns over national security and a desire to punish those who had compromised themselves by complicity with the enemy, was faced with considera ble difficulties, In this context, forces both within and outside the police conjoined to assure a relatively rapid rehabilitation of the institution, a rehabilitation which ultimately failed to overcome certain frustrations in both the personal and professional domains.

Given that, since the second half of 1942, reports on the attitude of the police had consistently indicated considerable disaffection with Vichy and widespread sympathy with the Resistance, it should come as no surprise to learn that the police did nothing to protect the Vichy government during the insurrection which was launched in Marseille on 21 August 1944. Instructions from the fascist Minister of the Interior, Joseph Darnand, ordering the forces of order to establish pockets of 'resistance' (flots de resistance) to protect the state from those who would overthrow it, went unheeded.' But it should not be inferred from this that the police unanimously engaged in the insurrection. Many simply failed to show up for work, taking sick leave, and seeking shelter where they could find it. Others were disarmed by Resistance groups who thought that they could make better use of the weapons.' In any event, the insurrectionary period in Marseille did not see the same co-operation between

1 For Darnand's instructions: H.R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis (Oxford 1993), 198; Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone (henceforth AD BDR) M6 11084b,

2 For accounts of police activity during the insurrection: Combattre, bebdomadaire mustd des amis des FTPF, special issue 'L'insurrecrion de Marseille, aout 1944', undated but probably November 1944; Rouge-Midi, 'La Police avec nous', 26/8/44; the assessment of communist deputy Jean Crisrofol at a meeting on 3111145 in Maurice Agulhon and Fernand Barrat, Les CRS it Marseille, 1944-47 (Paris 1971), 91. For the activity of the GMR from Marseille see the oral evidence of Joseph Bronzini, Georges Vidal and Marcel Parodi, presented in appendices of my thesis:

Simon Kitson, 'The Marseille Police in their Context from Popular Front to the Liberation', D.Phil., Sussex 1995; Revue du Tarn, no. 134 (Summer 1989), 297-309; Archives Nationales (henceforth AN) 72AJ 198, Redan, Souvenirs de fa Resistance dans le Departement du Tarn, 1944; AD BDR 56W 39; 'Bulletin d'information du Cornite Departemental de Liberation de Rumilly', I'AgricuIteur Savoyard, 1619/44.

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police and Resistance that was witnessed in Paris. In the capital the police had been given the responsibility of defending their headquarters, the Prefecture de Police.3 In Marseille they were given no such role, which would have easily established their participation in the minds of the public. Nonetheless, 30 members of the forces of order were killed fighting for the Liberation, accounting for about one third of all the casualties suffered by the armed groups of the Resistance, Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (FFI). The communist newspaper Rouge-Midi insisted that the behaviour of the vast majority of the Marseille police during the insurrection was beyond the slightest reproach. But this information was contained in a small article lost amongst others praising the activity of a number of professional groupings, and was rapidly contradicted by less flattering assessments of police participation. Their inability to establish insurrectionary credentials similar to those of their Parisian counterparts made it more difficult for the Marseille police to improve their image and hence to impose their authority.

The poor image of the police in provincial France was partly derived from traditional hostility to the forces of order. There was a widely-held belief that the police in general were corrupt and self-interested. It is significant that documents of the Resistance concerning police involvement with its organizations frequently showed scepticism as far as the motives behind police resistance were concerned. In addition, there was hostility to the way in which the state had traditionally used its police force as an instrument of political oppression. It was no coincidence that it was the Renseignements Generaux (RG) branch, specializing in political policing, and the Groupes Mobiles de Reserve (GMR), specializing in the maintenance of public order, which were singled out for the most criticism at the Liberation. During the Occupation, political oppression by the state had reached new heights. Both Vichy and the Germans had asked police forces to perform a political role: chasing Jews, rounding up those required for the labour draft or arresting resisters. Many police officers had sought to undermine these orders, but police resistance often took the form of exaggerated displays of zeal. This was particularly the case with regard to the round-up of recruits for the labour draft, in the course of which arrests of workers were not infrequently carried out amongst those whom the police knew were actually exempt from the labour draft and who were subsequently released. This both relieved hierarchical pressure on policemen by producing results, however illusory, and satisfied their desire to have

3 About the Parisian police in the insurrection see: Georges Cogniot, 'Pour l'ordre public', l'Humanite, 30/8/44, 1; Marcel Cachin, 'L'epopee de Paris', l'Humanite, 30/8/44, 1; declarations of Georges Bidault, 'La premiere manifestation officielle de la liberation', Combat, 24/8/44, 2; 'Communique - Ie CNR felicite les defenseurs de la Prefecture de Police', l'Humanite, 24/8/44; Peter Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy (New York 1968), 83-4; Claude Angeli and Paul Gillet, La Police dans fa politique, 1944-54 (Paris 1967), 139; Simon Kitson, 'The Police in the Liberation of Paris' in H.R. Kedward and Nancy Wood (eds), The Liberation of France, Image and Event (Oxford 1995).

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nothing to do with political measures of this nature. But the side-effect was to undermine further the image of an already tainted police. The general euphoria surrounding the Liberation encouraged the belief that it was possible to start afresh and to establish services genuinely concerned with the interests of the public.'

Beyond their moral bankruptcy, the police were also physically unable to carry out all the tasks they were being asked to fulfil, Most police stations had not evolved from the flea-ridden hovels where policemen had been expected to work in the 1930s. An inspection conducted at the beginning of 1944 revealed that many were in a deplorable state, had little furniture and had frequently been requisitioned without being adapted to their new usage. The police station in the Ist arrondissement was a former bar, and an unsuspecting passer-by might have assumed that that was still its function as the bar sign continued to hang above its entrance. Its 16th arrondissement counterpart had previously been used as a butcher's shop and still had the hooks hanging from the ceiling. Nothing had been done since the Liberation to remedy this situation. In fact, the state of police buildings had deteriorated yet further. The greater part of the central police station had been engulfed in the flames of a mysterious fire during the battle for Marseille.' The police also lacked means of communication and locomotion. Telegraphs and telephones were out of action in the first few weeks of September. The Police Secours service, which was expected to intervene in the event of accidents, possessed only one vehicle.' Moreover, the instruments which police officers consider the basis of their authority, that is to say uniforms and weapons, were in even shorter supply than they had been before the war. The departmental Prefect complained in January 1945 that almost 600 police officers who had been disarmed by the Germans or the FFI still lacked the arms they needed. A number of Gardiens de la Paix were still waiting for a uniform a year after the Liberation.'

4 'Les dissous', La Marseillaise, quotidien d'information du Front National, 19110/44; H. Buisson, La Police, son histoire (Paris 1958), 265; Madeleine Baudoin, Histoire des Groupes Francs (MUR) des Boucbes-du-Rhone (Paris 1962), 45. For a further discussion of this question see Simon Kitson, 'La reconstitution de la Police a Marseille (aout 1944-fevrier 1945)', Provence Historique, no. 178 (October 1994), 498-500. As concerns the optimism of the population see Pierre Laborie, 'Opinion et representations - la Liberation et l'image de la Resistance', Revue d'Histoire de la 2" guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains, no. 131 (Iuly 1983), 65-91.

5 For the development of the question of police buildings see: L'Etatiste, no. 122 (june 1939), 1, 'La reorganisation ii Marseille'; Centre d'Arc hives Contemporaines (CAC) 860679, art 4, Ccntrole des Commissariats d'arrondissements de la ville de Marseille, rapport no 164, 31/3/44; AD BDR M6 11560, Secretaire General pour la Police a M. le Comrnissaire Regional de la Republique, no. 25 Pol, 29/8/44; AD BDR 23J3, Le Secretaire General pour la Police au Directeur General de la Surete Nationale, 'Situation des fonctionnaires de Police', undated (September 1945?).

6 For problems of communication and locomotion: Pierre Guiral, Liberation de Marseille (Paris 1974),172; 'Un probleme urgent: il nous but une Police', Le Provencal, 6/2/45.

7 For weapons and uniforms: AN FIC III 1210, Rapport mensuel du Prefer, 15/1-15/2/45; 'Un probleme urgent', op. cit.; 'La grande pitie de la Police', Le Provencal, 24/9/45.

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Police manpower was also a serious problem. The local authorities complained that manpower had considerably decreased since the Liberation, due to a large number of police officers leaving the force, including those who had been suspended or removed as alleged collaborators. Commissariats in the 5th, 13th, 15th and 24th arrondissements found themselves without commissaires in November owing to the removal from office of their incumbents. Others left the force because they had joined it in 1943 or 1944 simply to escape the forced labour draft and now had no desire to pursue a police career. Owing to poor working conditions, many of the best elements of the police sought more lucrative posts in industry or commerce. Attempts were made to limit this desertion by refusing to authorize resignations. But these backfired. Those who could not resign had little choice but to behave in a way that would lead to their being sacked - by taking unauthorized leave of absence, by turning up scruffily dressed or by being generally disobedient. Vacancies thus created were rarely filled. A press campaign in October 1944 inviting applications to the force produced only five candidates. In December, there were 51 new recruits as opposed to 84 resignations. The authorities explained the lack of response to the recruitment drive by the insufficiency of the salary offered compared to the cost of living and the effort demanded. To this reason must be added the poor public image of the force and uncertainty over its future. The resultant shortages of manpower were said to be such that the Marseille police needed some 2000 new officers. To make matters worse, a proportion of the existing manpower was diverted away from police tasks to administrative duties.'

These shortages were all the more noticeable owing to the wide range of demands on police services. Administrative reports traditionally underlined the difficulty of policing a city like Marseille. Made up of 111 districts, many of which resembled villages more than the districts of a city, Marseille spread out like a huge sprawling mass. Its administrative surface area of 23,000 hectares was five times that of Lyons and nearly three times that of Paris, but its police force was less than a sixth of that of the capital. The particular character of the city came largely from its status as France's largest port and brought with it all the problems of policing traditionally associated with ports. The period following the Liberation added new difficulties for the police. They were confronted with a particularly high level of common law crimes. Muggings were commonplace. Armed robberies against shops and warehouses became daily occurrences. This was usually attributed to the lowering of morality associated with wars, but other factors such as poverty, the severe

8 AN F1C III 1210, Rapport mensuel du Prefer, 15/1-1512145; AN F1a 4023, Rapport de I'IGSA, 'Debats sur la Police', 15110/44; AD BDR M6 14621, Commissaire Divisionnaire RG a M le Chef Service Regional des RG, 23/11/44; AD BDR 23J3, Le Secreta ire General pour la Police au Directeur General de la Surete Nationale, 'Situation des fonctionnaires de Police', op. cit., 'Un probleme urgent', op. cit., 'Les policiers feront-ils greve?', La liberte de Nice et du Sud-Est, 8/9/45; Jean Cristofol at a meeting on 31/1/45 in Agulhon and Barrat, Les CRS a Marseille, 1944-47, op. cit., 91.

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shortages, the ready availability of guns and poor street-lighting also played a role."

Besides coping with alarming trends in criminality, the police had to maintain public order and carry out a range of sensitive political duties. Some form of purge among the population was inevitable. The fierce repression of the Occupation period had fostered a desire for revenge on the Germans and their accomplices. When nazi atrocities such as the shooting on 18 July of 38 leading Resistance figures and their burial in a mass grave at Signes (Var) Came to light after the Liberation, they served to pour oil on these flames. Vichy had divided the French, thereby magnifying the phobia of an <enemy within'. This phobia was coupled with the need to be vigilant for reasons of national security, because although Marseille was libetated in August 1944, the war dragged on into May 1945. Many collaborators had simply gone into hiding in the region or had joined the FFI, hoping either to regain lost credit by lastminute Resistance activity or to undermine these organizations from within. The danger represented by internal enemies was highlighted by those members of the fascist political grouping, the Parti Populaire Francais, who took to the roofs that summer and operated as snipers against celebrating crowds. It was not until 6 September that the last of these sharp-shooters was shot down from a roof in the Oddo district and burnt, to the jubilant cheers of the crowd. Other collaborators had fled to neighbouring fascist countries and some had enrolled in espionage training schools in Germany and parachuted back into France in December, feeding public rumour and the fear of the Fifth Column."

9 For traditional problems of policing Marseille: D. Bleitrach et al., Classe ouuriere et Socialdemocratie: Lille et Marseille (Paris 1981),37; R. Colornbani and Ch.·E. Loo, C'itait 'Marseille d'abord' (Paris 1992), 11-22; Philippe Sanmarco and Bernard Morel, Marseille, l'endroit du decor (Aix 1985), 13-19. For problems particular to the Liberation: 'Pourquoi ne pas reeclairer toutes les rues de la cite', Le Provencal, 7/1/45; 'Un probleme urgent', op. cit., 'La grande pitie de la Police', op. cit.; 'Crimes, vols et delits sont en province en progression constante depuis 1939', Le Monde,27/9/46.

10 For need for purge and fear for national security: AD BDR M6 11560, Ie Directeur General de la Surete Nationale a M. Ie Secretaire General pour la Police, 29/11/44; AN FIC III 1210, Rapport mensuel du Prefer Departernental, 15/1-1512145; Guiral, Liberation de MarseiiJe, op. cit., 139, AN Fl a 3347, Valabregue, 'Memoire sur la reconstitution de la Police', note adressee a M. le Ministre de l'Interieur, 29/11/44; Marcel Cachiri, 'Pour une epuration complete', l'Humanite, 8/10/44, 1; 'Epuration jusqu'au bout', Rouge·Midi, 31/8/44; 'Ou on est l'epuration', Rouge-Midi, 4/9/44; Philippe Buton, 'L'etar restaure', in J.·P. merna and F. Bedirida, La France des Annees Noires, vol, 2 (Paris 1993), 424; Guiral, Liberation de Marseille, op. cit.; Philippe Bourdrel, I:epuMtion sauuage, 1944-45, vol, 1 (Paris 1988), 109-216; Pierre Ricci, Vision et Sensibilite (Paris 1988), 91. For activity of collaborators against the Liberation: AD BDR M6 11560, le Cornmissaire Regional de la Republique ii MM les Prefers Departernentaux, no. 406XA, 27/12144; AN Fl a 3349, dossier XV D3, M. le Directeur de la Surveillance du Territoire a M. le Directeur General de la Surete Nationale, no. D 1776115/STA, 20/12/44; Adrien Tixier's comments quoted in Claude Angeli and Paul Gillet, La Police dans fa politique (1944-1954) {Paris 1967), 121-2; Paul Jankowski, Communism & collaboration {New Haven 1989), 137-42; jean-Andre Vaucouret, Un homme politique conteste, thesis (Aix 1978), 584.

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Given the multiplicity and complexity of police tasks and the general weakness of the force, it is not surprising that the police were not automatically given a monopoly over policing. No one was contesting their power to arrest criminals. But in the domains of political policing, purging the population and assuring public order, other contenders existed. One possibility would have been to make use of the armed forces to ensure public order. Raymond Aubrac, the first Commissaire de fa Republique, the Liberation's version of a Regional Prefect, was keen to avoid using the American army. De Gaulle had warned him against conceding any sovereignty to the Americans. Moreover, Aubrac was aware that American soldiers were proving to be more a source of disorder than a potential force of order and he was afraid that asking them to intervene might antagonize the population. As for the French army, its troops had headed north to continue the fight. Beyond military units there were also the parallel police organizations established by the Resistance. Even before the Germans had left, Resistance structures, imbued with the notion of serving the population, had begun to emerge. One such was the Milices Patriotiques. The project for these militias was launched from Moscow in August 1943, by the leader of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez. The first Mifices Patriotiques came into being the following spring with missions including the maintenance of public order and the defence of the life and property of French people against terror. Pierre Tissier, adviser to the Commissaire de fa Republique, underlined retrospectively that during the insurrection it was inevitable that parallel police units of this sort should make numerous arrests without reference to legal procedure. He justified this conclusion by quoting the exceptional circumstances. But the actions of the Milices Patriotiques and other para-police formations continued after the Liberation. For Tissier, this was normal, because the state authorities were not ready to assume this role themselves. The communists, who demanded a permanent status for these militias, justified their continued activity by stating the need to set an example to the official justice system and to allow the public itself to have a role in the purge process."

11 For the question of the military authorities: Guiral, Liberation de Marseille, op. cit., 111; Agulhon and Barrat, Les CRS a Marseille, 45; Charles-Louis Foulon, Le poauoir en province ala Liberation (Paris 1975), 207; Herbert R. Lottman, The Purge (New York 1986), 126; G.E. Maguire, Anglo-American Policy towards the Free French (London 1995), 137. For Milices Patriotiques and FFl: AN Fla 3348 Milices Patrlotiques; AN Fla 3349, Rapport de Pierre Tissier, 812145; AD BDR 23J3, undated police report entitled 'Difficultes rencontrees par la Police dans l'accomplissement journalier de sa tache depuis la Liberation'; Cachin, 'Pour une epuration complete', op. cit., 1; Agulhon and Barrat, Les CRS a Marseille, op. cit., 23; Georges Carrot, Le Maintien de l'Ordre en France au XX' siede (Paris 1990), 192-4; Gregoire Madjarian, Conflits, pouuoirs et societe a la Liberation (Paris 1980), 145-64; Jean-Paul Scot, 'Les pouvoirs d'Etat et I'action des communistes pour la "democratie agissante''', Cahiers d'Histoire de l'Institut Maurice Tborez, no. 8-9 (1974), 109; De Gaulle quoted in Henri Amouroux, Les reglements de comptes (Paris 1991), 148; Madeleine Baudoin, Temoins de la Resistance, thesis (Aix 1977),627; Philippe Buron, La France et les Francais de la Liberation (Paris 1984), 56; idem, Les lendemains qui decbantent (Paris 1993), 138-41; jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic (Cambridge 1987),

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The police argued that the existence of such parallel movements weakened their position still further by undermining their authority. The continuation of irregular arrests after the re-establishment of the regular state institutions called into question their ability to perform the tasks traditionally allotted to them. A police report dated 27 September 1944 concerning the kidnapping (and supposed execution) by the Milices Patriotiques of Marseille of the head of the FFI in Marignane (suspected of having belonged to the fascist organization, the Milice Francaise) makes explicit the frustration of one officer in such a case. The commissaire who wrote it claimed that although the police were in a position to establish who had carried out this execution, they had been pressured by more powerful forces into turning a blind eye to this abuse. Other types of direct attack on their authority were also registered. Policemen received tracts questioning their patriotism and instructing them to join the army. Officers walking the beat were insulted by resisters. A Gardien de la Paix who intervened in an incident between an officer of the FFl and an employee of the tramways found himself subject to the insults of the FFl officer who stated that for the award for the dirtiest race in existence the police were second only to toads. Other Gardiens complained of unprovoked attacks by Miliciens Patriotiques. The ultimate humiliation for police officers was their arrest by members of these popular movements. Besides the effect these movements were having on their authority, the police doubted the efficiency, objectivity and motivation of these forces in the tasks they had been assigned. It was claimed that many members of these organizations had a criminal record, poor Resistance credentials, lacked discipline, and were simply satisfying violent instincts or a desire for revenge on personal, political or class enemies. Police assessment in this respect was rapidly shared by both the public and a large contingent of the local Resistance."

By criticizing Resistance formations, the public was able to undermine their moral superiority and divert attention away from the fact that, despite massive hostility to Vichy and acts of complicity with the Resistance, the majority of the population had not actively engaged in Resistance activity in any com-

47-8; Riviere-Chalan (pseudo Vincent Raymond), Poliaer du pouuoir et marxisme, 1936-70

(Paris 1989). .

12 AN F1a 4023, Rapport de l'IGSA, 'Debars sur la Police', 15110/44; AD BDR M6 11560, Commissaire de Police Mobile a M. Ie Commissaire Principal de la ge Brigade, no. 18099 BRlREG, 27/9/44; AD BDR M6 11560, tract du Comite Departementale des Forces Unies de la Jeunesse Patriotique, undated but just after the Liberation; AD BDR M6 11560, rapport du Cornmissaire du 21e arrondissement au Secreraire General pour la Police, 6/11/44; AD BDR, M611560, Le Secretaire General pour la Police a M. Ie Commissaire Regional de la Republique, Marseille, 'La situation de la Police (rapport demande par M Juvenal, president du CDL)', no. 1200,30/9/44; AD BDR M6 11560, Gardien de la Paix Henri Roche a I'Officier commandant [a 11 e Compagnie, Corps Urbain de Marseille, 6112144; AD BDR 23J3, undated police report entitled 'Difficultes renconrrees par la Police dans I'accomplissement journalier de sa tache depuis la Liberation'; Guiral, Liberation de Marseille, op. cit., 113; Vaucouret, Un bomme politique conteste, op. cit., 584.

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mitted sense. This is not to say that Resistance hopes of creating a better society and a police force in the service of the population were not supported by the public. In the heady days of August 1944, nothing had seemed impossible; public optimism had been widespread. Opinion polls revealed that the population believed that the war would be over by Christmas. The march towards a better society seemed to be under way. However, the continuation of the war well into the next year, and the problems posed by rumours of the Fifth Column and the parachuting of German agents into France raised the question of French security. These security problems caused the focus to switch once again onto the police, who had experience of countering such threats. The non-return of plenty increased the daily reliance of the population on the black market, which became more or less accepted by the state authorities as the means of survival for many families, but with which the Milices Patriotiques attempted to interfere. The population criticized the attempts of these organizations to prevent them from buying black market cigarettes or food. Rumours were widespread concerning the participation of the Milices P atriotiques in thefts and killings which were more acts of personal vengeance than a means of protecting the population. The growth and manipulation of these rumours undermined the image of purity of the Resistance movements."

Resistance attitudes to the popular movements which they had spawned varied considerably. Some doubted the true credentials of their members, pointing to their recent adhesion to the Resistance or their ostentatious attitudes. For the non-Stalinist extreme left, the Milices Patriotiques became suspect - in the same way as the police - once they had developed into permanent para-police organizations. The communists and the Conseil National de fa Resistance (CNR) were the initial defenders of the Milices Patriotiques. When the Minister of the Interior, the socialist Adrien Tixier, announced on 29 October that no non-state police forces would be tolerated, the CNR, with communist support, protested that such a decision was impractical. Rather than dismantling the Milices, they simply changed their name to Gardes Civiques Republicaines. By January 1945, however, the communists had taken a different stand, with Maurice Thorez declaring that policing should be left in the hands of state authorities and therefore that the militias should be dissolved. The communists were undoubtedly responding to instructions from Moscow not to undermine French national unity. At the same time, like other political parries, they were vying to win as much power as possible, which ultimately meant infiltrating existing state structures rather than maintaining parallel forces which the public's demand for normalization were rendering superfluous. Ultimately, the abolition of these parallel police movements was

13 AD BDR M6 11560, Inspecteur de la Surete a M. Ie Cornrnissaire de Police, 5111144; IFOP opinion poll published in Liberation, 719/44, 1; Madajarian, Conflits, pouuoirs et societe a la Liberation, op. cit., 151; Laborie, 'Opinion et representations', op. cit., 65-91; Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy (Paris 1990), 34; Vaucouret, Un homme politique conteste, op. cit., 585; Jankowski, Communism & collaboration, op. cit., 143.

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carried out with the consent of the greater part of the Resistance in conformity with the wishes of the population. 14

Removing potential rivals was one step towards rehabilitation, but full rehabilitation was dependent on building police structures which inspired confidence. As early as 22 August 1944, Raymond Aubrac, as Commissaire de la Republique, tried to create a popular police force, the Forces Republicaines de Securite (FRS), under the control of the local state administration but derived from the armed elements of the internal Resistance. Recruiting their members from organizations such as the Milices Patriotiques, these units established themselves slowly during the month of September, reaching a peak of 3000 men. It was hoped that these FRS would put an end to some of the abuses committed by the militias. If successful in their mission they could project an image of the Resistance as the restorer of order and hence dispel the outlaw image of movements which had been forced to live clandestinely for the previous four years. At the same time they would assure the local authorities of a pseudo-police organization benefiting from sufficient credibility with Resistance movements to be unimpeded in the execution of delicate political missions. There was, however, no question of these forces replacing the regular police. Rather, they were to be subordinated to the traditional forces, their members being, in theory at least, placed directly under the orders of a Commissaire de Police. Moreover, it was specified that these forces were to be temporary, set up to help in the search for collaborators and the repression of the black market. By the end of December these units had made 1740 arrests. However, they cannot be considered a wholehearted success. They failed to put an end either to the militias, or to their autonomous police activities. There was doubt about the credentials of some who infiltrated these structures and they had to undergo purges of politically suspect elements within their own ranks. Collaboration with police services was far from perfect. The crimes committed by a fraction of the FRS in the operation of their duties enabled police officers to attach a criminal label to all these forces and to argue that the place for the FRS was in the Baumettes prison. 15

14 AN Fla 3347, Valabregue, 'Memoire sur la reconstitution de la Police', op. cit., AN Fla 3291 IV )-1, Rapport du Commissaire Regional, Marseille, 15/12/44; La Write, 15/11/44; Baudoin, Histoire des Groupes Francs (MUR), op. cit., 187; Yvan Craipeau, La Liberation confisquee (Paris 1978),58-9; Madjarian, Confiits, pouuoirs et societe ilia Liberation, op. cir., 148; G. Dupeux, La France de 1945 a 1965 (Paris 1969), 75; Carrot, Le Maintien de I'Ordre en France au XXe Siecle, op, cit., 213.

15 AD BDR M6 11557, L'officier de la paix de Ia 151 CRS a M. Ie Secreta ire General pour la Police, 3/4/45; AN FlC III 1210, Rapport Mensue! du Prefet Departemental, September 1944; AN Fl a 3349, Rapport de Pierre Tissier, 8/2/45; 'Creation des FRS pour la region de Marseille', Rouge-Midi, 4/9/44; Foulon, Le pouuoir en province a fa Liberation, op. cit., 233; Carrot, Le Maintien de I'Ordre en France au XXe Siecle, op. cit., 217-18. There were said to be 20,000 members of these MiNces patriotiques in the Bouches-du-Rhone as late as February 1945:

Madjarian, Conflits, pouuoirs et societe a la Liberation, op. cit., 147.

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A number of changes in more traditional police structures occurred after August 1944. The institutions directly inspired by Vichy were simply scrapped at the Liberation. However, new institutions were often basically superficial transformations of the old, or a synthesis of the old and the new, e.g. the Compagnies Republicaines de Securiu: (CRS), which replaced the FRS and the GMR. The new institution, which adopted the statutes of the Vichy public order force, the GMR, was to be traditional in its role and organization to encourage recruitment by offering security of employment in a stable institution. But the personnel was to be partially regenerated, with elements recruited from both the GMR and parallel police forces of the Resistance after a purge within both. The creation of the CRS was decided with particular speed. The original proposition, put forward by M. Valabregue of the Interior Ministry, was dated 29 November 1944. The decrees abolishing the GMR and establishing the CRS were published on 8 December. The Minister of the Interior, Adrien Tixier, had written that he wanted to act quickly so as to prevent any new discussion within the government or elsewhere. De Gaulle himself, who was on a visit to the Soviet Union, was not informed of this important decision until after its publication. The rapidity of this decision highlights the desire of the central government to control outlying regions and to be able to impose its authority on popular Resistance movements."

Creating a new police force also involved weeding out suspicious elements.

Pressure for a purge came from both external political forces, especially the local communist party, and forces within the police, particularly from the re-emerging police trade unions. Local police chiefs and senior members of the Resistance administration authorities underlined both the necessity of a purge and the urgency with which this filtering should take place. It was stressed that since the police represented authority it was important that they should set an example. Performing this operation quickly would allow the institution to return to its normal tasks as soon as possible. It would also give the officers remaining a feeling of professional security by letting them know that their jobs were now safe and that they could devote themselves entirely to the tasks in hand. In addition, a rapid purge would help to limit the extent to which an unofficial purge would be forced on the police from the outside. Despite the difficulties involved, the purge of the police in Marseille was carried out extremely rapidly. From 1942, resisters had begun to draw up lists of those who should be allowed to stay in the post-Liberation administration. As soon as the insurrection was launched, police officers began arresting suspect colleagues. A purge committee, comprising both representatives of local

16 AN Fla 3347, Valabregue, 'Mernoire sur la reconstitution de la Police', op. cit.; AN Fla 3347 XVA7, Note de Service de M. Tixier, Ministre de I'Interieur, 3/12144; AN Fla 3347, Minisrre des Finances a M. Ie Ministre de I'Interieur, no. 300, 13/1145; AN F1a 3291, dossier rv, J~1, Rapport de Raymond Aubrac, 15/12144; AN Fla 3349, Rapport de Pierre Tissier, 8/2/45; Buisson, La Police, son bistoire, op. cit., 282. Of 10,913 Gardiens and 313 Officers of the GMR in service on 1 August 1944, 5500 Gardiens (50.4 per cent) and 120 Officers (38.4 per cent) figured on the payrolls of the CRS on 15/1/45: Carrot, Le Maintien de l'Ordre en France au XXe Siecle, op. cit., 219 and 221.

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political movements and members of the police, was convened as soon as the Liberation was complete, and examined dossiers according to the dispositions of an ordinance of June 1944. The rapidity of the purge did not prevent it from being much more severe than that carried out in other state institutions. Out of 217 Marseille police officers whose activity was thought worthy of investigation between the Liberation and January 1945, there were 90 sackings, 16 obligatory retirements, 77 suspensions, 96 imprisonments and 26 referrals to the Court of Justice. The new chief of police in Marseille affirmed that in no other administration had a purge been carried out as rapidly or as thoroughly. The authorities underlined the fact that the punishments particularly affected the higher ranks of the police. The decrees of the Commissaire de la Republique leave little doubt on this point. Special editions of the Bulletin Officiel du Commissariat Regional de la Republique list the punishments meted out, from which it can be calculated that only 7 per cent of the decrees concerned Gardiens de la Paix. Of the three officials to have occupied the post of Intendant de Police in Marseille, the most senior local police post, only Robert Andrieu, an important member of a Resistance network, kept a position in the administration after the war. 17

The removal of members of the hierarchy created v~cancies for those who had participated in the Resistance. Etienne Mercuri was appointed as the new local police chief on 23 August 1944 and given the title Secreta ire General pour La Police. Born in Marseille in 1897, he entered the police in April 1920. His Resistance activity included helping the departure of Polish soldiers for England, fabricating false identity cards, sabotaging political missions and acting as an agent for information-gathering. His engagement in the Resistance dated from December 1942, when he joined the Alliance network. From July 1943 he also belonged to the police Resistance network: the reseau Ajax. His nomination to his post-Liberation function was proposed by both the local

17 Centre d' Archives Contemporaines (Fontainebleau), 790207, art. 1, Ie Secretaire General pour la Po [ice it M. Ie Directeur General de la Sfirete Nationale, no. 4693-xa, 20/5/45; AN F1a 3349, Rapport de Pierre Tissier, 8/2/45; AN Fla 4023, IGSA, 'Debars sur la Police', 15/10/44; AD BDR M6 11560, le Secretaire General pour la Police it M. Ie Commissaire Regional, 30/9/44; Raymond Aubrac in Le Provencal, 419/44; 'M. Raymond Aubrac donne Ie bilan de quatre sernaines d'epuration', La Marseillaise, quotidien d'information du Front National, 1110/44; Bulletin officiel du Commissariat regional de [a republique, 28/2/45. AD BDR M6 11560, Ie Secretaire General pour la Police it M. Ie Commissaire Regional, 30/9/44. Amicale des Anciens Fonctionnaires de la Police Francaise, La verite sur l'epuration de fa Police (Paris, nd), 9. Most historians agree concerning the severity of the police purge: Pascal Ory, 'Mythe et realite de l'epuration', Histoire, no. 144 (May 1991),67; Guiral, Liberation de Marseille, op. cit., 141. In a study of the situation in the Languedoc, Jacques-Augustin Bailly contrasts the situation within the police where the purge was extremely severe and that in the gendarmerie where professional solidarity was such that it limited the scope of the purge: J.-A. Bailly, La Liberation confisquee (Paris 1993),295-304; Philippe Randa, Dossier complet sur la Police (Paris 1988),24-5; Angeli and Gillet, La Police dans fa politique, op. cit., 26; Herbert R. Lottman, The Purge (New York 1986), 29; Bourdrel, L'epuration sauvage, op. cit., 118; Antoinette Vivaldi and Claude Coiffard, 'Contribution 11 l'histoire de l'epuration it Marseille, 1944-45', Master's dissertation [Aix-enProvence 1973-74), 84-5; Foulon, Le pouuoir en province a fa Liberation, op. cit., 162-3.

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underground Socialist Party and the reseau Ajax. To the post of Secretaire General Adjoint was appointed the charismatic figure of Xavier Culioli, Culioli had grown up in the Corsican village of Chera and entered the police in the 1920s with the active support of a socialist deputy in Marseille, after failing a medical to become a primary school teacher on the grounds that he was too thin. Like many Corsicans in Marseille, he had enjoyed friendly relations with one of the giants of local politics, Simon Sabiani. But when Sabiani drifted to the extreme right in 1934, Culioli cut off all contact. Henceforth, he devoted himself wholeheartedly to the Socialist Party, to free-masonry and his important activity in the local police trade unions. During the war he had maintained these links, attempted to reconstitute the trade unions which Vichy had dissolved and set about recruiting police resisters for local socialist militias. Further down the police hierarchy, many police resisters were also discovering promotional rewards for their recent activity,"

There is little doubt that, drawn from the Resistance, this new hierarchy was able to address the difficulties of the period with greater assurance and indeed to give a more favourable presentation of the police's recent past. In September 1944, at the request of the socialist head of the Comite Departemental de Liberation, the new Secretaire General pour la Police wrote a long report concerning the activity and attitude of the police during the Occupation. He described an institution which had remained fundamentally republican and stressed that the Occupation had been an extremely difficult period for police officers, that they counted a number of victims in their ranks and that they had played an active role in the Liberation. The police, he claimed, had been faced with the troubling question of whether to stay in their posts or resign, and if they decided on the former it was in accordance with Resistance instructions to stay in their posts to undermine Vichy from within. Much of what is said in this report mirrors basic truths. The Resistance had insisted that police officers stay in their posts; republicanism had not been extinguished in police ranks, despite Vichy, and the police had resented the fascist take-over of 1944. Nevertheless this report plays down the repressive role of the police, particularly by omitting to mention the arrest of Jews and communists. To reinforce the image of the police as a victim of the Occupation and an actor in the Resistance, seven of the streets renamed at the Liberation were given the names of police resisters, and the police established independent Resistance societies such as the Amicale des Anciens Resistants de la Police, established in Marseille on 26 April 1947.19

18 AD BDR M6 11636, Le charge de mission du Comrnissaire de la Republique it M. Ie Comrnissaire de la Republique, no. 2561, 6/10144; AD BDR 23J3, Attestation de Xavier Culioli, 18112145; AD BDR 23J3, Attestation de Horace Manicacci, Delegue Regional du Parti socialiste SFIO, 20/12145; AD BDR 23J3, undated document concerning the professional and resistance activity of Etienne Mercuri; Gabriel-Xavier Culioli, La terre des seigneurs (Paris 1986); Simon Kitson, 'The Marseille Police in their Context from Popular Front to liberation', D.PhiL (Sussex 1995); idem, 'Les Policiers Marseillais et Ie Front Populaire, 1936-38', Provence Historique (forthcoming) contains a number of references to Culioli's activity in the 1930s.

19 AD BDR M6 11560, Ie Secretaire General pour la Police a M. le Cornmissaire Regional,

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Although the police as an institution was rehabilitated fairly quickly, there remained a number of areas of frustration. The removal of parallel police movements such as the Milices Patriotiques had not solved all the problems of policing. For one thing, post-Liberation Marseille was starving. Supplies of basic commodities and foodstuffs remained disastrous well into 1946. Few French cities suffered as severely as Marseille in this respect. The city had no agricultural hinterland to provide adequate supplies of vegetables or meat and the dear blue waters of the Mediterranean lacked the plankton necessary to support marine life, obliging the city to import much of its fish stock from Atlantic ports. The availability of food thus became dependent on the efficiency of transport systems, which were virtually at a standstill. Much of the French railway network had been destroyed during the fighting of August 1944. The port of Marseille lay in ruins due to successive bombings by the Italians in 1940 and the Americans in 1943/44 and a systematic nazi attempt to destroy remaining installations during the battle for Marseille. Although reconstruction began extremely rapidly, much of the port's capacity was used for military transports, paying little attention to civilian needs. At the end of December 1944, an administrative report summarizing the situation claimed that of a list of essential foodstuffs, it was only with regard to butterfat and wine that ration tickets were honoured. A year later the population was still out in the streets demonstrating about the lack of food provision. The inadequacies of official food distribution forced the population to have recourse to an expensive black market system which had developed in the city since the pre-war period. The war had encouraged the flourishing of unofficial food networks and now the arrival of American troops added an extra dimension. The Americans were extensively engaged in the local black market, selling tins of food, coffee and bars of chocolate to the highest bidders. The black market represented a considerable headache for local police authorities, who were expected to arrest profiteers while at the same time allowing the commodities which they supplied to filter down to the population."

30/9/44; AD BDR 143W 36, Amicale des Anciens Resistants de la Police; Adrien Bles, Dictionnaire bistorique des rues de Marseille (Marseille 1989).

20 AD BDR 28J 215, Discours de Jean Crisrofol, lors de la visite de Vincent Auriol, 21/9/47; AD BDR 65/474, Note de l'Ingenieur du 3e arrondissement, 'Destructions causees par bombardements aeriens et par les troupes allemandes', 24/4/45; AD BDR M6 13300, Service deparrernental des RG, rapport du 2619/44; AN F1A 4023, Rapports du Commissaire Regional de Ja Republique, March 1945, June 1945, September 1945; AN FIC III 1210, Rapport du Prefer des Bouches-duRhone, 2112144 and 1512145; AN F1A 4023, Rapport du Commissa ire Regional de la Republique au Ministre du RavitailIement, 1411/45; AD BDR M14 5768, Rapport de l'Inspecrion du Travail, 5112144; AN F1A 4023, Rapport anonyme, 26112/44; Robert Mencherini, Uunion departementale CCT des Boucbes-du-Rhone de la Liberation a fa Scission, thesis (Aix 1984), 112-14 and 154; Robert Aron, France reborn (New York 1964), 343; Pierre and Marthe Massenet, Journal d'une longue nuit (paris 1971),277; Andre Kaspi, La Liberation de fa France (Paris 1995), 89; CHDGM, La guerre en Mediterranee. 1939,.-45 (Paris 1971), 461; Jean-Pierre Azema and Olivier Wieviorka, Les Liberations de la France (Paris 1993), 181; Patrice Liquiere, Restaurer, reformer, agir (Paris 1995), 97.

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American troops were also largely held responsible for the massive growth in prostitution at the Liberation. Marseille had long held an international reputation for prostitution. To those earning their living from this profession the stationing of 180,000 American troops in the city and its surroundings represented something of a godsend. The problem from a police point of view was not just that there was a growth in prostitution, but also that it was the wrong type of prostitution. The police divided prostitutes into three groups. The first were those who worked in officially tolerated brothels which were a logical development of the 1863 decision to restrict prostitution to certain arrondissements in the city. This type of prostitution was in decline. In 1939 there had been 31 officially tolerated brothels. By the Liberation this number had fallen to 24, largely because six had been destroyed by the Germans when they razed the old quarters of Marseille in 1943 and a Vichy law of June 1942 had forbidden the creation of new brothels or their transfer to other sites. The second group were known as 'rilles en carte': isolated prostitutes who since 1821 had been registered and expected to undergo bi-weekly medical examinations. Finally, there were the 'c/andestines': those who were not registered or controlled medically. Seven hundred and six clandestine prostitutes had been arrested in 1937; 871 in 1943 and 4754 in 1945. If the police disapproved of the decline of officially tolerated brothels and the rise of clandestine prostitution, this was for two reasons. First, the police relied on the information gathered in the brothels, which were after all important meeting-places for criminals. Second, clandestine prostitutes presented a greater risk of infection from sexually transmitted diseases and would solicit openly in public places, raising the eyebrows of the moralists. There was considerable public pressure to clear prostitution off the streets."

Closely related to the question of prostitution in Marseille was that of gangsterism, which also thrived during the period immediately after the Liberation. It is usual to divide the mainly Corsican gangsters, who had earned the city the nickname of 'Marseille-Chicago' in the 1930s, into two camps, according to their behaviour during the Occupation. On the one hand were those, like the infamous Carbone and Spirito, who put themselves at the service of the nazi occupiers following the logic of their previous political support for Simon Sabiani, the local leader of the pseudo-fascist group, the Parti Populaire Francais (PPF). On the other, there were the Guerini and Renucci brothers who had been electoral agents of left-wing candidates in the 1930s and pursued this logic into resistance. Such a division is undoubtedly an over-simplification. Many gangsters had indeed adopted unambiguous collaborationist positions but several of those who now paraded under the flag of the Resistance had taken a much less clear-cut stance. The Guerini brothers,

21 For the post-Liberation situation see: AD BDR 23J3, Le Commissaire de Police, chef du service des recherches de la securite publique a M. Ie Cornmissaire Central, no. 4321, GVLA, 8/2/46; Foulon, Le pouvoir en province il la Liberation, op. cit., 207. Foe the pre-war situation, J. Dorian, Belles de Lune (Paris 1935); Edmond Jaloux, Marseille (Paris 1926),45; J.-M. Berliere, La Police des Mceurs sous La Troisieme Republique (Paris 1992), 102.

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who experienced the most phenomenal rise to fame and glory after the Liberation, typify this ambiguity. The eldest brother., Antoine, had kept his bars and night-clubs open during the war and had entertained German and collaborationist clients, generally carrying on business as usual, although at the same time sheltering British airmen. Antoine was arrested at the Liberation before a series of contacts played in his favour. His more charismatic brother, Barthelemy, popularly known as Meme, had attacked convoys of Miliciens, liquidated nazi spies for the French secret services, sheltered Jewish children and even been rewarded with a Resistance medal. Those gangsters now benefiting from an image as 'resisters' could not only cash in on the possibilities offered by the black market or prostitution, but were also given the opportunity to buy bars and night-clubs previously owned by 'collaborationist' gangsters. Moreover, contacts made in the Resistance could frequently serve to strengthen the position of underworld leaders when faced with the administrative authorities. When the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhone attempted to have the Renucci brothers banned from the department, he received letters pleading in their favour from two of the highest-ranking officials in the French police, who underlined their Resistance credentials, despite the Prefect's evidence that the Renucci brothers had entertained close relations with the PPF during the war,"

A number of police officers had hoped that the post-Liberation police would be able to withstand the temptations of corruption offered by the local underworld. It is significant that some police resisters had chosen noms de guerre making explicit reference to purity, such as 'l'incorruptible' or 'le pur', suggesting a reaction against the corrupt image of the Marseille police in the 1930s and the hope that out of resistance would come a new clean police force. After the Liberation, political forces within the police continued to stress the need for purity. One of the principal demands of police trade unions in May 1945 was to combat the criminality of the police themselves. A communist grouping within the police operated under the title 'Groupe de policiers republicains pour Marseille propre, debarrassee de taus Ies gangsters'. Needless to say, such optimism proved somewhat idealistic as corruption was widespread. Some officers hired out their uniforms to bank robbers. Others took part actively in thefts or bribery. For both communists and Gaullists, two words were almost synonymous with corruption: one was 'Corsican' and the other 'socialist'. Since the police hierarchy was firmly in the hands of representatives of both these groupings, it should come as little surprise that the origins of corruption should be traced back to them. In fact, Culioli had taken a hard line against the Marseille socialists' tolerance of corruption. But he was not totally above the spirit of the clan and no sooner was he installed in office than he was being asked to intervene on behalf of a Corsican relative who had shot a communist. Although Mercuri was born in Marseille, he also had Corsican

22 AD BDR M6 11557, Le Commissaire de Police judiciaire a M. Ie Commissaire Principal, Chef de la ge Brigade regionale de Police judiciaire, no. 386 Br Reg, 15/1/46; Roger Colombani, Flies et Voyous (Monte Carlo 1985).

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roots and serious, though probably exaggerated, doubts were cast with regard to his probity, especially when it was revealed that he had escaped the clutches of the Gestapo in 1944 thanks to a tip-off from PPF gangster Charles Palmieri. To add to suspicions, the presidency of the police purge commission was entrusted to the Corsican socialist politician, Horace Manicacci, who was married to the cousin of the Guerini brothers. The hierarchy itself put the blame for corruption on the poor quality of recruitment and the inadequate level of wages. This was a baton the socialist newspaper Le Provencal took up, claiming that, given the appalling levels of police pay, what was surprising was not that there were corrupt police officers but rather that there were any honest ones."

The question of wages was at the heart of police frustration in postLiberation France. Le Provencal asked how a society could expect a decent police force if it failed to show it recognition. In order to earn a decent wage and meet the needs of their families, many officers took a second job outside their official working hours. Policemen found employment as concierges in apartment blocks or as barmen. The increased tiredness this caused undermined their ability to do their police work, to say nothing of the effect it had on public opinion. For categories of workers with no direct access to the food production process, lack of wages made it particularly difficult to obtain essential foodstuffs. It was true that certain branches of the police, such as the regional crime squads, had sufficient mobility to be able to stock up with products on visits to the farms in the Vaucluse organized to coincide with their professional duties. It was also the case that certain branches were involved in the supervision of food distribution in markets and restaurants. Hand-outs were a possibility. But for those not involved in these branches or with sufficient professional conscience to avoid these temptations, food represented a serious problem. Unable to afford to buy black market products, they became dependent on the rations in the police canteens but these were far from sufficient. In summer 1945, the head of the police social service conducted a survey with his counterparts in other regions. At his request they drew up a list of the menus in their police canteens during a given week. The findings of the survey could not be published as the comparison with other regions, particularly Rennes, was thought to be too depressing for Marseille police officers."

23 For 'noms de guerre': AN 3AG/2/53, list of members of Ajax, 'Secreur 9, Marseille'. For police demands for purity: Centre d'Archives Contemporaines (Fontainebleau), 790207, art. 1, Ie Secretaire Genera! pour 1a Police a M. le Directeur General de la Surete Nationale, no. 4693-xa, 2015/45; 'Aide immediate a Rouge-Midi' Rouge-Midi, 20110/47. Regarding accusations and suspicions against the police hierarchy: CGT archives 34J 52, Affaire Fregier; AN FIa 3349 dossier IV-]3, Rapport no. Jur/263/85L212, Pierre Tissier it Adrien Tixier, 'La situation de 1a Region de Marseille', 812145; AD BDR 23J3; Culioli, La terre des seigneurs, op. cit., 299 and 335-41. For Manicacci, see: Georges Marion, Gaston Defferre (Paris 1989), 81; Marie-Christine Guerini, Eempreinte d'un nom (Paris 1985), 49; Agulhon and Barrat, Les CRS a Marseille, 1944-47, op. cir., 87. For the position of Le Provencal: 'La grande pitie de la Police', Le Provenyal,24/9/45.

24 AD BDR 23J3, Le Secreta ire General pour la Police au Directeur General de la Sillete

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Lack of money also meant that the police were frustrated in their hopes of seeing a better standard of living in housing and accommodation. Homelessness was a huge problem in the population at large. Thirty-two thousand families were homeless in Marseille in 1945. Traditional housing difficulties had been aggravated by the wartime loss of buildings. Ofthe 87,725 buildings registered in Marseille in 1939, 3603 were now totally destroyed and a further 10,053 seriously damaged. To the Italian bombing of 1940 and the American bombings of 1943/44, the nazis had added the callous destruction of the old district of the city at the beginning of 1943. Many of the houses which did exist were as squalid and unhygienic as they had been before the war. Only 19 per cent of Marseille's residential surface area was linked to a sewerage network. The police were particularly affected by these difficulties. Many police officers were shunted from one region to another at the Liberation. Those transferred to the Marseille region had considerable difficulty finding accommodation as most flats were beyond their meagre wages. There were numerous examples of policemen renting so-called 'furnished' accommodation which contained little furniture, no sheets, blankets or even windows. Others, making health their priority, tried to circumvent this problem by finding lodgings in distant suburbs, but this simply added to their problems with the fatigue of longer journeys on crowded tramways. The inevitable effect of overwork, a poor diet and bad housing conditions was a sharp reduction in standards of health and in particular numerous cases of tuberculosis, which Mercuri claimed was spreading every day within the ranks of the police. In the first six months of 1945 more than 50 police officers were on long-term sick leave."

Thus, at the Liberation the police experienced both a fairly rapid rehabilitation and a series of frustrations. Their rehabilitation was prepared by minor structural alterations and the purge and renewal of a part of their personnel which gave the institution a new assurance. But ultimately, the return to an unrivalled police system owed much to the political and social climate of the moment. The police benefited from the general lack of enthusiasm for the preservation of alternative structures of order. These movements, born of the exceptional circumstances of the Occupation and claiming popular legitimacy, were doomed once the population began demanding a return to normality. The mistrust some resisters felt towards the Milices Patriotiques

Nationale, 'Situation des fonctionnaires de Police', op. cit.; 'Les policiers feront-ils greve?', La Liberti de Nice et du Sud-Est, 8/9/45; 'La grande pitie de [a Police', op. cit.

25 For damage to buidings and poor standards of hygiene: AD BDR 28} 215, Discours de Jean Cristofol, lors de [a visite de Vincent Auriol, 21/9/47; Guiral, Liberation de Marseille, op. cir., 112; Azerna and Wieviorka, Les Liberations de la France, op. cit., 180; Kaspi, La Liberation de la France, op. cit., 88. For the effect on the police: AD BDR 23}3, Le Secretaire General pour la Police au Directeur General de la Surete Nationale, 'Situation des fonctionnaires de Police', op, cit.; 'Les policiers feront-ils greve?', op. cit.; 'La grande pitie de la Police', op. cit.

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combined with the desire of the Resistance parties to gain as much control as possible within existing state structures to make these alternative movements superfluous to their ambitions. This situation ensured the rapid rehabilitation of the police, but it failed to overcome the material difficulties police officers confronted on a personal and a professional basis, thereby legitimizing their sentiment that they were the pariahs of society: a self-perception of victimization which gives continuity to police attitudes throughout history. Moreover, the pragmatism of this rehabilitation frustrated any hopes for a radical change in the relationship between the police and the population.

Simon Kitson lectures in twentieth-century French history and politics at the University of Birmingham. He has published a number of articles about the French police and is currently completing the manuscript of a book, Police and Politics in Marseille, 1936-1945.