TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, Administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant 50 Phil.

867 November 01, 1927 Facts: Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of the deceased Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines and the testatrix wished that the distribution of his properties and everything in connection with it be in accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositor-appellant Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his opposition were the following: (1) the approval of said scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition, (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business, and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws. Issue: Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen who have resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippines. Held: Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, where it was provided, nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. However, t he oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the national law of the testatrix was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed; thus, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous. Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989 Facts: This is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Branch XXVI. Petitioner, a Filipina, and private respondent, a German national, got married on 7 September 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together for some time in Malate, Manilawhere their only child Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born on April 20, 1980. However, on 15 January 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the marriage of Pilapil and Geiling on the ground of failure of their marriage. 27 June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982, and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Several motions for dismissal were filed by Pilapil. She also filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Manila, Issues: (1) Whether or not the family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of the petitioner are also covered by the foreign law of her former husband. (2) Whether or not private respondent has the legal capacity to initiate an action for adultery against the petitioner. Held: (1) The petitioners family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity are all bound to Philippine laws, regardless of where she lives. However, Philippine laws recognize decrees validly and legally obtained abroad, because if not, the

enjoyment of rights of a foreign spouse who obtained a divorce decreed by his national law would eventually injure or be prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would still be valid under her national law. (2) As a consequence of the divorce decree, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the action for adultery under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other. WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000] JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,respondents

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla a).It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and TwentyFive (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.

If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer, lessee or transferee shall also have the same obligation to the testators sister. Failure to do so will forfeit the property to the sister and nearest relatives.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

Coscolluella filed a case against the transferee bank and the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. They were declared in default except Johnny Rabadilla whose default order was lifted upon filing of an answer. He also entered into a compromise agreement which he failed to fulfill.

RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as near descendants without a definite identity or reference as to who are the near descendants and therefore, under Articles 843 and 845 as not written.

RULING: Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrixs near descendantswould substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrixs near descendants.

No fideicommissary substitution either. Dr. Rabadilla and his heirs are allowed to alienate the property. In fideicommissary substitution, the heir is not allowed to alienate it because his duty is to preserve and transmit it to the second heir. Also, if Dr. Rabadilla is the fiduciary and the near descendants of the testator are the second heirs, it violates the requirement of law that the fiduciary and the fideicommissary must be within the one degree relationship. In fact, the near descendants are not in anyway related to Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs.

Landayan v. Bacani G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982 FACTS: Teodoro Abenojar died intestate, leaving al parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as the only forced heir and descendant of the late Teodoro Abenojar. Petitioners herein filed a complaint in the CFI of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs ofthe deceased Teodoro Abenojar, They alleged that they are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted asecond marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have anyoffspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They aver that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate.

ISSUE: WON Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. RULING: The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law. He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar. Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. On this supposition, the subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned Sayson v. CA GR 892224-25, January 23, 1992 FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabela. It was opposed by of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel alleging their successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants. Subsequently, of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit Teodoros share in his parents estate by right of representation because of Delia and Edmundo are adopted children and of Doribel was legitimate daughter. The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from E and R by right of representation. The CA found De and E disqualified from inheriting from E and R. ISSUE: Whether or not of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. RULING: As to Doribel, YES, for she was a legitimate daughter of T and thus granddaughter of E and R. She has right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of intestate estate of hergrandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children. As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were totalstrangers,

cannot inherit by representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relative of either party.

Pecson v Mediavillo (G.R. NO. 7890)

Facts: The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir (judge) found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition . Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion averring:

That Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the testator, Florencio Pecson

That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states: I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, Rosario, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.

That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks.

It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario) also died. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator. The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14 years old, and shortly afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather. The court therefore decreed that clause 3 of the will is contrary to law and is set aside for being of no force or value whatever. Issue:

Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. Held:

Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited. In the case, It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man. It was upon that occasion when the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that after said event, she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.

2.Rafael Maninang and Soledad Maninang, Petitioners Vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Bernardo S. Aseneta
Facts: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died leaving a holographic will which provides that all her real and personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang, after which a petition for the probate of the will was filed by the petitioner at CFI Quezon City while private respondent on the other hand instituted intestate proceedings at CFI Pasig, Rizal being the adopted child and claims to be the sole heir of the decedent. Both cases were being consolidated in CFI Rizal. A motion to dismiss the Testate case was filed by the private respondent on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he as the only compulsory heir was preterited. Petitioner in her opposition averred that it is still the rule that in case for probate of the will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will. Trial court as sustained by the Court of Appeals denied the opposition thus this case. Issue: Whether under the terms of the decedents Will, private respondent has been preterited or disinherited and was it a valid disinheritance. Held: The court made a distinction between preterition and disinheritance stating that Preterition consist in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited, while, disinheritance

is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. It continued that by virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of the controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered and opined that the conclusion of the trial court that private respondent was preterited was not indubitable reading it from the face of the will.