THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE vs. SPS.

GUECO
G.R. No. 141968
FEBRUARY 12, 2001
FACTS:
The Gueco Spouses obtained a loan from petitioner International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank of the Philippines)
to purchase a car. In consideration thereof, the Spouses executed promissory notes which were payable in monthly
installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as security for the notes. The Spouses defaulted in payment of
installments. After some negotiations and computation, the amount of car loan was lowered. Finally, Dr. Gueco
delivered a managers check in the amount of reduced car loan but the car was not released because of his refusal to
sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner, however, insisted that the joint motion to dismiss is standard operating
procedure in their bank to effect a compromise and to preclude future filing of claims, counterclaims or suits for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was fraud in the part of herein petitioner.
RULING:
Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. It is the voluntary execution of a
wrongful act, or a willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which naturally and necessarily arise from such
act or omission. We fail to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to
dismiss could constitute as fraud. True, petitioner may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a
joint motion to dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this can not in anyway have
prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The motion to dismiss was in fact also for the benefit of Dr. Gueco, as the case filed by
petitioner against it before the lower court would be dismissed with prejudice. The whole point of the parties entering
into the compromise agreement was in order that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return petitioner
would return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner's act of
requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss can not be said to be a deliberate attempt on the part of
petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties. It should, likewise, be noted that in cases of breach of
contract, moral damages may only be awarded when the breach was attended by fraud or bad faith. The law presumes
good faith. Dr. Gueco failed to present an iota of evidence to overcome this presumption. Necessarily, the claim for
exemplary damages must fail. In no way, may the conduct of petitioner be characterized as wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. 139050
OCTOBER 2, 2001
FACTS:
On 12 December 1992, a shipment of bales of textile gray cloth arrived at the Manila International Container Port
(MICP). There has been a mistake in the name of the consignee provided in the shipment's Inward Foreign Manifest.
Forthwith, the shipping agent, FIL-JAPAN, requested for an amendment of the Inward Foreign Manifest so as to
correct the name of the consignee from that of GQ GARMENTS, Inc., to that of AGFHA, Inc. Subsequently, FILJAPAN forwarded to AGFHA, Inc., the amended Inward Foreign Manifest which the latter, in turn, submitted to the
MICP Law Division. The MICP indorsed the document to the Customs Intelligence Investigation Services (CIIS). The
CIIS placed the subject shipment under Hold Order on the ground that GQ GARMENTS, Inc., could not be located in
its given address and was thus suspected to be a fictitious firm. Forfeiture proceedings under Section 2530(f) and (l) (35) of the Tariff and Customs Code were initiated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of fraud in relation to the shipment subject of the case at bench.
RULING:
Petitioner asserts that all of the requisites for forfeiture proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code are present in
this case. Private respondent AGFHA, Inc., on the other hand, maintains that there has only been an inadvertent error
and not an intentional wrongful declaration by the shipper to evade payment of any tax due.
Fraud must be proved to justify forfeiture. It must be actual, amounting to intentional wrong-doing with the clear
purpose of avoiding the tax. Forfeiture is not favored in law nor in equity. Mere negligence is not equivalent to the
fraud contemplated by law. What is here involved is an honest mistake, not even directly attributable to private
respondent, which will not deprive the government of its right to collect the proper tax. The conclusion of the appellate
court, being consistent with the evidence on record and not contrary to law and jurisprudence, hardly can be overturned
by this Court.
YAMBAO vs. ZUIGA
G.R. No. 146173 DECEMBER 11, 2003
FACTS:
At around 3:30 p.m. of May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was being driven by her driver, Ceferino G.
Venturina along the northbound lane of Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA). Suddenly, the bus bumped
Herminigildo Zuiga, a pedestrian. Such was the force of the impact that the left side of the front windshield of the bus
was cracked. Zuiga was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was given medical attention, but due to
the massive injuries sustained, he succumbed shortly thereafter.
Private respondents, heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages.
The complaint alleged that Venturina drove the bus in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner, in violation of traffic
rules and regulations, without due regard to public safety, thus resulting in the victims premature death. In her Answer,
the petitioner denied the allegations of the complaint, trying to shift the blame to the victim, theorizing that
Herminigildo bumped into her bus, while avoiding an unidentified woman who was chasing him. She further alleged
that she was not liable for any damages because as an employer, she exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection and supervision of her bus driver.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees, thus absolving her from any liability.
RULING:
Petitioner claimed that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her driver, Venturina. Her
allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his drivers license and clearances is worthless, in
view of her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. Moreover, petitioner
contradicted herself. She declared that Venturina applied with her sometime in January 1992 and she then required him
to submit his license and clearances. However, the record likewise shows that Venturina submitted the said
requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal accident itself. In other words, petitioners own
admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not exercise due diligence in the selection of her bus driver.
In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances when he applied with petitioner in
January 1992, the latter still fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Petitioner failed to present
convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturinas qualifications, safety record, and driving history.
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. For as pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and

guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any showing that petitioner required
Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption
from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
RAMON K. ILUSORIO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 139130. NOVEMBER 27, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner is a prominent businessman and was a depositor in good standing of respondent bank, the Manila Banking
Corporation. As he was then running about 20 corporations, and was going out of the country a number of times,
petitioner entrusted to his secretary, Katherine E. Eugenio, his credit cards and his checkbook with blank checks.
Eugenio was able to encash and deposit to her personal account about seventeen (17) checks drawn against the account
of the petitioner at the respondent bank, with an aggregate amount of P119,634.34. Petitioner did not bother to check
his statement of account until a business partner apprised him that he saw Eugenio use his credit cards. Petitioner fired
Eugenio immediately, and instituted a criminal action against her for estafa thru falsification.
Petitioner then requested the respondent bank to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks which
were wrongfully encashed but respondent bank refused. Hence, petitioner filed the instant case.
ISSUE:
Is Manila Bank liable for damages for its negligence in failing to detect the discrepant checks?
RULING:
Petitioners contention that Manila Bank was remiss in the exercise of its duty as drawee lacks factual basis. Manila
Bank employees exercised due diligence in cashing the checks. Its verifiers first verified the drawers signatures
thereon as against his specimen signature cards, and when in doubt, the verifier went further, such as by referring to a
more experienced verifier for further verification. In some instances the verifier made a confirmation by calling the
depositor by phone. It is only after taking such precautionary measures that the subject checks were given to the teller
for payment.
Of course it is possible that the verifiers of TMBC might have made a mistake in failing to detect any forgery -- if
indeed there was. However, a mistake is not equivalent to negligence if they were honest mistakes. In the instant case,
we believe and so hold that if there were mistakes, the same were not deliberate, since the bank took all the precautions.
As borne by the records, it was petitioner, not the bank, who was negligent. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. In the present case, it appears that
petitioner accorded his secretary unusual degree of trust and unrestricted access to his credit cards, passbooks, check
books, bank statements, including custody and possession of cancelled checks and reconciliation of accounts.
MUAJE-TUAZON vs. WENPHIL
G.R. No. 162447. DECEMBER 27, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Annabelle M. Tuazon and Almer R. Abing worked as branch managers of the Wendy's food chains. In
Wendys Biggie Size It! Crew Challenge" promotion contest, branches managed by petitioners won first and second
places, respectively. Because of its success, respondent had a second run of the contest from April 26 to July 4, 1999.
The Meycauayan branch won again. The MCU Caloocan branch failed to make it among the winners. Before the
announcement of the third round winners, management received reports that as early as the first round of the contest,
the Meycauayan, MCU Caloocan, Tandang Sora and Fairview branches cheated. An internal investigation ensued.
Petitioners were summoned to the main office regarding the reported anomaly. Petitioners denied there was cheating.

Immediately thereafter, petitioners were notified, in writing, of hearings and of their immediate suspension. Thereafter,
petitioners were dismissed.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent guilty of illegal suspension and dismissal in the case at bench?
RULING:
There is no denying that petitioners were managerial employees. They executed management policies, they had the
power to hire personnel and assign them tasks; and discipline the employees in their branch. They recommended
actions on employees to the head office.Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as one who
is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Consequently, as managerial employees, in the case of
petitioners, the mere existence of grounds for the loss of trust and confidence justify their dismissal. Pursuant to our
ruling in Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, as long as the employer has a reasonable ground to believe
that the managerial employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, or the nature of his participation
renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position, the managerial employee can be
dismissed.
In the present case, the tape receipts presented by respondents showed that there were anomalies committed in the
branches managed by the petitioners. On the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility alone,
petitioners may be held liable for negligence in the performance of their managerial duties, unless petitioners can
positively show that they were not involved. Their position requires a high degree of responsibility that necessarily
includes unearthing of fraudulent and irregular activities. Their bare, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated denial of any
participation in the cheating does not prove their innocence nor disprove their alleged guilt. Additionally, some
employees declared in their affidavits that the cheating was actually the idea of the petitioners.
PCIB VS. CA
GR No. 121413 January 29, 2001
FACTS:
The plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41, in favor of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue as payment of plaintiffs percentage or manufacturers sales taxes for the third
quarter of 1977. The aforesaid check was deposited with the defendant IBAA (now PCIBank) and was subsequently
cleared at the Central Bank. Upon presentment with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to
IBAA as collecting or depository bank. The proceeds of the same Citibank check of the plaintiff was never paid to or
received by the payee thereof, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. As a consequence, upon demand of the Bureau
and/or Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of its percentage/manufacturers sales taxes for the third quarter of 1977 and that said second
payment of plaintiff in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was duly received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue addressed to the plaintiff that its check in the amount of P4,746,114.41
was not paid to the government or its authorized agent and instead encashed by unauthorized persons, hence, plaintiff
has to pay the said amount within fifteen days from receipt of the letter. Upon advice of the plaintiffs lawyers, plaintiff
paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the amount of P4,746,114.41, representing payment of plaintiffs percentage
tax for the third quarter of 1977. Plaintiff demanded defendant to reimburse him of the said amount paid for the second
time to BIR but the latter refused.
ISSUE:
Whether PCIB is liable to Ford Philippines the amount of several checks which were allegedly embezzled by a
syndicate group.
RULING:

The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors
action against the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury of which complaint is made.
It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our
view, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Fords
negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.
Citibank should have scrutinized Citibank Check before paying the amount of the proceeds thereof to the collecting
bank of the BIR. One thing is clear from the record: the clearing stamps at the back of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597
and 16508 do not bear any initials. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. Had this
been duly examined, the switching of the worthless checks to Citibank Check Nos. 10597 and 16508 would have been
discovered in time. For this reason, Citibank had indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is to
ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated payee. The fact that the drawee bank did not
discover the irregularity seasonably, in our view, constitutes negligence in carrying out the banks duty to its
depositors. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the
bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship.
Citibank must likewise answer for the damages incurred by Ford on Citibank Checks because of the contractual
relationship existing between the two. Citibank, as the drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and
such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to the latter.
CEREZO VS. TUAZON
GR No. 141538 March 23, 2004
FACTS:
Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda.
After considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial
court made no pronouncement on Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court
did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezos business benefited the family, pursuant to
Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon
arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is solidarily liable.
RULING:
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one
whose interest is affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is
possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also
primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazons action for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is
liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not
even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even
necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employers liability based on
a delict is merely subsidiary. The words primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer to the remedy
provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability
under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly.
When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in
not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a
subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately
for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that
the employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action
where the employees delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a
delict, then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Thus, the petition was denied ordering the defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the plaintiff.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. VS. DELOS SANTOS
GR No. 54080 November 22, 2000
FACTS:
Defendant Alberto delos Santos was the driver of defendant Rudy Samidan of the latters vehicle, a Forward Cargo
Truck. At about 12:30 in the afternoon, he was driving said truck along the National Highway within the vicinity of
Gerona, Tarlac. The Viron Bus, driven by Wilfredo Villanueva, tried to overtake his truck, and he swerved to the right
shoulder of the highway, but as soon as he occupied the right lane of the road, the cargo truck which he was driving
was hit by the Viron bus on its left front side, as the bus swerved to his lane to avoid an incoming bus on its opposite
direction. With the driver of another truck dealing likewise in vegetables, Dulnuan, the two of them and the driver of
the Viron bus proceeded to report the incident to the Police Station.
Both the RTC and the CA rendered its decision in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the employer is liable to the negligence of his employee.
RULING:
As employers of the bus driver, the petitioner is, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for
the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only jusris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family.
Petitioner, through its witnesses, failed to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision
of employees, thus, petitioner as the employer is responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the
relationship of pater familias or on the employers own negligence. Hence, with the allegations and subsequent proof of
negligence against the bus driver of petitioner, petitioner (employer) is liable for damages.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION VS. BAKING

GR No. 57435 May 25, 2007
FACTS:
Sebastian Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Dr. Sy gave respondent two
medical prescriptions Diomicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Unaware that what was
given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of dormicum on three consecutive days. On the third
day he took the medicine, and he figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one
Jose Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while driving he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its
impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the collision,
respondent returned to Dr. Sy. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to him
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron
The RTC and CA rendered their decision in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of respondents accident.
RULING:
Article 2176 states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relationship
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling respondent domicrum, instead of the prescribed
diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the employee
should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident
was respondents negligence in driving. The court disagrees. The accident could have not occurred had petitioners
employee been careful in reading the prescription.
Article 2180 in complementing the preceding article states that the obligation imposed by articles 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. It is thus clear that
the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of
the employer either in the selection of the employee or the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption,
however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove such exercised of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of employee, thus making the petitioner solidarily liable for the damages.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES VS. AGANA
GR No. 126467 February 11, 2008
FACTS:

On April 04, 1984, Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Thus, Dr.
Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Medical City, performed a surgery upon her. During the surgery, he found that
the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy upon
Natividad. Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy. Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision. The operation, however, appeared to be flawed as the attending nurses entered in the
corresponding Record of Operation that there were 2 lacking sponge and announced that it was searched by the surgeon
but to no avail.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgical operation performed upon her. Dr.
Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to treat the cancerous nodes which were not removed. Natividad
and her husband went to the US to seek further treatment. After 4 months she was told that she was free of cancer.
They then flew back to the Philippines. Two weeks thereafter , Natividads daughter found a piece of gauze protruding
from her vagina. Dr. Ampil saw immediately informed. He proceeded to Natividads house where he extracted by hand
a piece of gauze. Natividad sought the treatment of Polymedic General Hospital thereat Dr. Gutierrez detected a foreign
object in her vagina - a foul-smelling gauze which infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her
reproductive organ which forced stool to excrete in her vagina. Another surgical operation was performed upon her.
Spouses Agana filed a complaint against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The Trial Court
found the respondents jointly and severally liable. The CA affirmed said decision with modification that Dr. Fuentes
was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.
RULING:
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the
assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid
area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr.
Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room.
Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were
not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in
the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and
all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead
surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following
conduct. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not
Dr. Fuentes.
Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.