CASES: Coronel vs. CA (suspensive condition) G.R. No.

103577, October 7, 1996 Doctrine: In a conditional contract of sale, the sale becomes absolute upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition. Facts: o A conditional sale of land was made from the Coronels to Alcaraz on the condition that once the title was transferred to the Coronels, they shall execute a deed of sale and transfer title to Alcaraz. o Alcaraz made a downpayment along with the conditional sale. o However, the property was subsequently sold to Mabanag. o Alcaraz filed a complaint for specific performance and caused an annotation of a notice of adverse claim. Issues: 1. Can the receipt of downpayment be considered a contract of sale? 2. What was the suspensive condition? Held/Ratio: 1. The receipt of downpayment was considered a contract of sale wherein the intention of the Coronels was to sell the property upon the receipt of the downpayment. It is not a contract to sell where ownership still remains in the hands of the seller until full payment of the price. 2. The suspensive condition in the contract was the moment the title was transferred to the Coronels. Upon the happening of such suspensive condition, the Coronels were obligated to transfer the title of the property to Alcaraz who was more than willing to pay the full purchase price already.

Gonales vs. Heirs of Thomas G.R. No. 131784, September 16, 1999 Doctrine: When a suspensive condition has not yet been fulfilled, the obligation to deliver/perform has not yet arisen. Facts: o Paula Cruz and Heirs of Thomas entered into a Contract of Lease/Purchase with Gonzales for a parcel of land for one year. o After the expiration of 1 year, the lessee shall purchase the property at 1M through annual rental payments. o Par. 9 of the contract states that the lessors shall commit themselves to obtain a separate TCT in favor of Gonzales after which, a new Contract of Lease/Purchase shall be made. o Gonzales paid the rentals but did not exercise his option to buy the property after 1 year and remained possession of the lot without paying rent. o Paula Cruz died. Heir of Cruz sent a letter to Gonzales rescinding the contract of lease/purchase due to breach. o Cruz sent a final demand letter to Gonzales to vacate the property and filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the property. o Sambarano (in behalf of Gonzales) was declared in default for failure to answer o Lower Court: Complaint dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the condition precedent (transferring of titles to Gonzales before he will pay the purchase price) is needed to perfect the contract? Held/Ratio: Yes. The record shows that at the time the contract was executed, the land in question was still registered in the name of Bernardina Calixto and Severo Cruz, respondents' predecessors-in-interest. There is no showing whether respondents were the only heirs of Severo Cruz or whether the other half of the land in the name of Bernardina Calixto was adjudicated to them by any means. In fact, they admit that extrajudicial proceedings were still ongoing. Hence, when the Contract of Lease/Purchase was executed, there was no assurance that the respondents were indeed the owners of the specific portion of the lot that petitioner wanted to buy, and if so, in what concept and to what extent. Thus, the clear intent of the ninth paragraph was for respondents to obtain a separate and distinct TCT in their names. This was necessary to enable them to show their ownership of the stipulated portion of the land and their concomitant right to dispose of it. Absent any title in their names, they could not have sold the disputed parcel of land. Because the property remained registered in the names of their predecessors-in-interest, there must be a valid judicial partition if they want to sell their share. Cruz could not validly transfer the title of the property still undergoing partition. Gonzales can only be compelled to perform his obligation upon the fulfillment of paragraph 9 of the contract. In this case, the obligation of the petitioner to buy the land cannot be enforced unless respondents comply with the suspensive condition that they acquire first a separate and distinct TCT in their names. The suspensive condition not having been fulfilled, then the obligation of the petitioner to purchase the land has not arisen. SC Petition granted. Heirs cannot rescind contract.

Parks vs. Province of Tarlac (Resolutory Condition) G.R. No. L-24190, July 13, 1926 Doctrine: In a condition precedent, the acquisition of the right is not effected while the condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. Facts: o o o o o [October 1910] Cirer and Hill donated a parcel of land to the Municipality of Tarlac with the condition that the land will be build with an elementary school and a park. [January 1921] Subsequently, Cirer and Hill sold the lot to George parks. Municipality transferred the lot to the Province of Tarlac. Parks filed a complaint with the court seeking to be declared the absolute owner of the lot. Parks main argument was that the Province was not able to comply with the conditions of Cirer and Hill and such donation was cancelled.

Issue: Whether the condition imposed was a suspensive or resolutory condition? Held/Ratio: RESOLUTORY CONDITION. Tarlac could not comply with the condition if it were a suspensive condition because it would amount to the invasion of anothers title or land. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while the condition is not deemed complied with. Plus, the action to revoke the donation has already prescribed. Plaintiff had no right of action.

Mixed Cause/Origin Lim vs. CA G.R. No. 87047, October 31, 1990 Doctrine: A condition that solely depends upon the will of one part is void. Facts: o o o Lim: lessor; Dy = lessee; contract of lease = 3 years Dy refused to vacate the premises Lim instituted an ejectment suit but terminated due to compromise agreement where the contractof lease shall be renewed every 3 years and an automatic increase of 20% in rental payments with the clause as long as the defend ance needs the premises and that they can pay the said increases After 6 years, Lim advised Dy that he no longer wishes to renew the contract of lease. nd Dy refused and a 2 ejectment suit was instituted. Lower Court = contract still valid as long as Dy pays; action barred by res juridicata on compromise agreement

o o o

Issue: Whether the contract of lease is a continuing lease? Held/Ratio: NO. The condition is not a resolutory condition but a potestative condition since it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee. A continuing lease is not mutual in nature and there is absence of equality. The lease agreement is renewable every 3 years and the renewal clause shows that it is not a continuing lease.

Smith Bell & Co. vs. Vicente Sotelo Matti G.R. No. L-16570, March 9, 1922 Doctrine: When the fulfillment of the condition does not depend upon the will of the debtor but on that of a third person, who can in no way be compelled to carry it out, the obligors part of the contract is deemed complied with. Facts: o o o o o o [Aug 1918] Smith Bell and Sotelo entered into contracts whereby Smith Bell obligated itself to sell, and Sotelo to purchase 2 steel tanks (w/in 4 months), 2 expellers (Sept 1918), and 2 electric motors (within 90 days). The tanks arrived at Manila on Aril 1919, the expellers, Oct 1918, and the motors on Feb 1919. Smith Bell notified Sotelo of the arrival of the goods but Sotelo refused to receive and pay for the goods. Smith Bello filed a complaint stating four causes of action seeking performance of Sotelo. Sotelo and intervenor, Manila Oil, denied the allegations and alleged that due to the delay in delivery of the goods, he suffered damages. Lower Court absolved Sotelo.
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Issue: Whether or not the condition was dependent upon the will of 3 parties? Held/Ratio: Yes. In all 3 contracts, the final clause states that the sellers are not responsible for delays caused by Force Majeure entirely beyond their control. The contracts were executed at the time of the world war where there existed rigid restriction on the export from the US of articles such as machineries in question. Plaintiff did all in its power to make the delivery on time. Sotelo compelled to receive and pay for the goods.

Osmena vs. Rama G.R. No. 4437, September 9, 1909 Doctrine: A condition imposed upon a contract by the promisor, the performance of which depends upon his exclusive will, is void, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 1115 of the Civil Code. Facts: Rama executed a contract to Osmena which stated that she received 200 in cash from Osmena P200 which she would pay in sugar in January or February the next year. Stating further that if she cannot pay in full, a balance shall be struck, showing the amount outstanding at the end of each June. The contract also stated that Rama will sell to Osmena all te sugar that she may harvest as a guaranty and pledge as security all of her present and future property. The following year, Rama asked for further loan of P70 and P50 from Don Penares which will be paid in sugar. When Osmena died, Rama was not able to pay the amount and the loan contracts were passed on to his heir, Agustina Rafols. Upon presentment of the loan contracts to Rama, she immediately acknowledged her indebtedness stating that she would pay the loan if her house would be sold. Rafols brought an action for the collection of the loans. The acknowledgment letter of indebtedness was offered as evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the proof was sufficient to recognize the debt of Rama? Held/Ratio:Yes. It was suggested during the discussion of the case in this court that, in the acknowledgement of indebtedness made by the defendant, she imposed the condition that she would pay the obligation if she sold her house. If that statement found in her acknowledgement of the indebtedness should be regarded as a condition, it was a condition which depended upon her exclusive will, and is, therefore, void. The acknowledgement therefore, was an absolute acknowledgement of the obligation and was sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from barring the action upon the original contract.

Hermosa vs. Longara G.R. No. L-5267, October 27, 1953

Facts: 1932-1944 3 claims were presented by Epifanio Longara against the intestate estate of credit advances amounting to Php2, 341.41 to the intestate. 1945-1947- Php12, 924.12 made to Hermosa Sr.s son; Php3, 772 made to his grandson. These advances were made after the death of the intestate. The intestate asked the credit advances for himself and for the members of his family. The credit advances were to be payable as soon as Fernando Hermosa Sr.s property in Spain was sold and he received money derived from the sale. CAs Ruling: The payment of the advances didnt become due until the administratrix received the money (P20,000.00) from the buyer of the property. Nov 1947- the property was sold Oct 1948- the claim was filed It is contented on this appeal that the obligation contracted by the intestate was subject to a condition exclusively dependent upon the will of the debtor and therefore null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the obligation contracted by Hermosa Sr was subject to a potestative condition? Held/Ratio: No. The condition upon without payment of the sums advanced was made to depend as soon as he received funds derived from the sale of his property in Spain discloses the fact that the condition in question does not depend exclusively upon the will of the debtor but also upon other circumstances beyond his control. The condition was a mixed condition depending partyly upon the will of the intestate and partly upon chance. The obligation to pay is made dependent upon the happening fo the condition. Action to recover has not yet prescribed. Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao G.R. No. L-16109, October 2, 1922 Doctrine: Facts: On December 12, 1918, taylor contracted hs services to Tan Liuan & Co as a superintendent of an oil factory, which the latter planned to establish. Contract was for 2 years along with a residence that would be provided for the plaintiff. The machinery for the factory had not yet been acquired and part of the stipulations of the contract included the ff: o It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed in the said factory fail, for any reason, to arrive in the city of Manila within 6 months from the date hereof, this contract may be cancelled by the party of the second part at its option. The machinery failed to arrive. Evidence shows that the defendants either cancelled the order by choice or were unable to raise the capital required to finance the project. Defendants cancelled the contract due to the fact that the oil business no longer promised large returns. Taylor was informed of the cancellation of the contract and filed an action in the court for the recovery of damages. Issue: Whether the for any reason clause was a valid condition, giving the employer the power to cancel the contract which may be at the employers own will? Held/Ratio: YES. One of the consequences of the stipulation was that the employers were left in a position where they could dominate the contingency, and the result was about the same as if they had been given an unqualified option to dispense with the services of Taylor at the end of 6 months. A condition at once facultative and resolutory may be valid even though the condition is made to depend upon the will of the obligor. The contract does not express a positive obligation to cause the machinery to arrive in Manila. The absence of affirmative proof showing that the non-arrival of the machinery was due to some cause not having its origin in their own act or will. Petition denied.

Rustan Pulp and Paper Mills vs. IAC G.R. No. 70789 October 19, 1992 Doctrine: A condition which is both potestative and resolutory may be vaild; however, that applies only at the birth, not the fulfillment of an existing obligation. Facts: Rustan Pulp established a pulp and paper mill while respondent Lluch was a holder of a forest products license. Lluch sent a letter to Rustan to negotiate the supplying of raw material to the latter. The Contract of sale was executed subject to the following conditions: o Rustan has the option to buy from other sellers who are equally qualified holders of appropriate licenses o Rustan will not buy from sellers whose goods emanated from Lluchs concession o Lluch has priority in supplying materials to Rustan o Rustan has the right to stop delivery of raw materials when it has determined that its supply is sufficient, and will have the prerogative to have deliveries continue when raw materials become necessary, provided that the seller is given sufficient notice. Vergara, Manager of Rustan, sent a letter to Lluch informing him that their supply has become sufficient and that they will not be needing further delivery. Lluch inquired whether the stoppage was temporary or permanent. However, no reply was given. Lluch continued to make deliveries and Rustan would accept the deliveries until Dece. 23, 1968. Lluch filed a case for contractual breach against Rustan which was dismissed. Issue: Whether the contractual stipulations regarding Rustans right to stop delivery of raw materials was valid? Held/Ratio: NO. The Rustan stipulation suggests a condition solely dependent upon the will of the Rustan. Rustan can stop delivery of raw materials from Lluch if the supply is sufficient, a fact which only petitioners can ascertain. The resumption of delivery is dependent upon the will of Rustan. Therefore, because of the purely potestative imposition, the stipulation must be taken out without affecting the rest of the stipulations considering that the condition relates to the fulfillment of an already existing obligation and not to its inception.

Negative Impossible Things Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. CA G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991 Doctrine: A condition is considered impossible when it unreasonably and unduly restricts the right of the done to dispose ones property, which is an innate right of the ownership -the right conveyed by the donor to the done. Donation that expressly provided its provision of automatic rescission shall be governed by the rules on contract and general prescription instead of rules governing effects and limitations on donation. Facts: On Aug. 23, 1930, Sps Eusebio Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased executed a deed of donation in favor of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila with the condition that the donee cannot dispose or sell the property within a period of 100 years from the date of the donation otherwise the donation shall be null and void. On June 30, 1980, Roman Catholic sold the property to Florencio and Soledad Ignacio. On November 29, 1984, private respondents, estate of Sps Castro and Rieta filed a complaint for the nullification of the donation and reconveyance of the land due to the violation of the condition. Trial court dismissed the complaint; CA reversed TC decision. Issue: Whether the condition is an impossible condition? Held/Ratio: YES. The cause of action of the Estate of Castro is based on the resolutory condition but this condition is an unreasonable restriction on the essential right of the owner to dispose his land. The restriction period on the disposal of land for 100 years is clearly a denial of an integral right of the owner hence it should be considered as an impossible condition. An impossible condition is considered as not imposed; respondent has no cause of action.

Prevention by the Obligor Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao (see earlier case discussion) Effect of fulfillment of condition by the Obligor Herrera vs. Leviste G.R. No. L-55744, February 28, 1995 Doctrine: Facts: June 10, 1969 Leviste obtained a loan from the GSIS. Leviste mortgaged 2 lots (Buendia and Paranaque) as security for such loan. Nov. 3, 1971 Leviste sold the Buendia property to Herrera. The conditions were: o Pay Leviste 11M o Assume Levistes indebtedness to GSIS o Substitute the Paranaque property for his own. o Failure to comply with the stipulations shall cause for the automatic rescission of the contract and all payments shall be forfeited in favor of the vendor. Herrera went to GSIS to remit money and restructure the mortgage obligation but GSIS asked him to substitute first the Paranaque property. During this time, no request was made by Leviste regarding the change of the property ownership. GSIS sent a notice to foreclose the mortgaged properties due to default of payment. Feb 1975 Properties were sold at public auction and GSIS was the highest bidder. Leviste exercised his right of redemption and was able to recover the 2 properties. When Herrera sent his letter to exercise his right of redemption, GSIS did not respond to his requests. On may 13, 1975, Herrera filed a suit against leviste for injunction, damages and cancellation of annotation. Issue: Whether Levistes assignment of right of redemption to Marcelo would result in the unjust enrichment of the former. Held/Ratio: NO. The loss of the property was attributable to the fault of Herrera because he: (a) did not submit collateral to GSIS in substitution of the Paranaque property, (b) not paying the mortgage debt when GSIS decided to foreclose, (c) not making an earnest effort to redeem the property as a possible redemptioner. Herrera did not fully comply with all the conditions of his contract with Leviste.

Effects of Rescission Song Fo vs. Hawaiian Philippines Doctrine: Rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement. Facts: Hawaiian Philippine entered into a contract with Song Fo where it would deliver 55,5006 gallons of molasses. Song Fo & Company presented before the CFI of Iloilo a complaint with two causes of action for breach of contract against Hawaiian-Philippine Co where the judgment asked for 70k Hawaiian Philippine set up the defense that since the Song Fo had defaulted in the payment for the molasses delivered to it by the defendant under the contract between the parties, the latter was compelled to cancel and rescind the said contract. Issue: Does Hawaiian Philippine have the right to rescind the contract of sale? Held/Ratio: NO. Hawaiian Philippines had no right to rescind the contract of sale. The Court finds that Hawaiian had an understanding with Song fo that the latter would pay the former at the end of each month for molasses delivered. Song Fo should have paid for the molasses delivered in December 1922. The general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches that are substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement. A delay in payment for a small quantity of molasses for some twenty days is not such a violation of an essential condition of the contract. Hawaiian has waived this condition when it still accepted overdue payments.

Boysaw vs. Interphil Promotions G.R. No. L-22590, March 20, 1987 Doctrine: Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause of action and in which each party is a debtor and creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. Facts: Boysaw and his manager, Ketchum, signed with Interphil Promotions, a contract to engage Flash Elorde in a boxing contest for the Junior Lightweight championship of the world. It was stipulated in the contract that the fight would be on Sept 30, 1961 or not later than 30 days thereafter should a postponement be agreed on and that Boysaw would not engage in any fights without the written consent of Interphil Boysaw fought and defeated his opponent in Las Vegas. Ketchum transferred his managerial rights to Amado Araneta then to Alfredo Yulo Jr. Sarreal, the representative of Interphil Promotions, wrote a letter to the Games and Amusement Board expressing concerns over the switch of managers. After a series of conferences, the fight was scheduled on November 4, 1961. Yulo did not agree to the change in the fight date. However, the fight never materialized. As a result of such, Boysaw and Yulo sued Interphil for damages and to honor their commitments under the boxing contract. Boysaw was out of the country at the time of the trial and the court kept postponing the hearings. The court gave him an ultimatum to appear on the next hearing or the case shall be submitted for judgment. Boysaw still failed to appear. Lower Court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the fight contract? Held/Ratio: Yes. Boysaw violated the terms of the contract when he fought with another boxer (Avila) and the changing of managers was without the consent of Interphil. While the contract imposed no penalty for such violation, this does not grant any of the parties the unbridled liberty to breach it with impunity. There is no doubt that the contract in question gave rise to reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. Lower Court decision affirmed.

Benefit of Period Buce vs. CA G.R. No. 136913, May 12, 2000 Doctrine: The legal presumption is that the fixing of a period is for the benefit of both parties. Absent any specific language for the extension of the period, mutual agreement between both parties must be had before such renewal may be made. Facts: Buce leased the property of Tiongco with a contract stipulating the following terms: o Lease contract period: 15 years (June 1979 to June 1994) o subject to renewal for another 10 years, under the same terms and conditions Buce constructed a building and paid a monthly rent of P200. Rent was increased to 400 in 1985. P1000 for July & Aug 1991 Tiongco wrote that another increase would be implemented raising the rent to P1,578 due to the rent Control Act. The postdated checks for P400 were refused by Tiongco due to such increase Aug. 1993, Buce filed a complaint with RTC Manila for specific performance and prayer for consignation. During the pendency of the case, Tiongcos counsel wrote to Buce informing her that the lease contact had already expired with a demand that she pay thearrears. RTC declared the lease contract renewed for ten years and to pay gradual amounts. Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that the renewal must be upon mutual consent of both parties. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether the extension of the period of lease was renewable. Held/Ratio: NO. In a reciprocal obligation like a lease, the period must be deemed to have been agreed upon for the benefit of both parties, absent language showing that the term was deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone. It was not specifically indicated who may exercise the option to renew, neither was it stated that the option was given for the benefit of Buce. Pursuant to Art. 1196, the period of the lease contract is deemed to have been set for the benefit of both parties. Renewal of the contract may be had only upon mutual agreement or at the will of both of term. The continuance, effectivity and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing the payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Petition partly granted. Tiongco must file separate suit for unlawful detainer.

Court to Fix Period cases Araneta vs. Phil Sugar Estate Development G.R. No. L-2258, may 31, 1967 Doctrine: Article 1197 involves a two-step process: (1) Determine that the obligation does not fix a period; from the nature it can be inferred that a period was intended (2) Decide what period was probably contemplated by the parties Facts: JM Tuason & Co owns a large parcel of land known as Sta Mesa Heights Subdivision. Through Araneta, JM sold a portion of the lot to Philippine Sugar Estates Development (PSED). The parties stipulated in the contract the ff: o PSED will build on said portion Sto Domingo Church and convent o JM Tuason shall construct street on the NE, NW and SW sides of the land so that the latter will be a block surrounded by streets on all four sides and NE street shall be named Sto Domingo Avenue PSED fulfilled his obligation but JM failed to finish the contruction of the NE street because a third-party occupant refused to vacate the premises. PSED filed a complaint against Araneta seeking specific performance and damages. Araneta argues that there was no period set for the completion of the NE street construction which the court must first fix in a proper suit. Lower court dismissed PSEDs complaint but later granted the motion for reconsideration and ordered Araneta to finish the NE street within two years. CA affirmed LCs decision. Issue: Whether or not the fixing of the period was proper? Held/Ratio: NO. The LC and CA decisions were wrong because what the Courts should have sought to answer was whether the stipulation of reasonable time was within the bounds of reasonable time. The lower courts were not careful enough in interpreting Article 1197. Even on the assumption that the court should have found that no reasonable time or no period at all had been fixed still, the complaint not having sought that the Court should set a period, the court could not proceed to do so unless the complaint in as first amended; for the original decision is clear that the complaint proceeded on the theory that the contract had been breached and defendant was already answerable in damages. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step process. The court must first determine that the obligation does not fix a period (or that the period is made to depend upon the will of the debtor)," but from the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended" (Art. 1197, pars. 1 and 2). This preliminary point settled, the Court must then proceed to the second step, and decide what period was "probably contemplated by the parties" (Do., par. 3). So that, ultimately, the Court cannot fix a period merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable, but must set the time that the parties are shown to have intended. DECISION REVERSED. Period shall be fixed upon the eviction of the squatters in the area.

Central Philippine University vs. CA G.R. No. 112127, July 17, 1995 Doctrine: When upon the nature and circumstances the parties intended a period and a reasonable time has elapsed, the Court can no longer set a period when the doing of such would only result to delay and multiplicity of suits Facts: [1939] Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU with the following conditions: o The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum rd o CPU cannot sell, convey or transfer to any 3 party or encumber it in any way o Land shall be called RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS along with a cornerstone in that name. Any income generated shall be put in a fund to be known as the RAMON LOPEZ FUND to be used for improvement of said campus and the erection of a building thereon. On May 31, 1989, the Heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance and damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. Heirs alleged that CPU was exchanging the donated property with NHA for another land. Trial Court nullified the deed of donation and the CA affirmed the decision for failure to comply with the conditions. Issue: Whether or not there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? Held/Ratio: NO. Under Article 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived. The general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of 50 years has already been allowed for the petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. It failed to do so hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplicity of suits. Under Article 1191, when the obligor fails to comply wit what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission. Petition denied.