> From: Dayanand Khanolkar <dvkhanolkar@gmail.com> > Subject: {SLC 2013-16} contempt of court > To: slc-2013-16@googlegroups.

com > Date: Friday, 7 March, 2014, 2:09 PM > n the Matter of Contempt of Court > Proceedings Vs. K.S. Sethi > > LegalCrystal Citation > : legalcrystal.com/683005 > Court : DelhiReported in > : ILR1972Delhi113Judge : S. > Rangarajan and; Rajindar Sachar, JJ. > Subject : CivilDecided On > : Dec-07-1971Acts > : Contempt of Court Act, 1952 - Sections 3 > Case Number : Criminal > Appeal No. 54 of 1971Appellant : In > the Matter of Contempt of Court Proceedings > Respondent : K.S. > SethiAdvocates: K.S. Sethi,; Y. > Dayal,; R.L. Aggarwal and; > Cases Referred : > (Thakur Lal v. Mahabir Prasad Sharma > Excerpt: > (i) Contempt of Court Act (1952) - Section > 3--Notice by contemner under Section 80, C.P.C. levelling > allegations of dishonesty and favoratism against ..... > Gupta, Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi that the contemner had > issued a copy of the notice under section 80 of the Code of > Civil Procedure charging him as well as B. Bansal which was > dismissed by the trial Judge and against which an > unsuccessful revision was preferred to this Court. Gupta as well as B. > 'dishonestly and fraudulently' taking 'shelter > of Article 133(3) of the Constitution'.He further stated > 'that the meanings of the above article are so simple > and easy that even a lay man cannot be misled by it'.It > was still further stated that he was fully conversant with > the law, the Judicial Officers Protection Act, whereby > judicial officers are provided benefit against such notices > if the orders are passed by them innocently and in good > faith, and accused Shri R. But without very strong > authority-and no authority has been cited in that

> connection- we are not prepared to say that a man merely by > filing or threatening to file a suit and calling his > communication a notice under Section 80 can insult and > vilify a Judge in this manner'.In that case the > contemner was an attorney. was satisfied that in the case > before him the Magistrate acted clearly within his > jurisdiction and thereforee contempt had been committed > by making the averments in the said notice under section 80 > Civil Procedure Code. (14) In the present case the learned > Judges were equally acting within the limits of their > jurisdiction and the question of the contemner challenging > their acts on the ground of want of good faith does not > arise. 1,000.00, in spite of representations made by Counsel > representing the Bar as well as the State that the maximum > sentence may be imposed, after considering all the > circumstances. 1900 36 that 'the publication in a > newspaper of an article containing scurrilous personal abuse > of a Judge, with reference to his conduct as a Judge in a > judicial proceeding which has terminated, is contempt of Court punishable by > the Court on summary > process'.The observations in that case on which the > contemner relies are 'if reasonable arguments or > expostulations are offered against any judicial act as > contrary to law or in public good no Court could or would treat > that as contempt of Court'.These > observations are of no assistance to him since that is not > the position here. On the other hand the relevant > observations of the Supreme Court in begin of the skype > highlighting 0065/1971 end of the skype highlighting > :1971CriLJ844 ,which, bear on the question whether the > contemner could be allowed to let in evidence in a case like > the present, have been referred to already. ) They only bear > upon the question whether expressions made in good faith in > legal proceedings which were open to the person concerned > could make out a case of contempt and have no > relevancy for having regard to the nature of the protection > extended to a judge who acts within his jurisdiction under > the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1950, no suit > would lie against him in respect of any such act and for > that reason the occasion to issue a notice under section 80 > Civil Procedure Code. > Judgment:S.

> Rangarajan, J. > > (1) Notice has been issued, suo > motu, by this Court to the contemner K. > S. Sethi, when it was brought to the notice of this Court by Shri R. L. Gupta, > Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi that the contemner had issued a > copy of the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil > Procedure charging him as well as B. C. Misra, J. with > dishonestly discharging their official duties, 'putting > off all judicial clothes' and 'becoming quite > naked' for 'rendering dishonestly undue favor to > Shri H. K. Bansal, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign > Trade, Udyog Bhavan, New Delhi'. Copies of the said > notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code. were addressed > to (1) the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government > of India, New Delhi, (2) the Chief Secretary, Delhi > Administration, Old Secretariat, Delhi, (3) Shri H. K. > Bansal, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade. Udyog > Bhavan, New Delhi, (4) B. C. Misra, J. and (5) Shri R. L. > Gupta, Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi. > (2) The > facts which led to the issue of such notice under section 80 > Civil Procedure Code. by the contemner may be briefly > noticed. In a declaratory suit, at the instance of the > contemner, against the Union of India and two others the > contemner had filed an application with regard to the > admissibility of an affidavit put in on behalf of the > opposite party by Shri H. K. Bansal which was dismissed by > the trial Judge and against which an unsuccessful revision > was preferred to this Court. After dismissal of > the revision by B. C. Misra, J., the above-said notice under > section 80 C, P. C. was issued by the contemner, this act > was reported to this Court by Shri R. L. > Gupta. > (3) The > dismissal by the trial Judge of the contemner's > application concerning the above-said affidavit was on the > ground that there was no material to hold that the affidavit > was false. > (4) In > the said notice the contemner had accused Shri R. L. Gupta > as well as B. C. Misra, J. of 'putting off all judicial

> clothes and becoming quite naked for rendering dishonestly > undue favor to deponent' (Shri H. K. Bansal). The > dismissal of the revision petition was stated to be an > 'injury in law' 'inflicted on the > petitioner' by a fiction (false-hood) of law of the > land'. His application for granting a certificate for > appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed. This > was stated to be done by B. C. Misra, J. 'dishonestly > and fraudulently' taking 'shelter of Article 133(3) > of the Constitution'. He further stated 'that the > meanings of the above article are so simple and easy that > even a lay man cannot be misled by it'. It was still > further stated that he was fully conversant with the law, > the Judicial Officers Protection Act, whereby judicial > officers are provided benefit against such notices if the > orders are passed by them innocently and in good faith, and > accused Shri R. L. Gupta and B. C. Misra, J. of having > 'acted with their ugliest had faith abusing the seats of > justice defying their oath of office with dishonest > determination to provide undue favor to' Shri H. K. > Bansal 'inflicting injury in law' on the contemner > and having 'caused substantial disrespect, worry', > etc. to the contemner for which he claimed damages in the > sum of Rs. 51.000.00. The said notice concluded with the > assertion that illegal favortism was shown by the learned > Judges, abusing judicial position, to Shri H. K. Bansal in > conspiracy with him. > (5) In > view of these allegations leveled by the contemner > scandalising the High Court and the court subordinate to it the > matter was placed before my Lord the then Chief Justice with > a note that the contemner had already been found guilty > ofcontempt on > 23-11-1967 and sentenced to four months' simple > imprisonment plus a fine of Rs. 1,000.00 by 1. D. Dua, C. J. > (as his lord- ship then was) and S. K. Kapur and S. N. > Andley, JJ. My Lord the Chief Justice had directed this > matter to be placed on the judicial side before a Division > Bench consisting of S. N. Andley and T. V. R. Tatachari, JJ. > who ordered notice to the contemner and directed the same to > be placed before a Bench constituted by my Lord the Chief > Justice. By a further order, dated 15th October 1971, their

> Lordships ordered notice to the counsel who have appeared > before us. > (6) In > answer to the notice issued to the contemner he filed a > written Statement praying that the notice/rule issued may be > declared to be invalid in law. He relied upon a number of > authorities, to which a reference will be made later, and > claimed that the allegations made by him in the said > statement were true. By a separate application, or (M) 889 > of 1971, he prayed for an opportunity to be given to him to > prove the truth of the allegations by letting in evidence. > During the course of the hearing the contemner raised two > points:-> (1)that > no contempt was > committed by him because he had made those allegations in a > notice given under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure > which was a necessary step for filing a suit for > damages; > > (2)that the present proceedings > taken for punishing him for contempt were premature > since he could be punished forcontempt only in the > eventuality of his suit for such damages being ultimately > dismissed. > The > second contention is really a corrollary of the first.(7) The > substance of the averments in the said notice, which have > been noticed already, are likely to bring the administration > of justice itself into contempt since by the > making of those allegations the authority of the Court is lowered and the > sense of confidence which people have in the administration > of justice in the Court is weakened. In other > words this is a case of the Court itself being > scandalised; it is not a mere case of offering protection to > Judges personally from imputation to which they may be > exposed as individuals. > (8) The > law regarding what constitutes contempt is now > wellsettled. The case law on the subject has been discussed > by the Supreme Court recently in Shri C. > K. Daphtary v. Shri O. P. Gupta & Ors. 0065/1971 :

> 1971CriLJ844 . It was pointed out by his lordship the > present Chief Justice of India that the mere fact that a > judgment contains errors can be no excuse for imputing > dishonesty to the Judge. The restrictions imposed on the > right of freedom of speech and the law regardingcontempt are reasonable. A > scandalous attack on a Judge in respect of a judgment or > past conduct affects adversely the due administration of > justice. Even the commission of a gross error in a judgment > does not amount to 'misbehavior' within the meaning > of Article 124(4) of the Constituti. If a judgment is > criticised as containing errors coupled with a criticism of > dishonesty on the part of the Judge the court trying contempt of court cannot act as an > appellate court and > decide whether there are errors or not. The observations in > an earlier decision in Sukhdeo Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice > and Judges of the Pepsu High Court A. I. R. 1954 S.C. > 186 to the effect that the Code of Criminal Procedure did > not apply in matters of contempt triable by the > High Court which > could deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure, > were approved. The only requirements while taking such > action are that the procedure should be fair, the contemner > be made aware of the charge given against him and be given a > reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The practice is to > issue a notice to the alleged contemner in order that he may > file his reply. The contemner in this case has done so by > filing a reply. But by means of a separate application he > wanted an opportunity to let in evidence to justify > allegations amounting to contempt of court. Adverting to a > similar stand by the contemner his lordship the Chief > Justice (Sikri, C. J.) observed in paragraph 81 (p. 1148) as > follows: > 'if > evidence was to be allowed to justify allegations amounting > to contempt of Court it would tend to > encourage disappointed litigants-and one party or the other > to a case is always disappointed-to avenge their defeat by > abusing the judge'. > (9) In > the present case also having regard to the nature of the > allegations made by the contemner we do not think that he is > entitled to an opportunity for letting in evidence to

> justify what he has said, namely, the learned Judges > concerned misconducted themselves by showing favoritism to > Shri H. K. Bansal and abused their judicial position in > conspiracy with him. > (10) We > see little force in the contention of the contemner that it > was necessary for him to give a notice under section 80 > Civil Procedure Code. as a preliminary to his filing a suit > for damages and that nothing that is said in such a notice > can in law amount to contempt. For this view we > have been able to derive considerable support from > observations made in some decisions. > (11) In > Advocate General v. D. Seshagiri Rao : AIR1966AP167 the > contention that contempt was not committed > on account of there having been no publication of the > imputation, since they were made in notices sent by the > contemner before taking legal proceedings against the two > judicial officers, was negatived. It was pointed out that > the consequence of such attacks on judicial officers was to > destroy the confidence of people in courts, seriously impair > judicial administration and bring the administration of > justice itself into disrepute. In that case the contemner > who was convicted of a criminal offence sent a notice to the > Magistrate who tried him alleging incompetency owing to his > note being aware of the elementary principal requisites for > a valid complaint coupled with an allegation that the > Magistrate had registered the complaint and convicted him in > order to favor some one. A similar view taken by a Division > Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of > Broomfield and Wassoodew. JJ. In re Tulsidas Amanmal Karani > : AIR1941Bom228 was followed; Broom- field, J. had observed > as follows : > 'learned counsel for the > opponent has argued that no offence was committed, not > even contempt of Court, because these > allegations were contained in a notice under section 80, > which the opponent was bound to submit before bringing a > suit. But without very strong authority-and no authority has > been cited in that connection- we are not prepared to say > that a man merely by filing or threatening to file a suit > and calling his communication a notice under Section 80 can

> insult and vilify a Judge in this manner'. > In that > case the contemner was an attorney. For this reason the > judgment was concerned with the question whether he should > be debarred from practicing as an attorney. > (12) In State of U. P. v. Lakshmi Narain Singhal A. I. R. > 1962 All 127 the question was whether contempt was committed by > the issuance of a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure > Code. to a Magistrate, who had jurisdiction to pass the > order he did, by imputing had faith to the Magistrate and > suggesting that he was personally interested in one of the > parties to the dispute. Broome, J. referred in this > connection to the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1950 > which offers protection to a judicial officer acting > judicially in two classes of cases: (a) in respect of acts > done or ordered to be done within the limits of his > jurisdiction, and (b) for acts done or ordered to be done > outside the limits of his jurisdiction. In the former class > of cases the protection offered by the Act is absolute and > the officer concerned is not liable to be sued, whether or > not he acted erroneously, irregularly or even illegally. > (13) > Reliance for this position was placed on Teven v. Ram Lal > Indian Law Reports Allahabad, Vol. Xii, 11(6). In the latter > class of cases, it was pointed out, protection can be > claimed only if the officer believed in good faith to have > jurisdiction to do the act complained of. Broome, J. was > satisfied that in the case before him the Magistrate acted > clearly within his jurisdiction and thereforee contempt had been committed > by making the averments in the said notice under section 80 > Civil Procedure Code. The reasoning, in other words, was > that if no suit itself could lie for damages against > judicial officers concerned on account of the Judicial > Officers Protection Act, the notice could not be looked upon > as a preliminary step towards a suit but must be treated as > a gratuitous attempt to interfere with the course of > justice. > (14) In > the present case the learned Judges were equally acting > within the limits of their jurisdiction and the question of > the contemner challenging their acts on the ground of want > of good faith does not arise. Recently the Supreme Courthad occasion to

> consider the question whether contempt had been committed > by making scandalous allegations against Judges in an > application for transferring certain proceedings from > one court to the > other. Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows > in Amrit Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) in Transfer > Petition No. 16 of 1968 decided on 24th March 19710 : > 'IT > is not from any exaggerated notion of the dignity of any one > of us that we are proceeding against the petitioner forcontempt of Court, but because it is > imposed upon this Court the duty of > preventing brevi manu in contempt to interfere with > the administration of justice. The petitioner has been > deliberately interfering with the course of justice and for > that purpose scandalising the Judges.' > (15) The > present contemner had made the above-said averments in the > notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code. even after he > had been punished for contempt in Criminal > Original 49 of 1967 on the file of this Court. I. D. Dua, C. J. (as > his Lordship then was) was inclined to impose only a > sentence of four months' simple imprisonment plus a fine > of Rs. 1,000.00, in spite of representations made by Counsel > representing the Bar as well as the State that the maximum > sentence may be imposed, after considering all the > circumstances. This obviously had no effect on the contemner > ; he has been persisting even subsequently in scandalising > the Court. Even after > notices were issued in this proceeding he had not shown the > slightest contriteness; on the other hand he has pressed for > an opportunity to substantiate those allegations by letting > in evidence. > (16) On > 4th October 1971 the contemner filed a written statement in > these proceedings. Since he has relied upon the following > decisions in the said written statement it has become > necessary to deal with them. It was held in The Queen v. > Gray Q. B. D. 1900 36 that 'the publication in a > newspaper of an article containing scurrilous personal abuse > of a Judge, with reference to his conduct as a Judge in a > judicial proceeding which has terminated, is contempt of Court punishable by > the Court on summary

> process'. The observations in that case on which the > contemner relies are 'if reasonable arguments or > expostulations are offered against any judicial act as > contrary to law or in public good no Court could or would treat > that as contempt of Court'. These > observations are of no assistance to him since that is not > the position here. For the same reason the observations of > Mukherjea, J. (as his lordship then was) in Brahma PrakaSh > Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh : 1954CriLJ238 to the > effect that 'reflection on the conduct of character of a > judge with reference to the discharge of his judicial > duties, would not be contempt if such reflection > is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable > criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public > acts done in the seat of justice' are also not of any > assistance to the conemner. > (17) The > following observations of the Supreme Court in Bathina > Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras : 1952CriLJ832 have > been relied upon, though out of the context: > 'if > the allegations are true obviously it would lead to the > benefit of the public to bring the matter into > light'. > The attack in that case was that the Sub Magistrate was > corrupt and instances were cited, where it was rumored that > the officer had either taken bribes or had put the parties > to undue harassment because they were obdurate enough to > refuse the demands of his broker. It was pointed out that > the contemner in that case had not, as a reasonable man, > attempted to verify the information he received and > ascertained, as far as he could, whether the facts were true > or mere concocted lies. It was observed by Mukherjea, J., in > that case, that defamatory statements about the conduct of a > judge even in respect of his judicial duties do not > necessarily constitute contempt of court for such libel may or > may not amount to contempt. It > constitutes contempt only when the > defamation is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the > due course of justice or proper administration of justice. > We are unable to find anything in favor of the contemner in > the other two decisions relied upon by him in this

> connection : : AIR1959Bom6 (State of Bombay v. Smt. Shrirish > V. Pai & Ors.) or : AIR1932Cal255 (Amulya Chandra > Bhaduri v. Satis Chandra girl & Ors.) > (18) In > Cr. Misc. 889 of 1971, filed by the contemner requesting for > an opportunity to be given to prove the truth of the > allegations made by him, he has relied upon two further > decisions, namely. A. 1. R. 1935 Cal 419 In the matter of > Trusher Kami Ghosh, Editor, Amrit Bazar Patrika (13) and A. > 1. R. 1961 Pun {Amarnath Sawan Mal v. Joginder Singh). (11). > In the former case, Derbyshire. C. J. pointed out that > 'the right to punish by summary procedure contempts of Court by scandalising > the Court still > exists'. In the latter case Tek Chand, J. was concerned > with the making of a false affidavit by a Sub Inspector of > Police by way of return to a petition for writ of habeas > corpus under section 491 Criminal Procedure Code . In that > context it was held that even 'perjury or false swearing > would constitute contempt of Court, if the alleged false > statement had an obstructive effect made with the knowledge > of falsity and the question was pertinent to the issue'. > None of these decisions are thereforee, of any assistance to > the contemner. On the other hand the relevant observations > of the Supreme Court in 0065/1971 : > 1971CriLJ844 , which, bear on the question whether the > contemner could be allowed to let in evidence in a case like > the present, have been referred to already. > (19) Two > other decisions relied upon by the contemner are : > AIR1960Pat326 - State of Bihar v. Shiv Prasad Lal Seth & > Anr. (the page has been omitted to be mentioned in the > written statement, but the identity of the case is clear) > and : AIR1955All391 (Thakur Lal v. Mahabir Prasad Sharma > & Anr.) They only bear upon the question whether > expressions made in good faith in legal proceedings which > were open to the person concerned could make out a case > of contemptand have > no relevancy for having regard to the nature of the > protection extended to a judge who acts within his > jurisdiction under the Judicial Officers' Protection > Act, 1950, no suit would lie against him in respect of any > such act and for that reason the occasion to issue a notice

> under section 80 Civil Procedure Code. would not arise. > (20) In > the course of his submissions today the contemner has drawn > our attention to an application dated 4th December 1971 > which he filed in the registry. This application had been > returned by the office for want of sufficient stamps being > affixed on the copy of the order of B. C. Misra, J. which > had been annexed to the application. We have overlooked this > objection, regarding want of sufficient stamp, and we have > considered the representations in this application also, > which were read out to us today in court by the contemner. The > contemner seeks an opportunity to let in evidence in support > of what he says he has rightly stated in the notice under > section 80 Civil Procedure Code. In substance this voices a > grievance that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was improperly > refused by B. C. Misra, J. This is again not the forum to > formulate such a grievance. If be is aggrieved by the said > order his remedy would be to apply to the Supreme Court for special leave. In > the circumstances none of the allegations made by the > contemner in the said application dated the 4th December > 1971 need detain us. We find the contemner guilty of having > committedcontempt of Court. > (21) We > have given the matter our earnest consideration and we have > heard not only the contemner but also Shri Deepak Chaudhry, > Central Government Counsel, Shri Yogeshwar Dayal, Additional > Standing Counsel for the Delhi Administration and Shri R. L. > Aggarwal, President of the High Court Bar Association. All > the learned counsel who assisted us have pressed for the > maximum punishment being awarded to the contemner who has. > unfortunately, been making scurrilous attacks of the above > description on Judges who decide against him. Having regard > to the fact that the contemner has not reformed himself and > has not shown any contriteness we consider it necessary to > impose the maximum punishment that is permissible under > the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 by > sentencing the contemner to undergo simple, imprisonment for > six months and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000.00. Before > concluding we thank the Counsel for the assistance they gave > us. > > --

> Thanks and regards, > > Dayanand V. Khanolkar > Mob.No.9892182484 > > > > > -> > Sandesh College of Law > > Batch 2013-15 > > --> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the > Google Groups "SLC 2013-16" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails > from it, send an email to slc-2013-16+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/slc-2013-16. > > To view this discussion on the web, visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/slc-201316/CAAH_hnWDKBSjmG0X-hPu7HgnKNRJRMXTqUNUmP9TYhhhQebTfQ%40mail.gmail.com. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.