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LAWRANCE A. BOHM (SBN 208716) SIANGAN. SMITH (SBN 269963) Bohm Law Group 4600 Northgate Blvd. Suite 210 Sacramento, GA 95834 Phone (916) 927-5574 Fax (916) 927-2046 Attomey for Plaintiff SOKPHY TIN

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA GOUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

SOKPHY TIN, CaseNo. 34-2010-00090959 Plaintiff,

V.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER Date: Time: Dept.: RefNo.: June 29, 2011 2:00 p.m. 53 1530457

PANDA EXPRESS, INC., PANDA EXPRESS LLC, PANDA INN, INC., PANDA RESTAURANT GROUP, INC., HIBAGHISAN, ING. and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants.

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Plaintiff, SOKPHY TIN, respectfully submits the following points and authorities in

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Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer.

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I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff SOKPHY TIN (hereafter "Plaintiff) filed a complaint alleging four causes of

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action against Defendants Panda Express, Inc., Panda Express, LLC, Panda Inn, Inc., Panda

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Restaurant Group, Inc., and Hibachi-San, Inc. (hereafter "Defendants"). Plaintiffs complaint

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included actions for: (1) Pregnancy/Sex Discrimination, (2) Retaliation (CFRA), (3) Failure to

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Prevent Discrimination and/or Retaliation, and (4) Adverse Action in Violation of Public

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Policy. Defendants have now filed a demurrer as to all four causes of action, on two different grounds. First, Defendants argue that each of Plaintiff s claims fails to state facts sufficient to 1
PlaintifT's Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer TFN V PANDA EXPRESS, INC , et al Lawrance A Bohm, Esq Bohm Law Group

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constitute a cause of action. Gal. Code Giv. Proc, 430, subd. (e). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims are "uncertain" because Plaintiff throughout her complaint refers to all five corporate defendants, collectively as "Panda Express." Gal. Code Civ. Proc, 430, subd. (f). Defendants' demurrer should be overruled on all counts challenged, for the following reasons: 1) In ruling on a demurrer, the Court only looks to the face of the pleadings, with liberal construction to be granted in construing the compliant; 2) Under this standard. Plaintiffs causes of action are all sufficiently pled under California law; 3) Demurrers based on "uncertainty" are strictly construed, because ambiguities may be cleared up through discovery; and 4) Any defects in Plaintiffs causes of action can easily be cured with leave to amend the complaint. IL STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff began her employment with Panda Express as counter help in July of 2004 at the West Sacramento location. Plaintiffs Complaint ("Complaint"), t 10- Around October 2004, Plaintiff became pregnant with her fifth child. Complaint, ^ 1 1 . Shortly after leaming she was pregnant, Plaintiff was promoted to assistant manager in training, and transferred to the Downtown Sacramento location with a pay increase. Complaint, ^ 1 4 . By late November 2004, Plaintiff completed her training and received her final manager in training evaluation, with a 97 percent passing rating, and was now the assistant manager for the West Sacramento location. Complaint, TITI19-20. In or around January 2005, Plaintiff notified the West Sacramento general manager, Yan Hua Liu (Liu) of her pregnancy, to which Liu responded by questioning Plaintiff as to "why she has so many children and why she continues having more babies." Complaint, 1| 21. Plaintiff later overheard Liu comment that had she known of Plaintiffs pregnancy earlier, Panda Express would not have trained her to become an assistant manager. Complaint, ^ 22. 2
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On or around January 25, 2005, during the same month in which she informed Panda Express of her pregnancy. Plaintiff was told of "concems with her work performance." In or around Febmary 2005, Plaintiff gave Liu a doctor's note, indicating she could not lift over fifty pounds. The next month, around mid-March, Plaintiff received a disciplinary action report

5 fi-om supervisor Wen Hao Cheng for "poor work performance." As a result, Plaintiff was 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 demoted to counter help with a pay decrease, and threatened with future termination. Complaint, ^Tl 26, 27. Plaintiff went on matemity leave during that same month. Complaint,^ 28. Plaintiff retumed to work after the birth ofher fifth child, around June 2005. In October 2006, she received a pay increase, and in May 2007, she was promoted to assistant manager in training and transferred to a location in Davis, Califomia. Plaintiff received strong weekly assessments throughout her training. Complaint, T H J 34-38. Inor around late June, Plaintiff was transferred back to Sacramento location (Del Paso Road) as assistant manager. Complaint, ^ 39. Plaintiff became pregnant with her sixth child around August 2007. Complaint, ^ 40. She notified Chandiawhata of her pregnancy in November 2007. Complaint, T l 41. Around January 2008, Plaintiff notified Sacramento general manager, Maria Vasquez that she needed to be placed on early matemity leave due to pregnancy complications. Complaint, T } 42. OnMarch 28, 2008, Plaintiff gave birth to her sixth child. Complaint, 143. Plaintiff retumed to work on June 15, 2008. Complaint, ^j 44. In August 2008, Plaintiff spoke with the area coach of operations, Kai-Yi Wang about permanently becoming the general manager ofthe Davis location, to which Wang responded that she should "just worry about taking care ofher children since she had so many." Complaint, ^ 46. Around November 2008, Plaintiff became pregnant with her seventh child, and informed general manager, lyamu that same month. Complaint, Tfl 49, 50. lyamu responded by asking Plaintiff why she had so many kids and whether she received welfare benefits. Complaint, ^ 50. During that same month. Plaintiff was called in to help out the West Sacramento location by general manager, Justin Gen. When lyamu called Plaintiff and

questioned her about not showing up to work, she explained that Gen called her in, and was 3
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supposed to call lyamu to let him know. lyamu wrote Plaintiff up for a "no-call, no show" for the day, and later received a written waming for the same incident. Complaint, Ij^ 51, 52. On or around January 22, 2009, Plaintiff made a request to take an upcoming Friday, January 30, 2009 off from work, which was approved by the general manager. Complaint, ^1 53-55. On Febmary 2, 2009, Plaintiff was suspended for three days from Panda Express, "due to absences." Complaint, ^ 57. When Plaintiff retumed to work on Febmary 6, 2009, she was informed she had been terminated and was given her final check. Plaintiffs termination papers listed Febmary 2, 2009 as her termination date and the reason given was for "attendance issues." Complaint, ^ 58. On or arotind Febmary 21,2009, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits. Complaint, T f 59. On or around March 25, 2009, Plaintiff was contacted by and Employment Development Department representative and informed that Panda Express was claiming that she had not been terminated, but was out on matemity leave. Plaintiff explained she had been terminated on Febmary 2, 2009 when she was four months pregnant. Complaint, 160. STANDARD OF DEMURRER A. Complaints attacked on demurrer are liberally construed. "A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their tmth, the plaintiffs ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof." Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.4th 832, 840. In assessing whether a cause of action survives a demurrer, a court may only consider what is on the face of the pleading, or what is subject to judicial notice. Code Civ. Proc, 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d311,318. For purposes of testing the sufficiency of the causes of action within a complaint, the demurrer admits all material facts properly pleaded, "however improbable they may be." Gervase v Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1224. Accordingly, a court must deny a demurrer when a party states a cause of action "under any possible legal theory," regardless ofthe possible difficulties of proof Aubry v Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 (emphasis added); Clausen v Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255. Even where a 4
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"plaintiff may be mistaken as to the nature of the case, or the legal theory on which he or she can prevail...if the essential facts of some valid cause of action are alleged, the complaint is good against a general demurrer. Quelimane Co v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39. Additionally, the court must constme the allegations "liberally," always "with a view to substantial justice." Code Civ. Proc, 452. B. Plaintiff must be granted to leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that amendment would cure defects in her complaint. If a complaint does not state a cause of action, but there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment, leave to amend must be granted. Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318 (emphasis added). To sustain a demurrer without leave to amend under those circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. "Where the complaint is defective, '[i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiffto amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citations.]' " Scott v. City of Indian ^e//.y(1972)6Cal.3d541,549. C. Demurrers premised on grounds of "uncertainty" are strictly construed. "A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly constmed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modem discovery procedures." Khoury v Maiy's of California, Inc (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. (see also Rutter, Civ. Proc. Before Trial, 7:85 (citing Khoury, supra, for the proposition that a demurrer for uncertainty will only be sustained when the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e. that he catmot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed towards him). Furthermore, the demurrer's accompanying points and authorities must specify exactly how and why the complaint is uncertain. "Generally, the failure to specify imcertain aspects of a complaint will defeat a demurrer based on the grounds of uncertainty." Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 Gal.App.3d 797, 809.
PlaintifTs Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer TIN V PANDA EXPRESS, fNC , et al

Lastiy, a plaintiff " '...need not particularize matters 5

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'presumptively within the knowledge ofthe demurring' defendant.' quoting Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Gal.2d 205, 209. ARGUMENT

[Citation.]" Id at 810;

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A. Plaintiffs Complaint Sufficiently Pleads all Four Causes of Action. 1. Plaintiffs First cause of action for Pregnancy/Sex Discrimination Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that establish: I) a nexus between her being pregnant and termination, 2) the refiisal of any defendant to accommodate her pregnancy, 3) the failure of any defendant to investigate discrimination against her after notification, 4) the disparate application of company practices against her as a pregnant woman, "or any discriminatory conduct whatsoever, for that matter." Pregnancy discrimination is a form of gender discrimination prohibited by FEHA. Cal. Govt. Code, 12940, subd. (a); Kelly v. Stamps.Com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097. To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, a plaintiff must show that her employer knew she was pregnant and evidence of pregnancy-discriminatory motive on defendant's part. Kelly v. Stamps.Com Inc., supra, 135 Gal.App.4th at 1101. Courts have long recognized that direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare, which is why Califomia adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 for trying discrimination claims based on a theory of disparate treatment. Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Gal.4th 317, 356357. Plaintiffs complaint establishes that: (I) at the time of her tennination, Plaintiff was pregnant (Complaint, T| 57); (2) less than three months before Plaintiffs termination. Defendants knew Plaintiff was pregnant (Complaint, t 50); and (3) When general manager lyamu leamed of Plaintiffs pregnancy, he asked why she had so many kids and whether she received welfare benefits (Complaint, T f 50). In addition to lyamu's imwelcomed comments in response to Plaintiffs 2008 pregnancy, comments were made by Panda Express management in reaction to her previous pregnancies as well. For example, in January 2005, when Plaintiff notified general manager Yan Hua Liu of
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her pregnancy, she too asked Plaintiff "why she has so many children and why she continues having more babies." Complaint, T f 21. Plaintiff later overheard Liu comment that "had she known of TIN'S pregnancy earlier, PANDA EXPRESS would not have trained her to become an assistant manager." Complaint, T f 22. Not only that, shortly after informing Defendants of her need for pregnancy accommodations in 2005, Plaintiff was disciplined, threatened with termination, and demoted with a pay decrease for alleged performance problems. Complaint, T I T ! 23-27. Prior to informing Defendants of her pregnancy. Plaintiff had an excellent

performance record. Complaint, T f 19. Similarly, shortly after notifying Defendants of her pregnancy in 2008, she was terminated for purported "attendance issues," even though she received prior permission for her absences. Plaintiffs Complaint, T f T f 50-53, 57, 58. Defendants agree that in establishing a nexus between pregnancy and adverse employment action, there only need be enough facts to permit a fact-finder to infer unlawful discrimination. See Defendants' Demurrer, 6:15-20; citing Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. (3d Cir. 2008) 527 F.3d 358 366 (emphasis added). Given tiie remarks by Defendants

regarding her pregnancies, her subsequent negative performance reviews (after her 2005 pregnancy), and her termination for purported "attendance issues," even though she received prior permission for her absences (after her 2008 pregnancy), there is more than enough for a fact-finder to infer that Plaintiff was unlawfully discriminated against because of her pregnancy. Should the Court find the allegations in Plaintiffs first cause of action insufficient, Plaintiff is confident that any defects can be cured by amendment. 2. Plaintiffs Second cause of action for Retaliation Defendants next contend that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that support her retaliation claim. In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected plaintiff to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer's action. Yanowitz v. L 'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4tii 1028,1044. At the outset, Plaintiff notes that Defendants' reliance on federal case, Cornwell v. Electro Cent. Credit Union (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 1018, 1036 is misplaced. Defendants cite 7
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Cornwell, for the proposition that Plaintiffs termination 7-8 months after retuming from matemity leave is too long of a period for the jury to conclude that Plaintiffs protected activities caused Defendants to fire her. Demurrer, 9:14-21. This assertion ignores the fact that less than three months before being terminated. Plaintiff notified Defendants of her subsequent pregnancy, and shortly after received unwarranted write-ups. Defendants also rely on federal case, Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc (IOth Cir. 1997) for the proposition that a three-month period between the activity and termination, standing alone, does not establish a causal connection." Demurrer 9:21-24 (emphasis added.) This, too, assumes Plaintiffs retaliation claim is based solely upon the timing of events. However, Defendants' alleged retaliation is based on much more than mere timing. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that "Plaintiff exercised her right to request time off from work due to her pregnancy condition pursuant to the California Family Rights Act," and that, Defendants' "termination of Plaintiff s employment violated Govemment Code 12945 (2) and Titie 2 ofthe Califomia Code of Regulations 7297.7." Complaint, T f T l 71, 72. It is clear tiiat Plaintiffs requests for accommodation and taking protected leave constituted a protected activity. Flait v. North American Watch Corp (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 477. Furthermore, it is clear that Plaintiff suffered adverse employment actions: In 2005, she was disciplined and demoted with a pay decrease shortly after she informed Defendants of her need for accommodation due to her pregnancy. Complaint, tTI 21-27. In 2008, in the same month that Plaintiff notified Defendants ofher pregnancy, she was written up for a "no-call, no-show," for reporting to a different store at another manager's direction. Complaint, T f 51. Shortly after that, Plaintiff was terminated for what Defendant claimed to be "attendance problems," despite the fact that Plaintiff received managers' approval for days off Complaint, T f 53-58. Given the history of Defendants' disparate treatment of Plaintiff in connection with her previous pregnancies, a fact-finder has more than enough information to infer that the real reason for terminating Plaintiff was because she had exercised her right to request time off 8
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from

work due to her pregnancy condition pursuant to the Califomia Family Rights Act.

However, ifthe Gourt determines that Plaintiffs complaint is defective for lack of specificity, such a defect can be easily cured by amendment. 3. Plaintiffs Third cause of action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination or Retaliation Defendants' argument that Plaintiff has failed to allege her third cause of action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination or Retaliation, is entirely based on the claimed insufficiencies regarding Plaintiffs first two causes of action for discrimination and retaliation. Since

Plaintiffs first two causes of actions are sufficiently pled. Defendants' demurrer to Plaintiffs third cause of action must fail on that basis. Defendants further claim that Plaintiffs complaint fails to establish how or why Defendants knew or should have known ofthe discrimination and/or retaliation. Demurrer, 10:21-25. Because the individuals engaging in discriminatory conduct were Defendants' own managers - the same individuals who had the duty to prevent such discrimination and take appropriate corrective action upon leaming of it - Plaintiff did not find it necessary to establish Defendants' knowledge by pointing out such an obvious fact. Nonetheless, ifthe Gourt agrees that Plaintiffs allegations as to the third cause of action are insufficient, Plaintiff can be more specific in an amended complaint. 4. Plaintiffs Fourth cause of action for Adverse Action in Violation of Public Policv As to Plaintiffs fourth and final cause of action. Defendant claims Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that she engaged in a protected activity, nor that she was subjected to an adverse employment action or termination as a result of engaging in any protected activity. To establish a claim for Adverse Action in Violation of Public Policy, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer terminated her (or took other adverse employment action); and (3) there was a nexus between the adverse action and public policy. Plaintiffs Complaint establishes that she engaged in a protected activity when she 9
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informed Defendants of each of her pregnancies and her need for time off as a result of those pregnancies. Complaint, T f T f 21, 41, 50. Plaintiff suffered adverse employment actions after informing Defendants ofher pregnancies on two out of three occasions. In January 2005, after Plaintiff notified the general manager of her pregnancy, the general manager criticized Plaintiff and asked why she continued to have more babies. Complaint, T f 21. That same month. Defendants informed Plaintiff of alleged performance problems, while just two months prior she was promoted to assistant manager and shown to have excellent performance. Complaint, T f T f 19, 23. In November 2008, when Plaintiff notified another general manager of a later pregnancy, that manager (lyamu) also made negative comments about Plaintiff having so many kids, and went as far asto ask her if she received welfare benefits. Complaint, T f 50. That same month. Plaintiff was instmcted to assist another store by general manager, Justin Gen, and she complied. T f 51. Despite the fact that she was following instmction of a superior, lyamu (the same manager who made negative comments about Plaintiffs pregnancy) wrote Plaintiff up as a "no-call, no-show" for the day. Id. Similarly, prior to her termination. Plaintiff was approved for time off, which she requested in advance. Complaint, Tfl 53-55. Plaintiff was subsequently terminated, and told by Defendants that her termination was a result of those very absences. Complaint, T f T f 57-58. In addition to having established her protected activities, and subsequent adverse employment actions. Plaintiff has also demonstrated there is a nexus between the two. While Plaintiffs complaint may not specifically allege the word, "nexus" as it relates to Plaintiffs protected activity and subsequent adverse employment actions, courts have held that, "[e]ven where an element is not specifically pled, such an omission is not fatal where the element may be reasonably inferred from the tenor and totality of allegations in the complaint. Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135,139. B. All allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint are directed at each individual defendant, and therefore cannot be deemed "uncertain." As a final attack on all four of Plaintiffs actions, Defendants argue their demurrer 10
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should be sustained on grounds of "uncertainty." Specifically, Defendants assert that because Plaintiff has "lumped" five defendant entities "into one big, amorphous entity she defines as 'PANDA EXPRESS' in paragraph 1 ofthe Complaint with no allegations that they acted, for example, some kind of co-venture in regard to all of the allegations made in the Complaint...Plaintiff has rendered it impossible for each of the defendants to properly and adequately respond to the allegations set forth in the Complaint." Demurrer, 12:9-19. While Defendants' assertions focus on Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Paragraph 9 specifically alleges: At all times relevant, each and every Defendant was an agent and/or employee of each and every other Defendant In doing the things alleged in the causes of action stated herein, each and every Defendant was acting within the course and scope ofthis agency or employment and was acting with the consent, permission and authorization of each remaining Defendant. All actions of each Defendant as alleged herein were ratified and approved by every other Defendant. Complaint, T f 9. Clearly, the above paragraph puts each Defendant on notice that they each must respond to aU allegations in the complaint, based on an agency theory. It may be tme that Defendants disagree with the allegations of Paragraph 9, but it is well established that factual disputes are not addressed by demurrer. See Committee on Children's Television, Inc v. General Foods Corp, supra, 35 Gal.3d at 213 ("It is not the ordinary fimction of a demurrer to test the tmth of the plaintiffs allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant's conduct."). Plaintiff brought this case against corporate entities, who in good faith, are believed to be the correct corporate defendants based upon information provided in her personnel records. Plaintiff has not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery in order to establish otherwise. As cited above, the court in Khoury v. Maiy's of California, Inc., supra, pointed out that the reason demurrers are strictly constmed, is because of the fact that any ambiguities can be cleared up in the course of discovery. M a t 616. Additionally, to the extent Defendants' claim for uncertainty is based on their confusion

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as to "whether Plaintiff ever worked for any of them, and if so, which Defendants" (Demurrer, 12:15-17), that particular information is "presumptively within the knowledge ofthe demurring defendant." Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist., supra, 135 Gal.App.3d at 810. Therefore, Defendants' demurrer to each cause of action for "uncertainty" should be overmled. C. If Plaintiffs Complaint is determined to be defective, Plaintiff requests leave to amend in order to cure defects in her Complaint. Even where a court grants a demurrer, justice demands "great liberality" in granting leave to amend. Scott v. Indian Wells (1972) 6 Gal.3d 541, 549. The Gourt must grant leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure defects in their complaint by amending it. Code Civ. Proc, 472a, subd. (c); Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Gal.4th 1074,1081. Defendants' demurrer is primarily based on Plaintiffs alleged failure to state sufficient facts, which Defendants argue leaves nothing but conclusory statements. Should the Gourt determine that any of causes of action insufficiently plead necessary facts. Plaintiff is confident that such insufficiency can be cured by amendment. V. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing. Defendants' Demurrer should be overmled. In the

altemative. Plaintiff requests for leave to amend to add any additional information pertaining to the sufficiency ofthe allegations asserted.

Dated: June 14,2011 BIANCA N. SMITH, ESQ. LAWRANCE A. BOHM, ESQ. BOHM LAW GROUP Attomey for Plaintiff SOKPHY TIN

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PlaintifTs Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer TIN V PANDA EXPRESS, INC., et al. Lawrance A. Bohm, Esq. Bohm Law Group

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Proof Of Service CASE: TIN v. PANDA EXPRESS, INC., et al. CASE NO.: 34-2010-00090959 I, the undersigned, declare:

5 6 ^ 8 9 10 11 12 13 ^^ J5 16 XX By causing the same to be personally delivered to the individual and at the address as set forth below. By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid for deposit in the United States Post Office mail box, at my business address shown above, following Lawrance A. Bohm's ordinary business practices for the collection and processing of mail, of which I am readily familiar, and addressed as set forth below. By depositing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with delivery fees thereon fully prepaid in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or delivering to an authorized courier or driver authorized by Federal Express to receive documents on the same date that it is placed at Lawrance A. Bohm for collection, addressed as set forth below. I am employed in the County of Sacramento, State of Califomia. I am over the age ofeighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 4600 Northgate Blvd. Suite 210, Sacramento, CA 95834. On June 14, 2011,1 served the within: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION T O DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER; DECLARATION O F BIANCA N. SMITH IN SUPPORT O F PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION T O DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER; [Proposed] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER

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By sending a copy by facsimile to the person(s) at the address(s) and facsimile number(s) set forth below.

Proof of Service

Lawrance A Bohm, Esq BOHM LAW GROUP

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Harry I. Johnson, III, Esq. Stanley G. Strinfellow, II, Esq. ARENT FOX LLP 555 West Fifth Street, 48* Floor Los Angeles, CA 90013 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Califomia the foregoing is tme and correct, and that this declaration was executed on June 14, 2011, at Sacramento, Califomia. BRANT W. NELSON

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Proof of Service

Lawrance A Bohm, Esq BOHM LAW GROUP