Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 111066-67 August 15, 1997 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VILLAMOR ORDOA @ AMOR, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.: Two cases, one for Murder and the other for Frustrated Murder, are before us on appeal. In a Decision dated July 12, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 32 found accused-appellant Villamor Ordoa @ Amor guilty of murdering Felicitas Dayag-Valenzuela, as well as for the frustrated murder of Marcelo Valenzuela. 1 At about five o'clock in the afternoon of April 25, 1992, spouses Marcelo Valenzuela and Felicitas Dayag Valenzuela were on their way home from Villa Bautista, Pangasinan. Marcelo was driving their tricycle and Felicitas was seated inside the sidecar as they traversed the irrigation dike in Barangay Luna, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Suddenly, someone started shooting at them. Felicitas was hit and fell face down about two meters from the tricycle after she attemped to escape. Marcelo saw the gunman Villamor Ordoa, herein accused-appellant, and eventually ran into him with the tricycle. As Marcelo tried to escape, he saw Ordoa reload his long firearm. The latter shot at Marcelo who was hit twice, on the chest near his fifth rib and on the arm. When Marcelo looked back, the accused was some fifty meters away. Marcelo also saw the latter return to where Felicitas was and fire at her as she lay prostrate. Despite in injury, Marcelo reached their house. With the assistance of a tricycle driver, he reported the incident to the Philippine National Police in the town of Cuyapo. Two policemen and his aunt brought him to the Provincial hospital in Tarlac, Tarlac. 2 The autopsy on Felicitas revealed that she had died on the spot after sustaining a gunshot wound on the chest which hit her heart and lungs and fractured a rib and another gunshot wound on the forehead exposing the brain and detaching part of her skull. 3 Marcelo was more fortunate because the gunshot wound on his chest, although potentially fatal, exited without causing internal injuries. 4 The gunman who ambushed them was SPO1 Villamor Ordoa, nicknamed Amor, a rifleman of the 126th Philippine Constabulary (now Philippine National Police) company based in Barangay Cavite, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The attack occurred on Saturday, April 25, 1992. Ordoa was attending a course on Urban Counter-Terrorist Warfare at Cabanatuan City from March 9, 1992 to May 1, 1992, Mondays to Saturday noon. In his defense, Ordoa presents the alibi that on April 25, 1992, from four thirty in the afternoon up to six thirty that same evening, he was watching basketball games at their 126th PC Company headquarters in Cavite, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The defense presented Cresencio Marzan who testified that he saw the accused at the games.

Ordoa's family residence is located some 600 meters away from Marcelo Valenzuela's house in Barangay Luna, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. When asked why Ordoa wanted to kill them, Marcelo surmised that the accused still bore a grudge against him for buying an irrigation pump from the latter's father, Basilio Ordoa, in December 1991. Marcelo testified that he bought the pump for P3,500.00 on December 15, 1991 and that the accused was angered when he learned of the sale and wanted the pump back. Marcelo added that he was unable to use the pump as the accused and Basilio Ordoa, his father, returned for it on the same day, giving him back the purchase price. 5 Basilio Ordoa testified that Marcelo bought the pump at the very cheap price of P1,000.00. Villamor Ordoa accompanied him when he returned the money to Marcelo. They brought the pump home in a sled (pasagad in Tagalog) as instructed by the latter. 6 Villamor Ordoa was charged with murder and frustrated murder on July 14, 1992 in Informations which read: Criminal Case No. 866-G That on or about the 25th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a long firearm, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, as the attack is sudden and unexpected, which methods directly insured the execution of his plan without risk to himself from the defense which the victim might have done, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Felicitas Dayag Valezuela thereby inflicting upon her gunshot wounds on her body which caused her instantaneous death. CONTRARY TO LAW. Criminal Case No. 867-G That on or about the 25th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a long firearm, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Marcelo Valenzuela thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body with gunshot wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, the timely and able medical attendance extended to said victim which prevented his death. CONTRARY TO LAW. After trial, the appealed decision convicting Villamor Ordoa of the crimes charged was rendered on July 12, 1993. The lower court found Ordoa's alibi unavailing and appreciated treachery to qualify the killing of Felicitas into murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Villamor Ordoa alias "Amor" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in the information, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 866-G for the Murder of Felicitas Dayag-Valenzuela, in Violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without aggravating or mitigation circumstances, and hereby sentences the said accused to RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law; In Criminal Case No. 867-G for the Frustrated Murder of Marcelo Valenzuela, without aggravating or mitigating circumstances, in Violation of Article 248 in relation to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the accused to the indeterminate penalty of 6 years, 1 month and 11 days ofprision mayor as maximum with the accessory penalties provided by law. The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim for the death of Felicitas Dayag-Valenzuela of (sic) the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the said heirs the amount of P37,157.00 by way of funeral and other expenses. SO ORDERED. 7 The accused is here represented by both counsel de oficio and counsel de parte who filed an appellant's brief and a supplement thereto, respectively. 8 Accused-appellant here points out several errors committed by the trial court including the alleged inconsistencies in Marcelo Valenzuela's testimony, the misappreciation of his alibi, the failure to prove treachery, the lack of motive to kill and its failure to apply the "equipoise rule." After a thorough review of the records in the case before us, the Court is convinced that Ordoa was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant cites two inconsistencies in Marcelo's testimony. Marcelo initially stated that fifteen shots were fired at them 9 and later said there were fifteen shots more or less. 10 The Court accepts Marcelo's explanation that he could not precisely recall how many shots were fired because the accused suddenly appeared and fired at them. 11 In such a situation, it is quite understandable that one cannot keep track of the number of shots fired because ones's immediate concern would be to flee or seek cover in order to survive. Accused likewise makes much of the fact that Marcelo first stated that Villamor Ordoa was the one who gave back the purchase price for the water pump but later declared it was Basilio Ordoa. The transcript of stenographic notes reveals a possible misunderstanding of the question proffered by counsel to which Marcelo assented. Q And when you said that when Amor Ordoa was trying to get back that irrigation pump from you, you were demanding the return of what you paid for it, was Amor Ordoa not able to return to you what you paid for that irrigation pump? A Yes, Sir. Q And you returned the irrigation pump to Amor Ordoa? A I returned it to his father, Sir. 12

Q Therefore when you testify (sic) on January 5, 1993 as read to you, you are not telling the truth because it was his father who returned to you the money. A He was the one who returned the money, Sir. Q Who? A His father, Sir. 13 It must be borne in mind that the questioning was done in the local dialect. The subsequent translation into English by the court stenographer may have resulted in a different interpretation. In any case, Marcelo clarified and categorically stated that it was the accused's father who returned the money to him. We find this alleged inconsistency to be minor and hardly relevant, as well as one that does not affect Marcelo's credibility. In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant also suggests that Marcelo had a motive to falsely testify against him since the purchase price for the pump was not returned, according to Marcelo's testimony. On the other hand, accused-appellant contends that he has no reason or motive to kill the victim. 14 The Court dismisses this argument as insignificant mainly because the element of motive is considered only when there is a doubt with respect to the identification of the assailant. 15 Motive is immaterial when the assailant is positively identified, such as in the case before us. We also find no reason for Marcelo to falsely accuse Ordoa on account of the purchase price because the money was returned to him. Marcelo lost his wife in this attack and was himself nearly mortally wounded. Logically, he would seek justice and redress against the guilty party and not anyone else. Accused-appellant adds that Marcelo's behavior after the incident is unusual because he allegedly did not report the same to the authorities. This is not the Court's finding after reviewing the records. We note that Marcelo clearly stated that he was accompanied by his aunt and a tricycle driver to the police and that two police officers brought him to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital for treatment. 16 The Court perceives Marcelo's testimony to be clear, convincing and worthy of credence. Ordoa's imputations of contradiction and improper motive on Marcelo's part are baseless and incapable of affecting the latter's credibility. Next, accused-appellant contends that his alibi should have been accepted at its face value by the trial court since it was corroborated by a credible and impartial witness. He adds that the Court should not be prejudiced against him simply because alibi was presented as part of his defense. Viewed in the light of Marcelo Valenzuela's positive identification of accused-appellant as their attacker and his credible narration of the events that transpired, Cresencio Marzan's tale hardly inspires belief when he claims to have seen Ordoa watching the basketball games during the time of the alleged ambush. Marzan stated that he saw the accused-appellant standing beside the guardhouse at the start of the game and again, at around four thirty in the afternoon at the same place when it ended. When queried how he could have been sure that the accused-appellant was there, Marzan replied that they "waved at each other." Like the trial court, we are not convinced that Marzan's testimony is trustworthy. Besides, it is even possible that the accused slipped away to ambush the Valenzuelas and returned at six thirty in the evening just as the second basketball game was ending. Ordoa's alibi thereby fails to impress us. Accused-appellant argues that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, not having been proved, the crime is, therefor, homicide and not murder. We cannot accept his theory. There is treachery or alevosia when an offender employs means and methods in the execution thereof which tend

directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 17 Treachery was present in the sudden and unexpected attack on the Valenzuelas, rendering them easy and defenseless targets of Ordoa.18 The unprovoked gunfire upon the unsuspecting spouses who were on their way home in their tricycle without any weapon to resist the attack constitutes a treacherous circumstance. Accused-appellant's reliance on the "equipoise rule" is misplaced. If an issue of fact is "in equipoise," that is to say, if the evidence pertinent to a disputed fact is equally balanced or does not produce a rational belief of its existence, the party holding the affirmative as to such fact must fail. 19 Said rule is not applicable in the case before us because the evidence here presented is not equally weighty. 20 The fact that Ordoa was the gunman who shot at the Valenzuelas has been firmly established with moral certitude and the case against accused-appellant has not been successfully assailed. Consequently, his conviction stands. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting Villamor Ordoa of Murder and Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995 THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through its Sanguniang Bayan and Mayor, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents. RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on June 28, 1994,reversing the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch I) of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol. The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 86). On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutiny of the conflicting claims and the respective evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (municipality of Candijay)." Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay." Added the respondent Court, "As aptly pointed out by defendant-appellant in its appeal brief, 'the plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini.'" (Decision p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court concluded that "the trial court erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner], because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265 creating the latter" (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37). The respondent Court also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the

monuments of the boundary line between [petitioner] and the Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where LoocTabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong, mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located." (Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court, after weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, including Executive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949 (which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31, 1903 (which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay." On that basis, the respondent Court held that: Clearly, from the foregoing, there is equiponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court has ruled: Equiponderance of evidence rule states: When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. (Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706.) WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside. Another judgment is hereby entered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402. No costs. (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37.) Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been rejected by the respondent Court, petitioner came to this Court, alleging (i) improper application by the respondent Court of Appeals of the socalled principle of "equiponderance of evidence", for having based its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which, petitioner claims, are void, (ii) the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a result of having been created under a void executive order, and (iii) that the challenged Decision "does not solve the problem of both towns but throws them back again to their controversy." (Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 21.) After deliberating on the petition, comment and reply, this Court is not persuaded to grant due course to the petition. With respect to the first and third grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this case had been adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the evidence on record. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.

In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402, may leave the parties where they are or may not resolve their problem one way or the other, is of no moment. The fact remains that, as correctly evaluated by the respondent Court, neither party was able to make out a case; neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions. On the second issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. 3 In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. 4 , which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated: While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warrantoproceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de factomunicipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the

contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon. At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curativelaws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded. Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs.Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDER

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 126480 August 10, 2001

MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: This petition assails the decision of the Court of appeals dated July 24, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 5, 1993, finding the accused (now petitioner) Maria Tin @ "Maria Ty" @ "Maria Dy" guilty of estafa and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six years and one day ofprision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the private complainant, Dr. Francisca M. Santiago, the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12 percent interest per annum from the filing of the information and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner was charged in an Information which reads: That, on or about February 8, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one FRANCISCA M. SANTIAGO in the following manner, to wit: the accused received in trust from said Francisca M. Santiago several pieces of jewelry with an estimated value of more than P220,000.00 as collateral to the loan in the amount of P220,000.00 which the latter obtained from the accused, under the express obligation of returning the said pieces of jewelry to said Francisca M. Santiago immediately upon demand for redemption, but the said accused once in possession of the said pieces of jewelry far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to do so despite repeated demands made upon her to that effect and with intent to defraud the said accused denied having received the said pieces of jewelry to the damage and prejudice of the said Francisca M. Santiago. CONTRARY TO LAW.1 On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago testified that on February 8, 1980, she and Aurora Jose went to Mady's Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of jewelry. She initially asked for P250,000.00 but petitioner offered only P220,000.00, P200,000.00 first and then the P20,000.00 a week later. A list of the jewelries was typewritten by a helper of the petitioner. This list was signed by petitioner as evidence of her receipt of the said jewelries.2 Dr. Santiago also averred that from 1980 to 1982, she made 19 payments of various amounts totaling P95,600.00.3 She said that the loan was under a "white-paper" system where there is no maturity/expiration date and where the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided the interests were paid.4

On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago said, she went to the pawnshop, with a certain Mrs. Dava and a Mrs. Zuiga to redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of P450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, petitioner told her that the jewelries were already sold.5 This prompted Dr. Santiago to consult Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote to Maria Tin6 asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the pieces of jewelry. On March 2, 1984, petitioner replied through her counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming that Dr. Santiago has an unsettled obligation of P220,000.00 and demanding payment. The letter also stated that no jewelries were received as collateral for the loan.7 In a handwritten letter dated March 7, 1984, Dr. Santiago pleaded for the redemption of her jewelries.8Maria Tin, also in a handwritten letter dated March 16, 1984, replied that she merely acted as guarantor of the loan and since she was made to pay the loan she now was demanding payment therefor.9 In said letter, Tin narrated the circumstances behind the loan, and alleged that it was another person who gave the loan and received the jewelry as collateral. Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. She merely introduced them to one another and it was Mia Chan who signed the acknowledgment receipt and who actually received the pieces of jewelry.10 Mia Chan, for her part, corroborated the testimony of petitioner, her mother-in-law. She stated that she was the one who extended the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she merely asked petitioner to appraise the pieces of jewelry for her. She also requested petitioner to collect payments from Dr. Santiago. According to Mia Chan, the loan was for a three-month term with 14 percent interest per annum. She stated she signed the receipt upon request of Dr. Santiago.11 On May 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads: From the foregoing, the court finds MARIA TIN; alias MARIA TY or MARIA DY, the accused, GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is hereby ordered to pay Dr. Francisca M. Santiago the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and P40,000.00 as Attorney's Fees. Dr. Francisca M. Santiago is required to pay the docket fees of the civil aspect of this case. SO ORDERED.12 Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. Her Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in: I. ... NOT FINDING THAT.THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS FULL OF LOOPHOLES AND SELF-CONTRADICTIONS, APART FROM BEING INHERENTLY INCREDIBLE, AND HENCE GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION. II. ... RELYING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVED TO BE WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFENSE RATHER ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE.

Ill. ... NOT UPHOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONTENTION (A) THAT SANTIAGO LIED WHEN SHE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN SHE ARRIVED AT MADY'S PAWNSHOP THAT SHE CAME TO KNOW FROM WHOM SHE WAS GOING TO OBTAIN A LOAN AND THAT IT WAS SANTIAGO WHO TYPED AND PREPARED EXH. "A" AND (B) THAT DRA. SANTIAGO HERSELF PREPARED EXH. "A" AND WROTE THE NAME "MARIA TIN" AS THE LENDER. Essentially, in our view, petitioner raises issues of fact by assailing the credibility of witnesses. As a general rule, this Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will review only errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again.13 However, there are certain exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts,14 In this case, the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are allegedly based on misapprehensions of vital facts, making their review necessary. A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts: (1) that accused was the one who extended the loan; (2) that accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as collateral for the loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was for an indefinite term. These factual circumstances must relate directly to the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.15 Both trial and appellate courts held that it was petitioner who extended the loan and who actually received the jewelries from Dr. Santiago. Their conclusion stemmed from the following circumstances: (1) In a letter she wrote to Fiscal Jumino, one Aurora Jose who had allegedly introduced Dr. Santiago to Maria Tin and who was present when the transaction took place, corroborated Dr. Santiago's testimony; (2) The signature of appellant [petitioner] appears on the document16 acknowledging receipt of the pieces of jewelry; (3) Receipts evidencing payments made by Dr. Santiago and which appeared to be signed by the petitioner were not denied by the latter; (4) Petitioner did not deny that she sent a note (Exh. "M-2") to Dr. Santiago reminding her to update her payments, or else she would auction the pieces of jewelry. A careful review of the records, however, reveals that, first, it was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to consider in evidence the letter which a certain Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal Jumino.17 Aurora Jose was never presented to testify on the veracity of said letter, much less its contents. A private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never presented as a witness.18 The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora Jose's alleged letter is obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value.19 Second, the signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit "A", apparently differs from the specimen signatures provided by petitioner Maria Tin in open court.20 But it has striking and obvious similarities to Mia Chan's specimen signatures.21 The differences and similarities are so obvious to the eye. They could not be casually disregarded. Expert handwriting analysis is probably useful here, but it is not indispensable.22 As said in People vs Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226:

When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts.23 In the present case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the signature in Exhibit "A" was the petitioner's, not Mia Chan's. This the prosecution did not do. Third, petitioner did not deny that she received payments and made demands for payment from private complainant. They do not show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan and accepted the jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan received certain payments from Dr. Santiago, as shown by Exhibits "8", "8-A", "10" and "10-A". A certain "Viring" also received payment from Dr. Santiago.24 These instances only prove that a person who received payments from another is not necessarily the person who extended the loan. Fourth, Exhibit "M-2"25 which the Court of Appeals considered proof that petitioner was in possession of the jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not properly identified or introduced as evidence at the trial. It was marked as an exhibit upon mere manifestation of counsel.26 It was not touched upon during the testimony of the private complainant nor listed in the list of exhibits for the prosecution,27 hence deemed inadmissible in evidence.28 Fifth, Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the jewelries, deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored. That admission is one against selfinterest, amounting to an incriminatory statement, which the witness could not have volunteered if not the truth. Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But private complainant averred that it was extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an indefinite term. Petitioner presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a threemonth period. Private complainant did not present evidence to substantiate her claim, other than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied' on the acknowledgment receipt allegedly, signed by petitioner in the presence of two witnesses; However, the prosecution did not present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuiga who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried to redeem her jewelries. While nonpresentation of certain witnesses is not a valid defense nor does it work against the prosecution's cause,29 this holds true only if the evidence of the prosecution is sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the prosecution evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the prosecution to present evidence which can help further its case, or explain why such evidence is not presented. When the sole testimony of the complainant is met by an equally credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must present credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to present corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why they were not produced, weakens the testimony of the witness who named those corroborating witnesses in her testimony.30 In this case, the prosecution's failure to present the corroborative witnesses, without any explanation for their non-appearance, makes private complainant's testimony weak.

Further, since it was private complainant who asserted that the loan was for an indefinite term under the so-called "white-paper system" of the pawnshop, she had the burden of proving that fact as true. In this she failed, and her failure undermines the case for the prosecution. Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.31 The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.32 Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14818, affirming that of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin isACQUITTED of the charge against her under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ. concur. If the evidence pertinent to a disputed fact is equally balanced or does not produce a rational belief of its existence, the party holding the affirmative as to such fact must fail (People v. Ordoa). When there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant(Municipality of Candijay v. CA) Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free (Maria Tin v. People).

Note: The equipoise rule is also known as the equiponderance of evidence rule.